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Inscribed Landscapes

Marking and Making Place

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PREFACE

This book is an archaeological and social anthropological exploration of the role of place marking in place making. The approaches taken by the various authors are varied, although all are united in the view that landscapes are not simply "out there," but constructed in social engagement. People physically inscribe spaces, such as in rock-art, monuments, and the like, in the process of *dwelling*. More intimately, people's spatial experiences are inscribed through the senses. Both people and place are codefined in a process of engagement that involves inscription. It is various dimensions of this codefinition that are explored in this book.

The initial seeds for this volume were laid in 1998 when we considered assembling a group of researchers to discuss how the marking of place affects human interaction and perception. At first we were particularly interested in how places marked or decorated with rock-art gained significance as socially marked *territorial* (already-owned) spaces. The psychological and social implications of such a process of place marking are considerable, but have remained largely unexplored by archaeologists.

However, we were not entirely satisfied with the initially bounded archaeological direction for this book. It was clear that it was not *inscriptions* that were at stake, but people's relationships with places in the production of a sense of place and belonging. We thus decided to redirect the book somewhat, to focus less on the fixed landmark and more on the humanization of landscapes, on the process of social and sensual anchorage in place. The book's new direction echoed more closely our intellectual interests and curiosities.

We have followed a number of conventions in the following pages. For one, we write of the nonwritten past as "pre-History" rather than "prehistory." We do this as an attempt to avoid the evolutionary loadedness of the notion of prehistory (while at the same time being well aware of the history of the terms prehistory/prehistory, as influentially used in particular by John Lubbock and Daniel Wilson during the mid- to late nineteenth century).

Following Paul Taçon and Christopher Chippindale's lead (1998, An archaeology of rock-art through informed methods and formal methods, 1–10 in *The Archaeology of Rock-Art*, edited by C. Chippindale and P. S. C. Taçon, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), we hyphenate "rock-art" to distinguish such practices from the Western artistic program, which is closely tied to a market economy.

We also sometimes refer to radiocarbon dates and sometimes to calibrated ages. Wherever radiocarbon dates are presented, they are listed as "years B.P."; calibrated ages are presented as "years ago." We use the

TWO

The Signature of Terror

Violence, Memory, and Landscape at Freeport

CHRIS BALLARD

The notion of a "culture of terror," developed by ethnographers of Latin America and given wider currency through the writing of Michael Taussig, resonates powerfully with conditions around the world's richest mining operation, Freeport's Grasberg mine in the Indonesian province of Papua or Irian Jaya.[1] Taussig (1987) described how a climate or culture of terror, the perpetual imminence of the threat of death, can create a "space of death," an imaginary zone in which fear blocks the senses as violence and representations of violence achieve a near-perfect circle of mirrors reflecting terror back upon both perpetrators and victims. Neither cultures of terror nor spaces of death, however, have been explored in any depth in terms of their topographic arrangement, the nature of their inscription in a specific landscape. How does death—or, more accurately, the terror of an unfamiliar, unexpected, or violent death—come to inhabit a landscape? How is the land itself marked, manipulated, and deployed in the orchestration of terror? And if landscapes, by definition, invoke perspective and the scope for different readings, how are these markings received by different audiences?

I address these questions by considering the history of violence around the Freeport mine, in an attempt to understand the operation of a technology of terror through the deployment of a particular iconography. The manipulation of a layered series of images and other prompts for the memory allows the very meaning of the landscape for a community, and thus the literal base of its identity, to be reconfigured. These images both record and recall violent events, conferring upon those who have the power to inscribe the landscape in this way a degree of control over the summoning of memories of the past and the heightening of terror and uncertainty about the future. In a companion paper (Ballard 2000), I considered the performative aspects of violence at Freeport and elaborated upon the relationship between violence and terror. Here I focus on the manner in which death and the terror of dying are implanted in the landscape and rendered perpetually present for its inhabitants, as an echo of violence that persists through the intervals between episodes of murder, torture, and disappearance. The manner in which bodies become absent and are then re-presented is mediated by an iconography of violence, which introduces signs that stand for these absences (Graziano 1992:73).

