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Von Bauern, Beamten und Banditen

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THE MANCHURIAN BANDITS IN THE MAKING OF THE JAPANESE EMPIRE¹

Li NARANGOA

Along with ginseng and soybeans, bandits were often described as one of the specialties of Manchuria. During the early 20th century, banditry in Manchuria not only captured the imagination of foreign travellers and news reporters, but most importantly, they became an issue in international relations. Located in a triangular position where the geopolitical interests of Russia, Japan and China met, Manchuria became a contested place, and its well-known bandits became the object of condemnation and competition between the three powers. The contenders for political power in Manchuria – the Russians, the Japanese, the Chinese Nationalists and also the Chinese Communist party – saw banditry in the region as a good excuse for making a claim to bring peace and order to the region. They accused each other of “banditizing” the region. The Chinese and Japanese claimed that the Russians were using bandits to create restlessness in the region, while the Russians argued that the Chinese were unable to control the region and that the Japanese were sponsoring bandits in their own interest in the region. The Japanese claimed that the Chinese civil wars stimulated the growth of banditry in Manchuria, while the Chinese argued that the Japanese were responsible for weapons smuggling and supporting armed bandits which brought unrest to the region. All claimed to suppress the bandits and to bring peace to the region.

At the same time, however, these contending powers competed to win selected bandits over to their own side for use in suppressing other bandits and exterminating their political opponents. Bandits were a primary source of organizational and human mobilization for them. In the official histories of these countries, however, the involvement of bandits in their combat, in their plots

¹ An earlier version of this paper was presented at the conference on ‘Crime, law and order in the Japanese empire, 1895–1945’, Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, Amsterdam, 14–15 September 2006. I would like to thank the organizers of the conference and participants for their comments.

against their enemies and in their maintenance of law and order in the region give way to the more ideologically sound patriotism or nationalism. This chapter is an attempt to shed light on the bandits' involvement in the power struggle between China, Russia and Japan in Manchuria. It focuses, nevertheless, on the Japanese army's association with the bandits in Manchuria during the period of early 20th century when Japan expanded its power to the north-eastern part of the continent. Looking at the bandits' participation in Japan's imperial endeavor would help us understand what actually happened on the ground behind the official diplomacy, military planning and combat. Japan's interest in bandits in Manchuria began at the turn of the century along with its interest in the territory called Manchuria. Her intervention in Manchuria and its world of bandits was conditioned by two contradictory attitudes: on the one hand, suppressing the bandits offered Japan the opportunity to demonstrate that its rule was better than all others in providing public security, while on the other, the Japanese army found the bandits to be an attractive ally in consolidating their rule, and this alliance undermined their interest in eliminating the bandits, along with their political opponents.

Japan's double standard in Manchuria towards the region's bandits arose from its need to expand its influence in local communities and to mobilize human resources for the armed struggles which it sponsored in the region. At the same time, however, it also reflected the general contradictory conceptions of bandits. On the one hand, they symbolize robbery, violence and cruelty, and raise fear in people's minds; in pre-modern and early modern times, bandits were the most dangerous form of organized crime. On the other hand, they also stood for the interests of society against the interests of the rulers. As HOBBSBAWM (1959) has argued, bandits may be viewed as primitive revolutionaries, attacking the rich and giving to the poor in the style of Robin Hood. The term bandit conjures up a romantic masculine dream of helping the weak and fighting against injustice. These two contradictory images were skilfully utilized by the different political forces in the region. The bandits to be suppressed or quelled were the "bad" bandits who staged robberies and killed and oppressed people, while the bandits to be wooed to become "good" bandits on the "right" side of the political struggle were those whose underlying instincts were said to be protecting people and bringing peace and order to society.

The concept of bandits had a very broad meaning, and many different terms were used in Chinese as well as Japanese to describe them: *feizei* (*hizoku* in Japanese), *tufei* (*dozoku*), *daozei* (*tōzoku*), *mazei* (*bazoku*), and *honghuzi* or *huzi*.

These terms changed their meaning over the time and could be used to cover a wide range of criminals from people engaged in petty stealing, to organized gangs who staged major raids, to one's political enemies. The Japanese army, as well as the Chinese Nationalists and Communists, often used the word "bandits" to discredit their ideological opponents. The Nationalists used the term "bandit" to describe the Communists – *gongfei* (communist bandits), while the Communists termed Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kaishek), *Jiangfei* (Jiang bandit) (WATANABE 1981: 22–23). This paper focuses on two terms, namely *mazei* (*bazoku*) and *feizei* (*hizoku*). The term *mazei* (*bazoku*), meaning mounted bandit, was supposedly a term created by the Japanese and was a very popular if not the only term used in Japan to refer to the bandits in Manchuria until the early 1930s. This term was replaced by *feizei* (*hizoku*) after the foundation of Manchukuo in 1932 to indiscriminately refer to all who caused social disturbance or committed anti-Japanese acts in Manchuria. If the former (*bazoku*) carried the connotation of common social banditry, the latter (*hizoku*) carried strong overtones of political banditry (or political opposition).

THE RISE OF THE MANCHURIAN BANDITS

Manchuria's reputation as the lair of banditry arose partly from the fact that it had been a place of exile for prisoners and outlaws during the Qing dynasty. The Manchu court regularly sent prisoners, outlaws and slaves here from other parts of the empire for the purposes of exile. Some individuals prospered in their exile, but others turned to banditry to sustain their existence. Manchuria was closed to free settlement until the second half of the 19th century, but poverty-stricken illegal migrants filtered across the border nevertheless, sometimes managing to carve out a new existence on the Manchurian plain as farmers or ginseng collectors, but often failing to make a living, and hence joining the bandits (WATANABE 1981: 37–38). The number and influence of the Manchurian bandits increased dramatically from the late 19th century onwards for four major reasons:

First, the lifting of the ban on migration from China proper to Manchuria led huge numbers of Han Chinese to settle in the region. This influx not only increased the number of poverty-stricken Chinese in Manchuria but also created conflicts between the locals and the migrant Chinese. The flow of migrants and the resulting tension was further exacerbated by the spread of railways from the turn of the 20th century, which made human movement and settlement much

easier. Local and migrant communities formed their own militias to defend themselves against other intruding communities and corrupt officials. In some cases these militias formed the core of new bandit groups. These bandits thus not only learned the skills of raiding and robbing, but also developed a sense of resisting injustice. On the other hand, many of the bandits developed cooperative relationships with local power-holders, providing them with protection from other bandit gangs and acting as enforcers for local elites in their dealings with the masses of people. Others were renegades, isolated from society, who killed and robbed cruelly and indiscriminately (WATANABE 1964: 12–28).

Second, the central authority of the Manchu court was weakened in Manchuria. From the late 19th century, there were three different separate and parallel administrative systems for the Manchus, Mongols and Chinese in Manchuria. This administrative pluralism not only made the control of bandits more difficult, but also provided an incentive for the spread of banditry through the ethnic tension created over land and tax rights. The court's weakness was particularly acute in Manchuria because this region was also the target of Russian and Japanese imperial ambitions.

Third, war and political turmoil increased the number of bandits. The land battles of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904/05 were all fought in Manchuria and they contributed to the administrative disarray in the region and a breakdown of law and order – all of which benefited the bandits. Korean gangs who had fled from the Japanese political oppression in their homeland and moved northwards across the Tumen river, formed bandit gangs in Manchuria to survive or to resist their former oppressors.

