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SHELTON KODIKARA

Strategic Factors in Interstate Relations in South Asia

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In this monograph Professor Shelton Kodikara makes a detailed examination of the complex pattern of interstate relations in South Asia. Although this pattern has been shaped primarily by India and the Indo Pakistan rivalry, it has also been influenced by the smaller states of the region, namely Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim and, most particularly, Bangladesh. These other powers have added a new dimension to interstate relations in South Asia and are now playing an increasingly important part since the tension between India and Pakistan has begun to subside.

The states of South Asia of course cannot pursue their foreign policies without taking account of the interests and activities of the major external powers, particularly the United States of America, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, Great Britain and the European Economic Community. The rising price of oil has given relations between the states of South Asia and those of the Persian Gulf a new significance.

Professor Kodikara brings a wide knowledge of these many interactions into focus in this study and makes an important contribution to the understanding of strategic interaction in the Indian Ocean area generally. His work will be of interest to readers in Australia and all other states of the Indian Ocean littoral.

Robert O'Neill
Editor, *Canberra Papers*
and Head, SDSC

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Contents

Introduction 1

The Indo-Pakistan Equation 2

Small Power Interaction in South Asia 13
- Sri Lanka and Nepal 17
- Bangladesh 26
- Bhutan and Sikkim 30

The Major Powers and South Asia 34
- The Changing Role of Britain 35
- The United States in South Asia 38
- Soviet Policy in South Asia 45
- India, Pakistan and China 51

Conclusion 65

Footnotes 67

The Strategic and Defence Study Centre 83

Introduction

The South Asian states, defined as comprising India, Pakistan, Bangladesh (after 1971), Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim (until 1975) merit regional treatment on several grounds;[1] geographical contiguity in belonging to a distinct sub-continent, ethnicity, historic cultural affinity, and, most importantly, existence of a common level of interaction determined by juxtaposition to the regional pole, namely, India. For these states, past dominance by the British Raj, either direct or indirect, provided yet another distinguishing element. The British had evolved the strategic concept of India's defence as involving the security of the whole sub-continent of South Asia, and extending to its environs, such as Tibet and Afghanistan; this tradition influenced early post-independence Indian strategies of defence.

The British withdrawal in 1947, however, did not entail a total divesting of Britain's erstwhile responsibilities in South Asia. The British stake in South Asia continued into the post-independence period and became an important component of the regional politics of the sub-continent. After 1947, South Asian regional interests also became interconnected with global developments involving adjustments and interactions among the big powers, principally Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and China.

This paper sets out to examine three dimensions of South Asian politics:

(1) The Indo-Pakistan equation as a factor in the sub-continent's international relations;

(2) The regional interaction of the smaller powers, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and the Himalayan kingdoms; and

(3) Major power involvement in South Asia.

The ground covered by this paper has been largely traversed before, and an impressive body of literature already exists on Indo-Pakistan relations, relations between India and the smaller powers, and on the general field of big-power interaction with the states of South Asia. This paper attempts to focus interest on small-power politics and big-power involvement in South Asia against the background of the pervasive rivalry between India and Pakistan. Thematically, the paper will stress geostrategic factors in the political configuration of South Asia, and its changing balance of power, with special reference to the two wars which have had a bearing on it, viz., the Sino-Indian war of 1962 and the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971. The present nature of interstate relations and balance of power will form the concluding part of the paper.

2

The Indo-Pakistan Equation

Much mutual recrimination and mistrust has persisted as the continuing feature of Indo-Pakistani relations since independence. The partition of British India came as a traumatic shock to both India and Pakistan. Partition was accepted as a disagreeable necessity by the Congress leadership: it entailed the bifurcation of Bengal, the cradle of modern Indian nationalism, the division of the rich and fertile Punjab, and the secession of strategic areas commanding the north-west approaches to India. The creation of a theocratic Islamic state juxtaposed to India was seen as a threat to India's secular democratic experiment, and partition was seen as a case of 'strategic and political secession' from India.[2] Not surprisingly, irredentist aspirations towards Pakistan have often been entertained, and sometimes even publicly expressed, in Indian circles. Soon after independence, for example, the President of the Indian National Congress, Acharya Kripalani declared: 'Neither the Congress nor the nation has given up its claim of a united India'.[3] Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Vallabhai Patel himself expressed the view that 'sooner than later, we shall again be united in common allegiance to our country'.[4] Many years after independence, similar declarations of intent were still being expressed on the Indian side. Soon after India's liberation of Goa, Congress President Sanjiva Reddy declared (on 4 January 1962) that India 'was determined to get Pakistani and Chinese aggression on its soil vacated before long', and further, that 'the cease-fire in Kashmir could not be accepted as a permanent solution of the problem' because 'the whole country [was] behind the Government in liberating the one-third of Kashmir under Pakistan's illegal occupation'.[5]

The view is attributed to Nehru himself, as late as 1963, that he regarded Pakistan 'as an area which should be re-incorporated into an Indian dominated confederation'.[6] Some of these statements were no doubt mere rhetoric, and were probably meant for domestic consumption. The Government was at the time under continual pressure from the press and public opinion, as well as from the political opposition, to defend its foreign and defence policies in the context of Indian reverses on the Chinese front in the late fifties and early sixties. But the impact of these statements on the Pakistani mind was to implant the conviction that India was not reconciled to Pakistan's existence as a sovereign, independent state, that Indian efforts in foreign policy 'were all directed towards one aim, the isolation of Pakistan and its disintegration', and that Pakistan must accept the situation of 'implacable hostility' with India and 'learn to live with it'.[7]

Friction between India and Pakistan had several roots: the old and recurrent Hindu-Muslim antagonism, problems created by the colossal problem of refugee rehabilitation, disputes concerning division of Indian assets, and sharing of river

waters flowing from Indian to Pakistani territory. These problems were progressively solved. But overshadowing all these was the rival claim to Kashmir; this dispute remained as a simmering fire which periodically burst into flames, adding new dimensions of hatred and conflict between the two countries. The former Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto described Kashmir as the 'handsome head' of the body of Pakistan. 'Pakistan is incomplete without Jammu and Kashmir both territorially and ideologically. Recovering them, she would recover her head and be made whole, stronger, and more viable'.[8]

Pakistan considered its claim to Kashmir to be buttressed by the fact of its being a contiguous Muslim-majority area with common road, river and rail connections. But for India to have conceded the validity of Pakistan's claim would have undermined the very basis of its own secular democracy, which included more Muslims than did the western wing of Pakistan. Juridical considerations apart, and leaving aside Nehru's own personal predilections, the Indian claim to Kashmir was based on strategic realities. Kashmir commanded a northern access to the Indian plains, and shared a common boundary with China. Nehru was greatly concerned when President Ayub was negotiating the demarcation of the Sino-Pakistani border in the Pakistani-held Kashmir area with the Chinese in 1963; he asked for and was given a map delineating the Pakistani position.[9] Inevitably, Kashmir became an important component in the power equation between the two countries. As attitudes hardened, Kashmir was viewed as an essential condition of security by both sides; its loss was perceived as entailing a relative loss of security by both sides.

India and Pakistan have fought four wars since Partition (1947-48, April 1965, September 1965 and December 1971). Two of these (1947 and September 1965) were directly sparked off by the Kashmir question; both ended in a military stalemate. The 1947 war ended with UN intervention and the imposition of the cease-fire line. The September 1965 war ended with Soviet mediation, the Tashkent summit and the Tashkent declaration. Pakistan's collusion in the tribal invasion of Kashmir which led to the 1947 war is established. President Ayub himself acknowledged the fact when he declared at a public meeting in Jakarta in December 1960: 'Thus began the problem of Kashmir, where the Muslims were fighting for freedom. Naturally we in Pakistan went to their aid'.[10] In retrospect, it seems that a mutual accommodation on Kashmir might have been possible before attitudes hardened on both sides in the sixties. Despite Nehru's strong emotional attachment to Kashmir, he might have been prevailed upon to accept some settlement based on a partition of the state. India had used its armed forces to integrate Junagadh and Hyderabad in Union territory because these states were enclaves within India. Such was not the case with Kashmir; Kashmir had a Muslim population and it was contiguous to both India and

Pakistan. The repeated offers of a no-war pact which Nehru made to President Ayub in the sixties indicates that even at that time Nehru might have been interested in a political solution of the Kashmir question based on mutual acceptance of the cease-fire line. The wars of 1965 however marked the point of no return. Ayub's own response to Nehru's offer was to propose joint defence against external aggression. The proposal as mooted by Ayub, in 1959, was intended to be contingent on an agreed solution of the Kashmir and Canal Waters problems, after which the armies of the two countries would disengage and move to their respective vulnerable frontiers, thus providing 'the substance of joint defence'. The question, 'joint defence against whom?' was not clearly spelled out in Ayub's proposal, but it was made in the context of the Khampa rebellion in Tibet in 1959, evidence of Chinese activity in the Ladakh area of Kashmir, and Pakistan's own commitment, through her link with western security pacts, to a containment of China policy.[11] Nehru's own response to the proposal was negative.

The Kutch war of April 1965, though fought with tanks and armoured vehicles by India and Pakistan, was a 'mini-battle', and was sparked off by a relatively minor border dispute in an area separating West Pakistan (Sind Province) from the State of Gujarat in India. Pakistan's claim to the Rann of Kutch was based on the ground that it was either a landlocked sea or a boundary lake, to which the principles of international law applied, and that therefore the boundary between the two States ran through the middle of the Rann. In the Indian view, there was no dispute regarding the Kutch boundary, since the former princely state of Kutch had always been in possession of the Rann in its entirety, and since in any case it was not an inland sea or lake, to which the principles of international law applied, as contended by Pakistan.[12] The dispute was later settled by international arbitration, 3200 square miles of the disputed territory being awarded to India, and 350 square miles to Pakistan.[13] Who aggressed against whom is always a difficult question to decide, but it is undisputed that the actual attack which led to hostilities was mounted by Pakistan on 9 April 1965, though according to the Pakistani version, the attack was a response to India's 'arms build-up in the disputed territory and attempt [ed] to seize the Kanjarkot area by force', in addition to India's 'forcible' occupation of Chhad Bet on the disputed boundary of the Rann in 1956.[14] The fact that India was caught in this war in the unfavourable mud-flat terrain of the Rann, soon to be inundated by monsoon rains, would appear to indicate that India was drawn into this war rather than the reverse; indeed, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri felt constrained to warn Pakistan that if it were to 'continue to discard reason and persist in its aggressive activities, our Army will defend the country and it will decide its own strategy and the employment of its manpower and its equipment in the manner

which it deems best'.[15] To this President Ayub Khan reacted with the statement:

> India has now threatened us with further aggression in a battle ground of her own choice. Does she realise that this will mean a general and total war between India and Pakistan with all its unpredictable consequences. If such a situation is forced on us, nobody can expect us not to meet the challenge.[16]

The April war of 1965, however, proved to be only a dress rehearsal for the larger Indo-Pak conflict which followed in September. The train of events which led to renewed hostilities commenced on August 5, when four to five thousand Pakistani guerrillas infiltrated the cease-fire line in Kashmir. Indian forces retaliated by crossing over and occupying key points on the routes used by the guerrillas on the Pakistani side of the cease-fire line. On 1 September, Pakistan mounted a major attack with artillery and tanks in the Chhamb sector near the disputed border between Pakistan and Jammu; on 6 September, Indian troops crossed the Punjab border in three places in the Lahore sector. The biggest tank battle since World War II had begun. The sequence of events and other evidence suggest that it was Pakistan which was seeking a military confrontation with India. Foreign Minister Bhutto was at this time advocating a preventive strike against India on the grounds of Pakistan's qualitative superiority in arms and expected support from China. The Bhutto Government was later strongly critical of the Ayub regime for not having exploited India's embarrassment during the Sino-Indian war of 1962 by intervening in Kashmir.[17] According to G.W. Choudhury:

> Calculations and temptations for intervening in the widespread political unrest and agitation in the Indian part of Kashmir, which began over the theft of the holy relic in 1964, were great for Ayub and his advisers. India under 'little Shastri' was considered to be weak following the death of Nehru. The mini Indo-Pakistani battle over the marshy lands in the Rann of Kutch in the Spring of 1965 gave the Pakistani armed forces a false sense of superiority, and memories of India's military defeats by the Chinese in 1962 were still fresh. Under these 'favourable circumstances' a group of the ruling elite – Bhutto being the most enthusiatic among them – felt that a policy of confrontation with India over Kashmir might be fruitful.[18]

Ayub later admitted that the decision to embark on confrontation with India in 1965 was his 'weakest and fatal' point.[19] However that may be, the 1965 war revealed the basic weakness of Pakistan's defence system: it was geared to the security of West Pakistan, and largely to operations in the Kashmir sector. Bhutto was to affirm publicly later that it was the possibility of Chinese intervention that had kept East Pakistan safe during the war.[20] India would have engaged in a politically counter-productive exercise with little strategic advantage if she had in fact mounted a campaign in East Pakistan. In any event, the reliance

on the Chinese alliance and the government's better protection for West Pakistan was not lost on the East Pakistanis. It was not without significance that Mujibur Rahman put forward his six-point plan for the regional autonomy of East Pakistan soon after the 1965 war.

The Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 was different from previous Indo-Pak wars in several respects. It was the first instance when East Pakistan was the source of the dispute, and it was the first time East Pakistan was the main theatre of operations. Kashmir was not the issue in this war, thought the fighting inevitably spread to Kashmir, as well as other sectors in the West. In East Pakistan the initial clashes, over several weeks, were with Indian-armed, Indian-trained and Indian-assisted Mukti Bahini guerrillas, at several points along the 1400-mile long border. Indian troops crossed the border by force as early as 27 October. On 3 December Pakistan mounted a major air attack on several Indian cities in the West; India retaliated by a major military offensive on 4 December. The declared war lasted barely two weeks. By 16 December the Pakistani Army of 90,000 in East Pakistan had surrendered to the Indian commander in Dacca.[21] In the West, too, it was India which wrested the initiative and ended the war with 2,750 square miles of Pakistani territory in Indian hands as compared with 50 square miles of Indian territory in Pakistani hands. Severe casualties were inflicted by India on the much smaller Pakistani Navy, which lost its only submarine off Visakhapatnam. Though the war was so brief, its impact on Indo-Pakistani relations, as well as power relations on the subcontinent generally, were most momentous. The war left a truncated Pakistan, smarting under a humiliating defeat. It led to the creation of the State of Bangladesh as yet another geostrategic entity in South Asia. The main outcome of the war for India was its establishment as the dominant power in the subcontinent, and as successor to the old British role. It also betokened an enhanced Soviet influence in the area in as much as the massive Indian victory had been achieved under Soviet auspices. After the fighting was over President Yahya Khan was succeeded by Bhutto in what was now a 'rump Pakistan', with only about a tenth of India's population and with greatly diminished diplomatic and political leverage.

As regards the Indo-Pakistan equation, the aftermath of the war has left behind three distinct sets of consequences: first, those relating to Kashmir itself, second, those relating to Pakistan's foreign policy generally, and third, those pertaining to the military balance between India and Pakistan. The residual State of Pakistan, from the point of view of its physical structure, was after 1971 more viable in that it was now geographically compact, as well as more culturally homogeneous and economically integrated. Problems pertaining to national integration and the search for a national identity, too, became simpler after 1971. The big question was, did post-1971 Pakistani leaders continue to regard the States

of Jammu and Kashmir as *Pakistania irredenta?* It has been cogently argued that the 1971 war entailed a reappraisal by Pakistan of its hard-line stand on Kashmir in several respects.[22] Perhaps Pakistan was forced into such a reappraisal since after the war India held all the trump cards at the negotiating table: a large army of prisoners of war, large tracts of occupied territory, and all the psychological advantages accruing from a great military victory. At Simla in June-July 1972, Pakistan conceded recognition of the cease-fire line of 17 December 1971 as the basis of negotiation in respect of Kashmir. This enabled India to ignore the UN cease-fire line of 1949, and discuss directly with Pakistan the new one, which incorporated certain territorial gains during the war in the Kargil sector. Para. IV (ii) of the Simla Agreement declared that 'in Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the cease-fire of 17 December 1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this line'. The requirement in the agreement that 'Indian and Pakistani forces shall be withdrawn to their side of the international border' meant Indian withdrawal from large areas of occupied territory in other sectors, mainly Sind. But the renunciation of the use of force (an acceptable substitute for a no-war pact) and acceptance of bilateralism by Pakistan were important gains for India. Thus it may be inferred that in the foreseeable future another Indo-Pak clash over Kashmir is highly unlikely, and that both sides may have come a long way towards accepting the new delineation of the border as definitive. According to Ayoob, a significant and substantive change in the Pakistani attitude was the Bhutto Government's acknowledgment that the Kashmiris' right to self-determination was no longer a 'sacred duty' of Pakistan, but a right to be won by the Kashmiris themselves.[23]

The impact of the war on Pakistani foreign policy was also profound. If the assumption in the previous paragraph that Kashmir had been devalued as a factor in Indo-Pak relations is correct, it seems plausible to assume that basic patterns of Pakistan's foreign policy will also change over the years. Pakistani disappointment with the United States alliance had become so deep-seated that it was no exaggeration when Howard Wriggins described Pakistan's connection with SEATO as a joke. 'For Pakistan' as *Strategic Survey* commented in 1971, 'the choice is now either resignation to life as a relatively small Muslim State, almost as much Middle Eastern as Asian, or alternatively a forlorn struggle to retrieve the Eastern territories by diplomacy, perhaps with the aid of China'. The first prospect would appear to be the likely one, in the light of current events. Pakistan always had a Pan-Islamic component in its foreign policy, the full realisation of which

was not compatible with the American alliance. After 1971 under Bhutto, however, Islamic unity was transformed from a secondary theme to a principal instrument of foreign policy. By 1973, Pakistani training missions had become conspicuous in front-line Arab states like Syria, Egypt, Jordon and Saudi Arabia and Pakistani civilian and military personnel were becoming prominent in military air operations in Libya, Kuwait and in several Persian Gulf Emirates. During the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, Pakistan supported the Arab cause diplomatically as well as materially. For example, elements of a squadron of Pak-piloted aircraft, based in Syria, saw combat, and two battalions of troops were alerted for transfer from Pakistan in the event of an Israeli attack on Damascus. Indeed, the cause of a *jihad* found support among influential sections of Pakistan's political elite. The way was thus paved for Pakistan to become the venue of the Islamic summit conference held in February 1974; this, in turn, paved the way for increased Arab economic assistance to Pakistan.[25]

Direct financial assistance to Pakistan from Islamic countries prior to 1973-74 was practically non-existent. But by mid-1976, five Arab countries and Iran had together given Pakistan loans and credits worth $993 million or almost one-third of all foreign financial aid received over the previous three years. The principal donors up to 1975-76 were Abu Dhaby ($100 m.), Iran ($628.6 m.), Kuwait ($44 m.), Libya ($80 m.), Saudi Arabia ($130 m.), Qatar ($10. m.), loans being generally funded on easy terms. In the seventies Arab States and Iran were also absorbing more than one-fourth of Pakistan's agricultural and industrial exports, Saudi Arabia being the largest single market. By 1977, there were more than 300,000 Pakistanis serving in the Middle East, mostly as unskilled workers, and in 1977-78 remittances from Pakistanis working abroad had risen sharply to more than $1.1 billion, or roughly double Pakistan's service on its foreign debt.[26] To what extent recent developments in Iran will affect Pakistan's overall foreign policy, it is premature to say; though Pakistan's CENTO partner, Iran, had also kept a line open to India. The Islamic Republic of Iran is unlikely to ignore the travails of a sister State on its periphery. However that may be, for his own part. President Zia of Pakistan has lost no time in recognising and extending congratulations to Dr. Bazargon as the new Prime Minister of Iran.[27]

It remains to examine the impact of the 1971 war on the military balance between India and Pakistan, always an important part of the equation. We shall consider the shifts in this balance both before and after the 1971 war.

The quest for military parity with India was, from Partition days, a continuing objective of Pakistani foreign policy. India inherited a larger share from the British Indian military establishment than did Pakistan: 88 infantry battalions for India as against 33 for Pakistan, armoured corps regiments in the proportion of 12 to 6, artillery units 18½ to 8½, engineers units 61 to 34, and fighter

squadrons 7 to 2.[28] The Kashmir war of 1947 broke out before either side could reconstitute and reorganise their respective armies; that war determined the military strategies of both India and Pakistan. India organised its Army almost exclusively as a plains army deployed for the contingency of war with Pakistan; Pakistan's plans were based on war with India. In 1954 Pakistan entered into a mutual defence agreement with the United States and acceded to SEATO more with a view to redressing the balance against India than to subserve the anti-communist objectives of the American alliance. This alliance did serve Pakistan's objectives to a limited extent; though it did not procure direct American military support in the conflict with India, it served to modernise the Pakistani Army and Air Force. As will be discussed later, Pakistani armed forces from 1954 to 1965 were wholly dependent on U.S. military assistance, and Pakistan received during this period a sum in excess of $1 billion by way of military supplies, (including aid for things which indirectly assist the defence effort).[29] The fifties were for India, according to S.S. Khera, a decade of 'general passivity in defence matters with not more than a restraining posture in support of the cease-fire line in Kashmir'.[30] Any large-scale expenditure on defence was precluded by pressing problems of economic development. Indian defence expenditure did rise sharply in response to Pakistan's receipt of military assistance from the U.S.[31] India's arms procurement was mainly from Britain, but generally until after the Indian debacle in the Sino-Indian war of 1962, defence expenditure in India had a lower profile than it did in Pakistan. It was believed in high quarters in Pakistan that in consequence Pakistan enjoyed, up to 1965, a qualitative military superiority over India. As Bhutto explained to Kuldip Nayar;

> There was a time when militarily in terms of big push we were superior to India because of the military assistance we were getting. That was the position up to 1965.[32]

In 1965, Pakistan's Army numbered 230,000, organised in eight divisions, (plus 250,000 lightly armed militia, and 30,000 Azad Kashmir troops) to India's sanctioned army strength of 825,000, organised in 16 divisions (including 9 mountain divisions recently formed), plus 47,000 in a volunteer reserve Territorial Army, with one armoured division, one armoured brigade, and four light tank regiments. Combat aircraft of 200 for Pakistan compared with about 500 for India.[33] Although these figures showed India's numerical military superiority in all departments, in terms of weapons sophistication Pakistan had the edge at this time; that is, after India had begun to receive military aid from the United States and when its purchases from Britain had registered a significant increase.[34]

When, after the 1965 September war, the U.S. imposed an arms embargo on both India and Pakistan, it was the latter which was more seriously affected by the

ban. After 1965, China and France replaced the U.S. as Pakistan's principal arms suppliers, while the Soviet Union supplanted Britain as India's main arms supplier. The significant innovation of the sixties, as far as India was concerned, was that the wars of 1962 with China and of 1965 with Pakistan, combined with the U.S. arms embargo, stimulated a drive for greater self-sufficiency in arms production. The Gnat interceptor, produced under licence from Britain, was used and proved effective in September of 1965. By 1972 200 Gnats Mk I had been produced in India and prototype tests for an improved Gnat Mk II were completed in late 1974, with the IAF being expected to order 300 of this category.[35] Assembly of the MiG-21 was begun in 1966, and the Vijayanta medium tank (with technical help from Vickers Armstrong) began licensed production in 1967, 60 per cent of its components being indigenously produced in 1971.[36] There was no comparable effort to indigenise production in Pakistan until after 1970, when 10 SA 316 Alouette III helicopters were commissioned from France for licensed production in Pakistan.[37] India's total victory in the 1971 war reflected the Indian army's new image since its reorganisation, begun in 1962, and the effects of the Government's new arms production and procurement policies. Statements made in the Pakistani press in the aftermath of the war seemed to indicate that the government of Bhutto had come to terms with the reality of Indian power and that the quest for a military balance with India was a thing of the past. An article in *Dawn* stated:

> For Pakistan the achievement of parity in military might with India was not a practical proposition even before 1965. It is even less so in today's condition. Therefore, Pakistan cannot enter into an arms race.[38]

Echoing the same sentiment, *The Pakistan Times* declared that 'we on our part have to rid ourselves of the fiction of equality of status with India. . .',[39] while Bhutto himself expressed a 'qualitative change' in Pakistan's policy from one of confrontation to consultation and negotiations with India.[40] Bhutto's later statements, however, seemed to belie this intention. In July 1973, for example, he expressed his intention to seek resumption of U.S. military aid 'to attain military parity with India', and in September he declared his readiness to discuss mutual arms reduction with India provided it would 'ensure parity between the two nations'.[41]

Figures relating to the defence expenditure of India and Pakistan after 1971 expressed as percentage of GNP show a marked relative increase for Pakistan. The average for India in the years 1971 to 1976 is about 3 per cent; for Pakistan approximately 6.5 per cent, whereas in the three years 1968-70, the expenditure had been 3.5 per cent for India and roughly the same for Pakistan.[42] In 1977, the total value of arms imports to Pakistan was $138,733,000 compared to India's $178,267,000.[43] After 1971, Pakistan also diversified the sources of

her arms supplies. China and France still remained important sources of supply, but Iran and Sweden, besides Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Libya, figured as important new sources of supply.