Recent studies of political iconography in violent contexts have tended to focus on the symbolism of community resistance and sectarian distinction. The graphic and political sophistication apparent in the graffiti and murals of Northern Ireland and Palestine has required that close attention be paid to the identity of the intended audiences for these images and slogans. Although Catholic murals in Belfast, often restricted to clearly defined working-class neighborhoods, are at one level emblems of resistance to Protestant domination and British rule (Sluka 1992), they are also, and perhaps just as powerfully, a means of policing community will, "part of an inwardly focused propaganda which largely ignores debate" (Jarman 1993:118). Murals have multiple audiences, but consideration of their location, their content, and their immediate historical context yields a much richer sense of their reception and their efficacy as interventions in relations of power, both between and within communities.

Of particular relevance to the Freeport case is Peteet's (1996:140) observation that an analysis of the way in which graffiti are read forces enquiry to extend beyond the simple binary of domination and resistance. Palestinian graffiti have provided the community with a voice, a means of access to communal memory, and a public affirmation of allegiance to different Palestinian factions; but the fact that most graffiti are rendered in Arabic means that Israeli soldiers, although keenly aware of the role of graffiti as a challenge to authority, remain largely ignorant of their content (Peteet 1996:150). Local historical context, relations of power, and the positions of image makers and image readers are thus vital to an adequate analysis of what, following Poole (1997), we might think of as a "visual economy" of political violence. The notion of visual economy introduces the sense of a systematic production, exchange, and reproduction of images and interpretations in whose organization the relations of power feature prominently.

Around the Freeport mine, the more obvious iconography of murals and graffiti has been overwhelmingly that of the state and its armed forces, and the multiple interpretations of these images and the intentions of their makers demand attention. An analysis of the patterned appearance of the state's images is potentially revealing of the structured nature of its attempts to dominate the community and thus capable of identifying the means of subverting their intended effects. Yet this is not to portray the communities of the mine area as passive consumers of some discourse of the dominant. Much as armed forces and communities alike participate in novel "vocabularies of terror" (Suárez-Oroco 1992:235) to manage and communicate conditions of radical violence, an iconography of terror requires the participation of both the army, as producers of the images, and the community, as active readers and interpreters. The capacity and the will to read and interpret, however the message might be transformed in the act of communication, necessarily implicate the audience as culturally fluent agents, fully capable of response. At Freeport, where the community's response has not thus far taken the more obvious forms of murals or graffiti, other, more subtle means of resisting the intended import of these images and insisting on the integrity of the community can be identified.

CONTEXTS FOR VIOLENCE AT FREEPORT

Irian Jaya has had a deeply troubled history of incorporation within the Republic of Indonesia since the colonial territory of Dutch New Guinea was transferred to Indonesia via the interim authority of the United Nations in 1962 (Budiardjo and Liong 1988; Défert 1996; Osborne 1985; Saltford 2000). The Indonesian military campaign to seize the western half of the island of New Guinea from the Dutch played a role in creating the international pressure that led to the transfer, and the army thereafter displayed a tendency to regard the possession of Irian Jaya and its resources as a right of conquest. Popular uprisings during the 1960s were brutally suppressed. After the crushing in 1977 of a provincewide insurrection led by the poorly equipped Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, or OPM), Irian Jaya became one of three provinces, along with East Timor and Aceh, in which the military exercised almost complete control (Aditjondro 1994; Robinson 1998).

The Freeport mine played an important role in the history of Irian Jaya under Suharto's New Order regime. The 1936 discovery of a substantial copper deposit at the Ertsberg ("Ore Mountain") in the Central Highlands of Dutch New Guinea had led to further exploration in 1960 by an American mining company, Freeport Sulphur (Wilson 1981). When Suharto came to power in 1965, Freeport was the first foreign company to sign a major investment contract with Indonesia, forming a local subsidiary, P.T. Freeport Indonesia. Initially a medium-sized copper and gold venture centered on the Ertsberg, the Freeport mining complex rose dramatically to global prominence after the 1988 discovery of the Grasberg, the world's richest copper-gold deposit, with an estimated reserve value in 1998 of US$54 billion. The newfound strategic significance of the mine for Indonesia resulted in a substantial increase in troop numbers around the mine and the local townships of Timika and Tembagapura, exacerbating existing tensions between the army, the mining company, and the Indigenous communities of the wider region. In the absence of an effective, functioning local civilian administration, the security forces, including both army and police units, are in many respects the representatives of the state, and their actions are commonly viewed locally as reflections of the will of a distant and fundamentally malign state.

