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CHINA AND THE 'CONTENDING BARBARIANS':
BEIJING'S VIEW OF THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD ORDER

by

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ABSTRACT

The question of how the present leadership in the People's Republic of China views the international order is crucial to our understanding of Beijing's approach to world problems as well as its defence and security postures. In Beijing's assessment of the strategic balance, the 'distant superpower', the United States, is a waning (albeit still formidable) world power, while the 'near superpower', the recently expansionist-minded Soviet Union, is regarded as the most immediate threat to China in particular and to world peace and stability in general. This paper, which is based upon an article by the author which was published in World Review, Volume 20, Number 4 (October 1981), explores the Chinese assessment in light of recent events and discusses the strategies or postures that have been devised as correlates to it, including the 'broad united front' with the United States. It also identifies some of the resources that China can presently bring to bear in the international arena, as well as some of those factors which may limit China's activities or objectives.

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Introduction.

The widespread fascination with the 'reintegration' of the People's Republic of China (PRC) into the complex world of international politics, as well as its continuing, but fitful, transition to the post-Maoist era of the 'Four Modernisations', has stimulated an enormous amount of published commentary and analysis over the past few years. Particular interest has been placed, and correctly so, on the perceived role of China in a pluralistic world dominated by two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, who are seemingly locked in confrontation during an age of strategic nuclear parity. However, since the question of where China 'fits' within the broad array of the world's political, military, and economic forces is rarely, if ever, stated explicitly by the Chinese themselves, the task of assessing Beijing's approaches to current strategic problems is not an easy one. Nonetheless, this essay will address itself to a few of the more crucial questions that must be asked when considering China and the central balance. How do the present leaders of China view the world? Do these views provide an adequate, or even accurate, foundation upon which the actual practice, or operationalisation, of policies in the international sphere can be carried out? What resources does China bring to bear on her international relations and activities?

The Post-Liberation Chinese View of the World.

As early as 1946, Mao Zedong, the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) Chairman and principal foreign policy architect, had held that China along with the Soviet-led communist bloc opposed the American-dominated Western imperialist camp, with the non-aligned (and emerging former colonial) states forming a sort of vague 'intermediate zone'. When the CCP came to power in China in October 1949, immediately the new regime became actively embroiled in the emerging 'cold war'. In February of the following year, the PRC had little option but to 'lean to one side' and sign a thirty-year Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance (including attached

protocols) with Moscow. Shortly thereafter, in June 1950, the Korean Conflict began, and by October Chinese 'volunteers' had joined the hostilities. For the next two decades, mutual animosity marked China's relations with the United States, who actively sought to isolate and contain the PRC in international politics. In the 1950s, the CCP's main objectives were national reunification (including the 'return' of Taiwan), the domestic consolidation of its rule, and the socio-economic reconstruction and transformation of the new Chinese state. Internationally, the CCP sought to enhance national security by devising a strategy to forstall American military and political encirclement. In this effort, China presented a policy of 'peaceful coexistence' to its Asian neighbours, as at the 1955 Bandung Conference, in an attempt to win friends and seek allies who would take a firmer stance against the U.S.

By the 1960s, the development of differences (or 'splits') in both world camps, but particularly the deepening of the Sino-Soviet conflict, not only challenged the prevailing views on bipolarity held by many Western analysts and officials, but had the effect of confronting China with a second major adversary. The previous Chinese implications about triangularity, or trilateralism, in the international system were made explicit by the autumn of 1963 following a series of events that blazed the trail of a deepening Sino-Soviet dispute. These included the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1958, the June 1959 Soviet cancellation of its agreement to help China become a nuclear power, the Khrushchev-Eisenhower talks at Camp David in late 1959, the withdrawal of Soviet aid and technicians from China in August 1960, the 1962 Missile Crisis in Cuba, and Moscow's signing of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in August 1963. The international order was seen as having entered a new stage wherein the two 'superpowers' formed a sort of 'Holy Alliance' against the 'world's revolutionary forces'. Mao made it clear that China was not in the Soviet bloc, but rather was in the

intermediate zone. Slowly, in other words, the Soviet 'revisionist, New Tsars' had come to rival the U.S. imperialists as China's principal enemy.

