


New Zealand Defence Policy Under Labour.

Peter Jennings.

A sub-thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
degree of Master of Arts (International Relations)
in the Department of International Relations,
Research School of Pacific Studies,
Australian National University,
Canberra.

October 1987.

This sub-thesis is my own work.
All sources used have been acknowledged.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'P.A.D. Jennings', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

P.A.D. Jennings.

Practical co-operation is the life blood
of any defence relationship...

(Annual Report of the NZ Ministry
of Defence, March 1987. p. 8.)

Contents.

	Page.
Acknowledgements	v
List of Tables	vi
Chapter One. Introduction: Scope and Aims.	1
Chapter Two. The Costs of the ANZUS Split to the Armed Forces.	6
Chapter Three. "Greater Self-Reliance".	57
Chapter Four. The ANZAC Relationship.	82
Chapter Five. Conclusion.	108
Interviews	111
Bibliography	114
Appendices	
One: AFNZ contact with the United States' Department of Defence prior to the ANZUS split.	126
Two: AFNZ weapons systems and platforms: An inventory and analysis of capabilities.	128

Acknowledgements.

I would like to thank the Australian-American Educational Foundation and the Fulbright Committee for providing me with a scholarship to travel to the Centre for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Boston, where I began research on New Zealand's ANZUS relations. The Department of International Relations at the ANU provided funding towards a study-trip to Wellington at the beginning of 1987. Mr Denis McLean, the Secretary of the New Zealand Ministry of Defence made the library facilities of the Ministry available to me, and Mr John Crawford, the Ministry Historian was most helpful in providing information and arranging interviews within the Ministry. The New Zealand High Commission in Canberra dealt quickly and efficiently with dozens of requests for information. My supervisors, Mr Alan Burnett and Dr Ross Babbage, provided encouragement and useful criticism throughout. Alan patiently explained the New Zealand psyche to me. Peter and Tess Samuel in Washington and Sue Galvin in Wellington gave me a wonderful introduction to their cities. Andrew Mack and Ashley Ekins and Dr Myles Robertson read an earlier draft of sections of this thesis and made some valuable comment.

Many New Zealanders in the armed forces and the Defence and Foreign Affairs Ministries spoke openly and at length to me about the Labour government defence policy. I have not identified them by name in footnotes, as many of these conversations were confidential. Although the views expressed in this thesis are my own, a great debt of gratitude is owed to these defence professionals who shared their insights with me.

This thesis is dedicated with love to my parents.

List of Tables.

	Page.
1. Overseas exercises - Man days of training: 1983-84 to 1986-87.	12
2. Frigate days in company with foreign ships: 1983-84 to 1986-87.	12
3. RNZAF aircraft days overseas: 1983-84 to 1986-87.	13
4. a) New Zealand defence personnel engaged in overseas training: 1980-81 to 1986-87.	16
b) New Zealand personnel on overseas exchanges: 1983-84 to 1986-87.	16
c) New Zealand personnel on routine overseas postings 1983-84 to 1988-87.	17
5. Maritime claims/EEZ's for the South Pacific Forum States.	37
6. Release rates from the AFNZ as a percentage of total establishment: 1984 and 1985.	40
7. Effective RNZAF and RNZN personnel: 1983 to 1986.	41
8. New Zealand defence co-operation with the United States: Mid-1987.	48
9. New Zealand defence policy objectives as stated in the 1987 Review (p. 31), compared with the 1983 Review (pp. 19-20).	62
10. a) The armed forces of New Zealand as at mid- 1984.	65
b) Developments in AFNZ force structure and operational policy under the Labour government: 1984 to September 1987.	66-7

Chapter One.

Introduction: Scope and Aims.

The real weakness of New Zealand is the absence of any well informed and coercive public opinion on external problems.

(William Downie Stewart, 1913¹)

It is now two and a half years since the United States suspended military co-operation with the Armed Forces of New Zealand (AFNZ) following the Labour Government's refusal to grant port-access to the **USS Buchanan** in January 1985. In this thesis I propose to study the consequences of the breakdown for the AFNZ with a view to establishing exactly what areas of co-operation have been affected and the significance this has for the professionalism and capability of the Services. Thus far, very few public studies have been made of the direct military costs of the ANZUS rift.² Most attention has been focused on the state of political relations between the ANZUS powers.³ It is however, impossible to make a fully informed judgement about the merits of the Government's present defence policy of developing closer relations with Australia in the context of what it claims is a more self-reliant defence posture without some understanding of the problems that policy seeks to remedy. Accordingly, I hope to present that necessary background, and from this point will go on to discuss the extent to which the Government's defence policy addresses itself to the problems generated by the rift with the United States.

This thesis does not attempt to study the political context of defence decision making in New Zealand, nor does it examine the motivations behind those groups which influence the making of defence policy. It is not concerned with the Labour Government's

anti-nuclear policy save in so far as it has had an influence on the direction of defence issues. Finally, it does not attempt to examine the wider concept of New Zealand's security interests as distinct from its immediate defence concerns.⁴ At its broadest level, New Zealand's security is dependent on global stability, on the continuity of its trading interests and on its political and diplomatic relationships with countries not only in the region but further afield in Asia and the northern hemisphere. New Zealand may be able to adequately deal with local sources of military threat, but still not be secure according to a wider definition of its interests.

Any comprehensive study of New Zealand defence policy would have to take these things into account. However there is some merit in undertaking a more limited study of the strictly military aspects of the country's security concerns. There has been a tendency in New Zealand to blur the distinctions between the defence and security aspects of Government policy. The result has been that the great bulk of contributions to the post-ANZUS security debate have focused on the wider questions of New Zealand's place in global security, and discussed the relative merits of alignment, non-alignment and neutrality as the basis of defence policy.⁵ While there is general agreement that the AFNZ need to focus on the South West Pacific as its area of operations, there has been almost no public debate about the relative merits of military doctrine and weapons platforms which could operate in the region. Outside of the Civil Service security community one can say with no exaggeration that academia, journalism and the peace movement have produced perhaps less than half-a-dozen people who would have more than a passing acquaintance with the operational concepts and weapons systems used by the AFNZ.⁶ One must, however, have a knowledge of these things in order to assess the military (as distinct from the political) efficacy of Labour Government defence policy. Accordingly, a study of the military component of security policy will be a useful addition to the defence debate in New Zealand. It is needed to provide a more concrete basis for analysing the Government's initiatives in this area.

The major focus of this work is therefore on defence policy narrowly defined in terms of New Zealand's military capability, force structure and operational doctrines. Three discrete but related issues are examined. First, I assess the extent to which the AFNZ have been adversely affected by the ending of US military co-operation. Second, I examine the Government's policy of developing 'greater self-reliance' within the AFNZ. Here, one must ask what this has meant in terms of the development of AFNZ force structure and operational doctrine. How different is the policy from the defence strategy outlined by the previous National Government of 1975 to 1984? What level of operational capability has the policy given the Armed Forces? Finally, to what extent has the policy helped to overcome the losses sustained with the ending of defence co-operation with the United States?

Third, I examine the second plank of Labour Government policy - namely the development of a closer defence relationship with Australia. I ask if the relationship has, in fact grown closer, and examine the limits to defence co-operation which may impede a closer ANZAC association.

It is concluded that the AFNZ have indeed suffered a loss of operational capability as a result of the cessation of US military co-operation. Further, although the Government has embarked on an ambitious programme of capital equipment replacement, its policy of developing greater self-reliance in the Armed Forces has largely failed. AFNZ capability for carrying out independent operations in the South Pacific has, if anything, somewhat declined since the ANZUS rift. There is a gap between the Services' operational doctrines and capabilities which has largely been brought about by the loss of various elements of defence co-operation with the United States. The defence relationship with Australia continues to be close and covers almost all areas of military endeavour. However a number of operational as well as political constraints have prevented the relationship from growing closer - the original aim of the Labour Government. I conclude that these factors may, in time, see the relationship moving further apart.

In some areas there have been advances in AFNZ capabilities, most notably in the acquisition of equipment which has augmented the existing force structure. However, on balance, my overall conclusion is that the Labour Government has failed to put forward a viable defence policy as a replacement for AFNZ participation in an operational ANZUS alliance. The fact that the government has not been widely criticised for this within New Zealand is testimony to the great lack of critical research and writing on defence policy in that country.

Finally, this thesis may be taken as a case study of the difficulties encountered by small countries in trying to maintain highly proficient defence forces within strict budgetary limits. The New Zealand case illustrates the dilemmas faced by many of the smaller NATO nations, where limited economic resources make it a very difficult task to refurbish or re-equip with expensive and complex modern weapons-systems and platforms.

Footnotes.

A great deal of the material for this thesis was gathered from interviews with defence and foreign affairs officials from the three ANZUS countries. Almost all of these interviews were conducted on a confidential basis. Much of the information used here would not otherwise have been made available. I have endeavoured to check such material through more than one source, and where possible have cited written material in support of information taken from interviews.

1 William Downie Stewart, "Introduction", Andre Siegfried, *Democracy in New Zealand*. (1913) (Victoria University Press with Price Milburn, Wellington, Second Edition, 1982.) p. xxiii.

2 An exception to this is Thomas-Durell Young, "New Zealand Defence Policy Under Labour", *Naval War College Review*. Vol. 39/3 May-June 1986. pp. 22-34. Young attempted an update of this article in, "New Zealand: Australia can't fill US shoes", *Pacific Defence Reporter*. June 1987. pp. 49-50; 55. However, this article omitted a significant amount of information available in Mid-1987, and was inaccurate in some respects.

3 See, for example, Roderic Alley, "ANZUS and the Nuclear Issue", in Jonathan Boston and Martin Holland (Ed's), *The Fourth Labour Government: Radical politics in New Zealand*. (OUP, Auckland, 1987) pp. 198-213; Ramesh Thakur, "Towards a nuclear free New Zealand?", *Asia-Pacific Community*. Vol. 27 Winter 1985. pp. 16-27; Andrew Mack, "Crisis in the Other Alliance", *World Policy Journal*. Summer 1986, pp. 447-472; Henry Albinski, "ANZUS: American foreign policy and the ANZUS problem", *Current Affairs Bulletin*. September 1985. pp. 14-24.

4 For an analysis of the conceptual difference between 'defence' and 'security' as it affects New Zealand see, Air Marshal (Rtd.) Sir Ewan Jamieson, *New Zealand Defence Policy: A Professional Viewpoint*. Unpublished paper given at the Seminar on New

Zealand Defence Policy, Institute of Policy Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, 9 December 1986.

⁵ Thus, for example, the most significant academic contribution - to date - to the debate on New Zealand security policy concerned itself almost wholly with the relative merits of alignment, non-alignment and neutrality, and had almost no discussion on AFNZ force structure and doctrinal requirements. See, Ramesh Thakur, *In Defence of New Zealand: Foreign Policy Choices in the Nuclear Age*. (Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1986). Similarly, it was found by the Defence Committee of Enquiry - established by the Lange Government to assess public opinion on defence issues - that only a tiny fraction of the 4,182 written submissions they received dealt with the military requirements of the AFNZ. Comment based in interviews with members of the Committee Secretariat. See, Defence Committee of Enquiry, *Defence and Security: What New Zealanders Want*. (Government Printer, Wellington, 1986).

⁶ There is no equivalent in New Zealand of the Australian Strategic and Defence Studies Centre or the Peace Research Centre, both at the Australian National University in Canberra. A number of academics write on foreign policy and defence related issues, however, of all of these, it can be said that their training and primary interest is in international relations rather than strategic and defence studies. To date, only one journalist, Mr Roger Mackey of the *Evening Post* (Wellington) specialises in defence writing. Others write on the field but tend to cover defence as specialised political commentators. In the Peace Movement, Dr Peter Wills of Scientists Against Nuclear Arms (SANA) in Auckland, and Mr Owen Wilkes of Peace Movement Aotearoa and Peter Winsley of the Labour Party Peace and Justice Forum and the Just Defence organisation in Wellington have written on force structure and AFNZ doctrinal issues. The quality of their analysis, however, can at best be described as uneven.

Chapter Two.

The Costs of the ANZUS Split to the Armed Forces.

It has been and will remain vital for the professionalism of small armed forces such as ours that they maintain effective interaction with larger partners. Only in this way will we be able to be confident of our own capacities.

Defence Minister Frank O'Flynn.
May 7, 1985. (1)

New Zealand's status in relation to the United States so far as it effects the Armed Forces, although it is described as a 'friendly nation', is lower down the scale than any nation that I could identify this side of Albania.

High Ranking MOD Official.
(Private interview)

The US/NZ defence relationship prior to February 1984 was second only to the ANZAC relationship in terms of its close and comprehensive nature. Arguably it was more important to the New Zealanders than the Australian link because of the access it gave them to high quality intelligence, equipment, logistic supply arrangements, as well as exercise and training programmes conducted according to current operational procedure and military doctrine. Although the US/NZ defence link dates back to the 1951 ANZUS Treaty (and, operationally, earlier), extensive military co-operation really only dates from the early 1970's². Co-operation since then has expanded to take in literally every aspect of military activity of concern to New Zealand. The extent of co-operation has ranged from the training of large elements of the AFNZ in US-sponsored exercises, to joint research on sonar

technology, and from the supply of high technology avionics systems and weapons fits for the Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF), to the supply of manuals of operational procedure for naval exercises.

In the 1970's, the American link quickly supplanted that of the United Kingdom as the latter dramatically cut its defence commitments from East of the Suez Canal. The American influence dominated many aspects of New Zealand military thinking, which was mainly geared for a collective security role within ANZUS. The close relation with the US was reinforced by New Zealand's links with Australia, which also looked to America for exercise experience, weapons systems intelligence and so forth.

By 1985 there were many dozens of bilateral or multilateral agreements linking New Zealand to the United States in almost every conceivable area of military activity.³ Informal links between the Services and the military and intelligence bureaucracies of the two countries made the relationship even closer. New Zealand officials enjoyed prompt, frequent and easy access to their Pentagon counterparts which went far beyond the provisions of written agreements. Indeed, when US officials reviewed the relationship in early 1985 as a prelude to cutting back on co-operation, they were reportedly surprised at the extent to which New Zealand's informal links with the US Defence Department were providing them with access to information and influence in Pentagon policy making which was not only greater than that provided for in formal treaties, but also more than senior American officials felt appropriate.⁴ In sum, New Zealand as a member of the English speaking Anglo-Saxon 'Club' of nations (usually taken to mean the USA, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) enjoyed a defence relationship with the United States more intimate than many NATO countries.⁵

This informal co-operative relationship was the first casualty of the split in ANZUS relations. Post-February 1985 all forms of US/NZ military contact have taken place through formal channels.⁶ This has had the effect of slowing down the pace at which NZ might receive information or material from the US, and in general has placed the conduct of

military relations between the two under very close scrutiny. Defence Liaison staff in the NZ Embassy in Washington and Defence Central in Wellington no longer have the opportunity to deal directly with their opposite numbers in the Pentagon or the various intelligence agencies.⁷ What had been a comfortable relationship based on personal familiarity has now been 'bureaucratised', and therefore much less effective. For New Zealand, this may be the most significant cost of the break in the alliance. Should ANZUS co-operation ever resume it seems unlikely that New Zealand would ever be able to regain the sort of easy defence relationship it enjoyed prior to February 1985. That relationship was built on an atmosphere of mutual trust which, having been lost, will take longer to rebuild than formal defence ties.

What then of the more material consequences of the split for the AFNZ? The major elements of defence co-operation can be broken down into the following areas;

2.1 Combined Military Exercises.

2.2 Training and Personnel Exchanges.

2.3 Operational, Planning and Technical Information Exchange.

2.4 Scientific Co-operation.

2.5 Logistic Supply.

2.6 Intelligence and Maritime Surveillance.

2.7 Manpower Retention.

2.8 Government/Military Relations.

2.9 Status of the ANZUS Treaty.

2.1 Combined Military Exercises.

From the early 1970's, the AFNZ built up a pattern of conducting frequent exercises with US forces either bilaterally, or as part of ANZUS, or wider Western alliance exercises. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) *Briefing Papers* prepared for Mr O'Flynn in July 1984 say this about combined exercises;

All three New Zealand Services depend heavily on participation in ANZUS exercises to build up operational standards and to ensure the compatibility of equipment. The [Royal New Zealand Navy] RNZN for example, is too small to maintain effective operational procedures without operating in an exercise environment with larger forces.... There are no alternative means of obtaining such experience.(8)

A study of the MOD *Annual Reports*⁹ since 1983 reveals that New Zealand was involved in four main sets of exercise programmes; (a) bilateral or multilateral exercises involving the United States, (b) exercises under the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), (c) exercises with Australia and (d) Service exercises in the South Pacific.

(a) Exercises with the United States.

Until February 1985, exercises in this category provided the AFNZ with its main experience of operating with large, technically sophisticated allied units. Typical of these were the RIMPAC maritime exercises which, in 1983 and 1985 involved forces from New Zealand, US, Canada, Japan and Australia operating in Hawaiian waters; or exercise TRIAD, which in October 1984 was the major ANZUS exercise involving air, land and sea forces from all three nations. These exercises were important in providing command experience at levels otherwise not open to small military forces, in a variety of tactical environments and enabling the use of high technology equipment not found in the AFNZ. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) no less than the AFNZ argues that such exercises are necessary to

...maintain and enhance important operational capabilities which make a strategy of self-reliance credible.(10)

In this context, the actual type of exercise carried out is less important than the opportunity it provides for a comparative evaluation of Service capabilities.

(b) FPDA Exercises.

The second exercise category involves those carried out under the Five Power Defence Arrangements. These are usually on a smaller scale and held less frequently throughout the year than ANZUS exercises. Some representative examples are; STARFISH, the annual maritime exercise in the South China Sea; the INTEGRATED AIR

DEFENCE SYSTEM exercise held annually in Malaysia/Singapore airspace; SOUTHERN SAFARI '84, which was typical of ground force exercises, as was LOTHLORIAN '85, involving the New Zealand Ready Reaction Force (RRF) as well as British, Malaysian and Singaporean units. Although useful, these exercises do not provide the same level of training as those involving larger commitments of US forces employing high technology equipment. The RNZN, for example finds exercising with the essentially coastal navies of Malaysia and Singapore to be less exacting than ANZUS exercises. The latter involve the use of more basic manuals of operational instruction and doctrine and less complex communication equipment. FPDA exercises are not considered to test the RNZN to its operational limits.¹¹

(c) Exercises with Australia.

Prior to February 1985, large scale exercises involving elements of the ADF and the AFNZ usually took place alongside US forces under ANZUS arrangements. Bilateral Australia/New Zealand exercises were confined to smaller scale but very frequent exchanges of forces. For example, exercise ANZAC EXCHANGE, which in 1984 saw some ten NZ soldiers serving in Australian army units for periods of one to four months; exercise LEOPARD LEARNER where in the same year five Royal New Zealand Armoured Corps personnel trained with Australian Leopard tanks; regular visits of RNZAF Orion Long Range Maritime Patrol (LRMP) aircraft to conduct Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) training; reciprocal visits of RNZAF A-4's to Williamstown airbase and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Mirages to Ohakea base. This level of contact is very important in developing a close sense of ANZAC co-operation, but it was designed to serve a different purpose from the larger scale ANZUS exercise programme.

(d) Exercises involving the South Pacific Island States.

AFNZ exercise activity in the South Pacific islands may be divided into two categories; those conducted under the Mutual Assistance Program (MAP), which may involve training activity with essentially paramilitary forces such as the Tonga Defence

Service (TDS), or aid related and disaster relief programmes involving, for example, civil construction projects or health work with the local population. On a much different scale are AFNZ tri-service exercises in the region, of which the most notable has been exercise JOINT VENTURE held in the Cook Islands in July/August 1986. According to Defence Minister O'Flynn it was

... the largest deployment of New Zealand forces in the Pacific since the war and the first occasion in which elements of all three services have deployed under national joint force command.(12)

Exercises of this sort are needed to test Service interoperability and AFNZ capability to operate alone in dealing with low level contingencies. However they represent a complement to, not a replacement of, exercises with larger allied forces.

(e) Exercising Post-1985.

Following the **Buchanan** incident all forms of bilateral US/NZ exercises have been cancelled, and the US has refused to participate in multilateral exercises in which New Zealand forces are present. In August 1985 the MOD revealed that it had to cancel or re-structure 22 joint exercises planned for 1985. This represented a loss of some 6000 man days of training time, of which it was possible to recoup some 1,100 days by re-scheduling exercises with Australia, Canada, the UK, Malaysia and Singapore under the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA).¹³ The shortfall of some 4,900 man days in the twelve months from February 1985 represented a serious loss. Tables I to III (over the page) give a more detailed breakdown of overseas exercise patterns as defined by 'man days of training', 'frigate days in company with overseas ships' and 'RNZAF aircraft days overseas', over the last four years.

Table I: Overseas Exercises - Man Days of Training 1983-84 to 1986-87

Name	1983/84	1984/85	1985/86	1986/87
	(Financial Year)			
USA	5,009	9,980	-----	-----
Australia	17,986	5,038	14,860	17,221
UK	6,250	8,660	8,525	7,496
Canada	781	20	404	756
Singapore/ Malaysia	6,422	5,870	9,732	8,852
Fiji	9,022	7,347	3,428	4,628
Western Samoa	-----	125	3,937	479
Cook Islands	-----	-----	139	12,646
Solomon Islands	-----	-----	24	-----
Operation Raleigh	-----	19	688	252
Niue	-----	-----	-----	300
Total USA/Aust/ UK/Canada	30,026	23,698	23,365	25,473
Total Other	15,444	13,361	18,372	27,157
Total	45,470	37,059	41,737	52,630

Source: Doug Kidd, *Questions*, 1986, Question #5.

Table II: Frigate Days in Company with Foreign Ships: 1983-84 to 1986-87

Organisation/ Country	1983/84	1984/85	1985/86	1986/87
	(Financial year)			
USA	10	5	----	----
Australia	47	15	45	55 ¹
UK	105 ²	25	----	----
Canada	----	7	8	----
Singapore	----	----	----	----
Malaysia	----	----	----	----
FPDA	10	10	----	20
ANZUS	40	33	----	----
RIMPAC (exercise)	----	30	----	3
Other	3	----	----	----
Total	215	123	53	78

Notes: 1. Includes 10 days with UK ships.

2. Figures for the UK include Operation Armilla and HMNZS Southland training.

Source: as above for Table I.

Table III: RNZAF Aircraft Days Overseas: 1983-84 to 1986-87.

Country	1983/84	1984/85 (Financial Year)	1985/86	1986/87
USA	105	94	----	----
Australia	325	164	298	332
UK	----	----	10	20
Canada	30	----	10	20
Singapore	31	323	30	40
Malaysia	232	----	168	240
Other	40	197	50	145
Total	763	778	566	797

Note: These figures do not include routine overseas flights, or logistic support flights in support of exercises.

Source: As above for Table I.

The RNZN has been the hardest hit by these prohibitions. Whereas in 1983/84 it spent some 235 days 'in company' with foreign ships, in 1985/86 it had 63 days and in 1986/87, 78 days. Discussions with RNZN sources indicate that the Navy considers this present level of overseas contact to be far below that needed to maintain adequate operational standards. Prior to the ANZUS rift it was held as a rule of thumb that, in any two year cycle, a ship needed to participate in two major and four minor exercises at the minimum in order to maintain peak efficiency.¹⁴ Now the RNZN no longer has access to major ANZUS exercise series such as RIMPAC, or the KANGAROO series of air/land/sea exercises, and is restricted for the most part to Australian and FPDA maritime exercises. There is some concern in the Navy that their already limited exercise contacts with the British Royal Navy (RN) will be ended because of the Government's anti-nuclear policy. As with the US Navy, the RN refuses to confirm or deny whether its ships carry nuclear weapons. Accordingly its vessels no longer visit New Zealand, thus limiting NZ/UK naval contact to FPDA exercises. In July 1986 the RN refused to take part in the annual FINCASTLE TROPHY anti-submarine warfare (ASW) exercises being held in New Zealand waters with Australia, Canada and ships of the RNZN. The British refused to confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons on their Nimrod ASW aircraft. The

exercise was later staged off the Australian coast where the RN took part. However, the U.K. ban does not yet appear to apply to FPDA exercises. In August 1986 elements of the RN and RNZN took part in Exercise STARFISH in the South China Sea.¹⁵

Overall, exercise time for both the Royal New Zealand Airforce (RNZAF) and the Army have increased in the last few years, but there has been a qualitative shift downwards as these two services exercise more with Pacific Island and ASEAN states rather than major Western powers. 1986/87, for example is the first year when the AFNZ has spent more time exercising with these countries than with the US, Australia, UK and Canada. Although exercises in places like the Cook Islands provide necessary experience of regional conditions, the Services in New Zealand are concerned that they are no longer able to make use of the range of skills and equipment only available from exercising with the United States. This has led to fears in the MOD that the loss of the American exercise link is causing a loss of operational capability in the Services. The Ministry told the Parliamentary Select Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence in October 1986 that:

Because of reduced opportunities to exercise and operate alongside major allies, operational standards have been adversely affected. In the Navy and Airforce, maritime units are feeling the effects of reduced anti-submarine warfare experience, maritime surveillance against combatants, in naval control of shipping procedures and in the maintenance of Officer of the Watch standards when operating in company. The loss of service experience involving up to date tactics and procedures for land forces, fighter attack and tactical transport operations is also a worry to the Army and Airforce.⁽¹⁶⁾

Since 1985, there has been a small increase in ANZAC exercise activity which, in most cases, involves AFNZ participation in what had been solely ADF exercises. But the ADF is reluctant to make co-operation as extensive as the New Zealanders would like. Indeed, a recently 'leaked' MOD document entitled "Impact of the ANZUS Rift: Chapter Three", written as a background to the New Zealand *Defence White Paper*, highlights problems creeping into the exercise relationship:

Efforts to achieve more bilateral exercises with Australia have been largely unsuccessful due to Australian resource constraints. Australian naval authorities also appear to be very sensitive about operating with New Zealand units in circumstances that might be interpreted [by the United States] as overly co-operative.⁽¹⁷⁾

Australian officials have suggested that this perhaps overdraws the picture, but it does reflect the AFNZ's concern that Australia has become the sole source for levels of exercise experience hitherto enjoyed under ANZUS. Australian officials make it clear that while they wish to co-operate with the AFNZ there are financial and operational limitations to the extent of that co-operation.¹⁸ First, in planning its own exercise programme, the ADF will try to maximise its contact with the United States. New Zealand very definitely takes second place on the rank. Second, Australian officials point out that there are areas where the ADF simply does not possess the range of skills, equipment or technical capacity that the United States had. The New Zealand Defence White Paper states that the Government "...does not look to Australia to replace the US."¹⁹ That statement however, only addresses the political side of the problem. It does not deal with the operational consequences the RNZN faces in dealing with the loss of 'high-tech' large scale exercise experience. Lastly, the size of the ADF exercise budget is, of course, limited and does not permit an increase in ANZAC exercise activity beyond the limited extent to which it has grown since 1985. It seems likely that the gap in technical capability which has always existed between the ADF and the AFNZ will continue to grow. The ADF will remain integrated into the American alliance and will continue to develop its forces in accordance with developments in allied doctrine, operational procedure, and technical matters. Although this is yet to become a major problem in ANZAC interoperability, in the long term Australia's close relationship with the US will place some operational difficulties in the way of ANZAC co-operation, especially in the highly complex area of maritime exercises. From the ADF perspective, exercising with the AFNZ becomes more difficult and less useful the longer New Zealand remains outside of co-operative activity within the ANZUS framework.

2.2 Training and Personnel Exchanges.

The AFNZ is heavily reliant on access to training courses overseas. Until recently, both the Army and the Navy conducted all its officer training overseas primarily because it was more cost efficient to send people to courses than to try to maintain training establishment infrastructures with the range of equipment that these require.²⁰ The RNZAF has always conducted basic training in New Zealand, but, as with the other Services, it is reliant on overseas training for specific-technology related courses, and for developing particular operational skills relevant to maintaining an expansion base with the capability to use a wide range of equipment. As with exercising, training with larger armed forces gives the AFNZ the opportunity to assess developments in doctrine, equipment and operational procedures, to make use of equipment not available in New Zealand, to sustain and improve operational skills and to maintain interoperability with allied nations. Table IV (a) shows the numbers of New Zealand defence personnel attending training courses at overseas establishments from 1980/81 to 1986/87. Tables IV (b) and (c) show personnel on overseas exchanges and on routine overseas postings respectively for 1983/84 to 1986/87.

Table IV: (A) New Zealand Defence Personnel Engaged in Overseas Training; 1980-81 to 1986-87.

	1980/81	(Financial Year)					
		81/82	82/83	83/84	84/85	85/86	86/87
UK	56	53	46	63	52	89	84
USA	26	22	51	69	70	34	40
Australia	155	150	186	276	194	235	207
Canada	**	**	**	2	1	2	7
West Germany	**	**	**	----	----	----	2
Malaysia	**	**	**	1	----	----	1

(B) New Zealand Personnel on Overseas Exchanges; 1983-84 to 1986-87.

	(Financial Year)			
	1983/84	1984/85	1985/86	1986/87
UK	2	1	4	3
USA	4	2	----	----
Australia	3	2	3	5
Continuing from previous year	7	12	9	9

(C) New Zealand Personnel on Routine Overseas Postings; 1983-84 to 1986-87.

	(Financial Year)			
	1983/84	1984/85	1985/86	1986/87
USA	1	----	----	1
Australia	3	6	2	10
Continuing from previous year	12	14	1	2

Notes: Numbers of personnel indicate activities that are to start during the year, except as shown otherwise.

** Indicates that the figure is unknown.

---- Indicates no representation that year.

Sources: (A) Information supplied to the author by the Ministry of Defence 1987.

(B), (C) Doug Kidd, *Questions*. 1986 Question # 38.

(a) Training with the United States.

Since February 1985, personnel from the AFNZ have had access restricted to training courses in the US except for courses provided by defence equipment manufactures from which the AFNZ is purchasing equipment, and in some cases where

New Zealand can prove that safety, or the ability to operate the defence forces effectively would be jeopardised if training was not provided.⁽²¹⁾

The 34 personnel who undertook some form of training in the United States in 1985/86 included 26 from the RNZAF who were receiving instruction in the use and maintenance of equipment from the aircraft firm Lear Seigler, which is contracted to refit the RNZAF's A-4 Skyhawks. The remaining 12 personnel attended conferences organised through various UKUSA arrangements.²² (See section 2.3). Longer term overseas exchange personnel have, as a matter of NZ Government policy, been limited to 17 a year. Such positions as were held in the US have not been filled as tours of duty come to an end.²³ A number of advanced courses in the US in "...telecommunications, logistics and staff fields are no longer open to New Zealanders."²⁴ In the shorter term it is possible that both the RNZAF and the RNZN will experience a lack of familiarisation training with newly upgraded equipment. The Skyhawk upgrade in avionics, fire-control, navigational guidance and wing refitting programme involves, for the most part, US technology, to which the

RNZAF will have only limited training access through Lear Seigler, not the US military.²⁵ Similarly, HMNZS Wellington has just undergone a major refit of communication, sensor and weapons control systems. Under normal conditions, the Wellington would have had the option of steaming to Hawaii for 'working up' exercises with the US Pacific Fleet - this can no longer be done.²⁶ In the longer term there is concern that the Services will lose contact with developments in doctrine, technology and operational procedures, thus ultimately damaging their ability to operate in co-operation with allied powers.

In September 1987 it was announced that the US would remove a prohibition on the access of New Zealand servicemen to American training institutions. It has been a matter of considerable irritation to the AFNZ that US military institutions would train officers from countries such as Yugoslavia, but not accept New Zealanders. The resumption of this contact does not indicate a 'thawing' of the relationship. Rather it signals that New Zealand's status as a friendly but not allied country has been established as the criterion for assessing US/NZ military co-operation. Whereas New Zealand was one of very few allied countries which were automatically guaranteed places in American training establishments, the new system allows New Zealand to bid for a limited number of places open to friendly but not allied nations of the United States (such as, in this particular case, Yugoslavia). It is understood that, for 1988, the AFNZ has applied to send two officers of Lieutenant Colonel rank (or equivalent) to the Marine Staff College and the Army Staff College for one year training programmes. The National War College has been deemed too expensive, costing in the vicinity of US\$90,000 to send an officer there for one year. This re-establishment of contact is important to the AFNZ in enabling them remain familiar with developments in thinking on doctrinal and strategic issues. It is, however, a very limited step, and only covers a small part of what had been a much wider training relationship.²⁷

(b) Training with the United Kingdom.

In 1985/86 some 10,916 man-days of "individual specialist training" of New Zealand military personnel were undertaken in the UK. The MOD describes the UK/NZ training relationship as;

...second only to that with Australia in terms of frequency of contact. In terms of professional value and up-to-date experience the British training relationship probably transcends even that with Australia.(28)

The British have expressed concern that clauses 5(2)(a) and 5(2)(b) of New Zealand's Anti-Nuclear Act - which came into force on June 7, 1987 - will have the effect of preventing elements of the AFNZ from training with UK forces. These clauses state;

5. Prohibition on acquisition of nuclear explosive devices.

(2) No person who is a New Zealand citizen, or a person ordinarily resident in New Zealand, and who is a servant or agent of the Crown, shall, beyond the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone,-

(a) Manufacture, acquire, or possess, or have control over, any nuclear explosive device; or,

(b) Aid, assist or abet any person to manufacture, acquire, possess, or have control over any nuclear explosive device.(29)

The clauses are ambiguous and much will depend on the meaning the government chooses to give them. Does, for example, a New Zealand soldier taking part in the annual exercise LONGLOOK with the British Army of the Rhine in West Germany "aid, assist, or abet any person" in having "control over any nuclear explosive device"? This interpretation holds if one argues that British troops are part of an organisation which clearly does "control" nuclear weapons. The view of the Chief of the UK Defence Staff and Admiral of the Fleet, Sir John Fieldhouse is that this is a legitimate interpretation. He told a New Zealand press conference that " ...in my view the legislation...will inhibit New Zealand officers and ratings from carrying on the normal, traditional patterns of activities."³⁰

Now that the anti-nuclear legislation has been passed it remains to be seen how the British and New Zealand Governments will choose to interpret Clause 5 of the Anti-Nuclear Act. However, the British have indicated their strong opposition to the legislation and it may be the case that they are unwilling to allow training activities to continue until this problem is resolved.

(c) Training with Australia.

