The concept of security : uncertainty, evidence and value

Abstract

Typically we think of security as a good like any other, something with a fairly determinate content which is enjoyed by individuals or groups. There have been many conceptions of what this good consists in but little agreement. In this thesis I conduct an analysis of the concept of security, arguing that while conceptions of security disagree about the content of this good, they all rely on an underlying thin concept: a mode of enjoying that content 'securely.' I provide an account what it means for an entity to enjoy a good securely from both a fact-relative and an evidence-relative perspective. From the fact-relative perspective I argue against a commonly held conception of secure enjoyment as protection from the interference of the powerful and instead suggest that it should be understood purely as the objective probability of enjoying the good in the future. From the evidence-relative perspective, I argue that we should understand the security of a good as the minimum degree of credence an agent may justifiably assign to enjoying that good. Securely enjoying a good therefore implies a reasonable guarantee of enjoying that good in the future, even in instances where the available evidence is limited or imprecise. I argue that the secure enjoyment of goods, from both a fact-relative and an evidence-relative perspective, has an important role to play in moral decision-making. In particular, the importance an agent places on the fact-relative security of a good models the agent's attitude towards outcome risks. Likewise, in situations where there are multiple credence functions compatible with the evidence, placing special weight on the secure expected utility of an act, appears to model the importance of avoiding an epistemic risk. In this respect, the value of security may amount to ensuring the achievement of a minimally decent future despite the limits of the available evidence.