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Pilot contamination for active eavesdropping

Maham, Behrouz; Hjørungnes, Are; Zhou, Xiangyun

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Abstract—Existing studies on physical layer security often assume the availability of perfect channel state information (CSI) and overlook the importance of channel training needed for obtaining the CSI. In this letter, we discuss how an active eavesdropper can attack the training phase in wireless communication to improve its eavesdropping performance. We derive a new security attack from the pilot contamination phenomenon, which targets at systems using reverse training to obtain the CSI at...[Show more]

dc.contributor.authorMaham, Behrouz
dc.contributor.authorHjørungnes, Are
dc.contributor.authorZhou, Xiangyun
dc.date.accessioned2014-05-06T04:56:57Z
dc.date.available2014-05-06T04:56:57Z
dc.date.created2012-03
dc.identifier.issn1536-1276
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1885/11616
dc.description.abstractAbstract—Existing studies on physical layer security often assume the availability of perfect channel state information (CSI) and overlook the importance of channel training needed for obtaining the CSI. In this letter, we discuss how an active eavesdropper can attack the training phase in wireless communication to improve its eavesdropping performance. We derive a new security attack from the pilot contamination phenomenon, which targets at systems using reverse training to obtain the CSI at the transmitter for precoder design. This attack changes the precoder used by the legitimate transmitter in a controlled manner to strengthen the signal reception at the eavesdropper during data transmission. Furthermore, we discuss an efficient use of the transmission energy of an advanced full-duplex eavesdropper to simultaneously achieve a satisfactory eavesdropping performance whilst degrading the detection performance of the legitimate receiver.
dc.description.sponsorshipThis work was supported by the Australian Research Council's Discovery Projects funding scheme (project no. DP110102548) and the Research Council of Norway through the project 197565/V30.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_AU
dc.publisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
dc.rightsIEEE
dc.sourceIEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications 11.3 (2012):903 - 907
dc.subjectphysical layer security
dc.subjectactive eavesdropper
dc.subjectchannel estimation
dc.subjectpilot contamination
dc.titlePilot contamination for active eavesdropping
dc.typeJournal article
local.identifier.citationvolume11
dcterms.dateAccepted2011-12-21
local.identifier.absfor100510 - Wireless Communications
local.identifier.ariespublicationf5625xPUB741
local.publisher.urlhttp://www.ieee.org/index.html
local.type.statusAccepted version
local.contributor.affiliationZhou, Xiangyun, Research School of Engineering, The Australian National University
dc.relationhttp://purl.org/au-research/grants/arc/dp110102548
local.bibliographicCitation.issue3
local.bibliographicCitation.startpage903
local.bibliographicCitation.lastpage907
local.identifier.doi10.1109/TWC.2012.020712.111298
local.identifier.absseo970109 - Expanding Knowledge in Engineering
dc.date.updated2015-12-10T08:56:57Z
local.identifier.scopusID2-s2.0-84862817856
local.identifier.thomsonID000301509200008
dcterms.accessRightsOpen Access
dc.provenancehttps://www.ieee.org/publications/rights/index.html#ieee-open-access..."The revised policy reaffirms the principle that authors are free to post the accepted version of their articles on their personal websites or those of their employers." from SHERPA/RoMEO site (as at 10/09/18).
CollectionsANU Research Publications

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