Fourth, becoming a bandit was a sure and speedy career path to officialdom. Pressured by external threats and internal problems and not able to rule the bandits, the Manchu authorities attempted to deal with the bandit problem by appointing bandit leaders to official positions. Thus, joining bandit gangs was a means of upward social mobility.

Then, after the inauguration of the Chinese Republic in 1912, banditry in Manchuria underwent a major transformation. Not only did the weakness of the new government offer new opportunities to bandit leaders to consolidate their power, but the republican authorities also actively wooed the bandits, partly because of their military and organizational strength and partly because of their apparent ability to mobilize public support. Some bandit gangs were absorbed into the regular military while some former military units became bandits, and new undisciplined bandit gangs also arose. As political divisions emerged within

the nationalist movement, rival political groups turned to these gangs for backing in their own political struggles (BILLINGSLEY 1988: 218–223). The most powerful of the bandit leaders, Zhang Zuolin, emerged as a warlord in Manchuria with an administration that covered much of Manchuria, but even his authority was challenged throughout the region by rival bandit gangs. During the 1920s there was a huge rise in the number of 'bandit soldiers' (*bingfei*), soldiers who had deserted from battles between various Chinese warlords, such as the Fengtian and Zhili cliques. A Japanese reporter did a survey on the bandits and reported that there were at the time at least 53 well-known bandit leaders (gangs) comprising about 14,000 individual bandits (AKAMA 1923: 517–522).

The republican policy of promoting Han Chinese migration to Manchuria and Mongolia also led to an increase in the number of Mongol bandits who aimed to protect their pastoral lands from the Chinese settlements. These latter bandits originated mostly from banner forces.

In short, the bandits in Manchuria in the early 20th century included petty farmers who robbed travellers or settlers for survival and militia groups which originated from community self-defence organizations, including quasi-official banner defence forces, or deserting soldiers (bandit soldiers). The distinction between the various groups was often unclear and individuals often shifted between the different groups, though those groups which had come into being because of ethnic tension largely consisted of a single ethnicity. Most organized militia or armed bandit groups that had a community base also had strict rules within and between their organizations and were in fact social bandits as defined by HOBBSAWM (1959). Many of the groups also exhibited a mercenary character, meaning they were often hired by rich people, communities or even by official institutions. They therefore had little objection when the Chinese Nationalists, as well as Communists, Russians and Japanese in Manchuria moved to hire them. What the bandit leaders were concerned with was the survival of their gangs, and they would accept the patronage of whomever provided the most resources. Their organizational and military-style training offered an excellent ready-made armed human resource for the Russians, the Japanese and the Chinese alike.

HIRING AND WOOING BANDITS

Japan's involvement with the bandits of Manchuria began at the turn of the 20th century when Manchuria became the site of a political clash between Russian

and Japanese interests, especially around the Russo-Japanese War of 1904/05. Both the Russians as well as the Japanese were keen to utilize the local bandits in Manchuria for their interests. The Japanese hired the bandits to engineer plots behind the Russian front. WATANABE (1964) called this kind of bandit *bōryaku bazoku* (plot bandits). He also called those Japanese who were involved in recruiting Manchurian bandits *goyō bazoku* (government sponsored bandits). Despite the Japanese army's involvement in recruiting bandits in Manchuria, its link with the bandits was never acknowledged.

The Japanese army apparently had imitated the Russians who were first to utilize the bandits in Manchuria. The Russian forces had occupied Manchuria after the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 and they remained long after they were supposed to withdraw, on the grounds that their presence was needed to stabilize the region. To consolidate their presence, the Russians developed a working relationship with some bandit gangs, providing them with funds and military training and using them to create disorder.² The Japanese were very much aware of this Russian strategy. Many reports were published in the Japanese press about the relations between the Russians and the bandits. In late 1903, at the start of the Russo-Japanese War, for example, the *Yomiuri Shinbun* reported that the Russians had gathered about 200 bandits in Liaoyang and had trained them in accordance with Russia's military discipline (*Yomiuri Shinbun*, 29 Nov 1903: 2). Other reports described how the Russians secretly guided these bandits on their raids, instructing them to create incidents which could justify the Russian military presence in Manchuria (*Yomiuri Shinbun*, 2 Dec 1903: 2). The bandits around the Fengtian area were said to have become fearless since the Russians had asked for their assistance, and their numbers had increased to such an extent that the Liaoyang region appeared like an army base (*Yomiuri Shinbun*, 23 March 1904: 2; 27 March 1904: 2). Though these Japanese news reports were critical of the Russian recruitment of bandits, the Japanese army understood the importance of the Russian idea of working with the bandits and had initiated its own recruitment program. By 1905, the Japanese army had recruited several

² The main sources for this account of the Russian activities are articles in Japanese newspapers such as *Yomiuri Shinbun*. It is possible that these stories were false and were inserted into the Japanese press in order to strengthen public support for a war against Russia. In general, however, the techniques of "black propaganda" had not been well developed by this time, and the stories provide a level of detail which suggests that the newspapers were endeavoring to be accurate.

battalions of bandits and distributed them in strategically important places behind the Russian front where they staged regular disturbances.

The strategy of wooing the bandits relied especially on the so-called *tairiku rōnin* (continental adventurers) and on Japanese intelligence agents. Using the *rōnin* was especially convenient, partly because many of these had been living on the continent and, unlike ordinary military men, were acquainted with the Chinese language and culture. The *rōnin* moreover commonly harbored a vision of creating a new world. These people had experienced the far-reaching political and social changes in Japan from the late 19th century when a generation of young people was able to create a new political system in Japan, and thus they had the strong inclination to believe in their ability to succeed and felt confident in their dreams of spectacular careers.

Many *rōnin* were attracted by what they saw as the romance of banditry as expressed in the term *bazoku*, which was the Japanese term for horse-borne or mounted bandits. In the early 20th century, *bazoku* held an aura of mystery and masculinity in Japan. WATANABE Ryūsaku (1981: 22–23) distinguished these mounted bandits from other types of bandits. According to him, *bazoku* were more like Robin Hood – social bandits who protected the weak in the society and attacked the rich – while other kinds of bandits simply carried out raids for their own benefit. *Bazoku* did not raid their immediate area because they usually originated from the village self-defence system and they therefore had to gain the trust of the local people, while the other types of bandits would raid anywhere. These Robin Hood-type bandits inspired many young Japanese to go to Manchuria to fulfil their romantic dreams. There were many reports during the early 20th century of young men from the Japanese countryside who would go to the larger towns to steal money to support their journey to Manchuria where they aspired to become a *bazoku*, or mounted bandit. The popularity of banditry was also reflected in a song called *bazoku no uta* ("The bandit song") which became a hit from the second decade of the 20th century (KUTSUKI 1968: 47):

I am going and you, too, should come with me.
I have grown tired of living in Japan so small.
There lies China on the other side of the Sea.
In China four billion people are waiting all...

[...] I left my home with skin like jade.
Now it is full of scars from swords and spear.

I smile to think of the things that made
me a real man behind my beard.

In the morning wind I bear my sword,
from the Long White Mountain down I stare;
the great North Manchurian plain lies so broad,
my humble house stands modestly there.

Ten odd years ago I left my home.
Now men in their thousands follow me;
a great mounted bandit I have become
under the blue Manchurian sky.

Today it is Kirin that lies before us.
Our horses quiet in the morning hours,
wake not the spirits of the trees, no dawn chorus.
Tomorrow Fengtian shall be ours.

Apparently this song had been sung in Japan in the early years of the 1910s, but it was banned by the government as a song which might hurt the relations between China and Japan. Nevertheless, it became popular again in the 1920s and many young people identified with the romantic dream which the song described.

