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Generalized Nash stability of voting situations under the Plurality, Nanson and Borda functions

Embury, Brian Leonard


In recently published papers, Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) have proved that for any issue containing at least three alternatives and under any voting procedure which is decisive, resolute, non-imposed and non-dictatorial there will always exist at least one situation in which at least one individual can secure an outcome which he prefers by following a strategy which does not reflect his sincere preferences. In a similar vein, Pattanaik (1973-76) has shown that under very wide...[Show more]

CollectionsOpen Access Theses
Date published: 1978
Type: Thesis (PhD)


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