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# CE RESEARCH CENTRE

WORKING PAPER NO. 66

PRINCIPAL ARMS CONTROL/DISARMAMENT  
AGREEMENTS OF THE TWENTIETH  
CENTURY

by

Trevor Findlay

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
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## BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Trevor Findlay is a Senior Research Fellow at the Peace Research Centre. From 1986-88 he was the first Foreign Affairs Disarmament Fellow appointed to the Centre by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. From 1974 to 1986 he was an officer of the Australian Foreign Service, serving in Tokyo, Mexico City and Geneva. At Geneva he was a member of the Australian delegations to the Conference on Disarmament and other disarmament meetings, including the Disarmament Commission and First Committee of the UN General Assembly in New York and the 1982 Second Special Session on Disarmament. His publications include *Nuclear Dynamite* and *Verifying a Test Ban*, both scheduled for publication in 1989. He is editor of the Peace Research Centre's quarterly periodical *Pacific Research*.



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This paper provides a comprehensive and up-to-date listing and description of the principal arms control and disarmament agreements of the twentieth century. They are divided into multilateral agreements, involving several states, and bilateral agreements, principally between the United States and the Soviet Union.

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## MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS<sup>1</sup>

### Geneva Protocol<sup>2</sup>, 1925<sup>3</sup>

Prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare. The text declares that the parties agree to be bound by the prohibition, 'which should be universally accepted as part of International Law, binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations'. In practice a large number of parties have reserved the right to use chemical weapons against non-parties or to retaliate with chemical weapons in the event of a chemical attack. The treaty is therefore largely a no-first use agreement. While the protocol itself contains no verification or compliance measures, the United Nations General Assembly has established procedures to permit the UN Secretary General to investigate alleged violations.

### Antarctic Treaty, 1959

Declares that Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. The treaty forbids military activity of any sort in Antarctica, such as the building of bases, training, manoeuvres and weapon testing. It effectively creates a nuclear-free zone in Antarctica by banning any nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste material. Unprecedented provision is made for open inspection of any base in Antarctica by any treaty party. The treaty applies to the area south of 60° South Latitude, including all ice shelves.

### Partial (or Limited) Test Ban Treaty (PTBT or LTBT), 1963

Bans all nuclear tests except those conducted underground. It also prohibits the venting of radioactivity from underground nuclear explosions if such radioactivity crosses international borders. The treaty had two main objectives: to slow the rate of nuclear proliferation and to prevent atmospheric contamination from nuclear fallout. While not specifically provided for in the treaty, it is understood that verification will be carried out by so-called National Technical Means, principally satellite-based monitoring, operated by the nuclear weapon state parties. Of the five declared nuclear weapon states, only the United

---

1 Agreements involving more than two states.

2 The protocol's official title is the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

3 Dates refer to the year in which the treaty was concluded. In some cases the treaty entered into force in the same year.



States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union are parties. France and China however also confine their nuclear testing underground. As of 1 January 1988 the treaty had 116 parties, the most recent accessions being Pakistan and Argentina.

### **Outer Space Treaty, 1967**

The treaty provides that 'outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claims of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means'. It further determines that none of the signatories will place any nuclear weapon or other weapon of mass destruction in orbit around the earth or install such weapons on any celestial body. No verification measures are included.

### **Treaty of Tlatelolco, 1967**


Established a nuclear weapon-free zone in Latin America. Parties to this treaty, which are confined to the states of Latin America, agree not to test, use, manufacture, produce or acquire by any other means nuclear weapons in the territory under their jurisdiction. While the whole of Latin America was declared a nuclear free zone, with boundaries extending out into the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, this zone will not enter into effect until all states in the region have ratified the treaty. Individual states may however bring the treaty into force for their own territory by depositing a waiver to that effect. Parties are required to conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The treaty is verified by OPANAL, the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.

Belize, Cuba, Dominica, Guyana, St Lucia and St Vincent and the Grenadines have not signed the treaty. Argentina has signed but not ratified, while Brazil and Chile have ratified but not deposited a waiver [see map 1]. Both Argentina and Brazil are widely considered to be potential nuclear weapon states. Both have asserted the right to develop so-called 'peaceful nuclear explosives', which are treated ambiguously by the treaty.

The treaty has two protocols. The first commits non-regional powers with territories within the zone to apply the treaty's provisions to such territories. It has been signed by all the eligible states: the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and France. Only France has failed to ratify.

