Self reliance and self sufficiency : experience of the Indian aircraft industry

Abstract

The thesis addresses three major questions arising from the decision of the Government of India to set up an indigenous aircraft industry in the public sector. Firstly, the rationale behind such a decision. Secondly, the decisionmaking and execution of the various aircraft manufacturing programs undertaken in the country. And finally, following from the above, has the aeronautical industry in India been able to make any significant progress towards the proclaimed goals of self sufficiency and self reliance? The creation of an aeronautical industry in India was the direct result of the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 which emphasised indigenous manufacture of aircraft in order to expand the technological and industrial base of the country as well as to lessen dependence on foreign suppliers. While short term import of combat aircraft was considered inevitable, the manufacturing policy envisaged the licenced production of aircraft in technical collaboration with foreign manufacturers in the initial stages. This would be followed by the creation of design, development and manufacturing facilities which would be geared towards fulfilling the requirements of the user agency, i.e. the Indian Air Force (lAF). Implementation of this policy was exceptionally swift. Within a period of six years beginning from 1956, the Government of India had taken steps to manufacture as many as six different types of aircraft. Of these, two, the HF-24 Marut and the HJT-16 Kiran were to be designed indigenously, and two, the Gnat and the HS-748 to be manufactured under licence from UK. Further, it was also decided to manufacture the MiG-21 fighter and Al-III helicopter under licence from the Soviet Union and France respectively. These projects however encountered serious problems at various stages of implementation. Firstly, the country lacked the trained manpower required for the execution of the manufacturing programs. Secondly, there were serious lapses in project planning and management. Even in cases where project reports were prepared with the help of overseas consultants, these were subject to arbitrary changes by decision-makers both at the Ministry of Defence and at Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). This resulted in considerable delays as well as low productivity. Further, there were considerable losses in terms of redundancy of parts and raw materials due to poor coordination between various sectors of the decision-making machinery. Finally, after more than 25 years of manufacturing experience, the country has not been able to evolve a cohesive aircraft procurement and manufacturing policy. As a consequence, not only is the industry facing a considerable problem of idle capacity in the near future but has also not been able to keep abreast of contemporary technology. HAL is now undertaking a second round of transfer of technology from the West - a situation reminiscent of the late 1950s. After two decades of attempting to design and develop its own combat aircraft, it has finally decided to license manufacture the Anglo-French Jaguar and the MiG-23. Thus, despite rhetoric to the contrary, a combination of poor planning and bad management have ensured that the aircraft industry in India is nowhere near the twin goals of self reliance and self sufficiency it had set for itself a quarter of a century ago.