A comparative estimate of the military strength of the two countries as of 1978, however, reveals that India had made giant strides towards the reorganisation and modernisation of its armed forces since 1965. The Indian army, according to recent estimates, consists of 17 infantry divisions, 10 mountain divisions, 2 armoured divisions plus 13 independent infantry and armoured brigades, making up a manpower strength of 950,000, including 200,000 reserves and a territorial army of 40,000. The old Centurion tanks, numbering 180, have been supplemented by an estimated 900 T54/55/62 tanks and some 700 locally produced Vijayanta medium tanks besides PT-76 light tanks. Sophisticated artillery has been acquired, the Indian armoury now containing the Soviet Atoll air-to-air missile, produced to arm the MiG-21 fighter, and the French anti-tank Bharat SS-11 missile, warheads for both of which are now being locally produced. In October 1971, India had ordered from the U.K. 40 systems of the Short Tigercat surface-to-air missile and these had been delivered in 1972.[44] The Indian Air Force, too, had made rapid strides towards operational strength. By 1978, it had about 670 combat aircraft, comprised of some 50 Canberra bombers, over 200 supersonic ground attack fighters (100 Su-7, 50 HF-24, and 65 Hunter), 270 MiG-21 and 130 Gnat interceptors, and an assorted range of recce, transport and trainer aircraft. By 1978, India had also built 20 SAM sites with 120 SA-2.[45] But by far the most significant development in the Indian armed services was the rapid increase since 1971 of India's frigate, destroyer and submarine fleet, and the rapid expansion of its defence production base. As of 1978, the Indian Navy consisted of 1 aircraft carrier, 8 Soviet F-class submarines (one nuclear-powered submarine is expected to be commissioned in 1980), 2 cruisers, 3 destroyers, 25 frigates (4 Leander class with 2 Seacat SAM, 10 Petya class, 2 training, etc.), 8 Osa class missile boats with Styx SSM, 8 patrol boats, 8 mine-sweepers, etc.[46] Besides the MiG and Gnat fighters, and the Vijayanta tank, the HF-24 fighter is also now manufactured in India with predominantly local components. By 1974, Magazon Dock in Bombay was expecting to build one Leander-class frigate per year, with more than 50 per cent local components.[47]

It seems clear that Pakistan's own arms procurement and development policies since 1971 have been intended to offset the glaring imbalance which was being consolidated in India's favour in the aftermath of the Indo-Pak war. One example of this is Pakistan's recent development of a naval capability, based around a growing submarine fleet. The Pakistan navy acquired 5 Midget SX-404 submarines,

3 Daphne class submarines (with 3 more on order) from France, all since 1971, and had built up a fleet of 19 patrol boats (ex-Chinese), in addition to the light cruiser (training) and 4 destroyers, which had all been operational in 1971.[48] The combat strength of the Pakistani air force was put at 247 aircraft in 1978, but these included the advanced Mirage V and F-86s from France and the MiG-19 from China, in addition to the existing Canberra bombers acquired from the United States. Pakistan also shopped in Sweden for 45 Saab Supporter primary trainer aircraft in 1975. Man-power strength in the army as of 1978 was estimated at 400,000, including released PoWs from India, but indicating an addition of 4 infantry divisions since 1971. Besides the Patton, Sherman and Chaffee, and later M-113 tanks acquired from the U.S., Pakistan's armoured potential has been considerably increased by the acquisition of the T-59 Tank from China, 700 of which, according to *Military Balance,* 1977-78, were operational by that year. Pakistan's missile capability had rested, before 1971, on the American Sidewinder and French Matra R-530, which were procured to arm the F-86, Mirage and MiG-19 fighters. In 1965, licensed production of the West German Cobra anti-tank missile had also commenced, and production of this category was completely indigenised. The innovation in the seventies was the negotiation with China for production of a SAM-6 missile system. Pakistan attempted to indigenise its arms production much later than did India. At present indigenous production relates, apart from the SA-316 Alouette III helicopter and Cobra anti-tank missile, to the Cessna Bird Dog light plane (60 per cent indigenous in 1976, no licence for which is required by the U.S.).

A factor which has impinged on the Indo-Pak military balance, indeed on the strategic dimensions of South Asia as a whole, is the situation arising from India's explosion of a nuclear device in May 1975. What is relevant in the above context is not so much the 'peaceful' nature of the explosion, but the impact it has had on the image of India as a near-nuclear power, with all the consequences this implies for Indo-Pak relations and for interstate relations in the subcontinent generally, to say nothing of its repercussions in the larger international environment. Pakistan's immediate reaction was to seek nuclear guarantees and warn that unless it received more than 'mere verbal assurances', it would move to acquire its own nuclear bomb. Bhutto had written in 1969:

> . . . it is crucial for Pakistan to give the greatest possible attention to nuclear technology, rather than allow herself to be deceived by an international treaty limiting this deterrent to the present nuclear Powers. India is unlikely to concede nuclear monopoly to others, and judging from her own nuclear programme and her diplomatic activities especially at Geneva, it appears that she is determined to proceed with her plans to detonate a nuclear bomb. If

> Pakistan restricts or suspends her nuclear programme, it would not only enable India to blackmail Pakistan with her nuclear advantage, but would impose a crippling limitation on the development of Pakistan's science and technology.[49]

Bhutto was the main advocate of a nuclear option for Pakistan. It does not appear that India's nuclear explosion has pushed Pakistan into a major nuclear program, which in any event is dependent on foreign assistance either from China or France, neither of which may, according to the Non-proliferation Treaty transfer nuclear technology to the point where Pakistan can assemble a device at this stage. However, neither Pakistan nor India, is a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Pakistan can thus be expected to match efforts with India, to the best of its ability, to develop a nuclear capacity. The present Prime Minister of India Morarji Desai, though expressing himself against even peaceful nuclear explosions, has not rejected them 'for all time', nor indicated an interest in signing the NPT. India therefore has a clear advantage over Pakistan as a near-nuclear power, which enhances her overall strategic superiority over Pakistan.

Small Power Interaction in South Asia

Independent India inherited a body of British strategic doctrine, developed for the defence of the British Indian Empre, as the basis of its own strategic theory. Strategic considerations arising out of India's disputes with Pakistan and China led her to reassess this heritage, but these also seemed to confirm in many ways the validity of the British approach. India's relations with her smaller neighbours, in particular, must first be viewed in the context of this tradition, and then in the light of changes to the politics of the region resulting from conflicts with Pakistan and China.

K.M. Panikkar, the noted historian and diplomat, has written that 'an integrated conception of the defence of India, and a doctrine of Indian defence supported by a consistent foreign policy [were] among the two major contributions of Britain to the Indian people'.[50] In British times, the defence and security of India had rested on a three-fold basis:

(a) safeguarding of the north-west frontier of India, through which successive invading armies had made inroads into Indian territory;

(b) preventing the area around the Indian subcontinent from falling under the control of a foreign power, and

(c) command of the Indian Ocean and its environs.

Throughout the nineteenth century and until the entrance of Japan into the Second World War, Britain had had undisputed mastery of the Indian Ocean, buttressed by possession of the strategic naval base at Trincomalee in Sri Lanka, long considered a vital pre-requisite of Indian security. Approaches to the Indian Ocean, too, were safeguarded by the British possession of Aden, which secured the Red Sea access to the Ocean, and of Singapore and Hong Kong, commanding sea-lanes from the East, and protecting sea-routes to Australia. British strategic concepts of the defence of India were, therefore, based largely on a continental system of security. Besides safeguarding of the north-west frontier, considered the *sine qua non* of India's defence, the security of the Indian empire was conceived of as revolving chiefly round the territorial integrity of 'buffer states' like Iran (Persia), Afghanistan, Tibet, and Sinkiang, and of the Himalayan kingdoms of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. Any threat to any of these States from a foreign power was considered to be a threat to the territorial integrity of India. The system's rationale was that any threat to India would be resisted beyond India's borders; its complement a foreign policy pursued with the objective of preventing foreign powers from gaining undue influence in the north-western approaches to India via Persia and Afghanistan. Indeed, a prominent objective of British policy in Asia in the later 19th Century was the containment of Russia's southward expansion towards Persia and Afghanistan, though perception of the dimensions of the Russian threat waxed and waned with changing political circumstances in Europe and with the personal predilections of the men who controlled affairs in London and Calcutta.[51] But it was not only with Russian designs that British statesmen and strategists were becoming concerned at the turn of the century: China, too, though weak, was considered a rival power, particularly in relation to British security and trade interests in Tibet and the Himalayan states of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. China had conceded exclusive British supremacy in Sikkim by the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 (which was not recognised by the Tibetan Lama), but claimed allegiance from Tibet and Nepal as well as Bhutan. Britain was inclined to concede the claim as regards Tibet, but not as regards Nepal and Bhutan. British policy around 1910 was 'to allow China practically complete control over Tibet, but to resist any Chinese attempt to interfere south of the Himalayan crest'.[52] Britain consolidated her position with Bhutan and Nepal by the treaties of 1910 and 1923, respectively. The 1910 treaty with Bhutan (a revision of an earlier treaty of 1865) provided for an enhanced subsidy of Rs. 100,000 payable to Bhutan for territory ceded in 1865, and Bhutan agreed 'to be guided by the British Government in regard to its external relations', while the latter undertook 'to exercise no interference in the internal administration of Bhutan'. Under the 1923 treaty with Nepal, both

Governments agreed 'mutually to acknowledge and respect each other's independence, both internal and external', though the scope of Nepal's independence was somewhat limited by the obligation of each Government 'to exert its good offices' to remove causes of 'any serious friction or misunderstanding with neighbouring States whose frontiers adjoing theirs', a proviso which really meant that Nepal should consult Britain as regards her relations with Tibet, Bhutan, Sikkim and China. Nepal was given the right to import arms and ammunition without previous British approval so long as 'the intentions of the Nepal Government are friendly and that there is no immediate danger to India from such importations', but this right was limited in practice if not in theory by a note accompanying the treaty, which required details of such imports to be furnished to the British envoy.[53]

Britain's treaties with the Himalayan States lapsed with the transfer of power; they are important, however, because they provided the guidelines for independent India's own definition of relations with these States. In fact, in the years following upon independence, India concluded treaties with these States, almost exactly on the same lines as Britain's treaties with them.

Thus Article II of the Indo-Bhutan treaty of August 1949 stipulated that the Government of India would exercise no interference in the internal administration of Bhutan while on its part, Bhutan agreed 'to be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its external relations'. Under Article VI, Bhutan was declared to be free to import 'with the assistance and approval of the Government, from or through India into Bhutan, whatever arms, ammunition, machinery, warlike material or stores may be required or desired for the strength and welfare of Bhutan'. The Bhutanese interpretation of the treaty was that it was not mandatory for the Bhutanese King to accept all advise given by India;[54] in fact, Bhutan became a member of the United Nations in 1971, with the support and sponsorship of Inida.

The Indo-Sikkimese treaty of December 1950 brought Sikkim more closely within the Indian fold. It gave the Indian Government 'the right to take such measures as it considers necessary for the defence of Sikkim or the security of India, whether preparatory or otherwise, and whether within or outside Sikkim.' This provision gave India the right to intervene even in Sikkim's internal affairs, since internal unrest in Sikkim could be construed as constituting a threat to the security of India.

By the Indo-Nepali treaty of January 1950, both Governments were obligated to 'inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding with any neighbouring State likely to cause any breach in the friendly relations subsisting between the two Governments'. (Art. II). This provision was further consolidated

by an exchange of letters (made public in 1959) which stipulated that neither Government would 'tolerate any threat to the security of the other by a foreign aggressor. To deal with any such threat the two Governments shall consult with each other and devise effective countermeasures'. Art. V granted Nepal the right to import arms, ammunition or warlike materials and equipment necessary for the security of Nepal through India, though 'the procedures for giving effect to this arrangement' were to be worked out through joint consultations. Articles VI and VII obligated each of the parties to extend reciprocal rights to citizens of the other regarding participation in industrial and economic development, trade and commerce, residence, and ownership in each other's territory. A treaty of trade and commerce was signed on the same date.[55] Even more momentous than the specific treaty provisions for Indo-Nepali relations were bilateral discussions relating to co-ordination of foreign policy between the two countries. These were inscribed in the form of an *aide memoire* presented to Nepal soon after India had signed the Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet in May 1954. The *aide memoire* stated *inter alia* that there should be co-ordination of foreign policy between India and Nepal insofar as it affected each other, that in matters relating to Nepal under consideration by India, the latter would consult the former, and that Nepal would likewise consult India in regard to any matter relating to foreign policy or relations with foreign powers, with a view to a co-ordinated policy, in particular in matters relating to Nepal's relations with Tibet and China.[56]

Up to 1969, when India agreed to their phased withdrawal at Nepal's request, an Indian Military Liaison Group was maintained in Kathmandu. In addition, India manned 17 border checkposts on the Nepal-Tibetan border with 75 wireless operators, who were also withdrawn after 1969. India's mutual defence assistance commitments with Nepal were further buttressed by an arms assistance agreement of 1965, which made Nepal dependent on India for all her military equipment. (This agreement too was ended in 1969.)[57]

In Sri Lanka's case, a Defence agreement signed with Britain in November 1947, became effective at the time of independence in February 1948. By this, the two countries agreed to give to each other military assistance for the security of their territories, for defence against external aggression, and for protection of essential communications. It was further provided that for this purpose Britain may base in Sri Lanka naval and air forces and land forces 'as may be mutually agreed'. An administrative arrangement under this agreement permitted the continued use by Britain of the Lankan air base at Katunayake and the naval base at Trincomalee.

Sri Lanka and Nepal

The foreign policies of Sri Lanka and Nepal present interesting parallels. The strategic location of both these States in relation to India is central to their foreign policy, making India the irreversible point of departure in the foreign policy of both Sri Lanka and Nepal.

Nepal was the classic instance of the 'buffer state' from British times, buttressing the defence of India on its northern flank; Sri Lanka, on its southern flank, had long been considered by naval strategists to be an essential link in India's security. Not surprisingly, proclamation of the strategic unity of India and her regional smaller neighbours became the recurrent theme of Indian pronunciations on relations with these States. In his *Discovery of India*, Nehru had written that 'the small national State is doomed', and envisaged that Sri Lanka would inevitably be drawn into a closer union with India 'presumably as an autonomous unit of the Indian Federation';[58] and Panikkar, also writing before independence, had averred that 'the internal organisation of India on a firm and stable basis with Burma and Ceylon was the essential pre-requisite to 'a realistic policy of Indian defence'.[59] These prognoses were later discarded by Nehru and Panikkar, but they reappeared in some guise or another in Indian writings and pronouncements even after the modern South Asian states-system had become a reality.[60] Official Indian policy after independence came to assert India's interest in the integrity and territorial inviolability of India's smaller neighbours as a variant of the policy of integration with India. Nehru asserted the doctrine on behalf of the Himalayan States, and Panikkar was considered in high quarters in Sri Lanka to be speaking on Nehru's behalf when he declared in a public speech in Bombay in August 1954 that India had made clear to foreign powers that she would not tolerate any interference in the affairs of Nepal, Burma, or Sri Lanka as countries lying within her area of primary and strategic importance.[61] Nehru had been quite explicit about Nepal, however, when he declared in Parliament:

> From time immemorial, the Himalayas have provided us with magnificent frontiers . . . We cannot allow that barrier to be penetrated because it is also the principal barrier to India. Therefore, much as we appreciate the independence of Nepal, we cannot allow anything to go wrong in Nepal or permit that barrier to be crossed or weakened, because that would be a risk to our own security.[62]

It has been asserted that Nehru was really proclaiming in the early fifties a 'Nehru Doctrine' for South Asia, on the lines of the Monroe Doctrine. Nehru specifically denied the allegation,[63] but confronted with India's protective role, Sri Lanka and Nepal adopted policies in some ways divergent but identical in demarcating areas of independent manoeuvre *vis-a-vis* India. Divergence arose from the fact that, in contrast to Sri Lanka, Nepal was, as one of its Prime Ministers put it, 'both landlocked and India-locked'. Hemmed in by the Himalayas in the north, Nepal's contacts with the outside world were dominated, in a geographical sense as well as under treaty relations, by India. The UN admission of both Sri Lanka and Nepal had been blocked by Soviet vetoes, and both countries entered the UN only in December 1955, after the package deal. But whereas Sri Lanka in the early fifties proceeded to establish diplomatic relations with some fourteen countries and had an agreement with Britain to conduct its relations with other countries through British consular or diplomatic representatives abroad, when necessary, Nepal during the same period had diplomatic relations only with India, Britain, the United States and France, and agreed in 1954 to conduct its relations with other countries, when necessary, through Indian diplomatic missions abroad. For different reasons, both countries postponed establishment of diplomatic relations with China until 1956, Nepal in deference to India's wishes, Sri Lanka because of a strident anti-communism which characterised the governments in power until that time. By far the greatest divergences arose from differential dynamics of the internal political systems and from India's own posture towards them.

Nehru's India was curiously enamoured of the Himalayan monarchies, perhaps because the Kings of the Himalayan States were seen as pillars of stability in a strategically sensitive area. But Nehru and his successors were also peculiarly amenable to overtures for support from populist elements within these States. The cases of Nepal and, as we shall see later, Sikkim, illustrate this. In Nepal, the anti-Rana revolution in 1950-51, which terminated more than a century of autocratic rule by a class of hereditary Prime Ministers, was in part a populist movement spearheaded by the Nepali Congress. India was sympathetic to this movement, but India was also instrumental in restoring to his throne King Tribhuvan, who had fled to India after he had been deposed by the Rana in favour of his two-year old grandson. In 1951, for the first time since 1846, the King of Nepal had a hand in the appointment of his own Cabinet. But this, too, was not completely a free choice. In the fifties, and to a lesser extent even later, the tenure of office of a Nepali Prime Minister who was *persona non grata* in New Delhi was likely to be short. Consequently the view from New Delhi became an important, even *the* most important consideration in the internal politics of

Nepal. India sustained the Nepali monarchy, but India also, not unnaturally, gave tacit support to politicians and parties which were India-oriented in their outlook. But it was also true, conversely, that a prime minister who had aliented nationalist sentiment in Nepal stood little chance of politically surviving in office. This gave considerable political leeway to the King to alternate his ministries with reference to his own political preferences, the public mood, and not least importantly, the prevailing pressures of the external environment. King Mahendra, who succeeded Tribhuvan in 1955, became adept at playing the game of Nepali politics, orchestrating his diverse official spokesmen to play diverse tunes, while himself remaining the effective head of government and symbol of Nepali nationalism. In December 1960, Mahendra felt strong enough to engineer a royal coup. The first popularly elected government of the Nepali Congress, leader B.P. Koirala, was dismissed, party-based democracy was abolished, and the King introduced a pyramidal *panchayati raj* – based on local self-government units – with himself at its apex. The Koirala ministry had been dubbed pro-Indian, and the coup acquired legitimacy as a nationalist enterprise. As Mahendra's successor King Birendra commented later:

> We tried out the party system but it did not work. Some parties were obviously receiving sustenance from outside. This was leading to a situation where Nepalis might have been fighting Nepalis. This is why we needed an alternative.[64]

The obvious reference here was to India. But the royal coup was undertaken at a time when China had become a factor in the regional balance in the Himalayan region. Both the United States and China had established embassies in Kathmandu in 1958; it was, in fact, the Chinese entry into the Nepali political scene which enabled Mahendra to undertake the coup at all. With the Chinese entry, Nepal began gradually to move out from under India's domination in foreign relations.

India did not enjoy so much political and diplomatic leverage in Sri Lanka in the fifties as it did in Nepal. One of Sri Lanka's first concerns after independence was to promulgate immigration and citizenship laws restricting, among other things, free movement of persons between India and Sri Lanka, and making the grant of citizenship to more than a million Indian-origin persons dependent on strictly residential qualifications.