The second protocol seeks assurances from the nuclear weapon states that they will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against treaty parties. It has been signed and ratified by all the nuclear weapon states.





Map 1 Area of application of the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone created by the Treaty of Tlatelolco [adapted from: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook 1982* (London, Taylor & Francis, 1982, p.416)]



## **Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 1968**

An initiative of Ireland, the NPT was negotiated in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) in Geneva on the basis of identical drafts submitted by the US and USSR. The treaty is a bargain: non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) undertake not to seek to acquire nuclear weapons, while existing nuclear weapon states (NWS) undertake not to assist such states to acquire them. The NWS also pledged to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to exert best efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament. Verification of compliance with the treaty is carried out by the IAEA through an elaborate system of 'safeguards'. Parties to the NPT are required to negotiate a safeguards agreement with the IAEA unless they were covered by pre-NPT safeguards.

As of 1 January 1988 the NPT had 137 parties, including the three original nuclear weapon states (the US, UK and USSR), making it the most widely adhered to arms control agreement. Among the most recent accessions have been Spain and Saudi Arabia. Significant non-parties are: India, Pakistan, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, France, Israel and South Africa. These states regard the NPT as discriminatory because of its division of the world into nuclear 'haves' and 'have-nots'.

## **Seabed Treaty, 1971**

Originally proposed by Malta, the Seabed Treaty prohibits the placing of weapons of mass destruction on the seabed, the ocean floor, or in the 'subsoil thereof', outside a 12-mile limit. In theory this treaty transforms 70% of the earth's surface into a de-militarized zone. In practice, the treaty has rather less meaning, since vast arsenals transit this area aboard submarines and surface vessels. The treaty relies on National Technical Means for its verification.

## **Biological Weapons (BW) Convention, 1972**

The BW Convention is the only disarmament (rather than arms control) agreement to be negotiated since 1945. It provides for the total prohibition of all biological weapons as well as the destruction of existing stocks. It proscribes microbiological and toxin agents of whatever description or production method that have 'no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes'. It also bans associated equipment and means of delivery for use in armed conflict for hostile purposes. Verification is non-existent, although consultation is provided for. The 1986 BW Review Conference established improved procedures for ensuring compliance with the treaty.



## **Helsinki Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament in Europe, 1975**

This agreement is part of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), known as the Helsinki Accord. It initiated the idea of so-called 'confidence-building measures'. The agreement provides for notification of 'major' military manoeuvres in Europe, involving at least 25,000 troops, at least 21 days in advance or, in the case of a manoeuvre arranged at shorter notice, at the earliest possible opportunity prior to its starting date.

The following information is to be provided for each major manoeuvre: designation (codename) if any; general purpose; states involved; types and numerical strength of forces involved; area; and estimated time-frame. States may voluntarily give additional information and/or invite observers to attend.

The 35 signatories include all the states of Europe except Albania, plus Canada and the United States.<sup>4</sup>

## **Environmental Modification Convention (ENMOD), 1977**

Prohibits military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to states party to the Convention. 'Environmental modification techniques' refers to any technique for changing - through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes - the dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space.

Understandings reached during the negotiations, but not written into the Convention, define the terms 'widespread', 'long-lasting' and 'severe'. The Convention was negotiated in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in Geneva, on the basis of parallel, identical draft texts tabled by the Soviet Union and the United States. The treaty does not provide for verification but does include a consultative mechanism.

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4 The participants in the CSCE process are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxemborg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America, Yugoslavia.



### **The Moon Treaty, 1979**

Otherwise known as the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, the treaty declares that the moon and other celestial bodies shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. It prohibits any threat or use of force or any other hostile act or threat of hostile act on the moon. It also prohibits the use of the moon to commit any such act or to engage in any such threat in relation to the earth, the moon, spacecraft, the personnel of spacecraft or man-made objects. Parties are forbidden to place in orbit around the moon objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction or place or use such weapons on the moon. The moon and its natural resources are declared to be the common heritage of mankind. The treaty has a miniscule number of parties and is opposed by the United States, largely because of its common heritage implications.

### **Inhumane Weapons Convention, 1981**


Officially known as the Convention on the Prohibition or Restriction of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects, the treaty arose from an initiative of the International Committee of the Red Cross. The Convention is an 'umbrella' treaty under which specific agreements can be concluded in the form of protocols. The first three protocols included are:

- \* Protocol I, which prohibits the use of weapons intended to injure by fragments which are not detectable in the human body by x-rays.
- \* Protocol II, which prohibits or restricts the use of mines, booby-traps and similar devices.
- \* Protocol III, which prohibits or restricts the use of incendiary weapons, such as napalm.