The traditional landowners of the highland mining area, the mining township of Tembagapura and its surrounds, are the Amungme, a language community of about 8,000 people, divided between urban residents of the lowland towns of Timika and Akimuga, and the inhabitants of rural hamlets scattered across a dozen narrow highland valleys cut into the southern slopes of the Central Range.[2] Although both the 1936 and 1960 reconnaissance expeditions were peacefully received, the Amungme reacted almost immediately to the start of mine construction in 1967 with a strong show of protest. They had been neither consulted about plans for the mine nor compensated for the loss of land, productive trees, or gardens.

Much as the miners themselves were in awe of the technical demands and the scale of construction at the Ertsberg (see Wilson 1981), so too the Amungme were initially overwhelmed by the accompanying environmental destruction of the headwater areas where the mine is located. As the presence of the mine failed to translate into shared benefits or wealth for the community, Amungme protests grew more forceful, culminating in the closure of exploration camps, which were marked off with cross-shaped *em jinkong* sticks forbidding further trespass. A 1974 agreement between the company and the community, mediated by the government and the army, was widely considered by the Amungme to have been forced upon them. When a small group of OPM fighters with Amungme leaders walked from neighboring Papua

New Guinea to Akimuga in 1977, many Amungme, including those few with jobs at Freeport, joined with them in an attack upon the mine. The army's response was devastating, putting almost the entire community into flight, with many families spending a year or more hiding in the forest. The 1977 uprising introduced a new era in relations between the community on one hand and the mine and the military on the other, characterized by a profound mutual enmity and distrust.

Although there had been a permanent police presence at the mine since the initial construction phase, the army appears not to have been involved at this early stage in direct conflict with the Amungme community, restricting its activities largely to the suppression of separatist sentiments among better-educated mine workers from other parts of the province and occasional intervention in interclan feuding. After the 1977 uprising, army units stationed around the mine began increasingly to focus their attention upon the community, and numerous Amungme were killed or assaulted in individual incidents during the 1980s. In the aftermath of the discovery of the Grasberg ore body in 1988, army interest in the new economic opportunities on offer in the Freeport area intensified, and a more coordinated campaign of arrest, torture, and disappearance appears to have begun in 1991–1992. In response to a new program of mining exploration across the Central Highlands, riding on the success of Freeport's Grasberg discovery, the OPM launched a series of acts of open defiance during 1994, raising the independence movement's banned "Morning Star" flag in several Amungme settlements. This renewed OPM activity then provoked or legitimated an intensification of the army's terror campaign, and relatives of known OPM members were abducted and executed during the latter half of 1994.

At dawn on the morning of Christmas Day, December 1994, a large crowd of Amungme and other highlanders raised the Morning Star flag on a small hill in the Wa Valley, overlooking the mining town of Tembagapura, a peaceful but astonishing act of defiance. The first troops to approach the gathering opened fire, wounding two men, one of whom, Naranebelan Anggaibak, was then captured. Reports from Amungme eyewitnesses detailed how Naranebelan was dragged behind a car by a noose around his neck to the army checkpoint near the Amungme settlement of Banti, a short distance from Tembagapura. By the time he was delivered to the Banti checkpoint, he was dead, and his body was then suspended by the ankles from a post opposite the checkpoint. Banti villagers, forced to file past the corpse on their way to church services that morning, were taunted by the surrounding soldiers asking whose pig, whose dog, this was. Naranebelan's relatives were refused permission to take the corpse for burial, and it was removed and probably thrown by the army into a steep ravine along the road between Tembagapura and Timika, where other bodies have been disposed of in a similar manner. That day, and for the next few weeks, terrible violence was unleashed on the community, as individuals were killed in public, others disappeared, and leading men and women in the Amungme community were arrested, held in shipping containers, and tortured.[3] As the army rushed in reinforcements, it also expanded its area of operations to the more distant Amungme settlements, establishing garrisons in each of the valleys. A pattern developed of intermittent outbreaks of violence coupled with periods of uneasy calm, which continued for more than three years until 1998.[4]

A number of questions hang over some of the incidents that were used to justify the increase in military numbers around Freeport, from a unit of less than 100 troops before 1977 to at least 1,850 soldiers by 1996. Shootings of Freeport workers along the road between Tembagapura and Timika in late 1994, attributed to the OPM, were almost certainly the work of army units on "black operations," designed to create a climate of fear and place pressure on the mining company to fund the presence of more troops. Likewise, a series of riots in Tembagapura and Timika over three days in March 1996, reported around the world and widely attributed at the time to Amungme dissatisfaction with the company, appears to have been instigated and directed by troops in civilian clothing carrying walkie-talkies.[5] Again, the company's response was to welcome further reinforcements and submit to the financial costs involved.