Some 70 percent of AFNZ overseas training takes place in Australia. The MOD *1986 Annual Report* states that " Up to 40 New Zealanders a year are trained in Australia in specializations for which we lack our own training capacity."³¹ Training exchanges follow a similar pattern to exercises in terms of their frequency and the range of activities they may involve. Thus, for example, New Zealand officer cadets train at the Australian Defence Force Academy, and at the Royal Military College, Duntroon. Senior officers train at the Australian Staff College at Queenscliff, and the Joint Services Staff College in Canberra. Elements of the RNZN and RNZAF attend courses covering a wide range of technical matters, from aircraft simulator training to attendance at the Australian Joint Anti-Submarine School. These programmes will continue, and no doubt increase in importance to the AFNZ as a source of training and a conduit for the development of skills. There are, however, some areas of training which the MOD recognises Australia cannot readily replace. These are in the areas where the ADF sends its own personnel to the US for training. Over time, in training as with exercises, a gap may begin to appear between the capabilities of the ADF which continues to work with US forces, and the AFNZ which are precluded from doing so. This will eventually impinge on the level of interoperability between the ANZAC armed forces. The whole process of military co-operation may become more time consuming, demanding and expensive for both Australia and New Zealand. Under these circumstances the New Zealand Government will have to persuade Australia that continued training with AFNZ personnel serves the interests of both countries - not just New Zealand.

2.3 Operational, Planning and Technical Information Exchange.

In the area of planning and technical information exchange one can distinguish between ANZUS co-operative activity, and the wider co-operative network involving for the most part the five Anglo-Saxon 'UKUSA' countries.

(a) ANZUS Arrangements.

Trilateral planning under ANZUS did not survive the reduction of US/NZ military co-operation. The twice-yearly ANZUS staff level meetings (SLM's) and ANZUS seminars to discuss matters such as logistic and equipment issues, operational procedures, tactics and training are no longer held. The MOD *1984 Briefing Papers* described the purpose of such meetings as being "...to ensure a satisfactory degree of interoperability between national forces so that they may operate together in time of conflict".³² Following February 1985, such co-operation of this sort ceased to be multilateral and, insofar as it continued, did so as three sets of bilateral relations. No co-ordination of operations and plans takes place in the US/NZ 'leg' of this triad. This will cause a fundamental block to interoperability between New Zealand and United States forces. Australia/US co-operation, on the other hand, remains as strong, if not stronger, than prior to the split. The crucial relationship for New Zealand is the third 'leg' of the triad, the Australia/NZ relationship. Over the last two years the consultative machinery between Canberra and Wellington has been slightly strengthened. There are annual meetings between the Ministers of Defence, twice yearly meetings of the Australia - New Zealand Consultative Committee on Defence Co-operation (ANZCCDC) which is made up of the Secretaries of the MOD and the Australian Department of Defence (DOD), and the Chiefs of Defence Staff. The Australia/New Zealand Defence Policy Group comprised of senior Service officials is briefed to aid the ANZCCDC in co-ordinating the implementation of agreed policy. Regular meetings of exercise planners have recently been introduced.³³

While the relationship remains close, the mechanisms of consultation have become more cumbersome and rigid as a result of the split. In addition to the added complexity of dealing with two sets of bilateral relations in place of ANZUS, the Australians are now required to ensure that no material of American origin is passed on to New Zealanders in meetings.

This new stricture has placed limits on the free and comfortable interaction of Service personnel at policy making level. It requires the DOD to place a much closer watching brief on the relationship than it might ordinarily feel inclined to do. The recent visit of allied naval vessels to Sydney for the Royal Australian Navy's (RAN) 75th Anniversary celebrations provides a case in point. Two sets of planning meetings had to be held; one, to plan an exercise programme for after the anniversary activities which the New Zealand representative could not attend by virtue of the US presence, and a second meeting to discuss the anniversary programme itself.³⁴

For all intents and purposes ANZUS exchanges on operational planning no longer take place. There was, however, never a great amount of work done specifically as 'ANZUS planning'. As things now stand, Australia has been placed in the somewhat invidious and delicate position of having to tread a tight-rope between the irreconcilable policies of its two closest allies. In addition it involves a greater commitment of Australian resources in order to conduct two sets of bilateral relations. From Canberra's point of view this complication of arrangements does not enhance trans-Tasman amity.

(b) New Zealand and UKUSA Co-operation.

Far more important than ANZUS planning arrangements are those which involved New Zealand participation in the planning fora of the UKUSA countries. There are many dozens of agreements between these countries covering all fields of military endeavour. The term 'UKUSA' originates from a 1947 agreement between the UK, USA, Australia, Canada and New Zealand which distributes signals intelligence collection responsibilities.³⁵ Here, I use the term to refer to the entire network of defence co-operation between these countries developed in the post-war period.

The MOD *1984 Briefing Papers* referred to these arrangements in the following terms

...[they] provide the mechanism for the exchange of classified information up to secret level and ensure the protection of the information given by all partners from disclosure to potential enemies.⁽³⁶⁾

Because of the secrecy with which UKUSA co-operation is maintained, there is very little public information relating to New Zealand's participation in UKUSA fora before or after the ANZUS split. Many UKUSA arrangements have their origin from the American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies Programme (ABCA Programme), which New Zealand joined as an associate member in 1965. The purpose of the ABCA programme has been described by an Australian participant as:

...to achieve operational compatibility and to obtain the maximum economy by use of the combined resources and efforts of the four ABCA armies....
Through the ABCA programme not only are latest trends and concepts made available, but loans of equipment, in some cases still under development, are provided at no cost to Australia....in this way Australia and New Zealand are able to overcome to some extent the effects of their isolation from the main Western R and D [Research and Development] centers.(37)

The ABCA Programme operates through meetings of Quadripartite Working Groups (QWG's) held every 18 months or so. Groups will focus on specific projects such as Armour, Infantry, Command and Control and combat development. The aim is to formulate policy to act as guidance for Army force structure, strategic analysis and doctrinal development.³⁸ A MOD briefing paper from the early 1980's says of the ABCA Programme that "Although New Zealand is not a full member, it observes all of the agreements reached between the four armies."³⁹

New Zealand also participates in the *Combined Communications Electronics Board (CCEB)*,⁴⁰ which is responsible for the co-ordination of military communications and the establishment of the content, format and release policy of Allied Communications Publications (ACP's). The CCEB has provided for the adoption of "common procedures, books and fleet operational doctrine". Through the UK and the US, "high grade cryptographic systems" have been released for use by the other UKUSA countries.

In 1980, New Zealand was granted full membership of the *Naval Command and Communications Board. (Called AUSCANNZUKUS NAVCOMMS.)* According to the MOD, its purpose is to to "...review the interoperability requirements in command, control and communication to satisfy the AUS-CAN-NZ-UK-US operational

concepts. This is achieved by reviewing areas of non-interoperability... and to recommend to higher national authorities sources of action to resolve such problems." The *Air Standardisation Co-ordination Committee (ASCC)* serves a similar function to the ABCA Armies Programme. Its purpose has been defined as "... to ensure that in the conduct of combined air operations there will be a minimum of operational, material and technical obstacles to full co-operation and to enable essential support facilities and logistic support to be provided for aircraft of the other ASCC forces." One means of doing this involves negotiating formal agreements known as "Air Standards" between ASCC members, two examples of which are the *Air Targeting Materials Programme (USAF/RNZAF)* and the *Agreement for Co-operative Airlift Support Between the USAF Military Airlift Command and the Royal New Zealand Airforce. (1971)*

In addition there are agreements relating to establishing uniform exercising procedures (*Combined Exercising Agreement ,COMBEXAG*), to the exchange of scientific R&D work (*The Technical Co-operation Programme TTCP* - see section 2.4), On the exchange of intelligence information (see section 2.6), on aspects of material standards (for example, the *International Naval Corrosion Committee*), and on the development of common codes and cryptanalytic devices.

New Zealand's participation in this network has given it access to a range of equipment, technical processes, cryptographic machinery and research and development findings which it could not possibly develop itself, given the very small scale of the defence establishment. The same can be said for the production of manuals of doctrine and technical instruction which define how elements of the forces will operate in combat (or, for that matter, in exercises). The AFNZ has operated its forces according to doctrine laid out by its major allies. Force structure and strategic doctrine have been developed in accordance with the principles established by UKUSA powers. New Zealand's ability to operate effectively with Australia - let alone the USA or the UK has been grounded on its access to UKUSA procedures. If ANZUS provided the skeleton of alliance co-operation,

then the web of UKUSA arrangements were the muscles and sinews which gave substance to that co-operation.

The consequences of the AFNZ being denied access to this information would be enormous. Vice Admiral Sir Neil Anderson (Ret), Chief of Defence Staff from 1980 to 1983 dealt with this matter in his submission to the Defence Committee of Enquiry, Chaired by Mr Frank Corner, in February 1986;

In the increasingly technological world of defence the crux today is communications - and this has expanded to include electronic data exchange for all three Services in operational situations. Such data exchanges as well as operational communications are protected by highly sophisticated cryptographic machines. The Australians need these to work with the US and their forces are geared to their increasing use. The systems are highly classified. How can we, in a stand alone situation, denied access to such equipment, ever work effectively with the Australians except at the most basic operational level? Our forces would be an embarrassment.... Without communications and cryptography...and without access to allied doctrine our Services will be in the wilderness. To produce our own would be a truly major task and expense. I venture to suggest that practically it could be beyond us.(41)

(c) New Zealand and UKUSA Co-operation Since March 1985.

Access to the various UKUSA defence arrangements was not automatically cut off following the **Buchanan** incident. Defence Minister Frank O'Flynn revealed in Parliament on July 10, 1986 that;

Since January 1986, 12 New Zealand service and civilian personnel have attended 11 multinational defence conferences convened by the United States. They covered operational, standardisation, technical co-operation, logistics, and communications matters. Two were attended by officers at the brigadier level, and the others by colonels or lieutenant colonels.... All of those activities are of a type in which New Zealand has customarily been involved.(42)

These activities sound very much like regular meetings of UKUSA agreement working groups. The officials report, *Impact of the ANZUS Rift: Chapter Three*, 'leaked' following the release of the *Defence White Paper*, noted that New Zealand still retained membership of the ABCA, TTCP, CCEB, AUSCANNZUKUS NAVCOMMS and COMBEXAG agreements. It added that "...it could not be over emphasised that continued access to these forums [sic] was of fundamental importance to New Zealand's armed forces.' "43 However, as the ANZUS treaty dispute demonstrates, formal membership does not necessarily mean that New Zealand will enjoy full access to all

activities that take place under the agreements. Allied nations are certainly much more cautious about providing classified material to New Zealand. There are signs that the AFNZ are being denied access to material in some sensitive communications areas. In October 1986 the MOD stated that "New Zealand has ... lost access to communications/electronic information which will pose interoperability problems for New Zealand forces in the Pacific."⁴⁴ This is hardly surprising, especially in the area of communications. It is unlikely that the AFNZ, or New Zealand intelligence organisations will still have access to new items of cryptographic equipment, or of decryption systems, or the periodic changes of codes that run through the machines. Access to these is closely guarded by the UKUSA countries as they form the guarantor of the secrecy of allied communications. If this is denied to New Zealand, many practical impediments will be placed in the way of maintaining interoperability with the ADF. Once again the point must be stressed that this is less a matter of the state of political relations between the two countries, than it is of the relative technical capacities of their two armed forces.

There will, no doubt, be pressure, certainly from sections of the military in the US, but also possibly from other UKUSA nations as well, to limit New Zealand participation in the more sensitive and secret elements of co-operation. New Zealand's anti-nuclear stance has served to distance it from the common allied security perspective which made such close co-operation possible between the Anglo-Saxon nations. Disagreement over commonly held assumptions about allied strategy and alliance responsibilities is not conducive to close co-operation. It seems reasonable to argue that the longer New Zealand remains isolated in this way, the more inclined the UKUSA nations will be to limit its participation in other secret allied arrangements. There is very little that the MOD can do of itself to prevent this from happening, but it does understand that total isolation from UKUSA groupings would be a major blow to AFNZ military capability. Denied UKUSA co-operation, New Zealand will have to fall back on its own highly limited resources to provide for the bulk of its needs in such areas as communications, interoperability, R&D,

equipment maintenance and intelligence collection and analysis. Under these conditions, very strict limits would be placed on the AFNZ's ability to deal with threats in the South Pacific region. However, such pressure as there is to deny New Zealand access to UKUSA information comes mainly from the US Navy Department and Pacific Command, Hawaii. Interviews with US officials confirm that, within the State Department and the Reagan Administration in Washington - those areas which effectively dominate US policy making towards New Zealand - the prevailing view appears to be, for the moment, that New Zealand participation in UKUSA fora should be allowed to continue

2.4 Scientific Co-operation.

The New Zealand Defence Science Establishment (DSE) is very small and carries out little in the way of basic research. It is heavily reliant on UKUSA scientific co-operation, most notably under The Technical Co-operation Programme (TTCP), from which it concentrates its work on sonar technologies and Mine Counter Measures (MCM) research. It appears that the DSE has not had its access restricted to various TTCP working groups, although the United States has ended the programme under which DSE scientists have worked on secondment in American institutions.⁴⁵ Without overseas scientific co-operation it is clear that the DSE could not carry out all the research deemed necessary by the military. The DSE's *Annual Review for the Year April 1985 to April 1986* indicates that in both sonar technology and MCM, DSE research is heavily dependent on international scientific co-operation. In the area of underwater acoustics, for example, the DSE describes its "long term goal" as attempting "...to foster New Zealand's ability to use the results of international R&D in sonar."⁴⁶ Of MCM, the 1986 MOD *Annual Report* claimed that the DSE "...is well placed to play an important part in the development of a more self-reliant defence posture."⁴⁷ But this should not be taken to mean that the DSE is capable of independent research in the field. The organisation's annual report notes:

In a period when New Zealand is aiming to develop a credible MCM capability without unnecessary costs or duplication of research and development efforts it is difficult to overstate the benefits of this form of liaison with specialists from overseas.(48)

As such, the organisation is vulnerable to any further prohibitions on co-operation which the Americans may chose to implement.

Operation Deep Freeze.

Perhaps the most damaging loss to the New Zealand scientific community would be if the US decided to remove support facilities at Harewood Airport in Christchurch for Operation Deep Freeze, the US Antarctic research programme. New Zealand's own research effort in the Antarctic at Scott Base on Ross Island is heavily dependent on US support for the transport and resupply of material. The MOD estimates that if the RNZAF were called upon to provide all the airlift requirements of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) this could only be done by cutting across other defence needs.⁴⁹ It seems that within the US Department of Navy at least there is some pressure to relocate their airbase in Hobart, Tasmania. The *Canberra Times* of March 14 1987 quotes the former Navy Secretary, John Lehman, as saying that plans have been drawn up to withdraw Operation Deep Freeze from Christchurch. He claimed that the Navy would like to move the operation to Hobart, and believed that the move could be made in the space of two years. The US Administration however, does not seem inclined to move Operation Deep Freeze. The Australian Government has not been formally approached on the matter.⁵⁰ Indeed, there seems little reason why the US would want to move the facility. Relocation in Hobart would be very costly, and the site is regarded as inferior to Christchurch for Antarctic operations. Further, the Lange Labour Government has agreed to grant blanket clearance to US aircraft transiting through Harewood Airport on Antarctic missions. Thus the US policy of 'neither confirm nor deny' has not been compromised.⁵¹ Indeed, insofar as there is any real opposition to the US presence in Christchurch, it comes from the activist section of the peace movement which is critical of the Government's application of a blanket landing clearance for potentially nuclear capable aircraft on route to the Antarctic.⁵² In practice the Government's assessment that these aircraft are not

carrying nuclear weapons seems sound, given their stated operational mission. However, short of boarding the aircraft, there is no way to prove with absolute certainty that they conform to the anti-nuclear policy. Some peace movement activists consider that the literal application of the anti-nuclear act ought to preclude such visits. There is, however, little chance that the Government will find such arguments persuasive, even though it may be agreed that granting blanket clearance does somewhat compromise the terms of the Anti-Nuclear Act. For Mr Lange, the most important consideration is perhaps one of principal rather than principle - Operation Deep Freeze is said to be worth NZ\$ 20 million annually to the Christchurch economy.⁵³

2.5 Co-operation over logistic supply.

To date, it appears that New Zealand still has a free hand to purchase items of equipment, ammunition and maintenance materials in the United States. For example, Congress granted permission for the technology transfer involved in the RNZAF's NZ\$140 million A-4 refurbishment contract with Lear Seigler, albeit following some lengthy delays in gaining approval.⁵⁴ New Zealand's downgrading in status from that of an 'ally' to that of a 'friend' may entail delays, but very few total prohibitions on purchasing. On February 2, 1987, the US Government announced that it would not renew or renegotiate the 1982 US/NZ Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) on Logistic Support Arrangements when it was due to expire in June. The US Embassy explained that allowing the MOU to lapse, meant that it would bring "...the logistics arrangement into accord with the suspension of the United States security commitment to New Zealand."⁵⁵ This should not have come as a surprise. In February 1985 the US had suspended negotiations on three annexes to the MOU.⁵⁶ Its total suspension will have three major effects. First, New Zealand will lose its priority access to the quick resupply of such things as ammunition and spare parts. It will still have access to the same range of material, but will now have to expect substantial delay in gaining approval for sales. Second, New

Zealand will no longer have the opportunity to time its orders to coincide with large production runs of the same item for US forces. Unit costs will therefore increase. Third, the MOU provided a guarantee of resupply in time of conflict or increased international tension. In the absence of this it becomes necessary to stockpile ammunition. The purchase, maintenance and storage of ammunition will involve considerably greater cost that was involved under the MOU.⁵⁷

In mid-1985 the Government began a programme to increase ammunition stockpiles. The claim has been made that they intend to build up stores sufficient to last for ninety days "...at usage rates appropriate to military operations in our region."⁵⁸ This is, of course, a comfortably ambiguous phrase, but it would realistically require a greater commitment of resources to the purchase and maintenance of ammunition than is allocated at present.⁵⁹ The point needs to be made that while the Government regards its increased spending on ammunition as part of the move to 'greater self-reliance', the commitment was simply unnecessary when, in a working alliance, a MOU guaranteed timely resupply.⁶⁰ The need to maintain large ammunition costs at all must therefore be regarded as one of the 'costs' of the ANZUS split.

The Broomfield Bill.

New Zealand's logistic supply arrangements are likely to be further limited by the passage of a bill presently before Congress titled the *New Zealand Military Preference Elimination Act*, more commonly known as the Broomfield Bill after its sponsor, Congressman William Broomfield, the senior Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The Bill is designed to remove New Zealand from the list of allied nations which receive preferential treatment with respect to security assistance and arms transfers as provided for by the *Foreign Assistance Act* and the *Arms Export Control Act*.. The Broomfield Bill has the support of the Administration. The State Department characterises it as "...an appropriate tidying up" of US relations with New Zealand.⁶¹ It therefore stands a good chance of being enacted into law. Under its provisions, New Zealand's access to the

US logistic supply system would be the same as that extended to *friendly* but not *allied* countries. Offers of sale, loan or lease of equipment, and the licences to export them will be subject to a thirty day ~~delay~~ during which Congress will be able to veto the proposed transfer. Access to training programmes will no longer be governed by agreements which guaranteed places for New Zealand personnel at lower cost. Arrangements within the US defence establishment designed to enhance rationalisation, standardisation and interoperability of equipment and procedures with the RNZN will be dissolved. Costs on the sale of equipment which had hitherto been waived - for example the use of plant and machinery, non-recurring costs and the recovery of inventory losses - will now be charged. These things may seem relatively minor, but their cumulative effect will be very costly for the AFNZ because it will hamper, and in some cases end, a number of agreements known as Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 'cases'. FMS cases are operated between each AFNZ service and their US equivalent; they are designed to facilitate the easy transfer of equipment by regularising arrangements for payment, shipping and use of materials. The RNZAF, for example, has what is known as a Firm Order Case with the US Navy for the repair, replenishment and return of its A-4 Skyhawks and the P3-K Orions. In the early 1980's the MOD reported that there were some fifteen requisitioning cases operating to cover specific items of equipment and their components.⁶² To a certain extent these agreements have already been undermined with the lapsing of the 1982 MOU. However, if the Broomfield Bill is enacted, many FMS cases will have to be terminated in order to accord with its provisions. At the advice of the Administration, Broomfield agreed not to eliminate preferential treatment in three areas vital to New Zealand, namely on military airlift, communications support and naval supplies and services. Elimination of these, Broomfield states, "...should await further consideration in the light of the practical defence requirements of the US and its allies."⁶³ Nevertheless, the existing provisions of the Broomfield Bill will increase costs and lengthen supply and repair times to the AFNZ, and

in turn this may generate difficulties over the frequency with which items of equipment go through maintenance and overhaul procedures.⁶⁴

2.6 Intelligence and Surveillance Co-operation.

(a) Intelligence.

New Zealand's capability for independent intelligence gathering is very small and limited almost wholly to the South Pacific Region. However, even within this region there are obvious limits to New Zealand's intelligence gathering capabilities. The coup in Fiji is a case in point. Mr Lange was apparently informed about its likelihood some 40 minutes after it took place.⁶⁵ The 1976 *Report of the Chief Ombudsman on the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service* (the Powles Report) acknowledged that New Zealand was "very heavily" dependent on intelligence material supplied by allied powers. It was a dependence, Powles argued, which stemmed from the "...government's desire to pursue independent and self-reliant policies designed to promote the national interests of New Zealand."⁶⁶ The 1984 *Briefing Papers* stated that without intelligence material from Australia and the United States:

...it would be impossible for New Zealand to gather the range and character of information relevant to the formulation of national foreign and defence policies.⁽⁶⁷⁾

The US prohibition on the supply of a considerable amount of intelligence material to New Zealand is perhaps the most serious loss in security terms. Announcing the cut-backs to Parliament on February 27, 1985, Acting Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer characterised the situation as "...serious but not... disastrous."⁶⁸ His comment reflects a general tendency on the part of the New Zealand political leadership to underestimate, at least in public statements, the importance of intelligence co-operation for regional security. Prime Minister Lange suggested that the cuts would prevent intelligence officers from studying the "Czechoslovakian order of battle",⁶⁹ but implied that nothing would be lost which was of direct importance to the country. Defence Minister Frank O'Flynn has made the comment that much intelligence is just "tittle-tattle" and

of no particular importance or interest to anyone unless you are interested in the sexual habits or drinking habits of some of the people it refers to.(70)

Such comments make light of a serious problem. The MOD informed the Parliamentary Select Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence that prior to February 1985 some two-thirds of its total information intake came from US sources. Since then "...the continued flow is less than 20 percent of that received before the last [1984] election";

Defence no longer receives US military and political estimates or assessments in the form of intelligence summaries, as it did before February 1985. All US processed intelligence has been withdrawn and much of the 'raw' intelligence is no longer received. Overall, the reduction since the last election exceeds 80 percent.(71)

It is, of course, very difficult to establish even a general outline of the types of material to which New Zealand no longer has access. In structural terms it is clear that New Zealand Intelligence personnel are no longer present at a range of meetings held between the UKUSA countries; this included the weekly meetings of the Joint Intelligence Committee in London,⁷² and most probably a number of annual meetings such as the annual Naval Intelligence Conference which a MOD document of the early 1980's describes as being

...attended by defence intelligence staffs from Australia, New Zealand and the United States with British observers [it] enables particular attention to be focussed on naval intelligence relating to the Pacific and Asian Seaboard.(73)

A New Zealand liaison officer at the US Intelligence Center Pacific has been withdrawn.⁷⁴

It has been indicated to the author that New Zealand no longer receives any intelligence gathered through US national technical (that is, satellite and other forms of mechanical surveillance resources) means.⁷⁵ Much of the material passed on to New Zealand clearly did not relate to the country's immediate strategic environment. This is not to say, however, that such material is not important to regional security. The MOD indicated in the 'leaked' document *Impact of the ANZUS Rift: Chapter Three* that it is lacking information on details of Soviet naval movements in South East Asia and technical data relating to Soviet weapons systems and platforms which is essential to identifying contacts of Soviet vessels in transit through the region.⁷⁶ Even further afield than South East Asia,

intelligence relating to sources of regional instability can be important to New Zealand in trade as well as security matters. Iran, for example, is an important trading partner. The conduct of the Iran/Iraq war is therefore of significance to New Zealand trade policy. It is an open question as to how adequate New Zealand's sources of information are on the Middle East following the US cut-backs.

Some sources have argued, among them Mr Gerald Hensley, the Permanent Head of the Prime Minister's Department, that New Zealand's most vital interests in the South West Pacific have not been compromised by the intelligence cut-backs.⁷⁷ However there is evidence to suggest that this is not the case. The document *Impact of the ANZUS Rift: Chapter Three* claims that there have been significant losses of intelligence material relating to the South West Pacific and the Southern Ocean - the area now referred to by the MOD as New Zealand's "area of direct strategic concern":

The most serious result is that the Maritime Defence Commander now has an incomplete picture of the presence and movement of ships and other foreign units within New Zealand's strategic environment and our area of direct strategic concern.⁽⁷⁸⁾

The Australian government acknowledges that US intelligence "complements Australia's information on political and military developments in our region."⁷⁹ However, in conformity with US requests, the government will not pass on any American sourced material to New Zealand, or Australian analysis based on US raw data.⁸⁰ It would seem that especially in the area of surveillance of maritime movements, US intelligence on the South Pacific region is indeed of importance. The MOD has acknowledged that it is still in receipt of "selected maritime information" from the United States.⁸¹ It would seem likely that some of that information would come from the UKUSA ocean surveillance net, the Naval Ocean Surveillance Information System (NOSIS) which gathers intelligence from various Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Centers (FOSICS) on the deployment of all (traced) Soviet ships and submarines.⁸²

New Zealand's intelligence links with Australia have also been affected by the ANZUS rift. Procedures have been adopted to ensure that no US-sourced material is

passed on to New Zealand.⁸³ In a few cases New Zealand intelligence officers on secondment to Australian intelligence organisations have been recalled or moved to less sensitive areas. For example, the liaison officer for the Directorate of Defence Intelligence (DDI) has been removed from a position within the Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO), and now works from the New Zealand High Commission.⁸⁴ Apart from the additional cost this has placed on Australian intelligence bureaucracies in terms of finances⁸⁵ and time, these measures have also formalised and placed constraints on a relationship which had hitherto operated with an unusual degree of informality. This cannot act in New Zealand's favour, for the tendency will be for their Australian counterparts to 'err on the side of caution' in passing on intelligence information. There are no formal limits placed on the passage of Australian-sourced intelligence material over the Tasman (although it would be remarkable if the Australians shared *all* their material). This no doubt is a vital source of information for New Zealand defence planning. The Australian *1987 Defence White Paper* has proposed the development of a satellite ground station in Western Australia, which would become a major listening post for the collection of Signals Intelligence from the Indian Ocean to South East Asia. Assuming that New Zealand is given access to this information, this will establish a limited measure of independence from American-sourced material, at the same time as creating a greater dependence on Australian-sourced material.⁸⁶

The New Zealand Government does not, however, seem to have come to terms with the difficulties imposed on the defence establishment as a result of the cuts to intelligence co-operation. The *Defence White Paper* mentions the need to "reshape" NZ intelligence gathering capability to give a closer focus "on the oceans around us", and additionally that "some independent capability is also required to monitor developments further afield."⁸⁷ But as a major focus of the White Paper is to contemplate the range of threats to New Zealand which may come from outside of the region, should the Government not place more emphasis on the need for out of region intelligence? New

Zealand no longer has access to this wider intelligence picture. It is difficult to see how, with its limited resources, it will be able to address this problem. This is also the view of Brigadier Sir William Gilbert, who was Director of the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service from 1956 to 1976. Brigadier Gilbert has expressed the view that:

It would be quite unrealistic to expect that even a tiny part of this intelligence could be replicated through our own unaided efforts, except perhaps in relation to the immediate NZ geographical area.

One should add that Brigadier Gilbert takes this to mean an area considerably smaller than that presently defined as the New Zealand 'area of direct strategic concern'.⁸⁸

The reforms to the intelligence community which Mr Lange announced on March 2, 1987 do not address this question. They provide for a reshuffle of the various intelligence organisations, creating a new Cabinet Committee and an Officials' Committee to oversee intelligence activities. The Prime Minister gave two main reasons for the changes:

Firstly, there is a need to give greater attention to intelligence gathering following the withdrawal of finished intelligence material from United States sources. It is particularly important to have information on the South Pacific and to view developments through our own eyes. Second, as the Defence White Paper notes, the Government intends to develop a comprehensive policy to bring together all the factors, ranging from military threats to natural disasters, that have a bearing on New Zealand's security and integrity.⁽⁸⁹⁾

The new intelligence structure may or may not contribute towards Lange's second goal, however the point should be obvious that a bureaucratic reshuffle of the type recently undertaken does not of itself improve the country's intelligence *gathering* capability. There is no doubt that, working in co-operation with Australia, New Zealand will be able to augment its intelligence capability in the South Pacific. However, there is also no doubt that it cannot hope to compensate for the loss of the range and breadth of US-supplied intelligence material. New Zealand has no choice but to live with this situation, but Australia too is placed in difficulty because of the intelligence prohibitions. It will have the continuing task of implementing US bans on passing information while at the same time becoming New Zealand's most important outside source for much intelligence material.

(b) Surveillance.

The New Zealand *Defence White Paper* defined the main surveillance role of the AFNZ as being first, to "...patrol our maritime environment to detect, identify and monitor activities relating to our security needs and interests" and, second, in co-operation with Australia, "...to provide the surveillance necessary to protect the resources within the extensive maritime economic zones which cover the [South Pacific] region."⁹⁰ (My emphasis) This is no small task. *Table V* shows the maritime claims for Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ's) made by the countries of the South Pacific Forum.

Table V: Maritime Claims/EEZ's for the South Pacific Forum States.

	Maritime Claim/EEZ (Square Nautical Miles)	Land Area
Australia	1,854,000	2,240,771
New Zealand	1,058,100	78,320
Island States		
Kiribati	965,000	198
Papua New Guinea	684,200	134,586
Cook Islands	556,100	70
Solomon Islands	458,400	8,862
Fiji	386,900	5,326
Tuvalu	211,500	7
Vanuatu	179,900	4,303
Tonga	158,400	203
Nuaru	92,800	6
Tokelau	91,300	3
Niue	87,300	75
Western Samoa	38,100	828
Total Island Claim	3,909,900	
Total Island Claim plus New Zealand	5,568,000	

Source: Adapted from J.R.V. Prescott, *The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World*. (Methuen, London, 1985) p. 197.

There is insufficient information in the public domain to establish how important US co-operation was for surveillance activity in the South Pacific, beyond observing that the NOSIS network obviously played an important role in detailing the transit of vessels into, and out of, the region. The MOD has indicated that a significant proportion of this

information is no longer supplied by the United States.⁹¹ The ANZUS MARSAR agreement, described by the MOD as "...a combined Australian, New Zealand and United States operational arrangement for co-operation in maritime surveillance",⁹² has not been formally abrogated, but Australia has picked up the surveillance responsibilities New Zealand had carried out within its area of responsibility.⁹³ That area corresponded with New Zealand's allotted zone for the "co-ordination on naval control and the protection of shipping" defined by the Radford-Collins Agreement as being from South of the equator, with longitude of about 170 degrees East to 106 degrees West.⁹⁴ The Australian Navy has also picked up New Zealand's naval control of shipping activities, and acts as a 'go between' between US and New Zealand forces to ensure that activities are, at the least, co-ordinated to the extent that the two navies do not duplicate each other's work.⁹⁵ It is clear that New Zealand surveillance activity is no longer co-ordinated under the ANZUS MARSAR arrangement. The most crucial point to be made however is that New Zealand simply does not possess the resources to carry out the White Paper's commitment to "...provide the surveillance necessary" for resource protection in the South Pacific Region. *Table V* shows the enormity of the region, and counts only the Forum States' EEZ's but not those of, for example, French possessions and unclaimed waters. New Zealand's six P3-K Orion Long Range Maritime Patrol (LRMP) aircraft and the four ageing *Leander* class frigates can only provide comprehensive coverage of a fraction of this area at any one time.⁹⁶ The addition of the fuel replenishment ship HMNZS *Endeavour* at the end of 1987, and the projected development of a logistic supply ship and aerial refueling capacity for the RNZAF will without doubt add to this surveillance capability.⁹⁷ But this will be an improvement on what had been a token effort. As of late 1985 Orion patrols in the South Pacific averaged one a month, although this was apparently increased when the sixth P3-K came into service. Additional flights take place at the request of Island governments. One, for example, took place in February 1986 when two RNZAF P3-K's spent some 46 hours (including transit time) around the Cook islands in pursuit of a submarine. After some

confusion the MOD decided that nothing was found. Although too complex to go into here, the incident does not increase one's confidence in RNZAF surveillance capability.⁹⁸

Because of their limited range, the RNZN *Leander* s' surveillance activities have usually been restricted to whatever was observed in transit between refuelling points. However, since 1985 there have been a greater number of port calls in the region.⁹⁹

The Australian Government has also indicated its intention to increase surveillance activity in the region. Defence Minister Kim Beazley announced in February 1987 that RAAF LRMP (P3-C) deployments into the region would increase from five to ten a year. These are usually of five days duration each. RAN deployments will also increase. In 1987 some 17 ships will visit ports in 12 island states.¹⁰⁰

These marginal increases should not cloud the fact that thorough, effective and constant maritime surveillance of such a massive region is beyond the combined capability of both Australia and New Zealand. As many as 2000 foreign (that is, non regional) vessels operate in South Pacific waters each year;¹⁰¹ with limited access to NOSIS information New Zealand will have only a partial idea of their whereabouts at any one time.

2.7 Manpower Retention.

Since the 1984 election the AFNZ has experienced significant manpower losses in some critical areas. It is impossible to gauge the extent to which this has occurred because of the ANZUS split. Indeed the biggest jump in release rates from the services took place in the twelve months to March 1985, that is before US/NZ co-operation was cut. However, it is equally clear that in the post-**Buchanan** period, many servicemen, particularly in the middle and lower ranks of the officer corps, no longer think that the military offers a promising career. The *MOD 1986 Annual Report* notes that the release rate from the three Services in the twelve months to March 1986 was 17.5 percent compared with 13.1 percent for the previous year.¹⁰² The 13.1 percent figure itself represented a massive 48 percent climb in releases as compared with the rate for 1983/84.¹⁰³ Releases have not been evenly

spread across all ranks. Rather, the junior end of the officer corps and certain specialist areas have shown disproportionate losses. *Table VI* shows release rates of servicemen in middle ranking positions as a percentage of the establishment total for each rank in 1984 and 1985.¹⁰⁴

Table VI: Release Rates from the NZAF as a percentage of total establishment; 1984 and 1985.

	Lieutenant Colonel	Major	Capt.	Lieut.
	(equivalent ranks)			
1984				
Army	14	6	9	29
Navy	13	20	8	35
Airforce	16	6	14	14
1985				
Army	10	7	6	19
Navy	13	16	17	35
Airforce	23	7	17	17

Source: Doug Kidd, *Questions*. 1986 Question # 41.