### **Treaty of Raratonga or South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (SPNFZ), 1985**

Concluded by the nations of the South Pacific Forum as a result of an Australian initiative in 1983. The treaty prohibits the manufacture or acquisition by other means of any nuclear explosive device, as well as possession or control over such a device by the parties anywhere inside or outside the zone area as described in an annex [see map 2]. The parties also undertake not to supply nuclear material or equipment unless subject to IAEA safeguards and to prevent in their territories the stationing or testing of any nuclear explosive device. However each party remains free to allow visits, as well as transit, by foreign ships and aircraft. The treaty entered into force in December 1986 when Australia became the eighth country to ratify. All eligible independent states within the zone are parties except Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and Tonga.





Map 2 Area of application of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. [Source: Attachment to Annex 1 to the Treaty of Raratonga]



The treaty also has three protocols. Under Protocol I, those outside states with territories within the zone (France, the UK and US), undertake to apply the treaty prohibitions (relating to the manufacture, stationing and testing of nuclear explosive devices) to those territories situated within the zone for which they are internationally responsible. None of the three eligible states has signed.

Under Protocol II, the nuclear weapon states agree not to use or threaten to use a nuclear explosive device against the parties to the treaty. Only China and the Soviet Union have signed and ratified. Under Protocol III the nuclear weapon states undertake not to test any nuclear device anywhere within the zone. The UK, France and the US have indicated they will not sign or ratify the protocols.

### **Stockholm Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures, 1986**

The agreement was negotiated by the Stockholm Conference, officially styled the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CCSBMDE), an outgrowth of the CSCE process. The agreement is designed to prevent surprise attack or accidental warfare in Europe by building on the initial CBMs instituted under the Helsinki Accord. It contains unprecedented verification arrangements, as well as observation and notification provisions. It marked the first time the Soviet Union had agreed to mandatory verification on its own territory. The agreement, which applies to the 35 countries involved in the CSCE, covers significant troop movements, military exercises and similar activities within designated limits. Geographically it covers the area from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains in the Soviet Union.

Highlights of the agreement are:

- . military land exercises and troop concentrations in which more than 13,000 troops, 300 tanks, 200 or more aircraft sorties (excluding helicopters), amphibious landings or parachute drops involving 3,000 troops, must be preceded by 42 days advance notification
- . when troop levels during an exercise exceed 17,000 all pact signatories have the right to send in observers for on-site observation
- . signatories have the right to carry out land or aerial inspections of any type of suspicious or unannounced military exercises; the nation where the activity is purportedly taking place must provide inspection aircraft within 12 hours
- . exercises involving more than 75,000 troops must be announced two years in advance; those involving over 40,000 require a year's notice.



## **BILATERAL AGREEMENTS<sup>5</sup>**

### **'Hot Line' Agreements, 1963, 1971, 1984 & 1987**

A 1963 Memorandum of Understanding, concluded in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis, established a direct communications link between Washington and Moscow for use in time of emergency.

An annex to the Memorandum provides for two circuits, a duplex wire telegraph circuit and a duplex radio telegraph circuit, as well as two terminal points with telegraph-teprinter equipment between which communications can be exchanged.

A 1971 agreement improved the reliability of the so-called Hot Line by establishing two satellite communications circuits between the two countries, with a system of multiple terminals in each country.

On 17 July 1984 the two sides added a facsimile transmission capability to the Hot Line to enable the parties to exchange messages more rapidly and send graphic material such as maps, charts or drawings.

In 1987 the two sides agreed to establish Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres in each other's capital cities, staffed by their own nationals, to provide additional 'crisis management' capability.

(Direct communications links have also been established between France and the USSR, as well as between the UK and the USSR, following agreements concluded in 1966 and 1967 respectively).

### **Accidental Nuclear War Agreement (Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War), 1971**

This agreement aims to reduce the risk of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war by 3 means:

1. a pledge by both sides to take measures each considers necessary to maintain and improve its organisational and technical safeguards against accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons.

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<sup>5</sup> Between the United States and the Soviet Union.



2. arrangements for immediate notification should a risk of nuclear war arise from such incidents, from detection of unidentified objects on early warning systems, or from any accidental, unauthorised, or other unexplained incident involving a possible detonation of a nuclear weapon.

3. advance notification of any planned missile launches beyond the territory of the launching party and in the direction of the other party.