While China's world view still officially held that 'imperialism', rather than 'revisionism', was the primary enemy, its re-formulated doctrine contained two basic objectives: to break out of the encirclement imposed now by both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. (whom Beijing considered to be jointly 'colluding' against China); and China's support for and organisation of a new international order in which Third World states would no longer be dominated by the two 'superpowers'. Two examples of China's drive for such a new world order were shown on the questions of maritime rights (including issues regarding the 'law of the sea and seabeds' and those delimiting territorial waters) and disarmament. The formula put forth to describe the posture was summarised in Lin Biao's 1965 treatise entitled 'Long Live the Victory of People's War:

Taking the entire globe, if North America and Western Europe can be called 'the cities of the world', then Asia, Africa and Latin America constitute 'the rural areas of the world'. In a sense, the contemporary world revolution... presents a picture of the encirclement of the cities by the rural areas. In the final analysis, the whole cause of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggle of Asian, African, and Latin American people who make up the overwhelming majority of the world population.¹

In fact, however, neither the formulation nor the operationalisation of China's new policy succeeded. Many Third World states were indifferent or hostile to Beijing's policy, seeing it as serving only China's national interests. This was particularly the case with her drive to exclude the Soviet Union from the abortive 1965 Afro-Asian Conference. Moreover, as China 'turned on itself' during the violent and chaotic Cultural Revolution, normal relations with the outside world were virtually suspended and in the eyes of many Third World states Beijing was scorned as an international pariah.

Following the slow return to relative stability within China by the early 1970s, and her long-denied 're-entry' into the international arena as symbolised by Beijing's assumption of the 'China seat' at the United Nations, a more definitive triangular view of the world emerged. Although credited to the thought of Mao Zedong, the 'Theory of the Three Worlds' was formally enunciated by Deng Xiaoping at the United Nations in 1974. It divided the world into three primary units: the First World of the two 'superpowers', the Soviet Union and the United States; the Second World of other industrialised powers, including the countries of Western Europe and Japan; and the Third World of developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. China identified itself as belonging to the Third World.

According to this view, the primary world struggle was between the Third and First Worlds. The Third World was assigned the role of the primary revolutionary force, constituting a potential 'united front' which could be directed against the superpowers. The Second World, it was held, would support the Third World on some issues. Hua Guofeng, CCP Chairman from 1977 to 1981, defined the objectives of this policy in his 'Political Report' to the Eleventh CCP Congress on 12 August 1977 thusly:

Chairman Mao's thesis differentiating the three worlds gives a correct orientation to the present international struggle and clearly defines the main revolutionary forces, the chief enemies, and the middle forces that can be won over and united, enabling the international proletariat to unite with all forces that can be united to form the broadest united front in the class struggle against the chief enemies of the world arena.²

Several events, however, combined to give impetus to a major 'shift' away from this 'dual adversary' viewpoint wherein the two superpowers constituted equal threats to world peace (but to China's security in particular) and toward the position that Moscow was the 'principal enemy'. The dual shocks' of the late 1960s, the Soviet intervention into Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and the armed clashes along the Sino-Soviet border on the Ussuri River

and in Xinjiang between April and August 1969, were particularly important in pointing out the immediacy of the Soviet danger to China. Soviet expansionism in Africa during the 1970s was also set against the perceived waning of American power, particularly in light of its failed policies in Indochina. Domestically, differences over policy among CCP leaders such as Lin Biao, who supported a strict policy of 'self-reliance' that opposed detente with either of the superpowers, and those, such as Zhou Enlai, who favoured a tactical turn to the West was all but resolved by late 1971 following the demise of Lin Biao. Subsequent events in Indochina and the rapid growth in Soviet military might during the 1970s also had a significant impact on China's singling out of Moscow as the number one threat. The Chinese argument was that while the world learned of the imperialistic nature of the U.S. in the 1960s, during the 1970s the world began to know Soviet social imperialism. Soviet activities and interests were viewed as a part of their plan for world domination. Moscow's behaviour was thus held as the rationale to 'adjust' China's policy with regard to the U.S., thereby constructing the broadest united front to counter-balance the Soviet threat.³

That CCP leaders have had to 'pull some ideological strings' in order to legitimise this shift toward what seems to be a more balance-of-power stance that is in many ways reminiscent of the 1950s 'cold war' period is indicative of the dynamic quality of Chinese strategic assessment. In some ways, its logic is not too far removed from the traditional Chinese concept of 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend'. Nor does it run counter to the ploy of yi yi zhi yi, or 'using barbarians to control barbarians'.

