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Fiduciary Non-cognitivism

Bugeja, Adam Paul


I present and defend a novel non-cognitivist theory of our moral thought and practices. It holds that moral judgements depend on the existence of broadly ‘social’ relationships among those who make them (among ‘moralists’, as I shall say). I am led to this position by observations about non-cognitive disagreement. Theorists can satisfactorily explain the phenomenon of moral disagreement as a kind of non-cognitive disagreement only if they predict that it...[Show more]

CollectionsOpen Access Theses
Date published: 2017
Type: Thesis (PhD)
DOI: 10.25911/5d6512573d986


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