## **SALT I, 1972**

The signature of the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty in 1972 was a high point in the political accommodation between the superpowers known as **detente**. It appeared to be a major step towards regulation of the arms race and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

SALT I had three main elements:

1. the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.
2. an 'Interim' Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Nuclear Arms.
3. a protocol concerning limitation of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and modern ballistic missile submarines.

In addition to these elements SALT I also included several Agreed Statements, Common Understandings and Unilateral Statements.

### **The ABM Treaty**

Under the ABM treaty each signatory undertook not to deploy nationwide anti-ballistic missile systems nor to deploy them in any area except one system around the national capital and one around an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) complex, comprising 100 launchers and 100 missiles per site. This was later changed to one site only at any location, an option which the US decided not to exercise. The Soviet Union has its one permitted system around Moscow, the Galosh ABM system. Further development of ABMs was prohibited, as was the substitution of other means (e.g. other missile systems) to the same end. The treaty is of unlimited duration and reviewed every five years. Verification is by National Technical Means, including satellites, signals and electronic intelligence and human intelligence.

### **The Interim Agreement**

The ICBM treaty was an interim agreement of only five years' duration, designed to permit further negotiations on strategic arms reductions to take place. It did not reduce the



### Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), 1974

The treaty establishes a nuclear testing 'threshold' by prohibiting nuclear tests with a yield exceeding 150 kilotons (equivalent to 150,000 tons of TNT). The text includes a protocol which details technical data to be exchanged and which limits weapon testing to designated sites to assist verification. The treaty has not been ratified by either party (principally because of American dissatisfaction with the verification arrangements), although both have pledged to act as if the treaty were in force. The US has accused the Soviets of exceeding the 150 kt threshold. Negotiations are continuing to improve the verification provisions.

### Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET), 1976

A companion treaty to the TTBT, this treaty limits 'peaceful nuclear explosions' (those detonated for purposes such as building harbours and dams and stimulating oil) to the same threshold as nuclear weapon tests - 150 kt. The treaty allows group explosions up to a limit of 1500kt but the explosions must be clearly separated in time to permit verification. The PNET provides for one of the most elaborate verification schemes devised to that time, including detailed information exchange and 'on-site' inspection of detonations above 100 kt. Like the TTBT this treaty remains unratified pending improvements to its verification provisions.

### Vladivostok Understanding, 1975

SALT I was extended at the Brezhnev/Ford summit meeting in Vladivostok in November 1974, by an 'understanding' designed to provide the basis for the conclusion of SALT II in 1975. Vladivostok added to the ceilings agreed in SALT I by limiting the number of strategic (long-range) bombers each side could deploy.

The Understanding also, for the first time, limited **warhead** numbers in addition to launchers, by limiting the number of launch vehicles that could be 'MIRVed'<sup>6</sup> to 1320 of a total ceiling of 2400 per side. The accord recognized that, as a result of 'MIRVing', the numbers of warheads had become as important as the number of launchers. While there

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6 The response of both superpowers to the development of ABM technology had been to multiply the number of warheads on its ballistic missiles. Each warhead would be carried by a separate re-entry vehicle which could be released independently. These vehicles were known as Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles or MIRVs.



was acceptance of the impossibility of counting the number of warheads on each launcher, the overall number of MIRVed launchers could be determined.

## SALT II, 1979

After several years of negotiations SALT II was finally signed in Vienna in 1979. It confirmed the Vladivostok ceiling of 2,400 launchers each (1320 MIRVed), but made this effective immediately. It also set a target level of 2250 launchers each, including ICBMs, long-range bombers and SLBMs, by 1981. The two sides also agreed for the first time on the number of launchers actually deployed: 2060 for the US and 2570 for the USSR.

The parties also agreed that they had already MIRVed 1046 (US) and 795 (USSR) launchers respectively. Thus the Soviets were allowed to MIRV a further 525 launchers to reach the Vladivostok ceiling of 1320. Within this ceiling sub-ceilings were set: 1200 for SLBMs and ICBMs and of these 1200, 820 for ICBMs. The two sides agreed that they had deployed 550 (US) and 600 (USSR) MIRVed ICBMs respectively, which would permit increases by both parties. Since land-launch allows the construction of much larger launchers (which can therefore carry more MIRVs), SALT II froze the numbers of 'heavy' ICBMs at existing levels. These were agreed to be the 308 Soviet SS-18s, of which the US had no equivalent.