After 1996, each of the military's different services insisted on being represented in the Timika area, and police, army, navy, air force, and even armored car units have been stationed there, largely at Freeport expense. The key units, in terms of confrontation with the Amungme community, are the red-bereted elite troops of the Special Forces Command (Kopassus); a unit of the army's Strategic Reserve (Kostrad) tasked specifically with the defense of the mine as a designated National Asset; the poorly trained Territorial troops (Korem) of the regional Trikora Military Command; and the elite paramilitary Police Mobile Brigade (Brimob). Competing business interests, legal and illegal, operated by each of these different units, have led to frequent clashes among them, often resulting in firefights and the loss of life.[6] This summary history of violence at Freeport establishes the range of actors in the area and supplies a context within which the place of violence in the landscape and its iconographic representation can be addressed.

THE CORPSE AS SIGN, AND THE SIGN OF THE CORPSE

Violence, a seemingly infinite category of activity and effect, assumes a more focused role in the context of a culture of terror. Elsewhere I advance the argument that violence and terror are mutually supportive, with violence at its most effective when enacted in a climate of terror, and terror continues and extends the work of violence (Ballard 2000). Though Taussig (1987:51f) alerted us to the dangers of seeking to distinguish the rational from the irrational in accounting for terror, the maintenance of a culture of terror involves a degree of conscious coordination and planning—a structured *mise-en-scène*, or material organization of the act of representation. There is no requirement that the actual agents of terror be capable of articulating this structure to fulfill their role; military hierarchies of command are designed precisely to distance the infliction of pain from its conception. But the patterned form of military or paramilitary campaigns of terror, and the parallel reproduction of highly elaborate and specialized forms of torture imply a network for the communication of techniques and technologies of terror that matches the traffic in more conventional forms of military knowledge and hardware (Nordstrom 1995).

Drawing on Elaine Scarry's *The Body in Pain* (1985), I propose that the deliberate enactment of terror upon a community follows closely her distinction of the three central features of the torture of individuals: the infliction of pain "in ever-intensifying ways"; the objectification of pain, in which the effects of pain are rendered visible for other observers; and the denial of the objectified pain, an act that is itself construed as evidence of the power of the torturer. In much the same way, communities

that become the target of campaigns of terror are subjected to a series of increasingly graphic forms of violence, in which the effects of violence are objectified and displayed before the community. The power of the state is then doubly confirmed by its capacity to deny the violence and to call into question the very absence of the disappeared.

James Siegel (1998) argued convincingly that Suharto's New Order regime employed violence along precisely these lines during a campaign to eliminate urban gangs in the capital of Jakarta during the 1980s. Beyond the immediate objective of creating the appearance of order for an international audience, Suharto sought to communicate to his political rivals and to the nation at large the extent of his control, both of events and of their meaning. The corpses of young men, bearing the tattoos associated with gang membership, assumed the function of signs, "left in the streets [to] keep the moment of disappearance from life vivid, retaining that moment in the present" (Siegel 1998:111). At Freeport, the steady increase in the frequency of violence during the early 1990s was matched by the development of an increasing sophistication in the manner in which bodies, parts of bodies, and the signs of bodies were deployed to amplify the effects of violence and thus to brand the brief eruptions of violence upon the communal memory. If, as in Jakarta, these corpses have functioned as signs of death for the Amungme community, the Amungme landscape has also been seeded with signs that themselves recall the corpses.

In common with most rural Melanesian communities (Ballard 1997), Amungme ground their identity upon the familiar features of the surrounding landscape, endowing it with a cosmography in which the land and the people account for one another's presence. Amungme land and Amungme people were allocated to each other in the foundational epoch recounted in myths. Mountains assume a particular cosmological significance as the final residences of the spirits of patrilineal ancestors, and each peak is thus associated with a specific patriclan.[7] In addition to this "mountain orientation" (Ellenberger 1996:146) mediated by ancestral spirits, Amungme cosmography conceives of a landscape possessed and inhabited by female earth spirits. The most significant of these female spirits, Tu Ni Me Ni, represents the ultimate locus of fertility in the Amungme cosmos, the source both of nourishment and of retribution, propitiated during periods of stress through a network of sites such as pools and pandanus groves. She is often described as embodying the landscape, with her head in the mountains, her breasts and womb in the valleys, and her legs stretched out toward the distant coast (see, for example, Beanal 1997).

