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Disclosure and information transfer in signaling games

Bruner, Justin


One of the major puzzles in evolutionary theory is how communication and information transfer are possible when the interests of those involved conflict. Perfect information transfer seems inevitable if there are physical constraints, which limit the signal repertoire of an individual, effectively making bluffing an impossibility. This, I argue, is incorrect. Unfakeable signals by no means guarantee information transfer. I demonstrate the existence of a so-called pooling equilibrium and discuss...[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2015
Type: Journal article
Source: Philosophy of Science
DOI: 10.1086/683016


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