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Solving dynamic public insurance games with endogenous agent distributions: theory and computational approximation

Kam, Timothy; Stauber, Ronald


We make two contributions in this paper. First, we extend the characterization of equilibrium payoff correspondences in history-dependent dynamic policy games to a class with endogenously heterogeneous private agents. In contrast to policy games involving representative agents, this extension has interesting consequences as it implies additional nonlinearity (i.e., bilinearity) between the game states (distributions) and continuation/promised values in the policymaker’s objective and incentive...[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2016
Type: Journal article
Source: Journal of Mathematical Economics
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.03.004
Access Rights: Open Access


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