In 1976 India imposed, for the first time, travel restrictions on Nepalese, for security reasons, in certain areas of north-west Bengal, Meghalaya, two northern districts of U.P., and areas of Sikkim adjacent to Bhutan, thus infringing a centuries-old tradition of tree travel across the open border between Nepal and India.[65] The strong Nepali reaction to the new requirement that permits be obtained to visit the specified areas was surprising, since the Nepal Government itself did not allow Indian nationals within 25 miles of its northern border,

a restriction which did not apply to Chinese on its southern border. Whereas Nepal did not pass legislation until 1967 to provide for settlers of Indian origin to acquire Nepali nationality (estimated at about 3 million) the citizenship status of Indian-origin persons in Sri Lanka was the main issue in dispute between the countries until 1964. The dispute concerned mostly Indian-origin estate-workers in the island, some of whom were unquestionably permanently settled, but the majority of whom, in the Sri Lankan view, were aliens, eligible for repatriation to India. The operation of Sri Lanka's citizenship law rendered more than a million of these people stateless, and their future became the subject of endless and acrimonious dispute between Nehru and four Prime Ministers of Sri Lanka in the fifties.[66] Nehru had himself been associated with the founding of the political organisation of Indians in Sri Lanka, the Ceylon Indian Congress, as far back as 1939 during one of his visits to Colombo. The Ceylon Indian Congress, renamed Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC) after independence, organised as a trade union with a political wing, became a powerful political group in the island, and its leaders had frequent direct access to the Prime Minister of India. The 1964 Indo-Ceylon agreement relating to persons of Indian origin in Sri Lanka was made possible because the context of Indo-Lanka relations had changed. In the first place, Shastri's succession to the prime ministership led to a fresh approach on the Indian side; also there was not now, as during Nehru's time, the same personal contacts between the Indian Government and the CWC leadership in Sri Lanka which had for long stood in the way of agreement; secondly, after the Sino-Indian war, fence-mending with neighbouring countries became an object of serious Indian concern. The fact that the terms of the 1964 agreement were extremely favourable to Sri Lanka, in the context of previous Indian intransigence on the questions in dispute, was perhaps largely due to the increased leverage Sri Lanka had acquired *vis-a-vis* India in the aftermath of the Sino-Indian war. Domestic political concerns were important in another sense in the context of Indo-Lanka relations. Tamils of South India and Sri Lanka have an empathy which does not exist between Singhalese and Tamils in Sri Lanka, or between a Tamil southerner and a Hindi-speaking northerner within India. Significant recent contacts have developed between Tamil political organisations in Sri Lanka and the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) in South India, from 1967 to 1977 the Government party in Tamilnadu.[67] Tamilian politics however, have also proved to be a factor binding the governments of India and Sri Lanka, for on both sides of Palk Strait Tamil politicians have, been advocating overtly or otherwise, the principle of secession.

The foregoing pages have attempted to relate issues of internal politics in Sri Lanka and Nepal to their mutual relations with India, and it has been

suggested that the emergence of China as a regional actor in South Asia has had a bearing on the course of these relations. The Chinese presence in Nepal and Sri Lanka and its impact on the regional balance bears closer examination. Independent Sri Lanka's connection with the Peoples' Republic of China goes back to 1952 when the island's economic compulsions led a government which was distinctly pro-western in its foreign policy orientation to negotiate a rice-rubber agreement with China on favourable terms to Sri Lanka. The agreement, originally negotiated for a five-year term, has been renewed regularly up to the present, whatever the political complexion of the government in power in Sri Lanka, and it has sheet-anchored Sino-Lanka relations. Political relations alternated between a high tide of good relations during the Bandaranaike administrations (1956-59, 1960-65 and 1970-77), which coincided partly with the period of the cultural revolution in China, except when they attempted to introduce Maoist literature and badges into Sri Lanka, leading to strained relations. A maritime agreement concluded in 1963 gave most-favoured-nation status to passenger and cargo services between the two countries.

Sino-Lanka relations have ebbed and flowed with changes of government in Sri Lanka. Chou En-lai's two visits to Sri Lanka in 1958 and 1964 were both undertaken when the Banderanaikes were in power, and Mrs. Bandaranaike herself visited Peking on three occasions during 1963 and 1972. When the Sino-Indian war broke out in October 1962, Mrs. Bandaranaike resisted pressure from elements within the Government party as well as from the parliamentary opposition to brand China the aggressor. Instead, she took the initiative in summoning the Colombo conference of six non-aligned nations with the object of exploring ways and means of bringing India and China to the conference table and settling the boundary dispute. The proposals which emanated from this conference, together with their clarifications, were personally explained in Peking by Mrs. Bandaranaike and Subandrio of Indonesia in January 1963, and in New Delhi by her and representatives of the UAR and Ghana the same month. No concrete achievement resulted from these initiatives: India accepted the conference proposals *in toto*, China only with reservations. Nevertheless, the mediation of the non-aligned powers provided, at the time, a beathing space for the disputants.[68]

The Chinese image was momentarily tarnished during Mrs. Bandaranaike's second administration, when suspicions were rife that China was implicated in the April insurgency in Sri Lanka in 1971. Much speculation centred round a Chinese ship carrying arms consigned to Tanzania, which called at Colombo harbour the day the insurgency started, April 5th. Chinese motives became suspect when China became the only major power which did not respond to the Sri Lanka Government's appeal for arms, and when the ship itself unexpectedly

sailed away while the appeal was under reference to Peking.[69] The insurgents had imbibed their intellectual nourishment from a variety of Marxist sources: from Mao, Kim Il Sung, Che Guevara, and Sri Lanka seriously investigated a possible Chinese role in the insurgency. The Sri Lanka government ordered the closure of the North Korean embassy, took into custody the erstwhile leader of the pro-Peking Communist Party, and four Indian frigates joined Sri Lankan patrol boats in a search for the mysterious Chinese ship.[70] Sino-Lanka relations were restored to normalcy only after Mrs. Bandaranaike broadcast to the nation, late in April, that foreign powers were not involved in the insurgency, and after Chou En-lai himself wrote to her stating that 'friendship between China and Ceylon is in the fundamental interest of the two peoples and can stand tests', and that 'the Chinese Government and people highly treasure the friendship between our two countries'. The letter also condemned the insurgents as opportunists, and commended the Sri Lanka Government in having brought under control 'a handful of persons who style themselves Guevarists, and into whose ranks foreign spies [have] sneaked'. The letter was accompanied by an interest-free, long-term loan of Rs. 150 million.[71] China had even in the sixties figured as an important aid donor; in the seventies, the scale of Chinese economic assistance to the island vastly increased. After the insurgency, Sri Lanka also received from China another interest-free loan of Rs. 265 million to finance agro-based industries, and a further interest-free loan of Rs. 48 million to finance an integrated textile mill. In addition, China offered as an outright gift five high-speed naval patrol boats, and had delivered four of these by July 1972.[72] In May 1973, Chinese technicians and workers completed, at a cost of Rs. 35 million, the Bandaranaike Memorial International Conference Hall, which became the venue of the fifth Non-aligned Summit conference, and which stood out in Colombo as a glittering showpiece of Chinese goodwill.

Sri Lanka's close connections with China during the Bandaranaike era were not prejudicial to the relationship with India. The Bandaranaikes maintained equally friendly relations with the Nehrus, and Mrs. Bandaranaike and Indira Gandhi in particular found a community of interest at a personal as well as political level. There is nothing to suggest that Sri Lanka's China policy was intended as a balance-of-power policy directed against India.

In contrast, Nepal's China policy was rooted in the politics of balance. It was in part one aspect of a general diversification of foreign policy which King Mahendra undertook after 1960 but it had its roots in Nepal's domestic political context. Though not withdrawing his support from the monarchy, Nehru had expressed great concern over the royal coup, and the 'setback to democracy' implied by it. More disconcertingly for King Mahendra, dissident Nepali Congress politicians who fled Nepal after the coup were given sanctuary in India, from where

they organised a base of political resistance to the royal regime, which involved armed raids into the jungle region of East Nepal known as the *terai*. These ceased after 1962, but Nepali Congress exiles continued to stay in India, and they were joined in 1968 by their leader B.P. Koirala, when he was released from prison by the King. Later Koirala himself revived the anti-Mahendra campaign.[73] It was not unnatural in such a context that Mahendra should have looked for alternative support-bases for his regime. Since India was at this time being viewed as a potential threat to the royal polity, it was also not unnatural that Mahendra should have begun to indulge in the time-honoured Nepali gambit of playing China off against India to ensure Nepal's security. In 1961, Mahendra attended the Belgrade non-aligned summit in person, visited Pakistan *en route* back to Nepal, and then undertook a seventeen-day visit to China.

Two concrete results emerged from the visit. First, China and Nepal reached agreement on their boundary in a manner favourable to Nepali interests; a protocol to the 1961 treaty, and signed as an annexe to it in January 1963, laid down the alignment of the boundary in concrete terms and established the exact position of permanent boundary markers set up in 1962.[74] Secondly, much to India's dismay, agreement was reached on the building of a highway connecting Kathmandu with Kodari, near the Tibetan border. Construction of the 100 km. highway commenced in October 1963 with Chinese road-builders under Nepalese control, and it was declared open in May 1967. From Kodari, the road linked with a 1000km highway to Lhasa via the all-weather Kuti Pass.[75] The Kathmandu-Lhasa road thus became the first to breach the Himalayan barrier. China later followed up by building another strategic road connecting Kathmandu with Pokhara, where it met an Indian built road connecting it to the important Indian rail centre in Gorakhpur. Road-building, in fact, became soon a matter of Sino-Indian rivalry in Nepal. Hitherto, India had been the main road-builder in Nepal: the Tribhuvan Rajpath, linking Kathmandu with the Indian border had been an Indian enterprise in the early fifties. The East-West Mahendra Rajpath too had been a collaborative venture in which India was associated with the U.S., U.K., U.S.S.R. and the United Nations. In terms of mileage India's contribution to road-development in Nepal far exceeded that of China.[76] But the Chinese advent as road-builders gave the Nepalese a counterweight which increased its bargaining position with India. 'Road politics' became an important ingredient in Mahendra's new-look foreign policy. The fact that India's influence on important matters in Nepal still obtained, however, was demonstrated when Mahendra was constrained to turn down a Chinese offer to build yet another east-west road in the *terai* region in Nepal.

On the other hand the road to China created problems for Nepal with China itself. Mahendra had said that communism would not come to Nepal 'in a taxi-cab'.[77] But during the cultural revolution in China, irritants in the Nepali-Chinese relationship appeared, largely, as in the case of Sri Lanka, caused by Chinese attempts to introduce Maoist literature and badges into the northern regions of Nepal.[78] Nepal's quick recognition of Bangladesh, too, was seen as a mild affront to China. Nonetheless, after 1960, the Chinese connection came to stay as an essential factor in Nepal's foreign policy. When King Birendra undertook a state visit to Szechwan and Tibet in June 1976, he flew over the Himalayas, the first direct air passage between China and Nepal marking, as Chinese premier Hua Kuo-feng said, 'the building of an air-bridge of China-Nepal friendship over the roof of the world for the first time in history'.[79] Prime Minister K.N. Bista expressed the Nepali view when he declared during a goodwill visit to India in April 1972 that 'Nepal was maintaining very good relations with China' and that 'China is a big country and we cannot ignore it'.[80]

The increasing diversification of Nepal's trade after 1960 indicates the extent to which Nepal was moving out of the constricting economic relationship which had been imposed by the trade treaty with India in 1950. That treaty, consistently with the principle of the open border between the two countries, generally provided for trade free of customs duty, except for goods of Nepali origin which might compete on favourable terms in India with comparable goods of Indian origin. But Nepal was obliged to maintain its foreign exchange trading account in India, and was compelled by its geographical situation to trade with third countries by means of routes and ports in India.[81] A new trade treaty with India in 1960 removed some of the difficulties, for example as regards the foreign exchange requirements, acknowledgement of Nepal's right to frame its own tariff policies, freedom of transit for goods to and from Nepal through India, and so on. But difficulties in Indo-Nepali trade matters remained. India had qualms about trade-deflection of goods of Indian origin via Nepal, and smuggling of goods imported by Nepal from third countries into India. Nepal chafed at the continued dominance of India in Nepal's foreign trade, and India's insistence that only goods produced 'wholly' in Nepal would be allowed access to the Indian market. A repeated Nepali request, that Nepal be given transit facilities to East Pakistan via Radhikapur in India, was not complied with until after the emergence of Bangladesh.[82] Nepal began trade diversification in earnest with a trade treaty with Pakistan in 1962, agreements with China in 1964, 1966 and 1971, and with the U.S.S.R. in 1965. Trade pacts with Yugoslavia (1965) and Egypt (1975) followed. By these agreements, Nepal diversified the sources of her essential imports like petroleum and machinery and also the markets of her exports like jute and jute products. India, however, remained

Nepal's main trading partner, as before, though new trade agreements signed in 1971 and 1978 have gone a long way to rationalise the problems inherent in Indo-Nepali trade.[83]

Diversification of trade and the attempt to increasingly broaden Nepal's foreign relations were both devoted to the same object: maximisation of Nepal's security *vis-a-vis* powerful neighbours. Nepal's most recent effort in this direction has been a policy of gaining international support to have Nepal declared a zone of peace, an idea first broached by King Birendra at the Algiers non-aligned summit in 1973. So far this policy has been supported by the Soviets, China, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.[84] India, while not averse to the proposal in principle, has held out for a declaration to make the whole South Asian region a zone of peace.[85] It was the new Indian Foreign Minister, A.B. Vajpayee, who expressed the consensus of the Janata party government towards Nepal; 'God and geography', he said, 'have linked our two nations and decreed that we live in friendship'.[86] In Sri Lanka, too, as we have seen, geography had decreed a close partnership with India; but God interposed a stretch of water between them. In the seventies, India and Sri Lanka signed two important accords demarcating their maritime boundary in their historic waters and exclusive economic zones in the Indian Ocean.[87]

Both Sri Lanka and Nepal had observed a policy of neutrality during the Sino-Indian war. During the Indo-Pak war of 1971, too, both Sri Lanka and Nepal initially kept aloof, regarding it as an internal affair of Pakistan, but while Sri Lanka tended later to veer towards Pakistan in the conflict, Nepal tended to lean towards the Bangladeshi cause, as the crisis developed. Maintenance of friendly ties with Pakistan had always been a basic element in Sri Lanka's foreign policy, and Sri Lanka expected a solution of the East Bengali crisis which would have preserved the integirty of Pakistan. Even after the crisis was over, in order not to offend Pakistani susceptibilities, Sri Lanka did not accord recognition to Bangladesh until March 1972. On the other hand, the crisis in East Bengal was developing almost next door to Nepal. Non-official Nepali organs and political opinion expressed their strong revulsion at the genocide which was taking place in East Bengal. Also, Nepalese Gurkha troops were involved in the fighting on behalf of India on both fronts. The official view expressed by Mahendra to the National Panchayat on 28 June was that the crisis should be 'peacefully settled in a manner acceptable to all concerned'.[88] When the existence of Bangladesh became an accomplished fact, however, Nepal was quick to accord recognition to the new State in January 1971.

Bangladesh

The advent of Bangladesh to the community of South Asian States, besides transfiguring the basic Indo-Pak power balance, involved a restructuring of interstate relations and emergence of a new element in subcontinental politics: the trilateral relationship between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. We are concerned here with the main features of this relationship insofar as it is relevant to the general question of small-power interaction in South Asia. India recognised Bangladesh on 6 December 1971 near the beginning of the two-week conflict; Pakistan not until 23 February 1974. The first agreement between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, devoted to a review of questions of mutual concern, did not therefore take place before April 1974.[89] But before this date India had, by bilateral negotiation and agreement with Pakistan and Bangladesh, respectively, attempted to sort out the complex problems which cropped up after the liberation war.

The most complex problem was 'the three-way process of repatriation': return of the 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war held in India, repatriation of about 200,000 (Bengali) Pakistanis to Bangladesh, and about 260,000 non-Bengalis from Bangladesh to Pakistan. This issue had been the subject of a preliminary accord between India and Bangladesh in April 1973, and the three-way process of repatriation had in fact commenced in September. Under the tripartite agreement, Bangladesh gave up its earlier insistence on trying 195 Pakistani POWs for war crimes as a condition precedent to agreeing to repatriation of the general body of POWs who, Bangladesh and India claimed, had surrendered to their joint command. By the time of this agreement, also, the three-way process of repatriation was well under way, and Pakistan herself agreed to take back all non-Bengalis in Bangladesh who had either a domicile in West Pakistan, or who were employees in central government service, or members of divided families, and who expressed a desire to be repatriated to Pakistan.[90]

A second problem, that concerning the 10 million refugees who had fled from East Pakistan to India during the crisis, was solved by the early return or repatriation of the refugees. By early February 1972, most of them were back in Bangladesh.[91] The so-called *Bihari* Muslims, numbered about a million in Bangladesh. They were an Urdu-speaking segment of East Bengal's population which had originated from northern Indian parts in Bihar and U.P. and became victims of periodic waves of persecution at the hands of Bangla guerrillas seeking vengeance for their alleged collaboration in the Pakistani army's repression in 1971. They became the subject of a new refugee problem for India. This, however, was confined to the period immediately following the liberation, and probably involved between 50,000 and 100,000 people.

Withdrawal of the Indian army from Bangladesh posed a third problem. After the liberation, the Indian army stayed on in Bangladesh, partly to disarm and reorganise the Mukti Bahini guerrillas who had taken part in the war; partly to help maintain law and order in a situation of chaos and confusion. But the Indian army itself soon came to be looked upon as an army of occupation, and demands for its withdrawal came to be voiced. When Mujibur Rahman met Indira Gandhi in Calcutta in February 1972, it was mutually agreed that Indian armed forces would be withdrawn by 25 March 1972. In effect, the Indian army withdrew ahead of schedule, on 15 March.[92] India, however, laid the basis for the development of Bangla's armed forces by giving helicopters and transport aircraft to the Bangla Air Force and a patrol boat to its Navy.

India's image as the liberating power was strengthened by the Friendship Treaty signed by Mujib and Indira Gandhi in Dacca in March 1972. The Treaty stipulated that the parties would not enter into or participate in military alliances directed against each other, commit aggression against each other, or give assistance to a third party engaged in an armed conflict against the other party, and further that:

> In case either party is attacked or threatened with attack, the high contracting parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to take appropriate effective measures to eliminate the threat and thus ensure the peace and security of their countries.[93]

While these instances of Indo-Bangla accord implied Indian ascendancy in the new state, other indications pointed to another direction. Strains in the bilateral relationship were possibly inherent in the situation, but these were magnified by a combination of factors, economic as well as political. The economic factor was related to the situation which developed in Bangladesh soon after its emergence. At the time of liberation, there were about 600 abandoned industrial units in the country, including jute, paper, textile and sugar mills. The decision to nationalise some of these imposed a heavy burden on the government's administrative resources. Their management was at first given to political activists, who were soon replaced by administrators. Industrial workers began to agitate for higher wages to neutralise higher living costs, and this led to a spate of strikes. The general economic dislocation accentuated the shortage of consumer goods, which in turn meant higher prices. The wholesale price index in Bangladesh went up by 70 per cent in the first eight months of 1972.[94] Smuggling by unscrupulous elements on both sides of the border compounded the difficulties. The large-scale smuggling of jute, rice and fish from Bangladesh to West Bengal became endemic, and led to large price increases in articles of common consumption. In October 1972, at the mid-term review of the trade agreement signed by India and

Bangladesh in March, the latter urgently requested that the border trade be suspended, and the request was implemented until such time as adequate checks and controls could be established along the entire border. In the public mind, the high prices became associated with the new relationship with India. The *Pakistan Times* commented:

> People blame these prices on India and the Indians have again become for them "Moro" – a contemptuous term for Marwaris.[95]

It is significant that Maulana Bashani, leader of a five-party United Front which opposed Mujib's Awami League government, was already, before the end of 1972, raising the anti-Indian cry on public platforms. In December 1972, for example, Bashani called upon the Bangla Government to repeal all pacts and treaties that Pakistani signed with India before the 1970 Pakistani elections.[96] In January 1973, he claimed that some organisations in India were conspiring to integrate Bangladesh with Inida and demanded the resignation of the Awami League government and the formation of a National government.[97] In July 1973, he was threatening to launch a *jihad* against India in the form of a boycott of Indian goods.[98] Later he was to characterise India's nuclear test explosion as a 'veiled threat to her smaller neighbours', and a deviation from the path of non-violence.[99]

Already before the anti-Mujib *coup*, there were seeds of discontent against the Bangla connection with India, and Mujib himself became identified as pro-Indian. Commenting on Mrs. Indira Gandhi's congratulatory telegram on Mujib's assumption of the Presidency in Bangladesh, *The Times* had stated with prescience in February 1975:

> Much of the internal opposition to Sheikh Mujib is anti-Indian and anti-Soviet in bias and deprived of even the minimal legitimate channels for expression which existed hitherto, it could go even deeper underground and become more difficult to combat.[100]

India reacted strongly when Mujib was assassinated in August 1975, and, according to Colin Legum of the London *Observer*, even sent Indian army units a short distance inside Bangladesh territory.[101] Prime Minister Indira Gandhi herself deplored the assassination of 'a great statesman and symbol figure of national freedom like Sheikh Mujibur Rahman' in a personal message which reciprocated sentiments of friendship expressed by the new President Khondakar Moushtaque Ahmed.[102] After the second *coup*, when Khondakar himself was ousted, and imprisoned Mujib supporters were brutally murdered in jail, Mrs Gandhi declared:

> Happenings in our neighbourhood cause us grave concern. India was careful not to interfere in the internal affairs of any country and kept itself scrupulously aloof from them. But it could not help expressing its concern when the

stability of the region is disturbed and could be a threat to India itself.[103]

Events in Bangladesh since November 1975 have indicated an escalation of anti-Indian feeling in the country, which appears to have become even more pronounced with the military takeover under General Ziaur Rahman. On 26 November, the Indian High Commissioner in Dacca was attacked and wounded in his chancery by a group of young Bangladeshis.[104] Border conflicts and skirmishes between Indian and Bangladeshi personnel had become so frequent in 1976 as to become a matter of serious diplomatic concern to the two countries. Incidents were sometimes sparked off by shooting at border patrols, more frequently from the Bangla side against patrols of the Indian Border Security Force.[105] But a number of clashes were provoked by the infiltration of Bangladeshi guerrillas, said to have been armed and trained in India, into Bangla territory.[106] Indo-Bangla border talks held in Dacca in January 1977 proved to be inconclusive; according to the Bangladeshi leader to the talks, over 1,300 border skirmishes had taken place between the two countries since November 1975, and in these 56 civilians had been killed and more than 200 dissidents had either surrendered or been captured.[107]

The continuing influx of refugees from Bangladesh to India added to prevailing discontents and difficulties. The creation of Bangladesh implied that Bihari Muslims as relatively recent migrants were not altogether loyal, and originally it was this minority which bore the brunt of the persecution in Bangladesh. Later the discrimination was directed specifically against Hindus, who made up around 15% of the population. The consolidation of the military regime coincided with the abandonment of Mujib's secular commitment, and in April 1977, Islam was made one of the tenets of the Bangladesh state. Legislation discriminating against Hindus had already existed in East Pakistan before 1971. This was tightened after May 1977, and a policy of weeding out Hindus from the army, police and civil service was set in train. Their difficulties were compounded by the fact that Hindus themselves did not identify themselves with the new regime, and generally supported the Awami League. India had perforce to accept increasing numbers of Hindus from Bangladesh who sought refuge in India. As Foreign Minister Vajpayee said: 'Those who ask for asylum because they are victimised in their country will get asylum. It is a moral not a diplomatic question'.[108] From the diplomatic point of view, however, the post-Mujib era in Bangladesh was marked by the decline of Indian influence, and to some extent, the rehabilitation of Pakistan as a factor in Bangla politics.