This kind of romanticism was often combined with fanatic idealism and a strong Japanese nationalism. Thus, amongst the adventurers who joined the bandits in Manchuria were many members of ultranationalist groups such as the *gen'yōsha*. Romanticism and nationalism created a number of real Japanese bandit leaders of different *bazoku* organizations in Manchuria. Most of these were *Manshū rōnin*, such as Henmi Isahiko (Jiang Lunbo), Usuki Ekizō (Tian Gui), Date Junnosuke (Zhang Yuancong), or Kohinata Hakurō (Shang Xudong) (WATANABE 1981: 22-23). They lived as bandits and all had Chinese names. The size of their bandit gangs ranged from 200 to 3,000 individuals (TSUZUKI 1972: 35). Being adventurers on the Continent or in Manchuria, they claimed to know the local customs better than any other Japanese and to be working for the friendship of Japan and China – if not for the good of the locals. But they often did not see the contradiction between their idealistic romantic notion of helping the locals and their service to the Japanese military (WATANABE 1981: 29).

They acted like local bandits, but worked for the Japanese army. Their idealistic romanticism was always driven by practical nationalism and Japanese imperialism. They were the *goyō bazoku* (government sponsored bandits).

In developing their policy towards the bandits in Manchuria, the Japanese army divided the region into three zones at the time of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904/05. The first zone, in the eastern part of Manchuria, belonged to the Japanese First Army which was responsible for fighting Russia. The eastern group's activities included bringing bandits over to the Japanese army's side and using them to conduct guerrilla operations behind the Russian lines against both Russian regular troops and bandits allied with Russia. They were able to ally with Peng Linge, a famous bandit head in Manchuria, and established the Liuhehui (Six Union Society) in Liaoyang to undertake anti-Russian activities such as cutting their telegraph lines. This gang had about 800 members.³ A Japanese report gloated at this development: "Russia sought to utilize the bandits who now turn around and make trouble for them. They are being bitten by their own dogs" (*Yomiuri Shinbun*, 9 March 1904: 5).

This eastern group was created during 1904 and was known as the Manzhou Yijun (or Manshū Gijun in Japanese, "volunteer army of Manchuria"). It was led by Major Hanada Nakanosuke, who seems to have recruited them primarily by dealing with the local gentries who had used the bandits to uphold their local interests. Amongst the Japanese leaders of the group were many who were related to the *gen'yōsha*. They were so successful that they were even able to win over one of the bandit gangs that had been under Russian instruction and was led by Zhang Xilan (TSUZUKI 1991: 26-27, 35). This eastern group also included Mongol units.

The second zone covered Inner Mongolia and was led by Major Ido Kawatatsu. Unfortunately, little is known about its activities, but it probably aimed to win support amongst the Mongol gangs.⁴

³ Rokugōkai [Six Union Society], *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 19 March 1904 (morning edition): 4. He and his group of about one thousand men, who were based around the Liaoyang area where they conducted regular raids, had become a problem for the government, police and army (*Yomiuri Shinbun*, 20 Jan 1903, morning edition, p. 5).

⁴ A so-called Special Activity Group (*tokubetsu kōdōhan*) was also set up in Peking in secret and aimed at harrassing the Russian west wing from Inner Mongolia and hatching plots along the Dongqing railway line. It was [later?] integrated into the so-called Manshū chūgijun (Manchuria Loyal Righteous Army) at which time it boasted 71 leaders and consisted of five groups of 500 to 1,000 bandits (WATANABE 1964: 34-35).

The third zone covered the south-western part of Manchuria and was called Dongya Yiyongjun (Tōa Giyūgun, "East Asian volunteer army"). This group operated specially around Jinzhou and had the task of attacking or disrupting the right flank of the Russian army. They were able to win over or hire two big groups of bandits of several hundred men. The Japanese promised the bandits a monthly salary according to their rank: six yuan for a common soldier, twelve yuan for low-grade officers, twenty-five yuan for a major and so forth. To mobilize their fighting spirit, the Japanese also introduced an award system according to the bandits' contribution to the battle itself. The bandits were trained in army discipline, but when they had to participate in battle in July 1904, the encounter resulted in their defeat because they were not trained sufficiently for modern battle and military discipline. The group was soon dissolved with the permission of the Japanese army (TSUZUKI 1991: 41, 60). Later, however, the name of this group was assumed by another group of bandits under the leadership of Henmi Isahiko (Jiang Lunbo), who had played a major role in the former group. He was asked by Japanese army intelligence to recruit other bandit groups. The idea of the Japanese army was that even if the bandits were not useful in real battle, it was better to control them than to leave them to the Russians. The group subsequently continued their activities by destroying railways and cutting off supply lines.

After the Russo-Japanese War, most of the Japanese bandit leaders of the bandit gangs remained in their groups. Some of them became active again after the fall of the Manchu Qing dynasty and supported the so-called Man-Mō (Manchuria and Mongolia) independence movements in 1912 and 1916. During Japan's Siberian intervention, the Japanese army in both Manchuria and Siberia sought again to utilize bandits in both regions and the Japanese interest in the bandits remained focused on their potential as political and military allies.

The Japanese invasion of Manchuria, however, brought these Japanese bandit leaders another exciting opportunity to demonstrate both their ability and their loyalty as Japanese imperial subjects. In the creation and maintenance of Manchukuo, which was set up by the Japanese Kwantung Army in 1932, the Japanese bandit leaders and their Manchurian bandits were asked to participate. When the Japanese Kwantung Army invited Pu Yi to become the head of the new state that they had been planning in Manchuria, Pu Yi initially did not agree and remained in Tianjin. The Japanese army intelligence subsequently orchestrated conspiracies and plots around Tianjin to destabilize Pu Yi's life. The Chinese authorities were very alert to Pu Yi's movements, forcing the Japanese

intelligence in Tianjin to find a way to distract the Chinese attention from Pu Yi. A plan was soon devised: they asked Matsumoto Kamenosuke, who had become leader of one of the bandit groups which was based close to Inner Mongolia and the Northern Chinese border, to carry out raids and incursions in the northwest of Tianjin in the winter of 1931 to divert the attention of the local authorities and the police from the Japanese plan to smuggle Pu Yi to Manchuria. With the help of the Japanese army's financial and weapons support, Matsumoto carried out the raids as promised and Pu Yi was deftly smuggled out of Tianjin and to Manchuria (WATANABE 1964: 119-121).

When Manchukuo was created in 1932, the Japanese bandit leaders gained a greater stature than ever before because they were mobilized to woo bandits, including anti-Manchukuo and anti-Japanese groups, to make them follow the new state. The Japanese bandit leaders and their gangs worked under the instructions of the Japanese army. Some of the gangs were incorporated into the official Manchukuo army system, but some did not want to be part of this system because they wanted instead to be part of the Japanese Kwantung army and be recognized as Japanese officers. The Japanese army, however, did not recognize them as official officers because they did not have any officer training. Some of them thus bestowed on themselves titles such as Commandant. This type of free-spirited behavior was left untouched as long as the Japanese army needed them and as long as it did not compete with or harm the army. After the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, however, when the old Kwantung Army officers who engaged with the Manchurian invasion were replaced by new ones, and more and more new armies were sent to North China, the so-called *goyō bazoku* lost their momentum (WATANABE 1986: 206-208).

