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Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games

Stauber, Ronald


Based on a model where deviations from equilibrium play are assumed to identify irrational players who are characterized by ambiguous set-valued strategies, this paper introduces an equilibrium notion for extensive games with ambiguity averse players that yields a precise interpretation for the counterfactual reasoning usually associated with backward induction. The resulting equilibria are always Nash equilibria, but may not satisfy the conditions required for various refinements of Nash...[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2017-03
Type: Journal article
Source: Games and Economic Behavior
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.010
Access Rights: Open Access


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