Making Islam the basis of the state brought Bangladesh one step closer to Pakistan, and it has been suggested that the change was in fact instituted at the behest of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.[109] Bhutto's visit to Dacca in June 1974 had

laid the basis for the reconciliation between Pakistan and Bangladesh and the warm welcome accorded to him suggests that even at that time the ties of Muslim brotherhood were stronger than the demands of Indian friendship. When the Morarji government signed the Farakka accord with Bangladesh, settling at long last the problem of the sharing of Ganges waters, the parliamentary opposition in India generally condemned the agreement as a sell-out to Bangladesh, and an Indira Congress spokeswoman alleged that the agreement had been signed in order to seek 'the friendship of a hostile neighbouring country'.[110]

At first it appears that geostrategic realities and factors of internal politics have the same relevance for Bangladesh foreign policy in relation to India as they have had for Sri Lanka and Nepal. The Indo-Bangla Friendship Treaty exemplified India's attempt to define relations with the new State of Bangladesh on the basis of a mutually shared perception of security needs in the area. But post-1975 regime-changes in Bangladesh have implied questioning of the whole basis of such perceptions and, it would appear, the present relevance of the friendship treaty itself is a matter of doubt.

Bhutan and Sikkim

Both Sikkim and Bhutan are generally thought of as having similar dependant relationships with India, but in fact there are important differences. Until Sikkim's integration with India in 1975, it occupied the status of a protectorate of India. Bhutan has on occasion also, been described as an Indian protectorate, but India's treaty relationship with Bhutan did not derogate from the state's independence, since it was not considered mandatory for Bhutan to accept India's advice on foreign policy matters, and recent Indian pronouncements have supported the Bhutanese view that Indian advice can only be proffered if requested.[111] Bhutanese sensitivities have been stirred by Indian maps which have shown the Indo-Bhutan boundary like that of Indian states.[112] India is committed to come to Bhutan's defence if requested, but it is not difficult to foresee situations when Bhutan can be persuaded to make the request in India's interests. In fact, India has made it quite clear on numerous occasions that it would speak on Bhutan's behalf in the latter's disputes with China.

In such a context, Bhutan tried to safeguard its independence by keeping aloof from contacts with the outside world: in the fifties India had less contact with Bhutan than it did with Nepal. Consistently with his Himalayan policy, however, Nehru supported the Bhutanese Maharaja (King), accorded him a royal welcome

in New Delhi in 1954, and himself visited Bhutan in 1958. The Bhutanese did not accept any Indian aid until after 1960, when Chinese consolidation in Tibet and the Sino-Indian border dispute invested Bhutan with a new strategic importance. After 1959, China had published a series of maps showing parts of Bhutan as Tibetan, and restricted the movement of Bhutanese and Indians following traditional routes through the Chumbi valley. Bhutan herself sealed the border with Tibet in 1959-60, and there was suspension of trade between Tibet and Bhutan.

In January 1960 India persuaded Bhutan to accept a Rs.150 million gift for road development; in mid-1962, the Puntsholing-Paro road was inaugurated, providing Bhutan with its first real link with the outside world. Further economic assistance followed, and Bhutan embarked on a program of modernisation under Indian auspices, which included development and training of Bhutanese armed forces. Chinese offers of economic assistance were declined, and Bhutan was also careful not to deal directly with China on matters pertaining to border problems or diplomatic exchange. China for its part maintained that she had consistently recognised Bhutan's sovereignty and territorial integrity and that since the border between them had never been formally defined, 'a reasonable solution could be found by negotiations between them'.[113] This is precluded by the nature of the Indo-Bhutanese relationship. In 1970, China was accusing Bhutan of 'outwardly making sweet statements but in actual fact closely collaborating with the Indians in a large military build-up in Bhutan'.[114]

The Indian victory in the Indo-Pak war of 1971 had the effect of further increasing her influence in Bhutan. Bhutan was the second country, after India, to recognise Bangladesh, and earlier the Bhutanese King had extended his moral as well as material support to East Bengali refugees, personally visiting refugee camps in Calcutta and even organising a monetary contribution on their behalf. From Bhutan's own point of view, Bangladesh was seen as a new friendly country giving landlocked Bhutan an additional trade outlet in the region. In recent years the incidence of high-powered state visits between New Delhi and Thimpu has increased, the present King himself having undertaken two visits to New Delhi since the Janata Party came to power in March 1977. The Indian President Sanjiva Reddy expressed current thinking in both New Delhi and Thimpu when he declared on the last occasion of the King's visit that 'there was ample scope for further consolidation of Indo-Bhutanese relations'.[115]

Sikkim's status as a protectorate of India was clearly defined by the 1950 treaty, under the terms of which India always maintained upwards of 25,000 regular troops of the Indian army in addition to a constabulary of 2,500 in Sikkim. Sikkim commanded the easiest access from Tibet to the Indian plains through the Nathu-la pass (15,000 ft) on the Tibetan-Sikkim border. The Sikkimese

mountains were India's Golan Heights, and Sikkim has always been considered by India as its strategically most vulnerable spot in the north. Sikkim's integration with India was therefore perhaps only a matter of time. The timing of it needs explanation.

From the Indian point of view, the threat to India's security was seen to be aggravated by a Chinese military build-up in the sixties in the Chumbi valley area on the Tibetan side of Nathu-la. Allegations and counter-allegations during this period of frequent border violations by China and India in the Sikkim area testified to an escalation of Sino-Indian rivalry over control of Nathu-la pass.[116] During the September 1965 Indo-Pak war, India was confronted with the serious possibility that China would intervene militarily on the Sikkim border.[117] In and after July 1966, according to Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh, Chinese troops began a propaganda campaign over loudspeakers across Nathu-la to undermine the morale and discipline of Indian troops by giving false stories about conditions in India.[118] The Chinese official reaction to Indian protests against what they considered to be Chinese subversion in Sikkim was contained in a Foreign Ministry Note which said that

> . . . it was entirely within China's sovereign rights for the Chinese frontier guards stationed at Nathu-la to make broadcasts on Chinese territory advocating friendship between the Chinese and Indian peoples and setting forth the truth about the Sino-Indian boundary question and no foreigner has any right to interfere in this.[119]

The diplomatic exchanges were followed by a serious military confrontation between India and China in the Nathu-la area.

In such a context, India viewed with great concern attempts on the part of the Sikkim Maharaja (Chogyal) and his American Maharani (Gyalmo) to internationalise the status of Sikkim in the manner of Nepal and Bhutan. The Chogyal reportedly asked India for a revision of the 1950 treaty, expressed a desire to join the United Nations, and generally began to adopt a policy with an anti-Indian orientation.[120] The Gyalmo caused embarrassment in all quarters by writing an article in a Sikkimese research bulletin stating that the Indian hill resort of Darjeeling was legally a part of Sikkim.[121] Indian susceptibilities were further aroused when the Chogyal, while in Kathmandu to attend King Birendra's coronation, in February 1975, reportedly conferred with the Chinese Vice-premier at a party, and gave a press conference before his departure in which he stated that he would 'leave no stone unturned' to keep Sikkim separate.[122]

Perhaps the most important dimension in the train of events which led to Sikkim's integration with India was escalation of a domestic political crisis in Sikkim after 1973. The basic issue involved in the crisis was the demand for

greater political participation by the majority of the population in Sikkim who were in fact of Nepali origin. They were resisting a weighted system of voting which gave a majority of Council seats to the minority Bhutia and Lepcha communities. The debate about electoral reforms between the loyalist National party (representing Bhutia-Lepchas) and opposition Congress parties (representing Nepalis) erupted in demonstrations against the Chogyal, which necessitated intervention of the Indian army in April 1973. The right to nominate the Chogyal's Chief Minister thereafter passed to the Indian representative. In July 1974, the Chogyal was constrained to approve a new constitution which further reduced his powers, and elections held under the new constitution gave the Sikkim Congress a majority of 29 out of 32 seats. The tussle now developed into a contest between the Chogyal and Dorji, Congress leader, who made no bones about his conviction that 'the democratic aspirations of the people [of Sikkim] could be fulfilled only if we are closer to India'.[123] Tripartite discussions between the Indian government, the Chogyal and Sikkim Congress leaders to resolve the crisis ended in failure. In April 1975, the Sikkim Assembly voted to abolish the institution of Chogyal and for full statehood within the Indian Union, and the decision was ratified by a hastily organised referendum.[124] By the 36th Constitution Amendment Act, the Indian Parliament voted to make Sikkim the 22nd State of the Indian Union the same month.

India's role in the development of events outlined above is a matter of debate. Members of the Chogyal's family have alleged that Indian intelligence agents were implicated (without perhaps the foreknowledge of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi) in the demonstrations which led to the virtual Indian take-over of the Sikkimese government in April 1973.[125] Mrs Gandhi's successor, Morarji Desai himself created quite a stir by stating to a *New York Times* correspondent that he did not agree with the manner in which the 'merger' of Sikkim was carried out.[126] No hard evidence was produced to substantiate allegations of collusion between India and the majority of leaders in Sikkim in the scenario which saw the swift diminution of the Chogyal's power. But it is reasonable to assume that India was aware of the dissident mood in Sikkim but held back until the violence became so pronounced that the Chogyal was forced to ask for Indian assistance.[127] However that may be, the Sikkim merger had important international repercussions. China denounced the 'annexation' of Sikkim in its customary strong language.[128] The Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs described the integration as a matter of great concern to the world and in particular to the States of the region, and stated:

> India has once again demonstrated its predilection for resorting to the use of force in ordering its relations with neighbours instead of basing them on the

principles of respect for territorial integrity of states and non-interference in their internal affairs.[129]

There was no public reaction in Bhutan to Sikkim's integration, but it would have been surprising if the Bhutanese royal family, which was related to the Chogyal, were not taken aback by the event. It was in Kathmandu and Dacca, however, where the reactions to the integration were strongest, but these came from demonstrating students denouncing Indian expansionism. The official reactions were of serious but cautious concern. In Colombo, the Sikkim 'merger' was hardly noticed.

The Sikkim integration and the birth of Bangladesh altered the structural framework of small power interaction in South Asia only to a limited extent. Though Bangladesh impinged on the Indo-Pak power equation, its existence had little relevance for India's relations with other regional neighbours. Small-power interaction in South Asia has been concerned essentially with the interaction of the small powers in the region with India.

The Major Powers and South Asia:

South Asian international relations cannot be fully understood except in terms of other important variables involving four major powers with interests in the region: Britain, the United States, China and the Soviet Union. Three of these powers, Britain, China and the Soviet Union had had traditional geostrategic interests in the subcontinent proper, or in areas peripheral to it, even before the British transfer of power in 1947-48. These continued into the post-independence period, though with new shifts of emphasis determined by regional conflicts and the momentum arising from the emergence of a new states-system in South Asia. Global trends in the aftermath of the Second World War added a new dimension to the regional politics of South Asia, and the United States' interest, beginning in the nineteen fifties, came as a new factor altogether in the politics of this region. Intrusion of big power politics into the South Asian region had two important implications: first it developed into a competition among the major powers for support bases among South Asian states; second, it developed into a competition among the South Asian states for big-power political, diplomatic and military support, intended to redress imbalances and inequalities perceived to exist in their mutual interstate relations. To be sure, big-power involvement aggravated regional tensions in some respects, as when it was the cause for acceleration of the arms build-up between India and Pakistan; but it also led to mediation in the

Indo-Pakistani conflict on more than one occasion. No consistent line of policy marked the strategy of the major powers in their approach to the main regional conflict of the area, that between India and Pakistan. Their approach to this problem was itself determined by the shifting demands of their own strategic and political necessities. Thus the United States at different times supported both India and Pakistan, so too the Soviet Union. Britain, as the former metropolitan power, leaned in one way or another towards both India and Pakistan, and even the Sino-Indian rivalry, which erupted in war in 1962, was preceded by *Hindi-Chini bhai bhai* (Indians and Chinese are brothers).

The Changing Role of Britain

Britain's role in South Asia was conditioned by her changed international status after the Second World War, but until superseded by the United States as the principal protector of western interests in South and Southeast Asia, Britain exercised a significant influence on political-diplomatic initiatives and military developments in the subcontinent. Of the four states which became independent from the British Raj in 1947-48, only Burma opted to sever the Commonwealth tie. India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka (Ceylon) became the first Asian Dominions, but remained within the Commonwealth even after they became republics in 1950, 1956 and 1972 respectively. It was recognition of Bangladesh by several Commonwealth members after the Indo-Pak war of 1971 which led 'the truncated state of Pakistan to withdraw from the Commonwealth'. 'This crisis', according to J.D.B. Miller,

> does not seem to have been regarded as a major Commonwealth issue by other members, who viewed it either as a domestic affair of the subcontinent or as an occasion of great-power rivalry.[130]

Politico-strategic and economic considerations weighed heavily in favour of the decision of all these states to stay in the Commonwealth, but for India and Pakistan, it was also connected with mutual perceptions of potential diplomatic disadvantages over the Kashmir issue in the event of staying out.[131] For both India and Pakistan, there were clear security advantages in remaining within the Commonwealth; for Sri Lanka, too, the Commonwealth was at first valued largely for its security connotations. But these were mainly oriented to India. In an international context dominated by an emerging pattern of bipolarity and Cold War, there was considerable pressure on newly independent states to define their posture towards the super powers, and in such a context the Commonwealth appeared as a centre

of tripolarity as well as of solidarity against external turmoils. In India, the decision to remain in the Commonwealth,[132] had the support of such nationalist stalwarts as Nehru (earlier an ardent advocate of *purna swaraj*) (total freedom) Krishna Menon, Rajagopalacharier, Rajendra Prasad, Maulana Abulkalam Azad and Vallabhai Patel, with Menon playing the central role.[133] India was especially concerned about developments in Southeast Asia, especially in Burma, Malaysia and Indonesia, where conditions of instability due to communist insurgency appeared to threaten stability in the subcontinent itself. Indeed, the pro-western orientation which marked Indian foreign policy up to about the end of 1949 was due partly, according to J.C. Kundra, to perception of a communist threat to the foundations of democratic government in India.[134] In February 1949, Nehru had described communist activities in India as 'bordering on open revolt', and in September the same year the Communist Party of Madras had been banned.[135] Other Asian members of the Commonwealth shared the same concerns. The term 'international communism' (referring to alleged Soviet Cominform-inspired activities) was much in vogue in those days, and the Commonwealth took upon itself the task of resisting its pressures. At a Commonwealth Foreign Ministers' meeting held in Colombo in January 1950, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin declared that 'the mainspring of Russian policy was not simply Communism, but a nineteenth-century expansionism'.[136] According to his prognosis, Soviet expansionist designs in Europe had been forestalled by a policy of western consolidation, as manifested in the Marshall Plan, the Brussels Treaty and the Atlantic Pact. Hence, the Soviet Union had turned her attention to the East, and the new nations of Asia were in danger of losing their independence to the subversive activities of international communism.[137] The Colombo Plan was devised at this conference as an attempt to provide an economic defence against communism.

Indo-Pakistani relations, however, were not fundamentally altered by their Commonwealth membership, which did nothing to prevent the wars of 1947, 1965 and 1971. Nor was the Commonwealth or any of its members instrumental in bringing about a settlement between the combatants in these wars. The only exception was the Kutch war (April 1965) which was successfully mediated by the British government. For India, the link with Britain appeared to lose its value with Britain's participation in SEATO in 1954 and with the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt in 1956. Britain's alleged pro-Pakistani stance in Security Council debates over Kashmir in 1957 and 1961, and Prime Minister Harold Wilson's charge of Indian aggression in the September 1965 war with Pakistan (though later withdrawn) aggravated the situation. Yet, despite Opposition pressure to quit the Commonwealth, Nehru and his successors retained the Commonwealth link

on the ground that the Commonwealth was not synonymous with Britain. Indeed, India could hardly at this time have seceded from the Commonwealth without seriously damaging her defence preparedness. The Indian Navy's six-year building program at this time (1955-61) was entirely dependent on British shipyards, and a special British defence credit was made in November 1964 to finance the construction of three new frigates. The Air Force was also, until 1965, overwhelmingly dependent on British-type bombers and fighters, and the Army weaponry was largely of British origin. During the Sino-Indian war of October-November 1962, and in its immediate aftermath, British military assistance and diplomatic support, in collaboration with that of the United States, helped India overcome a crisis in her history. During the war, the United States and Britain each pledged about $76 million in emergency aid to provide support to the Indian army.[138] Even after the cease-fire on the India-China border, the United States and Britain agreed (at Nassau on 29 December 1962) to continue to supply military aid to India, on an emergency basis, up to a limit of $120 million. The central feature of the military assistance programme was the arming of six Indian divisions for mountain warfare, the provision of transport and trainer aircraft, and a variety of military equipment. On 30 June 1963, at Birch Grove, the two countries decided on a further substantial programme of military aid to India, over and above that agreed upon at Nassau. Apart from additional arms and air transport and training facilities, this programme provided for extensive radar communications and Anglo-American assistance to expand India's own armament production.[139]

No less significant was the diplomatic move initiated by Duncan Sandys, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, and Averell Harriman, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, which led to the joint statement issued by Nehru and Ayub Khan on 29 November 1962, in which India and Pakistan agreed 'that a renewed effort should be made to resolve the outstanding differences between their two countries on Kashmir and other related matters'.[140] This initiative looked towards a Kashmir settlement as a *quid pro quo* for Anglo-American arms assistance to India, which Pakistan could justifiably construe as being against the spirit of her military alliances with Britain and the United States. The projected Nehru-Ayub Khan meeting to discuss Kashmir did not materialise, however, Indo-Pakistan exchanges having broken down after a series of preliminary meetings at ministerial level. Britain continued to concert with the United States in giving arms aid to India until 1965. When, after Britain's successful mediation over the Kutch dispute between India and Pakistan in April 1965, hostilities between these two powers again erupted in September, Western arms aid seemed to be defeating its purpose, and was terminated. After 1965, as noted below, India began increasingly to turn towards the

Soviet Union for its military supplies, as Pakistan did towards China.