BANDITS AS A POLITICAL BARGAINING CHIP

The prevalence of banditry in Manchuria was one of the main pretexts presented by the Japanese army for its invasion of Manchuria in September 1931. The Japanese claimed that the Chinese authorities had failed to provide basic security and order in Manchuria and implied that this failure took away their right to rule the region. The Japanese Delegation's report which was submitted to the League of Nations after the invasion repeatedly mentioned the presence of large numbers of bandits in Manchuria and the danger which they caused to Japanese lives and property there. Alleging a need for "self-defence" and the need to suppress these bandits, Japan claimed to be justified in resorting to drastic military

measures (Koo 1932: 5). Banditry in Manchuria thus provided the basis for the Japanese claim of bringing peace and order to the region.

This Japanese claim was plausible for two reasons: First, as more and more Japanese began to settle and conduct business in Manchuria after the Russo-Japanese War, Japanese civilians increasingly became the targets of bandit attacks. Under these circumstances, Japanese officials in Manchuria became seriously interested in the suppression of Manchuria's bandits. Before the Manchurian incident of 1931, the Japanese relied mostly on Chinese troops and police to suppress the bandits. The Japanese became the target of the bandits in the first instance because they had money and secondly because they were also a part of the enemy nation who had defeated the Chinese empire in war three decades earlier. Many Japanese businessmen were taken hostage in exchange for money and goods while others were killed (KURUJIMA 1932). In general the hostages were treated well as long as the ransom was paid; if payment was delayed, then the bandits would increase the pressure by sending family members the severed ears, nose or other body parts of the hostages. The growing network of railways under Japanese control also became an important target for bandit raids. Nor was the Japanese consulate able to escape the bandit raids, one such example being the raid on Jiandao on 28th June 1922. In this raid, more than 300 bandits not only made a wide range of raids on local civilian households, but they also took over the post office and the Japanese consulate. They seized all the weapons and munitions of the Japanese consulate (over a hundred pistols and guns and about 10,000 rounds of ammunition) (*Yomiuri Shinbun*, 30 June 1922: 3).

The second factor which made the Japanese claim powerful was that the Chinese Nationalists also identified banditry as one of the important problems facing society in Manchuria and elsewhere in China and saw the importance of establishing peace "before the Government of the Republic of China can make any real progress with its program of national reconstruction." They were, however, to give a very different explanation for the problem from that provided by the Japanese: "There are two factors which make for unrest – the attitude and actions of Japan, and the activities in many parts of the country of large groups of armed men, some of whom are Communists, some bandits pure and simple, and others a mixture of both elements" (T'ANG 1934: 1). Obviously, the Chinese Nationalists were accusing the Japanese and the Communists for the unrest in the country.

These nationalist claims were also reasonable. The Japanese in fact continued to work with Manchurian bandits to achieve their political and mili-

tary ends. Apart from hiring bandits to cause unrest around the Tianjin area to create political uncertainty as mentioned above, the Japanese also recruited more bandits in Manchuria to form a military force that would help their army maintain peace in Manchuria. Thus, soon after their invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the Japanese Kwantung army created a so-called "Northeastern People's Self-defence Army" (Tōhoku Minshū Jieigun) by gathering and hiring bandits in Manchuria to fight against the Chinese national army and other groups opposed to the Japanese occupation (THE NORTH-EASTERN AFFAIRS RESEARCH INSTITUTE 1932). In October 1931, the Kwantung army sent three of their agents, Kuraoka Shigetarō, Matsumoto Tokumatsu and Michimoto Gennosuke with ten thousand Japanese yen to Mukden to hire the services of Lin Ying-Ching. Lin's task, in view of the money he received, was to recruit bandits and vagabonds, and organize them into a planned self-defence army. This army was armed by the Japanese military, and arms and ammunition were supplied by the Japanese. Lin was appointed as Commander-in-Chief of the army while the three Japanese individuals mentioned above were all appointed as advisors. This army was set up to attack Jinzhou, which was still under Chinese control, and to drive out the Provincial government which was provisionally stationed there after the Japanese occupation of Mukden. The army attacked Jinzhou as planned, but was defeated by the Chinese troops. After the defeat of Lin's army, the Japanese utilized Zhang Xuecheng to attack Jinzhou, but before the attack could be carried out, Zhang was captured by Chinese troops (Koo 1932: 18–19).

The Chinese assessor of the League of Nations, Wellington Koo, submitted a memorandum on banditry and criticized the double game which Japan was playing with the bandits.

In the many statements which the Japanese Delegation has submitted during the meetings of the League of Nations since the outbreak on September 18th, 1932, frequent reference was made to the presence of large numbers of bandits in the Three Eastern Provinces [Manchuria] and the danger which they caused to Japanese lives and property there. Alleging the need of 'self-defence' and of the suppression of these bandits, Japan claims to be justified in resorting to drastic military measures. [...] While it is not for us at present either to affirm or to deny the existence of civil warfare or of the prevalence of banditry in the Three Eastern Provinces, it is necessary that we inquire into the circumstance under which these two evils have been able

to develop and the intimate relations which they have with Japan herself. (Koo 1932: 5, 22)

He continued to explain that the Japanese contributed to the Chinese civil war between various warlords and Zhang Zuolin. According to him, the bandits were well armed with arms and ammunition which were either smuggled in or provided by the Japanese. The South Manchurian Railway zone controlled by the Japanese and the Kwantung-leased Territory offered a good base for arms smuggling. The number of bandit raids in the South Manchurian Railway zone was nine in 1906, but this figure had increased to 368 by 1928. Wellington Koo pointed out that the increase in the number of bandit raids was "in direct proportion to the increase of Japanese power" in the South Manchurian Railway zone (Koo 1932: 17). The accuracy of the number is difficult to prove, but judging from the increase in the number of bandits in the 1920s in general, the ratio might not be too exaggerated.

Both the Japanese and the Chinese Nationalists had their own plausible reasons to condemn the other for the increase in bandit activity in Manchuria. In the name of peace, the aim of these accusations was of course to deny the other's rights over Manchuria and to justify their own instead. The question of the bandits of Manchuria literally became a bargaining chip in the international political power struggle. The bargaining ended abruptly, however, with Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933, after which the Japanese army became the sole controller of Manchuria and all its bandits. Managing the old and new bandits and creating or maintaining peace in Manchuria turned out to be a costly nightmare for the Japanese army.

THE BANDITS AND LAW AND ORDER: SUPPRESSION OR ENTICEMENT?

The Japanese management of the bandits and its maintenance of law and order in Manchuria after the foundation of the new Manchukuo state followed two major paths: the paths of enticement and suppression. Enticement or wooing bandits was necessary because neither the new state nor the Japanese army did have sufficient human, material and military resources to suppress the bandits by force in the short term. Another reason for choosing the non-violent path was the attempt to reflect the "benevolent" rule of the new state and to show that the Japanese were there to bring peace and order to the region, not to oppress people – and this even included outlaws, as long as they ceased their

bandit activities and supported the new regime. Moreover, the Japanese were competing with the anti-Japanese guerrilla groups who were also recruiting bandits to their own causes (KIKUCHI 1934: 3). It was important, therefore, to draw the bandits to the Japanese-Manchukuo side. At the same time, suppression was practiced against those who did not want to join the new state and especially if they joined anti-Japanese and anti-Manchukuo guerrilla movements. Bandits were seen as the cause of the relentless social disturbances which endangered people's lives and led to poverty. The Japanese ideology surrounding the founding of Manchukuo in 1932 was to bring benevolent rule to a region which had been controlled by bandits. Quelling bandits was considered to be the most important contribution which could be made to the social and political security of Manchuria.