The MOD *1986 Annual Report* noted that these losses were

...diluting service expertise with implications for the maintenance of professional standards, and it is also diminishing the return to New Zealand from substantial investment in training personnel for military careers.⁽¹⁰⁵⁾

The RNZAF has been particularly hard hit, although it must be acknowledged that a major cause of this has been the very good wages and conditions offered by commercial airlines for RNZAF pilots.¹⁰⁶ In April 1985 it was compelled to impose a state of 'critical manning', which requires two years' notice to be given by people intending to leave the force. It has been applied to the categories of "...pilot, navigator, and air electronics officer, in the rank of Squadron Leader and below, and in the airmen aircrew branch."¹⁰⁷ This has enabled the Airforce to maintain what it calls "adequate operational standards", but there has been a very significant qualitative loss. Those leaving have served a minimum of eight years and have a measure of (pre-ANZUS split) experience which newly trained officers cannot replace.¹⁰⁸ *Table VII* (over the page) shows rates for effective RNZAF and RNZN personnel from 1983 to 1986.

Table VII: Effective RNZAF and RNZN Personnel: 1983 to 1986.

As at	31 August 1986	1985	1984	1983
RNZAF: Pilots and Aircrew.				
Pilots	217	201	234	226
Other Aircrew	100	105	92	109
Total	317	306	326	336
RNZN: Sea Going Personnel				
	1,896	1871	1998	2059

Source: Doug Kidd, *Questions*. 1986 Question # 56.

The table shows that the number of effective pilots in the RNZAF fell in 1985, however critical manning has probably reduced the rate of resignations. The figures hide the real loss to the Services however because they count new intakes of personnel only just out of the training process. The Navy however has suffered a more sustained fall. Its most serious manpower problem is with the loss of skilled engineering personnel in the Fleet Maintenance Unit (FMU). The Navy estimates that staff shortages have been as high as 75 and 90 percent in some areas, including joiners, boilermakers, shipwrights, sheetmetal workers, fitters and turners, diesel, electrical and weapons fitters.¹⁰⁹ This is beginning to cause serious delays in the regular Assisted Maintenance Periods (AMP's) for ships, and was partly the cause of extended delays in the refit schedules of **HMNZ Wellington** in 1986 and **Tui** in 1985.¹¹⁰

The Chief of the General Staff, Major General John Mace has recently expressed public concern at the loss of senior staff from Defence Headquarters in Wellington.¹¹¹ That his comments on manpower were made public is an indication of the concern felt at senior level about the loss of personnel. Mace said that he believed the ANZUS issue was not a major factor in many resignations, and cited such factors as disillusionment with public attitudes to defence, an absence of a "...meeting of minds [between the MOD and O'Flynn] on some areas of equipment replacement" and finally limited career prospects as the major

reasons for resignations.¹¹² However it is not difficult to relate all these factors back to the ANZUS split as being the prime cause of hostile government/military relations, indifferent public feeling and limited career prospects.

The fall in service retention rates has placed great strain on facilities for training incoming personnel. This is further hampered by the limits on overseas training and exercising programmes. In consequence the services are in some difficulty in filling positions with suitably trained men. The Navy, for example, finds that it now takes between 12 to 18 months to train people up to Officer of the Watch Certificate level. Prior to the ANZUS split this training was usually completed in six months.¹¹³ Presently only nine of 20 Principal Warfare Officer (PWO) positions are filled. There are some 28 people with the necessary training, but most are working in areas for which they have not been specifically trained.¹¹⁴ The net effect is that where most ships carried two to three PWO's, they now carry one; where Fleet Head Quarters usually had seven PWO's, it now only has one.¹¹⁵ The other services are experiencing similar problems. In such a situation, priority is given to 'vital' work, often at the expense of other tasks. For example, the Navy has been unable to produce any firing analysis for its weapons systems over the last two years.¹¹⁶

At the very least, one can say that the ANZUS rift has contributed to a growing manpower problem in the NZAF over the last three years. These things in turn exacerbate a number of problems such as training and personnel placement which will have an impact on the Services' overall capability.

2.8 Government/Military Relations.

One of the most damaging, albeit indirect, consequences of the ANZUS split has been the deterioration of relations between the Government on the one hand, and the MOD and the Services, on the other. Indeed relations are probably worse than at any other time in New Zealand's history. The point needs to be stressed that, although few in the military

support the Government's anti-nuclear policy, the MOD accepts without question the Government's right to implement policy as it sees fit. What has caused real rancour between the politicians and the military has been the way in which Mr Lange and Mr O'Flynn in particular have publicly treated the concerns of the Services.

The first such instance of this came with Mr Lange's response to a statement signed by sixteen former Chiefs of Staff in early October 1985. The statement, entitled *Current Issues and ANZUS*, expressed concern about the military consequences of the rift in ANZUS, and was widely published.¹¹⁷ In spite of the seniority of the people concerned, and the fact that the views given by a majority of former New Zealand military commanders of the post-war period ought to have been taken seriously, Lange's dismissive comment was that they were "geriatric Generals." He later apologised for this remark, but not for the similarly insulting press release statement which said of the former Chiefs that:

Under the National Government they were silent while our ability to defend ourselves withered away and they snuggled under the bomb.(118)

The MOD itself has felt that on many occasions the Government has been disinclined to take its advice seriously. Defence personnel were not permitted to give evidence before the Committee of Enquiry into public attitudes on defence matters (the Corner Committee).¹¹⁹ The 1987 Defence Review itself was conducted by an 'Officials Committee' and headed by a representative from the Prime Minister's Department specifically to prevent the MOD from having a dominant input into the review process.

Relations with Defence Minister O'Flynn have been strained, a fact which was made public in January 1986 when the Chief of General Staff, Major General John Mace, appealed to Mr Lange to reverse O'Flynn's decision not to send an Army officer to a training course in Canada.¹²⁰ Of itself, the issue was comparatively minor, but the Services were treating it as a benchmark of O'Flynn's attitude as Minister. Mr O'Flynn's response came in the form of a remarkable twelve page press release in which he freely accused sections of the defence bureaucracy of "disloyalty", "blackmail" and telling "wicked lies".

O'Flynn declared that;

The real difficulty is that from the first the Government's policy of not allowing nuclear weapons into New Zealand even temporarily on visiting ships was unpalatable to the defence establishment generally.⁽¹²¹⁾

This in a sense was true, although the more immediate concern was that O'Flynn wanted to limit overseas training opportunities at a time when the Services had already lost access to US courses. More fundamentally, his press release and the events leading up to it were evidence of O'Flynn's hostile attitude to the military and their traditional concerns. O'Flynn made it clear prior to the election in July 1984 that he did not want to be the Defence Minister, and he has indicated since that he has not enjoyed the job.¹²² On a number of occasions he has been dismissive of what he perceives to be the mind-set of the military. Of the former Chiefs of Staff, for example, he told a gathering of the Navy League that "...it is small wonder that they are indoctrinated with the defence philosophy that has been current at least since World War Two."¹²³ His audience was not impressed. He has referred to one prominent critic of government policy, Air Vice Marshal Morrison (Rtd) as "Joe McCarthy resurrected".¹²⁴ O'Flynn has also on occasion proposed such novel - and in view of his critics, ill considered - defence options for New Zealand as blowing up bridges and tunnels to ensure that "...an invasion could be made extremely difficult" for the enemy.¹²⁵ It is fair to say that O'Flynn has something of an adversarial attitude in dealing with his department. Private discussions with Defence officials confirm that they find him a difficult man with whom to work and often resistant to departmental advice on even the most technical aspects of weapons systems and platforms.¹²⁶

One consequence of this has been that senior Defence officials have been more inclined to speak out against government policy after retirement. Thus far, in addition to the former Chiefs of Staff, a former Chief of Naval Staff (Rear Admiral Cedric Steward), a Chief of Defence Staff (Air Marshal Sir Ewan Jamieson) and Defence Attache in Washington (Brigadier Alex Hamilton) have made highly critical comments about the effect Government policy is having on the AFNZ's capabilities.¹²⁷

Within the serving defence bureaucracy there has been a greater tendency for information unfavourable to the government to 'leak'. This reflects a general feeling that information relating to the costs of the ANZUS split has been kept from the public. Leaks of this type brought forth the above noted O'Flynn statement about disloyalty in January 1986. Most recently the section of the Officials Committee report titled *Impact of the ANZUS Rift: Chapter Three* was leaked at a time designed to compromise the 1987 *Defence White Paper's* optimistic view of the AFNZ's capacity for greater self-reliance in the South Pacific.

This then characterises the present state of feeling between government and the defence bureaucracy. Relations between the two are made difficult by a mutual suspicion, charged with what at times amounts to ill disguised contempt for opposing points of view. The military feels that the government has a faulty grasp of fundamental defence concepts, has refused to listen to departmental advice, and has failed to outline a plausible defence strategy for New Zealand outside of ANZUS. The Government, for its part, feels that the military's opposition to its policy is bureaucratic stonewalling which amounts at times to disloyalty towards their political masters.

2.9 Status of the ANZUS Treaty.

Although most aspects of US/NZ military co-operation under ANZUS ceased from March 1985, the US maintained that the overall mutual security commitment of the treaty remained operative. However, in July 1986 following the post ASEAN Ministerial Conference in Manila, George Shultz declared that there appeared to be no way of reconciling the differences between the two countries. The time had come for the two countries to "part as friends."¹²⁸ The Administration warned that;

New Zealand's withdrawal of an essential element of its ANZUS participation inevitably must alter the obligations of the United States with respect to its security responsibilities to New Zealand.(129)

The US security obligation to New Zealand was formally suspended "... pending adequate corrective measures" at the US/Australian bilateral talks in San Francisco on August 11, 1986.¹³⁰

Of itself this act added nothing new in the way of restrictions on military co-operation. However it is not without importance. The loss of New Zealand's formal status as an ally of the United States has left the way open for Congress to take further initiatives to ensure that, as William Broomfield puts it:

The laws of the United States should reflect this fundamental change in the foreign relations of the United States with New Zealand.⁽¹³¹⁾

This way of thinking may prompt some in Congress - and, for that matter, in the Administration - to go further in writing New Zealand out of the remaining defence co-operative agreements. Second, and perhaps more important, the San Francisco declaration of August 11 has become the symbolic end of ANZUS co-operation. It underlines the permanency of the split, and recognises the fact that the defence establishments in all three countries will henceforth proceed on the basis that trilateral co-operation no longer takes place. The *New Zealand 1987 White Paper* maintains that the AFNZ "...will continue to meet ANZUS obligations in conventional terms."¹³² It is unlikely that the Government has thought through all the implications of that pledge. Does it recognise, for example, that an attack on US forces in South Korea or the Philippines might, under the terms of the treaty, require New Zealand to "...act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes"?¹³³ In practice the New Zealand Government's claim still to be bound to the treaty rests ultimately on a specious legalism which ignores the substantive elements of what had been ANZUS co-operation, stressing instead the empty shell of a treaty which no longer has an operational heart. New Zealand's 'membership' of ANZUS involves no more commitment, and has no more meaning for defence policy than its continued membership of the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), which still exists because no member nation has bothered to abrogate it. It is true that clause ten of the ANZUS Treaty provides that the only means of ending membership is for the nation

concerned to give twelve months notice of its intended departure from the ANZUS Council. As none of the countries intends to do this ANZUS will remain extant in the way SEATO does. Mr Lange's focus on New Zealand's continued membership of ANZUS at the expense of the treaty's operational substance is caused more by a recognition of the strong public support for maintaining the alliance, than it is by an understanding of the country's security needs.

In *Table VIII*, (see over, page 48) I have attempted to summarise the present state of US/NZ co-operation over the various areas discussed in this paper. This is, of course, a highly schematic way of presenting information which ignores many of the important qualifications that have been brought out in this chapter. However it illustrates several important points. First, not all elements of the US/NZ military relationship were cut in March 1985, indeed there continues to be quite extensive co-operation under the terms of various UKUSA agreements, in areas of scientific research and, for the moment at least, in the logistic supply area as defined by several important Foreign Military Sales cases. Second, since March 1985, US prohibitions on co-operation have been extended to cover further areas, for example allowing the 1982 MOU on Logistic Supply to lapse, ending the exchange of scientists on secondment and formally suspending the ANZUS security commitment. Most recently the Administration has given support to the Broomfield Bill presently before Congress. It is possible that further areas of co-operation will be cut in time, and indeed the longer New Zealand remains estranged from the United States, the more likely this prospect becomes. Third, the most significant losses to the AFNZ have been in the areas of exercise experience, training, some aspects of operational planning, intelligence and surveillance information and, more generally, in the loss of access to the US defence establishment; something which had been a feature of the relationship prior to 1985. Last, one should note that the problems which these measures have caused the AFNZ have less to do with the acquisition of items of equipment - over which there have not been too many difficulties - but more so with maintaining the ability to put the

Table VIII: New Zealand Defence Co-operation with the United States: Mid-1987.

(Arrows represent possible or probable trends in the defence relationship. Question marks indicate insufficient information, but an educated guess as to the state of the relationship.)

	Fully Operational	Limited Co-op. X	No Co-operation
MOD Access to US Personnel		X ----->	
Exercises			
Multilateral with US			X
ANZUS			X
US/NZ			X
Training			
Private Company	X		
Safety related		X	
All other		<-----X	
Personnel Exchanges			
Attaches		X(NZ Govt reduced numbers)	
Exchanges		X ----->	
Operational Planning			
ANZUS			X
NZ/US			X
UKUSA arrangements			
ABCA	X		
CCEB		?	
AUSCANNZUKUS			
NAVCOMMS		?----->(?)	
NATO Code		?	
ASCC	X		
COMBEXAG			X
PAMS	X		
Scientific Co-operation			
TTCP	X		
Operation Deep Freeze	X ----->(?)		
Personnel Secondments			X
Logistic Supply			
Sales of Equipment		X (Slowed)	
1982 MOU			X
FMS Cases		X --(Broomfield)-->?	
Airlift Support	X		
Communications Support	X ----->(?)		
Naval Supplies	X		
Intelligence			
UKUSA intelligence		?	
US Processed Data			X
National/Technical			X
US Int. Summaries			X
US 'Raw' Int.		X	
Surveillance			
Radford-Collins			X
ANZUS MARSAR			X
NOSIS Data		X ("Selected")	
ANZUS Guarantee			X

equipment to effective use. To use a computer analogy, this is not a hardware problem, but rather a problem of software which relates to the armed forces' need for the provision of timely intelligence, maintenance of adequate training standards, production of effective doctrine for the employment of forces, guarantees of prompt resupply of ammunition, spare parts and equipment, provision of adequate maintenance services, and in the development of adequate command control and communications networks. In these areas, the armed forces have been very badly affected by the ANZUS split. In the following two chapters I propose to consider the extent to which the government has been able to overcome these losses.

Footnotes.

¹ Frank O'Flynn, "Formidable Challenges For All", address to the Diplomatic Corps, Wellington May 7, 1985. *New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review*. (Hereafter *NZ FAR*) Vol 35/2 April-June 1985. pp. 17-24. pp. 18-19.

² The signing of the ANZUS Treaty in September 1951 did not bring about major changes in the force structure and doctrine of the AFNZ. The treaty was taken to be a statement of political intent rather than the basis of new elements of military co-operation. Thus, while ANZUS provided what successive New Zealand Governments took to be a guarantee of security in the Pacific, New Zealand's defence interests continued to be tied to British Commonwealth concerns until the mid-1960's. When, in 1966 the United Kingdom announced its intention to reduce defence commitments in South East Asia, New Zealand's defence planners began to look to the need to develop a closer relationship with the United States. New Zealand's participation in the Vietnam conflict was, as Alan and Robin Burnett note, "...unquestionably taken in furtherance of SEATO obligations" (Alan and Robin Burnett, *The Australia and New Zealand Nexus*. [Australian Institute of International Affairs, Canberra, 1978] p. 93.), but it is equally clear that the Government was concerned to reinforce the United States' commitment to New Zealand under ANZUS by acting in a manner designed to solicit American approval. The New Zealand Government's *1972 Review of Defence Policy* spoke of the need to "...place increased emphasis on collaboration with allied forces, particularly Australian and United States forces" (Government of New Zealand, *Review of Defence Policy*. [Government Printer, Wellington, 1972] p. 23.) It was also the first white paper to recognise the retrenchment of British and United States power in the South East Asian region. (p. 9) There is some irony in the fact that the development of many co-operative defence mechanisms in the New Zealand/United States relationship begins only after the US announcement of the Guam doctrine and the beginning of military withdrawal from the South East Asian region.

³ See Peter R. Wills, *New Zealand's Military Establishment: Current Realities*. ('A submission to the Committee of Enquiry on the Future of New Zealand's Defence Policy by Peter Wills on behalf of Scientists Against Nuclear Arms, NZ') February 1986. Wills notes some 57 agreements and no doubt the list could be added to. See also Desmond Ball, "The ANZUS Connection: The Security Relationship Between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America." in T.J. Hearn (Ed), *Arms, Disarmament and New Zealand*.

(University of Otago, Dunedin, 1983) pp. 59-110 for a discussion of the US/NZ relationship as it operated until February 1985.

4 Interviews with US officials.

5 Owen Harries, "Crisis in the Pacific", *Commentary* Vol. 79/6 June 1985. pp. 47-54. p. 49. On the UKUSA relationship see, Desmond Ball, "The ANZUS Connection..." p. 75 ff and Jeffrey T. Richelson and Desmond Ball, *The Ties That Bind*. (Allen and Unwin, Boston etc. 1985) "Introduction".

6 There is one exception to this. In September 1987 the United States relaxed a prohibition on contact with the AFNZ. A brief article in the *Australian* newspaper reported that " 'Informal' meetings of US and New Zealand military personnel will be allowed". Interviews with US officials indicate that this does not mean that contact is being resumed at levels anything like those prior to the **Buchanan** incident. US officials will not visit New Zealand, but on some matters middle-ranking AFNZ officers will be able to travel to Hawaii on what is being called "informal and low key" visits to discuss policy issues. "US relaxes two sanctions on NZ" *Australian*. September 17, 1987.

7 See Appendix One.

8 Ministry of Defence, (Hereafter MOD) *Briefing Papers Prepared for the Minister of Defence*. (Released October 19, 1984) p. 13.

9 Material for the following sections is drawn from the MOD, *Report of the Ministry of Defence for the year ended 31 March for 1984 to 1986*. (NZ Government Printer, Wellington.)

10 Senator Gareth Evans representing the Minister of Defence Kim Beazley, *Hansard: The Senate*. March 19, 1986 Department of Foreign Affairs, *Background*. No. # 516. March 19, 1986.

11 Interviews with Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) officials.

12 Frank O'Flynn, "Introduction" MOD, *1987 Annual Report*. p. 6.

13 Information supplied to Mr Doug Kidd, MP by the MOD in his capacity as Member of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence. October 1985 Questions # 1 and 2. (Here after referred to as Doug Kidd, *Questions*.)

14 Interviews with RNZN officials. The Navy's dissatisfaction with present arrangements was most recently expressed by Rear Admiral Doug Domett, Chief of Naval Staff, on September 9, 1987. He claimed that the RNZN was "...losing a lot" by not being able to exercise with the United States Navy, and drew an analogy with another New Zealand combative endeavour; "How will you have good rugby players if you don't play with good rugby players?". "Navy 'loses' after Anzus break", *The Dominion*. September 10, 1987. More striking than the comments is the fact that a serving high-ranking member of the AFNZ was prepared to be publicly critical of government defence policy.

15 See, "Brits Back US Line", *Evening Post*. (Wellington) August 13, 1986. *Weekly Hansard*. (NZ) September 9 1986, p. 4048 and September 23 1986, p. 4676 and interviews with RNZN Officials.

16 Doug Kidd, *Questions*. 1986 Question # 51.

17 The document is quoted in "Review had real problems cut out", *Evening Post*. February 27, 1987.

18 Interviews with Australian Defence Department and Service officials.

19 Government of New Zealand, *Defence of New Zealand: Review of Defence Policy 1987*. (NZ Government Printer, Wellington 1987) p. 17.

20 Interviews with MOD Defence Central officials. See the MOD *1984 Briefing Papers*. pp. 12-13.

21 Doug Kidd, *Questions*. 1986 Question # 1.

- 22 Frank O'Flynn, answer to question number 37, *Weekly Hansard*. (NZ) July 10 1986 p. 2956.
- 23 Information supplied to the author by the MOD.
- 24 Doug Kidd, *Questions*. 1986 Question # 51.
- 25 Will W. Schaffer, "A-4 Skyhawk: Retrofit and Modernisation Extend Service Life" *Asian Defence Journal*. May 1986 pp. 60-66. p. 63.
- 26 Thomas Durell-Young, "New Zealand Defence Policy..." p. 25.
- 27 Interviews with US defence personnel. See, " 'Partial Thaw' in Anzus row", *Otago Daily Times*, September 17, 1987 and "US relaxes two sanctions on NZ" *Australian*. September 17, 1987.
- 28 Doug Kidd, *Questions*. 1986 Question # 37.
- 29 *New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act* (NZ Government Publisher, Wellington, 1987, # 86.)
- 30 Sir John Fieldhouse, *Transcript of a News Conference held in the Beehive Theatre*. Wellington, February 19, 1986. p. 6. See also Roger Mackey, "Nuke Bill threatens NZ's British links" *Evening Post*. August 28, 1986 and "Defence tie hiccup expected" *Evening Post* October 21, 1986.
- 31 MOD, *1986 Annual Report*. p. 9.
- 32 MOD, 1984 Briefing Papers. p. 11.
- 33 Desmond Ball, "The Security Relationship between Australia and New Zealand" in Desmond Ball (Ed), *The ANZAC Connection*. (George Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1985) pp. 34-52. p. 38.
- 34 Interviews with Australian and New Zealand defence officials.
- 35 Richelson and Ball, *Ties that Bind...* pp. 4-5.
- 36 MOD, *1984 Briefing Papers*. p. 14.
- 37 Major J.F. Koek (RAE), "ABCA. A Guide for International Standardisation." *Defence Force Journal* # 5, July/August 1977. pp. 51-54. p. 51.
- 38 Desmond Ball, "The Security Relationship..." p. 41.
- 39 Information provided by the MOD.
- 40 Information for the following paragraphs was provided by the MOD. See also, Keith Burgess, "The List" *Peace Researcher*. No # 9, 1986 (Christchurch, NZ); "Post Gains Details of US Military Links" *Evening Post*. March 8, 1985; "PM Urged to Give ANZUS Rift Details" *Dominion*. (Wellington) March 2, 1987; Peter Wills, *New Zealand's Military Establishment...*
- 41 Vice Admiral Sir Neil Anderson (Ret) KBE, CB, *Submission to the Defence Committee of Enquiry*. February 1986 p. 6. (Original held by the MOD, Wellington. Accession number 0967)
- 42 Frank O'Flynn, answer to question number 37, *Weekly Hansard* (NZ) July 10 1986 p. 2956.
- 43 ANZUS Rift document quoted in "PM Urged to Reveal ANZUS Rift Details", *Dominion*. March 2, 1987.
- 44 Doug Kidd, *Questions*. 1986 Question # 51.
- 45 Information provided by the MOD.
- 46 Defence Scientific Establishment (DSE), *Annual Review 1985-86*. (DSE, Auckland, 1986) p. 30.
- 47 MOD, *1986 Annual Report*. p. 42.

- 48 DSE, *Annual Review...* p. 43.
- 49 Doug Kidd, *Questions*. 1986 Question # 78.
- 50 Mr Bill Hayden answer to question on notice, question number 5210. House of Representatives March 20, 1987. Department of Foreign Affairs, *Backgrounder* # 578. July 1, 1987.
- 51 Richard Long, "NZ admits secret deal on base" *Australian*. April 9, 1987; and "Opposition endangering US base, says Lange" *Australian*. April 14, 1987. See also Questions for Oral Answer April 7, 1987 Question 1. p. 8352; April 8, 1987 Question 2. p. 8394 *Weekly Hansard* (NZ) # 39, 1987.
- 52 Sections of the Peace Movement have been in active opposition to Operation Deep Freeze for a number of years. For some samples of their writings on the operation see, Bob Leonard "Nuclear Submarine Communications Tested on the Ice" *Peace Researcher*. No # 8, 1985 (Christchurch); "Defrosting Operation Deep Freeze" *Boom Times*. 'Newsletter of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament' April 1984; and the pamphlet, *Militarisation in NZ - A growing threat*. (Friends of Great Barrier, March 1984)
- 53 Richard Long, "Opposition endangering US base..."
- 54 Interview with NZ defence official. For details of the contract see Roger Mackey, "\$149m Skyhawk Refit" *Evening Post*. February 27, 1986.
- 55 US Embassy press release quoted in, "US Decision nail in ANZUS coffin", *Evening Post*. February 3, 1987.
- 56 These were on "...co-operation in service air transportation, communication and electronics and procedural matters for supply support." MOD, *1985 Annual Report*. p. 35.
- 57 Mr G Ansell, (NZ High Commissioner to Australia) "The Defence Policy of New Zealand" *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute of Australia*. Vol 8/1 December 1985. pp. 41-44. p. 44.
- 58 Interviews with MOD and US Defence officials. See "Arms Cost Rise Tipped" *Evening Post*. February 3, 1987.
- 59 Some NZ\$29.6 million was expended on ammunition in the FY 1986/87, and NZ\$32.479 has been allocated for Fy 1987/88. (MOD, *Notes on Estimates 1987-1988*. [MOD, Wellington, 1987] p. 60.) This may be compared to the unit cost for specific ammunition types as assessed by the MOD in late 1985:
- | | |
|----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Bombs GP Mk 82 (500 lb) | \$ 2205 |
| Rocket CRV7 c/w Warhead HE | \$ 1150 |
| Cartridge 20mm HE | \$ 25 |
| Depth Charge Mk 2 | \$ 11,450 |
| IKARA missile | \$800,000 |
| Shell 4.5inch HE | \$ 371 |
| Cartridge 4.5inch | \$ 504 |
| Round 105mm HE c/w fuze | \$ 385 |
| Bomb 81mm HE | \$ 313 |
| Cartridge Ball 5.56mm | \$ 292 per 1000 cartridges. |
- (Source: Doug Kidd, *Questions*. 1985 Question # 25.)

A confidential source indicated to me that the RNZAF had produced some estimates (in 1985 dollars) costing ammunition requirements for the A-4 Skyhawk's three weapons systems, the Maverick and Sidewinder missiles and laser-guided bombs. The assessment was based on twelve A-4's flying three sorties per day, using each of their weapons-systems. One day's ammunition use, on these figures, would cost US\$4.5million (About

NZ\$9 million in 1985) It may, of course be objected that such a high estimate of ammunition usage is not realistic given the likely contingencies the AFNZ may face. However, this example illustrates the point that ammunition costs are extremely high. The only way the AFNZ could build up war-reserves to sustain 90 days of operations would be if it were assumed that there would be almost no use of complex weapons systems such as bombs, missiles and depth charges, and little use of other weapons.

60 Interviews with MOD officials.

61 State Department official quoted by Anne Summers, "Polls: NZ may feel US heat, but not us." *Times on Sunday*. (Aust) June 21, 1987.

62 Information supplied to Author by the MOD. See the MOD, *1984 Briefing Papers*. p. 12.

63 Press statement by Congressman William Broomfield, "New Zealand should no longer enjoy military assistance and arms export preferences." (Washington, January 1987.) See "Congress Bill to end ally status" *Canberra Times*. June 6, 1987 and "Reagan halts NZ cut price defence", *Dominion*. February 3, 1987.

64 The State department position on the Broomfield Bill was put at a September 22, 1987 hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee for East Asia and the Pacific. Mr Stapleton Roy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs said that the bill would "...codify into law present practices and the existing non-aligned security relationship between the US and New Zealand". At the same meeting Congressman Broomfield said that passage of the bill would have "little practical effect, but great symbolic effect" on the US/New Zealand Defence relationship. (See, United States Information Service *Backgrounder*. "Administration supports end of New Zealand preferences", September 25, 1987.) I believe that Broomfield underestimates the effect his own bill will have on the AFNZ. For example, costs which have hitherto been waived on the use of plant and equipment will, if charged, add quite a significant amount to the cost to New Zealand of repair, replenishment and maintenance work done in the 'States on RNZAF aircraft. In making this statement Broomfield was perhaps forgetting the small size of the armed forces against which his bill is directed. The 'cost' by US standards may be low, for the AFNZ however, it will represent a not negligible part of the defence budget.

65 As indicated by David Lange's "Ministerial statement - Military Coup, Fiji" *Weekly Hansard*. (NZ) May 12, 1987. p. 9010.

66 The *Powles Report* quoted by Desmond Ball, "The ANZUS Connection..." p.83.

67 MOD, *1984 Briefing Papers*. p. 11.

68 Deputy Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer, *Weekly Hansard*. (NZ) February 27, 1985.

69 David Lange, *Transcript of a Press Conference*. London February 28, 1985.

70 Frank O'Flynn, interview with the author. The Beehive, Wellington, February 18, 1987.

71 Doug Kidd, *Questions*. 1986 Questions # 3a and 3b.

72 "Thatcher freezes NZ from spy briefings" *Australian*. May 5, 1986 and "Lange 'barred NZ from UK intelligence' " *Australian*. May 6, 1987.

73 Information supplied to the author by the MOD.

74 Interviews.

75 Interviews.

76 Document quoted in Richard Long, "Australia link weaker, says leaked report" *Dominion*. February 28, 1987 and "Review had real problems cut out" *Evening Post*. February 27, 1987.

- 77 Hensley's testimony to the Parliamentary Select Committee of Foreign Affairs and Defence is reported in "Kiwis Not Fussed By ANZUS Fracas", *Asian Defence Journal*. # 11, November 1986. p. 106.
- 78 Document quoted in "Australia link weaker..."
- 79 Department of Defence, *The Defence of Australia 1987*. (Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1987) p. 4.
- 80 See Defence Minister Kim Beazley's statement on Australian policy in Parliament, (House of Representatives) March 21, 1985. Department of Foreign Affairs, *Backgrounders*. # 480, March 29, 1985.
- 81 Doug Kidd, *Questions*. 1986 Question # 3a.
- 82 Richelson and Ball, *Ties that Bind...* pp. 198-99.
- 83 Kim Beazley, *Weekly Hansard*. (House of Representatives) # 2, 1985. February 27, 1985. pp. 269-70.
- 84 Interviews.
- 85 Frank Cranston, "NZ faces bill over intelligence" *Jane's Defence Weekly*. August 9, 1986. p. 187.
- 86 Department of Defence, *The Defence of Australia...* p. 34. and Frank Cranston, "Australia's plans for new listening post" *Jane's Defence Weekly*. April 4, 1987. p. 582.
- 87 Government of New Zealand, *Review of Defence Policy...* pp 19, 32.
- 88 Brigadier Sir William Gilbert (Ret) "New Zealand Defence - The Aspect of Intelligence." *Submission to the Defence Committee of Enquiry*. February 26, 1986. (Accession number 1462.) p. 2.
- 89 David Lange, *New Zealand Intelligence Review: Statement by the Prime Minister; March 2, 1987*. Press Release from the New Zealand High Commission, Canberra.
- 90 Government of New Zealand, *Review of Defence Policy...* pp 33, 13.
- 91 Doug Kidd, *Questions*. 1986 Question # 3a.
- 92 Keith Burgess, "The List" ... p. 2.
- 93 Interviews.
- 94 Desmond Ball, "The Security Relationship..." p. 91.
- 95 Interviews.
- 96 The MOD indicates that the P3-K's can monitor surface activity over 30,000 square miles in one hour. Doug Kidd, *Questions*. 1986 Question # 54.
- 97 However the value of this development may be lost depending on the state of relations between Fiji and New Zealand as the former searches for a new governmental structure. Should New Zealand find that Fiji's new political set up is not acceptable to it, it will have to face the possibility of a continued ban on military co-operation. If that happens then it will lose access to an important RNZAF and RNZN staging post for operations into the South Pacific and a useful Army training ground for jungle warfare exercises. See David Barber, "Pacific politics will never be the same" *National Business Review*. July 10, 1987.
- 98 On the use of P3-K's see, Doug Kidd, *Questions*. 1985 Questions # 6 and 7. Also *Weekly Hansard*. (NZ) March 26, 1986 p. 735. On the Cook Islands Submarine affair see, Owen Wilkes, "Stooging Around the Cook Islands: The Mysterious Case of the Disappearing Submarine." *New Zealand Monthly Review*. Vol 27/10 October 1986 pp. 3-13 and David Lange's rebuttal, Post Cabinet Press Conference of October 20, 1986. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Press Statements*. No. # 18. October 31, 1986.

- 99 Doug Kidd, *Questions*. 1985 Questions # 6.
- 100 Kim Beazley, "Defence Initiatives in the South Pacific; Ministerial Statement" *Daily Hansard*. (House of Representatives) February 20, 1987. pp. 433-36. p. 435.
- 101 J.R.V. Prescott, *The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World*. (Methuen, London, and NY, 1985) p.201.
- 102 MOD, *1985 Annual Report*. p. 28.
- 103 MOD, *1985 and 1986 Annual Reports*. p. 28 and 29 respectively.
- 104 A set of not directly comparable figures has been taken from New Zealand *Hansard*. From these figures it is apparent that the ranks to suffer the highest level of resignations have been Major and Captain or equivalent. Once again, however it is impossible to link these resignations to any specific cause. The two six month periods with the highest levels of resignations are to March 31, 1985 and to September 30, 1985 - roughly covering the Labour Government's first year in office. One might speculate that some of these resignations were caused by the Government's anti-nuclear policies.

Officer Resignations from the services, measured in six month periods to the end of September and March: September 1984 to September 1986.

	30 Sept. 1984			31 Mar. 1985			30 Sept. 1985			31 Mar. 1986			30 Sept. 1986		
	A	N	F	A	N	F	A	N	F	A	N	F	A	N	F
Maj.-Gen.	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Brig.	--	--	1	--	--	--	--	--	1	--	--	--	--	--	--
Cnl.	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1	--	--	--	--	1	--	--
Lieut.-Cnl.	1	4	--	2	4	2	2	--	1	2	--	6	1	--	1
Major	3	8	7	5	7	3	4	10	2	8	3	1	2	4	4
Captain	9	2	4	9	7	19	4	9	24	5	5	7	3	5	5
Lieut.	5	3	1	4	3	2	1	2	4	5	--	2	4	2	3
2nd Lieut.	1	--	1	1	1	--	2	2	2	--	--	--	--	1	2
Totals	19	17	14	21	22	26	13	24	34	20	8	16	11	14	15

Source: adapted from *Weekly Hansard*. (NZ) June 30 to July 2, 1987 # 47. Questions for written answer # 25-29. pp. 10225-26.

- 105 MOD, *1986 Annual Report*. p. 29.
- 106 The RNZAF maximum salary is estimated to be about \$40,000, while the Air New Zealand maximum is about \$138,000. "RNZAF evaluating PC-9 amidst growing aircrew shortage" *Australian Aviation*. September 1987 p. 101.
- 107 MOD, *1986 Annual Report*. p. 29.
- 108 Interviews. See, Doug Kidd, *Questions*. 1986 Question # 48.
- 109 Doug Kidd, *Questions*. 1986 Question # 20; MOD, *1986 Annual Report*. p. 39.
- 110 Interviews.
- 111 Mace's comments are quoted in "Resignations of Senior Army staff 'worrying' ", *The Press*. (Christchurch) June 22, 1987.
- 112 *ibid*.
- 113 Interviews with MOD officials.
- 114 Doug Kidd, *Questions*. 1986 Question # 49.