The United States in South Asia

The United States' interest in South Asia has always been a product of its global strategy; consequently, shifts in global strategy have been reflected in U.S. policy changes in South Asia. In the early fifties U.S. involvement there was dictated by a larger commitment to prevent communist expansion in Asia generally. At that time the United States was only peripherally concerned with developments in South Asia itself; higher priorities were placed on West Asia, where a Soviet military threat to Iran and Turkey was perceived, and to Southeast Asia, where the Chinese were suspected of long-term expansionist ambitions. Pakistan was built up as a political and military support-base for Iran and Afghanistan, with both of whom Pakistan shared borders, because an important element of U.S. strategic policy was centred in West Asia. East Pakistan was also considered to be geographically positioned to play at least a subordinate role in U.S. strategic policy in Southeast Asia.[141]

In pursuance of its role of containing communism, Pakistan was inducted to SEATO and the Baghdad Pact (CENTO). CENTO gave an opening to the Muslim world of the Middle East for Pakistan, besides providing an avenue for promotion of regional co-operation for development.[142] SEATO, however, served no useful purpose for either Pakistan or the United States. As G.W. Choudhury observed:

> The military alliance between the United States and Pakistan was based on different expectations and aims from the two sides; the United States gave military aid to Pakistan in the context of its global policy of containing communism; Pakistan considered the whole deal from the angle of its problems of security and defence *vis-a-vis* India . . . Pakistan's entry into the American sponsored pacts, both bilateral and multilateral, was mainly due to the desperate urge to improve the balance of power in the subcontinent.[143]

American military assistance to Pakistan was given on the specific understanding that it was not to be used in aggression against another power; indeed, President Eisenhower offered military assistance to India, too, on the same terms in February 1952, an offer declined by Nehru. Generally, the United States remained unreceptive to the Pakistani proposition that the Indo-Pak conflict must be viewed by the United States from the perspective of Pakistan as its 'most allied ally in Asia'. A pro-Pakistani lobby did exist in the United States, however, and one of its leading spokesmen, Vice-President Nixon, had, in 1953, advocated strengthening

Pakistan not only against the USSR but also as 'a counterforce to the confirmed neutralism of Jawaharlal Nehru's India'.[144]

Despite the ambivalence with which Pakistan regarded SEATO in the context of its irrelevance in an Indo-Pakistani war, and its own preoccupation with widening horizons in the Third World, Pakistan received a substantial pay-off in the form of military and economic assistance for its alliance with the United States. During the period 1954-1965, for example, the value of U.S. military shipments to Pakistan amounted to over U.S. $1 billion.[145] U.S. military assistance to India during the same period, at constant 1968 prices, amounted to about $100 million, more than 75 per cent of which was accounted for by military supplies during the three years 1962-64.[146] Pakistan came to rely almost exclusively on the United States during this period for its military hardware. Nearly all of Pakistan's combat tanks, much of its artillery, all its fighters, bombers and transport aircraft until 1965 were of U.S. origin.[147] Much to Pakistan's chagrin, however, the quantum of U.S. economic assistance to India far outweighed economic assistance to Pakistan. The United States was seriously concerned with the success of India's Five Year Plans; the escalation of the Sino-Indian border dispute in the late fifties gave it yet another stake in India. With Kennedy's election as U.S. President, an important change in American geopolitical perspectives on South Asia began to appear. By 1960, the Soviets were perceived as less of a military threat to West Asia – they were seen to be more concerned with a political and economic presence in the region. In response, the United States shifted from a military-strategic to a political emphasis, implying a departure from a 'containment of Russia' policy in West Asia, though both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations retained a 'containment of China' adjunct in thier foreign policy.[148]

But the real divide was the Sino-Indian war of 1962. With its outbreak, India was seen to be a more important factor than Pakistan for the realisation of U.S. policy objectives in Asia, and in particular in its containment of China. Nehru's request for military assistance was promptly agreed to, even prior to intimating the decision to Pakistan, as Kennedy had agreed to do earlier.[149] A State Department Release of 17 November 1962 stated that, as in the case of the 1954 arms aid to Pakistan, if arms aid to India were 'misused or misdirected against another in aggression', the United States would undertake action both within and outside the United Nations to thwart such aggression.[150]

The Sino-Indian war affected South Asian politics and balance of power in several important ways. Its impact on small power politics in the region, and on the significant changes which it brought about in the foreign policies of Sri Lanka and Nepal have been discussed in the previous section. Three other concomitants of the war may be noted here. In the first place, the new U.S. interest in, and military

assistance to, India connoted a decline of the Pakistani-U.S. alliance. Pakistani leaders could not reconcile themselves to the changed situation under which non-aligned India had taken precedence in American thinking over allied Pakistan. Pakistani leaders saw U.S. policy in South Asia in the early sixties as a case of over-reaction to an imagined Chinese threat to India's independence and integrity. They did not subscribe to the view, expressed by Kennedy in a press statement in September 1963, that China would renew hostilities with India that fall.[151] In this statement, Kennedy had given expression to the American dilemma:

> . . . if that country (India) becomes fragmented and defeated, of course, that would be a most destructive blow to the balance of power.
>
> On the other hand, everything we give to India adversely affects the balance of power with Pakistan, which is a much smaller country. So we are dealing with a very, very complicated problem, because the hostility between them is so deep.[152]

The Pakistani disillusionment with the new American policy has been well expressed by former Prime Minister Bhutto:

> Nehru's troublesome policies and the irritation generated by his non-alignment were forgotten, as was the fidelity with which Pakistan attached itself to the United States interest. Undoubtedly, substantial economic and military assistance was rendered to Pakistan, but it was not without an adequate *quid pro quo*. Pakistan had undertaken to stretch her defence commitments against the Communist powers without a categorical assurance with regard to the Soviet Union, which openly supported Afghanistan and India against Pakistan. The policy of alignment also damaged Pakistan's image in the United Nations, strained her relations with neighbouring Arab states, and drove her towards isolation in the community of Asia and Africa. The changes in the subcontinent and on the Himalayan frontiers had erased with a single stroke both the services of Pakistan and the antagonisms against India.[153]

Pakistan's reaction to the changed situation was to shift from a policy of alliance to a policy of bilateralism, aimed at maintaining simultaneous good relations with the U.S., U.S.S.R. and China. Field Marshal Ayub Khan was the chief architect of the new policy.[154]

A second concomitant of the Sino-Indian war was that it brought about Soviet-U.S. collaboration against China in South Asia. 'By 1963', says Leo Rose, 'enlistment of India's co-operation in the containment of China policy had become the basis for the Asian strategies of both the United States and the U.S.S.R.'.[155] Giving military assistance to India came to be regarded by both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. as being in their mutual interest as well as in that of India. The respective aid programs of the superpowers were complementary, more, it would

appear, by design than by accident. The Soviets supplied jet fighters and even jet aircraft factories; the United States an air defence support system (the lack of which had prevented India from using its air force in the 1962 war, for fear of retaliation by China). The Indian army obtained tanks from the Soviet Union, and U.S. arms for ten mountain divisions. Implicit in these developments was a further deterioration of U.S. relations with Pakistan. Pakistan's developing relationship with China had become the cause of serious concern in Washington, impelling U.S. Under-Secretary of State George Ball to warn President Ayub that he hoped Pakistan would not 'carry relations with Red China to a point where it impairs a relationship which we have and an alliance which we have'.[156]

Soviet mediation in the September 1965 Indo-Pakistan war was fully supported by the United States. United States Ambassador Chester Bowles said that the U.S. had 'sincerely welcomed the Soviet initiative and hoped and prayed that the Soviet Union would be able to find a solution to India-Pakistani disputes'.[157] It is problematic whether Soviet efforts at mediation would have achieved their object, at least on the Pakistani side, in the absence of the supporting American role.

A third consequence of the 1962 war was that it tilted the military balance within the subcontinent decidedly in India's favour. The 1962 war marks the turning point in the modernisation of the Indian armed forces. Indian units which faced the Chinese in October-November 1962 were equipped for the most part with antiquated weapons, transport and communications equipment, and had no experience of mountain warfare. Anglo-American military assistance to India enabled it to form an entirely new army for combat against the Chinese, in addition to the other on the Pakistan front. The fact that India's principal preoccupation, even during the Sino-Indian war, was with a possible Pakistani attack on the western front was demonstrated by the Indian Government's refusal, until 8 November 1962, to allow Army Commander Thapar to pull out any formations from the Pakistan front in Punjab and Kashmir.[158] Thereafter, one and a half divisions were withdrawn from the Pakistan front for action against the Chinese.[159] According to President Ayub:

> The fact of the matter is that, taking advantage of the favourable western response to her demands for arms, India [is] planning to raise two armies, one with which to face China and the other to use against Pakistan and her other smaller neighbours in pursuance of her expansionist objectives. Any army meant for China would by the nature of things be so positioned as to be able to wheel round swiftly to attack East Pakistan. Thus both the armies pose a grave threat to Pakistan.[160]

Bhutto wrote apropos of the 1965 war:

> If the military balance had not been altered, India would not have been in a position to mount the attack. The six mountain divisions which were formed and equipped by the United States for the purpose of facing the Chinese were turned against Pakistan in Kashmir.[161]

The 1965 war brought about a further change in U.S. policy in South Asia. That war, in fact, came as a considerable embarrassment to the U.S., which was committed, by bilateral arrangements as well as by specific guarantees, to assist Pakistan in the event of aggression against her.[162] Bilateral agreements between the two countries had repeatedly declared that the U.S. regarded as vital to its national interest and to world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of Pakistan . These were supplemented by public statements and private assurances from American statesmen and officials reaffirming the commitment to defend Pakistan against aggression, even from India. In November 1962, for example, U.S. ambassador to Pakistan Walter McConnaughy had guaranteed assistance to Pakistan in the event of aggression from outside, including India, and President Kennedy himself, at a press conference the same month had declared that 'our help to India in no way diminishes or qualifies our commitments to Pakistan and we have made this clear to both governments'.[163] On 17 September 1963, Phillips Talbot stated:

> I think that the leaders of the Government of Pakistan understand our concern for the security of Pakistan, just as the leaders of India understand our concern for the security of India. And both, I believe, recognize that in what we regard as the highly unlikely event that either country should attack the other, there would be an American response.[164]

Further, on 25 March 1964, Robert McNamara had reiterated to the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the U.S.

> had taken great pains to assure Pakistan that our aid to India will not be at the expense of Pakistan security to which we are committed under our Mutual Defence Arrangements.[165]

When the 1965 war broke out, Pakistan invoked these assurances in seeking U.S. assistance against India, but the crux of the matter turned on the definition of aggression. According to Pakistan, the war started on 6th September,, when Indian troops crossed Pakistan's international border in the area near Lahore. According to India, the war started on 5th August, when 4,000 to 5,000 guerrillas, trained and equipped by Pakistan, crossed into Kashmir in an attempt to inspire and lead a general uprising. The American response to the Pakistani request was negative. As Secretary of State Dean Rusk said, 'The U.S. was being invited in on the crash landing without being in on the take-off'.[166] The United States

kept out of the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war. Its immediate response to the war was to terminate economic and military assistance to both sides. The embargo on military supplies to India and Pakistan has remained basically unchanged up to the present, with exceptions applicable to supply of spare parts and limited sales of second-hand American-made equipment owned by third countries but under U.S. control.[167]

In the late sixties and early seventies, U.S. policy in South Asia underwent yet another fundamental change. India no longer loomed large in the U.S. global perspective; the threat of another Sino-Indian armed conflict had gradually receded. The arms embargo had worked to the disadvantage of Pakistan, since the Soviets had filled the breach for India, as regards arms supplies, and Pakistani acquisition of arms from China and other sources was not adequate to redress the increasing military imbalance between the two countries. Besides, in theatres other than South Asia, whether in North Vietnam, Syria, Iraq or Laos, it was the Soviet posture that now caused concern to the United States. The United States and China now found a common concern in containing increasing Soviet influence. This had the effect of rehabilitating the U.S.-Pakistani relationship. Indeed, Pakistan became an intermediary between the United States and China and the secret Kissinger mission to Peking in July 1971, which was intended to prepare the ground for Nixon's visit later, was undertaken from Rawalpindi.

The East Bengali crisis and the Indo-Pak war of 1971 revealed the new alignment of international forces in the subcontinent. The Soviets gave diplomatic support to the Bangladeshi liberation movement, and were behind Inida in the war. The United States and China gave diplomatic support and were behind Pakistan in the war. United States policy was not without its ambivalence, however. In October 1970, President Nixon had lifted the ban on the sale of military supplies to Pakistan, but in April 1971 the ban was reimposed and economic aid was also suspended in an effort to pressure Pakistan to come to terms with the Bangladesh movement. On the other hand, American economic aid to India, and the permits which allowed India to purchase military equipment, were not suspended until the actual outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan. The U.S. 'tilt' towards Pakistan became clear only after the outbreak of hostilities. By mid-1971 it was becoming clear that events in East Pakistan were moving towards a crisis, and that Indian intervention in the context of the enormous exodus of refugees into India had become a distinct possibility. In this context, Kissinger, returning after his first visit to Peking, reportedly invited Indian ambassador L.K. Jha to Los Angeles and informed him that if India and Pakistan went to war over the Bangladesh issue, and China intervened on the side of Pakistan, India should not expect the United

States to come to her help.[168] 'This', according to the reputed Indian scholar S.P. Varma,

> was a clear notice to India that both the United States and China were going to help Pakistan and that India would ignore the warning at her own peril.[169]

Perceiving her diplomatic isolation, India entered into the Indo-Soviet treaty in August 1971. Varma suggests that had the United States and China not moved closer to each other in 1971 'clearly against the Soviet Union', and that had the United States not intimated its inability to support India in the event of Chinese intervention on the Pakistani side in an Indo-Pak war over Bangladesh,

> the Indo-Soviet treaty would either not have materialised at the time that it did, or not been followed in all its logical implications.[170]

When the war broke out, the United States, supported by China, took the matter to the United Nations Security Council, where it was stifled by a Soviet veto. In the U.N. General Assembly, the U.S. delegate openly accused India of aggression against Pakistan. In December 1971, at the time of the Indo-Pak war, the United States deployed a task force headed by the aircraft carrier *Enterprise*, and including an amphibious assault ship with a battalion of 800 marines, three guided missile escorts, four destroyers, a nuclear-attack submarine, and an oiler, which entered the Bay of Bengal and remained there until January 1972.[171] The U.S. position after the declaration of the cease-fire was stated in the official communique of the Sino-American conference held in Peking in February 1972 as follows:

> The United States favors the continuation of the cease-fire between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military forces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir; the United States supports the right of the peoples of South Asia to shape their own future in peace, free of military threat, and without having the area become the subject of big-power rivalry.[172]

After the 1971 war, the American image was tarnished both in India and in Pakistan: in India because of the United States 'tilt' towards Pakistan in the crisis, in Pakistan because of the failure of the United States to provide any tangible support in her hour of need. The seventies have been generally a period of a lowered American profile in South Asia. The Nixon-Kissinger strategy of detente with the Soviet Union, and the rapprochement with China indicated the diminished importance of South Asia as a counterpoise to either of these powers. Both Nixon and Carter accepted publicly India's status as the dominant power in South Asia, but Carter was perhaps the first U.S. President to indicate support for India's regional hegemony. During his visit to New Delhi in January 1978, Carter told the Indian Parliament:

> In global politics, history has cast our countries in different roles. The United States is one of the so-called superpowers; India is the largest of the non-aligned countries. But each of us respects the other's conception of its international responsibilities and the values that we do share provide a basis for cooperation in attacking the great global problems of economic justice, human rights and the prevention of war.[173]

After 1977, on the Indian side, too, the new government of Morarji Desai has attempted to diversify its foreign relations by expanding economic and political ties with western Europe, the United States and China. This has not necessarily implied a setback for the Soviets in India; indeed, Desai himself has paid state visits to both Washington and Moscow, and the Soviet stake in India may now be too important to be easily discredited. Both superpowers, however, appear now to be in agreement about the Indian role in South Asia.

Soviet Policy in South Asia

Like the United States, Soviet policy in South Asia was determined by the Soviets' own conception of their global strategic interests; the Soviets, however, had a greater regional stake in developments in South Asia because developments in the fifties impinged more directly on interests considered to be vital to the Soviet Union's own security. Two issues, in particular, became relevant in this context: one, Pakistan's adherence to American military pacts; the other, the Soviet rift with China.

Until 1952, the Soviet Union did not take any part in the Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir. When in January 1952, the Soviets first intervened in a UN debate on this issue, it was intended as a move to oppose Anglo-American 'interference', and to support settlement of the constitutional status of Kashmir by the people of Kashmir themselves![174] After 1953, however, Soviet policy in this respect underwent a qualitative change. Pakistan's inclusion in the system of US military alliances was seen as making the South Asian subcontinent a vital adjunct in the containment of communist policy. Post-Stalinist Russia abandoned its earlier denunciation of the Indian Congress leadership as consisting of bourgeois reactionaries and began to accept the principle of peaceful co-existence between different social systems as well as the doctrinal validity of different approaches to socialism. Nehru, having visited the US and China in 1954, went to Moscow in June 1955, and the prolonged return visit of Krushchev and Bulganin to India later in the year proved to be crucial in the change of Soviet policy. Krushchev

declared in Srinagar in December 1955 that 'the question of Kashmir as one of the States of the Republic of India has already been decided by the people of Kashmir', and in his report to the Supreme Soviet the same month Bulganin declared more explicitly that 'the Soviet Government supports India's policy on the Kashmir question'.[175]

Concomitant with the development of a new relationship with India was a gradual deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations. The new Soviet policy was given theoretical enunciation at the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU, which the Chinese later characterised as 'the first step taken along the road to revisionism'.[176] The ideological debate between the Soviets and Chinese was carried over to the World Congress of Communist Parties held in Moscow in 1957, which, without leading to an overt split, merely glossed over mutual differences; at the 3rd Congress of the Rumanian Communist Party, however, there were hard exchanges between Krushchev and Peng Chen. The breach was widened at the second Moscow Congress held in November 1960, and the point of no return was marked by the 22nd Congress of the CPSU held in October 1961, from which Chou En-lai walked out.

It is perhaps true that the Sino-Soviet ideological debate developed on its own momentum; but concurrently with the development of the debate were other factors which added to its vituperative character. Three of these stand out as important, and all three have a bearing on Indo-Soviet relations. In the first place, the Soviet Union refused in June 1959 to provide China with a sample of an atomic bomb, and technical data concerning its manufacture. Secondly, in July 1960, the Soviets recalled all their experts in China within a month's notice thus, according to the Chinese, 'tearing up hundreds of agreements and contracts'.[177] Thirdly, and most significantly for Indo-Soviet relations, the Soviets refrained from supporting China in the Sino-Indian border dispute and, on the contrary, tended more and more as the Sino-Soviet dispute deteriorated, to support India on the issue. The crux was the Sino-Indian military clash at *Longju* (near Migyitun, on the border of Northeast India and Tibet), the most serious in the Sino-Indian border dispute up to that time, which led to the *Tass* statement of 9 September 1959, which deprecated bloodshed between allies (China) and friends (India), and appealed to both sides to settle their differences peacefully.[178] The *Tass* statement, the publication of which they had attempted to prevent, came as a great shock to the Chinese. According to the Chinese version:

> Between December 10, 1959, and January 30, 1960, the Chinese leaders had six talks with the Soviet ambassador. They pointed out that the Soviet leaders were wrong to 'maintain strict neturality' on the Sino-Indian boundary question and that, far from being neutral, their statements actually censured China and were in favour of India.[179]

Even more significant in the Sino-Indian-Soviet trilateral relationship was the fact that the Soviets supplied military assistance to India both before and after the eruption of the Sino-Indian war of October 1962. Before the war, the Soviet Union had already been supplying India with helicopters and transport planes on favourable terms, which had been used to supply advanced Indian posts in Ladakh, and Soviet instructors had been sent to train Indian Air Force pilots in the use of these planes in mountainous terrain.[180] In May 1962, India decided to buy MIG-21 fighters from the Soviet Union, and in July signed an agreement providing for the delivery of 19 MIG-21s and also for financial and technical assistance in setting up factories for the manufacture of MIGs in India under license, the payment to be made in Indian currency or in Indian manufactured goods. By the early 1960s, in fact, the anti-Chinese orientation of Soviet policy had become more important than its earlier anti-American orientation, and the Soviets considerably expanded their economic and military assistance to India. By May 1964, India had received from the Soviet Union a total of $130 million by way of military assistance, which exceeded the US military assistance given to India after the Chinese invasion up to the same date.[181] The complementarity of American and Soviet interests in South Asia produced by the Sino-Indian war implied a mutual resolve to enhance India's military preparedness. The US, however, was reluctant to undertake a long-term program of military assistance to India on any large scale because of its obvious implications for American relations with Pakistan. The Soviets filled the breach. The Indo-Soviet arms agreement of 11 September 1964 registered a significant increase in the supply of Soviet arms to India: it covered 44 MIG-21s, 50 ground-to-air missiles, about 70 light tanks, 6 submarines, and other heavy weapons, for which India was to pay in Indian currency or manufactured goods over 10 years at two per cent interest. The arms deliveries were valued at $142 million.[182] After 1965, the Soviet Union became the principal supplier of arms to India.[183]

In the sixties, the Soviets began to take an interest in Pakistan, for the first time, as a factor in their new South Asian diplomacy. The first Soviet overtures to Pakistan were made in 1963-64, and these were probably related to the boundary agreement signed between China and Pakistan in March 1963, which gave China direct access to strategically important areas in Kashmir.[184] In October 1963, the Soviet Union had reiterated its support for Afghanistan's demand for Pakhtoonistan, a claim which Bulganin had originally endorsed in his December 1955 report to the Supreme Soviet.[185] This involved territory which was part of Pakistan but, beginning with an aviation, cultural and trade agreement, Pakistani-Soviet relations began gradually to improve. When Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Sergev visited Pakistan in November 1964, Pakistani Foreign Minister Bhutto attempted to

lay the basis of a new relationship with the Soviets by assuring the visitor that Pakistani foreign policy was 'independent', and that though a member of SEATO, Pakistan was not in agreement with US policy in Vietnam and opposed the presence of the US Fleet in the Indian Ocean. Bhutto's January 1965 visit to Moscow was itself the prelude to Field Marshal Ayub's visit to Moscow later in April, and the latter during this visit expounded his policy of bilateralism 'the essence of which was to maintain simultaneously good relations with the USSR, the US, and China'.[186]

It was evident, however, that the mainspring of Soviet policy towards Pakistan was the growing Sino-Soviet confrontation. In April 1968 Kosygin himself visited Pakistan, the first ever by a Soviet Prime Minister, during the course of which he agreed to sell a modest quantity of arms to Pakistan, 'to fill a few gaps in Pakistan's defence requirements'. This was a departure from traditional Soviet friendship for India, but the Soviets were evidently much concerned with the developing Pakistan-China axis even more than Pakistan's membership of SEATO and CENTO.[187] Significantly enough, Pakistan had given notice of the closure of the US intelligence communications centre at Babadar early in 1968, prior to the Kosygin visit. The Soviets' arms deliveries to Pakistan followed soon after General Yahya Khan's visit to Moscow, at the head of a military delegation in June 1968.[188] In March 1969, the Soviet Defence Minister, Marshal Grechko visited both India and Pakistan, and the same month the Soviet Deputy Chief of Staff of the Soviet Navy said at a dinner given by the Pakistan Navy Chief in Islamabad that 'a powerful Pakistan Navy would be a pre-condition for peace in this part of the Indian Ocean'.[189]

As the foregoing pages have indicated, the sixties were a period of Soviet-US collaboration and collusion directed against China and, for the Soviets in particular, the year 1969 was marked by increasingly violent border clashes with China, with the possibility of a Sino-Soviet war resulting from these clashes becoming a serious possibility. It was in this context that Brezhnev first put forward in June 1969, at a meeting of World Communist Parties, his proposal for a system of collective security in Asia. Though formulated as a nebulous concept, the anti-Chinese connotations of the Brezhnev Plan were clear, and escaped the notice neither of the Indians nor the Pakistanis.[190] Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's reaction was to comment that 'unless each country is strong in itself, even collective security will not amount to much', and Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh averred that 'the countries of South-east Asia should be strong enough to defend themselves against aggression and retain their territorial integrity on their own strength'.[191] The Pakistani reaction to the Plan was also negative. It was seen as directed against China, and,

according to Choudhury, 'Pakistanis were practically unanimous in opposing the Brezhnev Plan'.[192]

Besides their disillusionment with the Pakistanis over their lack of interest in Soviet-sponsored Asian collective security, the Soviets began to drop the tenuous Pakistani connection for two other reasons. One of these related to the vehemence of Indian objections to Soviet arms supplies to Pakistan, even though these applied merely to 'nuts and bolts'. The other, more important factor was perhaps the role that Pakistan began to play in the rapprochement between China and America, which began during Nixon's visit to Pakistan in August 1969, and culminated in Kissinger's secret trip to Peking via Rawalpindi in July 1971. In 1969 Marshal Grechko had told the Pakistani Foreign Secretary: 'You cannot have simultaneous friendship with the Soviet Union and China'. On being told that this was precisely current Soviet policy in respect of India and Pakistan, Grechko replied: 'What is permissible for a superpower is not permissible for a country like Pakistan'.[193] Grechko was in India in March 1969 before he proceeded to Pakistan, and on that occasion he brought with him the draft of an Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty.[194]

It was not before August 1971 that the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty, in gestation for a period of two years, and in a somewhat different form from the original Grechko draft, finally materialised. Moscow originally interpreted the treaty as a step towards an Indian endorsement of the Asian collective security system proposed by Brezhnev in 1969, and the original Grechko draft did not contain Article IX of the 1971 treaty, under which each contracting party undertook to abstain from providing assistance to any third party embroiled in conflict with the other party, and providing for mutual consultations in the event of an attack, or threat of attack, to either side.[195]

As noted earlier, however, India saw the proposed treaty in a new light with the developing international alignment of forces in the context of the Bangladesh crisis, and the possibility of war with Pakistan. Articles VIII, IX and X of the 1971 treaty therefore provided specifically for mutual defence assistance between the Soviet Union and India. India obtained reinsurance in the form of this treaty against the possible conjuncture of forces against her by the United States and China in the event of an Indo-Pak war.

