Bargaining Mechanisms for One-Way Games
We introduce one-way games, a two-player framework whose distinguishable feature is that the private payoff of one (independent) player is determined only by her own strategy and does not depend on the actions taken by the other (dependent) player. We show that the equilibrium outcome in one-way games without side payments and the social cost of any ex post efficient mechanism can be far from the optimum. We also show that it is impossible to design a Bayes–Nash incentive-compatible mechanism...[Show more]
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|Source:||Games - Open Access Game Theory Journal|
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