- 115 Interviews with RNZN officials.
- 116 Interviews with RNZN officials.
- 117 Of the paper's seventeen signatories three had been Chiefs of Defence Staff as well as Service Chiefs, 13 had been Service chiefs and one retired at Brigadier level. Their statement is published under the title "Labour's ANZUS drift worries defence experts" in the *Evening Post*. October 9, 1985.
- 118 For the apology see "PM rues 'Geriatric Generals' publicity *New Zealand Herald*. (Auckland) October 14, 1985. and the Prime Minister's *Press Release* October 9, 1985.
- 119 At a *Post-Cabinet Press Conference* on December 5, 1985 Lange indicated that serving defence personnel would be allowed to make public submissions to the Corner Committee. However the Prime Minister had changed his mind by the following day. In a *Note to the Media* dated December 6, 1985, on the Committee's operation, Lange indicated that serving personnel would have to follow "normal procedures" by going through their Chief of Staff. In practice this meant that Service personnel would not be allowed direct access to the Committee.
- 120 Roger Mackey, "Army Chief's Plea to PM Rare Move" *Evening Post*. January 21, 1986. See also Dave Wilson, "Defence Weakness 'kept from public' ", *Dominion*. January 14, 1986.
- 121 Roger Mackey, "Army Chief's Plea to PM Rare Move" *Evening Post*. January 21, 1986; Dave Wilson, "Defence Weakness 'kept from public' " *Dominion*. January 14, 1986.
- 122 Frank O'Flynn, interviews with the author February 16 and 18, 1987.
- 123 Frank O'Flynn, statement made in a speech to the Navy League of New Zealand, October 12, 1985. Quoted in the New Zealand Navy League, *Submission to the Defence Committee of Enquiry*. February 1, 1986. pp. 17-18. (Accession number # 701)
- 124 Frank O'Flynn, in a speech to the House, August 5, 1986. *Weekly Hansard*. (NZ) August 5, 1986 p. 3697.
- 125 Frank O'Flynn, *Hansard*. (NZ) Vol 457. September 1984.
- 126 Interviews with MOD and service officials.
- 127 In the case of Rear Admiral Steward see, "Chief warns: Navy needs allies" *Evening Post*. 31, 1986. For Air Marshal Sir Ewan Jamieson see "Defence Review 'Flawed in concepts' ", *Dominion*. February 28, 1987. For the Prime Minister's attack on Jamieson see, "PM's credibility tested by flaws in attack on Govt opponents", *New Zealand Herald*. March 3, 1987; "PM maintains attack on defence critics", *New Zealand Herald*. March 4, 1987; and the resolution of the dispute, "PM apologises to Ex-Defence Chief", *New Zealand Herald*. March 10, 1987. and "Crown to pay costs of Mr Lange's apology", *The Press*. March 10, 1987. For Brigadier Hamilton's comments see, "NZ Losing Goodwill Among US Military", *New Zealand Herald*. April 23, 1987.
- 128 "Parting as Friends" *NZFAR*. Vol 36/2 April-June 1986. p. 7.
- 129 US Department of State, *Statement on the United States Disagreement with New Zealand over Ship Visit Issues*. July 2, 1987.
- 130 US/Australian Joint Communique, San Francisco, August 11, 1986. Reprinted in "Canberra sympathetic to US exclusion of NZ", *Australian*. August 13, 1986.
- 131 Congressman William Broomfield, "New Zealand should no longer enjoy military assistance..."
- 132 Government of New Zealand, *Review of Defence Policy...* p 31.
- 133 The text of the ANZUS Treaty may be found in Desmond Ball (Ed), *The ANZAC Connection...* pp. 124-26. The quotation is from article four of the treaty.

Chapter Three.

"Greater Self-Reliance".

For New Zealand to attempt to stand alone and self-sufficient would be absurd. We have neither the economic strength nor the scale.
(1983 Defence Review.¹)

...if self sufficiency is to be given even a partial goal then much more attention must be given to the supporting and logistic functions.
(Dr DJ Barnes.²)

The reduction in military co-operation between the United States and New Zealand forced the latter to review its defence policy in order to assess the consequences of the American action, and to define a new policy which could maintain the AFNZ's operational standards. The review process began in March 1985, immediately after the United States announced the first of its prohibitions on military interaction.³ It culminated in February 1987 with the release of a White Paper entitled *Defence of New Zealand: Review of Defence Policy 1987*. Thus the government spent just under two years in developing what the White Paper called "... the most fundamental change in defence policies that has occurred since World War II".⁴ The 1987 Review in fact re-affirmed three elements of defence policy which had been central to the previous two defence White Papers of 1978 and 1983,⁵ namely the development of a more self-reliant approach for the armed forces, a focus on the South Pacific region, and close defence co-operation with Australia.

The question of New Zealand's relations with Australia will be dealt with in the following chapter. This chapter considers the Labour government's policy of developing

greater self-reliance in the armed forces. More particularly, it analyses the 1987 Review's claim that, "for the first time" a New Zealand government had taken "the decisions on force structure needed to give practical effect to this shift of emphasis" away from being part of larger allied formations to having instead "a capability to operate independently... to counter low level contingencies in our region of direct strategic concern".⁶ It is argued that there is no significant difference between the force structure and strategic concepts of the AFNZ as outlined in the 1983 and 1987 defence reviews. Further, the Labour government policy of greater self-reliance has not addressed many of the difficulties faced by the AFNZ as described in chapter two.

Defining "Greater Self-Reliance".

In the March 31, 1985 *MOD Annual Report*, defence minister O'Flynn indicated that the "difficulties in [New Zealand's] security relationship with the United States" had meant that

...we must begin to place a more realistic emphasis on greater self-reliance in New Zealand's own region.... We are confident that this can be done with a moderate increase in defence expenditure and more effective targeting of our needs. On that basis New Zealand can certainly develop a more self-reliant defence capability.... We do not intend to shape our forces to act as an appendage to overseas forces ever ready to be deployed to wars in distant lands. We do intend that our armed services are ready to protect New Zealand itself and have the ability to move quickly to help our friends in the South Pacific should we be asked for help.(7)

O'Flynn's comments were typical of government statements which responded to the US actions after the **Buchanan** dispute by stressing that the AFNZ would develop a more self-reliant defence capability.

A country *wholly* self-reliant in defence would, in theory, not only be able to defend its territory against attack, but would also conduct its own research and development programmes for equipment; manufacture weapons systems and ammunition; develop a logistic support infrastructure for all defence equipment; conduct training and exercise programmes sufficient to maintain the professionalism of the armed services; develop contingency planning and operational procedures for employing the armed

services; and supply all surveillance and intelligence requirements. This level of self-reliance is far beyond New Zealand's limited capacity to achieve, nor does the government maintain that developing such a degree of independence is its goal. However, at no stage in the defence review process has the Labour government defined precisely what it means by the term 'greater self-reliance', or rather, it has not stated the degree to which it believes the country should become self-reliant. The green paper, *The Defence Question: a discussion paper*, asks the "fundamental question"

[what] is the extent to which we can meet the objective of ensuring our security in an insecure world through our own efforts or in co-operation with others (8)

But of more than 4,000 submissions to the Defence Committee of Enquiry, perhaps less than twenty would have considered the extent to which New Zealand could achieve greater defence self-reliance.⁹ The 1987 White Paper did, however, outline what it saw as a basic principle guiding defence strategy;

...this country must exercise greater self-reliance and, as far as possible, maintain the ability to meet or deter credible threats to our security or interests using our own resources.(10)

This is similar to the central tenet of Australian defence policy, described by the 1987 Australian defence White Paper as the need to possess

the military capability to prevent an enemy from attacking us successfully in our sea and air approaches, gaining a foothold on our territory, or extracting political concessions from us through the use of military force.(11)

However, the Australian government is under no illusions that it can provide all the military resources needed to achieve these goals. The government's view is that 'self-reliance' - in the sense of being able to independently deal with certain levels of combat situations - can only be maintained in an alliance with the United States. Australian self-reliance is therefore predicated on the continuing receipt of American-sourced intelligence information, preferential status in the purchase of military equipment and logistic support, access to training courses and developments in doctrine, operational procedures for the use of military equipment, defence related research and development findings, and the opportunity

for exercise experience with elements of US forces.¹² Paul Dibb concluded in his *Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities*:

It may appear to be a contradiction, but if Australia is to become more self-reliant in its defence capabilities, it will continue, for the foreseeable future at least, to require the tangible benefits of defence co-operation with the United States (13)

Thus, in defining 'self-reliance', a distinction has been drawn between the ADF's defence infrastructure needs -which cannot be fully met by Australia acting alone¹⁴ - and the ADF's ability to respond to certain levels of threat - which, it is presently assumed, can be done without recourse to direct American military intervention.

The term 'greater self-reliance' has not been used with as much precision in New Zealand as it has Australia. Assertions of the need to achieve greater self-reliance have not, for the most part, been elaborated upon.

In the 1987 New Zealand Defence Review, an assessment was made of the military capabilities needed to fulfil a policy of maintaining the ability to meet or deter credible military threats. It included giving "the highest priority" to intelligence gathering and assessment, especially of information from the South Pacific region, and added that the following were crucial to maintaining a posture of greater self-reliance:

The distances over which operations in the Pacific must be conducted, and the lack of support systems in the region, means that logistic capabilities acquire critical importance. The previous assumption that other countries could make up for our deficiencies is not appropriate to a policy of increased self-reliance.

[There] is the need to maintain adequate stocks and reserves.

...the armed forces need a substantial support infrastructure. Provision must be made for training, technical, logistic, communication, administrative, data processing and scientific support.

[There is] the need to maintain effective air and maritime forces. The forces must be able to conduct surveillance, maintain a presence, deter and detect airborne and sub-surface incursions and maintain an attack and self-defence capability. Range, endurance and readiness are the key ingredients. (15)

Some important questions arise from a consideration of these capability requirements. To what extent has the government made provision for each of these capabilities; what changes in AFNZ force structure and operational doctrines have been

brought about; in what ways has 'greater self-reliance' altered the strategic priorities of the AFNZ? These questions will be considered in the remainder of this chapter.

Strategic priorities.

Table IX (over the page), outlines the strategic priorities defined for the AFNZ in the 1987 defence review as compared to those put forward in the 1983 review¹⁶ - which were, in effect, a re-wording of the priorities established in the 1978 review.¹⁷ An examination of Table IX shows that there is only one significant difference between the strategic priorities as set out in the two defence reviews; the 1983 review places greater emphasis on the need to participate in ANZUS military activities¹⁸. In other respects the two lists of priorities are almost identical, save for some minor changes in wording. Both reviews identify the South Pacific as being New Zealand's area of primary strategic concern, both define the defence of New Zealand and protection of its EEZ and the islands for which it has statutory defence responsibilities as being the most important goal of the AFNZ. An important difference, however, is that while the 1987 review places emphasis on the AFNZ ability to operate alone in the region (or with Australian forces), the earlier reviews gave prime emphasis on their ability to operate as part of larger allied units. The 1978 review, for example, defined the policy objectives of the RNZN as being:

First, to be prepared to make an operational contribution to the wider strategic interests we share in the Pacific region with Australia and the United States, especially in the security of maritime lines of communication;

Second, to provide for the exercise of effective maritime control in New Zealand territorial waters, the EEZ, and as required, in our most immediate area of strategic interest in the South Pacific...and a readiness to deploy to meet political and in the last resort, military problems...(19)

The need to be able to operate with allied units was also stressed as part of the other services' operational requirements, albeit with not the degree of emphasis found in the case of the RNZN. Similarly, the 1983 review accepted this focus of priority, without stressing the point that the ability to operate with allied units might call upon skills different from

1987 Defence Review.

1983 Defence Review.

* To preserve the security and integrity of New Zealand, our 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone, and the Island States (the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau) for which New Zealand has defence responsibilities.

* To preserve the security and integrity of New Zealand and its 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone.

* To be able to mount an effective military response to any low level contingency within our area of direct strategic concern.

* To be able to respond militarily to low-level emergencies within the South Pacific.

* To maintain an expansion base which would enable New Zealand to respond to higher level contingencies within our area of direct strategic concern.

* [The forces should be capable of] timely expansion should the need arise, and for the mobilisation of wider national resources for national defence if required

* To promote the security and stable development of the South Pacific by providing practical assistance in defence matters to the countries of the South Pacific Region.

* To promote the security and stable development in the South Pacific by providing, on request, practical assistance in defence matters (including training, exchanges and exercises) to the countries of the region.

* to maintain close defence co-operation with Australia, and in particular areas (such as defence procurement, logistic support, and co-ordination of defence activities in the South Pacific) to develop a closer defence relationship.

*To develop further our defence cooperation with Australia, including defence supply and mutual logistic support

* To continue to meet ANZUS obligations in conventional terms.

* To maintain and strengthen our defence relationships with our ANZUS partners....To demonstrate our commitment to ANZUS by participating alongside allied units in military exercises on a regular basis.

* To maintain an ability to operate in our southern maritime region, and provide logistic support to our activities in Antarctica.

* To give support to New Zealand's scientific research and other interests in the Antarctic

* To contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in south east Asia by continuing to maintain an active role in the Five Power Defence Arrangements and mutually beneficial military assistance, training and exchange programmes with the countries of the region.

* To demonstrate a commitment to the maintenance of peace and stability in South East Asia by continuing the mutually beneficial military training assistance arrangements, exchange programmes and exercises with the countries of the region.

* To provide disaster relief assistance, resource protection, rescue and medical evacuation services to the community in New Zealand, and in the South Pacific.

* ... to provide assistance to our South Pacific island neighbours - on request - in surveillance, search and rescue and disaster relief activities.

* To promote peace and international security through contributions to United Nations peace-keeping operations.

* ... the structures and capabilities developed for these purposes.... will also enable the government to contribute to international peacekeeping activities should it wish to do so.

those required to protect New Zealand's immediate interests. This is a significant difference between the thrust of the 1987 review, and those which preceded it. But it is more a difference of approach than a new assessment of New Zealand's fundamental security interests, over which there has been no significant change between the 1987 and the 1983 and 1978 defence reviews.

Changes in force structure and operational doctrine.

Has the Labour government, as it claimed in the 1987 White Paper, taken "the decisions on force structure needed to give practical effect to this shift of emphasis" away from forces designed for operating with larger allied units to forces designed for independent operations (or operations with Australian forces only)?²⁰ One might begin by noting that the White Paper has very little to say about force structure. Only six pages are devoted to discussing New Zealand's required defence capabilities, and many comments made in this section of the report are extremely banal. For example:

The Navy needs the ability to operate throughout the area of direct strategic interest to New Zealand.

and;

training of pilots is an essential part of maintaining the RNZAF's effectiveness.²¹

These statements are not helpful in establishing what types of weapons platforms and systems would be of greatest use to fulfil New Zealand's defence requirements, or in outlining the defence roles they would be called upon to play.

The *Defence of New Zealand*, unlike the 1978 and 1983 defence reviews,²² is therefore lacking in any systematic analysis of AFNZ force structure and operational planning needs. This is in spite of the fact that the Defence Review Officials Committee Reports on which the White Paper was based were requested to outline the "changes in force structure and equipment which may be required to provide...capabilities" appropriate to a policy of greater self-reliance.²³ Indeed it appears that, even towards the end of 1987, a policy of systematically linking force structure planning to wider strategic assessments is

still lacking. Ministry of Foreign Affairs *Briefing Papers* prepared in August 1987 for the new Minister, Mr Marshall, point out that a "...detailed implementation programme is required" to plan for the

necessary re-equipment of the armed forces. The precise implications of the re-equipment decisions already taken and the further decisions necessary to implement the policy laid out in the Defence Review need to be set out so that the implementation can be tied closely to policy...(24)

This suggests that the force structure and operational planning initiatives introduced by the Labour Government have not, to date, been implemented as the result of a wholly coherent defence policy.

Table X (a) (on page 65) provides brief details of New Zealand defence spending, AFNZ manpower levels and force structure as at mid-1984, when the Labour government was elected. This can be compared with Table X(b) (on pages 66-7), which lists developments in AFNZ force structure and operational policy under the Labour government. Appendix two presents a detailed analysis of AFNZ weapons systems and platforms.

Table X (a) The Armed Forces of New Zealand as at mid-1984.

Population: 3,300,000.
 Military service: voluntary, supplemented by
 Territorial Army service: 7 weeks basic, 20
 days per year.
 Total armed forces: 12,692.
 GDP 1982/3: \$NZ 31.235 bn (\$US 22.783 bn).
 Est 1983/4: 33.0 bn (\$US 21.682 bn).
 Def exp 1982/3: \$NZ 652.10 m (\$US 475.638 m).
 Budget '983/4: 715.32 m (\$US 469.987 m).
 GDP growth: 3.2% (1982), 0% (1983).
 Inflation: 15.8% (1982), 12.6% (1983).
 Debt: \$US 10.2 bn (1982).
 FMA: \$US 0.51 m (1982/3), \$US 0.55 m
 (1983/4).*
 \$US 1 = \$NZ 1.3710 (1982/3), 1.5221
 (1983/4).

Army: 5,548.
 2 inf bns.
 1 arty bty.
 1 lt armd sqn.
 26 *Scorpion* lt tks; 72 M-113 APC; 10 5.5-in.
 (140mm) guns; 41 105mm (incl pack) how; 71
 81mm mor; 22 106mm RCL.
 RESERVES: 1,410 Regular, 6,288 Territorial. 6
 Territorial inf bns, 4 fd, 1 med arty btys, 1
 recce, 1 APC, 1 ATK sqns.

Navy: 2,827.
 4 *Leander* frigates: with 1 *Wasp* hel, *Seacat* SAM:
 1 with 1 x 4 SAM; 2 with 2 x 4; 1 with 2 x 4,
Ikara ASW.
 4 *Lake* patrol craft.
 2 inshore patrol craft.
 7 *Wasp* hel.

Base: Auckland.
 RESERVES: 708 Regular, 400 Territorial.

Air Force: 4,317; 33 combat ac.
 1 FGA sqn with 9 A-4K, 3 TA-4K *Skyhawk*.
 1 OCU with 16 BAC-167 *Strikemaster*.
 1 MR sqn with 5 P-3B *Orion*.
 2 med tpt sqns with 5 C-130H, 6 *Andover* (to
 retire), 2 Boeing 727-100C.
 1 tpt hel sqn with 6 *Sioux*, 11 UH-1D/H.
 1 comms sqn with 4 *Andover*, 3 Cessna 421C.
 Trainers: 4 *Airtourer*, 15 CT-4 *Airtrainer*, 3 F-27
Friendship ac; 3 *Sioux* hel.
 RESERVES: 866 Regular, 201 Territorial.

Forces Abroad: Singapore: 1 inf bn with log spt;
 1 spt hel unit (3 UH-1). Egypt (Sinai MFO): 35;
 2 UH-1 hel.

* Defence Mutual Assistance Programme.

Source: International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1984-1985*.
 (ISIS, London, 1984) p. 106.

Table X (b) Developments in AFNZ force structure and operational policy under the Labour Government 1984 to September 1987.

1) Major acquisition projects undertaken by the Labour Government.

Authorisation for funding.	Project.
March 26 1985	\$34.6 million for the purchase of a sixth Orion LRMP aircraft and updating of avionics, sensor gear and weapons fit to 'P3-K' standard.
May 1, 1985	\$148 million allocated to updating the A-4 Skyhawks in avionics and weapons systems.
October 4, 1985	\$7.28 million for the purchase of six sets of Strikemaster wings and centre section lower spar booms (January 26, 1987, approved an additional NZ\$2.07 million for one additional wing and boom set and seven fin modification sets.)
December 4, 1985	\$3.4 million for the purchase of remotely operated vessels and associated equipment for developing a counter mining capability.
May 9, 1986	\$ 21.1 million for purchase of 24 105mm Light Guns for the Army
May 26, 1986	\$27.6 million for purchase of a tanker, HMNZS Endeavour , and associated spares and equipment, for the at sea fuel replenishment of RNZN vessels.
June 9, 1986	\$ 8.316 million for purchase of 1000 Minimi light support weapons for the Army.
June 25, 1986	\$11.65 million for purchase of Sidewinder Air to Air missiles.
October 16, 1986	\$11.23 million for the purchase of Maverick air to ground missiles.
February 5, 1987	\$37.46 million for purchase of 18,000 Steyr rifles from Australia for the Army.

2) Major projects continuing to receive funding from the Labour Government.

Authorisation for funding.	Project.
May 26, 1980	\$19.29 million for 26 Scorpion tracked fire support vehicles (now \$24.2 million total cost estimate) 1987/88 cost; \$2.075 million.
September 23, 1981	\$72.23 million (now \$125.0 million total cost estimate) for Army 'B vehicle' replacement programme. 1987/88 cost; \$24.47million.
October 12, 1981	\$137 million (now \$167 million total cost estimate) for purchase of HMNZ Ships Wellington and Southland , and refit programme. 1987/88 cost; \$16.79 million.
May 30 1983	\$20.82 million for replacement of equipment in HMNZS Canterbury . 1987/88 cost; \$2.59 million.
June 25 1984	\$68.59m for purchase, and structural refurbishment of 10 A4 G Skyhawks from RAN.

Table X(b) continued.3) Major projects foreshadowed by the 1987 White Paper.

(These projects have yet to become major elements in budgetary planning.)

Frigate Replacement Project.

Logistic Support Ship to support Ready Reaction Force.

Development of an air refuelling capability to support A-4's.

4) Major alterations in troop deployments, operational policy

Increase of Army manpower strength by 300. Increase in strength of Ready Reaction Force from 1,000 to 1,500.

Return of the New Zealand Force in South-east Asia (NZFORSEA) based in Singapore to New Zealand in 1989.

Increased P3 - K LRMP surveillance effort in the South West Pacific.

Increased tri-service exercising of units in the South West Pacific.

Increased activity under the Mutual Assistance Programme (MAP) with Island Governments. (But, from May 14, 1987 cessation of MAP activities with Fiji.)

Development of a limited airborne commando capacity within the Ready Reaction Force.

Higher priority for intelligence gathering - especially maritime intelligence in the NZ area of direct strategic concern.

Development of a "national joint force command structure."

Sources: MOD, *Notes on Estimates 1986-1987 and 1987-1988*. (MOD, Wellington, 1986 and 1987) Part F Annex "K. Capital Equipment Projects." (In both volumes.); Government of New Zealand, *Defence of New Zealand... passim*; MOD, *1985, 1986 and 1987 Annual Reports. passim*.

The most important point to be made about these developments is that they do not fundamentally alter AFNZ force structure or operational doctrine from that which had been outlined in the 1978 and 1983 White Papers. Most of the major acquisition projects undertaken by the Labour government had been identified by the earlier reviews as projects which needed government consideration. The same is true also of the major projects

foreshadowed by the 1987 White Paper. This is not to say that all of these projects would have gone ahead under a National Party government²⁵ - indeed, the record of the National Party on defence spending suggests that some projects would have been dropped.²⁶ However, the point is that Labour defence policy has not changed AFNZ force structure. Rather, it has augmented the existing force structure, which was developed during the 1970's when operating forces with larger allied units was seen to be a major AFNZ priority.²⁷

Thus, the 1987 review's claim that it has "shifted the emphasis" of AFNZ force structure to a more self-reliant approach, is not borne out on a close examination of the government's weapons acquisition projects. Indeed many of the White Paper's claims on the development of 'greater self-reliance' cannot be taken at face-value. The paper infers, for example that the acquisition of an air refuelling system for the A4 Skyhawks will enhance a policy of greater self-reliance, but why this is so is not stated.²⁸ No attempt is made to consider the need for aerial refuelling for strike aircraft in a threat environment which, according to the White Paper, does not call for the possession of such a capability.²⁹

Similarly, the White Paper refers to the RNZN's *Leander* class frigates as "...unsuited in many respects to New Zealand's requirements". The paper then goes on to describe a ship which has "range, seakeeping, endurance, helicopter accommodation and surveillance and communications facilities". The review says that the ship will not need "advanced or complex weapons", but it will need "basic self-defence capability against air and surface attack and some ability against submarines".³⁰ The White Paper clearly infers that a policy of greater self-reliance will be enhanced with the acquisition of a less complex ship.³¹ However, the baseline characteristics for the new surface combatant (that is, a statement of preferred ship capabilities used for costing purposes) released by the RNZN in July 1987, indicate that the Navy's preferred option is for a ship with a much greater overall capability than the *Leander* class vessels presently in service,³² and a level of

capability which would find *optimum* performance in operations with large, allied naval formations.³³

Alterations of AFNZ operational doctrine referred to in Table X (b) (4) do indicate that some changes have taken place to bring about a closer focus on independent operations in the South Pacific. However, in many cases the changes are minor, and will have a very limited effect on New Zealand's capability to operate independently in the region. The increase in surveillance activity is tiny in relation to the area which has to be covered³⁴ and, as yet, no information has been released about how the government intends to increase its intelligence gathering activity in the region.³⁵ The Ready Reaction Force has been increased in size, and will be further increased with the addition of elements from the 1st Infantry Battalion,³⁶ to what Mr O'Flynn has called "a fully operational battalion group" by late 1989.³⁷ Yet there appears to be deep confusion within government and MOD circles about the role of the RRF in conducting independent operations in the South Pacific. The 1987 White Paper defines the function of the RRF as to provide

a small self-contained all-arms group which can be committed to independent low-level operations at short notice.³⁸

However, the prevailing assumption of the review was that such deployment would always take place in circumstances where the RRF had the support of the island government concerned. Nowhere does the 1987 White Paper consider the possibility that an island government may adopt policies inimical to New Zealand's interests, or that the RRF may be called upon to, say, evacuate a group of New Zealand nationals from an island under hostile conditions.³⁹ Following the military coup d'etat in Fiji, officials have had to consider the capabilities of the RRF in the light of such contingencies. No satisfactory conclusions have yet been reached. In interviewing one senior civilian MOD official, I was told that it would indeed have been possible for the RRF to evacuate New Zealand nationals from Fiji, even if the battalion was met with force from the Royal Fiji Military Forces. The airborne commando capability mentioned in the White Paper was pointed to as an

illustration of the RRF's capability to secure a harbour or airfield as an entry point.⁴⁰ Several officials in the Army, however, did not agree. They argued that the commando capability was too small to be of effective use, that Army regarded it as a means of retaining a professional skill, and perhaps as "an incentive to service". In the Army view, the RRF was thought to provide a convenient basis for force structure planning and allocations of financial priorities.⁴¹ Its chief function was seen as providing aid to the civil power for island governments, and perhaps a role like that undertaken in Rhodesia by New Zealand Army personnel taking part in the Commonwealth Cease-Fire Monitoring Group. It was most emphatically not seen as conferring upon New Zealand a self-reliant capability for launching military operations in the South Pacific region.⁴²

Thus, although it can be said that some of the government's operational planning reforms do provide a focus on greater self-reliance,⁴³ the capabilities of the services are what finally determines the extent to which New Zealand will be able to operate a more credibly self-reliant AFNZ.

One of the most apparent deficiencies of the 1987 White Paper is that it does not directly address many of the problems created by the loss of defence co-operation with the United States. It makes some acknowledgement of the need to increase intelligence collection, to provide greater logistic supply and support arrangements, and to increase exercise experience.⁴⁴ But no details are included in the White Paper to show how these problems might be overcome. Nevertheless the maintenance of these support, training and logistic functions is the key determinate in establishing the extent to which New Zealand can adopt a greater measure of self-reliance in defence policy. It cannot be said that, in any of these areas, the government has been able to overcome the losses of ANZUS co-operation. As was argued in Chapter Two, exercise and training arrangements are not adequate to the task of maintaining highly proficient armed forces; New Zealand's intelligence and surveillance capability is insufficient to provide for all its needs; nor does the defence budget allow for the creation of sufficiently large stocks of spare-parts and

ammunition to enable the AFNZ to maintain a self-reliant logistic support capability. The Labour government is not the first in New Zealand to under-rate the importance of these areas. It is, however, the first to do so without the logistic underpinning of various ANZUS arrangements.

This is not to say that the government could not implement a more self-reliant policy compared to that adopted by the National Party government in the 1970's. The limiting factor is defence spending. The government has remained equivocal about the overall level of spending required to develop a policy of greater self-reliance. The White Paper said that loss of US co-operation and the requirement of greater self-reliance "...will involve additional costs". But later in the document this was modified to the more cautious statement that "...the United States withdrawal of co-operation may entail some further continued costs beyond those already met".⁴⁵ In practice, Labour has decided to keep spending at about the level of two percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), broadly in line with the pattern of defence allocations since the early 1980's. Although defence budgets have increased in absolute terms since 1984, they have, at best, remained level in real terms, and declined relative to the increasing cost of military equipment, almost all of which New Zealand purchases overseas.⁴⁶ It remains to be seen whether or not the government will be able to sufficiently alter spending priorities within the defence budget to cover those areas most in need of additional funds - ammunition, spare-part stocks, fuel, costs associated with exercises and training. Thus far, however, the 'running costs' element of the defence budget, under which these items are accounted, has declined as a percentage of the total budget.⁴⁷ Critics of government policy have maintained that two percent of GDP is simply too small to allow for the development of greater defence self-reliance. Former Chief of Defence Staff, Air Marshal Sir Ewan Jamieson is of the opinion that spending would need to increase to about 2.5 percent of GDP - a 25 percent defence budget increase in dollar terms - " [if] New Zealand is to give substance to any future defence policy statements propounding greater self-reliance".⁴⁸ Such an increase is

politically out of the question, indeed Defence will do well over the next few years to not suffer a spending decrease in real terms.⁴⁹ Therefore, based on an assessment of the size of the defence vote, and the areas in which the Labour government has directed defence spending, it seems reasonable to conclude that financial restrictions will prevent the development of a credibly more self-reliant defence policy.

Contrary to claims made by the Labour government, the 1987 defence review has not developed a policy likely to give the AFNZ a credibly greater measure of self-reliance. The strategic priorities defined by the White Paper are almost identical to those set out in the 1983 and 1978 *Defence Reviews*; moreover the force structure initiatives proposed by the government do not significantly alter the AFNZ force structure developed in the 1970's for combined operations with allied powers. Some changes in operational doctrine will facilitate AFNZ operations in the region, but these are at present overshadowed by confusion about the roles and capabilities of the three services, and the levels of contingencies they can realistically be expected to deal with. Lastly, the review process has failed to address the problem areas created by the loss of defence co-operation with the United States. This, in part, is due to resource limitations on defence expenditure, but more so to the limits imposed on the AFNZ by New Zealand's own small scale. It is simply not possible for New Zealand acting on its own to duplicate the resources which were provided to it by association with the United States.

It is therefore argued that the Labour government has not been able to develop a more self-reliant defence policy. Chapter four will assess the extent to which the government has been able to implement the second plank of its policy - that is, a closer military relationship with Australia.

Footnotes.

¹ Government of New Zealand, *Defence Review 1983*. (Government Printer, Wellington, 1983) p. 19.

² Dr DJ Barnes, *New Zealand Defence: Submission to the Defence Committee of Enquiry*. (Unpublished paper. Committee accession number 1321.) p.7. Dr Barnes is presently Chief Director (Industrial) Department of Scientific and Industrial Research. He was formerly Assistant Secretary (Science and Electronic Data Processing), MOD.

³ For a description of the early part of the review process see, Frank O'Flynn, *Speech to the Canterbury Officers Club*, Christchurch. June 18, 1985. The Labour government brought down an interim defence review in May 1985 which, among other things saw an increase in the defence budget of NZ\$16 million - used to purchase ammunition stocks. In December 1985, the government announced the establishment of a "Committee of Enquiry on the Future of New Zealand Defence Policy", which was given the task to produce a report for the government (based on opinion poll research and public hearings) on public attitudes to defence and alliance questions. To facilitate the Committee's work a green paper was issued on December 20, 1985 entitled *The Defence Question: A discussion paper*. (Government Printer, Wellington, 1985). The paper set out the basics of government policy such as its unequivocal anti-nuclear stance, its desire to achieve greater self-reliance, and its focus on the South Pacific. It outlined the various defence options open to the country. The Committee of Enquiry produced a report entitled *Defence and Security: What New Zealanders Want* (Government Printer, Wellington, 1986) which was passed on to the government in July 1986, and released to the public in August that year. On September 8, 1986, the government established an interdepartmental Defence Review Officials Committee (DROC) to produce a preliminary report on defence policy to be "considered" by the Cabinet External Relations and Security Committee and the MOD's Defence Council. The DROC was made up of representatives from the three services, Defence Headquarters, MFA and Treasury, it was chaired by Dr John Henderson, formerly a lecturer in political Science at the University of Canterbury, now Head of the Prime Minister's Advisory Group.* The DROC was instructed to have its report ready for Cabinet by October 15, 1986. This provided only a six week period for conducting the review, which proved to be too short. The DROC ultimately presented its two-part report to Cabinet in late January and early February 1987. The first section reported on the defence capabilities required by the AFNZ, and the second on the implications this had for force structure and budget allocations. Both were classified and not released publicly although a section of one of the reports, *Impact of the ANZUS rift: Chapter Three*, (frequently mentioned in my chapter two) was leaked to the press. The document, *Defence of New Zealand*, was written by Henderson and based to some degree on the DROC's reports. After some editorial changes, Cabinet approved it for publication in the third week of February 1987. (See, Office of the Prime Minister, *Note to the Media*. December 6, 1985. [Background on the Committee of Enquiry]; Frank O'Flynn, "Press Statement on the Defence Review" September 11, 1986, MFA, *Press Statements*. October 7, 1986. pp. 7-8; "Defence Policy Under Review" *NZFA* Vol. 36/3, July-September 1986. p. 7; for the DROC's terms of reference see Doug Kidd, *Questions*. 1986 Question # 1. There is, as yet, no published account of the operation of the DROC; comments about the presentation of the two reports to Cabinet are based on interviews with MOD officials.)

* The Prime Minister's Advisory Group is comprised of between six and ten members which are hired usually from the private sector or academia to provide the Prime Minister with a source of policy advice separate from the Public Service. The Group was administratively located in the Prime Minister's Department until February 1987 when the Department was split into two offices; the Cabinet Office and the Prime Minister's Office, now headed by Henderson. The latter is comprised of the Advisory Group, Prime Minister's Public Service staff and a press office. See Jonathan Boston, "Advising the Prime Minister in New Zealand: The role, functions and evolution of the Prime Minister's Advisory Group". Unpublished paper given at the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, August 25-28, 1987. Auckland.

