Social Cohesion and Support for Democracy in Australia: Assessing recent polling data and frameworks

Abstract

This paper is the first in a series examining the relationship between support for democracy and social cohesion in Australia. Following the terrorist attack in Bondi in December 2025 targeting Jewish Australians, the Federal Government expanded social cohesion to be a more central policy concern through the Terms of Reference of the Royal Commission into Antisemitism and Social Cohesion. There is a long history of Australian policy efforts to strengthen social cohesion, including polices since the 1970s associated with social citizenship, ongoing debates around immigration and multiculturalism, and more recent shifts toward place-based and devolved approaches to community leadership. Recent national disasters, including floods and fires, have further exposed pressures on community infrastructure and highlighted persistent patterns of inclusion and exclusion. Together, these developments have elevated social cohesion within public and policy narratives, often framed around Australia’s pluralistic communities and democratic traditions. In this context, and alongside the announcement of the Royal Commission, this paper examines current community attitudes in the lead up to, and overlapping with the terrorist attacks, as a baseline and contextual analysis. While we use specific set of widely accepted definitions, we note their limitations. Drawing on recent ANUpoll data and using the pillars of the OECD framework as a baseline approach, the paper distinguishes between satisfaction with democracy and principled support for democracy as a system of government and situates democratic attitudes within broader dimensions of social cohesion: social inclusion, social capital, and social mobility. The findings show that Australians remain broadly supportive of democracy in principle, even where satisfaction with democratic performance is weaker. However, this support is unevenly distributed. The strongest divides are structured by age and education. Support is lowest not among young Australians per se, but among younger Australians without Year 12 or post-school qualifications—an age–education interaction that reveals substantial social polarisation in democratic commitment. Specifically, among Australians aged 18–34 without Year 12 or post-school qualifications, fewer than one in four regard democracy as always preferable, compared with nearly two-thirds of those with a degree. Once age is controlled for, education is positively associated with democratic support, indicating clear social polarisation by education. Economic insecurity is modestly associated with principled democratic support but strongly associated with dissatisfaction with democratic performance. Institutional and interpersonal trust are strongly associated with both support for and satisfaction with democracy; trust in social media is associated with weaker democratic commitment. Perceptions of unfairness and limited opportunity further explain emerging vulnerabilities. Furthermore, persistent economic disadvantage among Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians remains a structural challenge to inclusive cohesion. Overall, the results suggest that Australia’s democratic consensus is present but socially stratified. The findings suggest that Australia’s democratic consensus is durable but uneven, concentrated among older and more educated Australians and more fragile where educational disadvantage, economic insecurity, and low institutional trust intersect. The analysis provides a baseline against which the Royal Commission’s process and recommendations can be evaluated and the paper concludes by outlining a coordinated longitudinal survey strategy for 2026–27 to track democratic attitudes and social cohesion through the Royal Commission process. Ultimately though, while the Royal Commission can play an important agenda-setting role, strengthening social cohesion requires a broader, whole-of-system policy approach spanning education, economic inclusion, institutional trust, information environments, and civil society. Show more