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Bargaining Mechanisms for One-Way Games

Abeliuk, Andres; Berbeglia, Gerardo; Van Hentenryck, Pascal

Description

We introduce one-way games, a two-player framework whose distinguishable feature is that the private payoff of one (independent) player is determined only by her own strategy and does not depend on the actions taken by the other (dependent) player. We show that the equilibrium outcome in one-way games without side payments and the social cost of any ex post efficient mechanism can be far from the optimum. We also show that it is impossible to design a Bayes–Nash incentive-compatible mechanism...[Show more]

dc.contributor.authorAbeliuk, Andres
dc.contributor.authorBerbeglia, Gerardo
dc.contributor.authorVan Hentenryck, Pascal
dc.date.accessioned2016-06-14T23:19:49Z
dc.identifier.issn2073-4336
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1885/103065
dc.description.abstractWe introduce one-way games, a two-player framework whose distinguishable feature is that the private payoff of one (independent) player is determined only by her own strategy and does not depend on the actions taken by the other (dependent) player. We show that the equilibrium outcome in one-way games without side payments and the social cost of any ex post efficient mechanism can be far from the optimum. We also show that it is impossible to design a Bayes–Nash incentive-compatible mechanism for one-way games that is budget-balanced, individually rational and efficient. To address this negative result, we propose a privacy-preserving mechanism based on a single-offer bargaining made by the dependent player that leverages the intrinsic advantage of the independent player. In this setting the outside option of the dependent player is not known a priori; however, we show that the mechanism satisfies individual rationality conditions, is incentive-compatible, budget-balanced and produces an outcome that is more efficient than the equilibrium without payments. Finally, we show that a randomized multi-offer extension brings no additional benefit in terms of efficiency.
dc.publisherMDPI AG
dc.sourceGames - Open Access Game Theory Journal
dc.titleBargaining Mechanisms for One-Way Games
dc.typeJournal article
local.description.notesImported from ARIES
local.identifier.citationvolume6
dc.date.issued2015
local.identifier.absfor080599 - Distributed Computing not elsewhere classified
local.identifier.ariespublicationU3488905xPUB14104
local.type.statusPublished Version
local.contributor.affiliationAbeliuk, Andres, NICTA
local.contributor.affiliationBerbeglia, Gerardo, NICTA
local.contributor.affiliationVan Hentenryck, Pascal, University of Melbourne
local.contributor.affiliationVan Hentenryck, Pascal, College of Engineering and Computer Science, ANU
local.description.embargo2037-12-31
local.bibliographicCitation.startpage347
local.bibliographicCitation.lastpage367
local.identifier.doi10.3390/g6030347
local.identifier.absseo970108 - Expanding Knowledge in the Information and Computing Sciences
local.identifier.absseo890203 - Computer Gaming Software
dc.date.updated2016-06-14T08:43:07Z
local.identifier.scopusID2-s2.0-84941204234
CollectionsANU Research Publications

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