- 4 Government of New Zealand, *Review of Defence Policy...* p. 38.
- 5 Government of New Zealand, *Defence Review 1978*. (Government Printer, Wellington, 1978.) and Government of New Zealand, *Defence Review 1983*. (Government Printer, Wellington, 1983.) See below for an assessment of the continuity between these defence reviews.
- 6 Government of New Zealand, *Review of Defence Policy...* p. 38.
- 7 Frank O'Flynn, "Introduction", MOD, *1985 Annual Report*. pp. 4-5.
- 8 Government of New Zealand, *The Defence Question...* p. 7.
- 9 Very few public submissions to the Defence Committee of Enquiry attempted to answer the problems posed in *The Defence Question* discussion paper. Of the 4,128 submissions received, 1,076 were copies of a pro-ANZUS newspaper advertisement. Prime Minister Lange was inclined to discount their worth because, in his view, they were not valid submissions. (See Lange's letter of August 4 1986 in, Defence Committee of Enquiry, *Defence and Security...* p. 78.) However the vast majority of all submissions confined their comments to support for or against Labour's anti-nuclear and alliance policies. Most were no longer than a few paragraphs and could not be said to be any more intellectually persuasive than the newspaper advertisement submission. Mr Frank Corner, the Chairman of the Committee of Enquiry made the following comment on the quality of the submissions:
 Among the 3,000 odd, I would say there were 100 or 200... that were careful and thoughtful, some of them on the collective security side, some of them anti-nuclear. A tremendous number of them were emotive, often illiterate cries of pain, or the copying out of pamphlets or half-heard lectures that members of various parts of the peace movement gave to meetings around the country.... a great number of them drove me absolutely to despair. (Mr Frank Corner, Interview with the author, Wellington, February 3, 1987.)
- Of the 100 or 200 thoughtful submissions estimated by Mr Corner, perhaps fewer than twenty considered the defence requirements necessary for a policy stressing greater self-reliance. The majority of these concluded that New Zealand had a very limited capacity (if any) to develop greater defence self-reliance outside of ANZUS alliance co-operation. Some of the more relevant submissions are as follows: by DJ Barnes quoted above; by Sir Neil Anderson quoted in chapter two (p. 25.); Brig. LW Wright (Rtd) *A Submission to the Defence Committee of Enquiry*. (Accession no. # 0860); Maj-Gen RG Williams (Rtd), *A Personal Submission to the Defence Committee of Enquiry* (Accession no. # 1312); Lt. Gen. Sir Leonard Thornton (Rtd), *Submission to the Committee of Enquiry on the Future of New Zealand Strategic and Security Policies*. (Accession no. # 0031). A 'peace movement' submission which dealt in part with force structure and greater self-reliance issues was by the Just Defence Group, *Submission to the Defence Committee of Enquiry* (Accession no. # 2907).
- 10 Government of New Zealand, *Review of Defence Policy...* p. 7.
- 11 Department of Defence, *The Defence of Australia...* p. 1.
- 12 See, for example, the material benefits of the ANZUS alliance for the ADF as outlined in , Department of Defence, *The Defence of Australia...* pp. 3-5. 'Australia and the United States'.
- 13 Paul Dibb, *Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities (Report to the Minister for Defence)*. (Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1986) p.vi.
- 14 That is to say, not within the present levels of defence spending.
- 15 Government of New Zealand, *Review of Defence Policy...* see pp. 33-34 "Implications of Self Reliance."

16 The strategic priorities as listed in Table IX for the 1983 review are not as they were printed in the review, but set out rather to complement the equivalent priority as defined by the 1987 Review. However, neither the 1987 nor the 1983 list of strategic priorities were intended to be read as indicating a specific order of importance, so the relative placing on the list is not important.

17 *The 1978 Defence Review* outlined New Zealand's strategic priorities as follows:

- *...to preserve national security and control of our own area, including the EEZ; and to promote security in the region around us by;
- * Developing our defence activities with emphasis on the preparedness to respond to low-key emergencies in our own region.
- *...such forces will be the base for timely expansion of our defence effort should the need arise.
- * As far as possible with limited resources, developing, mutually beneficial training and exchange programmes with countries of the Pacific and to a degree South-east Asia.
- * Working towards an enhanced combined defence capability with Australia, including defence supply
- * Further strengthening relationships within ANZUS.
- * Making a capability for limited support of national research and other interests in Antarctica
- * Undertaking limited joint training and exercises by invitation in South-east Asia, as a demonstration of our continuing interest in stability and security in that region; at the same time, continuing to respond to requests from countries in the region for limited military training in New Zealand.
- * Making use of trained, mobile, and self-sufficient defence forces to provide, on request, military assistance, technical aid, surveillance of outside activities, search and rescue, and disaster relief services in the South Pacific.
- * Defence forces meeting these requirements will also confer a capability to contribute to international peacekeeping if required.

Government of New Zealand, *Defence Review 1978*. pp. 18-19.

18 Although the 1987 review professes a commitment to "continue to meet ANZUS obligations in conventional terms", this statement is more reflective of the Labour government's political position on ANZUS than it is an indication of ANZUS operational activities. Elsewhere the 1987 review states that:

defence planning must proceed in recognition of the reality that, between the United States and New Zealand, ANZUS is 'inoperative'. (p. 18.)

This is a more accurate reflection of New Zealand's present posture towards ANZUS co-operation, 'conventional' or otherwise.

19 Government of New Zealand, *Defence Review 1978*. p. 24.

20 Government of New Zealand, *Review of Defence Policy...* p. 38.

21 Other examples include:

* on intelligence:

In order to make a judgement on what is required to meet our security objectives, it is necessary first to ascertain what might present a challenge to these goals.

* on surveillance needs:

A priority for both naval and airforces is to patrol our maritime environment to detect, identify and monitor activities relating to our security needs and interests.

* on the preferred capabilities of a logistic support ship:

[it] should have the ability to carry troops, equipment and stores.

* on the Airforce:

The RNZAF also has the important role of deploying and supporting ground forces with fixed wing, helicopter and fighter attack aircraft.

Government of New Zealand, *Review of Defence Policy...* Ch 7 "Defence Capabilities" pp. 32-37. This thesis is not the first work to be critical of the intellectual content of Dr John Henderson's *Review of Defence Policy*. The White Paper was not well received when it was released in February 1987. Mr Frank Corner referred to it as the work of "amateurs", Sir Ewan Jamieson called it wordy and insubstantial, a document long on rhetoric and short on specifics. Peace Activist Mr Owen Wilkes referred to the document as "disappointingly short", and claimed that the New Zealand public "...deserves to know more about how we are to be defended now we are nuclear free". For early reactions to the White Paper, see; "Defence review 'flawed in concepts' ", *Dominion*. February 28, 1987; "Boring defence debate irks O'Flynn", *Dominion Sunday Times*. March 1. 1987; "Defence review critic talks of 'tunnel vision' ", *Evening Post*. February 27, 1987; "Review had real problems cut out", *Evening Post*. February 27, 1987; "RSA chief faults defence policy", *Dominion*. March 3, 1987. More lengthy academic considerations of the White Paper have also tended to be critical. See, John Beaglehole, "Defence White Paper lacks strong commitment to Western Stance", *Pacific Defence Reporter*. May 1987 pp. 31-4; and Ramesh Thakur, "New Zealand Defence Review 1985-1987", *Asian Defence Journal*. July 1987. pp. 56-65. Thakur too, advances the charge of banality, and concludes:

Grandiloquent claims to the contrary notwithstanding, the paper lacks innovative thrust and imaginative concepts to rescue the country from a defence policy awash upon a tidal wave of platitudinous seas. (p. 64.)

22 The 1978 and 1983 *Defence Reviews* were 58 and 51 pages long respectively. Both devoted about twenty pages to a discussion of force structure and operational planning issues. Although it could not be said that the reviews provided an exhaustive analysis of these topics, they did provide an outline of the functions of the various sections of the services, and discussed their re-equipment needs. The 1987 White Paper, by comparison, began with two apparently contradictory remarks. At paragraph 1.2 it said:

This White Paper completes this Government's comprehensive review of defence policy which began with the May 1985 Interim Review. (p. 5.)

The following paragraphs, however, suggested that the White Paper was neither comprehensive nor complete:

The next major step will be the development of a comprehensive policy bringing together the full range of factors, both domestic and international, that are of importance for the preservation of New Zealand's security and well-being. ... Decisions on the required military capabilities and the major items of equipment will be made by Government within the policy framework outlined by this statement. (p. 5.)

One could have been forgiven for thinking that this *was* the aim of the defence review process. The government had made several statements during 1985 that re-equipment decisions were being delayed pending the findings of the review process. But the tenor of the review's opening pages did not suggest that a co-ordinated study of New Zealand's force structure needs had yet taken place. (For some examples of government statements on the delay of re-equipment programmes until the release of the review see, Frank O'Flynn, "Introduction" MOD, *1986 Annual Report*. pp. 4-9; and Frank O'Flynn, "Defence Policy" Speech to the New Zealand Returned Servicemens Association, Wellington June 9, 1986. MFA, *Ministerial Speeches*. No. # 6, July 15, 1986. pp. 1-9.

23 For the DROC's terms of reference see Doug Kidd, *Questions*. 1986 Question # 1.

24 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Briefing Papers Prepared for the Minister of Foreign Affairs*. (Released September, 1987) p. 13.

25 Nor can one infer that all the foreshadowed projects will go ahead under the Labour government. See the following chapter for a discussion of the joint new surface combatant project with Australia.

26 For example, many officials in the MOD are of the opinion that a National government would not have proceeded with the decision to purchase a tanker for the Navy. (Interviews with MOD officials.) During the Nationals' term in office from 1975 to 1984, defence spending was kept at the absolute minimum consonant with maintaining what the *1978 Defence Review* called "viability and credibility" (p. 26) with New Zealand's ANZUS allies. One result of this was that many force structure decisions were delayed. The *1983 Defence Review* expressed a concern that "deferment of this kind leading to a period of under-investment in capital equipment can have drastic long-term consequences by building up an insurmountable peak of requirements at a later date". (p. 46) Thus one legacy of the National government's underspending in defence has been to make the force structure problem much more acute for Labour.

27 To the extent that the addition of a small tanker will enhance RNZN capabilities for independent operations in the South Pacific, the point can be made that the MOD had identified this as a desirable capability almost ten years ago, in the *1978 Defence Review* (p. 29.) The possession of a tanker, however, was not seen in 1978 as conferring a measure of self-reliance sufficient to minimise the value of defence co-operation under ANZUS.

28 Government of New Zealand, *Review of Defence Policy...* p. 36.

29 Government of New Zealand, *Review of Defence Policy...* p. 11. The conclusion to the review's section on 'Threat Assessment' states;

New Zealand is not threatened by invasion or large scale attack and no likelihood of such an attack is foreseen in the next decade. Indeed, the contingency of invasion is so remote that it need not form the basis of our defence strategy. Defence efforts must focus on more credible and feasible lower level threats, while maintaining a basis for expansion should more serious threats emerge.

None of the 'more credible' threats would warrant a New Zealand military response involving the use of strike aircraft. The review does not, therefore, present an intellectually credible justification for the maintenance of a strike-wing in the RNZAF. Their justification is made on the basis of deterring a threat (p. 36) which the review earlier says does not exist. The *1978 Defence Review* provided a more credible reason for maintaining a strike-wing which related to the need to maintain air-crew proficiency in skills which could not be readily gained in a short space of time should a threat to security suddenly emerge. (p. 37.)

30 Government of New Zealand, *Review of Defence Policy...* p. 34.

31 As such, the *Defence of New Zealand* seemed more concerned about Labour Party sensitivities over the 'militaristic' connotations of the term 'frigate' than it did to the need to describe the required capabilities for naval operations in New Zealand's region of direct strategic concern. For indications of Labour Party concern about the 'offensive' nature of frigates, and the government decision not to call the *Leander* replacements by that name, see "Boring defence debate irks O'Flynn" *Dominion Sunday Times*, March 1, 1987; "One new vessel, but no frigates" *Evening Post*, February 4, 1987; Sections of the Labour Party have long opposed the maintenance of frigates in the RNZN on the grounds of cost, and also that they have a weapons capability far in excess of that needed. The Peace and Justice Forum, a peace group linked to the Labour Party via the Wellington Labour Regional Council has acted as an anti-frigate lobby for some years, and has enjoyed access to NZLP policy making bodies, as well as the Minister of Defence. (See their, *An Alternative Defence Policy: A Paper for Discussion* [Peace and Justice Forum, Wellington, March 1985] pp. 14-15, for a statement of their opposition to frigates.)

32 Royal New Zealand Navy Background, "Replacements for the frigates: new surface combatant project" July 15, 1987. MFA, *Press Statements*. No. # 10. August 13, 1987. pp. 12-14.

33 The main difference between the new surface combatant and the *Leander* class frigates is that the former would have a longer range. In other respects the vessels will be configured to perform functions such as ASW and convoy support.

34 See, pp. 37-9 above.

35 See, pp. 35-6 above.

36 That is, the battalion presently based at Singapore. The recall of NZFORSEA (comprised of the 1st Infantry Battalion, No. 141 Flight RNZAF piloting Iroquois helicopters and support elements) was announced on December 23, 1986. Once again, it puts into effect a measure originally proposed in the *1978 Defence Review*. (pp. 33-4.) The recall suggested then did not take effect because of the cost involved in housing the battalion on its return. Although elements of the 1st Battalion will join the RRF, it appears that no satisfactory role has yet been designated for the battalion group. (Interviews with MOD personnel.)

37 Frank O'Flynn, "Introduction", MOD, *1987 Annual Report*. p. 6. It should be noted that does not mean that New Zealand has a readily deployable battalion of infantry troops. The RRF is composed of a variety of units; infantry, artillery, armoured reconnaissance and supporting arms and services. (See, MOD Public Relations Directorate, *Armed Forces of New Zealand*. [Government Printer, Wellington, 1986] pp. 21-22. It is called a battalion more for administrative purposes - the name is not a true indication of the numbers of troops it can readily deploy. (Interviews with NZ Army Officials.) The Force was developed as a result of the 1983 Defence Review, but neither the Labour government nor its National predecessor have provided a reason as to why it is based on a battalion strength force. In 1957 the New Zealand government considered that a division was the smallest strength necessary to deploy an operational forces overseas. Since then the number has constantly declined to most recently that of a battalion group in 1983. The reduction in size has been brought about more because of political and financial constraints, rather than considerations of the optimal number needed to serve New Zealand's interests. Major JG Rolfe, "The New Zealand Army: An alternative for deployment", *The New Zealand Army Journal*. No. # 2, July 1986. pp. 1-7.

38 Government of New Zealand, *Review of Defence Policy...* p. 35.

39 On the South Pacific, the White Paper comments:

...the South Pacific is one of the most peaceful regions of the world. The Island states' transition to independence, especially when compared to other regions, has been orderly. Island nations have displayed a commitment to stable, democratic, non-ideological forms of government. (p. 12)

The only envisaged threat to the islands is that their "size and economic vulnerability ...[leave] them potentially open to externally sourced attempts to change their governments". (p. 13) The Fiji coup was, of course, unexpected, but one could not be accused of indulging in hindsight to say that the 1987 White Paper had a remarkably sanguine view of intrinsic sources of regional instability.

40 Interview with civilian MOD official.

41 See the *1983 Defence Review*. p. 28.

42 Interviews with New Zealand Army officials. The point about the RRF's limited capabilities has been forcefully expressed by Lieutenant General (Rtd) Sir Leonard Thornton:

...we would be wise not to fool ourselves, and the trusting island governments [for which New Zealand has defence obligations], that those regions can be made secure. Just because we can mount a company operation on a Pacific beach, in the piping days of peace, with a frigate in the background and a Hercules or two dropping parachutists and supplies, it does not follow that we could operate in the same locality in a strategically hostile situation. There is danger that some people other than Pacific Islanders may have already become confused on this point.

"The 1986 Whitmore Lecture - Defence in the Eighties", *The New Zealand Army Journal*. Special Edition, 1986. p. 12.

43 Even here there are some problems. For example amendments to the Defence Act of 1971 (carried out in July 1987), which enable the Chief of Defence Staff to command a tri-service force, and alterations of the structure of Defence Headquarters (in February 1987), to facilitate tri-service co-ordination, have not yet resulted in close contingency planning between the three services. It may take some time for intra-service rivalries to be broken down sufficiently to ensure that useful contingency planning is co-ordinated between the services. (Interviews with MOD officials.)

44 The White Paper's comments on Intelligence and surveillance are quoted here on page 60. On exercising, the document says:

In the past our operational standards have been measured against other major western nations.... The challenge that lies ahead is to maintain the highest possible degree of professionalism, while relating training to the types of contingencies that are likely to occur in our region, and operations appropriate to deal with them. (pp. 19-22.)

45 Government of New Zealand, *Defence of New Zealand*. pp. 19, 27.

46 The following table provides some major indices of New Zealand defence expenditure.

A) Major indices of New Zealand defence expenditure: 1976-77 to 1987-88.

	Total Gross Defence Expenditure (year dollars) NZ\$million	Defence Expenditure 1986/87 dollars NZ\$million	Relationship to GDP (percent)	Spending Per Capita	
				US\$	NZ\$
1976-77	214.83	639.86	1.56	69	69
1977-78	252.17	667.78	1.65	77	81
1978-79	299.51	700.65	1.71	99	95
1979-80	346.09	687.03	1.66	111	110
1980-81	455.94	778.52	1.89	138	144
1981-82	593.65	886.72	2.06	151	182
1982-83	652.13	913.82	2.03	138	199
1983-84	672.98	933.06	2.10	124	237
1984-85	765.41	923.77	1.92	n.a.	230
1985-86	870.46	951.19	1.94	n.a.	265
1986-87	1,095.96	-----	2.10 (est)	n.a.	330
1987-88(est)	1,301.50	-----	2.23 (est)	n.a.	

Sources: MOD, *Notes on Estimates 1987-88* (pp. 76-7.)

ISS, *The Military Balance 1976-77 to 1986-1987* inclusive, for US per capita spending figures. NB these were given for the calander year.

Table A shows that when past budgets are given values in 1986/87 dollars, the last two budgets represent only a minimal increase, and perhaps a decrease when one factors out \$48.193 million and \$111.009 million Goods and Services Tax (GST) for 1986/87 and 1987/88 respectively. The per capita figures show the decline in value of the NZ dollar against the US dollar, from parity in 1976/77 to slightly over half the value in 1983-84. The trend continued into 1985, whereafter the NZ dollar began to appreciate against foreign currencies.

On the escalating costs of military equipment, Barnes quotes figures to indicate that a ship which might have cost some \$2 million in the 1960's, cost (in 1984 terms) over \$200 million. DJ Barnes, "Logistics, industry and science" in Desmond Ball, (Ed), *The ANZAC Connection...* (pp. 53-67. p. 59.)

47 The following table shows the major groupings of defence expenditure as a percentage of budget allocation.

B) Major groupings of defence expenditure expressed as a percentage of the budget allocation; 1976-77 to 1987-88.

	Manpower	Running Costs	Capital Works	Capital Other	GST ¹
1976-77	58.2	30.56	2.58	8.66	----
1977-78	56.44	32.74	2.14	8.68	----
1978-79	59.77	30.48	3.08	6.67	----
1979-80	58.75	32.71	2.64	5.9	----
1980-81	55.37	33.91	2.49	8.23	----
1981-82	51.65	32.55	2.62	13.18	----
1982-83	51.16	31.61	2.9	14.33	----
1983-84	49.4	30.7	7.2	12.7	----
1984-85	47.1	29.7	6.4	16.8	----
1985-86	44.9	30.9	7.2	17.0	----
1986-87	42.4	27.2	7.7	18.3	4.4
1987-88(est) ²	38.4	28.8	7.2	17.1	8.5

Notes: 1. A Goods and Services Tax of ten percent was introduced by the Labour Government on October 1, 1986.

2. 1987-88 figures are an estimate of expenditure.

Sources: MOD, *Notes on Estimates* for years 1986-87 (p. 121.), and 1987-88 (p. 77.)

Table B shows the four major categories of spending within the defence budget. The Labour Government has continued the trend to spend more in the 'Capital other' section, under which equipment purchasing programmes are listed. The increasing percentage allocation is itself a recognition of the spiralling cost of military equipment. However, perhaps the most important category from the perspective of developing a policy of greater self-reliance is 'Running Costs', under which heading such things as ammunition, spare parts, fuel, exercise and training times are accounted. The figures illustrate that running costs are declining as a percentage of the defence budget.

48 Air Marshal (Rtd) Sir Ewan Jamieson, *New Zealand Defence Policy: A Professional Viewpoint* ... p. 8. Others believe Jamieson's estimate is too low; Brigadier Hamilton, for example, is of the opinion that spending would have to double from its present level in order to achieve a significant level of greater self-reliance. See, "NZ Losing Goodwill Among US Military" *New Zealand Herald*. April 23, 1987.

49 The Minister of Finance, Mr Roger Douglas, has announced that a review of the MOD administration and resource management will take place over the next few years. (See his *Budget Speech of June 18, 1987*. [Government Printer, Wellington, 1987] p. 23) Douglas is reported to be of the opinion that defence spending could be cut by as much as \$300 million a year. (*Trans Tasman*. No # 87-683. July 9, 1987) He had already targeted the MOD to lose \$50 million a year for five years starting with the 1986/87 fiscal year. (See, Roger Douglas, *Statement on Government Expenditure Reform May 19, 1986*. [Government Printer, Wellington, 1986] pp. 19, 26.) The cut was implemented for the first year of the proposal, but not for the second, 1987/88. With the second-term Lange government deciding to focus heavily on domestic issues by reforming the costly State education and health services, it is my opinion that defence spending will probably decline in real terms over the next few years.

Chapter Four.
The ANZAC Relationship.

...from the very beginning ANZAC did not indicate a close and indistinguishable union but rather it emphasised the uniqueness of the two nationalities involved.

(Chris Pugsley¹)

It doesn't pay to team up with them.... it is a great pity that we are so much victims of geography that in a sense we must play in a team with them.

(Sir Carl Berendson on Australia²)

The purpose of this chapter is to consider some of the difficulties which lie in the way of the New Zealand Labour government developing closer defence relations with Australia. One must examine how the relationship has developed since the ANZUS split, and what the prospects are for it growing closer from late 1987 onwards. I also consider the extent to which a closer association may *disadvantage* the AFNZ.

At Gallipoli, Australian and New Zealand troops developed a level of respect and camaraderie for each other which has never left the two countries' armed services.³ However, the spirit of ANZAC co-operation has not always characterised the relationship between governments over the making of strategic and defence policy. The rhetoric of politicians on both sides of the Tasman has tended to obscure differences of policy on these matters.⁴ Indeed, taking into account the shared historical, ethnic, linguistic, political and cultural base of Australia and New Zealand - as well as their geographic proximity - the extent to which their governments have *differed* on strategic and defence matters is quite remarkable. The difference of approach on the anti-nuclear question is not therefore the first to divide the ANZAC governments,⁵ but it is arguably the most important, and the one which has caused the widest disparity in security outlook.

As was the case with the New Zealand/United States defence relationship, the signing of ANZUS in 1951 (and of the ANZAC Agreement of 1944) did not herald the rapid development of defence co-operation between New Zealand and Australia. New Zealand governments were considerably more reticent than Australia about the benefits of the American alliance,⁶ and, during the 1950's and early 1960's the primary focus of AFNZ defence thinking and co-operative activity remained on the United Kingdom.⁷ This association prompted New Zealand's entry into the Korean war, the Malayan 'Emergency', and 'Confrontation' with Indonesia. New Zealand's extremely reluctant commitment of forces to Vietnam in April 1964, was made less out of support for American policy in South Vietnam than because it followed a pattern of defence commitment to the region.⁸

The impulse to increase defence co-operation with Australia began with the foreshadowed withdrawal of British forces from South East Asia in the late 1960's. Despite government statements about the two countries forming a "single strategic entity", and calls to give material effect to elements of defence co-operation, progress in enhancing co-operation during the 1970's was slow.⁹ Indeed, the defence relationship seemed to suffer from benign neglect. Although the AFNZ and the ADF enjoyed a close affinity and interoperability, there were few formal arrangements giving definition to this co-operation. Perhaps the most important element of co-operation was officer training - New Zealand Army officer-cadets had been training at Duntroon since 1911 - and combined exercises. But little had been achieved in the areas of joint planning or developing logistic arrangements, nor had Australia established itself as a supplier of weapons to the AFNZ.

Only in the 1970's did trilateral ANZUS and bilateral ANZAC military co-operation become central to AFNZ force-structuring policy and operational planning. At government level, different interests and strategic priorities mitigated against creating a tight network of co-operative arrangements. From the New Zealand perspective, there was some concern that the size of Australia (and the ADF in comparison with the AFNZ) would lead it to

dominate all formal arrangements. ANZAC rhetoric aside then, the two governments have not been inclined to make the defence relationship as close as many thought was possible or desirable.

ANZAC co-operation after the ANZUS split.

The changed circumstances of US/New Zealand relations forced both the Labour government and the defence bureaucracy to reassess the ANZAC relationship. Australia had assumed a heightened importance for both groups. The Labour government recognised that the New Zealand population supported the concept of alignment, and especially so of a defence association with Australia. Thus, in the context of a weakened link with the United States, it became a matter of political necessity to highlight the ANZAC relationship.¹⁰ All New Zealand governments have acknowledged the importance of the defence relationship with Australia¹¹ but now that relationship had assumed even greater significance for the AFNZ. With only some minor exceptions¹² Australia had become New Zealand's sole source of 'NATO standard' exercise and training experience, and it had assumed a new dominance in the supply of intelligence and surveillance information, and in some areas of logistic supply and support. It followed that, shortly after the **Buchanan** incident, the government began to speak in terms of developing a closer defence association with Australia. Defence Minister O'Flynn expressed this intention in his introduction to the *MOD 1985 Annual Report*:

Curtailment of defence co-operation by the United States has...underlined the importance to New Zealand of exercising and training with Australian forces. ... In essence, our aim is to increase co-operation and so preserve, to the extent that our joint resources permit, the present satisfactory security situation in the region.(13)

The Australian perspective was somewhat different. Prior to the **Buchanan** dispute Prime Minister Hawke had made it clear to David Lange that Australia supported the US position on port access for nuclear powered and/or capable ships.¹⁴ Following the US decision to downgrade defence co-operation with New Zealand, Canberra took steps to ensure that Australian bilateral relations with both the United States and New Zealand were

preserved. The ANZUS Council meeting scheduled to be held in Canberra in July 1985 was cancelled, and in its place two sets of bilateral meetings were arranged; one involving talks between Hawke, Hayden and US Secretary of State George Shultz, and the other at a slightly lower official level involving talks between Kim Beazley, the Australian Minister for Defence, and Frank O'Flynn in Wellington.¹⁵

Beazley's visit to Wellington between March 31 and April 4, 1985 set the official tone of Australian policy towards New Zealand following the ANZUS rift. In a speech to the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Beazley outlined what he referred to as the "valuable - and in some ways irreplaceable - co-operation on defence matters" between Australia and the United States, but at the same time acknowledged that, in the ANZAC relationship it was important to

minimis[e] the effects of our differences, so that our efforts in support of shared interests will continue to be complementary, mutually reinforcing and effective.¹⁶

The joint communique which followed Beazley's meeting with O'Flynn spoke of the need to build on the bilateral relationship, and it pointed to the decision to hold bilateral military exercises in place of trilateral ANZUS exercises, and to consider how training and logistic supply arrangements might be expanded.¹⁷

Co-operation has continued across all of these areas, to the extent that the MOD *1987 Annual Report* refers in glowing terms to the "... wide-ranging and intensive" military interaction between the two countries. It points out that more combined exercises are taking place and more New Zealanders are training in Australian institutions than prior to the ANZUS split.¹⁸ This is indeed true, but it cannot therefore be inferred that this activity necessarily overcomes the losses sustained by the AFNZ with the end of US co-operation. In Chapter two, I discussed the various elements of Australia/New Zealand defence co-operation as they had been affected by changes in the New Zealand/United States relationship. These findings are summarised here to recapitulate on the present state of ANZAC co-operation.

Exercises. New Zealand participation in what had once been solely ADF exercises has increased. These however are usually small scale exercises. The RNZN especially, is concerned at the lack of opportunities to conduct exercises in such areas as ASW, naval control of shipping, and control of sea lanes of communication. For all services, however, exercises with the ADF although very important can provide neither the scale, range and diversity of operations, equipment and skills encountered in ANZUS exercises.¹⁹

Training. The training relationship, as always, remains very important for New Zealand. Some 70 percent of AFNZ training now takes place in Australia. As with exercises, the problem arises not with the training presently undertaken, but rather with those areas of military skills which Australia cannot supplement. These relate to a number of more technical areas, such as operating specific types of equipment, or working with facilities not in the ADF inventory.

Operational planning and technical information exchange arrangements. There has been some increase in the frequency of various regular meetings, most notably at Ministerial level which have been held at six month intervals since 1985. However, it is understood that, at lower-level meetings, the public service or military seniority of the Australian delegations has been reduced. The MOD has recognised that "Effective interaction could not be maintained for long without common doctrine and standard operating procedures...".²⁰ It seems likely that the ADF and AFNZ will experience interoperability problems because the latter no longer has access to developments in US thinking on doctrine and operating procedures. The ADF will increasingly be called upon to distinguish between the operational procedures it adopts for exercises with US, and exercises with New Zealand forces. (In the same way that such a distinction now has to be made between ADF exercises carried out with US and, say, ASEAN forces.) Thus, over time, a gap in the proficiency of the ADF and the AFNZ may become more noticeable. Finally, although Paul Dibb suggested in his *Review of Australia's defence capabilities* that there was room for joint military planning between the two forces,²¹ there is no evidence to

suggest that the government will follow Dibb's advice. The proposal was not repeated in the official statement of defence policy, *The Defence of Australia*.

Scientific co-operation between Australia and New Zealand is on a small scale. An MOU on closer defence science co-operation has recently been prepared.²² The relationship has most likely been impaired with restrictions on the passage of US-sourced intelligence. An MOD briefing paper on Australian/New Zealand defence co-operation prepared around 1982/83 complained about the Australian Defence Science and Technical Organisation (DSTO) that:

Defence science co-operation between Australia and New Zealand is a somewhat one-sided arrangement at the moment. The slant is definitely in favour of the Australians. Co-operation is mainly in the field of information exchange, which New Zealand, represented by the Defence Scientific Establishment, readily passes to the Australian Defence Science and Technical Organisation. Australia, on the other hand, is somewhat more guarded in the type and volume of information passing eastwards across the Tasman. Australia is very conscious of security sensitive information and this has hampered co-operation to a large degree.(23)

The ANZUS dispute will not have helped in dispelling this Australian concern. It is likely that an even closer guard is now placed on sensitive information crossing the Tasman.

Intelligence Exchange. This area poses perhaps the most significant problem in ANZAC defence co-operation. Australia rapidly implemented prohibitions on passing US-sourced intelligence to New Zealand. Australian-sourced material is still exchanged, but in practice it has been found that these changes have introduced a measure of formality and circumspection in the ANZAC relationship which will be difficult to overcome. This also causes problems in the operational planning relationship, and creates a disparity between Australian and New Zealand policy makers in their working levels of knowledge about the region and strategic developments pertinent to the region.

Surveillance co-operation. Both Australia and New Zealand have increased their surveillance activity in the South Pacific. Australian access to NOSIS material may create a gap between the proficiency of the two countrys' Orion LRMP operations, although I have no direct evidence to this effect. It is understood that the RAN has taken over RNZN

operations carried out under the Radford-Collins Agreement and the ANZUS MARSAR arrangements.

The conclusion which emerges from this summary is that although co-operation continues to be close and comprehensive, the ANZUS split has placed some fundamental political and operational barriers in the way of the ANZAC relationship becoming closer in a qualitative sense.

The operational barriers are created by the primacy Australia places on its relationship with the United States. As was illustrated in chapter three, the government and the ADF regard ANZUS as an essential alliance which confers a greater degree of self-reliance in Australian military capabilities. The MOD's briefing papers prepared in August 1987 for the new Minister of Defence Mr Tizard made this point with an unusual degree of bluntness:

Australian Ministers...have emphasised that there are limits to Australia's ability to increase exercise activities with the New Zealand Forces because of resource constraints. They also have reiterated the importance to Australia of maintaining an active exercise programme with the United States, which for Australia must have primacy when determining the allocation of exercise effort.(24)

This is not just true of exercises, but also any other area where resources for co-operative activity with allies are limited. As it was put to me by an Australian defence official, New Zealand must reconcile itself to being the "second cab off the rank" for operations with the ADF, after Australian time with US forces has been maximised.²⁵

A related problem is that the ADF's continuing link with American defence co-operation will provide it with a range of exercise and training experience no longer open to the AFNZ. The less commonality of experience there is between the two armed forces, the greater the degree of difficulty will be encountered when they operate together. The point, however, should not be overemphasised. Co-operation between the two armed forces will remain very close. But in the medium to long term, as the AFNZ continues to be isolated from US military co-operation, it will emerge that the ADF has a qualitative edge over the AFNZ in proficiency with new items of equipment and developments in operational

planning and doctrine. This is a problem which very much concerns senior defence officials in Wellington. The fear is that isolation from the front rank of Western military co-operation will result in the ANZAC relationship becoming more difficult to sustain.²⁶ If this happens, defence planners in Canberra will be forced to question whether or not the ADF derives adequate value for their exercise dollars spent on co-operation with New Zealand.²⁷

A third difficulty which will grow in importance over the next few years, is the alteration in Australian defence policy to adopt a much closer focus on defence of the Australian North and the air-sea gap north to the Indonesian archipelago. As more resources are devoted to building up a large, permanent military force in the North, and to establishing the infrastructure to sustain it, it will become clearer that Australia and New Zealand do have differing defence priorities. The *1983 Defence Review* confidently asserted that, of Australia and New Zealand it could be said that "... the two countries constitute a single strategic entity".²⁸ But, in the middle 1980's, the differing strategic outlooks of the two countries tend to detract from the accuracy of this statement.²⁹ New Zealand's strategic interests are much more closely focused on the South Pacific, and less so with the wider interests of Australia, which is also an Indian ocean power, and perceives that any major threat towards it will manifest itself through the island archipelago to the North.

A 'Single Strategic Entity'?

The history of the phrase 'single strategic entity' over the last two years provides a useful insight into some of the difficulties which presently face the ANZAC relationship. The phrase was used in the Labour government's Green Paper, *The Defence Question*, which asked what was required of New Zealand in a defence association with Australia:

There is a widely accepted proposition that the two countries constitute a single strategic area: an attack on one would be responded to by both. ... Is this thinking still valid? If so how shall we align our strategic policies with those of Australia - particularly where there are differences on the question of nuclear policy and thus in

our respective defence relationships with the United States. Do we accept a role in preserving security across such a large and disparate region as what used to be called Australasia? (30)

The answer given in a number of speeches and statements by Frank O'Flynn was that New Zealand security was bound up with the security of Australia - an attack on one would lead to a military response by the other.³¹ In itself this was an unremarkable conclusion. A more difficult question was about the extent to which AFNZ planning should be based around responding to likely threat contingencies in the Australian North. One prominent New Zealand defence commentator, Malcolm Templeton, argued that a "modified 'forward defence' policy" should be adopted which would necessitate the AFNZ being prepared to:

- adapt its defence strategy and equipment and training policies to Australia's.
- accept the Australian perception of the threat to Australia, if it accepts that the threat is also a threat to New Zealand.
- examine the possibility of a common doctrine for the organisation of the armed forces of the two countries, of joint planning and co-operation in regard to production and supply, as envisaged in the Canberra [ANZAC] pact.(32)

Templeton's reason for taking this position was not that he believed low-level threats to Australia's North necessarily endangered New Zealand, but rather that such an effort would be necessary if New Zealand was to persuade Australia that it was 'pulling its weight' in the defence alliance.³³

There was, however, a certain lack of realism in this and similar proposals. The AFNZ did not welcome them because it was realised that, once adopted, 'joint planning' would effectively mean 'Australian dominance in planning'. The leadership of the AFNZ did not relish the prospect of becoming an annex to DOD policy makers in Canberra.³⁴ Nor would this have necessarily been appropriate to New Zealand's more immediate defence needs in the South Pacific. Although Australia and New Zealand had very similar strategic interests, they were not identical. Labour government policy had served to widen this disparity.