In the early 1970s, both Zhou and Deng argued that the international system would remain unstable, and that the cause of this instability was superpower competition centered in Europe. This competition would inevitably lead to war. China, however, was not deemed to be in the forefront of this

international strategic struggle. In the short term, it was speculated that such superpower competition in more vital and vulnerable spheres of interest than Asia might provide China with the international 'breathing space' required to resurrect itself politically and economically from a decade of turmoil.

However, at the Tenth CCP Congress in August 1973, Zhou suggested that long-term peace might be assured 'so long as the peoples, who are becoming more and more awakened, keep the orientation clearly in sight, heighten their vigilance, strengthen unity, and persevere in struggle'.⁴ After the final collapse of the Saigon regime in the spring of 1975, Chinese analysts began to argue that Soviet actions were moving beyond a wholly Eurocentric orientation.

Soviet social-imperialism, like a hungry tiger coming out from its lair in the mountains, poses an even greater danger to the states and peoples in Southeast Asia than decaying U.S. imperialism. That is why it is far more important to heighten vigilance against the Soviet Union...[which is] trying its best to replace the United States as the overlord in Asia.⁵

At the Eleventh CCP Congress in 1977, following the death of Mao, the initial 'smashing' of the Gang of Four, and the re-emergence of Deng Xiaoping, the possibility of delaying or otherwise impeding the outbreak of inevitable world war was raised for the first time since Zhou's remark in 1973:

So long as the people of all countries heighten their vigilance, close their ranks, get prepared and wage unrelenting struggles, they may be able to put off the outbreak of war, or will find themselves in a favorable position when war does break out.⁶

By November 1977, it was unequivocally stated that given the fact that the Soviet Union was the most reckless and treacherous of the superpowers as well as the most dangerous source of world war, China urgently needed a long period of peace in order to achieve the gigantic task of modernisation.⁷ PRC policy proceeded from the assumptions that the USSR considered the US

to be its chief enemy and that Soviet build-up in the Far East was directed mainly at America and Japan, rather than China. This had earlier been described as 'feinting to the east while attacking the west'.⁸ The appropriate strategy was deemed to be that of emphasising China's long-term scientific, technological and industrial development rather than opting for an abrupt (and by implication illusory) 'quick fix' to deal with the threat.⁹ Indeed, as has been suggested by one analyst, by insisting that the Soviets were occupied with the West and Middle East (a critique substantiated by Moscow's intervention in Afghanistan), Beijing gains a degree of freedom from domestic criticisms about the priority it has recently put on economic improvements over military modernisation.¹⁰

The Contemporary View from Beijing.

Since the dramatic escalation of Sino-Vietnamese tensions in early 1978 (including the Vietnamese intrusion into Kampuchea in December of that year and the subsequent China-Vietnam border war in February-March 1979) and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, a somewhat different Chinese strategic view has emerged. Emphasis on an approaching frontal confrontation between the Soviet Union and the West has given way subtly to a perception of a Soviet policy of strategic encirclement aimed at strangling the West through dominance over the world's energy sources and supply routes. Beijing sees Moscow's goal as an outflanking operation whereby the USSR is pushing into Southwest Asia and, with the help of its 'surrogates' Vietnam and Cuba, is seeking to expand its hegemonic control from the Horn of Africa and Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca and the Pacific Ocean.

To elaborate the Chinese position more fully, it is held by Beijing that during the past decade and a half Soviet global strategy evolved gradually in the process of the USSR transforming itself into a 'social-

imperialist country'.¹¹ Its largely unchallenged expansionist ambitions grew with its military might. As Soviet military strength waxed, American military power waned. No longer was there seen to be a superpower alignment or collusion against China, rather Beijing argued that the U.S. had been 'duped' by the Soviets through such devices as the SALT II treaty. While the U.S. has remained the only country in the world capable of challenging the Soviet bid for world hegemony, it has been put on the defensive. Nonetheless, the two superpowers are set on a collision course which will inevitably cause them to clash in different parts of the world.

