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A Bargaining Mechanism for One-Way Games

Abeliuk, Andres; Berbeglia, Gerardo; Van Hentenryck, Pascal

Description

We introduce one-way games, a framework motivated by applications in large-scale power restoration, humanitarian logistics, and integrated supply chains. The distinguishable feature of the games is that the payoff of some player is determined only by her own strategy and does not depend on actions taken by other players. We show that the equilibrium outcome in one-way games without payments and the social cost of any ex-post efficient mechanism, can be far from the optimum. We also show that it...[Show more]

dc.contributor.authorAbeliuk, Andres
dc.contributor.authorBerbeglia, Gerardo
dc.contributor.authorVan Hentenryck, Pascal
dc.coverage.spatialBuenos Aires, Argentina
dc.date.accessioned2016-06-14T23:21:15Z
dc.date.createdJuly 25-31, 2015
dc.identifier.isbn9781577357384
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1885/103797
dc.description.abstractWe introduce one-way games, a framework motivated by applications in large-scale power restoration, humanitarian logistics, and integrated supply chains. The distinguishable feature of the games is that the payoff of some player is determined only by her own strategy and does not depend on actions taken by other players. We show that the equilibrium outcome in one-way games without payments and the social cost of any ex-post efficient mechanism, can be far from the optimum. We also show that it is impossible to design a Bayes- Nash incentive-compatible mechanism for one way games that is budget-balanced, individually rational, and efficient. Finally, we propose a privacy preserving mechanism that is incentive compatible and budget-balanced, satisfies ex-post individual rationality conditions, and produces an outcome which is more efficient than the equilibrium without payments
dc.publisherAAAI Press
dc.relation.ispartofseries24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence IJCAI 2015
dc.rightsFixed, and entered 17/12. Problems uploading document 16/12/15
dc.sourceExploiting Symmetries by Planning for a Descriptive Quotient
dc.titleA Bargaining Mechanism for One-Way Games
dc.typeConference paper
local.description.notesImported from ARIES
local.description.refereedYes
dc.date.issued2015
local.identifier.absfor080109 - Pattern Recognition and Data Mining
local.identifier.ariespublicationu4334215xPUB1527
local.type.statusPublished Version
local.contributor.affiliationAbeliuk, Andres, NICTA
local.contributor.affiliationBerbeglia, Gerardo, NICTA
local.contributor.affiliationVan Hentenryck, Pascal, College of Engineering and Computer Science, ANU
local.description.embargo2037-12-31
local.bibliographicCitation.startpage440
local.bibliographicCitation.lastpage446
local.identifier.absseo970108 - Expanding Knowledge in the Information and Computing Sciences
dc.date.updated2016-06-14T09:03:30Z
local.identifier.scopusID2-s2.0-84949747671
CollectionsANU Research Publications

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