A Bargaining Mechanism for One-Way Games
We introduce one-way games, a framework motivated by applications in large-scale power restoration, humanitarian logistics, and integrated supply chains. The distinguishable feature of the games is that the payoff of some player is determined only by her own strategy and does not depend on actions taken by other players. We show that the equilibrium outcome in one-way games without payments and the social cost of any ex-post efficient mechanism, can be far from the optimum. We also show that it...[Show more]
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