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Pinocchio against the Semantic Hierarchies

Eldridge-Smith, Peter


The Liar paradox is an obstacle to a theory of truth, but a Liar sentence need not contain a semantic predicate. The Pinocchio paradox, devised by Veronique Eldridge-Smith, was the first published paradox to show this. Pinocchio’s nose grows if, and only if, what Pinocchio is saying is untrue (the Pinocchio principle). What happens if Pinocchio says that his nose is growing? Eldridge-Smith and Eldridge-Smith (Analysis, 70(2): 212-5, 2010) posed the Pinocchio paradox against the...[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2018
Type: Journal article
Source: Philosophia
DOI: 10.1007/s11406-018-9948-y


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