The formation of the Communist Party of India, 1927-1937 : the dilemma of the Indian left

Abstract

The thesis takes as its starting point the historical failure of Indian communism to create a viable, popular alternative to the country's dominant political culture. It argues that the 'Stalinisation' - or, as I have termed it, 'bolshevisation'- of Indian communism has been central to this failure. Bolshevisation'has undermined the autonomy of Indian communism and has thus prevented the movement from maintaining two relationships critical for political success - with its national environment and its own history. But not all communist parties suffered this fate. Why, then, was the Communist Party of India bolshevised'? The thesis is devoted to answering this question; for it was during the formation of the Communist Party of India (CPI), between the mid-1920s and the mid-1930s, that it was first ' bolshevised’. The 'bolshevisation' phenomenon is an interesting one. Not only was it a central cause of the CPI's failure to create a political alternative, but it also performed a necessary integrative function for the Party - a necessity largely arising, in turn, from its inability to maintain a stable mass base. This inability was largely a consequence of a. number of specific features of the colonial Indian environment.•The negative environmental features operating in Calcutta and Bombay were quite different: in the former the problem was largely one arising from the intensive 'colonialisation' of eastern India; in Bombay it was a problem of what I have called 'political space' for revolutionary mass politics. Thus we are investigating a phenomenon that was, simultaneously, a cause,cure and symptom of the failure of Indian communism. This investigation therefore allows us to connect a leadership failure with the environmental features contributing to that failure. The first Indian political groups with identifiably Marxist programs were founded in 1927 in the cities of Bombay and Calcutta - the two locations to which Indian communism was virtually to be confined throughout almost all of the formation period. This event followed an extended period of ideological transition, guided from abroad, among a few nationalists. Both groups then sought to take advantage of a contemporaneous wave of working class unrest. But while the Bombay group achieved a remarkable success and built for itself a major mass base, the Calcutta group was unable to replicate this achievement. There was a corresponding contrast in the two groups' development as communist leaderships - the Bombay group progressed towards becoming a 'proletarianised' and autonomus leadership while the Calcutta group stagnated, then disintegrated. The Bombay group's development could be seen clearly in the markedly independent stance it adopted towards the Communist International (Comintern) . But this, achievement remained unconsolidated and very vulnerable. This phase ended in 1929 with the arrests of both provincial leaderships and the breaking of the Bombay mass base: the environmental conditions under which the Bombay developments had occured proved to be both temporary and atypicaHy favourable. In the unfavourable conditions for communist politics in the ensuing period, from 1929 to 1933, the communist leadership which remained, regressed. Between 1929 and 1933 Indian communism consisted of a constellation of impotent and mutually hostile factions based on regional, personality and policy differences. After surveying the communists' situation the imprisoned former leadership realised that Indian communism faced a dilemma, imposed by the extremely difficult 'objective conditions': a 'natural' process of national Party formation'from below' would be extremely protracted and uncertain; therefore the Party could be formed in the foreseeable future only by the artificial, 'from the top'method of direct Comintern intervention - i.e., by full'bolshevisation1. However the jailed leadership did not comprehend the full implications of the 'bolshevised' alternative - that it involved the long term failure of Indian communism. It chose this course. After its unanticipated release from prison it managed,between 1934 and 1937, as a proxy Comintern representative, to form a centralised, functioning CPI. The Party has subsequently retained these 'bolshevised' foundations.