Sensations and the identity theory

Abstract

Chapter One presents one formulation of the problem which different versions of the identity theory attempt to solve. The attempted solutions offered by other versions of the identity theory are evaluated. Chapter Two is a statement of the identity theory. It restricts the discussion to the identity of sensations and brain processes. It tries to clarity what is to count as a sensation and what as a brain process. Some introductory remarks are made in it about the nature of the concept of identity. Chapter Three is concerned with distinguishing the factual and logical (in the widest sense of these terms) components of the identity theory. It is argued that they cannot be treated in isolation of each other. The independent identification of sensations through nonverbal behaviour, and of brain processes through brain-readings is discussed. Chapters Four and Five are devoted to a discussion of avowals. It is argued that sensations can be identified through avowals as well. The nature of avowals is discussed; it is argued that the typical avowal is corrigible, and that avowals have grounds. Alternative analyses of avowals are discussed. Chapter Six takes up the question whether or not sensations can be said to have spatial location. It is argued that an affirmative answer can be given if we recognize that sensations, like all processes, can be said to have spatial location only in a derivative sense. Chapter Seven examines the nature of the identity between sensations and brain processes. Identity is argued to be an empirical, extensional, heterogeneons, reductive identity of properties. The task of Chapter Eight is twofold: first, to meet the objection that the identity proposed is too weak-and thus compatible with the distinctness of sensations and brain processes; and second, to compare the identity theory with dualism and with the oriteriological view.