SALT II also placed constraints on future developments. The number of MIRVed warheads per launcher was restricted to the number already tested (10 for ICBMs and 14 for SLBMs) - thus limiting the numbers of warheads deliverable by each side. Each side was also only permitted to develop and deploy one new type of ICBM during the life of the treaty, which was set to expire in 1985.

The treaty concluded with restatement of the legitimacy of satellite and electronic means of verification (known as National Technical Means) and agreement that neither side would attempt to conceal information by the encoding of telemetric messages from missile tests.

The SALT II Protocol had a more limited life, expiring in 1982, and had two provisions:

1. a ban on flight testing and deployment of land-based mobile missiles and air-to-surface ballistic missiles.
2. a ban on the deployment (but not testing) of cruise missiles, land or sea-launched, with a range in excess of 600 km.

While the SALT II Agreement has never been ratified, largely because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, both sides pledged that they would abide by its provisions. These



commitments continued even after the treaty expired at the end of December 1985. In May 1986 however the United States announced that it would no longer be bound by the provisions of SALT II. By deploying its 131st B-52 bomber modified to carry cruise missiles the United States in November 1986 exceeded the SALT II ceiling of 1320 MIRVed launchers and cruise missile-equipped bombers.

### **Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Agreement, 1987**

The first treaty to abolish an entire class of nuclear weapons. It provides for the removal, destruction and banning of future production of short and intermediate-range ground-based ballistic and cruise missiles worldwide by the Soviet Union and the United States. The range of the missiles affected extends from 500 to 5500 kilometres (ranges above 5500 are considered 'strategic'). Specifically included in the ban are Soviet SS20s, SS4s and SS5s and American Pershing IA and II based in the FRG and ground-launched cruise missiles based in the UK, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium and the FRG.

The most stringent verification provisions ever seen in a disarmament treaty permit on-site inspection of production facilities in the United States and the Soviet Union over a 13-year period, principally the Votkinsk Missile Assembly Plant west of the Urals in the Soviet Union and the Hercules Plant at Magna, Utah, in the United States. The treaty also provides for inspection of missile dismantling and destruction and short-notice on-site inspection (20 per year for each side). The treaty, while only removing 3-4% of the super-power nuclear arsenals, sets important verification precedents for a future Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) agreement.

The INF agreement was signed in Washington in December 1987 by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev and ratified by both parties at their summit in Moscow in June 1988.



## Arms Control Acronyms

|         |                                                                                                                  |
|---------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| ABM     | Anti-Ballistic Missile                                                                                           |
| ASAT    | Anti-Satellite Weapon                                                                                            |
| BW      | Biological Weapons                                                                                               |
| CBMs    | Confidence-Building Measures                                                                                     |
| CCSBMDE | Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures<br>and Disarmament in Europe (the Stockholm Conference) |
| CCD     | Conference of the Committee on Disarmament                                                                       |
| CD      | Committee on Disarmament, later Conference on Disarmament                                                        |
| CW      | Chemical Weapons                                                                                                 |
| CPD     | Comprehensive Program of Disarmament                                                                             |
| CTB(T)  | Comprehensive Test Ban (Treaty)                                                                                  |
| CSCE    | Conference on Security & Cooperation in Europe                                                                   |
| CST     | Conventional Stability Talks                                                                                     |
| ENMOD   | Environmental Modification Convention                                                                            |
| ENDC    | Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee                                                                            |
| GCD     | General & Complete Disarmament                                                                                   |
| ICBM    | Intercontinental Ballistic Missile                                                                               |
| INF     | Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces                                                                                |
| IAEA    | International Atomic Energy Agency                                                                               |
| LTBT    | Limited (or Partial) Test Ban Treaty                                                                             |
| MBFR    | Mutual & Balanced Force Reduction Talks (Vienna)                                                                 |
| MIRV    | Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle                                                               |
| NPT     | Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty                                                                                 |
| NTM     | National Technical Means (of Verification)                                                                       |
| PTBT    | Partial (or Limited) Test Ban Treaty                                                                             |
| PNET    | Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty                                                                               |
| SALT    | Strategic Arms Limitation Talks                                                                                  |
| SLBM    | Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile                                                                             |
| SPNFZ   | South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty                                                                           |
| START   | Strategic Arms Reduction Talks                                                                                   |
| TTBT    | Threshold Test Ban Treaty                                                                                        |
| UNDC    | UN Disarmament Commission                                                                                        |
| UNSSOD  | UN Special Session on Disarmament                                                                                |



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