The Organisational Salience and the Perceived Influence of Operational Safety Professionals: An examination of Hopkins’ hypothesis that decentralised hierarchical structures limit the capacity of technical experts and specialists to promote operational safety priorities in corporate decision-making processes

Abstract

This research examines Hopkins’ argument, in his analysis of the BP Texas City Refinery disaster, that a decentralised organisational structure contributed to a “blindness to major risk”. Hopkins asserts that communications along hierarchical lines of operational accountability allow for safety-critical information to be discounted by intermediaries with commercial priorities. He suggests that fully independent and centralised lines of functional accountability for technical experts and safety specialists could ensure that safety priorities are recognised and advocated if decision-making can be readily escalated to their CEO. Hopkins’ recommendations are grounded in high reliability theory and supported by the analysis of several disaster investigations. A literature review identifies various theoretical issues that underpin the central research hypothesis that organisational structure impacts on the exercise of influence. The research itself is a practical inquiry: seeking to better understand how this hypothesis is interpreted and applied by safety practitioners within hazardous industry. I gather the opinions, insights and experiences of thirty professionals from nine participating companies within the Australian resources sector. The key research objective is to examine the practical relationship between: the structured organisational salience of technical safety professionals; and their perceived influence on the priority given to operational safety issues in both operational and strategic decision- making. A secondary concern is to identify organisational dynamics that affect the influence that is exercised by technical safety professionals and to understand how organisational design parameters may be utilised to appropriately reinforce operational safety priorities. The research findings are presented as nine corporate case studies, describing the structured positions and activities of technical experts and process safety professionals within the operational hierarchy. The research finds that operational safety professionals and process safety experts are typically not able to fulfil their responsibilities within their defined roles. They are instead challenging or circumventing the structured parameters of their position and functions. The research findings confirm the underlying concerns that organisational design choices impact on the capacity within the organisation to reliably communicate safety-critical technical details. Hopkins’ hypothesis is extended to include organisational design parameters beyond structure. Three other modifying factors are identified as also able to elevate or undermine the influence of technical experts and safety specialists. These are: leadership support; management systems; and personal credibility, as illustrated below.

Figure: Organisational Factors that Modify Influence

In particular, the capacity of leadership, such as CEOs, to dictate and modify organisational structure and to establish and reinforce corporate priorities has both indirect and direct impacts on the influence that operational safety professionals exercise. There is also a widely acknowledged expectation that safety practitioners, including technical experts, should be personally persuasive with “an ability to influence”. This suggests that delegated authority for safety practitioners is accepted as being limited and unlikely to be available. Promoting a single cohesive safety message that does not account for such issues of influence and authority may present the appearance of a unified safety culture in spite of recognised underlying conflicts: between organisational sub-cultures such as managers, operators and engineers; or between corporate goals such as production and safety.