The Soviet attitude to the Bangladesh crisis was not without its ambivalence. In April 1971, when the Pakistani army was let loose on the people of East Bengal, Podgorny, Chairman of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet, addressed Yahya Khan, expressing his concern at the 'numerous casualties, the suffering and privations' of the people of East Pakistan. The repressive measures and bloodshed in East Pakistan was roundly condemned, and Podgorny appealed to Yahya to 'stop the bloodshed and repression against the population in East Pakistan', and

urged the 'adoption of methods for a peaceful political settlement' in the 'interests of preserving peace in the area'.[196] Podgorny's espousal of the cause of 'vital interests of the entire people of Pakistan' in this message was a clear indication that the Soviets were at this time thinking in terms of the indivisibility and unity of Pakistan and that, in their conception, Mujibur Rahman himself was not for the independence of East Pakistan.[197] But the scenario changed substantively with the emergence of Bangladesh as a *fait accompli*. Soviet assistance to Bangladesh started even before the official recognition of the new state. The Soviets airlifted urgently needed supplies of food and drugs to Dacca, and the USSR and other socialist countries were among the first to accord official recognition to the Peoples' Republic of Bangladesh, and declare their readiness to establish diplomatic relations with it. On 24 January 1972 President Podgorny and Premier Kosygin themselves sent a telegram declaring recognition and their readiness to exchange diplomatic representatives. In February 1972 the USSR and Bangladesh exchanged diplomatic representatives. In early March 1972, Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman visited Moscow, and his talks with Soviet leaders on this occasion led to the signing of a joint declaration covering proposed Soviet aid to Bangladesh, furthering of friendly relations, and all-round cooperation. Apart from the rudimentary military assistance received from India in the aftermath of liberation, Bangladesh has relied largely on the Soviet Union for its arms build-up.[198]

By the mid-seventies Soviet pre-eminence in South Asia had declined in some measure – in India following upon the electoral victory of the Janata party, and in Bangladesh following upon Mujib's assassination. Domestic political factors connected with the ideological and organic links between the Communist Party of India and the Soviet Union, and the former's unqualified support of the Indira Gandhi regime, including its endorsement of the decision to proclaim emergency rule in mid-1975 had made sections of the Janata Party leadership suspicious of the Soviet connection, and of the 1971 Indo-Soviet treaty itself. It was therefore believed that Indira's so-called 'tilt' towards Moscow would be corrected by the new regime of Morarji Desai, and that India would henceforth follow a 'genuine' non-aligned policy. However, a new reappraisal of Indo-Soviet relations followed upon the important state visit to New Delhi of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in April 1977, and Desai's own visit to Moscow later in October. Soviet contributions to the recent development of India's defence establishment has been crucial, particularly as regards development of the Indian Navy. Soviet trade, too, had registered a four-fold increase during the last decade and the 1979 Indo-Soviet trading turnover is expected to exceed the £800 million mark under the terms of a new 15-year economic pact.[199] There are more than fifty important Soviet-assisted projects including the prestigious Bokaro steel mills in India, and

Morarji Desai struck an unexpected note of pragmatism in Moscow when he referred to the 'preservation and continuance in today's circumstances of this (Indo-Soviet) relationship' as a 'tribute to the maturity of two proud nations who recognised the imperative of peaceful coexistence'.[200]

Yet, Soviet attempts to gain Indian support in its anti-Chinese tirades have proved to be unsuccessful both with Mrs Gandhi and Morarji Desai. In the course of Kosygin's visit to India in March 1979, five important agreements and protocols, including the economic pact referred to above, were signed, under which the Soviets promised to finance a new steel mill at Visakhapatnam, increase the capacity of existing plants at Bhillai and Bokaro, provide chemical fertilisers and give agricultural machinery and motor vehicles. Desai was also promised an extra 600,000 metric tonnes of crude oil from the Soviet Union, which is already supplying 53 per cent of India's liquid fuel needs.[201] Kosygin, however, was not successful in the 'main purpose of the mission – to obtain wholehearted endorsement of the Soviet campaign against China', and Indian External Affairs Minister Vajpayee went on television soon after the visit to state that there were major differences between the Indian and Russian views on China.[202] An important adjunct to the new pragmatism in Indian foreign policy has been the attempt to resolve outstanding issues in dispute between India and China, and Vajpayee himself visited Peking in 1978, following upon the visit of a Chinese goodwill mission headed by Wang Pin-nam in March of that year. The joint communique at the end of the Kosygin visit did call for an 'immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of Chinese troops from the territory of Vietnam', but India refused to condemn China as the aggressor in Vietnam. Desai insisted on a Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea even though India had signed, in February 1978, five economic cooperation agreements between the two countries covering such diverse fields as trade, agriculture, science and technology and cultural exchange.[203] 'South Asia', according to Leo Rose, 'is likely to be an area of extensive investment and diminishing returns for the Soviet Union'.[204]

India, Pakistan and China

Of all the major powers, China had the most immediate interests in South Asia. Not only did China share international borders with India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim, besides Burma, but Tibet had long maintained trade relations with most of these states. With the communist takeover in China in January 1949 the status of Tibet was temporarily in abeyance, but the communist Chinese

occupation of Tibet in October 1950 dispelled any doubts as to the continuance of the independent nature of the Tibetan regime. China claimed Tibet as unquestionably an integral part of China and, in the context of Indian remonstrations against the Chinese occupation, charged India with interference in its internal affairs. As Girilal Jain has pointed out, Nehru both welcomed and dreaded the Chinese revolution;[205] it is now known that the Chinese occupation of Tibet had repercussions in the form of initiatives originating from Indian Intelligence, and its then chief Home Minister Sardar Vallabhai Patel, to reorganise frontier defence and establish border checkposts.[206] However, until 1962 Nehru never envisaged any serious confrontation with China. Despite the fact that early communist Chinese attitudes to the Indian political leadership were a reflection of Soviet views of it as consisting of bourgeois reactionaries, Nehru went to great lengths to accommodate the Chinese view of Tibet, and even to accept the Chinese revolution as a *fait accompli* and as a major event in history, and to recognise it as such.[207]

For the Chinese, Indian *bona fides* seemed to be borne out by the Indian role in the Korean armistice;[208] for the Indians, the Tibetan episode was not seen as evidence of Chinese southward expansionism. Peking's May 1951 agreement with Tibet gave China the handling of all external affairs of the area of Tibet, while the autonomy and political system of Tibet remained unaltered. India moved to regularise Sino-Indian relations by the 1954 treaty which, apart from incorporating the five principles of peaceful coexistence, later to be known as Panchsheel, dealt with questions pertaining to Indian trade, pilgrim traffic, trading posts and communications. India also agreed to the term 'the Tibet region of China', thereby recognising it for the first time as an integral part of the Peoples' Republic, and, consistently with the advice of ambassador Panikkar to the effect that 'British policy . . . of looking upon Tibet as an area in which we had special political interest could not be maintained', Nehru himself averred:

> I am not aware of any time during the last few hundred years when Chinese sovereignty, or if you like suzerainty, was challenged by any outside country and, whatever the Government of China was, China always maintained this claim to sovereignty over Tibet.[209]

Advocates of Nehru, who was later criticised for having relied too much on the diplomatic instrument in his dealings with China, and for having been one of those primarily responsible for India's military unpreparedness in the Sino-Indian war of 1962, have pointed out that Nehru was in fact much concerned even in the early fifties about Chinese intentions. According to S.S. Khera, Nehru was disappointed that the Chinese limited the duration of the 1954 treaty to eight instead of twenty-five years, as he had wished.

> Also, late in the day as it was, his suspicion about Chinese intentions were aroused. He stoutly defended the 1954 agreement; but he also gave instructions to set up frontier posts to safeguard India's northern frontiers.[210]

According to Mullik, Nehru did conceive of a threat, not from Chinese communism but from Chinese nationalism. He 'was a philosopher but a realist at the same time'.[211]

We shall attempt later in these pages to discuss causes for the Indian military debacle of 1962. What is pertinent to our present purpose is the steady deterioration which overtook Sino-Indian relations after about the mid-fifties. Already in 1954 a dispute between the two sides had occurred over possession of Barahoti (Wu-je) on the border of North Central India and Tibet. Indian intelligence had also repeatedly from 1951 been reporting on Chinese survey and road-building activities in the Ladakh area. It was not, however, until March 1957, when the Chinese announced for the first time the completion of a highway connecting Sinkiang with western Tibet (the Aksai-Chin road which skirted the Kashmir border) that the full significance of this development appeared to dawn on Indian government authorities. In October 1957, the road was formally opened for traffic with 12 Chinese trucks undertaking a trial run between Yarkhand and Gartok less than 100 km from the Indian border west of Nepal. Mullik, then India's Intelligence Chief, comments:

> However, enough information was available about the construction of the road right from 1951 to 1957, when the road was formally declared open.
>
> But though it was also known that the Chinese laid great stress on the construction of this road which they considered to be vital, its implications to India's security in the Ladakh region were not properly comprehended at any level. All through these years no questions were raised by the Army Headquarters or the Ministry of External Affairs about this road. It was only after the road had been completed and heavy traffic had started plying that some attention was turned on it though even then . . . it was only considered to be of nuisance value and not one that affected our security.[212]

Even when Intelligence recommended to the External Affairs Ministry in March 1958 that a protest should be lodged with the Government of China about this road, 'the line taken . . . was that the exact boundary of this area had not yet been demarcated and so in any protest we lodged we could not be on firm grounds. Probably the infiltrations had been made by over-zealous survey officers and did not indicate anything more serious. Moreover, as we were not physically controlling this area, it would be useless to make any formal protest'.[213] Indian authorities are replete with references to the inadequacy of the maps then available

with which to identify the international boundary both in the Ladakh and the NEFA area.[214] In this context it appears surprising that a suggestion to trade Indian acceptance of the Chinese presence in Aksai-Chin for Chinese recognition of the McMahon Line was not seriously pursued on the Indian side. According to Kuldip Nayar, the suggestion was transmitted from Krishna Menon to Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi, in the form of a proposed Indian acceptance of Peking's suzerainty over the area of the Aksai-Chin road 'as well as over a ten-mile strip to serve as a buffer to the road' in exchange for Chinese recognition of the McMahon Line and India's rights to the rest of Ladakh. China was reprtedly agreeable to the suggestion, which was apparently endorsed by Nehru himself. But Home Minister Pant reportedly stood in the way of any such deal, and in his talks with Chou En-lai in April 1960 ruled out any settlement based on such an arrangement.[215]

Yet, up to the end of 1958, India had established no checkposts in north and north-east Ladakh (i.e., the area covered by Soda Plains, Aksai-Chin, Lingzi Tang and Depsang Plains), although Indian frontier outposts had been established by this time all along the Sino-Indian border from Karakoram in south-east Ladakh to the NEFA area in north-east India. These outposts covered all important passes in Uttar Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab and south-east Ladakh touching on Tibet, and India held posts along the Sikkim frontier jointly with the Sikkim Police, and covered Nepali passes jointly with the Nepalese army.[216] North and north-east Ladakh was in fact more accessible from Sinkiang than from the Ladakh Valley, the average elevation there being over 15,000 feet, and the terrain being snowbound for more than six months in the year. The fact that this area was also almost totally devoid of population or even vegetation might account for India's relative lack of unease over the Chinese presence there. Chou En-lai's claim in 1960 that Chinese troops had entered Western Tibet from Sinkiang via what later became the Aksai-Chin road as early as October 1950 has been contested.[217] There was, however, an old silk route which covered part of the Aksai-Chin road which was traditionally used for trade by mule-caravan or by foot, and which was used by the Chinese, until the Aksai-Chin road became motorable, for regular changeover of troops from Yarkhand to western Tibet.[218]

The Tibetan revolt of 1959 invested the Aksai-Chin area with a new strategic importance for both China and India. For China, guerilla fighting in eastern Tibet made the Aksai-Chin road the only land route available for communication with Tibet, and possession of this road became a matter of desperate urgency. For India, suppression of the revolt by the Chinese was seen as a breach of the spirit of the 1954 treaty, and appeared to give a new dimension to China's military potential across the Sino-Indian border. China considered India's granting of asylum to the

Dalai Lama and a large party of Tibetan refugees accompanying him to be an unfriendly act, and charged that Kalimpong in India was the centre of the Tibetan revolt. Countering these allegations, Nehru stated in the Lok Sabha in April 1959:

> We have no desire whatever to interfere in Tibet; we have every desire to maintain the friendship between India and China; but at the same time we have every sympathy for the people of Tibet, and we are greatly distressed at their helpless plight. We still hope that the authorities of China, in their wisdom, will not use their great strength against the Tibetans but will win them to friendly cooperation in accordance with the assurances they have themselves given about the autonomy of the Tibet region.[219]

The Chinese took strong exception to the expression of sympathy for the Tibetan people by Nehru and other Indian leaders, and alleged that this was tantamount to interference in China's internal affairs.[220] In May 1959, the Chinese ambassador in New Delhi told the Indian Foreign Secretary that India was responsible for recent abnormalities in Sino-Indian relations, and that the Indian government was encouraging Tibetan rebels.[221]

1959 was the great divide in Sino-Indian relations, and perhaps the granting of Indian asylum to the Dalai Lama, as some claimed, was the issue which led to a rapid deterioration in these relations.[222] The Longju incident of 8 September 1959, referred to earlier, was symptomatic of the changed relationship; but even more serious in its implications was the Kongka La incident of 21 October 1959, when in an attempt to establish an Indian outpose at Kongka La near the bank of the Chang Chenmo River (considered on the Indian side to be thirty miles within Indian territory), an Indian patrol was ambushed by the Chinese, resulting in eight dead and several injured. This, according to Mullik, 'marked the end of the period of friendship between India and China', and 'the point of no return'.[223] These incidents were significant in another way: they brought to the fore the basic divergences regarding the Indian response to the border dispute which existed between the Indian Intelligence Bureau and the Army High Command. The army chiefs, who were well aware of the logistic difficulties in maintaining forward checkposts in territory which was considered to be disputed, and who in any event 'did not consider it a feasible proposition at all even to envisage an armed conflict with the Chinese',[224] conflicted with the Intelligence Bureau, whose responsibility it had hitherto been to ensure frontier security. After October 1959, it was decided that no further movements of armed police would take place in the frontier without army clearance, and the protection of the border was thereafter handed over to the army, and all operations of armed police made subject to the prior approval of the army command.[225]

The fact that neither the Indian political leadership nor the Army High Command anticipated a war with China, and were only preparing for a game of border skirmishes is now too well known to require elaboration. The most convincing testimony to this is the fact that Brigadier Dalvi himself, the most forward of the forward Indian commanders on 20th October 1962, was taken completely by surprise by the Chinese attack, the destruction of his brigade and his own capture by the Chinese on that day.[226] His statement that after 1959 China intensified her war preparations, and that it was coldly calculated by the Chinese especially after mid-1962, however, is without substantiation.[227] After the top-level diplomatic parleys between Chou En-lai and Nehru in 1960 proved to be unproductive, and the protracted officials' talks in 1960-61 also ended in failure, it would appear that both India and China engaged in a feverish pushing forward of their border checkposts, and consolidating their respective 'lines of actual control', especially in the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) region. According to the Indian version, the Chinese crossed the McMahon Line on 8th September 1959; earlier in January, the Chinese premier in a communication to Nehru had for the first time declared that 'the Sino-Indian border had never been formally delimited' and that 'the McMahon Line was a product of the British policy of aggression against the Tibet region of China . . . and cannot be considered legal'.[228] In his letter of 8th September 1959, Chou En-lai himself, for the first time, laid a formal claim to about 50,000 square miles of territory in Ladakh and in NEFA, which India considered to be within its own borders.[229]

The Indian reaction to this situation was two-fold. In the first place, it pre-empted any diplomatic adjustment or bartering away of rival claims because Indian opinion had become so incensed at what was considered to be Chinese 'cartographic aggression' against India that the Government was constrained to adopt an uncompromising attitude towards China, besides defending itself as best it could in Parliament and in the press. Secondly, since the possibility of a war with China was still discounted both by the army and political leadership,[230] the strategy evolved to meet the Chinese threat was progressively to stake territorial claims by establishing more and more forward checkposts and more extensive patrolling of border areas. According to Lt-Gen. Kaul, the 'forward policy' was evolved by Nehru himself in November 1961 at a meeting at which Krishna Menon, army chief General Thapar and he himself were present. The strategy simply consisted in Nehru's belief that 'whoever succeeded in establishing (even a symbolic) post, would establish a claim to that territory, as possession was nine-tenths of the law'. If China could set up posts, so could India. Kaul says that Nehru was told of numerical and logistical difficulties which would be an obstacle in such a race with the Chinese:

> A discussion then followed the upshot of which I understood to be that (since China was unlikely to go to war with India), there was no reason why we should not play a game of chess and a battle of wits with them, so far as the establishing of posts was concerned. If they advanced in one place, we should advance in another.[231]

The essence of the policy was to keep up with the Chinese in setting up border posts in what was considered to be Indian territory. It was Kaul's belief that Nehru evolved this policy largely for domestic consumption, in the context of mounting criticism in Parliament and in the press against Chinese occupation of Indian territory.

Kaul's version of the origins of the 'forward policy' has been contested by other authorities. According to Dalvi, the 'forward policy' was Kaul's own formulation, not Nehru's, and he questions its overall strategic viability.[232] Krishna Menon later (in 1967) denied that India followed any forward policy at all.[233] According to Mullik, however, the meeting referred to by Kaul followed upon an exposition he himself made, from an intelligence point of view, to Home Minister Shastri, Defence Minister Krishna Menon and Nehru himself, about the dangers of Chinese penetration into Indian territory, and his suggestions (with the aid of maps) of the exact areas which Indian troops should occupy to forestall further Chinese moves. Mullik differs from Kaul, who believed that political considerations forced Nehru to ask the army to start an adventurist policy for which it was not prepared. On the contrary, Nehru wanted effective occupation of Indian territory by the army, not opening of symbolic posts.[234]

What seems clear is that a new policy, short of war, *was* begun by India late in 1961 as a response to the developing border dispute with China. Interestingly enough, Lt-Gen. Kaul himself was placed in charge of the execution of the policy, and was appointed to the command of a newly raised Fourth Army Corps on 3rd October 1962, with the responsibility of manning the border posts.[235] Whatever Kaul's own role in the formulation of the new policy and in its execution, however, it was bound to set off a chain reaction fraught with dire consequences. In June 1962, the decision was taken to establish an Indian outpost in Dhola, at the trijunction of Bhutan, Tibet and India, an area in dispute which, according to Dalvi, was 'the detonator which set off the fuse of the Chinese invasion'.[236] In the first week of October, the 7th Brigade under the command of Brigadier Dalvi himself was posted to the Namka Chu valley in the Dhola area, and on 10th October, there was a major clash between the Chinese and Indians, involving hand-to-hand fighting at Tseng-Jong.[237]

Matters were not improved when Nehru, on the eve of his departure to Sri Lanka on a state visit in mid-October, stated at a press interview that the Indian armed forces had been ordered 'to throw out' the Chinese aggressors from NEFA, and that his instructions were to 'free our territory'. Asked how soon this would happen, Nehru is reported as having replied: 'I cannot fix a date. That is entirely for the Army'.[238] Dalvi calls this statement 'one of the great *faux pas* of modern times . . . He should not have used the phrase 'throw out' when referring to a major power, and especially the Chinese, who are proud and sensitive'.[239] Surprisingly enough, in the context of all these developments, the prospect of a major military confrontation with the Chinese was furthest from the minds of the Army command and government leaders. As stated above, Nehru was undertaking a visit to Sri Lanka in mid-October, having returned from London in September. Defence Minister Menon was preparing to attend UN sessions about the same time, while Finance Minister Desai, having accompanied Nehru to London, left from there for Washington for a World Bank meeting.[240] Kaul himself, who, according to his own account, informed US special emissary Chester Bowles at a meeting with him in March 1962, that the Chinese were likely to 'provoke a clash with us in the summer of autumn of 1962 and this raised many problems for us', took two months leave in September and proceeded to Srinagar.[241]

It is arguable, as has been suggested earlier, that a basis for settlement of the Sino-Indian border dispute did exist, given a mutual adjustment of claims by the two sides in Ladakh and NEFA. In 1960, China entered into border agreements with Nepal and Burma and, in the latter case, recognised Burma's traditional boundary in the north with Tibet as defined by the McMahon Line. In 1962 the Sino-Pakistan border was delimited by agreement, and this was followed up with a Sino-Afghanistan border agreement. Whether or not these were for the most part propaganda efforts on the part of China to isolate the Sino-Indian border dispute as a case of Indian intransigence, is debatable. By the early sixties, however, the question of the 'violation' of Indian territory by Chinese aggression had gone beyond the point of a compromise solution. Given the dynamics of the prevailing border situation, therefore, a major military confrontation between China and India had become, to use the historian's phrase, inevitable.

Some of the major causes for India's military debacle in the war of October 1962 have already been implied in the foregoing pages. The military men tended to blame the political leadership, especially Nehru, for India's military unpreparedness. Kaul found three persons on the civilian side responsible for this unpreparedness: Nehru, Krishna Menon and Morarji Desai:

> Nehru for allowing this to happen under his captaincy; Krishna Menon for not taking appropriate and expeditious steps to deal with certain grave matters and situations concerning the defence of the country; and Morarji Desai for not making sufficient funds available for essential defence requirements.[242]

Dalvi is quite categorical about his own indictment of Nehru. Not only did he 'let matters drift' in relations with China until 1959, but

> Mr Nehru's China and Defence policies were found wanting in 1962. His declared China policy was to confront China and not to surrender to force, and yet inwardly he hoped for a peaceful settlement. However, his subsequent political actions were not designed to implement this policy. He did not prepare for a military decision. He ordered only limited preparations, misled the nation in various statements which he made from time to time and contributed more than his fair share to the euphoria and equivocation, prior to the Chinese invasion . . .
>
> He was omnipotent for over fifteen years and in 1962 he is solely responsible for (these) miscalculations and omissions.[243]

Supporting these indictments of the military men, Mankekar in his book *The Guilty Men of 1962*, criticised Nehru for India having 'recklessly dropped its guard and blindly reposed faith in the Chinese protestations of friendship and peace', from which blunder 'flowed all the troubles that India had to face since 1959 at any rate'. Mankekar did recognise Nehru's awareness of the Chinese threat, his intermittent efforts to take protective measures short of war, his constant prodding of Army headquarters and the Defence ministry to hold the north-eastern frontier by moving up outposts in this area. But the thrust of his argument centred on 'Nehru's abject reliance on diplomacy – the starry-eyed Nehru brand of it – to counter the danger from China to the neglect of the conventional instrument of policy, namely the armed forces'.