Mining in the Amungme landscape has thus been quite literally an assault upon the body of Amungme belief and the foundations of Amungme identity. Individual peaks, such as the Grasberg and Ertsberg, have been leveled or reduced to deep pits, lakes associated with earth spirits filled in with mine waste, and sacred sites in the valleys destroyed in the construction of the mine's infrastructure. Because the Amungme clearly link the activities of the mining company and the presence of the army, referring to the latter as "Freeport's savage dogs" (*anjing galak dari Freeport*), the company's assault on the landscape is perceived as another facet of the army's assault upon the community. Freeport's ebullient chief executive officer, Jim-Bob Moffett, has done little to counter this perception in describing the Grasberg ore body in corporeal terms, as "a volcano that's been decapitated by nature, [where] we're mining the esophagus, if you will" (Project Underground 1998:14).

The Amungme landscape operates as a sign in and of itself, inconceivable without the knowledge and presence of the Amungme community. Memory supplies the necessary markers of identity and ownership, in associating particular locations with former settlement or garden sites and with all of the remembered incidents of a community's history. The crossed *em jinkong* sticks placed around the mine by Amungme during construction are of a universal form, indistinguishable one from another, indicating the displeasure of the owner at finding evidence of trespass in a garden or along a path.[8] Within small-scale communities such as the Amungme hamlets of the highlands, the ownership of a specified area of land, although not immune from dispute, requires no physical signs that proclaim an individual's identity; the presence of trees and gardens identifiable as the produce of the owners or their kin, or the capacity to correctly identify and name the features of the landscape, are sufficient in themselves.

The land acquires significance through a dense microhistory of these acts of naming, acts that include the use of a location for activities such as gardening, hunting, settlement, or ritual performance. Violence and death are already present in this named landscape, emplotted in the form of burial sites or the locations of deaths during interclan wars. But these are deaths that have been rendered meaningful for Amungme through a range of conventional practices, including mortuary payments and war compensation, and the proper interment of bodies. In contrast, uncompensated or unreciprocated deaths at the hands of the military, particularly where the bodies have not been made available, have produced a disordered landscape of "corpses out of place" (Warren 1993:31).

In the absence of corpses, which Amungme relatives are often refused permission to bury (as in the case of Naranebelan's body), the sites of murder or of the initial display of the body assume a particular threat of their own. If the "sight of torture is itself a torture," as Fabri (1995:150) observed of the creation of violence as a spectacle in Guatemala, it is equally the case that the *site* of torture or other violence can be refashioned as an instrument of terror. The passage of Naranebelan's body, from the hillside where he was captured, via the road along which he was dragged, to the post (which still stands), and thence to the ravine where he is presumed to lie, has endowed these locations with an unprecedented and terrifying significance for the Amungme of the Wa Valley. The growing number of these sites of murder, of torture, of arrest, and of the disposal of bodies is sufficient to form a topographic grid or layer composed of the memories of these events of unaccountable violence. Amungme people traversing the landscape by foot or in vehicles point out these locations, recounting and reliving the events.

An additional and corresponding layer of significance has recently been draped over the landscape, this time in the form of a series of graphic images engraved and painted by the security forces. During the most recent phase of violence, in the 1990s, these images first appeared around the vicinity of the army and police posts, initially in the form of the insignia of units stationed there, as bored soldiers and police passed their time reproducing their divisional emblems on walls or on prominent boulders, an activity common enough to military units everywhere. In late 1996, the elite Kopassus unit stationed at Tsinga village carefully engraved and painted a large rock in front of their mess with a skull bearing their distinctive red beret (Figure 2.1). A similar image of a skull, this time weeping blood from the cracks around the face—like a corpse trapped in an eternal torture, portending perhaps the capacity of



FIGURE 2.1. Kopassus (Special Forces) insignia engraved and painted onto a boulder at Tsinga village (photo taken in 1997). The acronym RPKAD beneath the skull stands for "Regimen Para Komando Angkatan Dara," the precursor to Kopassus during the period 1955–1971, famous for its role in the invasion of Dutch New Guinea; the wings and anchor indicate the airborne and naval capabilities of this elite unit.

the state to pursue people beyond death—appeared later in front of the army post at Banti. For the illiterate majority of the Amungme population, for whom the unit names and insignia are not always intelligible, the meaning of the skulls is an unmistakable warning of the fate of those who resist the army.