Thus, following the release of the Dibb Report in June 1986, Australian policy makers reacted strongly against a number of speeches made by Frank O'Flynn, in which he claimed that Dibb's Report vindicated New Zealand's defence policy³⁵ and set the ground

work for development of a closer ANZAC alliance. He told the New Zealand Returned Servicemen's Association in June 1986:

...both governments agree that the two countries are one strategic entity. The Dibb report says so too. The maximum possible defence co-operation with Australia is just about the most important feature of our defence policy. It seems to me indeed that no defence policy can be realistic which doesn't extend to both countries.(36)

O'Flynn's speeches were embarrassing to the Australian government. He talked about the similarity between Dibb's conclusions and those of the Labour government.³⁷ Elsewhere, he claimed that Dibb minimised the role of ANZUS, and in the same speech went on to talk about the "almost paranoid attitudes and statements" of "United States leaders", and New Zealand's rejection of nuclear weapons, which was the only defence offered by the ANZUS alliance.³⁸ In so doing, O'Flynn missed the point central to Dibb's work; namely that ANZUS made it possible for the ADF to be more self-reliant. Australia did not share O'Flynn's perceptions about the nature of the ANZUS guarantee. Indeed O'Flynn's statement only highlighted the fact that a 'realistic defence policy' did not extend to the two countries.³⁹ Dibb did use the phrase 'common strategic entity', but only in the context of defence planning purposes, in other respects he used the phrase 'shared strategic concerns', which suggested that ANZAC strategic interests overlapped rather than coincided.⁴⁰

Three events took place which punctured O'Flynn's rather inflated assessment of the prospects for a closer ANZAC alliance. The first came with the visit to Canberra in October 1986 of Dr John Henderson, Head of the New Zealand Defence Review Officials Committee, for briefings on the ANZAC relationship. Details of the meeting have not been formally released but it is apparent that Henderson was informed in no uncertain manner about Australian displeasure at O'Flynn's comments and of the limits to defence co-operation created by New Zealand's divergent policies. O'Flynn was apparently very surprised at the less than warm reception Henderson received.⁴¹ The Australian message was reinforced in December 1986 when Dr Ross Babbage of the Strategic and Defence

Studies Center at the Australian National University delivered a paper at a conference on defence policy in Wellington. Babbage argued that:

The concept of a single strategic entity between our two countries...may now be far less relevant than at any time in our history. Our strategic interests are similar in most respects but our priorities now differ markedly.(42)

Babbage highlighted the different approach each country had towards ANZUS, and the differing priorities accorded to defence spending. He argued that proposals for closer trans-Tasman co-operation could well be thought to lack

any sense of credibility in the absence of fundamental changes to New Zealand's international policies and budgetary priorities.(43)

Babbage's paper had some impact on the New Zealand government because it was (correctly) read as carrying the stamp of Australian Defence Department approval. It also set the tone for an official visit by Bill Hayden, Minister for Foreign Affairs, which began on December 9, 1986. Hayden made points similar to those made by Babbage. His arrival statement was forceful and direct:

As I have stated before, the Australian government disagrees completely with New Zealand policy on port and air access and understands the actions which the United States has taken to suspend its security obligations under ANZUS to New Zealand. ... Australia regards its alliance relationship with the United States, expressed through ANZUS, as of prime importance to its security. The Australian government has the full backing of the majority of the Australian people in this. Equally, for obvious practical reasons, Australia cannot realistically be expected to provide a substitute for the United States as a security partner for New Zealand.(44)

Hayden's private comments were reportedly no less blunt. He said that the ADF incurred extra costs in conducting two sets of bilateral exercises rather than trilateral ANZUS exercises, he said that New Zealand might have to spend more on defence; most significantly he said that the defence relationship had been developed about as far as it could go.⁴⁵

Thus, by late 1986, the New Zealanders had been informed by several Australian sources that developing a closer ANZAC relationship was not going to be as easy as Frank O'Flynn had intimated in his speeches on the Dibb report. David Lange responded to Hayden's comments by saying it was "quite alarmingly bizarre" to suggest that New

Zealand had thought Australia could replace the United States in a defence relationship. Bizarre or not, that very thing seemed to be the consequence if not quite the explicit goal of Lange's defence policy.⁴⁶ Hayden's visit, along with less public forms of pressure from across the Tasman, served to tone down the strength of the government's public comments about the defence relationship. The New Zealanders had, in effect, been told to consider the more materially difficult problems in the alliance. The 1987 defence White Paper did not use the phrase 'single strategic entity'. Moreover it acknowledged that there were limits to the extent that the relationship could be brought closer together.

Joint Acquisition - New Zealand as a 'Window of opportunity'.

There was one area, however, where both Babbage and Hayden believed there was room for enhanced co-operation - the joint acquisition of new items of defence equipment. This was not a particularly new goal of Australian defence policy towards New Zealand.⁴⁷ The 1983 MOU on logistic support established the framework for such co-operation to take place. In mid-1985, it seemed as though the three projects which had initially been identified as having potential for co-operation in procurement had stalled. New Zealand had decided not to go ahead with purchase of submarines as replacements for the *Leander* frigates. Project WALER, for the development of an Australian designed armoured personnel carrier, had been abandoned by the Australians, and significant differences were emerging between the ADF and the AFNZ on the selection of light arms.⁴⁸ Although the record on joint weapons acquisition was not good, there was a strong perception in Canberra that the opportunity was there for the Australian defence industry to profit from the New Zealand Labour government's proposed force structure development programme. In June 1986 Alan Burnett of the International Relations department at the Australian National University produced a paper entitled *Prospects for sales of defence equipment to New Zealand*. The paper was read at the office of Robert Cooksey, a ministerial consultant to Kim Beazley, who was writing a report on Australia's defence exports and industry.

Burnett pointed out in his paper that over the next ten to fifteen years the AFNZ would need to be re-equipped in almost all areas. He concluded that Australia could become a major supplier of New Zealand's equipment needs:

Australia is now in a strong position to insist on a quid pro quo for the patience and support it has given the New Zealand government since the latter fell out with the United States...In addition it can be argued that the balance of advantage in terms of CER [The Closer Economic Relations Agreement of 1983] is in favor of New Zealand and that, in such circumstances New Zealand should begin to take positive steps towards strengthening its defence forces through the rationalisation of defence purchases and, especially, by agreeing that Australia should be the primary source of supply. ... It should almost go without saying that it is in Australia's interests to begin the process of influencing thinking in New Zealand while the process of reviewing defence and security is underway in Wellington.(49)

Burnett's thinking paralleled that of many Canberra policy makers. Cooksey's published report described the New Zealand defence market as providing a "...window of opportunity for Australian exports of defence products and services." He went on to say that "It would make sense for New Zealand to regard Australia as its primary source of supply."⁵⁰ In fact, it probably makes more sense for Australia rather than New Zealand to think that way. By international standards Australian defence products are costly, and this tends to conflict with New Zealand Department of Treasury thinking, which has always opted for the least costly choices in military equipment. Such a policy makes prudent sense in the context of a limited defence budget.⁵¹ However, in a low-key fashion, the Australians did make it clear to the New Zealand government that prospects for a closer ANZAC alliance depended to a large extent on the sorts of military capabilities retained by the AFNZ. The retention of these capabilities depended in turn on the types of military equipment the New Zealanders bought. When Beazley visited Wellington in early March 1987, shortly after the New Zealand defence White Paper had been released, joint equipment acquisition was at the top of the discussion agenda. He argued that New Zealand needed to retain certain defence capabilities including LRMP surveillance, a blue water navy with ASW capacity, and a deployment and support capability for the Ready Reaction Force. Beazley told the New Zealand press, "Provided these capabilities are maintained -

and your *White Paper* says that you will - then co-operation between our two countries can be close."⁵²

Beazley's remarks were interpreted by journalists in both Australia and New Zealand as being directed towards encouraging the New Zealand government to participate in joint equipment development and procurement projects, even if this came at the price of New Zealand paying a premium for the purchase of Australian equipment.⁵³

In the first instance, the New Zealanders had shown some willingness to do this. A few weeks before their White Paper was released, the government announced that the Army would be re-equipped with the Australian-manufactured version of the Steyr rifle - a decision over which there had been some equivocation. Although the Army maintains that it is happy with the selection, it is understood that its preference was for the Canadian manufactured M16-A2, not least because according to some calculations the Australian weapon was almost a third again more expensive, and could not be delivered by the time the Army wanted.⁵⁴ The purchase of the Steyr was one governed by political considerations about the health of the ANZAC relationship rather than by financial, or indeed, operational requirements. The size of the project however ensured that the premium is not too great. The Army will receive some 18,000 rifles for a total cost of NZ\$ 37 million, but it is estimated that New Zealand industry will receive about NZ\$ 5 million in offsets from producing some plastic components for both the Australian and the New Zealand orders.⁵⁵

A far more important project than the Steyr is the proposal for the development of a New Surface Combatant (NSC) for the RAN and the RNZN. A MOU was signed on March 6, 1987 covering New Zealand participation in the project to the extent of arranging "collaboration in the selection of a design" of a particular NSC type.⁵⁶ New Zealand participation in the project is very important for Australia. It would add an additional four frigates to the eight which Australia intends to produce, bringing the total estimated value of the project to some A\$ 5 billion, from the A\$ 3.5 billion estimated for the Australian

production.⁵⁷ Apart from the added income to Australian industry, the production of twelve rather than eight frigates would create significant economies of scale thus reducing the overall cost. Australian negotiators have made it clear to New Zealand that its participation in the NSC project is regarded as an important element of the CER agreement. The Australian government views the project as being important not only because of the need for New Zealand to retain a blue-water naval capability, but also because it can become a much needed source of foreign currency.⁵⁸

Although the New Zealand government has signed the March 1987 MOU, it has approached the project with great caution and - to use the words of a senior RNZN official - has "built plenty of off-ramps" into its agreement on participation.⁵⁹ The MOU, for example is only effective until a final design selection is made sometime towards the end of 1988. Once that is done the New Zealanders will be faced with the choice of becoming further committed to the construction phase of the project, or withdrawing from it. Their decision will have to be made between December 1988 and Mid-1989.⁶⁰ Following the redefinition of ANZAC defence relations made between the publication of the Dibb Report and the Australian defence White Paper, this period will become the next crucial point in defining the health of the ANZAC relationship. If New Zealand decides not to go ahead with the project, defence relations with Australia will sour, and questions will once again be asked in Canberra about the value Australia derives from the alliance. If New Zealand goes ahead with the project, then it will be faced with sustaining a long-term budget commitment much greater than the previous New Zealand governments have considered appropriate, or indeed possible, for defence spending. The NSC project can therefore be treated as a 'litmus test' for the development of a closer ANZAC relationship.

What are the prospects for New Zealand staying with the project? The estimated cost of the four New Zealand frigates has been put at A\$1.5 billion. This figure, it has to be admitted, is very approximate and much will change according to the particular weapons systems, sensors and other electronic gear New Zealand decides to have fitted into the common hull

design. It has been estimated that a ship's weapons and electronics systems can account for about half of the total acquisition costs.⁶¹ Thus it can be assumed that, for economic reasons alone, the New Zealanders will opt for a less costly weapons and electronics fit.⁶² Other costs however are fixed. New Zealand pays about one-third of the NSC research and development costs, and this itself could account for perhaps a quarter of the total cost of the project.⁶³ These are in the nature of fixed costs and there is little chance that they can be reduced. Most importantly, there is the question of the extent to which the cost of the project will grow during the life of the project. Studies based on US and UK ship development and procurement show that the average annual growth rate in cost is about nine percent. If one assumes this to apply to the NSC project, then, for every 25 percent reduction on once-for-all costs that New Zealand is able to effect on its four frigates, a nine percent growth rate in annual costs will wipe out that reduction in the space of 40 months.⁶⁴ Although the A\$1.5 billion figure represents a 'sail-away' frigate with weapons and electronic fits and the infrastructure for maintenance-in-place, maintenance costs are extremely high, and increase as the vessel ages. Finally, New Zealand industry has only a very limited capability to take advantage of the offset arrangements, which in theory would allow work of to up to one-third of the total A\$5 billion project cost to be done across the Tasman. Thus far, there has been very limited interest displayed by New Zealand manufacturers in the project, and the areas where such involvement is likely to take place are in the production of low value goods such as:

wheelhouse superstructures, masts, and hangars for the helicopters...fire fighting gear, air conditioning, control panels and switching, rafts, lines, wiring looms, spooling, specialist flange work and modular cabin units. (65)

In short, although the cost of the project will undoubtedly alter, it is unlikely that the total cost to New Zealand once the project is completed will be anything *less* than the present estimated cost. The NSC MOU states that New Zealand would expect to take delivery of two frigates in the mid-1990's, and the final two towards the turn of the century. If one assumes that major financial commitment to the project will start with fiscal

year 1989-90, then New Zealand will face (on average) an annual budgetary commitment of between A\$125 and \$150 million to the project for between ten and twelve years. This figure can be contrasted with the size of the 1987/88 defence vote allocated for capital equipment acquisition, some NZ\$222.389 million or 17.1 percent of the total vote. This was one of the largest ever defence capital equipment budgets.⁶⁶ (Compared with an expended NZ\$200.277 million in 1986-8; 18.3 percent in 1986/87).⁶⁷ As an average figure, perhaps 25 percent⁶⁸ of the capital equipment allocation will annually be available for commitment to new projects - about NZ\$ 50 million in the case of this years' budget. The RNZN's share of the 1987/88 capital equipment budget was NZ\$58.185 million , a figure which represents one of the largest Navy capital equipment budgets ever. Yet the annual cost of the NSC project is more than twice the size of the present Navy allocation, and about half the size of the total capital equipment budget in any one year. This suggests that the Labour government would have to be prepared to sustain a very large increase in the defence capital equipment budget, over a prolonged period of time. A number of factors mitigate against this happening. There is only limited support within the NZLP for sustaining a large defence budget, and even more limited support for maintaining the NSC project.⁶⁹ Second, even if the government wishes to continue the project, the health of the New Zealand economy may be such as to prevent it from being completed. Third, there is a quite likely possibility that the government may be able to purchase some second hand frigates, at a price considerably cheaper than those available in the NSC project. The **Southland** and the **Wellington** were purchased under similar conditions in the early 1980's, when the *1983 Defence Review* had judged that it was beyond New Zealand's capacity to buy new frigates.⁷⁰

Very powerful economic constraints suggest that New Zealand will have difficulty staying with the NSC project. It seems more than likely that the Labour government will reduce its participation in the project or withdraw altogether. In the event that this happens, the Australian response will further cool a less than warm relationship. Rightly or wrongly,

it will confirm the thought in many minds in Canberra that New Zealand is not prepared to shoulder what Australia defines as an equal burden in the ANZAC relationship.

The Australian reaction to New Zealand's post-ANZUS defence policy has been mixed. On the one hand, diplomats have reminded New Zealanders that the ANZUS split has caused Australia some political embarrassment, and cost money in adjusting the defence relationship. They have pointed out that several considerations impede the development of a closer defence relationship and that the two countries can no longer be considered a single strategic entity. On the other hand, policy makers in Canberra have realised that they are now in a much stronger position to influence the direction of New Zealand defence policy. By determining the extent of co-operative activity in the relationship, Canberra quite literally has the power to determine the level of AFNZ operational proficiency. In terms of operational doctrine, the debate in New Zealand is not about whether the AFNZ should be concerned with the defence of North Australia, but rather *to what degree* should they be prepared to integrate into Australian defence plans. Close integration of planning may make sense from the point of view of enhancing the alliance relationship, but it may also skew AFNZ defence priorities away from concentration on New Zealand's area of primary strategic concern - the South Pacific. Lastly, as Australia looks to New Zealand as a market for selling defence products, it seems that the health of the ANZAC relationship could, to some extent be determined by New Zealand's willingness to buy. In sum, the Lange Labour government has found that closer ANZAC defence co-operation cannot be achieved easily, cannot be wholly comprehensive and cannot be won without some cost. Far from re-invigorating an alliance of equals, Labour government policy has served to thrust New Zealand into a position of greater dependence on Australia. To quote Sir Leonard Thornton:

If we accept [the] worst case then the only collective defence relationship we have to consider is that with Australia. Some people might regard it as less a collective than a horse and rabbit pie under the familiar recipe of one horse and one rabbit.(71)

Sir Leonard would not need reminding that rabbits have always been thought of as fair-game in Australia.

Footnotes.

1 Chris Pugsley, "Gallipoli - A New Zealand Perspective" Unpublished paper given at the Australian War Memorial History Conference, February 11-15, 1985. Canberra.

2 Sir Carl Berendson (NZ Ambassador to the United States), letter to Sir Alister McIntosh (Secretary of the Department of External Affairs), August 1949. Quoted in Mike Ashby, "Congruence and divergence in Australian and New Zealand defence policies" Unpublished paper given at the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, August 25-28, 1987. Auckland.

3 It is as well to remember that, in both New Zealand and Australia, Gallipoli is commemorated more for its contribution to the development of a *separate* national identity than to the creation of an ANZAC spirit. In the view of a New Zealand historian of the Gallipoli campaign, "Today in Australia 'ANZAC' is another word for 'Australian' ". [Christopher Pugsley, *Gallipoli: The New Zealand Story*. (Hodder & Stoughton, Auckland, 1984) p. 354.] The recent Australian film, *Gallipoli*, saw fit not to mention New Zealand at all.

4 Many such statements do not progress beyond rhetoric of "our two great peoples" variety. For some representative examples see, KJ Holyoake, *A Defence Policy For New Zealand*. (New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Wellington, 1969); RD Muldoon, "New Zealand's Defence Relations" *Pacific Defence Reporter*. September 1976 pp. 12-13; TF Gill, "A New Zealand Defence Policy for the 1980's" *Pacific Defence Reporter*. September 1980 pp. 51-52; RD Muldoon, "New Zealand and Regional Defence" *Pacific Defence Reporter*. June 1979 pp. 6-7; An Australian example is GGD Scholes, "The strategic outlook: the view from Canberra" in Desmond Ball (Ed), *The Anzac Connection...* pp. 15-21. Nor are such statements confined to past administrations. For a more recent example see, D Lange, "Australia - NZ Relations" MFA, *Ministerial Press Releases* No. # 9, December 1986. pp. 15-18.

5 In the inter-war period, the two nations differed over the best means to ensure their national security, New Zealand contributing to the development of the British naval base at Singapore, while the Australians developed their independent navy. See, IC McGibbon, *Blue-Water Rationale: The naval defence of New Zealand 1914-1942*. (New Zealand Government Printer, Wellington, 1981) McGibbon observes that the New Zealand response to a 1935 Australian suggestion that the two countries develop closer defence relations was:

lukewarm....close co-ordination of effort was not achieved, nor was there any attempt to develop a system of joint planning for regional defence, which remained inadequate right through until the outbreak of war in 1939. (pp. 246-47.)

Co-ordination of the Australian and New Zealand effort during the Second World War began badly when the New Zealand government did not consult with Australia before deciding, in November 1939, that it would send the first echelon of its expeditionary force overseas as soon as it was ready. McGibbon argues that it "...precipitated a minor trans-Tasman crisis", by forcing the Australian government to adopt a similar policy when Canberra believed that a delay in deployment was prudent. (Ian McGibbon, "Australia-New Zealand Defence Relations to 1939" Keith Sinclair [Ed], *Tasman Relations: New*

Zealand and Australia, 1788-1988. [Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1987] pp. 164-182. pp. 179-80.)

Relations reached their nadir in May 1943 when the New Zealand Government refused to join the Australians in withdrawing their troops from the Middle-East to fight the Japanese advance in New Guinea. New Zealand's decision was greeted with much greater anger by Australia. Prime Minister John Curtin sent a caustic cable to his New Zealand counterpart, Peter Fraser, on June 1, 1943:

...the immediate defence of New Zealand is in the Pacific Ocean and the concentration of enemy strength is being made in the islands to the north of Australia, which is between the enemy and New Zealand....For every soldier New Zealand keeps away from the Pacific theatre, either an Australian or American has to fill his place.

(Document reproduced in WJ Hudson & HJW Stokes [Eds] *Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937-49. Vol IV: July 1942 - December 1943*. [Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1983] Document 206, pp. 391-92.)

⁶ For an examination of the differences between the Australian and the New Zealand approach to signing the ANZUS Treaty see, FLW Wood, "New Zealand Foreign Policy 1945-51" in Sir Alister McIntosh (et al), *New Zealand in World Affairs Volume 1*. (Price Milburn for the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Wellington, 1977) pp. 89-113; and IC MacGibbon, "The Defence of New Zealand 1945-57" in *ibid.* pp. 143-176. MacGibbon points out that the prime consideration in New Zealand's signing the ANZUS treaty was to provide itself with a guarantee for local defence within the Pacific area. This would release New Zealand forces for participation in a future middle-eastern campaign, to which the Government remained committed until 1955. The preamble of the ANZUS treaty itself made it clear that New Zealand and Australia had military obligations in the British Commonwealth. It was to these obligations, not American ones, that the New Zealand Government directed AFNZ planning. (pp. 159-60.) The Australian attitude, on the other hand, was that it was much more important to develop joint planning and military operations with the United States. Neither the Americans nor the New Zealanders wanted this degree of military co-ordination.

⁷ Indeed the phrase 'primary focus' understates the extent to which the AFNZ were locked into military association with the United Kingdom. MacGibbon notes that, until the mid-1960's, the AFNZ post-war re-equipment programme involved purchases "almost exclusively from British sources". Until 1960 at least one of the armed forces' Chiefs of Staff was a British officer on secondment. Between 1951 and 1956 both the Chief of Naval Staff and the Chief of Air Staff were British, and it was only in 1957 that the first New Zealander was appointed to the New Zealand Navy Board. IC MacGibbon, "The Defence of New Zealand 1945-57" ... pp. 147-48.

⁸ Michael Stenson, "The origins and significance of 'Forward Defence' in Asia" pp. 177-198 in Sir Alister McIntosh et al, *New Zealand in World Affairs...* pp 189-90. Australia by comparison made a commitment of ground forces much earlier and with greater enthusiasm. See David McCraw, "Reluctant Ally: New Zealand's Entry into the Vietnam War", *New Zealand Journal of History*. Vol 15/1 April 1981. pp. 49-60. passim.

⁹ There have been many attempts by politicians on both sides of the Tasman to extend areas of defence co-operation. In 1933 Australian Prime Minister JA Lyons suggested to his New Zealand counterpart GW Forbes "that 'active co-operation and co-ordination' between the two defence establishments would 'definitely strengthen our position against aggression' ". (MacGibbon, "Australia-New Zealand Defence Relations to 1939" ... p.

178.) Nothing appeared to come of the suggestion. The 1944 ANZAC Pact specified that the two governments should develop defence co-operation by:

- (i) Continuous consultation in all defence matters of mutual interest,
- (ii) The organisation, equipment, training and exercising of the armed forces under a common doctrine,
- (iii) Joint planning
- (iv) Interchange of staff, and
- (v) The co-ordination of policy for the production of munitions, aircraft and supply items and for shipping...

(Text of the Treaty in Desmond Ball (Ed), *The ANZAC Connection...* pp. 127-34.)

Once again, however, the statement of intent was not translated into reality. A further attempt to co-ordinate defence policy was made with the signing of a *Memorandum of Understanding between the Governments of Australia and New Zealand concerning Co-operation in Defence Supply* in August 1969. The document specified that the two countries would pursue the maximum practicable standardisation of military equipment and materials, maximum practicable rationalisation and integration of local defence production, maximum reciprocity in defence procurement, exchange of technical knowledge and production skills and co-ordination of defence purchases outside of the Australian -New Zealand area. (Text of the MOU in Desmond Ball (Ed), *The ANZAC Connection...* pp. 135-6.) Almost a decade later Alan and Robin Burnett concluded that, when it came to implementing the agreement "...there was a loss of momentum in this area". Some contracts had been exchanged, but almost all were on a very minor scale. (Alan and Robin Burnett, *The Australia and New Zealand Nexus...* p. 76.) In March 1976 Prime Ministers Fraser and Muldoon met at Rotorua, and there "...agreed on the need to develop and improve defence co-operation between Australia and New Zealand and on the desirability of further co-operation in the field of defence supply". (MOD, *Defence Review 1978...* p. 17.) However the only lasting product from their meeting was the creation of the phrase 'single strategic entity' to describe the ANZAC strategic environment. In April 1977 the two countries' Defence Ministers agreed that there was a need for closer defence co-operation; " 'to maximise the combined effectiveness of the defence capabilities of the two countries, subject to the availability of resources and the requirements of independent national decisions' ". (*ibid.*) By then, at least, the two parties had learned to qualify their otherwise grandiose statements. The 1969 MOU has since been superseded by a 1983 MOU concerning closer defence logistic co-operation. The MOU outlines the general principles by which the ANZAC defence forces should acquire equipment. The document recognises the need for the development of an industrial infrastructure in the two countries to manufacture items of equipment, stores and spares, and to establish commonality of standards in the support and maintenance of equipment; the need to establish complementary logistic support capabilities; to minimise duplication of effort and maximise either country's comparative advantage in any area of production. Significantly the MOU adds that:

...the realisation of complementary logistic support capability in the two countries is itself a common strategic objective and may involve in particular cases a cost additional to the cost of procurement from a third country.

(Text of the MOU in Desmond Ball (Ed), *The ANZAC Connection...* pp. 137-9.) The 1983 MOU's prospect of success will be discussed later in this chapter. The point should be noted, however, that ANZAC defence co-operation especially in the areas of logistic support and equipment acquisition had not developed in the post war period to the extent politicians and others had predicted.

¹⁰ The Report of the Defence Committee of Enquiry, *Defence and Security: What New Zealanders Want*. (Government Publisher, Wellington, July 1986) commissioned a survey of 1600 people on defence matters. Held during April and May 1986, the survey found that 82 percent of those interviewed favoured New Zealand forming alliances with other

countries; 71 percent supported ANZUS as against 13 percent who were opposed to the treaty. Of the 82 percent who favoured alliances, 68 percent believed New Zealand should align with Australia; 92 percent said that they thought Australia was either 'important' or 'very important' to New Zealand's national security; 70 percent favoured defence co-operation "in all circumstances" (and a further 20 percent 'in some cases') and 81 percent thought that New Zealand should aid Australia in all or most circumstances if it were attacked. (pp. 40-41) The Committee concluded that "...enhancement of the bilateral ANZUS relationship with Australia is the most promising option left open to New Zealand". (p. 73) Indeed the survey figures suggested that it was the only politically sensible option as well.

11 The *1987 Defence Review*, to quote just one, wrote of the ANZAC alliance as providing "...the single most important strand in our international network [of defence relations]" p. 17.

12 The exceptions being the comparatively minor exercise and training relationships with the United Kingdom and Canada. Although FPDA exercises involve units of the RN, these cannot be put in the same category as ANZUS level exercises in terms of the complexity of operations which are carried out.

13 Frank O'Flynn, "Introduction", MOD, *1985 Annual Report*. p. 7.

14 Hawke wrote a letter to Lange on New Zealand's anti-nuclear policies towards the middle of January 1985. It was a forthright statement of the Australian position on granting port access to nuclear capable vessels without compromising the US policy of neither confirming nor denying whether or not the ships were nuclear armed. Hawke later released details of the letter, which said in part:

...the Australian government would need to continue to make clear that, whatever New Zealand's position or policies might be, Australia, as a sovereign nation which must protect its fundamental security interests, had its own well-known and clearly expressed position on visits by United States warships and the importance of maintaining the neither confirm nor deny principle. We could not accept as a permanent arrangement that the ANZUS alliance has a different meaning, and entailed different obligations, for different members. ...Australia would be avoiding any public statements which cast doubt on whether the U.S. was applying its policy of neither confirming nor denying that warships were carrying nuclear weapons in particular cases and, as New Zealand's alliance partner, saw it as important that the New Zealand government should do the same. ("ANZUS: Prime Minister's letter to New Zealand's Prime Minister" News Release of January 25, 1985, in *Australian Foreign Affairs Record*. January 1985. pp. 51-2.)

The letter was not well received in Wellington.

15 On the arrangements for this see, "Postponement of ANZUS Council meeting" Statement by the Prime Minister, March 4, 1985. DFA, *Backgrounder*. No. # 468. March 6, 1985; and Statements on ANZUS by the Prime Minister, March 7 and 9, 1985 in DFA, *Backgrounder*. No., # 469. March 13, 1985. Hawke was clearly displeased by the need to make these arrangements, and stressed at a press conference that "New Zealand must have foreseen that once it made that decision [on port access] you can't have a continuation of an alliance relationship if an essential element of that relationship comes to an end." (Unpublished typescript of a press conference with Prime Minister Hawke, March 5, 1985.)

16 Kim Beazley, "Australian defence policy: the way ahead" Speech to the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Wellington, April 2, 1985. *Australian Foreign Affairs Record*. April 1985. pp. 298-302. pp. 301,302.

17 *Joint Communique issued by the Australian Minister for Defence, Mr Kim Beazley, and the New Zealand Minister for Defence, the Hon. Frank O'Flynn, in Wellington. April 3, 1985. Australian Foreign Affairs Record. pp. 303-304. p. 304. The communique also contained a blunt restatement of the Australian position on port access:*

The Australian government regarded granting a reasonable level of port access as a responsibility inherent in the status of an ally (p. 303)

18 MOD, *1987 Annual Report*. pp. 8-9.

19 The MOD, *1987 Annual Report*. pp. 17-18, provides a list of military exercises conducted during the twelve months to March 1987. A comparison with earlier annual reports will show that the 1987 exercise list is shorter and devotes more space to discussing comparatively minor exercises (such as command post exercises). Major exercises of the scale of TRIAD, RIMPAC and COPE THUNDER no longer feature.

20 MOD, *Briefing Paper on Defence Co-operation with Australia*. Released August 1987. p. 5.

21 Paul Dibb, *Review of Australia's defence capabilities...* p. 48.

22 MOD, *Briefing Paper on Defence Co-operation with Australia*. (1987) p. 9.

23 MOD, *Briefing Paper on Australia/New Zealand Defence Co-operation*. (No date given, but most likely 1982/83)

24 MOD, *Briefing Paper on Defence Co-operation with Australia*. (1987) p. 7.

25 Interview with DOD official.

26 Interviews with MOD officials.

27 Indeed, to a certain extent, planners are doing this in Canberra already. The arrangements made for planning two bilateral sets of exercises, and for sifting intelligence material before it is passed onto New Zealand has involved spending more money. In circumstances where there is a perception that New Zealand is not fully 'pulling its weight' in alliance burden-sharing, some Australian defence officials have been inclined to resent the added costs imposed on DOD because of the New Zealanders' actions. (See, Kim Beazley's answer to a question on notice, in *Weekly Hansard*, (H. of R.) March 13, 1986 pp. 1338-90; Frank Cranston, "NZ faces bill over intelligence" *Jane's Defence Weekly*. August 9, 1986. p. 187.

28 Government of New Zealand, *Defence Review 1983*. ... p. 17.

29 On the question of the differing strategic interests of the ANZAC countries, and the changes in policy which serve to highlight them see, Michael McKinley, *By the West Divided: The Indian Ocean as an ANZAC Strategic Divide*. Unpublished paper given at the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, August 25-28, 1987. Auckland.

30 Government of New Zealand, *The Defence Question*. ...p. 9.

31 See, for example, Frank O'Flynn, "New Zealand reviews its strategy", *Australian*. June 6, 1986.

32 Malcolm Templeton, *Defence and Security: What New Zealand Needs*. (Victoria University Press for the Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 1986) p. 57.

33 Malcolm Templeton, *Defence and Security* ... p. 30.

34 A point repeatedly made to me in interviews with MOD officials.

35 O'Flynn's initial reaction to the report can be found in "NZ decisions vindicated, says O'Flynn", *Evening Post*. June 16, 1986.

- 36 Frank O'Flynn, "Defence Policy" Speech to the New Zealand Returned Servicemen's Association. ... p. 7.
- 37 Frank O'Flynn, "Defence Policy" Speech to the New Zealand Returned Servicemens Association. ... p. 1.
- 38 Frank O'Flynn, "Defence Policy" Speech to the Bay of Plenty Officers Club. MFA, *Ministerial Speeches*. No. # 6. July, 15, 1986. pp. 17-27. pp. 2, 24, 25.
- 39 The 1983 *Defence Review's* use of the term 'single strategic entity' was qualified with the sentence; "It is inconceivable that Australia and New Zealand will set radically divergent courses in defence and strategic policies". (p. 17) This statement may have been true from the point of view of the needs of coherent defence policy, but in 1983 the New Zealand Labour Party developed its port access policy in the final form that it was to appear in the 1984 election manifesto. The United States had also indicated what its position would be on port access. At that time it was all too conceivable that Australia and New Zealand were about to set radically different courses on defence and strategic policies. Of course, this may well have influenced the Muldoon government's decision to include such a sentence in the White Paper. (On developments in the NZLP anti-nuclear platform in 1983 see, Roderic Alley, "ANZUS and the Nuclear Issue" ... *passim*.)
- 40 Paul Dibb, *Review of Australia's defence capabilities...* pp. 47-48.
- 41 These comments are based on private interviews, but some indication of the difficulties Henderson encountered can be found in Bernard Lagin, "Defence Policy Puzzle" *Dominion*. October 20, 1986; Roger Mackey, "Trans-Tasman defence bridge tolled" *Evening Post*, October 9, 1986 and Richard Long, "Australian defence link hits delays" *Dominion*. October 16, 1986.
- 42 Ross Babbage, *The Future of the Australian-New Zealand Defence Relationship*. (Unpublished paper delivered at the Institute of Policy Studies seminar on New Zealand defence policy. Wellington, December 9, 1986) p. 9.
- 43 Ross Babbage, *The Future of the Australian-New Zealand Defence Relationship*. ... p. 17.
- 44 Bill Hayden, "New Zealand visit - Arrival Statement", DFA, *Backgrounder*. No. # 554, December 10, 1986.
- 45 For newspaper comment on Hayden's visit, see, "Hayden spells out disagreement with Lange over NZ defence role", *Sydney Morning Herald*. December 12, 1986; "NZ, Australia agree to no expansion of defence ties", *Age*. (Melbourne) December 12, 1986; "Hayden outburst shocks NZ hosts" *Australian*. December 12, 1986; "Australia is not a substitute for US defence" *Canberra Times*. December 12, 1986;
- 46 Lange's comment was made at a joint press conference with Hayden on December 11, 1986. MFA, *Press Statements*. No. # 17, December 17 1987. p. 23. At the same press conference Lange said, on the question of developing closer defence relations: "I don't think that either of us have the current capacity to spend more time with each other than we do now" (p. 25.) This can be compared with Lange's announcement of the Hayden visit on November 21, 1986: "Mr Hayden's visit would provide an occasion to review this co-operation and where possible to enhance it". (David, Lange, Press Statement: Visit by Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs" November 21, 1986, MFA, *Press Statements*, No. # 20, December 17, 1986. p. 1.)
- 47 See footnote 11, this chapter. In 1933 Prime Minister Lyons approached New Zealand with an offer to co-ordinate defence procurements. He apologised to his counterpart Forbes for "appearing somewhat in the role of a salesman with goods to offer for sale" Ian McGibbon, "Australia-New Zealand Defence Relations to 1939" ... p. 178.