> Nehru had been carried away by his own hot-gospelling philosophy of the fifties which assumed that in the present age war had ceased to be an instrument of policy and its place had been taken by personal diplomacy and the conciliation machinery provided by the United Nations.[244]

A more incisive commentary of the Indian defeat is provided by Khera, who served as Nehru's Cabinet Secretary. He recognises that India's military unpreparedness in 1962 was in 'large measure' due to an 'ill-founded trust' which the nation and its leaders placed on the long history of friendship with China. Also relevant, according to Khera was Krishna Menon's incumbency of the Defence Ministry during the period 1957-62, and his belief that the enemy to guard against was Pakistan, not China. Though Menon's initiative and drive were largely

responsible for the indigenous manufacture of arms and armaments in India, there appeared to be a progressive weakening of the entire defence structure during his stewardship, attributed by Khera to the manner of his conducting business, personal differences with colleagues (especially Desai) and his habit of working through personal favourites, which undermined morale in the army. Further, 'no one seems to have been able to assess, or even to recognise significantly, the real state of the military threat that was looming menacingly across India's northern border during the 1950s'. The final and culminating cause was the performance of the military chiefs, especially the senior army officers. The commanders blamed lack of equipment and stores, but the best use was not made of what was available. The commanders, in fact, seemed to be poorly informed about events across India's borders; this made realistic planning difficult and inhibited proper preparations.[245] Reporting to Parliament after the Henderson-Brooks Inquiry into the Indian military failure, Defence Minister Chavan stated that the main lesson learnt from 1962 was that the quality of General Staff work, and the depth of its planning would be one of the most crucial factors in Indian defence preparedness in the future. He also stated that the training of Indian troops had borne little relation to the particular terrain in which they had to operate.[246] A juridical assessment of the rival claims of India and China on the border issue is irrelevant for the purposes of this paper, and these claims are succinctly presented in the *Officials Report*, cited earlier. The genesis of the 1962 Sino-Indian war, however, and India's defeat in that war had significant consequences for South Asia's geostrategic interests and balance of power. Some of these, as they pertain to the smaller states of South Asia, were considered in the previous section of this paper. We shall now deal with the development of the China-Pakistan axis in the sixties, and its implications for the balance of power in South Asia.

'Well into the 1950s', says G.W. Choudhury, 'China was correct but cool towards Pakistan'.[247] Even at the height of the good Sino-Indian relations of the early fifties, China refrained from endorsing the Indian position on Kashmir. A major irritant in the Sino-Pakistani relationship during this period was Pakistan's membership of SEATO and CENTO, despite Pakistani assurances to Peking that, on Pakistan's part, adherence to SEATO did not imply any aggressive designs against China. The constraints imposed by these alliances did, however, entail ambivalence on Pakistan's part about the question of Chinese admission to the UN, and on the question of Taiwan (Formosa).[248] In 1956, Pakistan's Prime Minister Suhrawardy undertook a visit to China and, on the occasion of the return visit to Pakistan by Chou En-lai in December the same year, the two sides affirmed that 'the difference between the political systems of Pakistan and China and the divergence of views on many problems should not prevent a strengthening of friendship (between the

two countries) . . . and that they are happy to place on record that there is no real conflict of interests between the two countries'.[249] When the Sino-Indian border dispute took a turn for the worse in the late fifties however, Pakistan under Ayub Khan perceived a threat to its own security from the Chinese militarisation of the frontier areas. Ayub's proposal for joint defence with India in 1959 was specifically made in the light of this perception.[250] Peking was aware of the implications of the proposal but curiously enough it was in 1959, according to Mullik, that Peking first made overtures to Pakistan for development of a new basis of relations between them.[251]

Though unreceptive to these overtures at the time, Pakistan began to see China in an entirely new light in the context of the escalation of the Sino-Indian border dispute, the outbreak of hostilities in October 1962, and the American interest in building up Indian military potential as a counterpoise to China. Ayub had first seriously broached the question of a border agreement with the Chinese at the end of 1961, and negotiation on this issue between the two sides was carried on during the course of 1962. In March 1963, Foreign Minister Bhutto signed the agreement on border demarcation between Sinkiang and Pakistani-held Kashmir, 'the first step', according to Ayub, 'in the evolution of relations between Pakistan and China'.[252] Under the agreement, which was signed on the basis that the boundary between Sinkiang and Kashmir had 'never been formally delimited and demarcated in history' about two-thirds of the area of 3,400 square miles on the Sinkiang-Kashmir boundary west of the Karakoram Pass in which mutual claims overlapped went to China; but this constituted mostly uninhabited territory. China herself agreed to vacate about 1,350 square miles in the Khunjerab and Oprang valley areas, which contained Chinese-built outposts, barracks and roads, as well as the Oprang salt mines; in this case the Chinese were vacating territory that was inhabited.[253] Pakistan looked upon the agreement as a net gain.[254] Significantly also from the Pakistani point of view, it was agreed that 'after the settlement of the dispute over Kashmir between Pakistan and India, the sovereign authorities concerned shall reopen negotiations with the Chinese Government regarding the boundary of Kashmir so as to sign a formal boundary treaty to replace the provisional agreement'.[255] This was the first Chinese public acknowledgement that China did not recognise Kashmir's accession to the Indian Union.

The boundary agreement was followed by the establishment of air communications between China and Pakistan, on the basis of a civil aviation agreement signed in August 1963, which gave Pakistan International Airlines facilities in Chinese airports.

In 1963 Chou En-lai revisited Pakistan, and Field Marshal Ayub himself made the trip to Peking in March 1965. The aftermath of the Sino-Indian war, the development of the Sino-Soviet dispute, and what appeared to be collusion between America and the Soviet Union in supporting India against the Chinese produced a community of interest between China and Pakistan, and strengthened the China-Pakistan axis. China was solidly behind Pakistan in the Indo-Pak war of September 1965. After the outbreak of this war, Premier Chou En-lai, at a North Korean embassy reception in Peking, accused the United States of supporting India's 'armed aggression' against Pakistan, and declared that the Soviets, too, had 'encouraged [India's] military adventure'. The Chinese premier said that China 'firmly supports' Pakistan in the war, and warned India that it 'must bear full responsibility for all the consequences of its extended aggression'.[256] On 17th September, China issued a three-day ultimatum to India demanding the dismantling of Indian defence installations allegedly located on the Chinese side of the Sikkim-Tibet border.[257] The ultimatum was later extended for two reasons: the Indian Prime Minister Shastri invited China to a joint Sino-Indian inspection of those points of the Sikkim-Tibet border across which Indian troops were alleged to have set up military structures; and Soviet mediation in the war preempted further deterioration of the situation and likely Chinese intervention in the war on the Pakistan side. It was significant, however, that the Chinese Note extending the ultimatum accused India of illegal occupation of Chinese territory south of the McMahon Line, and of pursuit of a policy of chauvinism and expansionism towards neighbouring countries. The Note stated that the Chinese government consistently held that the Kashmir problem should be solved on the basis of respect for the Kashmiri peoples' right of self-determination, but this did not mean that China could approve Indian aggression against Pakistan on the pretext of the Kashmir issue. The Note continued that the Indian armed attack against Pakistan 'cannot but arouse the grave concern of the Chinese government' and declared that China would not cease supporting Pakistan in 'her just struggle against aggression'.[258]

The 1965 crisis passed without further incident, but Sino-Indian border intrusions and clashes continued in the sixties, culminating in the serious military confrontation at Nathu-La in 1967. By this time, the China-Pakistan axis had become an important ingredient in the balance of power in South Asia. In March and June, 1966, respectively, Liu Shao Chi and Chou came to Pakistan on separate visits. Ayub sent his Foreign Minister Arshad Husain and Army chief Yahya Khan to Peking in 1968. After Yahya's takeover, he sent one of his top military colleagues, Air Force Chief Nur Khan, to China in July 1969, and in November 1970, Yahya himself undertook a visit to Peking. It might be surmised

that Chinese military assistance to Pakistan figured largely in the discussions during these visits. From the mid-sixties until the early seventies, China in fact became Pakistan's chief arms supplier, and the ordnance factory set up by the Chinese in Dacca in 1970 was one of the pioneering attempts to indigenise arms production in Pakistan. As mentioned above, Yahya was personally responsible as intermediary for the Kissinger visit to Peking via Rawalpindi in November 1970, which paved the way for the later Nixon visit and rapprochement between America and China. Choudhury has summed up the rationale of the Sino-Pakistani axis during the sixties:

> China's special relationship with Pakistan from 1960 through 1970 was based on mutual advantage and pragmatic reality. No formal pact or alliance existed between the two countries, but their relationship was of the same intensity as that between the United States and Pakistan in the mid-1950s or that between the USSR and India in 1971.[259]

The escalation of the Bangladesh crisis and the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty in 1971 introduced new factors which impinged on the triangular relationship between India, Pakistan and China. Like the other major powers, China could not look upon the prospect of Pakistan's disintegration with equanimity; at the same time, China could not, consistently with its ideological support of national liberation movements, give unequivocal support to the Pakistani military junta's repressive policies in East Pakistan. Both India and the Soviet Union (after the Podgorny letter to Yahya) were attacked for interference in Pakistan's internal affairs, but neither did the Chinese offer firm assurances of military intervention in a possible Indo-Pak war over Bangladesh as they had in the 1965 war.[260] In response to the request of a high-powered Pakistani delegation which visited Peking in November 1971 (consisting of the Air Force Commander, Chief of General Staff, Navy Chief, and including Bhutto), China supplied Pakistan with military aircraft, tanks, and anti-aircraft installations.[261] But there was no assurance of any Chinese diversionary action on India's northern frontier, as was sought by the delegation.[262]

During the 1971 war, China did render diplomatic support to Pakistan in the UN Security Council, by using its veto to prevent a Soviet draft resolution calling for a political settlement in East Pakistan. This involved a cessation of hostilities and an end to 'all acts of violence by Pakistani forces'. Indicative of the new international alignment of forces in South Asia was the fact that Chinese policy in the UN over the Bangladesh issue was now in conformity with that of the United States. The official communiqué, issued after the US-Chinese conference held in Peking in February 1972, stated:

> [China] firmly maintains that India and Pakistan should, in accordance with United Nations Resolutions on the India-Pakistan question, immediately withdraw all their forces to their respective territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir and firmly supports the Pakistan Government and people in their struggle to preserve their independence and sovereignty and the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination.[263]

China continued to give military assistance to Pakistan in the aftermath of the 1971 war, although its scale has notably diminished in recent years, and Pakistan herself has sought diversification of her arms supplies, as mentioned earlier in this paper.

Recent trends appear to indicate a significant shift in the triangular balance of forces between India, Pakistan and China, with both India and China giving evidence of willingness to normalise their mutual relations.

Conclusion

The foregoing pages have attempted to demonstrate the theoertical validity of a balance of power approach to the study of international relations in South Asia. These relations have been seen in terms of three interdependent variables: the Indo-Pakistani power rivalry, involvement of the major powers in the politics of South Asia, as well as the interaction of small powers in the subcontinent in the context of the other two variables. That a connection can be established between the central balance of power and the regional balance in South Asia has been explained in the paper in terms of two main considerations: first, competition among major powers for support-bases among South Asian states in the context of their own global rivalries; second, competition among South Asian states themselves for political, diplomatic, economic or military support from the major powers, which would redress imbalances and inequalities perceived to exist in their mutual interstate relations. This had been seen as being particularly relevant to the Indo-Pakistani situation, but as also applying to a lesser extent, to the cases of Sri Lanka and Nepal.

If the account of small power interaction in the paper looks almost exclusively like an account of India's interaction with her smaller neighbours in the region, it is because that is in fact the case. There has been surprisingly little contact, for example, between Sri Lanka and Nepal, or between Sri Lanka and the Himalayan states, or even between the Himalayan states themselves. Central to the discussion in this paper, as indeed to any discussion of international relations in South Asia, is the dominant position of India as the regional pole around which the states-system of South Asia operates. The discussion would appear to validate the conclusion that the Chinese presence in South Asia, has perhaps a greater relevance for small power interaction with India than even Pakistan's existence and posture as a persistent rival of India. The smaller states of the region would also appear to have been less influenced in their behaviour by the Indo-Pakistani conflict than by the Sino-Indian war of 1962 and its aftermath.

The proposition that threat perceptions relating to India exist in all the small states of the region has been taken as axiomatic, and it has been suggested in the paper that these are related not only to the geostrategic location of these states but also to pronouncements of various kinds in India (which are taken to be declarations of intent), advocating a link between India and some of these states on strategic grounds. The perceived threat might be overt, directly related to the independence and integrity of a state regime (e.g., Sikkim in 1973-75, Nepal in 1960-62, Bangladesh in 1975), or it might be covert, related to indirect pressure on

the smaller states in the ordinary day-to-day diplomatic, economic or cultural intercourse. India's conception that the small states of the region lie within her security sphere has entailed the corollary that these states must subserve her security interests and move within the Indian orbit.

In the context of small power interaction in South Asia, who perceives threat and from where, is of course a question that is relevant to the argument. The fact that threat perceptions are generally related to the internal structure of states can be illustrated by the fact that in the seventies the Sikkim Chogyal perceived a threat from India while the Sikkim Congress did not. In Bangladesh, Mujib's regime did not perceive a threat from India, but post-Mujib regimes have. Similarly, when the party complexion of the Indian government changed for the first time in 1977, there appeared to be a significant change in India's attitude to the smaller states. Implicit in Morarji Desai's critique of the Sikkim merger was the charge that the Indira Gandhi government had used the merger to buttress her own domestic political position. This view seems to be strengthened by the fact that the Desai government also proceeded to accomodate Bangladesh on the Farakka issue against the opposition of Indira Congress elements in Parliament.

Notwithstanding all this, however, there does appear to be a certain regularity or permanency of responses both on the part of the perceiver (small states) and the perceived (India), which is related to basic geostrategic interests. That is to say, whatever the nature of the regime, India will continue to pursue her geostrategic interests in the region, and whatever the nature of the regime, there would appear to be a natural tendency on the part of the small states to concert with other powers, or with multilateral organisations or movements to decrease, offset and obviate pressure from India and redress the unequal balance against her.

Hence again the relevance of the balance of power approach to the study of small power interaction in South Asia. As against India, China was sometimes, as in Nepal and Sri Lanka, regarded as an instrument redressing the balance; but at times China was herself regarded, in these and other small states in the region, as a threat. The ubiquity of the Chinese presence in South Asia has at present an important bearing upon the regional balance of power. It is significant that major power interests in South Asia have been constantly changing whereas the geostrategic interests of India in the subcontinent have remained more or less constant. In the fifties, the chief concern of the United States was to draft South Asian states in a bid to contain communism in Southeast Asia: this was primarly an anti-Russian move. In the early sixties, we find 'collusion' between the United States and the Soviet Union to support India against China. In the late sixties, the Soviet Union is attempting to draft both India and Pakistan into a collective security system directed against China. In the early seventies, there is

again 'collusion', this time between the United States and China to maintain the balance in South Asia in favour of Pakistan. The dominant global influence in South Asian politics is presently the Sino-Soviet conflict. The outcome of initiatives from both sides to improve Sino-Indian relations is yet to be seen.

Footnotes

[1] Burma is not considered as belonging to the regional entity defined as South Asia in this paper, on the grounds that she has ceased, since the mid-fifties, to have any meaningful interactions with the states of the South Asian region.

[2] Cf. Mohammed Ayoob, 'The Indian Ocean Littoral: Intra-Regional Conflicts and Weapons Proliferation', in R.J. O'Neill (ed.), *Insecurity! The Spread of Weapons in the Indian and Pacific Oceans* (Canberra, ANU, 1978), p.188.

[3] Amrita Bazar Patrika, 18 August 1947, quoted in Mohammed Ayub Khan, *Friends not Masters* (London, 1967), p.115.

[4] *ibid.*, p.116.

[5] Quoted in Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *The Myth of Independence* (London, 1969), pp.61-62.

[6] G.W. Choudhury, *Pakistan's Relations with India, 1947-1966* (London, 1968), p.11, quoting Professor F.N. Trager's view.

[7] Ayub Khan, *op.cit.*, p.117.

[8] Bhutto, *op.cit.*, p.180.

[9] Ayub Khan, *op.cit.*, p.163.

[10] See B.L. Sharma, *The Kashmir Story* (New Delhi, 1967), p.12.

[11] See Ayub Khan, *op.cit.*, pp.126-28. Also Mohammed Ayoob, *India, Pakistan and Bangladesh* (New Delhi, 1975) p.93.
Nehru had, as early as 1956, suggested at a public meeting a Kashmir settlement based on mutual acceptance by India and Pakistan of the UN ceasefire line. See Sharma, *op.cit.*, p.96. See also Kuldip Nayar, *Between the Lines* (New Delhi, 1969), p.114.

[12] A succinct summary of the dispute, with supporting documents, is to be found in The Indian Society of International Law, *The Kutch-Sind Border Question: A Collection of Documents with Comments,* New Delhi, 1965.

[13] IISS, *Strategic Survey* 1968, p.34.

[14] *ibid.* Extract from the First of the Month Broadcast to the Nation, made by Field Marshal Mohammed Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan, on 1 May 1965.

[15] *ibid.* Indian Prime Minister's Motion in the *Lok Sabha*, 28 April 1965.

[16] *loc.cit.*

[17] See *White Paper on Kashmir*, issued by Bhutto government in *Pakistan Times,* 16 and 17 January 1977.

[18] G.W. Choudhury, *The Last Days of United Pakistan,* (London, 1974), p.20. A letter from Bhutto, then Foreign Minister, to President Ayub dated 12 May 1965, and reproduced in the *White Paper*, supports the confrontationist theory, and Bhutto's own role in propagating it. See S.D. Muni, 'South Asia' (mimeo), to be published in Mohammed Ayoob (ed.) *Conflicts and Conflict Managers: Great Powers and the Third World* (London, 1979).

[19] Choudhury, *op.cit.*, p.20.

[20] Ayoob, *India, Pakistan and Bangladesh*, p.11.

[21] IISS, *Strategic Survey 1971*, p.50.

[22] See Mohammed Ayoob, 'India and Pakistan: Prospects for Detente', *Pacific Community,* 8:165, October 1976.

[23] *ibid,* p.165.

[24] IISS, *Strategic Survey* 1971, p.49.

[25] See M.G. Weinbaum and Gautam Sen, 'Pakistan Enters the Middle East', *Orbis,* 22:596-604, Fall 1978.

[26] *ibid.*

[27] *The Canberra Times,* 13 February 1979.

[28] S.S. Khera, *India's Defence Problem* (New Delhi, 1968), pp.27-30.

[29] O'Neill (ed.), *Insecurity*!, p.190.

[30] Khera, *op.cit.,* p.39.

[31] The impact of Pakistan's alliance with the U.S. on India was analysed by Hans Morgenthau, who estimated a 200 per cent increase in Indian arms expenditure between 1955 and 1957. See Hans Morgenthau, 'Alliances', *Confluence,* 6:327-28, Winter 1958.

[32] Ayoob, *India, Pakistan and Bangladesh*, p.71.

[33] IISS, *The Military Balance 1964-65,* pp.26, 31.

[34] For the Indo-Nepal Trade Treaty of 1971, see *Times of India*, 14 and 17 August 1971; for the 1978 Trade and Transit Treaties, *ibid*, 18 March 1978.

[35] See *SIPRI Arms Trade Registers: The Arms Trade with the Third World* (Stockholm, 1975), pp.33-37; *SIPRI Yearbook*, 1975.

[36] *SIPRI Yearbook* 1972.

[37] *SIPRI: Arms Trade Registers* (1975), pp.38-39.

[38] Ayoob, *op.cit.*, p.37.

[39] *ibid.*,p.38.

[40] *ibid.,* p.70.

[41] *loc.cit.*

[42] IISS, *The Military Balance* 1972-73 and 1977-78.

[43] *SIPRI Worksheets.*

[44] See *The Military Balance 1977-78; SIPRI Yearbooks* for 1972, 1975, 1976, 1977.

[45] *Military Balance 1977-78.*

[46] *ibid.*

[47] *SIPRI Yearbook* 1973

[48] See J.L. Richardson, 'Crisis for Non-Proliferation', in R.J. O'Neill (ed), *The Strategic Nuclear Balance: An Australian Perspective* (Canberra, ANU 1975),pp.95-96.

[49] Bhutto, *op.cit.,* p.153.

[50] K.M. Panikkar, *Problems of Indian Defence,* (Bombay, 1960), p.23.

[51] Among the exponents of a 'forward policy' were Lords Lytton and Curzon. Lord Salisbury, who was not so impressed by the reality of a Russian threat to India gained a sort of notoriety by commending to his detractors the use of large-scale maps. See Lady Gwendolen Cecil, *Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury,* (London, 1931), Vol.II, pp.155-56.

[52] Leo E. Rose, *Nepal: Strategy for Survival,* (Berkeley, 1971), p.163.

[53] *ibid.*, pp.171-72.

[54] This interpretation was given by the Bhutanese King himself in an interview to *The Statesman*, 11 April 1971.

[55] For texts of the treaties with Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim, see *Foreign Policy of India: Texts of Documents (1947-59),* 2nd ed., Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi 1964. Text of Letters of Exchange between Nepal and India in S.D. Muni, *Foreign Policy of Nepal,* (New Delhi, 1973), Appendix V.

[56] See Rose, *op.cit.,* pp.205-06.

[57] *New York Times,* 7 September 1969.

[58] Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, (London, 1944), 3rd ed., p.511.

[59] K.M. Panikkar, *India and the Indian Ocean,* (London, 1945), p.95.

[60] See, e.g., K.B. Vaidya, *The Naval Defence of India* (Bombay, 1949), p.33. In a book published in 1974, a former commander of the Indian Navy wrote:

> Sri Lanka is as important strategically to India as Eire is to the United Kingdom or Taiwan to China . . . As long as Sri Lanka is friendly or neutral, India has nothing to worry about but if there be any danger of the island falling under the domination of a power hostile to India, India cannot tolerate such a situation endangering her territorial integrity.