While this superpower confrontation is on a global scale, the position Europe occupies in the overall strategy of the two makes it the focus of their contention. But because the Soviet Union is effectively blocked in terms of taking Europe by force, it has developed the concept of 'seizing Europe by stratagem'. This involves, on the one hand, exerting military pressure to compel Western Europe to seek detente with Moscow, forcing Western Europe to opt for 'neutrality' (which would disintegrate N.A.T.O.), and step by step squeeze out U.S. influence. On the other hand, it tries to make a breakthrough in the Middle East and Africa, 'the extended backdoor of Europe', and gain control of the oil-rich Gulf and mineral-rich Africa. The Soviet Union's push into Africa through its Cuban mercenaries and its painstaking efforts to cultivate and expand its influence in the Horn of Africa and about the Red Sea since the mid-1970s are part of its strategic drive to wrest Western Europe from the United States.

On the east and on the west, the Chinese surmise, the Soviets have run into stiff confrontation and are unable to make a frontal attack. So Moscow has turned its attention to pushing southward at the soft underbelly - thus re-enacting Tsarist Russian postures. The armed invasion of Afghanistan is a major step in its thrust southward, and has become a

'bridgehead' for further advance into the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

In concert with its gains in the Red Sea area, this forms a pincer attack on the oil-rich and unstable Gulf.

Recently the Soviet Union has reinforced its strategic deployment and made significant headway in the Asian-Pacific region, the Chinese point out.¹²

It has backed Vietnam's policy to establish regional hegemony, while building up its own military strength so that it has a quarter of its total military forces in the region. As an example of this, Moscow now has gained access to the naval and air facilities at Da Nang, Cam Ranh Bay and Kampong Som. It has actively pursued what Beijing calls a 'dumb-bell strategy' of striving to dominate the Strait of Malacca to control passage between the Indian and Pacific Oceans even as it pushes its way south to connect its western front to Vietnam and Kampuchea through Afghanistan.

Its goals are to set up a cordon through these oceans so as to cut off the U.S., China, Japan and Europe, as well as to put up a wall of encirclement around China to stop it from becoming a big power.

The Chinese conclude that so long as unity against Soviet hegemonism is encouraged and fostered in a way that does not confine itself to the problem of one country or one region but proceeds from an overall and effective strategy, Moscow will run into resistance wherever it tries to expand. Proceeding only from temporary, regional interests could lead to greater dangers, but proceeding from long-term, overall strategic considerations could ease crises and preserve world peace (or at least delay the outbreak of a major war),

Thus, the present Chinese view, at least at its declaratory level, reflects a rather 'neo-bipolar' and 'neo-containment' perspective of the world, whereby the Soviet hegemonist forces are vying against the anti-hegemonial united front led by the United States (and including China). It can be argued that this still embodies the rather crude use of 'triangular

diplomacy' as a device by which A + B can combine, however temporarily, against C.¹³ However, with the increasingly close relations between the U.S. and China, as exemplified by mutual assertions of 'parallel security interests', a growing 'consultative relationship', and the June 1981 American decision to consider the sale of military weapons and technology on a case-by-case basis to the PRC, this 'strategic triangle' has become less operational, with the result that Beijing (and to some extent the U.S. as well) has comparatively less room for manoeuvre or bargaining with either of its antagonists.

China undoubtedly recognises that a more logical way to view its role in this balance, as the weakest of the three, would be to seek a reasonable relationship with both (thus approaching the role of a 'pivot' or 'balancer'). This would better enable Beijing to play off its major contestants one against the other and allow it to move toward a double 'guarantee' of security. This option, however, is not now deemed to be a viable one, with the result that Sino-American ties continue to grow.

No doubt the long-term Chinese goal is to be fully independent, and Beijing will, if for no other reason than maintaining its dignity, continue to signal its 'American friend' that it does nonetheless seek options - as in its June 1981 call for renewed negotiations with the Soviets over such issues as trade and disputed borders (particularly in the Pamirs Mountains area). That the PRC has some measure of leverage vis-a-vis the U.S. can be traced to the latter's generally euphoric attitudes towards the development of Sino-U.S. camaraderie (despite the difficulties encountered early in the Reagan administration). As Vice-President Walter Mondale chirped in Beijing on 27 August 1979:

Despite the sometimes profound differences
between our two systems, we are committed

to joining you to advance our many parallel strategies and bilateral interests. Thus, any nation which seeks to weaken or isolate you in world affairs assumes a stance counter to American interests.