The enticement process often first involved the mediation of private and semi-official channels, such as the Japanese bandit leaders, other adventurers (*Manshū rōnin*), civilians, religious organizations and army officials. These private or semi-official individuals and organizations would urge the bandit leaders to "wash their hands" as bandits and return to farming, or to join the new state institutions, such as the new Manchukuo army. As a result of the state's subjugation measures and because of a lack of ammunition and other resources, the bandit leaders would often accept the state's offer of official rank and lands and submit themselves and their followers to the state (NAKAJIMA 1976: 139). There was also often a process of negotiation between the gang leaders and the Japanese or Manchukuo authorities before any final submission. This negotiation was about what the government would offer in the event that the bandits gave up their "profession." The result would invariably be that the gangs would give up their criminal activities in exchange for amnesty, access to official positions (such as police posts), and grants of agricultural land.⁵

In other cases, the negotiations took place between bandits and religious groups who sought to convince them of the error of their ways and win them back to the path of righteousness. This path of righteousness, it should be noted, was often paved with offers of material goods and employment. Nonetheless, there were limits to the extent to which the Japanese were willing to rehabilitate the bandits. If they were involved in anti-Japanese movements, they were not

⁵When Manchukuo was founded in March 1932, bandits in many parts of Manchukuo were given official titles and the responsibility for maintaining order in their respective regions. They included a number of *rōnin* such as Zhang Congyuan (Date Junnosuke), who was given the title "Commander of the Andong region command" (WATANABE 1986: 205–206).

allowed to submit, and their leaders would be summarily executed. Some of the bandit leaders received official military ranks, but as soon as there was certain order in the new state, they were asked to retire because most of the bandits were illiterates. Even the Japanese bandit leaders, the *goyō bazoku*, were unable to establish a career in the formal military (WATANABE 1986: 206–208). This was a big disappointment for these young people who sought to or believed it their right to forge a career in banditry as they had in the old Manchurian order.

Not all of the rehabilitations were successful in the long term, however. According to a Japanese survey, about 42% of some 3,541 bandits who had joined the new Manchukuo army and defence force returned to their old “profession” of banditry between 1932 and 1934. Between October 1935 and March 1936, a total of 1,901 bandits were enticed over to the Japanese side and most of these were subsequently turned into farmers (RANSEIKAI 1970: 496). In 1935, a number of police officers who had formerly been bandits resumed their old “profession,” presumably dissatisfied with the conditions on the government side (*Manshū Nichinichi Shinbun*, 15 Aug 1935: 2). The main reasons for this recidivism included insufficient wages, difficulties with their livelihoods, harsh working conditions, or a discrepancy between the agreed conditions before the enticement and afterwards. There was also dissatisfaction with the act of disarmament itself since the bandits were disarmed as soon as they agreed to join the new state order. Only in a few special cases were the bandits allowed to join the Manchukuo armed forces or police with their arms. One more reason for dissatisfaction on the side of the enticed bandits who joined the Manchukuo army was that only the top bandit leaders received official officer positions such as captain or brigade commander. All the others would become common soldiers, even though they may have had some sort of title in their bandit gang. The bandit leaders who accepted ranks such as captain or brigade commander also often found that this title was just a name. They did not have any real power in the official army system and moreover found that their followers were often scattered amongst other brigades or camps. This brought dissatisfaction amongst them and caused them to return to their old “profession.” Apart from these conditions and the dissatisfaction that they engendered, there was also the influence of the anti-Japanese and anti-Manchukuo groups, including the Chinese communists and nationalists. About 57% of the recidivists between 1932 and 1934 were reported to have been persuaded by external co-option (WATANABE 1981: 138–139) and some 210 rebellions involving 12,554 individuals also occurred between 1932 and 1937 (RANSEIKAI 1970: 214–216, 496).

Some people remained in the army or police force no matter what position was offered to them because they had difficulties finding another job or because they were tired of the bandit life, and their current position in fact provided a kind of stability. But even those who chose to remain in their official positions always harbored sympathy and support for their “colleagues and friends.” For example, the bandits who agreed to join the Manchukuo official army to fight against other bandits were sometimes reported as offering help to their bandit brothers by supplying them with munitions and bullets so long as there were no Japanese advisors or leaders in the groups. Both sides would agree to meet and fight at a certain time and place. The “real” bandits would hide an agreed amount of money in an agreed place and retreat. The “tamed” bandits, meanwhile, who were supposed to drive their opponents away, would replace the secreted money with munitions and retreat themselves (WATANABE 1981: 99).

Parallel to this enticement and wooing process, suppression was the most important means of managing and controlling bandits. In fact, quelling or suppressing bandits turned out to be the primary duty of the Manchukuo police and army throughout the short history of Manchukuo. The number of people whom the Japanese referred to as bandits increased dramatically after the foundation of Manchukuo in 1932. It was reported that at the time of the founding of Manchukuo in March 1932 the total number of bandits exceeded 100,000. By September of the same year the number had increased to 210,000 (JMYB 1939: 669). The increase in numbers was caused by a very strong anti-Japanese nationalist feeling which was experienced all over China. Although the Japanese easily defeated the Chinese regular army, they faced continuing serious guerrilla resistance throughout Manchukuo. The Japanese also called these anti-Japanese and anti-Manchukuo resistance groups *hizoku* (robber bandits). In the face of this strong resistance, the primary campaign of the Manchukuo authorities and the Japanese army was to create and maintain domestic peace and order.

The resistance also prompted a change in terminology on the part of the Japanese. While previously the term *bazoku* with its somewhat romantic and noble connotations had been the general term, the Japanese now changed to *hizoku*, a purely negative term. The term *bazoku* virtually disappeared from the mass media and official reports. *Hizoku*, in fact, was already widely used in China (as *feizei*), where it was a common term of abuse between political opponents. The Chinese Nationalists and Communists frequently referred to each other as bandits or “*fei*” to undermine the legitimacy of their rival’s claims to rule China. The Chinese government routinely used the term *jiaofei* (fighting

the bandits) or *miefei* (exterminating the bandits) to describe its campaigns to suppress rebels, warlords and rival political and ideological factions (BILLINGSLEY 1988: 10–11).

Labelling political opponents as bandits was a means of criminalizing them, of denying the possibility that they might represent a legitimate political point of view. It seems, then, that the Japanese use of the term *hizoku* was a direct adaptation of the Chinese practice. Interestingly, the constant use of *hizoku* to refer to political opponents had the effect of changing the meaning of the word. Whereas it originally had purely negative connotations, during the 1930s it came to denote those who took up bandit activities or resistance movements for political reasons. Although this change did not make the term a positive one, it nonetheless tended to identify a category of political bandits whose activities shaded into partisan warfare. The change in terminology made no difference to the policy of the Manchukuo authorities towards the bandits, however. They continued to use the old methods: wooing bandits where possible to reduce the human costs of military action, but fighting them with military force when a quick return to public order was needed or when they identified certain groups clearly as an active anti-Japanese or anti-Manchukuo resistance group. Since there were so many resistance organizations and militia groups in the early years of the new state, the authorities carried out bandit suppression campaigns in several waves and concentrated their military and police forces to destroy the "bandits."

According to Japanese statistics, the Manchukuo and Japanese Kwantung armies carried out 7,329 separate military campaigns against the so-called bandit insurgencies between November 1934 and March 1940, involving a total of 631,366 men. These campaigns gave rise to about 24,671 "bandit" deaths, 13,369 injuries and 3,355 captives (RANSEIKAI 1970: 426).

