AI rule and a fundamental objection to epistocracy
Abstract
Epistocracy is rule by whoever is more likely to make correct decisions. AI epistocracy is rule by an artificial intelligence that is more likely to make correct decisions than any humans, individually or collectively. I argue that although various objections have been raised against epistocracy, the most popular do not apply to epistocracy organized around AI rule. I use this result to show that epistocracy is fundamentally flawed because none of its forms provide adequate opportunity for people (as opposed to individuals) to develop a record of meaningful moral achievement. This Collective Moral Achievement Objection provides a novel reason to value democracy. It also provides guidance on how we ought to incorporate digital technologies into politics, regardless of how proficient these technologies may become at identifying correct decisions.
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AI and Society
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