The military and foreign policy in Pakistan : with special reference to Pakistan-Soviet relations 1947-1971

Abstract

The thesis is a study of the role of the Pakistan military in foreign policy, with particular emphasis on the linkages between defence and foreign policy, using relations with the Soviet Union to demonstrate the extent to which the military has dominated Pakistan's external directions from independence in 1947 to the country’s dismemberment in 1971. From the very start, Pakistan's political leadership, military and bureaucracy adopted an anti-Soviet and pro-Western foreign policy, with the military showing particular interest in establishing defence links with the West. Pakistan-Soviet relations were therefore tense as Pakistan ignored Soviet overtures, motivated by the Soviet desire to curb Western influence in a strategically placed country. Pakistan-Soviet tensions reached their peak as Pakistan formally entered into anti-Soviet alliances with the West. Internal developments guided Pakistan's foreign policy, with the military dictating the country's domestic and external orientations. Internally, the Wlitary High Command exercised power in partnership with the bureaucracy, as bureaucratic-controlled governments advanced the military's interests. Pakistan's uncertain external environment, particularly its conflictual relations with India, advanced the military's internal standing as it was used to justify ever-increasing defence spending. As the military's autonomy grew, it embarked on independent, although parallel, efforts with the bureaucracy to obtain Pakistan's entry into US-sponsored regional pacts, motivated by its desire to obtain Western arms assistance. While Pakistan's entry into the pacts and rejection of Soviet overtures led the antagonised Soviets into supporting India and Afghanistan in their disputes with Pakistan, the main beneficiary of alignment was the military as US military aid poured into the country, further strengthening the Pakistan Armed Forces' internal position. Close links with the US in turn reinforced the anti-Soviet and pro-Western views of the Pakistan officer corps. The military took over direct power in 1958 when its internal autonomy and Pakistan's pro-Western foreign policy directions were threatened by domestic opposition. It then moved to consolidate its position by supporting Ayub's rule and in the external sphere continued to dictate a pro-Western and anti-Soviet foreign policy. However, external determinants such as superpower detente and US partiality towards India downgraded Pakistan's importance in American regional strategies, forcing Ayub to readjust his foreign policy rhetoric. He then attempted to use the Chinese and Soviet cards, hoping to pressure the Americans to revise their policies vis-à-vis Pakistan, especially in the wake of the US arms embargo in 1965. Although Pakistan-Soviet relations improved as the Soviet Union reacted positively, motivated by its desire to curb Chinese and Western influence in Pakistan, tensions remained due to Ayub's continued efforts to consolidate relations with the West. Ayub’s failure to persuade the Americans to resume arms assistance, combined with dissatisfaction arising from the conduct and aftermath of the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, led the military to withdraw its support as internal opposition grew to Ayub's authoritarian rule. Army C-in-C Yahya Khan then took over power as Martial Law was imposed in 1969. Under Yahya, the military once again kept its options open vis-à-vis the Soviet Union as long as the Americans downgraded Pakistan's importance as an ally, although Pakistan's primary foreign policy objective remained a strengthening of relations with the West, with an emphasis on a revival of defence links with the US. Once US global interests, including Pakistan's role in helping the Americans to open relations with the PRC, led to the establishment of closer US-Pakistan relations, the Yahya regime downgraded relations with the Soviet Union. Pakistan's foreign policy directions assumed a new significance in the wake of the East Pakistan crisis, as the Soviets supported India during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, while Pakistan's American and Chinese allies only extended it limited support. Yahya's shortsighted internal and external directions ultimately led to the dismemberment of Pakistan.