To bolster the military campaigns, a civil defence system was set up. The idea was to segregate the "bandits" from the common masses and abolish their bases in order to make the military campaigns easier. Two main methods were used to segregate the "bandits" from other types of common criminals. The first was to introduce the *baojia* (*hōka* in Japanese) system. At the end of 1933, the Manchukuo government introduced the *baojia* system in all its provinces except the Mongol regions. *Baojia* was an old Chinese control system that had been used for several centuries across Chinese history in many different forms up to the end of the Qing Dynasty. In Manchukuo, the *baojia* system was a household-based neighborhood watch and security system. Under this system, about

ten households formed a unit (*pai*) which was held responsible for reporting to the authorities any suspected bandit, any person having deadly weapons in their possession, or anyone creating a public nuisance. Should the *pai* fail to do what it should, its members were reprimanded collectively.⁶ The second means of isolating the bandits and reducing both their number and the rate of crime were collective settlements (*shūdan buraku*). Collective settlement meant that small settlements were combined or moved into bigger settlements to protect each other from outside intruders. By 1937, more than 10,000 such settlements were created with a population of about 5.5 million (*Senfu Geppō* 1938: 21).⁷ These collective settlements were self-contained communities: they usually consisted of 50–100 households, and each household had a fixed amount of land to farm. The community would work the land together and share the harvest. Every 25 households or so formed one communication unit. The *baojia* system was applied to these settlements as well. The ideal settlement was supposed to be built in a walled fortress-like compound whose walls were approximately eight *chaku* (three *chaku* equals one meter) high and three *chaku* thick and surrounded by a three *chaku* deep ditch outside the wall (RANSEIKAI 1970: 301).

Traditionally, most of the bandit bands had a hideout or base where they gathered or retreated over the winter season, but there were also bandits who were constantly on the move and did not have fixed bases. Because of the military campaigns and the exclusive policies of *baojia* and collective settlements, most of the bandits were forced to become mobile and abandon any long-term fixed bases. Without bases, they also had less access to support from local people and local leaders and were more easily destroyed (NAKAJIMA 1976: 70, 86). According to the *Japan-Manchoukuo* [sic] *Year Book* (JMYB 1939: 669), by 1937, not only were the number of bandits reduced but also the size of the bandit groups shrank. In 1932 there were some bandit groups that had an active fighting force of 30,000 men, but by 1937, when Japan launched its second war on China, the bandit problem in Manchukuo was largely under control and the

⁶ This *baojia* system also originated from previous governments. During the warlord period, each county had been divided into several districts and the *baojia* (also known as *baoweituan*) was an autonomous district organization which assisted the police in maintaining public peace in the district. These *baojia* organizations were armed (MAN'ETSU CHOSABU 1927).

⁷ *Rikukaigun gunji nenkan* 1937 records a different number, 3.5 million instead of 5.5 million.

average size was less than 30 bandits per group. That means the battles shifted to smaller, guerrilla-style warfare.

CONCLUSION

The bandits of Manchuria played a dual role in the Japanese strategy in the region during the first half of the 20th century. Initially, the powerful bandit gangs appeared to the Japanese to be ideal political and military partners, both because of their apparent relationship with the people and also because of their military and organizational skills. The bandits also appealed to the Japanese romanticism of the swashbuckling life and noble character of the bandit brotherhood. The Japanese in turn were attractive partners for the bandits because they seemed to offer both practical support and political legitimacy which could lift the bandits up to the status of respectable political players. This sense of partnership gradually eroded over time. Each side soon realized that the other was profoundly opportunistic. The Japanese and the bandits would both make and break short-term arrangements without any thought to the value of long-term alliances. The instability of relations between the Japanese and the bandits contrasted with the generally powerful and enduring ties of loyalty that prevailed within the bandit gangs. The most serious cause of this rupture was the fact that the growing Japanese economic and political interests in the area came to be threatened by the bandits and by Japan's realization that suppressing banditry would give it a powerful political claim to hegemony in Manchuria.

The Japanese hegemony in the region became a reality when Manchukuo was founded by the Japanese army in 1932, under the pretext of bringing peace and order to the region. The Japanese army now had no choice but to deal with both the old and new bandits. If they had at one time been able to choose the bandits with whom they wished to collaborate and view the rest as the problem of the Chinese government, now they were forced not only to manage the "good bandits" but also to solve the problem of the "bad bandits." These new and "bad bandits" now became political bandits (*hizoku*) who had to be re-doctrinated if not suppressed. Reducing banditry and crime was the prime aim of the Japanese and Manchukuo authorities in their attempt to demonstrate their "benevolent" and "just" rule to the people in Manchuria and to the world. Their strategy in this endeavor was to use enticement and suppression. Both of these strategies were meant to promote the idea of the "benevolent" rule of the new Manchukuo state and of the Japanese empire at large.

The Japanese combination of heavy-handed military action, isolation and gentler enticement greatly reduced the number and strength of the gangs and scattered them. Some of the so-called bandits crossed over the Soviet border and others went over to join the nationalist and communist mainstream armies. The Japanese did not, however, significantly change the social order which had given rise to banditry. Harsh physical conditions, tension between older and newer settlers (in this case, more than a million Japanese who had settled in Manchukuo), a civil defence system that in effect provided basic training for bandit work, and difficulties in maintaining close administrative supervision of remote regions all meant that Manchuria was ripe for a further outbreak of banditry when the Japanese power disappeared in 1945.

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TOSAKA JUNS KRITIK AM BÜRGERLICH-DEMOKRATISCHEN LIBERALISMUS UND NIPPONISTISCHEN FASCHISMUS IN JAPAN

Fabian SCHÄFER

Bis auf wenige Ausnahmen wurde der marxistische Philosoph und Kritiker Tosaka Jun (1900–1945) in der westlichsprachigen Japanwissenschaft nahezu vollständig vernachlässigt.¹ Dafür ist zum einen sicherlich sein früher Tod verantwortlich – der regimiekritische Intellektuelle verstarb nur wenige Tage vor der japanischen Kapitulation im Gefängnis von Nagano aufgrund der schlechten Haftbedingungen an einer Nierenentzündung –, zum anderen wohl aber auch die stark ideologisierte Instrumentalisierung dieses Vertreters der so genannten Kyōto-Schule und Nicht-Konvertiten in der unmittelbaren Nachkriegszeit durch marxistische Intellektuelle in Japan.² Erst im Zuge der Rezeption der *Cultural Studies* in Japan in den 1990er Jahren wurde den zeit- und medienkritischen Analysen des marxistischen Philosophen als einem der wichtigsten Vertreter einer japanischen Tradition kritischer Denkansätze wieder ein vermehrtes Interesse zuteil. Dies geschah vor allem vor dem Hintergrund, die stark eurozentrischen *Cultural Studies* durch die Einbeziehung der eigenen kritischen Denktradition einer Rekontextualisierung im japanischen Rahmen zu unterziehen.³ Dieses „Neulesen“ marginalisierter japanischer Intellektueller und Wissensformen und die daraus notwendig folgende „Neuschreibung“ der japanischen Ideengeschichte in der westlichsprachigen Japanwissenschaft ist auch wichtiger Bestandteil eines internationalen Forschungsprojekts mit dem Titel „Rewriting Japanese Modern and Contemporary Intellectual History“, das durch US-ame-

¹ Ausnahmen bilden vor allem HAROOTUNIAN 2000a und 2000b oder DILWORTH, VIGLIELMO und ZAVALA 1998.

² Umfangreiche biografische Angaben zur Person Tosaka Juns finden sich bei DILWORTH, VIGLIELMO und ZAVALA 1998: 312–325.

