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Observational learning with position uncertainty

Monzón, Ignacio; Rapp, Michael


Observational learning is typically examined when agents have precise information about their position in the sequence of play. We present a model in which agents are uncertain about their positions. Agents sample the decisions of past individuals and receive a private signal about the state of the world. We show that social learning is robust to position uncertainty. Under any sampling rule satisfying a stationarity assumption, learning is complete if signal strength is unbounded. In cases...[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2014-09-30
Type: Journal article
Source: Journal of Economic Theory
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.09.012


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