Transnational Environmental Crime in Greater China: A Case Study from the Perspective of Network Theories

Abstract

The central goal of this study is to produce an in-depth understanding of the nature and dynamics of China-related transnational environmental crime (TEC). To that end, this study takes the Greater China – including mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan – as the specific geographic focus for its investigation into three key TEC sectors (illegal trade in wildlife, forest products, and ozone depleting substances (ODS)).

Overall, this study seeks to achieve the central goal in a four-step sequence. First, it builds a network-centric conceptual framework based on the idea of “networked threats require networked responses” advocated by many influential scholars. This framework focuses on addressing two puzzles: what essentially constitutes a network threat; and what forms a networked response. Second, it applies the concept of networked threats to the study of China’s global trade in illegal wildlife, forest products, and ODS. Third, it examines China’s TEC-related legal frameworks and enforcement responses and identifies key challenges that China has encountered in each of the three selected TEC sectors. Fourth and finally, it combines the above three lines of understandings – the accounts of networked responses, the empirical findings of China’s illegal trade, and the key regulatory and enforcement challenges identified – to develop practical suggestions on how can China apply the notion of networked responses to the formulation of regulatory and enforcement strategies for addressing the identified key challenges.

This study makes two broad arguments: one theoretically oriented and one empirically directed. First, this study argues that while the concept of networked threats can be approached along the dimensions of transaction networks and directed networks, networked responses are not a standard, formatted mode of regulatory or enforcement responses. Instead, networked responses should be understood as a special way of thinking and acting: a way that sees a bright-side actor (e.g., enforcement agencies) as operating in an environment occupied by various networks and entities, which simultaneously present challenges in terms of amplified (networked) threats, as well as opportunities in terms of power amplifiers for the bright-side actor, in the sense that they could potentially be leveraged for tackling these threats.

Second, China’s global trade in environmental contraband is typified by the substantial scale of China’s black markets and the deep embeddedness of China in the international and regional illicit trade chains. These two features, on the one hand, pose a serious challenge to the Chinese government in tackling its TEC; while on the other hand, they imply that Chinese effort and progress made toward addressing its illegal internal trade will likely have a substantive, positive overflowing effect on the whole of the international and regional illegal trade.