That the message was directed as much at the Soviets as at the Chinese was unmistakably clear.¹⁴ Undeniably, the fundamental incompatibility of the espoused socio-political systems of the PRC and the U.S. does count for something in the long-term. Also, there are several important differences that continue to cloud the relationship, such as the range of burning issues concerning Taiwan and problems of trade. Beijing may also be wary of appearing too closely aligned with the U.S. in the eyes of the non-aligned states of the Third World. While it continues to actively champion Third World causes in the United Nations, China has for several years subtly shifted much of its attention to the Second World and the 'distant superpower' in order to obtain the necessary technologies and assistance to fuel its modernisation drive.

There probably is not any one permanent 'best friend' in the world for the PRC, only a number of powers with varying degrees of parallel interests. In fact, the current leaders in Beijing seem to see the kaleidoscopic world order primarily through the lenses of real politik. The main variable is the interplay of national interests between the great powers, only slightly coloured by ideology.¹⁵ Even the ideological dimension of the Sino-Soviet dispute has been played down to the point where China no longer refers to the Soviet Union as being 'revisionist'. This is so partly because many of the current domestic political and socio-economic policies of the PRC are similar to those of the Soviet Union or even the 'capitalist West', and partly because China has 'tilted' so noticeably in the direction of the 'imperialist' United States. China's unilateral announcement in April 1980 of its intent not to seek the renewal of what it must have felt was a modern 'unequal treaty' with a European power, namely the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty, was symbolic of

its determination not to ever again get involved in such an 'entangling alliance' or become overly dependent on any single state.¹⁶ This does not necessarily eliminate the possibility that China would sign a limited treaty of peace and friendship with a 'tacit ally' like the U.S., if it were deemed crucial to do so in the national interest.

That China does not want to be used as a 'card' in the great powers' game of geopolitical poker was clearly pointed out by a new Chinese journal called Liaowang (Observation), which attacked people who viewed Sino-U.S. relations in particular as simply a 'bargaining chip' in world strategy.¹⁷ It went on to say that China ought to be respected for its role in countering the Soviet Union, and that 'for a country and a people to be regarded as a playing card is in itself an insult'. The tactic of 'card-playing', unless diligently practised within a broader strategic doctrine, implies an improvisational and ineffective deterrence gambit. To many, Beijing included, the frequent American reference to 'playing the China card' reflects the poor state of U.S. strategic thinking.

China's primary area of immediate strategic interest is in the Asian region, where it shares common borders with a dozen independent or protected states. Of particular concern are its long borders with the Soviet Union (and its satellite state the Mongolian People's Republic) and its tense frontiers with Vietnam. These geopolitical facts are fundamental to Beijing's strategic perceptions. When set against a history of centuries of enmity, excepting the 1950s aberrational period of Sino-Soviet collaboration, it is virtually impossible for China's leaders to see Soviet policy towards the PRC as anything but an extension of Russian national interests backed up by a qualitatively superior and battle-tested military machine. Undoubtedly, Chinese strategists recognise Moscow's almost pathological fear of encirclement by a U.S.-PRC-Japan (and possibly Pakistan) axis in the east and a strong N.A.T.O. alliance in the west.¹⁸ Some have even gone so far

as to suggest that Moscow's counter-guerrilla operations in Afghanistan are, in part, designed to be a 'practice run' for 'selected incursions' against some of the more vulnerable and sensitive outlying regions of China, such as Xinjiang. As the author points out elsewhere,¹⁹ while the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) is no match for the superior Soviet forces along the borders,²⁰ little is to be gained by a show of arms by either side at present.

Conclusion.

For the foreseeable future, China will continue to approach the strategic balance and problems of defence and security in much the same way as it now does. It will continue its 'broad united front' with the U.S. against the Soviet Union and its allies and proxies. Although it will call for the 'rollback' of Soviet expansionism, Beijing will likely be satisfied if Moscow and its allies can be bogged down indefinitely in places like Afghanistan and Kampuchea at the expense of their prestige, morale and economic viability.²¹ While its 'ally', the United States, will be encouraged to carry the burden of defence against the Soviets, including the arming of friendly nations like Pakistan and Japan, China will feel compelled to divert its vast energies but limited financial resources away from defence toward its economic modernisation programme. It will continue to emphasise the acquisition of production capability rather than outright military equipment transfers of any large dimension. It will buy only selected military items, such as anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, with the aim of augmenting the existing defensive capabilities of the PLA,²² while indigenously developing (with external assistance where relevant) technological know-how for the long-term. For now, however, China must rely for national defence on numbers, rather than superior, or even comparable, technological quality.