See Ravi Kaul, 'The Indian Ocean: A Strategic Posture for India', in T.T. Poulouse, *Indian Ocean Power Rivalry* (New Delhi, 1974), p.66.

[61] M.S. Rajan, 'Indian Foreign Policy in Action 1954-56', *India Quarterly,* 16:228-29, n.100, July-September 1960.

[62] Quoted in Rose, *op.cit.,* p.192.

[63] Cf. C.J. Chacko, 'The Japanese Monroe Doctrine', *Indian Yearbook of International Affairs, 1953,* Vol.II, p.119; for Nehru's disavowal of an Indian 'Monroe Doctrine', see *Lok Sabha Deb.*, 16 November 1954, Vol.IV, coll.1202-04.

[64] *Times of India*, 10 October 1973.

[65] *ibid.*, 13 October 1976 and 3 December 1976.

[66] See S.U. Kodikara, 'Contemporary Indo-Lanka Relations', *Sri Lanka Journal of Social Sciences,* 1:69-71, June 1978.

[67] *ibid.*, pp.65-67.

[68] See S.U. Kodikara, 'Major Trends in Sri Lanka's Foreign Policy since 1956', *Asian Survey,* December 1973; Neville Maxwell's *India's China War* (London, 1970), Anchor Books ed., 1972, pp.459-65, provides interesting details on the mediation process.

[69] As revealed by Senator M. Tiruchelvam in *Senate Deb.*, (1972), Vol.32, col.823.

[70] *The Hindu*, 14 April 1971; for Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram's statement in the *Lok Sabha*, see Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, *Bangladesh Documents*, (Madras, 1971), p.702.

[71] Text of letter in *Ceylon Daily News* 27 May 1971.

[72] See Anuradha Muni, 'Sri Lanka's China Policy: Major Trends', *South Asian Studies,* 8:93, January 1973.

[73] B.P. Koirala had long-standing connections with Indian socialists, particularly with J.P. Narayan. His activities in the seventies had become so openly subversive, however, that the Indian Government was itself considerably embarrassed by Koirala's continued stay in India. In 1975 Koirala gave himself up for trial in Nepal.

[74] *The Hindu*, 23 January 1963.

[75] See *Times of India*, 12 January 1965; *ibid.*, 14 July 1967.

[76] *ibid.*, 27 November 1977.

[77] Rose, op.cit., p.241.

[78] *The Times,* 9 June 1972; *The Japan Times*, 11 August 1972.

[79] *Times of India,* 3 and 6 June 1976.

[80] *ibid.*, 20 April 1972.

[81] For a discussion of the issues involved in Nepal's foreign trade, see S.D. Muni, *op.cit.*, pp.201-15.

[82] See *Times of India*, 2 and 3 November 1970; *ibid.*, 29 March 1972, for agreement on Nepali trade access to Bangladesh. The Indian ban on Nepali exports of synthetic fabrics and stainless steel utensils was based on the charge that these goods were being produced in Nepal out of foreign raw materials. *ibid.*, 26 and 31 December 1969.

[83] For 1971 trade treaty, see *ibid.*, 14 and 17 August 1971; 1978 trade and transit treaties in *ibid.*, 18 March 1978.

[84] See *ibid.*, 10 January 1976; *Pakistan Times*, 25 March 1975, Sri Lanka's support to the proposal was reiterated during President J.R. Jayewardena's state visit to Nepal in November 1978.

[85] In the joint communique issued on the occasion of Prime Minister Morarji Desai's visit to Nepal in December 1977, Nepal 'recalled' the proposal for making it a zone of peace, and India asserted that peace must prevail in the entire region to which the two nations belonged. See *Times of India*, 12 December 1977.

[86] *ibid.*, 16 July 1977.

[87] See Kodikara, 'Contemporary Indo-Lanka Relations', pp.67-70.

[88] *Times of India*, 29 June 1971.

[89] For text of agreement, see Mohammed Ayoob, *India, Pakistan and Bangladesh* pp.170-173.

[90] *ibid.*

[91] *Times of India*, 7 February 1972.

[92] Two Indian army battalions returned to Bangladesh for action against armed Mizo tribesmen who had crossed into the Chittagong area from neighbouring Indian states, at the request of the Bangla Government, later in the month. The liberation of Bangladesh led to the almost total collapse of the Mizo insurgency, but sporadic Mizo lawlessness continued early in 1972. See *Pakistan Times*, 23 March 1972; *Times of India*, 24 March 1972 and 12 July 1972.

[93] Text of treaty in *Times of India*, 20 March 1972.

[94] *ibid.*, 10 October 1972.

[95] *Pakistan Times*, 1 August 1974.

[96] *ibid.*, 14 December 1972.

[97] *ibid.*, 1 January 1973.

[98] *ibid.*, 6 June 1973.

[99] *ibid.*, 23 May 1974.

[100] *The Times,* 4 February 1975.

[101] Article by Legum in *Pakistan Times*, 17 November 1975. The report is unconfirmed. It is probable that the Indian army was moved to the Indo-Bangla border to protect Indian security interests and minority groups in Bangladesh.

[102] *ibid.*, 17 August 1975, 26 August 1975.

[103] *Times of India,* 8 November 1975.

[104] *New York Times,* 27 November 1975.

[105] See, for example, *ibid.*, 22 April 1976; *The Times,* 21 April 1976.

[106] See, *Pakistan Times,* 3 February 1976, 15 September and 20 December 1976.

[107] *ibid.*, 31 January 1977.

[108] *Times of India,* 30 June 1977.

[109] See feature article by Sunanda Datta Ray in *The Canberra Times,* 31 October 1977.

[110] *Times of India,* 19 November 1977.

[111] Both Mrs Gandhi and her Foreign Minister Swaran Singh have separately upheld this view while reiterating Nehru's assurance of assistance to Bhutan, if attacked. See *Times of India,* 13 October 1966; *Hindusthan Times,* 13 July 1967.

[112] See S. Scheinbert, *The Development of Bhutan and its Role in Sino-Indian Relations,* University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, 1974, p.147.

[113] *Times of India*, 28 October 1966.

[114] *ibid.*, 7 July 1960.

[115] *The Hindu,* 27 March 1978.

[116] See, for example, *Times of India,* 26 November 1965, *ibid.,* 22 November 1965; *New York Times,* 14 November 1965; *The Times,* 4 September 1964.

[117] According to G.W. Choudhury, who had access to classified documents pertaining to Ayub Khan's secret visit to Peking in the midst of the Indo-Pak war of 1965, China would have intervened militarily against India, and it was Ayub's unwillingness or inability to carry on a prolonged war which prevented a general war on the subcontinent. G.W. Choudhury, *op.cit.,* p.206.

[118] *Times of India*, 17 June 1967.

[119] *ibid.,* 19 September 1966, quoting New China New Agency.

[120] *The Dawn,* (Karachi), 14 December 1966; the role of the Gyalmo in the deterioration of the situation in Sikkim was widely commented on at the time. See Bernard Weinraub's report in *New York Times*, 28 April 1973.

[121] See *The Age,* 2 May 1967.

[122] *The Hindu*, 10 April 1975.

[123] *Times of India,* 12 July 1974.

[124] The referendum, organised at five days notice, showed a turn-out of over 70 per cent of the voters and a more than 95 per cent affirmative majority. Foreign newsmen were debarred from going to Sikkim for the poll, which was probably mere window-dressing. According to the *South China Morning Post,* 15 April 1975, even the *Hindusthan Times* regarded the poll as 'farcical'.

[125] See *New York Times*, 12 and 29 April 1973; *The Times*, 10 April 1973.

[126] For Desai's statements in Parliament on the subject, see *Times of India,* 11 March 1978.

[127] See *New York Times*, 28 April 1973.

[128] *South China Morning Post*, 15 April 1975 and 8 December 1975.

[129] *Pakistan Times,* 12 April 1975.

[130] J.D.B. Miller, *Survey of Commonwealth Affairs, 1953-69* (London, 1974), pp.61-62.

[131] See Michael Brecher, 'India's Decision to Remain in the Commonwealth'. *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics,* 12:62-64, March 1974. See also the same author's supplementary Note in *ibid.*, July 1974, pp.228-30.

Nehru considered Liaquat Ali Khan to be 'obstructive' in Commonwealth discussions relating to the Indian decision.

[132] The decision was taken in the Indian cabinet in December 1948.

[133] Brecher, *op.cit.* (March 1974), p.67, n.18, and p.77, n.55. The formula which enabled India to remain in the Commonwealth as a republic, viz., that the King was 'the symbol of free association and as such Head of the Commonwealth' was devised jointly by Krishna Menon, and British Cabinet Secretary Sir Norman Brook.

[134] J.C. Kundra, *Indian Foreign Policy 1947-54: A Study of Relations with the Western Bloc* (Groningen, 1955), p.52 ff.

[135] *ibid.*

[136] *Commonwealth Meeting on Foreign Affairs, January 1950. Minutes of Meetings and Memoranda.* (Colombo, Government Press, 1950.)

[137] *ibid.*

[138] Brecher (March 1974), p.83.

[139] Mohammed Ayub Khan, *op.cit.*, p.134.

[140] *ibid.*, pp.148-49: Maxwell, *op.cit.*, pp.466-68.

[141] See Leo E. Rose, 'The Superpowers in Asia: A Geostrategic Analysis', *Orbis,* 22:396-7, Summer 1978.

[142] Ayub Khan, *op.cit.*, p.157.

[143] G.W. Choudhury, *India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers* (London, 1975), p.87.

[144] Choudhury quoting Nixon's biographer in *ibid.*, p.86.

[145] Computed from *SIPRI Worksheets;* G.W. Choudhury, quoting 'reliable sources', puts the total value of US military shipments to Pakistan during this period at $1.5 million. Choudhury, *The Major Powers*, p.122.

[146] Computed from *SIPRI Worksheets.*

[147] *Loc.cit.*

[148] Rose, 'The Superpowers in South Asia', pp.397-98.

[149] Ayub Khan, *op.cit.*, p.145.

[150] Text of Release in *ibid.,* p.148.

[151] See Bhutto, *op.cit.,* p.67.

[152] Quoted in *ibid.*

[153] *ibid.,* p.58.

[154] '. . . it was easy to deduce that if we could not establish normal relations with all our three big neighbours (India, China and the Soviet Union), the best thing was to have an understanding with two of them. They might have their internal differences but we did not need to get involved in that . . . It was on this basis that I set out to normalise our relations with the Peoples' Republic of China and the Soviet Union'. Ayub Khan, *op.cit.,* p.118.

[155] Rose, 'The Superpowers in Asia', p.408.

[156] Bhutto, *op.cit.,* p.69.

[157] Vijay Chawla, 'Soviet-Pakistani Relations', in S.P. Varma and Virendra Narain (eds), *Pakistan Political System in Crisis: Emergence of Bangladesh* (Jaipur, 1972), p.107.

[158] Kaul, *op.cit.,* p.411.

[159] Ayub Khan mentions that the withdrawal was balanced by the posting of armoured corps on the Pak frontier, *op.cit.,*

[160] *ibid.,* p.136.

[161] Bhutto, *op.cit.,* p.76.

[162] The United States entered into bilateral agreements with Pakistan outside the SEATO framework, in 1954 (renewed secretly in 1964) and in 1959 to defend Pakistan against outside aggression.

[163] Bhutto, *op.cit.,* p.72.

[164] *ibid.,* p.73.

[165] *ibid.,*

[166] G.W. Choudhury, *op.cit.,* p.121.

[167] Third Party transfers to Pakistan have included 50 Northrop F-5A Freedom Fighters, ex-Iran, which are to be delivered with US approval when Iran receives new F-5Es.

[168] See S.P. Varma, 'Bangladesh and Role of Major Powers', in S.P. Varma and Virendra Narain, *op.cit.*, p.227.

[169] *ibid.*

[170] *ibid.*, pp.229-30.

[171] *United Nations Report of Consultant Experts on the Indian Ocean.* A/AC. 159/1, 3 May 1974, para 17.

[172] Quoted in W. Norman Brown, *The United States and India, Pakistan, Bangladesh* (Cambridge, Mass. 1972), p.205.

[173] Quoted in Stephen P. Cohen and Richard L. Park, *India Emergent* (New York, 1978), p.xviii.

[174] Sharma, *op.cit.*, pp.87-88.

[175] *ibid.*, p.96; A.G. Noorani, *Brezhnev Plan for Asian Security: Russia in Asia* (Bombay, 1975), pp.35-36.

[176] See *Peoples' Daily* editorial dated 6 September 1963, entitled 'The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves', in *ibid,* p.37.

[177] *ibid.*, p.39.

[178] See B.N. Mullik, *The Chinese Betrayal: My Years With Nehru* (New Delhi, 1971), pp.186-88.

[179] *Peoples' Daily* editorial of 2 November 1963 quoted in Noorani, *op.cit.*, p.40.

[180] See Margaret W. Fisher, Leo E. Rose and Robert A. Huttenback, *Himalayan Battleground: Sino-Indian Rivalry in Ladakh* (London, 1963), p.143; General Kaul, who was sceptical of the Indian government decision to bulk purchase Soviet helicopters, personally test-flighted one of them in Ladakh, and was piloted by a Russian. Kaul, *op.cit.*, pp.262-67.

[181] Noorani, *op.cit.*, pp.48-49.

[182] *ibid.*, quoting *New York Times*, 22 September 1964.

[183] The value of Soviet arms supplies to India from 1965 to 1971 was computed at $731 million, and up to 1975, $1.375 billion, both according to American sources. See Ayoob in O'Neill (ed), *Insecurity!* p.195.

[184] Choudhury, *The Major Powers,* p.36.

[185] Noorani, *op.cit.,* p.36; Choudhury, *The Major Powers,* p.37.

[186] *ibid.,* p.40.

[187] See IISS, *Strategic Survey 1968*, pp.33-34.

[188] Indian susceptibilities were greatly aroused by the arms deal, which related to spare parts for tanks and MIGs Pakistan had bought from China and, in fact, India was supplied with details of the contracts Yahya signed with the Soviets, but the Indian Defence Ministry's assessment was that Moscow had also agreed to supply Pakistan with ground to air missiles in the future. See Kuldip, Nayar, *op.cit.,* p.104.

[189] *ibid.,* p.119.

[190] See Noorani, *op.cit., passim.*

[191] *ibid.,* p.116.

[192] G.W. Choudhury, *The Major Powers,* p.66.

[193] *ibid.,* p.62.

[194] Noorani, *op.cit.,* p.61.

[195] Rose, 'The Superpowers in Asia', p.401; Noorani, *op.cit.,* p.61.

[196] Text of Podgorny message in G.P. Deshpande, 'The Soviet and Chinese Stakes', M. Ayoob *et.al., Bangladesh: Struggle for Nationhood* (New Delhi, 1971), pp.128-29.

[197] *ibid.,* pp.1191-121. According to Deshpande's assessment of Soviet policy at this time, the 'Soviet Union is not interested in the break-up of Pakistan. It is firmly on the side of the status quo'.

[198] See *SIPRI Yearbooks* 1973, 1975, 1977.

[199] See *The Canberra Times,* 2 April 1979.

[200] See R.V.R. Chandrasekkera Rao, 'Janata Government and Soviet Connection', *World Today,* February 1978.

[201] *ibid.*

[202] See comment in Sunanda K. Datta Ray, in *ibid.*

[203] See *The Hindu,* 27 February 1978.

[204] Rose, 'The Superpowers and South Asia', p.407.

[205] Girilal Jain, *Panchsheel and After: A Reappraisal of Sino-Indian Relations in the Context of the Tibetan Insurrection* (Bombay 1960) p.151.

[206] Mullik, *op.cit.,* pp.115-23; Kuldip Nayar, *op.cit.,* Annexures I and II, pp.216-27.

[207] See W.F. Van Eekelen, *Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute with China* (The Hague, 1964), pp.24 ff.

[208] From the outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950, India had been exerting herself diplomatically to prevent a clash between the United States and China, which the deployment of the 7th Fleet in defence of Formosa seemed to make likely, and these efforts in the cause of peace were welcomed in Peking. India also played an important role in negotiations to achieve a ceasefire in Korea, evolved the formula on prisoner-of-war repatriation, and eventually served on the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. See Maxwell, *op.cit.,* p.273.

[209] Quoted in Van Eekelen, *op.cit.,* pp.29, 37.

[210] Khera, *op.cit.,* p.155.

[211] Mullik, *op.cit.,* pp.175-76.

[212] *ibid.,* p.199.

[213] *ibid.,* pp.200-01.

[214] See *ibid.,* pp.95-96; Brigadier J.P. Dalvi, *Himalayan Blunder* (New Delhi, n.d.), p.185. According to Mullik, it was only after the publication of the *Report of the Officials of the Government of India and the Peoples' Republic of China on the Boundary Question*, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1961, that 'we knew clearly what our coordinates were in respect of any particular territory. Before that, the entire McMahon Line was indicated by a line on a small-scale map, and the same was the case with the rest of the boundary'.

[215] Kuldip Nayar, *op.cit.,* p.136.

[216] Mullik, *op.cit.,* pp.190-93.

[217] *ibid.,* p.196.

[218] *ibid.,* pp.196-97.

[219] For Nehru's speech of 27 April 1959 to the Lok Sabha, see Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, *Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations,* Vol. I, pp.31-38.

[220] See article entitled 'The Revolution in Tibet and Nehru's Philosophy', *Peking Review,* 12 May 1959; see also Maxwell, *op.cit.,* pp.487-88.

[221] Mullik, *op.cit.,* p.229.

[222] See *Dalvi, op.cit.,* p.138; also Margaret W. Fisher, *et al., op.cit.,* p.86. According to Maxwell, Chou En-Lai was not offended by the granting of asylum to the Dala's Lama as such, which he considered normal international practice; what irked the Chinese was the 'impressive' welcome accorded to him and Nehru's visit to him soon after his arrival. *op.cit.,* p.277.

[223] Mullik, *op.cit.,* p.243.

[224] Cf. Khera, *op.cit.,* p.158.

[225] *Loc.cit.*

[226] 'Quite frankly', says Dalvi, 'I did not credit them with the intention of invading India', *op.cit.,* p.331.

[227] *ibid.,* pp.138-42. If such were in fact the case, it is surprising that the Indian Government, Indian intelligence, and, as mentioned above, Dalvi himself, were taken so completely by surprise by the Chinese military action on 20th October 1962.

[228] See Ministry of Information, Government of India, *China's Betrayal of India* (New Delhi, 1962), pp.20-21; Maxwell singles out as an important factor leading to the escalation of the border dispute the establishment of an Indian post at Che Dong (Dhola) in June 1962 which, he emphasises, 'was indubitably north of the McMahon Line,' and which provoked the Chinese action of 8th September, encircling the post with an outnumbering force intended to urge the Indian garrison to withdraw. Confusion regarding location of the Indian post would appear to have been compounded by the fact that Dhola Pass lay south of the McMahon Line. *op.cit.,* p.373.

[229] For the Chinese view of the dispute, see Government of the Peoples' Republic of China, *The Sino-Indian Boundary Question* (Peking, 1962).

[230] Kaul, *The Untold Story*, p.328, states: 'Nehru believed that apart from creating tension, neither China, (nor Pakistan) was in a position to provoke a war with us as they had their problems'.

[231] *ibid.,* pp.283-87.

[232] Dalvi, *op.cit.,* pp.65, 70-73; Maxwell states that as late as October 1962, Kaul told him that the foreward policy had been his own conception 'sold to Nehru over the head of Krishna Menon' though in his (Kaul's) later 'accounts responsibility for the policy is shifted away from himself and towards Nehru, Menon' and his own military superiors. Maxwell, *op.cit.,* pp.178, 485.

[233] Mullik, *op.cit.,* p.319.

[234] *ibid.,* pp.314-20.

[235] Dalvi, *op.cit.,* p.230.

[236] *ibid.,* p.129.

[237] Kaul, *op.cit.,* pp.390-91. Kaul gives the following casualties in the fighting: India – 6 dead, 11 wounded, 5 missing. China (quoting Peking Radio), 100 casualties.

[238] *The Statesman*, 13 October 1962.

[239] Dalvi, *op.cit.,* p.271.

[240] *ibid.,* pp.142-45.

[241] Kaul, *op.cit.,* p.349; see also Dalvi, *op.cit.,* p.133. Kaul was recalled to the command of the Fourth Army Corps from Srinagar.

[242] Kaul, *op.cit.,* p.357.

[243] Dalvi, *op.cit.,* pp.50, 95.

[244] Quoted in Mullik, *op.cit.,* p.171 ff.

[245] Khera, *op.cit.,* pp.200-16.

[246] *ibid.,* p.216; for extracts from the Henderson-Brooks Committee report, see Kuldip Nayar, *op.cit.,* Annexure II, pp.223-27.

[247] Choudhury, *The Major Powers,* p.159.

[248] *ibid.,* pp.16-62.

[249] *ibid.,* p.161.

[250] *ibid.,* p.163.

[251] ' . . . in June 1959, when I was in London, I learnt from an absolutely unimpeachable source that, towards the end of May, the Chinese ambassador in Karachi had a meeting with the Pakistan Foreign Minister and had stressed the

need of China and Pakistan taking a new look at their relations, particularly in the context of the hostile attitude which India was displaying towards China. According to the source, 'Pakistan at that stage had made no commitments', Mullik, *op.cit.*, p.230.

[252] Ayub Khan, *op.cit.*, p.164.

[253] *ibid.*, Choudhury, *The Major Powers*, pp.178-80.

[254] *ibid.*, p.180; for Bhutto's comments on the agreement see Bhutto, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan: A Compendium made in the National Assembly of Pakistan*, 1962-64 (Karachi, 1964), pp.79-81.

[255] See Fisher *et.al.*, *op.cit.*, pp.141-42.

[256] *The Japan Times*, quoting New China News Agency, 10 September 1965.

[257] Text of ultimatum in *Washington Post*, 18 September 1965..

[258] Text of Note in *ibid.*, 20 September 1965. According to Choudhury, Chinese President Liu, in a September 8 letter to Ayub, had already made it clear that China would respond to an Indian attack on East Pakistan not only there but also in the north. *The Major Powers*, p.189.

[259] Choudhury, *The Major Powers*, p.196.

[260] *ibid.*, p.210 ff.

[261] See S.P. Varma, 'Bangladesh and the Role of Major Powers', in S.P. Varma and Virendra Narain, *op.cit.*, pp.227-29.

[262] Choudhury, *The Major Powers*, p.213.

[263] Norman Brown, *op.cit.*, p.205.

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