- 48 DJ Barnes, "Logistics, Industry and Science" in Desmond Ball (Ed), *The ANZAC Connection...* pp.53-67. p. 67. On the Scrapping of the Submarine project see, Doug Kidd, *Questions*. 1985 Question No. # 11. On the light arms question see below.
- 49 Alan Burnett, *Prospects for sales of defence equipment to New Zealand*. (privately circulated paper, June 1986) p. 13.
- 50 Robert Cooksey, *Review of Australia's Defence Exports and Defence Industry*. [Report to the Minister of Defence] (Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, October 1986) p. 264.
- 51 DJ Barnes, "Logistics, Industry and Science"... p. 57, expands on this point.
- 52 Kim Beazley quoted by David Barber, "Beazley did for Labour what Hayden didn't", *National Business Review*. March 13, 1987. The message was not lost on Lange, who responded to Beazley's comments by saying; "Now, of course, if we don't deliver on that, Australia won't deliver. It's as simple as that." The 1987 Australian defence White Paper repeated Beazley's comments, albeit in a less direct manner:
- It is important that Australian and New Zealand forces maintain and develop their ability to operate together. We will continue to promote defence co-operation and operational compatability with New Zealand, reflecting the considerable potential for strengthening our defence relationship.
The extent to which this potential can be realised will depend, among other things, on the compability of the equipment and capabilities of the two forces. Priority must therefore be given to co-ordinating our policies on these matters. (My emphasis. Government of Australia, *The Defence of Australia...*p. 5.)
- 53 See, David Barber, "Beazley did for Labour..." and Mark Baker, "Beazley hopes to cash in on NZ defence plans" *The Age*. March 4, 1987.
- 54 Interviews with MOD and service officials. See "NZ to get Steyr rifle" *Dominion*. December 3, 1897.
- 55 Interviews with MOD officials, see MOD, *Notes on Estimates 1987-1988*. p. 124; MOD, *1987 Annual Report*. p. 9.
- 56 *Memorandum of Understanding between the government of Australia and the government of New Zealand concerning collaboration in acquisition of New Surface Combatants*. Wellington, March 6, 1987. (Unpublished typescript.)
- 57 "\$5 billion joint venture to build frigates" *Canberra Times*. July 15, 1987.
- 58 Interviews with MOD and DOD officials.
- 59 Interview with RNZN official. The MOU also leaves room open for New Zealand to continue to participate in the project but also:
 ...procure up to two New Surface Combatants outside the joint project, although the New Zealand government recognises in these circumstances that benefits would still flow from maintaining maximum possible compatibility with the design chosen under the joint project. (March 6, 1987*Memorandum of Understanding ...* p. 2.)
- 60 Interviews with DOD officials.
- 61 William H Gzarke Jr and George Kerr, "Major factors in frigate design" quoted in Captain Chris Skinner, "Implications of the New Surface Combatant Project" *Maritime Studies*. No. 34, May/June 1987. pp. 7-10. p.10.

- 62 It is quite possible that, for example, the Seacat missile system will be removed from the present *Leander* class frigates, updated to the Seawolf system, and put in the NSC. (Interviews with MOD and DOD personnel.)
- 63 Interviews with DOD officials.
- 64 PG Pugh, "Economics and Naval Power" *Naval Forces*. Vol 8/3 1987. pp. 50-61. p. 63.
- 65 "Manufacturers start search for ship work" *Dominion*. August 18, 1987.
- 66 See Table B at footnote 47, chapter three.
- 67 MOD, *Notes on Estimates 1987-1988*. ... pp. E50, 77.
- 68 PG Pugh, "Economics and Naval Power"... p. 50.
- 69 See, footnote 49, chapter three. Peace movement opposition to the NSC project is quite strong, nor should they be underestimated as a lobby group which is listened to by the government. Towards the end of his term as Defence Minister, for example, Frank O'Flynn found himself in sympathy with the Just Defence group's rejection of the frigate as being important to New Zealand's defence needs. O'Flynn had the following to say in an interview with me on the matter:

On the *Leander* frigates

[They are] in my view more of a danger than an asset.

On the NSC project

The [defence] review is going to mark the end of the four frigate navy. We are not going to replace them with more frigates. ...I am thoroughly dissatisfied with the Navy's performance because they are firmly convinced that they have to have a four frigate navy and they are not listening to what I have to say to them. ... I am simply not satisfied with the research and investigation that they have carried out. I am a bit, what shall I say, ...a bit wary of Mr Beazley's programme too. I mean Mr Beazley's alright, but we have decided to send two officers to take part in the working up of that project which will give some kind of say. If it turns out absolutely as advertised and doesn't cost any more, or not too much more, than other vessels that might be found, then we may take part in it. (Frank O'Flynn, Interview, Wellington, February 16, 1987.

This could hardly be considered a ringing endorsement of the project. To date, the new Defence Minister Mr Tizard has not given any public indication of his personal thoughts on the NSC project.

- 70 Government of New Zealand, *Defence Review 1983* ... p. 23.
- 71 Sir Leonard Thornton, "The 1986 Whitmore lecture..." p. 9.

Chapter Five.

Conclusion.

In the modern world military skills are increasingly complex and call for knowledge, responsibility, and discipline of a high order. Once lost, such skills will be difficult to recover; in the fast-changing strategic circumstances of our day there is not likely to be time.
1978 Defence Review. (p. 20)

The major aim of this thesis has been to examine the extent to which US prohibitions on military co-operation with New Zealand have adversely affected the military capabilities of the AFNZ. There is really only one true yardstick of military capability, and that is the success of armed forces in battle. Short of this definitive test however, the indications are that the break in ANZUS co-operative activity between New Zealand and the United States has indeed been costly to the AFNZ.

The Armed Forces of New Zealand enjoyed a reputation for military professionalism far in excess of their size or degree of global influence. This derived in part from a perception of the qualities of the individual New Zealand soldier in battle. Perhaps more importantly it also came from New Zealand's participation in ANZUS and UKUSA co-operative military activities. Access to the highest level of Western alliance defence co-operation exposed the AFNZ to a range of research and development, intelligence material and military planning and thinking which it could not produce for itself because of New Zealand's very small economic base. In addition, co-operation under the ANZUS alliance

made it possible for the AFNZ to exercise and train with US forces under the most testing military conditions, using the most advanced equipment according to the most sophisticated techniques of operational doctrine. The armed forces - along with their Australian counterparts - were given access to Pentagon sources second only perhaps to the UK, and were accorded equivalent priority with US forces for material from the American logistic supply network. This degree of co-operation with the United States served to distinguish New Zealand from other small countries struggling to equip and train armed forces with very limited defence budgets.¹

Most, but not all, of this co-operative activity was lost to the AFNZ following the US decision to reduce military contact with New Zealand. The New Zealand Labour government was forced to conduct a defence review to assess the extent to which it was possible to make up these losses through other means. The 1987 White Paper, the *Defence of New Zealand*, proposed a policy which involved developing 'greater self-reliance' within the armed forces and establishing a closer defence relationship with Australia.

I have argued that the government has failed to achieve either of these two goals. The policy of developing 'greater self-reliance' has not markedly changed AFNZ force structure or operational doctrine. While there have been some advances in augmenting the existing force structure, there has been very little development in the areas which might confer on the AFNZ a measure of operational self-reliance. In matters of intelligence gathering, surveillance, logistic supply of ammunition, spare parts and equipment, and in the development of operational doctrine for the armed forces, the government has found that there is very little it can do in its own right to make up for the loss of ANZUS co-operation.

The ANZAC defence relationship is a necessary, but not a sufficient means of maintaining AFNZ capabilities outside of ANZUS. The relationship has, in a limited sense, grown closer, without it being possible for Australia to compensate for the lost areas of ANZUS military co-operation. In addition, Australia's continued membership of ANZUS

acts as a block to the development of a closer ANZAC alliance, and may, in the medium to long term, present difficulties in maintaining a close relationship with New Zealand. Nevertheless, the importance to New Zealand of the Australian connection suggests that Australia will be put into a dominant position whereby it will have great influence in AFNZ strategic planning and force structure development. The project for joint acquisition of a new surface combatant will be an important test case of Australia's potential dominance in New Zealand defence policy making.

The defence policy of the New Zealand Labour government can therefore be accounted a failure. In February 1985, the government failed in its commitment to maintain active participation in the ANZUS alliance when the United States reduced defence co-operation once port access was refused to the **USS Buchanan**. The government has subsequently failed to address itself to the losses the AFNZ sustained as a result of the ANZUS split. Far from being more self-reliant, the AFNZ has suffered a loss of military capability and has become *more* reliant on the good will of another country - Australia. Far from developing a closer ANZAC alliance of *equal* partners, New Zealand has been accorded a very much more junior role in its defence association with Australia. In time, it may be shown to be the case that Australia is a harsher taskmaster to New Zealand than ever was the United States.

Footnote.

¹ The AFNZ is most often directly compared at a **qualitative** level with the military forces of NATO or OECD nations. There may be some comparative merit, however, in listing those countries which have armed forces of the same approximate **size** as the AFNZ. The following list is of States recorded in the IISS *Military Balance 1986-1987*, as having armed forces comprising of between 10,000 and 25,000 regular servicemen in 1986: Cyprus, Ireland, Switzerland, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Chad, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mozambique, Zambia, Mongolia, Sri Lanka and El Salvador.

Interviews.

This thesis draws on material from interviews taken on four separate study trips, one to the United States and three to New Zealand between September 1985 and August 1987. In addition, I have received many briefings from MOD and MFA staff at the New Zealand High Commission in Canberra. Dates of meetings are listed, as is the job title of the person concerned at the time of the interview.

Vice Admiral Sir Neil Anderson, Former CNS, CDS, Wellington. January 29, 1987.

Mr Jim Anderton, NZLP MP for Sydenham, Wellington. February 20, 1987; September 2, 1987.

Mr M. Ashby, Member of the Secretariat of the Defence Committee of Enquiry, Wellington. January, 20, 1987.

Captain N. Bailey, RAN, Australian Defence Liaison Staff (From January 1987), Australian High Commission, Wellington. September 3, 1987.

Captain S. Baldwin. USN, Defence Attache US Embassy, Wellington. January 20, 1987; September 2, 1987.

Ms Helen Clark, Chairperson Parliamentary Select Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, and NZLP Caucus Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Wellington. September 1, 1987.

Major General John Coates, Australian Defence Attache, Australian Embassy, Washington, DC. December 2, 1985.

Mr Warren Cooper, MP, Former National Party Government Foreign Minister, Wellington. January 30, 1987

Mr Frank Corner, Former Secretary of MFA, Chairman of the Defence Committee of Enquiry, 1986, Wellington. February 3, 1987.

Mr Ross Craig, Assistant Secretary (Policy) MOD, Wellington. February 3, 1987.

Air Marshal Crooks, Chief of Defence Staff, Wellington. February 18, 1987.

Commander D. Davidson, RNZN, Joint Services Staff College, Canberra. June 15, 1987.

Colonel J. Dennistoun-Wood. NZ Army, Wellington. September 1, 1987.

- Mr Robert Eaddy, Office of the Leader of the Opposition, Wellington. January 30, 1987.
- Mr W. Eagleson, National Party Defence Researcher, Wellington, January 20, 1987.
- Mr John Glassman, Director, Australia/New Zealand Office, State Department, Washington, DC. January 13, 1986.
- Brigadier Alex Hamilton, Head of the New Zealand Defence Liaison Staff, New Zealand Embassy to the United States, Washington, DC. January 14, 1986.
- Mr John Henderson, Head, Prime Minister's Advisory Group, Wellington. February 19, 1987.
- Commodore G. Hopkins, RNZN, Head of the Defence Liaison Staff (From April 1987), New Zealand High Commission, Canberra. September 11, 1987.
- Mr D. Jameson, Counselor for Political Affairs, US Department of State, US Embassy, Wellington. September 4, 1987.
- Air Marshal (Rtd) Sir Ewan Jamieson. RNZAF, Chief of Defence Staff 1984 to end 1986, Wellington. February 13, 1987; September 1, 1987.
- Mr Doug Kidd, MP, National Party Defence Spokesman, Wellington. February 11, 1987.
- Mr James Lilley, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, Department of State, Washington DC. December 5, 1985
- Major General John Mace, Chief of General Staff. Wellington. February 4, 20, 1987.
- Mr R. Mackey. Journalist, Wellington. February 19, 1987; September 4, 1987.
- Mr Jim McLay, MP Leader of the National Party, Wellington. February 11, 1986
- Mr Denis McLean, Secretary of Defence, Wellington. February 18, 1987.
- Brigadier Meldrum, NZ Army, Deputy Chief of General Staff, Wellington. September 3, 1987.
- Group Captain N. Montgomery, RAAF, Australian Defence Liaison Staff (Until January 1987), Australian High Commission, Wellington. January 15, 1987.
- Air Vice Marshal I. Morrison, Former CAS, Wellington. January 28, 1987.
- Mr Jim Morton, Political Counselor, US Embassy, Wellington. February 17, 1987.
- Sir Robert Muldoon, MP, Prime Minister 1975 to July 1984. Wellington. February 12, 1987
- Mr Peter Neilson, NZLP MP for Miramar, Parliamentary Under-Secretary to the Minister of Trade and Industry, Canberra April 9, 1987.
- Air Vice Marshal Patrick Neville, Chief of Air Staff, Wellington. February 17, 1987.

- Air Commodore BJ O'Connor, Former ACDS, Wellington. January 27, 1987.
- Hon. Frank O'Flynn, Minister for Defence in the first Lange government, Wellington.
February 16; 18, 1987.
- Captain R. Partington, RAN, Director of Naval Operations, Canberra. May 11, 1987.
- Lieutenant Colonel James Riordan, USMC, International Security Affairs, Office of the
Secretary of Defence, Department of Defence, Washington DC. December 3, 1985.
- Sir Wallace Rowling, NZ Ambassador to the United States, Washington, DC. December 4,
1985.
- Mr P. Sinclair Director of International and Domestic Policy, MOD, Wellington.
February 5, 1987; September 1, 1987.
- Mr Frank Tatu, Australia Desk, Department of State, Washington DC. November 29,
1985.
- Rear Admiral Lin Tempro, Chief of Naval Staff, February 1986 to May 1987. Wellington.
February 16, 1987.
- Rear Admiral Thorn, Former CNS, Wellington. February 4, 1987.
- Lieutenant General (Rtd) Sir Leonard Thornton, NZ Army, Chief of Defence Staff, 1965-
71, Wellington. January 15, 1987.
- Ms Judith Trotter, Americas Division, MFA, Wellington. February 14, 1986.
- Mr Alan Twohill, Assistant Secretary (Finance) MOD, Wellington. February 9, 1987.
- Colonel T. Wallace US Army, Army Attache for Australia and New Zealand, US
Embassy, Canberra. June 18, 1987.
- Mr O. Wilkes. Peace Movement Aotearoa, Wellington. January 22, 1987; August 31,
1987.
- Mr Peter Winsley, Just Defence, Wellington. January 24, 1987.
- Mr John Wood and Mr Simon Murdock, NZ Embassy, Washington DC. November 26,
1985.

Bibliography

Newspapers, journals and periodicals

Newspapers

The Australian
The Age (Melbourne)
Canberra Times
Dominion (Wellington)
Evening Post (Wellington)
National Business Review (New Zealand)
New Zealand Herald (Auckland)
Otago Daily Times
The Press (Christchurch)
Sydney Morning Herald
Times on Sunday (Australia)

Journals and periodicals

Asian Defence Journal (Singapore)
Australian Foreign Affairs Record (DFA)
Bulletin (Australia)
Jane's Defence Weekly (London)
New Zealand Army Journal
New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review (MFA)
New Zealand International Review
New Zealand Listener
New Zealand Monthly Review
Pacific Defence Reporter (Australia)
Peace Researcher (Christchurch)
Trans Tasman (Wellington)

New Zealand official sources

Mr G. Ansell, (NZ High Commissioner to Australia) "The Defence Policy of New Zealand" *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute of Australia*. Vol 8/1, December 1985. pp. 41-44.

Defence Act, No. 52 of 1971. As amended (Government Printer, Wellington, 1971)

Defence Committee of Enquiry, *Defence and Security: What New Zealanders Want* (Government Printer, Wellington, 1986)

Defence Scientific Establishment (DSE), *Annual Review 1985-86*. (DSE, Auckland, 1986)

- Defence Science Establishment (DSE) *Annual Review 1986/87*. (DSE, Auckland, June 1987)
- Department of Statistics, *New Zealand Official Yearbook 1986-87*. (Government Printer, Wellington, 1986)
- Roger Douglas, *Budget Speech of June 18, 1987*. (Government Printer, Wellington, 1987)
- Roger Douglas, *Statement on Government Expenditure Reform May 19, 1986*. (Government Printer, Wellington, 1986)
- TF Gill, "A New Zealand Defence Policy for the 1980's" *Pacific Defence Reporter*. September 1980 pp. 51-52
- Government of New Zealand, *Defence of New Zealand: Review of Defence Policy 1987* (NZ Government Printer, Wellington 1987)
- Government of New Zealand, *The Defence Question: A discussion paper*. (Government Printer, Wellington, 1985).
- Government of New Zealand, *Defence Review 1978*. (Government Printer, Wellington, 1978.)
- Government of New Zealand, *Defence Review 1983*. (Government Printer, Wellington, 1983.)
- Government of New Zealand, *Estimates of Expenditure of the Government of New Zealand for the year ending 31 March 1988*. (Government Printer, Wellington, 1987.)
- Government of New Zealand, *Estimates Commentary 1987-88*. (Government Printer, Wellington, 1987.)
- Impact of the ANZUS rift: Chapter Three* (Leaked MOD document)
- Joint Statement by the Rt Hon David Lange, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, New Zealand and Mr Bill Hayden MP, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Australia*. December 12, 1986. DFA, *Backgrounder*. No. # 554. December 12, 1986.
- David Lange, "Australia - NZ Relations" MFA, *Ministerial Press Releases* No. # 9, December 1986. pp. 15-18.
- David Lange, "Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs to visit" December 17, 1986. MFA, *Press Statements*. No. # 20, December 17, 1986.
- David Lange, "Joint press conference by the Prime Minister and Mr Bill Hayden" December 11, 1986. MFA, *Press Statements*. No. # 20, December 17, 1986.
- David Lange, *New Zealand Intelligence Review: Statement by the Prime Minister; March 2, 1987*. Press Release from the New Zealand High Commission, Canberra.

- David Lange, "New Zealand's Security Policy" *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 63/5, Summer 1985. pp. 1009-1019.
- David Lange, "Ministerial statement - Military Coup, Fiji" *Weekly Hansard*. (NZ) May 12, 1987. p. 9010.
- David Lange, *The Shape of the Future: A statement by the Prime Minister Rt Hon David Lange*. (no publisher, no date - mid-1987?)
- David Lange, *Transcript of a Press Conference*. London February 28, 1985.
- Ministry of Defence (Public relations directorate), *Armed Forces of New Zealand*. Second edition. (Government Printer, Wellington, 1986.)
- Ministry of Defence, *Australia/New Zealand Defence co-operation*. (Unpublished briefing paper, no date, circa 1981/2.)
- Ministry of Defence, *Briefing Papers Prepared for the Minister of Defence*. (Released October 19, 1984)
- Ministry of Defence, *Briefing Paper on Defence Co-operation with Australia*. (Released October 5, 1987)
- Ministry of Defence, *Notes on Estimates*. for 1984-85, 1985-86 and 1986-87.
- Ministry of Defence, *Report of the Ministry of Defence for the year ended 31 March*. For years 1973 to 1987 inclusive. (Government Printer, Wellington.)
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Airmail Bulletin*. (A compilation of press clippings issued every week or fortnigh for MFA overseas missions.)
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Briefing Papers Prepared for the Minister of Foreign Affairs*. (Released September, 1987)
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Foreign Policy Speeches*. (A compilation of speeches by government ministers and officials on foreign policy matters. Issued irregularly.)
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Ministerial Speeches*. (A compilation of speeches by government ministers and officials. Issued irregularly.)
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Press Statements*. (A compilation of ministerial press releases and press conference transcripts. Issued irregularly.)
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the year ended 31 March*. For years 1984 to 1987 inclusive. (Government Printer, Wellington.)
- RD Muldoon, "New Zealand's Defence Relations" *Pacific Defence Reporter*. September 1976 pp. 12-13
- RD Muldoon, "New Zealand and Regional Defence" *Pacific Defence Reporter*. June 1979 pp. 6-7
- New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act, No. 86 of 1987* (NZ Government Publisher, Wellington, 1987.)

New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, *Weekly Hansard*. First and second session forty-first Parliament 1986-87, and first session of the forty-second Parliament 1987. (Government Printer, Wellington.)

Office of the Prime Minister, *Note to the Media*. December 6, 1985. [Backgrounder on the Committee of Enquiry]

Frank O'Flynn, "Formidable Challenges For All" address to the Diplomatic Corps, Wellington May 7, 1985. *New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review*. Vol. 35/2 April-June 1985. pp. 17-23.

Frank O'Flynn, "New Zealand reviews its strategy" *Australian*. June 6, 1986.

Frank O'Flynn, "Press Statement on the Defence Review" September 11, 1986, MFA, *Press Statements*. October 7, 1986.

Frank O'Flynn, *Speech to the Canterbury Officers Club*, Christchurch. June 18, 1985.

Frank O'Flynn, "Defence Policy" Speech to the New Zealand Returned Servicemens' Association, Wellington June 9, 1986. MFA, *Ministerial Speeches*. No. # 6, July 15, 1986. pp. 1-9.

"Parting as Friends" *NZFA*. Vol 36/2 April-June 1986. p. 7.

Royal New Zealand Navy, "Replacements for the frigates: new surface combatant project" July 15, 1987. MFA, *Press Statements*. No. # 10. August 13, 1987. pp. 12-14.

Select Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Report on the enquiry into Disarmament and Arms Control. (Government Printer, Wellington, 1985)

State Services Commission, *Directory of Official Information 1985*. (Government Publishers, Wellington, 1985)

Defence Committee of Enquiry submissions

Vice Admiral Sir Neil Anderson (Rtd) KBE, CB, *Submission to the Defence Committee of Enquiry*. February 1986 p. 6. (Accession no. # 0967)

Dr DJ Barnes, *New Zealand Defence: Submission to the Defence Committee of Enquiry*. (Unpublished paper. Committee accession number 1321.)

Brigadier Sir William Gilbert (Rtd) "New Zealand Defence - The Aspect of Intelligence." *Submission to the Defence Committee of Enquiry*. February 26, 1986. (Accession number 1462.)

Just Defence, *Submission to the Defence Committee of Enquiry* (Accession no. # 2907).

New Zealand Navy League, *Submission to the Defence Committee of Enquiry*. February 1, 1986. (Accession number # 701)

Lt. Gen. Sir Leonard Thornton (Rtd), *Submission to the Committee of Enquiry on the Future of New Zealand Strategic and Security Policies*. (Accession no. # 0031).

Maj-Gen RG Williams (Rtd), *A Personal Submission to the Defence Committee of Enquiry* (Accession no. # 1312)

Peter R. Wills, *New Zealand's Military Establishment: Current Realities*. ('A submission to the Committee of Enquiry on the Future of New Zealand's Defence Policy by Peter Wills on behalf of Scientists Against Nuclear Arms, NZ') February 1986.

Brig. LW Wright (Rtd) *A Submission to the Defence Committee of Enquiry*. (Accession no. # 0860)

Australian official sources

Australia New Zealand Defence Ministers Meeting: Wellington, March 5 and 6, 1987. Joint Communique, March 6, 1987. DFA, Backgrounder. No. # 562, March 11, 1987.

Australian Parliamentary Debates, *Daily Hansard; Weekly Hansard*, both Houses, 1984-87 [Various issues] (Government printer, Canberra.)

Kim Beazley, "ANZUS: regional defence implications" *Australian Foreign Affairs Record*. May 1985. pp. 397-402.

Kim Beazley, "Australian defence policy: the way ahead" Speech to the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Wellington, April 2, 1985. *Australian Foreign Affairs Record*. April 1985. pp. 298-302.

Kim Beazley, "Defence Initiatives in the South Pacific; Ministerial Statement" *Daily Hansard*. (House of Representatives) February 20, 1987. pp. 433-36.

Kim Beazley, Defence Policy - Ministerial Statement. March 19, 1987. *Daily Hansard*. (H. of R.) March 19, 1987.

Kim Beazley, statement on Australian policy in Parliament, (House of Representatives) March 21, 1985. Department of Foreign Affairs, *Backgrounder*. No. # 480, March 29, 1985.

Robert J. Cooksey, *Review of Australia's Defence Exports and Defence Industry*. [Report to the Minister for Defence] (Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1986)

Department of Defence, *The Defence of Australia 1987*. (Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1987)

Department of Foreign Affairs, *Backgrounder*. (Canberra. A weekly compilation of government statements on defence and foreign policy questions.)

Paul Dibb, *Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities*. (Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, March 1986)

- Bob Hawke, "ANZUS: Prime Minister's letter to New Zealand's Prime Minister" News Release of January 25, 1985, *Australian Foreign Affairs Record*. January 1985. pp. 51-2.
- Bob Hawke, "Postponement of ANZUS Council meeting" Statement by the Prime Minister, March 4, 1985. DFA, *Backgrounder*. No. # 468. March 6, 1985.
- Bob Hawke, Statements on ANZUS by the Prime Minister, March 7 and 9, 1985 in DFA, *Backgrounder*. No., # 469. March 13, 1985.
- Bob Hawke, Unpublished typescript of a press conference with Prime Minister Hawke, March 5, 1985.
- Bill Hayden, *New Zealand Visit - Arrival statement*. December 10, 1986. DFA, *Backgrounder*. No. # 554, December 12, 1986.
- Bill Hayden, "The ANZUS Treaty: its value and relevance" Speech to the Victorian Fabian Society. *Australian Foreign Affairs Record*. May 1985 pp. 389-396.
- Bill Hayden, Press Statement on ANZUS. December 10, 1985. DFA, *Backgrounder*. No. # 507 January 15, 1986.
- Bill Hayden, *Visit to New Zealand - Joint Statement of Bill Hayden and David Lange*. Wellington, December 12, 1986. DFA, *Backgrounder*. No. 554, December 12, 1986.
- WJ Hudson & HJW Stokes (Eds) *Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937-49. Vol IV: July 1942 - December 1943*. (Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1983)
- Joint Communique issued by the Australian Minister for Defence, Mr Kim Beazley, and the New Zealand Minister for Defence, the Hon. Frank O'Flynn, Canberra April 30, 1986*. (Unpublished typescript)
- Joint Communique issued by the Australian Minister for Defence, Mr Kim Beazley, and the New Zealand Minister for Defence, the Hon. Frank O'Flynn, in Wellington. April 3, 1985*. *Australian Foreign Affairs Record*. pp. 303-304.
- Joint Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the United States Secretary of State at the Conclusion of the Australia-United States Ministerial Talks, Canberra July 15, 1985*. DFA, *Backgrounder*. No. # 487. July 17, 1985.
- Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Australia and the Government of New Zealand concerning collaboration in acquisition of new surface combatants*. (Typed manuscript.)
- Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, *Australian Defence*. (Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, November 1976)
- GGD Scholes, "The strategic outlook: the view from Canberra" in Desmond Ball (Ed), *The Anzac Connection...* pp. 15-21.

Transcript of the press conference between Kim Beazley, Minister for Defence Australia, and the Hon. Frank O'Flynn, Minister for Defence New Zealand. Parliament House, Canberra. April 30, 1986. (Unpublished manuscript.)

United States official sources

Congressman William Broomfield, "New Zealand should no longer enjoy military assistance and arms export preferences." *Press release*. (Washington, January 1987.)

US/Australian Joint Communique, San Francisco, August 11, 1986. Reprinted under the title "Canberra sympathetic to US exclusion of NZ" *Australian*. August 13, 1986.

US Department of State, *Statement on the United States Disagreement with New Zealand over Ship Visit Issues*. July 2, 1987.

US Information Service, "Administration supports the end of New Zealand Preferences" *Backgrounder*. September 25, 1987

Unpublished sources

Mike Ashby, "Congruence and divergence in Australian and New Zealand defence policies" Unpublished paper given at the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, August 25-28, 1987. Auckland.

Ross Babbage, *The prospects for security co-operation between the ANZUS allies till the turn of the century*. Unpublished paper given at the Eighth Annual National Defence University Pacific Symposium on Pacific Basin Security: Impact of political and social change toward the year 2000. February 26-27, 1987, Honolulu.

Ross Babbage, *The Future of the Australian-New Zealand Defence Relationship*. Unpublished paper given at the Seminar on New Zealand Defence Policy, Institute of Policy Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, 9 December 1986.

Jonathan Boston, "Advising the Prime Minister in New Zealand: The role, functions and evolution of the Prime Minister's Advisory Group". Unpublished paper given at the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, August 25-28, 1987. Auckland.

Alan Burnett, *ANZUS: Developments in the relationship with New Zealand*. (Unpublished paper delivered at the Australian Fabian Society Conference on ANZUS and Australia's defence. July 1986)

Alan Burnett, *Prospects for sales of defence equipment to New Zealand*. (Unpublished manuscript, July 1986)

Kevin Clements, *New Zealand Defence Policy: Challenges for the future*. Unpublished paper given at the Seminar on New Zealand Defence Policy, Institute of Policy Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, 9 December 1986.

Sir John Fieldhouse, *Transcript of a News Conference held in the Beehive Theatre*. Wellington February 19, 1986.

Steve Hoadley, *New Zealand logistics co-operation with the United States before and after the ANZUS dispute*. Unpublished paper given at the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, August 25-28, 1987. Auckland.

Air Marshal (Rtd) Sir Ewan Jamieson, *New Zealand Defence Policy: A Professional Viewpoint*. Unpublished paper given at the Seminar on New Zealand Defence Policy, Institute of Policy Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, 9 December 1986.

Doug Kidd, *Questions put to the Ministry of Defence, 1985 and 1986*. (Typed manuscript) During the term of the first Lange government, Doug Kidd was National Party spokesman for defence matters and held a seat on the Parliamentary Select Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence. This manuscript is made up of MOD answers to questions put by Kidd as part of the select committee's review of defence expenditure.

Michael McKinley, *By the West Divided: The Indian Ocean as an ANZAC Strategic Divide*. Unpublished paper given at the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, August 25-28, 1987. Auckland.

DBG McLean *The American dimension to New Zealand defence and regional security interests*. Unpublished paper given at the conference on Australia-United States Relations, Pennsylvania State University, June 1984.

Chris Pugsley, "Gallipoli - A New Zealand Perspective" Unpublished paper given at the Australian War Memorial History Conference, February 11-15, 1985. Canberra.

Malcolm Templeton, "A Layman's Perspective" Unpublished paper given at the Seminar on New Zealand Defence Policy, Institute of Policy Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, 9 December 1986.

Secondary sources

Books and monographs

Desmond Ball (Ed), *The ANZAC Connection*. (Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1985)

Jonathan Boston and Martin Holland, *The Fourth Labour Government: Radical politics in New Zealand*. (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1987)

Alan and Robin Burnett, *The Australia and New Zealand Nexus*. (Australian Institute of International Affairs, Canberra, 1978)

Hyam Gold, *New Directions in New Zealand Foreign Policy*. (Benton Ross, Auckland, 1985)

TJ Hearn (Ed), *Arms, Disarmament and New Zealand*. (Department of University Extension, University of Otago, Dunedin, 1983)

- International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance*. for years 1972-73 to 1986-87 inclusive. (IISS, London)
- International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), *Strategic Survey 1985-86*. (IISS, London, 1986)
- Colin James, *The Quiet Revolution: Turbulence and transition in contemporary New Zealand*. (Allen and Unwin/Port Nicholson Press, Wellington, 1986)
- IC McGibbon, *Blue-Water Rationale: The naval defence of New Zealand 1914-1942*. (New Zealand Government Printer, Wellington, 1981)
- Sir Alister McIntosh (et al), *New Zealand in World Affairs Volume 1*. (Price Milburn for the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Wellington, 1977)
- Michael McKinley, *ANZUS, New Zealand and the Meaning of Life*. (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Legislative Research Service Discussion Paper No. # 6, 1985-86, Canberra, 1986)
- Militarisation in NZ - A growing threat*. (Friends of Great Barrier, no place, March 1984)
- Erik Olson and Bill Webb (Eds), *New Zealand Foreign Policy and Defence*. (Department of University Extension University of Otago, Dunedin, 1977)
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), *OECD Economic Surveys 1986/1987: New Zealand*. (OECD, Paris, May 1987)
- Peace and Justice Forum, *An Alternative Defence Policy: A Paper for Discussion* (Peace and Justice Forum, Wellington, March 1985)
- J.R.V. Prescott, *The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World*. (Methuin, London, and NY, 1985)
- Christopher Pugsley, *Gallipoli: The New Zealand Story*. (Hodder & Stoughton, Auckland, 1984)
- Jeffrey T. Richelson and Desmond Ball, *The Ties That Bind*. (Allen and Unwin, Boston etc. 1985)
- Andre Siegfried, *Democracy in New Zealand*. (1913) (Victorial University Press with Price Milburn, Wellington, Second Edition, 1982)
- Keith Sinclair (Ed), *Tasman Relations: New Zealand and Australia, 1788-1988*. (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1987)
- Malcolm Templeton, *Defence and Security: What New Zealand Needs*. (Institute of Policy Studies/Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1986)
- Ramesh Thakur, *In Defence of New Zealand: Foreign Policy Choices in the Nuclear Age*. (Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1986).