In terms of deterrence, China will continue to adhere to the policy of denying the enemy the ability to win, as opposed to the policy of deterrence by threat to inflict unacceptable punishment - as in the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (or 'MAD'). The basic defensiveness of this posture is

derived from and guaranteed by what the Chinese feel are the immutable factors of geography and demography. The twin pillars of this deterrence posture are China's nuclear forces, which have a credible retaliatory capability, primarily in MRBMs, and its 4.2 million man²³ conventional PLA forces which are still programmed primarily to fight a 'protracted people's war' (albeit under 'modern conditions'). At the same time, Beijing will seek to strengthen its posture by political and diplomatic manoeuvring and by manipulating the perceptions of its adversaries through such devices as 'psychological deterrence' and 'image management',²⁴ which are strikingly reminiscent of the tactics discussed by the classical Chinese military strategist, Sun Tzu:

If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging us...All we need to do is to throw something odd and unaccountable in his way...Though the enemy be stronger..., we may prevent him from fighting. Scheme so as to discover his plans. Rouse him and learn the principle of his activity...²⁵

It should be noted that, the above Chinese postures notwithstanding, if Beijing felt that opportunity or need were to compel a more dynamic projection of its influence or power within the Asian region, it would do so in a firm manner after careful calculation. Such was the case in the 1962 border war with India and the 1979 fray with Vietnam. In both conflicts, China sent out prior 'signals' to its adversaries (and any potential backers of the targeted states) indicating the nature of the disputes, the conditions by which conflict could be avoided, and the limited objectives it might have in case of hostilities. Domestically, the regime prepared the people for a range of contingencies, including the possibility of armed struggle with the neighbouring state. Despite the fact that these incursions were given labels such as 'self-defence counter-attack' (against Vietnam), they were in reality limited pre-emptive conventional wars. In the case of the Afghan insurgents who are fighting the Soviet-backed Karmal regime, China will continue to give support

in small arms and, possibly, training in the techniques of guerrilla warfare. However, because China is 'waging a people's war' on its own socio-economic problems, it will not be able to detour many funds or resources into such aid programmes.²⁶ This crucial problem of the allocation of precious resources will, in fact, constitute the key to China's future interaction with the world, as well as our understanding of it.

The domestic importance of 'economic readjustment' and the associated need for all-round stability will tend to make Beijing's posture within the Asian region one of 'accommodation'. It will seek stability particularly along its borders with neighbouring states, and will pose itself as a status quo power in the eyes of the ASEAN states. It can be expected that Beijing will strive to forestall further gains in the region by either the Soviet Union or Vietnam, primarily through non-coercive tactics. However, another flare-up of the hostilities along the Sino-Vietnamese border is not beyond the realm of possibility -- although the 1979 Chinese 'punishment' of Vietnam can be seen as an effort to force a return to the regional status quo ante, or at least a stabilisation of the current regional balance. All jargon aside, the Sino-Vietnamese struggle boils down to a continuing tussle between two neighbouring states with a long history of national differences and animosities. That this relationship is nothing more than a function of the Sino-Soviet dispute seems to be an overly simplified reading of the situation. This is, however right or wrong, the way that it is now portrayed by many, including the Chinese themselves. Seen in this context, it is perhaps easier to understand the nature of current Chinese regional assessments and activities, and to put them into some realistic perspective, no matter how 'odd and unaccountable' they may otherwise appear to be.

NOTES

¹ Lin Biao, 'Long Live the Victory of People's War!' Renmin ribao (People's Daily), 3 September 1965.

² Xinhua News Agency, 22 August 1977. Probably the most important official interpretation of this Thesis was given by the Editorial Department of Renmin ribao, 'Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism', 1 November 1977 in Beijing Review, No. 45, (4 November 1977), pp. 10-41.