³ Zur Reartikulation der *Cultural Studies* und zur Konstruktion einer „historischen Formation“ kritischen Denkens innerhalb der *Cultural Studies* in Japan vgl. SCHÄFER 2006: 229–232.

ZU DEN AUTOREN

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1985–1992 Studium der Japanologie, Volkswirtschaftslehre und politischen Wissenschaften an der Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn (Magister Artium). Von Oktober 1990 bis April 1992 studentische Hilfskraft am Japanologischen Seminar. In diesen Zeitraum fällt der intensivste Kontakt zum Jubilar, dessen Seminare zu *bungo* und *kanbun* sie absolvierte. Nach einem Jahr Lehrtätigkeit im Fachbereich II/Japanologie der Universität Trier verbrachte sie vier Jahre an der Hitotsubashi-Universität, Tōkyō. 1996 Promotion an der Universität Bonn über die japanische Luftfahrtindustrie. Seit September 1997 Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am Institut für Kulturvergleichende Wirtschaftsforschung (heute: Lehrstuhl für Evolutionsökonomik und Institutionentheorie) der Universität Witten/Herdecke.

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Judith Fröhlich

Lizentiatsstudium (MA) in Allgemeiner Geschichte, Japanologie und Kunstgeschichte Ostasiens an der Universität Zürich mit Abschluss im Jahre 1999. Eine

Anstellung im Rahmen eines schweizerischen Nationalfonds-Projekts (NFP) am Historischen Seminar der Universität Zürich ermöglichte die Entstehung ihrer Doktorarbeit, die unter dem Titel *Rulers, Peasants and the Use of the Written Word: Ategawa no shō, 1004-1304* dieses Jahr (2007) bei Peter Lang erscheinen wird. Zwischen 2005 und 2007 war Judith Fröhlich in der Japanabteilung des Museum Rietbergs in Zürich tätig. Seit 2006 arbeitet sie an einem Habilitationsprojekt mit dem Titel „National Identity and the Perception of the West in Nineteenth-Century Japan.“ Detlev Taranczewski begegnete Judith Fröhlich zum ersten Mal im März 1999 auf einer Tagung in Bonn. Auf die Frage, ob er sich als Historiker oder Japanologe betrachte, antwortete Herr Taranczewski damals, er wolle sich weder zum einen noch zum anderen bekennen müssen. Der erste Eindruck sollte sich später bestätigen. Detlev Taranczewski schwimmt gerne gegen den Strom und wirkt dennoch als ausgesprochen integrierende Persönlichkeit. Vor allem der jüngeren Generation gegenüber ist er stets wohlwollend eingestellt. An dieser Stelle dankt die Autorin dieses Beitrags Herrn Taranczewski für die vielen Ratschläge, kritischen Anmerkungen und wiederholt schönen Begegnungen.

Maren Godzik

Studium der Japanologie, Soziologie und Orientalischen Kunstgeschichte von 1991 bis 1999 an der Universität Bonn. Detlev Taranczewskis Veranstaltungen in *bungo*, *kanbun* und Sozialgeschichte des Mittelalters waren ein elementarer Bestandteil dieses Studiums. Durch ein Monbushō-Stipendium (und Unterstützung des „Reisebüros Taranczewski“) verbrachte Maren Godzik ein Jahr an der Universität Kumamoto. Nach acht Monaten als Wissenschaftliche Hilfskraft am Seminar für Ostasiatische Geschichte an der Universität Erfurt forschte sie zwei Jahre mit einem DAAD-Stipendium an der National University for Fine Arts and Music (2000–2002). Von 2002 bis 2004 war sie Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am Japanologischen Seminar der Universität Bonn und promovierte dort im Jahre 2005, wobei ihr verschiedene Gespräche mit Detlev Taranczewski außerordentlich weiterhalfen. Seit 2006 ist Maren Godzik Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am Deutschen Institut für Japanstudien in Tōkyō, wo sie sich mit dem Thema Wohn- und Lebensformen im Alter beschäftigt.

Robert Horres

Geb. 1962, Studium der Japanologie, der Vergleichenden Religionswissenschaft und der Volkswirtschaftslehre an der Universität Bonn und der Waseda Universität, Tōkyō. 1991–1993 Forschungsaufenthalt an der Keiō Universität, Tōkyō

mit einem Stipendium des japanischen Kultusministeriums. 1993–1995 Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Japanologischen Seminar der Universität Bonn; 1995 Dissertation zum Dr. phil. mit einer Arbeit zum japanischen Raumfahrtmanagement. 1995–1996 Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Deutschen Institut für Japanstudien, Tōkyō. 1996–1998 Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Japanologischen Seminar der Universität Bonn; 1998–2004 Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter an der Forschungsstelle Modernes Japan der Universität Bonn. Seit März 2004 Universitätsprofessor für Japanologie an der Eberhard Karls-Universität Tübingen. Verschiedene Forschungsaufenthalte in Japan, zuletzt 2003 am Historiographischen Institut der Universität Tōkyō und 2005 am Tübinger Zentrum für japanische Sprache in Kyōto. Arbeitsgebiete: Technik, Kultur und Gesellschaft; medienbasierte Erforschung kultureller Ressourcen.

Hans Martin Krämer

Von 1992 bis 1996 Studium der Neueren Geschichte, der Philosophie und des Modernen Japan an der Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf. 1996/97 einjähriger Studienaufenthalt an der Sophia-Universität in Tōkyō. Von 1997 bis 1999 Abschluss des Studiums mit der Fächerkombination Geschichte Japans, Japanisch, Neuere Geschichte an der Ruhr-Universität Bochum. Von Oktober 1999 bis September 2001 und seit August 2004 Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Lehrstuhl Geschichte Japans der Fakultät für Ostasienwissenschaften der Ruhr-Universität Bochum. Von Oktober 2001 bis Dezember 2002 Forschungsaufenthalt in Japan (Universität Tōkyō) als Fellow der Japan Foundation. Promotion im Jahre 2005. Seit September 2006 einjähriger Forschungsaufenthalt als Advanced Research Fellow an der Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts (USA). Veröffentlichungen zur Ideengeschichte sowie zur Geschichte der Bildung und Sozialpolitik im Japan des 20. Jahrhunderts. Hat Detlev Taranczewskis Diskussionsfreude bei den Treffen der Initiative zur historischen Japanforschung kennen und schätzen gelernt.

Peter Mario Kreuter

Geb. 1970 in Koblenz, Studium der Mittelalterlichen und Neueren Geschichte sowie diverser Philologien 1989–1997 an der Universität Bonn, Forschungsaufenthalte in Rumänien. Seit 2005 Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter des „Bonner Paracelsus-Projekts“ am Medizinhistorischen Institut der Universität Bonn. Leidenschaftlicher Dänologe im Nebenerwerb! Detlev und ich? Viel Wandern, viel Ätzen gegen Firlefanz in der Wissenschaft, viel Freude an Wiglaf Droste und

viel Zufriedenheit mit dem, was wir tun... und leider habe ich niemals *bungo* oder *kanbun* bei ihm studiert, eines meiner größten Defizite überhaupt.

Marie-Luise Legeland

Studium der Japanologie, Soziologie, Germanistik und Theater-, Film- und Fernsehwissenschaften an den Universitäten Köln, Kyōto und Bonn. Von Detlev Taranczewski wurde sie in die Geheimnisse des klassischen Japanisch (*bungo*) sowie des Sinojapanischen (*kanbun*) eingeweiht. Nach ihrem Magister-Abschluss verbrachte sie einen dreieinhalbjährigen Studienaufenthalt an der Universität Kyōto und kehrte 2002 als Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin an die Japanologie der Universität Bonn zurück, wo sie das große Vergnügen hatte, das Mitarbeiter-Zimmer mit Detlev Taranczewski zu teilen. Eine Dissertation zum Thema „Thermalquellen als Reiseziel. Geschichte und Gegenwart von Badereisen in Japan“ steht vor dem Abschluss. Lieber Detlev, ich danke Dir für viele anregende Gespräche, Deinen Humor und Deinen weisen Rat!

