Skip navigation
Skip navigation

Contingent identity

Schwarz, Wolfgang


It is widely held that if an object a is identical (or non-identical) to an object b, then it is necessary that a is identical (non-identical) to b. This view is supported an argument from Leibniz's Law and a popular conception of de re modality. On the other hand, there are good reasons to allow for contingent identity. Various alternative accounts of de re modality have been developed to achieve this kind of generality, and to explain what is wrong with the argument from Leibniz's Law.

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2013-05
Type: Journal article
Source: Philosophy Compass
DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12028


File Description SizeFormat Image
Schwarz Contingent Identity 2013.pdf220.8 kBAdobe PDFThumbnail

Items in Open Research are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

Updated:  20 July 2017/ Responsible Officer:  University Librarian/ Page Contact:  Library Systems & Web Coordinator