³ While China looked to the U.S., however, at least initially the latter escaped neither the charges of expansionism nor the label of a hegemonic power. See, e.g. Xinhua News Agency, 19 December 1974.

⁴ Zhou Enlai, 'Political Report' to the 10th CCP Congress, 24 August 1973, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report-People's Republic of China (hereafter FBIS-PRC), 31 August 1973, p. B-10.

⁵ See, e.g., Ren Guping, 'Repulse the Wolf at the Gate, Guard Against the Tiger at the Back Door', Renmin ribao, 29 July 1975.

⁶ Hua Guofeng, 'Political Report to the 11th CCP Congress, 12 August 1977', in The Eleventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1977), p. 41.

⁷ Editorial Department of Renmin ribao, 'Chairman Mao's Theory...', Beijing Review, No. 45 (4 November 1977), p. 33. See also, Beijing Review, No. 17 (27 April 1981), p. 3.

⁸ Beijing Review, Nos. 35-36 (7 September 1973), p. 22. See also, Beijing Review, No. 26 (30 June 1980), pp. 8-9.

⁹ Jonathan Pollack, 'Chinese Global Strategy and Soviet Power', Problems of Communism, XXX:1 (January-February 1981), p. 61.

¹⁰ Christopher F. Chyba, 'U.S. Military-Support Equipment Sales to the People's Republic of China', Asian Survey, XXX: 4 (April 1981), p. 479.

¹¹ Beijing Review, No. 25 (22 June 1981), pp. 22-25 provides the most current Chinese views on Soviet global strategy.

¹² Beijing Review, No. 1 (5 January 1981), pp. 11-13.

¹³ John Gittings, 'China Reassesses its Moscow Links', South, No. 8 (June 1981), pp. 19-22. See also Gerald Segal, 'China and the Great Power Triangle', The China Quarterly, No. 83 (September 1980), pp. 490-509.

¹⁴ It was not until Harold Brown, U.S. Secretary of Defense, made his January 1980 trip to China, in the wake of the Soviet move into Afghanistan, that the U.S. unequivocally altered its previous official stance of 'even-handed' treatment of the USSR and the PRC.

¹⁵The influence of ideology and religion at lower levels of interaction in the world order is much more important in the Chinese view.

¹⁶It could be speculated that if China ever had any intention of seeking a future reapproachment with the USSR, it might use its closer relations with the US in order to gain better terms from Moscow.

¹⁷Quoted in Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong), No. 772 (23-29 April 1981), p. 3.

¹⁸In fact, Soviet foreign policy makers see the developing Sino-American relationship as the most de-stabilising factor in the contemporary international environment. To counter it, the USSR has increased and modernised its military forces in Asia, further entrenched its positions in Japan's 'Northern Islands', continued to support Vietnam and its policies in Kampuchea and Laos, and sought closer ties with India.

¹⁹Donald H. McMillen, 'The Urumqi Military Region: Problems of Defence and Security in China's "Middle East"', The China Quarterly (forthcoming).

²⁰The best recent work on the strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese military is Ray Bonds, ed., The Chinese War Machine (London: Salamander Books, 1979).

²¹China's 'warming-up' to ASEAN as a bulwark against Vietnamese 'regional hegemonism' has been only partly successful due to continuing fears among some Southeast Asian states that the PRC constitutes an equal, if not greater, long-term threat to the region. See, e.g., Asiaweek, 14 August 1981, p. 12 and Sydney Morning Herald, 25 August 1981, p. 5.

²²It has been estimated that it would cost China \$41-63 billion just to obtain a 'confident capability' to deter a Soviet conventional attack. Drew Middleton, International Herald Tribune, 17 April 1981. In fact, however, the Chinese have cut the defence budget by 13 per cent in September 1980, and have trimmed it yet again in February 1981.

²³There have been indications that plans have been made to reduce the strength of the PLA through demobilisation and retirement to somewhat over 3 million. Such a move would be made primarily for reasons of economy and efficiency.

²⁴See, e.g., Michael Pillsbury, 'Strategic Acupuncture', Foreign Affairs, No. 41 (Winter 1980-81), pp. 44-61.

²⁵Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Lionel Giles (London: Luzac and Co., 1910), pp. 46, 50-51.

²⁶The Chinese apologia for this state of affairs is exemplified by Beijing Review, No. 17 (27 April 1981), p. 3.

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