Soviet-Iraqi relations : a case study of the gulf war

Abstract

On July 17, 1968, the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party (ABSP) came to power in Baghdad under the presidency of al-Bakr for whom the Iraqi 'strongman1, Saddam Hussein, had deputized. The glaring characteristics of the Iraqi Ba'athist regime had been secularist, radical, revolutionary and anti-imperialist. On the surface, Iraq seemed to be an ideal location for the expansion of Soviet influence. Similarly, from the Baghdad regime's viewpoint, at the time, to have warm, close relations with the Soviet Union was the best option for countering any threat endangering its national interests and security. Such close relations lay in the fact that, apart from being plunged into military confrontation with Israel in the Arab-Israeli theater and border dispute over Shatt al-Arab waterway with the Teheran regime, the Ba'athist leaders in Baghdad were, moreover, politically isolated by the conservative, monarchical, and moderate Gulf sheikhdoms spearheaded by the Riyadh regime. It is no exaggeration to say that in April 1972 the Soviet-Iraqi relationship was conspicuously highlighted by the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. The then Iraqi Vice President, Saddam Hussein's pragmatic policy, as was widely believed, was behind his decision to reach such a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union. Iraqi dependence on the Soviet Union was increased because of (i) the necessity for suppressing the renewal of the Kurdish rebellion; (ii) the nationalisation of the Iraqi oil enterprise; (iii) the eruption of the Arab-Israel war in October 1973; and (iv) the massive military build-up of the Shah of Iran. Iraq has been given a large amount of economic, military and technical assistance by the Soviet Union.