Corruption and Informal Security Welfare Regimes: Insights from Pakistan: Briefing Note 39 - Serious Organised Crime & Anti-Corruption Evidence (SOC ACE) Research Programme

Abstract

From the Serious Organised Crime & Anti-Corruption Evidence (SOC ACE) Research Programme

This briefing note summarises research that examines the complex relationship between corruption and informal security welfare regimes, using Pakistan as a case study. In contexts where formal welfare systems are weak or inaccessible, individuals often rely on informal networks such as kinship ties and patron-client relationships for social protection. The research highlights how corruption plays a dual role in these regimes: it undermines formal welfare provision while simultaneously acting as a survival strategy for people who are excluded from formal welfare systems.

Drawing on conceptual literature and empirical evidence, the research shows that corruption exacerbates inclusion and exclusion errors, erodes trust in institutions and reinforces exploitative relationships. Corruption diverts resources from formal welfare programmes, producing inclusion and exclusion errors, as evident in Pakistan’s Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP) where audits uncovered Rs141 billion in irregularities. Patron-client relationships are reinforced by corruption, often involving exploitative practices that consolidate elite power and exclude people who lack connections to potential patrons. Yet grassroots corruption often enables access to essential services, especially for vulnerable populations navigating dysfunctional formal welfare systems.

For policymakers, the research shows the importance of carefully calibrating anti-corruption efforts. Zero-tolerance approaches risk dismantling informal security welfare access mechanisms that many depend on, potentially worsening exclusion and inequality. Instead, the research finds that the priority should be tackling high-level corruption that most severely undermines fairness and efficiency, such as embezzlement and procurement fraud. Targeting low-level misconduct may disrupt informal access to welfare without addressing systemic issues.

This research calls for nuanced, politically feasible strategies that strengthen formal welfare provision while acknowledging the functional role of corruption in informal systems. While entrenched elite interests and institutional weakness are likely to continue to constrain meaningful reform, developing more effective approaches that balance pragmatism with transformation can help to avoid further marginalisation.