To mark the Indonesian Independence Day celebrations in August 1997, the road from Tembagapura town down to the Amungme village of Banti was adorned with a pair of columns, forming a ceremonial gateway to the village. On three of the four faces of either column an anonymous artist had produced the requisite multicolored images of the military heirs of the Indonesian revolution, dropping by parachute into a hell of explosions, piloting fighter jets diving with guns blazing, or driving a tank across a battlefield (Figure 2.2). The mine's tramway was depicted, as were several curious images, including a soldier wearing a badge with the acronym AEA used by Freeport's medical services contractors (who ran a clinic in the village of Banti), and a jar enigmatically marked "Ovaltine." Above the tank rose the figure of a bare-chested Amungme warrior, patriotically sporting a red-and-white headband and raising a clenched fist, with an Indonesian red-and-white (*merah putih*) flag in the other hand (Figure 2.3).



FIGURE 2.2. Indonesian Independence Day gateway erected on the road to Banti village, 1997.

FIGURE 2.3. Indonesian Independence Day gateway erected on the road to Banti village, 1997.

These are images with complex genealogies and an equally intricate communicative intent. As statements of the permanent presence and eternal vigilance of the military, they signal the army's goal of pervading all aspects of Amungme life, much as it monitors the movements of each individual through the issue of passes for travel between valleys and enters the classroom through the ubiquitous presence of mock rifles carved from wood with which pupils conduct their compulsory marching exercises. Scarry (1985:52) identified torture's goal of fashioning a "totality of pain" for the victim, and the intention for terror is perhaps a similar aspiration to a totality of representation, in which all aspects of a community's life come to reflect the will of the state.

For Amungme, the images are doubly potent through their capacity to summon up the memory of violent events and thus the enduring threat of further violence. The images themselves are almost invariably violent, as illustrated by the use of skulls and the themes of the panels of the Independence Day gateway. However, the particular significance of army unit designations and the ideological import of Independence Day celebrations and their symbolism more generally are not clearly recognized by many Amungme. Instead, the violence that is summoned up for Amungme through these images is the specific violence of the past enacted upon kin and neighbors, and of the perpetual threat of its resurgence. Where the bodies of the murdered, the tortured, and the disappeared are not made available for mourning and for appropriate reception in the Amungme landscape and memory, the army's graffiti come to stand instead for the absent corpses: as signs of corpses that are themselves signs of the power of the state.

If these images are evidently directed in part toward the Amungme, they also serve to speak to other audiences in quite different ways. During 1998, a further addition to this landscape of novel images was a rash of graffiti painted by the elite Police Mobile Brigade (Brimob). In large, white lettering, the acronym BRIMOB appeared on cliff faces and boulders along the length of the road between Tembagapura and the Amungme settlement of Banti (Figure 2.4). Because much of the previous unit-specific imagery had been confined to the immediate vicinity of army and police posts, this was something of a departure in its attempt to mark out a new territory for inscription; the sole Brimob post in the valley was one positioned above the gate at the bottom end of Tembagapura, controlling access from the Banti road. Unadorned by any attempt at

FIGURE 2.4. Brimob (Police Mobile Brigade) graffiti on the Tembagapura-Banti road, 1998.

representation beyond the simple reproduction of the acronym, the Brimob graffiti assumed a literate audience. However, literate Amungme read this graffiti not as a warning to them, but as an unmistakable sign of interunit rivalry: a territorial challenge by the elite police to the Kostrad army units, much envied for their access as Freeport's official guards to seemingly unlimited company largesse and expanded opportunities for graft and theft from the mine and the company's townships.

