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The enforcement-compliance paradox: implementation of pesticide regulation in China

Yan, H; van Rooij, Benjamin; Van der Heijden, Jeroen


This article, in a study of amoral cost–benefit analysis, legitimacy and capacity to obey the law, seeks to understand why Chinese farmers obey or break pesticide rules. It uses data gathered through intensive fieldwork at a local level, including interviews with 31 pesticide experts and officials and 119 vegetable farmers in central China. It uncovers an enforcement–compliance paradox: a situation where law enforcement concentrates exactly on those rules that are least likely to be broken...[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2016-07
Type: Journal article
Source: China Information
DOI: 10.1177/0920203X16636510
Access Rights: Open Access


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