Anti-realism : the manifestation of semantic knowledge

Abstract

Realistic views are fashionable. In this thesis, I defend a view opposed to realism, which Dummett calls "anti-realism". My defence of anti-realism depends on the assumption that a theory of meaning should explain how speakers understand one another. The theory should therefore describe linguistic abilities in terms of communicable features of linguistic practice: those which are exhaustively manifest in use. I call this the manifestation argument. In the first Chapter, I apply the manifestation argument not only to theories of meaning which yield specifications of the content of sentences of a language (1.2), but also to theories which aim primarily to define linguistic behaviour as a species of intentional activity (I.3). The manifestation argument tells against the realist assumption of verification transcendent truth: that there may be truths which speakers could never be in a position to verify (1.2.3,I.3.3). However, holistic theories are exempted from the anti-realist argument. Alternative characterisations of realism are also mentioned(1.4). Dummett's theory of meaning is tailored to ensure that knowledge of meaning can be manifested. I endorse this account, with minor modifications (II.l-II.5). The revisionary consequences of the account are, I think, more extreme than Dummett supposes (II.6). Dummett takes Intuitionism in mathematics to be the paradigm of an anti-realist account of meaning (III.l-III.2). Two accounts of the meaning of the intuitionist logical constants are discussed. The first, which Dummett prefers, is in terms of canonical proof conditions (III.3-III.4); the second is an intuitionist analogue of a Tarski style truth definition (III.5). I argue that the former is required for justifying the intuitionist account, even though the latter adequately captures the intuitionist notion of truth. Chapter IV concerns the motivation of the manifestation argument (IV.l). I discuss the acquisition argument for anti-realism used by Dummett; namely, that it must be possible to acquire a grasp of the meaning of a sentence of a language from experience of its use (IV.2). I suggest that the manifestation argument is prior to the acquisition argument. I argue that anti-realism need not be reductionist (IV.4), and that vagueness suggests a modification of the manifestation argument. When intuitionism in mathematics provides the model of a theory of meaning for natural language, various notions of assertibility replace that of provability. Dummett considers conclusive verifiability (V.2) and falsifiability (V.3). Both fail to provide an acceptable account of negation, and do not allow for those assertions of natural language evidence for which is inconclusive (V.4). I take conditions of verification and falsification to determine meaning (V. 5). The intuitionist analogy is applied to time in Chapter VI. I discuss the analysis of temporal modification (VI.Z), and argue that tensed sentences involve indexical reference to time (VI.3). This suggests a generalised anti-realism about spatial and personal indexicals, which I reject (VI.4). I also reject Dummett's treatment of tense-links, but endorse a modified anti-realism about time (VI.5). I conclude with a discussion of holism. According to Dummett, holistic theories are objectionable because they are not molecular (VII.l). There are three strands in Dummett's notion of molecularity, and I discuss the role of each in rejecting varieties of holism (VII.2-VII.4). Dummett has doubts about anti-realist molecular theories which I dismiss, but I argue that the anti-realist cannot explain what I call 'radical' meaning change (VII.5).