One of the enduring features of the long history of violence at Freeport has been the question mark about the company's complicity in the army's atrocities, an accusation leveled at Freeport by both the Amungme community and international observers, but denied by the company. Although this is not the place to offer definitive pronouncements on such a complex topic, it is valid to seek to understand the role of Freeport staff as another potential audience for the army's graffiti. Here, perhaps, the issue of complicity between image and audience is brought most powerfully into focus, because staff whom I questioned about the emergence of the army and police insignia appeared genuinely ignorant of their presence. The army and police pose no threat to their existence, and Freeport staff have rarely been the targets of violence. Only a small proportion of the staff ventures down to Banti, or to remote villages such as Tsinga, and thus have the opportunity of encountering these images, suggesting that the army has observed fairly carefully the principle of "line of sight." But those Freeport staff who are exposed to the graffiti are also largely unaffected by them, viewing them as an integral part of the social landscape. Though these graffiti function as land mines for the memories of passing Amungme, Freeport staff can apparently move freely among them without triggering their charges. However, surrounded as they are by a community subjected to more than two decades of state violence, the ability of Freeport staff to remain oblivious to the potential significance of army graffiti is itself a form of knowledge, a will to ignorance.[9]

RESISTANCE (*AVANT LA LETTRE*)

What Taussig referred to as "the problem of writing effectively against terror" (1987:3) is the risk we run of representing terror as a rational economy of behavior, and thus of extending its reach. This is to contribute, in effect, to the torturer's goal of creating a totality of representation, in which the efficacy of torture or terror is made evident through the fashioning of the victim (or the writer) as another mouth for the truths of the state. A common response to this problem has been to perceive, in even the most mundane actions, the seeds of a coherent project of resistance (Ortner 1995). Inspired by a commendable wish to portray communities as agents in their own right and not simply as passive consumers of the truths of others, studies of resistance tend to focus on conscious and unambiguous acts of reaction to domination (see also McNiven and Russell, this volume).

Without diminishing the scale or dismissing the impact of the army's onslaught on the community and the mine's assault on the land, it must also be observed that the Amungme have succumbed neither to the violence nor to the terror. As a community, Amungme have continued to escape the circle of mirrors, the totality of representation that I identify as the goal of the state operating through its security forces, and their success in this evasion can perhaps be characterized as a form of resistance. But to describe the various ways in which this is effected as a single, coherent strategy of resistance is to obscure several complex operations of power and to conflate conscious and unconscious acts and their intended and unintended consequences. At one level there appears to be a curious silence on the part of the Amungme in response to the iconography of terror described here. Thus far there has been no countericonography—no Amungme graffiti and very little graphic art—to challenge the images deployed around the Freeport mine by the security forces. The one exception to this observation is the raising of the Morning Star flag, a singular act of defiance that has historically provoked violent repression from the army and police. But Amungme have conventionally disputed identity and land through a politics of residence and of naming, rather than through an iconography of graphic symbols denoting status. Amungme resistance might be said to revolve around an insistence on the primordial link between Amungme and their landscape, and a confidence that Amungme people have a privileged access to the meaning of the land and the knowledge of its names. In linking the violence of the security forces to the presence of the mine, Amungme accord a central role in their analysis of terror to the mine's assault on their land. It is no accident, in this light, that one of the principal demands of Amungme leaders during recent negotiations with Freeport has been the restoration of Amungme names to those elements of the landscape whose significance has been obscured by Indonesian or American terms.

Amungme resistance has also drawn strength from the failure of the state to incorporate the community successfully in a symbolic relationship characterized by domination through the imposition of a common graphic vocabulary or visual economy. The symbols and imagery of the state, which are deployed to such effect elsewhere in Indonesia (Siegel 1998), are often imperfectly recognized and received by Amungme and thus limited in their

effect. Bourdieu (2000:175) observed that the efficacy of symbolic domination rests upon the capacity of the state, through lengthy processes of inculcation and incorporation, to naturalize "common symbolic forms of thought, social frames of perception, understanding or memory."[10] Where these familiarizing conditions are not met—where the symbolism of national Independence Day is poorly understood, for example—the "submission" of the dominated cannot be secured. The state's frustration at the incomplete incorporation of the Amungme—their failure to recognize and correctly interpret their symbolic relationship—sets the stage for recourse to physical violence, which has the effect of still further alienating the Amungme. If the Indonesian state's strategic marginalization of communities such as the Amungme is a theater of statehood directed principally toward the cosmopolitan centers of Java (Tsing 1993), it is a strategy that also serves to undermine the efficacy of the state's symbolic dominance, through its failure to inculcate the logic and the grammar of domination among these marginalized communities.

