The dual-use dilemma : lessons from nuclear science

Abstract

The subject of this dissertation is the dual-use dilemma, which arises in the context of research in the life and other sciences as a consequence of the fact that one and the same piece of scientific research has the potential to be used for harm as well as for good. In the life sciences, this dilemma is often characterised by the capacity for emerging research and technology to be used to greatly improve our health, wealth, and overall well-being, while at the same time bringing with it the capability to enable acts of bioterrorism. Within the regulatory debate about dual-use research, the possibility of the censorship of dual-use research that poses a significant misuse has been downplayed. Censorship is rejected for three reasons: censorship violates an individual's right to freedom of speech, it is antithetical to scientific freedom, and censorship is almost impossible to utilise in a morally upstanding fashion when put into practice. This neglect is further compounded by lack of interest and exploration of the paradigmatic instance of a field defined both by its dual-use nature and its use of censorship-the nuclear sciences. This dissertation aims to provide an ethical analysis of the permissibility of censorship of dual-use research utilising lessons from the nuclear sciences. After an outlining my project and its scope in chapter one, I introduce the topic of dual-use, and the neglect of the nuclear sciences in the current debate in the life sciences in chapter two. I then examine what we mean when we say we have censored something in chapter three, and give a taxonomy censorship. I then discuss the three central objections to censorship utilising, among others, historical cases from the nuclear sciences. In chapter four, I argue that the right to freedom of speech may be outweighed by competing moral considerations, and provide a framework for making decisions about censorship: an "ethics of urgency." In chapter five, I examine the moral weight of appeals to scientific freedom, and argue that at times the weight of this freedom is not enough to resist censorship. In chapter six I discuss two pragmatic issues that might affect the permissibility of censorship as a practice: corruption and subversion. I argue that corruption does not provide a reason to discount censorship entirely, but that subversion might make censorship impossible to implement as an effective regulatory strategy. I then conclude, in chapter seven, with a discussion of the implications of this work for future research.