A preference model for choice subject to surprise
Grant and Quiggin (Econ Theo 54:717–755, 2013a, J Econ Behav Organ 93:17–31, 2013b) suggest that agents employ heuristics to constrain the set of acts under consideration before applying standard decision theory, based on their restricted model of the world to the remaining acts. The aim of this paper is to provide an axiomatic foundation, and an associated representation theorem, for the preference model proposed by Grant and Quiggin. The unawareness of the agent is encoded both in the...[Show more]
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