NOTES

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1. Formerly known as Irian Jaya, a name widely associated with the New Order regime of former President Suharto, Indonesia's easternmost province was renamed "Papua" in January 2000 by the newly elected president, Abdurrahman Wahid (however, Indonesia's Parliament had not yet ratified this change by January 2001). Though Papuans now refer to their territory as West Papua, Irian Jaya is used in this chapter to retain the historical flavor of the New Order regime under which these events took place.

2. The lowland portion of the Freeport mining lease is owned largely by Kamoro-speaking communities (though this ownership is not recognized by the state) (Widjojo 1997). The apparent absence of overt conflict between Kamoro people and the army poses intriguing questions, which space does not permit me to explore here, about the nature of resistance under different historical and cultural conditions.

3. A preliminary but incomplete account of these events is given in a report published by the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA 1995).

4. Details of the long list of massacres and other abuses of basic human rights during 1994–1998 are beyond the scope of this chapter, but have been described in a series of reports by church groups and other nongovernment organizations (see ACFOA 1995; Catholic Church of Jayapura 1995; ELSHAM 1997, 1999; Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights and the Institute for Human Rights Studies and Advocacy. 1999).

5. In fact, Amungme appear to have been only marginally involved in these riots, which largely involved migrants from other parts of Irian Jaya.

6. See Robinson (1998) and Kammen (1999) for further discussions of the role of business interests in similar conflicts within the security forces in Aceh and East Timor.

7. Ellenberger's (1996:144f) detailed account of the role of mountains in the beliefs of northern Amungme, or Damal, accords closely with my own more limited enquiries among Amungme.

8. The Amungme assumption of the transparency of the message of the *em jinkong* sticks placed around the mine during the construction phase, as claims by landowners prohibiting further trespass, was sorely misplaced. Freeport workers read the sticks instead as "hex sticks" (see, for example, Wilson 1981:168), designed to bring misfortune down upon the mine—evidence, for the miners, both of the "primitive" mentality of the Amungme and of their fundamental opposition to the entire mining project.

9. Elsewhere (Ballard 2000) I address in more detail the question of Freeport's apparent "will to ignorance" and also describe how the army has sought to attract Freeport's attention more directly and to inculcate a sense of terror in the company.

10. "Symbolic violence is the coercion which is set up only through the consent that the dominated cannot fail to give to the dominator (and therefore the domination) when their understanding of the situation and relation can only use instruments of knowledge that they have in common with the dominator, which, being merely the incorporated form of the structure of the relation of domination, make this relation appear as natural" (Bourdieu 2000:170).

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THREE

Ritual Response

Place Marking and the Colonial Frontier in Australia

IAN J. MCNIVEN AND LYNETTE RUSSELL

It is time that Australian historians sought to understand the Aboriginal response to conquest and dispossession. To do so it is necessary to seriously explore *the farside of the frontier* and the underside of the caste barrier.
HENRY REYNOLDS, *Aboriginal-European Contact History* (EMPHASIS ADDED)

Historical scholarship over the past two decades has seen a growing awareness of colonial processes and in particular the dramatic and often violent events of the colonial frontier. For Indigenous people, depopulation and dispossession are all-too-familiar themes of colonialism. In Australia, rewriting these violent themes into colonial history has undermined European narratives of colonialism by introducing Indigenous stories of agency, resistance, and survival from the frontier. Historical sources alone are, however, inadequate for the task of exploring activities on the far side of the frontier, because without Indigenous voices the process of rewriting will continue to be a colonial enterprise, appropriating, suffocating, ignoring, or otherwise marginalizing non-European views and experiences of the past.

Australian archaeologists have begun to make contributions to writing so-called "alternative" contact histories. In this connection, Birmingham (1992:178) identified two key questions that guide research on Australian contact sites: "First, how is the documentary record confirmed, complemented or challenged by the archaeological evidence? Second, what further questions arise from queries or gaps in the documentary record for which the archaeologist is likely to find answers?"

In her own study, Birmingham (1992) found that Aboriginal Tasmanians at Wybalenna reserve resisted colonial domination by strategically resisting different aspects of European culture. Related studies have also investigated accommodation and resistance at other early-European frontier sites such as homesteads (Murray 1993) and shepherd's huts (Wolski 2000). On a narrower scale, investigations have shown the social, economic, and perhaps even ceremonial circumstances in which Aboriginal people appropriated, enculturated, and used items of