A Problem of Paradigms: Grounding Asymmetric Institutional Permissions for the Use of Lethal Force

Abstract

In this thesis I seek to demonstrate that the legal and customary norms defining the permissible use of lethal force by police are more restrictive than those defining the permissible use of lethal force by military personnel. I argue that in many cases this asymmetry can rest on a foundation provided by the moral norms of individual self- defense, but that the strength of this foundation is contingent on the context in which lethal force is used. Provided that three contextual asymmetries between police and military operations hold, we can morally justify the asymmetric legal and customary permissions granted to these two institutions on the basis of threat, liability, necessity, and proportionality. However, there are limits to the moral grounds these norms can provide. In cases where the three contextual asymmetries begin to break down, the moral foundation offered by the moral norms of individual self-defense weakens. In cases of contextual equivalence, we are forced to adopt one of two conclusions. Either we accept that our legal and customary norms are without moral foundation in such cases, or we must find alternative moral reasons to morally justify the asymmetry. In the final section I briefly draw out the strengths and weaknesses of both positions and offer some discussion of what other moral reasons we might use to shore-up the moral foundation for the asymmetry in the legal and customary norms regulating the permissible use by military and police institutions.