Ralph Lützel

1980–1993 Studium der Geographie, Japanologie und Verkehrspolitik (später der Historischen Geographie) an der Universität Bonn. Zwischen 1985 und 1987 Besuch von Veranstaltungen zu *bungo*, *kanbun* und japanischem Feudalismus beim Jubilar. 1989 Abschluss Diplom-Geograph; 1993 Promotion zum Dr. phil.; 1993–1998 Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Deutschen Institut für Japanstudien in Tōkyō. 1998–2007 Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Japanologischen Seminar/Forschungsstelle Modernes Japan der Universität Bonn; während dieser Zeit erneut intensive Berührung mit dem Jubilar, diesmal als Kollege, Wander- und Trinkgenosse. 2006 Habilitation an der Philosophischen Fakultät der Universität Bonn. Seit März 2007 erneut Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Deutschen Institut für Japanstudien in Tōkyō. Forschungsbereiche: Geographie und Demographie Japans.

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Mitarbeiterin der Stiftung Deutsche Geisteswissenschaftliche Institute im Ausland. 1983–1989 Studium der Fächer Japanisch, Koreanisch, Computerlinguistik an der Universität Bonn. 1990–1991 Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin an der Arbeitsstelle Lehrmaterialien Japanisch der Freien Universität Berlin, 1991–2000 Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am Japanologischen Seminar der Universität Bonn (mit einer Unterbrechung von 1994–1996 als Stipendiatin

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Margaret Mehl

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Li Narangoa

Reader (entspr. W2-Prof.) am College of Asia and the Pacific, Australian National University. Studium am Japanologischen Seminar der Universität Bonn zwischen 1990 und 1997. Ihre Dissertationsschrift: *Japanische Religionspolitik in der Mongolei 1932–1945. Reformbestrebungen und Dialog zwischen japanischem und mongolischem Buddhismus*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz 1997. Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin in Bonn 1997–1998. Zwischen 1998 und 2001 arbeitete sie am Nordic Institute of Asian Studies in Kopenhagen. Veröffentlichungen im Jahre 2006 u.a.: *Mongols From Country To City: Floating Boundaries, Pastoralism and City Life in the Mongol Lands* (hg. mit Ole Bruun); Mōkyō seiken ron – „Kairai seiken“ no rekishiteki imi [Die mongolische Regierung unter Japan: Die historische Bedeutung von „Marionetten-Staaten“], in: *Iwanami Kōza. Ajia Taiheiyō sensō*, Bd. 7, Tōkyō: Iwanami.

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Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter an der Forschungsstelle Modernes Japan, Universität Bonn. Studium der Ethnologie, Alt-Amerikanistik und Soziologie an der Universität Bonn, Promotion 1987 mit einem Thema zur Kultur der Ainu. 1988–1990 Stipendiat am Deutschen Institut für Japanstudien, Tōkyō, 1990 bis 1995 Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter dortselbst; seit 1996 an der Universität Bonn. Forschungsinteressen: Moderne japanische Gesellschaft, Minderheiten in Japan, Theorien und Methoden der Japanforschung, japanische Auswanderer in Südamerika.

Peter Pantzer

Geboren 1942 in Salzburg, Österreich. Nach dem Gymnasialabschluss zwei Jahre Militärdienst. Anschließend Studium der Neueren Geschichte an der Universität Wien, Promotion 1968. Zweieinhalbjähriger Studienaufenthalt an der Tokyo Universität (1968/1971). Ab 1972 Assistent und Lektor am Institut für Japanologie an der Wiener Universität. Nach Habilitation und Ernennung zum Professor Übersiedlung nach Bonn, zunächst zur Lehrstuhlvertretung, seit 1994 fest berufen als Professor für Japanologie; 1998 bis 2002 Vorsitzender der European Association of Japanese Resource Specialists (EAJRS).

Fabian Schäfer

M.A., Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Lehrstuhl für Japanologie, Ostasiatisches Institut, Universität Leipzig. Wichtige Veröffentlichungen: „Cultural Studies in Japan“. In: Hans Martin Krämer, Tino Scholz und Sebastian Conrad (Hg.): *Geschichtswissenschaft in Japan. Themen, Ansätze und Theorien*. Göttingen 2006, S. 213–223. „Ono Hideo und der Ursprung der Zeitungswissenschaft (*shinbungaku*) in Japan“. In: Stefanie Averbeck und Arnulf Kutsch (Hg.): *Zeitung, Werbung, Öffentlichkeit. Biografisch-systematische Studien zur Frühgeschichte der Kommunikationsforschung*. Köln 2005, S. 23–54.

Winfried Schenk

Jg. 1956. Professor für Historische Geographie am Geographischen Institut der Universität Bonn. Herr Prof. Toshihiro Yoshida von der Kokugakuin-Universität in Tōkyō war 2002/03 für ein Jahr Gastprofessor am Geographischen Institut der Universität Bonn. Bei meinem Gegenbesuch in Japan im Jahr 2004 traf ich in seinem Umfeld auch mit Herrn PD Dr. Detlev Taranczewski in Tōkyō zusammen. Ich kannte ihn bis dahin vor allem als Mitglied in seiner Habilitationskommission in Bonn, in die ich gewählt worden war, da er ein historisch-geographisches Thema bearbeitet hatte. Seitdem besteht ein loser, aber sehr anregender Kontakt mit Herrn Taranczewski namentlich über die Betreuung der aus Kawasaki stammenden Studentin der Historischen Geographie, Mari Kubota.

Maria Shinoto

Studium der Japanologie u.a. bei Detlev Taranczewski, der Sinologie, Vor- und Frühgeschichte und Alten Geschichte in Bonn, Tōkyō (Keiō-Universität) und Cambridge. Nach dem Magister in Japanologie Lehrtätigkeit in Bonn, Wechsel in die Vor- und Frühgeschichte an der Universität Heidelberg, Lehrtätigkeit

sowie Forschung in einem EU-Projekt mit Grabungen in Tiryns, Griechenland. Nach der Promotion zu Fragen der Keramikklassifikation bei Professor Dr. J. Maran im Fach Vor- und Frühgeschichte Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am Department for Cultural Heritage, Beppu University, Japan.

Maik Hendrik Sprotte

Gegenwärtig Wissenschaftlicher Assistent am Institut für Japanologie im Zentrum für Ostasienwissenschaften (ZO) der Universität Heidelberg. Seine Forschungsinteressen im Bereich der historischen Japanforschung liegen unter anderem auf den Motiven, Inhalten und Wirkungsweisen von Maßnahmen der Inneren Sicherheit in der politischen Geschichte Japans bis 1945 unter Berücksichtigung alltagsgeschichtlicher Strukturen, und auf der politischen Kultur Japans in Geschichte und Gegenwart in ihrer Gesamtheit (hier: Möglichkeiten politischer Partizipation, Schaffung und Weiterentwicklung moderner politischer Institutionsformen). Er hat während seines Japanologiestudiums an der Universität Bonn in verschiedenen Lehrveranstaltungen des Jubilars zur vormoderne Geschichte Japans von dessen beeindruckenden Kenntnissen vormoderne Sprachstile und historischer Zusammenhänge profitieren können.

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