Articles in journals and books

- Henry Albinski, "ANZUS: American foreign policy and the ANZUS problem" *Current Affairs Bulletin*. September 1985. pp. 14-24.
- Roderic Alley, "ANZUS and the Nuclear Issue" in, Jonathan Boston and Martin Holland (Eds), *The Fourth Labour Government: ...* pp. 198-213.
- Desmond Ball, "The ANZUS Connection: The Security Relationship Between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America." in T.J. Hearn (Ed), *Arms, Disarmament and New Zealand*. (University of Otago, Dunedin, 1983) pp. 59-110
- Desmond Ball, "The Security Relationship between Australia and New Zealand" in Desmond Ball (Ed), *The ANZAC Connection*. (George Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1985) pp. 34-52.
- DJ Barnes, "Logistics, industry and science" in Desmond Ball, (Ed), *The ANZAC Connection...* pp. 53-67
- John Beaglehole, "The Armed forces of the Asia-Pacific Region: No. # 12 - New Zealand: highly professional, but upgrading a slow process" *Pacific Defence Reporter*. July 1984. pp. 15-20.
- John Beaglehole, "Defence White Paper lacks strong commitment to Western Stance" *Pacific Defence Reporter*. May 1987 pp. 31-4.
- John Beaglehole, "A New Zealand perspective: no room for complacency" (Interview with Air Marshal Ewan Jamieson, then Chief of Defence Staff.) *Pacific Defence Reporter*. June 1984. pp. 25-26.
- Keith Burgess, "The List" *Peace Researcher*. No # 9, 1986.
- Frank Cranston, "Australia's plans for new listening post" *Jane's Defence Weekly*. April 4, 1987. p. 582.
- Owen Harries, "Crisis in the Pacific" *Commentary*. Vol. 79/6, June 1985. pp. 47-54.
- Peter Jennings, "New Zealand: Who can put Humpty Dumpty together again?" *Pacific Defence Reporter*. August 1987 pp. 23-24.
- "Kiwis [sic] Not Fussed By ANZUS Fracas" *Asian Defence Journal*. No. # 11, November 1986. p. 106.
- Major J.F. Koek (RAE), "ABCA. A Guide for International Standardisation." *Defence Force Journal* No # 5, July/August 1977. pp. 51-54.
- Andrew Mack, "Crisis in the Other Alliance" *World Policy Journal*. Summer 1986, pp. 447-472.
- David McCraw, "Reluctant Ally. New Zealand's Entry into the Vietnam War" *New Zealand Journal of History*. Vol 15/1 April 1981. pp. 49-60.

- Ian McGibbon, "Australia-New Zealand Defence Relations to 1939" in, Keith Sinclair (Ed), *Tasman Relations: New Zealand and Australia, 1788-1988*. ... pp. 164-182.
- IC MacGibbon, "The Defence of New Zealand 1945-57" in Sir Alister McIntosh (et al), *New Zealand in World Affairs Volume 1*. ... pp. 143-176.
- IC McGibbon, "History of New Zealand Defence" in Erik Olson and Bill Webb (Eds), *New Zealand Foreign Policy and Defence*. ... pp. 19-34.
- Helen Paske, "Who defends NZ?" *New Zealand Listener*. September 5, 1981. pp. 18-21.
- PG Pugh, "Economics and Naval Power" *Naval Forces*. Vol 8/3 1987. pp. 50-61.
- Major JG Rolfe, "The New Zealand Army: An alternative for deployment" *The New Zealand Army Journal*. No. # 2, July 1986. pp. 1-7.
- James Rolfe, "Trans-Tasman defence co-operation" *New Zealand International Review*. Vol 12/5 September/October 1987. pp. 9-12.
- Will W. Schaffer, "A-4 Skyhawk: Retrofit and Modernisation Extend Service Life" *Asian Defence Journal*. May 1986 pp. 60-66.
- Capt. Chris J Skinner RAN, "Implications of the New Surface Combatant Project" *Maritime Studies*. No. # 34, May/June 1987. pp. 7-10.
- Michael Stenson, "The origins and significance of 'Forward Defence' in Asia" pp. 177-198 in Sir Alister McIntosh et al, *New Zealand in World Affairs Volume 1*... pp 189-90.
- Ramesh Thakur, "New Zealand Defence Review 1983" *Asian Defence Journal*. May 1984. pp. 90-96.
- Ramesh Thakur, "New Zealand Defence Review 1985-1987" *Asian Defence Journal*. July 1987. pp. 56-65.
- Ramesh Thakur, "New Zealand: in search of a defence policy" *Asian Defence Journal*. July 1985. pp. 52-60.
- Ramesh Thakur, "Towards a Nuclear Free New Zealand" *Asia-Pacific Community*. Vol 27/ Winter 1985. pp. 16-27.
- Lieutenant General (Rtd) Sir Leonard Thornton, "The 1986 Whitmore Lecture - Defence in the Eighties" *The New Zealand Army Journal*. Special Edition, 1986
- Owen Wilkes, "Stooging Around the Cook Islands: The Mysterious Case of the Disappearing Submarine." *New Zealand Monthly Review*. Vol 27/10 October 1986 pp. 3-13.
- FLW Wood, "New Zealand Foreign Policy 1945-51" in Sir Alister McIntosh (et al), *New Zealand in World Affairs Volume 1*. ... pp. 89-113
- Thomas-Durrell Young, "New Zealand: Australia can't fill US shoes" *Pacific Defence Reporter*. June 1987. pp. 49-50

Thomas Durell-Young, "New Zealand Defence Policy Under Labour" *Naval War College Review*. Vol 39/3 May-June 1986 pp. 22-34.

Appendix One.

AFNZ contact with the United States Department of Defence prior to the ANZUS split.

The following extract is taken from the submission by Air Commodore Ian Gillard (Rtd) to the Defence Committee of Enquiry. (Accession no. # 0662) Air Commodore Gillard was Head of the Defence Staff at the New Zealand Embassy, Washington DC, from November 1980 to December 1983. Very few details have been made public about the nature of the more informal elements of defence co-operation between New Zealand and the United States. Air Commodore Gillard's comments provide an indication of the importance the AFNZ placed on co-operation of this type.

Commodore Ian Gillard (Rtd), NZ Defence Attache to the United States, 1980-83. Submission to the Defence Committee of Enquiry.

During my appointment as New Zealand Defence and Air Attache in Washington, I had almost unrestricted access to the Pentagon building and to senior officers and officials in Department of Defense. Subject to their availability, I could call with minimum notice on Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and their staffs. Likewise, I had ready access to senior defence civilians up to Deputy Secretary level. I held a pass which allowed me unescorted into every section of the Pentagon except the office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Military Command Center (war command post), and the Defence Intelligence Agency. Even these highly sensitive places were regularly visited by me as the attache of a close ally, but with an escort.

The effect of this degree of confidence and co-operation was that New Zealand had ready and intimate access to the American defence officials generating policy. New Zealand was taken into their confidence to a surprising degree, a result of trust built up over generations of close and mutually beneficial co-operation, and America's perception that we were one of their most trusted allies. Each Monday morning for an hour, in company with my Australian counterpart, I attended an informal meeting with the second-in-command of the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This is a planning staff of 400 plus officers and civilians who undertake the formulation of American defence planning. To my knowledge no other nation was accorded this privilege, and I believe it to have been a carry over from the Vietnam war. Similarly, each second Tuesday my Australian colleague and I were briefed for an hour in the Defence Intelligence Agency, with at least 30 specialist desk officers in attendance, to answer any questions we might have on behalf of our country. I understand my successor receives none of this now, and must seek time consuming permission to visit officials in the Pentagon, and be escorted everywhere while there. The confidence and goodwill which I enjoyed is not accorded our present Defence Attache, but, it is certain nothing has changed for his Australian counterpart.

My ability to deal personally with senior US military officers and defence officials, gave rise to advantages to New Zealand beyond purely military matters. Intervention in trade and economic matters on our behalf at Cabinet level, by Secretary of Defense, came about from the goodwill and understanding of New Zealand's special status as "a trusted friend and ally". As an ANZUS partner, the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff and their senior officials, regularly accepted invitations to

the Ambassador's residence and to the Embassy. On those occasions unparalleled opportunities arose for diplomacy. I understand contact of this nature is now minimal, if not terminated.

... Our membership of ANZUS, a treaty foisted on the Americans by Australia, with the help of New Zealand, gave us a status and voice in world affairs, which we could not otherwise have aspired to. On defence matters we were, with Australia, generally accorded privileges second only to Great Britain and Canada. Most of that goodwill has been stripped away by our Government's idealistic and unjustified policy about USN and Royal Navy ship visits. The balance of any residual goodwill will vanish if that policy is put in legislation.

Gillard's successor as Defence Attache was Brigadier Alex Hamilton, who returned to New Zealand after a three year term in April 1987. His comments on the attitudes of US servicemen to New Zealand were reported by the *New Zealand Herald*:

We have been engaged primarily on a damage limitation exercise, trying to secure the best possible outcome for the few activities allowed to continue under the new rules. The amount of effort required to achieve any success has been out of all proportion to the business concluded. Some United States servicemen are genuinely embarrassed by the stringent and ungenerous rules that they are obliged to apply to every request we make of them. Others are quite bitter and display no sympathy towards us at all. Not surprisingly, the most antagonistic are sailors. They simply cannot accept that any country which claims to be an ally or even a friend can reasonably forbid sailors access during peacetime, yet expect them to come to their aid in time of war.... The longer our forces are out of contact with United States forces, and senior New Zealand defence people are out of contact with their counterparts in the States, the less chance there will be of friendships and goodwill playing any part in interaction.

"NZ Losing Goodwill Among US Military", *New Zealand Herald*. April 23, 1987.

Appendix Two.

AFNZ weapons systems and platforms: An inventory and analysis of capabilities.

The purpose of this appendix is to provide information on the major items of defence equipment in service with the AFNZ. No publicly available source gathers this information together in the manner presented here. Most of the material giving technical specifications of weapons capabilities is taken from volumes produced by Jane's Defence publishers, from material provided to me by the MOD, and from MOD press releases and internal unclassified documents.

Summary of equipment discussed.

NAVY

4 Leander Class Frigates
 New Surface Combatant Project
 1 Tanker
 1 Logistic Support Ship
 4 Lake Class Patrol Craft
 1 Survey Vessel
 1 Oceanographic Research Vessel
 4 Inshore Patrol Craft
 2 Inshore Survey Craft
 1 Diving Tender
 1 Tug
 1 Sail Training Ship
 Rigid Inflatable Boats

ARMY

LIGHT-ARMS

Pistols: Browning HP 35
 Rifles: Colt M16A1
 SLR L1A1
 Steyr AUG
 Machine-guns
 Bren L4
 FN-FAL/HB
 GP M-G L7
 Minimi LMG

MORTARS

81mm L16
 81mm L1A1

ANTI-TANK WEAPONS

75mm RCL M20
 106mm RCL M40A1
 Carl Gustav M2 Rocket Launcher
 M72 Light Anti-tank weapon

VERY LOW LEVEL AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM**ARTILLERY**

5.5inch Medium Gun
105mm L5 Pack Howitzer
105mm M101A1 Howitzer
105mm L118/119 Light Gun

ARMoured VEHICLES

Scorpion light tank (Tracked Fire Support Vehicle)
M113A1 APC
M577A1 Command Post Carrier
M548 Tracked Load Carrier

GENERAL SERVICE VEHICLES

Landrover V8
Mercedes-Benz Unimog U1300L
Mercedes-Benz Unimog UL1700L
Mercedes-Benz 2228/41
Honda XL 250RC

AIR-FORCE**STRIKE AIRCRAFT**

McDonnell Douglas A4K & TA4K Skyhawk
Lockheed P3K Orion

HELICOPTERS

Bell UH/IH Iroquois
Westland Wasp
Bell 47G-3B-1 and 47G 3B-2 Sioux

FIXED-WING TRANSPORTS

Lockheed C-130H Hercules
Boeing 727-100C
Hawker Siddley Andover C Mk 1
Cessna 421C Golden Eagle

FIXED-WING TRAINING

BAC 167 Strikemaster Mk 88
Aerospace CT4-B Airtrainer
AE.SL 16/24 Airtourer
Fokker F27-120 Friendship

Royal New Zealand Navy

2 Leander and 2 Broad-Beamed Leander Class Frigates

Name	Builder	Commissioned
Waikato	F 55 Harland & Wolff, Belfast	Sept. 16, 1966
Wellington*	F 69 Vickers Armstrong, Newcastle	Oct. 17, 1969
Southland	F 104 Yarrow & Co. Scotstoun	Sept. 18, 1963
Canterbury**	F 421 Yarrow Ltd. Clyde	Oct. 22, 1971

* broad-beamed (BB). Ex-HMS **Bacchante**. Commissioned in NZ Oct. 4, 1982
 ** broad-beamed (BB). Ex-HMS **Dido**. Commissioned in NZ Dec. 21, 1983

Displacement	2,580 tons standard, 3,035 tons full load		
Displacement BB	2,474 tons standard, 2,945 tons full load		
Length	113.4 m	BB	113.4m
Beam	12.4m		13m
Draught	4.8m		5.5m
Range	approx: 2,300km (without refueling)		
Main engines	2 sets dr geared turbines; 2 shafts; 30,000 shp		
Boilers	2 Babcock and Wilcox		
Speed	28 knots		
Complement			
	Waikato	243 (16 officers, 227 ratings)	
	Canterbury	245 (15 officers, 230 ratings)	
	Southland	257 (19 officers, 238 ratings)	
	Wellington	260 (19 officers, 241 ratings)	
Weapons fits			
	Waikato and Canterbury	2 twin Mk 6 115mm guns Seacat guided missile system (one quad launcher) 2 triple Mk 32 Mod 5 A/S torpedo tubes Wasp (HAS Mk 1) ASW helicopter (see RNZAF section) 2 0.5in guns	
	Southland	2 twin 40mm/60 bofors guns 1 Ikara anti-submarine missile group launcher Seacat guided missile system (two quad launchers) 2 triple Mk 32 Mod 5 A/S torpedo tubes Wasp (HAS Mk 1) ASW helicopter (see RNZAF section)	
	Wellington	Seacat guided missile system (one quad launcher) 2 triple Mk 32 Mod 5 A/S torpedo tubes Wasp (HAS Mk 1) ASW helicopter (see RNZAF section) 2 0.5in guns	
Radar	Search; Type 965 Tactical; Type 993 Navigational; 1006 Fire control; MRS 3 System and I Band. (Wellington and Canterbury are being refitted with RCA R76C5 fire control system)		
Sonar	Graseby G 750 Medium Range (Wellington and Southland) Type 184M (Waikato and Canterbury)		

The four *Leander* class frigates are the centrepiece of the RNZN. They are described in the 1983 defence White Paper as:

configured essentially as anti-submarine escorts best suited to operations within a fleet environment.[1]

Although the RNZN engages in a regular exercise programme to maintain skills in such areas as ASW and maritime protection of shipping, the frigates' present major operational function is to provide a resource protection role in the New Zealand EEZ, and conduct surveillance and civil aid operations in the South Pacific. A major criticism of the *Leanders* is that they have lacked the range necessary for providing an effective presence in the region.

The **Waikato** and the **Canterbury** were acquired in the 1960's, and are now nearing the end of their operational life. In 1984 the **Waikato** was assigned a training and resource protection role and is no longer considered operational for combat exercise purposes. It is planned to give the **Canterbury** a refit similar to that done on the **Wellington**. This should begin in 1988 and will extend the life of the vessel until after the mid 1990's. The government authorised the purchase of the **Wellington** and the **Southland** from the UK government in 1981 at a cost of NZ\$137 million (September 1981 dollars). Total estimated cost to date of purchase and refit has been NZ\$167.98 million. The **Southland** refit programme was completed in early 1986 and the ship underwent trials in 1987. The **Wellington** refit programme was completed in August 1986, and it has since begin working up trials. Although the MOD has undertaken studies to see if it is possible to further extend the operational life of the *Leanders*, it recognises that both the **Wellington** and the **Southland** will have to be phased out of service towards the end of the century.

Leander Weapons specifications

0.50 inch Browning Machine guns

Calibre	0.50mm
Length of gun	1653mm
Length of barrel	1143mm
Weight	39.1kg
Muzzle Velocity	810m/sec
Feed System	disintegrating belt unit
Cyclic rate	450-600rpm
Manufacturer	Saco defence Inc. Maine, USA

The 0.5 Browning light machine guns have been installed in the **Waikato**, **Canterbury** and **Wellington**, in the latter replacing the 20mm GAN BO1 Oerlikon. They were taken from the Lake Class patrol boats when the latter were fitted with rapid firing 12.7mm guns.[2]

¹ Government of New Zealand, *Defence Review 1983*. (Government Printer, Wellington, 1983) p. 23.

² Information supplied by the MOD.

Twin 40mm/60 bofors guns

Calibre	40mm
Barrel length	60 calibres
Elevation	to 80°
Projectile weight	0.9kg
Muzzle velocity	830m/sec
Rate of fire	120 rounds per minute
Maximum range	3km
Maximum altitude	5,600m
Manufacturer	Bofors

The twin mounted 40mm/60 Bofors Anti-Aircraft gun has the exact specifications of the single 40mm/60 mounting introduced in 1942. The twin mounting weighs approximately three tons, and is in use with many Commonwealth navies.

Mk 6 115mm guns

Gun data	
Calibre	115mm* (4.5 inch)
Barrel length	approx 50 calibres
Elevation	to approx 80°
Projectile weight	approx 25 kg
Muzzle velocity	approx 850m/sec
Rate of fire	20 rounds/barrel/minute
Maximum range	approx 19km (10 nm)
Date introduced to UK navy:	1946.
Manufacturer	Vickers (UK)

* The RNZN lists the calibre of their MK 6 as 115mm. However *Jane's Weapons Systems 1985-86* (16th Ed) puts the Mk 6 calibre at 113 mm, and Doug Richardson in *Naval Armament* (Janes, 1981) at 114mm. All, however, agree that the calibre in imperial units is 4.5 inches.

The MK 6 twin barreled 4.5 inch gun is in wide use with the UK and many Commonwealth navies. It is remotely controlled, powered by electro-hydraulics. It has a semi-automatic loading cycle with the shell and cartridge being separately hoisted to the gun and loaded manually into the loading tray.

Seacat shipborne surface to air missile

Missile Data	
Length	147cm
Body diameter	19cm
Wing Span	65cm
Launch weight	63kg
Propulsion	solid propellant rocket
Guidance	command to line of sight
Warhead	High Explosive (HE)
Maximum range	approx 5 km
Manufacturer	Short Brothers, Belfast.

Seacat is in use with some 16 navies world wide. Its primary use is as a close range, anti-aircraft point-defence system, although it can be used in a surface to surface role for targets within visual range.

Mk 32 Mod 5 A/S torpedo tubes

The US manufactured Mk 32 Mod 5 anti-submarine torpedo tube has been fitted into all four frigates in modernisation programmes carried out through the first half of the 1980's. It launches 12.75 inch torpedoes, such as the Mk 44 and the Mk 46, the latter of which is also used with the Ikara missile system. The tubes are arranged in a triangular group, on a trainable deck mounting. Each tube is independently fired by an electric firing circuit which releases a blast of compressed air into the after-end of the tube.[3]

Mk 44 Torpedo

Length	2.56m
Diameter	32.4cm (12.75in)
Weight	233kg approx
Warhead weight	34kg
Max Speed	30knots
Range	5000m approx
Maximum submersion depth	300m
Propulsion	electrical
US design, licensed production in a number of countries.	

Now designated obsolete by the US Navy, the MK 44 is a lightweight, anti-submarine, active acoustic homing torpedo. In New Zealand service the Mk 44 is being superceded by the Mk 46.

Mk 46 Torpedo

Length	2.59m
Diameter	32.4cm (12.75in)
Weight	230kg approx
Warhead weight	44kg
Max Speed	40knots
Range	11,000m max.
Acquisition range	460m
Maximum submersion depth	classified
Propulsion	mono-propellant
US design, involving AeroJet Electro Systems Company, Honeywell Inc. and Gould Ocean Systems Division.	

³ Carl D Corse, Jr, *Introduction to Shipboard Weapons*. (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1975) pp. 365-367

The RNZN made an initial purchase of 20 Mk 46 torpedoes from Australia as part of a package of IKARA missile systems for **HMNZS Southland**. The cost, in February 1983 dollars for 20 Ikara missiles and MK 46 torpedoes was NZ\$ 13.204 million. In addition a RNZN/RAN Memorandum of Understanding was signed to facilitate the Australian repair and maintenance of the torpedoes.[4] The MK 46 can home in on a target following either radiated noise or searching via active sonar. Following an enabling run of up to 11,000 meters, the torpedo will traverse an upward spiral until registering the target or running out of propellant.⁵ Although the Government classifies the amount of ammunition held in stock, it has admitted that, following its decision in 1985 to increase stockholding of ammunition, additional torpedoes have been - or will be - purchased.[6]

Ikara anti-submarine missile group launcher

Missile data	
Length	343cm
Wing span	153cm
Propulsion	solid-propellant rocket
Guidance	autopilot with altimeter plus command from launch platform
Warhead	Mk 46 homing torpedo
Maximum range	15-18km
Cruising speed	high subsonic
Manufactured by the Australian Department of Defence Production.	

The Ikara system has been fitted to **HMNZS Southland**. It is designed to give a ship a long-range anti-submarine capability out to the maximum range of a ship's sonar (in the case of **Southland**, the Graseby 750) which provides targeting information. The Ikara launch vehicle will carry a Mk 46 torpedo which descends to the sea surface by parachute at its optimum dropping point. The ship's on board fire control system (in the **Southland** the MRS 3 system and I band) processes the sonar information together with data from the launch vehicle and other information such as the ship's position, course and weather conditions. This provides radio tracking and guidance for the system. The launcher has an automatic handling system for rapid reload.

⁴ Doug Kidd, *Questions*, 1985 Question # 19. MOD, *1984 Annual Report*. p. 11.

⁵ Carl D Corse, Jr, *Introduction to Shipboard Weapons...* p. 362.

⁶ Doug Kidd, *Questions*, 1985 Question # 3.

Leander Radar Specifications.

Search: Type 965.

The Type 965 is a long-range air search radar widely in use with the Royal Navy. It also fulfills target designation functions for the Ikara and Seacat systems. The stacked dipole antenna array is configured in the 'bedspring' or 'bedstead' array characteristic of air-search radar. The type 965 is manufactured by Marconi Radar Systems of Chelmsford, England.

Tactical: Type 993

This is a target indicator radar, operating on the S-band. The antenna is configured in a characteristic 'quarter-cheese' shape. The Type 993 began to be phased out in Royal Navy ships in 1978, to be replaced with the Type 994, which uses the 993 antenna, but with a new transceiver said to give better performance than its predecessor. Jane's Weapons Systems considers the Type 993 to now be obsolescent.[7]

Navigation: Type 1006

This is the standard Royal Navy I-band navigational radar, in use with many navies including the RAN where it is fitted in the River Class destroyer escorts and the Oxley Class submarines. The surface role antenna consists of a 2.4 meter slotted waveguide linear array, which rotates at 24 revolutions per minute. The array has a horizontal beam width of 1° and a vertical beam width of 18°. The transmitter/receiver operates at about 9445MHz with three pulse lengths at two repetition frequencies. The display is via a 12 inch cathode ray tube, and symbolic data display can be achieved by linking with a computer system.

⁷ The comment is made in Ronald T Petty (Ed), *Jane's Weapons Systems 1985-86*. (Janes, London, 1985) p. 549.

Fire Control System: MRS 3/GWS 22

The MRS 3 is the RNZN system for the control of the 4.5 inch and 20mm guns, and the GWS 22 for the Seacat missile system. Their function is to acquire targets originally detected by the search type radar 965, and to determine the accurate range, bearing and angle of elevation of the target. Radars carried for the system are known as the 903 and the 904. Both are conventional I/J band conical scan tracking radars. This system has been replaced by the **R-76 Fire Control System**, which among its functions includes search for air and surface targets, automatic detection, precision tracking and direction of weapons. The system can also provide direct and indirect naval gun fire support, and is based on a low-weight, multi-mode radar, the **R76C5 Naval Fire Control Radar** which is fitted in both the **Wellington** and the **Canterbury**. The R76C5 has 360° combined search detection and tracking capabilities. It transmits on the I-band with peak power of 250 kW and has an acquisition and tracking range on a one-square-metre target of 40km. Manufactured by RCA Government Systems Division of New Jersey, USA, the company claims the system has an average reaction time of 3.5 seconds between the designation and tracking of a target. The RNZN indicates that the R76 fire control system can be operated by two men unlike the MRS3, which requires six operators. The system also has the capability for expansion at low cost with the addition of micro-computers to the existing system. It therefore can provide the basis of a fire control system for more complex weapons should the RNZN have the option of modernising.[8]

Leander Sonar Specifications

Sonar Type 184M

Few technical details of this sonar have been released. It is in extensive service with the Royal Navy as an anti-submarine search and attack sonar. It can scan 360° in both active and passive modes and provide range, bearing and target doppler (movement) data to the MRS3/GWS22 and R76C5 fire control computers. It is manufactured by Graseby Dynamics Ltd. of Hertford, England.

G 750 Sonar

This is a modernised and improved version of the 184M. It provides all-round surveillance, continuous torpedo warning, independent doppler search and accurate fire control data from two independent fire control systems. It can track two targets simultaneously, and has an active search capability over a 45° arc. It is manufactured by Graseby Dynamics of Hertford, England. Three systems have been sold to the RNZN.

⁸ Michael Field, "High-tech gunfire system for RNZN" *Evening Post*. May 27, 1987.

New Surface Combatant Project

The most important force structure development project yet undertaken by the government involves finding a replacement for the *Leander* class frigates. Given the size of the New Zealand defence budget, the previous National Party government declared in the 1983 defence White Paper that purchase of new frigates had gone beyond what New Zealand could afford.[9] At that time the government was considering replacing the frigates with submarines, which had smaller crews and lower operating costs. The submarine project was shelved also because of cost. Feasibility studies showed that the cost of participating in an acquisition project with Australia for four submarines would cost between NZ\$1.3 and \$1.9 billion dollars, depending on the level of capabilities adopted. This sum was considerably greater than the entire projected Navy capital equipment procurement budget for the following fifteen years.[10] New Zealand's decision to participate in a joint acquisition project with Australia for a New Surface Combatant will involve a similar level of cost to the submarine project. This reason alone should give cause to remain cautious about the project's prospects for success. However if it does go ahead, the RNZN will have four frigates of a similar, and in some specific areas a higher level of capability than the *Leanders*. In July 1987 the Navy received ministerial approval for a set of 'baseline characteristics' which be used as guidelines for the design and development stage of the project. These baseline characteristics include:

- * A range of 6000 nautical miles (at 18 knots, the comparable figure for the *Leanders* is about 2500nm)
- * endurance of at least 30 days
- * a speed of 24 knots
- * the ability to operate, hangar and maintain a medium helicopter
- * a medium calibre gun
- * a point defence missile system (for defence against air or missile attack)
- * surveillance systems (sonar and radar)
- * ship launched torpedo system [11]

There is little that can be said about these characteristics until further details are released. It is hardly remarkable, for example, that a ship this size would be equipped with sonar and radar; the crucial issue will be what type of sonar and radar, and what level of capability they offer. The same applies with the types of weapons systems under consideration. It is understood that the Navy is lobbying government quite forcefully to have a larger calibre gun built into the specifications.[12] In September 1987 three designs were selected as a shortlist for the NCS project. These were the Meko 200 PH from Blohm and Voss of West Germany, the M-Class produced by Royal Schelde of the Netherlands, and Yarrow's Type 23 class. All may be described as light patrol frigates of between 2,500 and 3,000 tonnes. It is anticipated that at the end of 1987 two of these three companies will be invited to join consortia to bid for construction, and that tenders for construction will be called in March 1988.[13]

⁹ Government of New Zealand, *Defence Review 1983*.... p. 23.

¹⁰ Doug Kidd, *Questions*. 1985 Question No. # 11.

¹¹ Royal New Zealand Navy, "Backgrounder: Replacements for the frigates: New Surface combatant project", MFA, *Press Statements*. No. # 10, August 13, 1987. pp. 12-14.

¹² Interviews with RNZN officials.

¹³ "Australia, NZ pick frigate shortlist" *Canberra Times*. September 10, 1987; "Australia, NZ chart anew: Frigate agreement made" *Evening Post*. September 10, 1987.

1 Tanker

HMNZS Endeavour

Length	136m
Beam	(no data available)
Displacement	12,300 tonnes
Speed	14knots
Armament	20mm Oerlikon (Chaff launcher)
Complement	35
Builder	Hyundai Heavy Industries, South Korea.

On May 26 1986, the Government authorised the expenditure of NZ\$ 27.677 million on the acquisition of a tanker and associated spares and equipment for the RNZN. A decision to purchase the tanker was made during the Government's May 1985 interim defence review, in recognition of the limited range of the Navy's four frigates. It was found that it was less costly to have the vessel built, rather than purchase, and then convert, an existing ship. The **Endeavour** will be commissioned into the Navy in November 1987. It has the capacity to carry 7,500 tonnes of NATO F76 diesel fuel and 120 of aviation (helicopter) fuel, as well as a limited amount of food stuffs. The ship will be fitted with port, starboard and astern Replenishment At Sea (RAS) refuelling rigs. The **Endeavour** will be equipped with one helicopter landing platform. To date, this is perhaps the Government's most important force structure decision to come to realisation. The RNZN has long suffered from the short range of the *Leander* class frigates, which have placed very tight restrictions on the surveillance capabilities of the RNZN. In effect, the Navy's surveillance role was limited to whatever could be observed in transit between fueling points. The presence of the **Endeavour** will make it possible for the Navy to visit, and return from, Niue and the Tokelau islands - for which New Zealand has statutory defence responsibilities - without depending on allied powers for at-sea refuelling.[14] Following the suspension of New Zealand's defence co-operation with Fiji in May 1987, the RNZN has lost access to refueling facilities at Suva. It is difficult to underestimate the importance of these facilities for New Zealand's operations in the greater South Pacific. Should it prove to be the case that defence co-operation is not resumed between Fiji and New Zealand, **HMNZS Endeavour** will, no doubt, replace Suva as the forward fuel replenishing point for RNZN operations to the North and East of Fiji. This will necessarily restrict the operational activities of the **Endeavour** to what had hitherto been provided by the refuelling point at Suva.[15]

¹⁴ "New tanker for the Navy", *Asian Defence Journal*. September 1986. p. 123, Thomas-Durrell Young, "Uncertain outlook for the Royal New Zealand Navy" *Proceedings of the US Naval Institute*. Vol 112/12/1006 December 1986. pp. 103-4. p. 103, Doug Kidd, *Questions*. 1985 Question # 6.

¹⁵ David Barber, "Pacific politics will never be the same", *National Business Review*. July 10, 1987.

1 Logistic Support Ship

The 1987 defence White Paper identified the need for a logistic support ship to support the Ready Reaction Force and to carry out a disaster relief role throughout the South Pacific Region.[16] The RNZN released details of the ship's required role and capabilities on July 15, 1987. These included:

* The ship will be required to operate through the area extending from the equator to 60° S.

* The requirement is to land vehicles, stores and some personnel in the region. To achieve this requirement the ship is to be capable of:

- embarking and operating two medium size utility helicopters
- carrying and operating landing craft
- loading and off-loading vehicles onto a jetty using an overside ramp, or by helicopter and landing craft

The ship will not require a beach landing capability.

The Navy estimate indicated that the ship would have the capacity to carry up to an infantry company with support elements (About 130 personnel), or the heavy vehicles and logistic support facilities of a larger force (such as the RRF) which had been deployed by air. The ship will have a required speed of 18 knots fully loaded, a range of 8000 nautical miles at a speed of 15 knots, and an endurance of 40 days with an embarked force. It will be armed with a self-defence close-in weapons system, and have the capacity for carrying munitions for the at-sea replenishment of the RNZN combat ships. The government is planning for a three year acquisition period (from July 1987). [17] As yet no details relating to cost have been released.

16 Government of New Zealand, *The Defence of New Zealand...* p. 35.

17 Royal New Zealand Navy, "Backgrounder: Logistic Support Ship", MOD, *Press Statements*. No. # 10. August 13, 1987. pp 8-12.

4 Lake Class Patrol Craft

HMNZS Pukaki	P 3568	Commissioned March 24, 1975
HMNZS Rotoiti	P 3569	Commissioned March 24, 1975
HMNZS Taupo	P 3570	Commissioned July 29, 1975
HMNZS Hawea	P 3571	Commissioned July 29, 1975
Length	107 feet (32.84m)	
Beam	20 feet (6.10m)	
Displacement	134 tons (136 tonnes)	
Speed	Over twenty knots	
Machinery	Twin Paxman Marine diesel engines rated 1500bhp at 1500rpm	
Armament	rapid firing 12.7mm guns	
Complement	20 (2 officers, 4 senior ratings, 14 junior ratings)	
Builder	Brooke Marine Limited, Lowestoft, England	

The four Lake Class Patrol craft were commissioned to perform fishery and resource protection roles within New Zealand's twelve mile limit. Subsequent to the declaration of the Law of the Sea Convention in 1982, the RNZN has used these craft to patrol out to the limits of New Zealand's 200 hundred mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). However in Navy's view, the Lake class craft are unsuited to this task because of limited range and seakeeping abilities. The craft could be kept in service until the end of the century; however Navy would prefer that replacements are considered because of limitations in the craft's operational capabilities.[18] However the recently completed defence review process did not consider the operational capabilities and specifications that Navy would require of a new class of patrol craft. The age of the vessels is now beginning to cause maintenance problems. Where as in 1981 some nine weeks per year were allocated for maintenance on each craft, in 1986 this had doubled to approximately 18 weeks. This is placing some pressure on the already stretched resources of the Navy's Fleet Maintenance Unit. [19]

18 Doug Kidd, *Questions*, 1986 Question # 16.

19 Information supplied to the author by the MOD.

1 Survey Vessel

HMNZS Monowai A 06 Commissioned in the RNZN Oct. 4, 1977

Length	89m
Beam	14m
Displacement	3861 tonnes
Draught	4.8m
Guns	2x 20mm
Main engines	2 Sulzer 7-cylinder diesels; 3,640 hp
Speed	14 knots
Range	12,000 cruising
Complement	250 officers and ratings*

* *Jane's Fighting Ships 1986-87* lists the **Monowai's** complement as 125 (11 officers, 114 ratings).

The **Monowai** is the RNZN's hydrographic survey ship. It was taken over in 1974 from the Cook Islands service, and the Scott Lithgow Drydocks Ltd, and commissioned in late 1977 after undertaking an extensive refit programme. This included the uprating of engines, provision of a helicopter deck and hangar, and the fitting of variable pitch propellers and bow thruster. The ship's main function is to survey the New Zealand coast and areas of the South Pacific. For example, in June 1985, **HMNZS Monowai** surveyed the southern and central Line islands of Kiribati for mapping and charting purposes and to define the Kiribati Exclusive Economic Zone. More recently, the **Monowai** has been engaged in re-charting the Cook Strait, and approaches to major New Zealand harbours. [20]

1 Oceanographic Research Vessel

HMNZS Tui A 2 Commissioned in the RNZN Sept. 11, 1970

Length	63.4m
Beam	11.3m
Displacement	1050 tonnes light; 1360 tonnes loaded
Main engines	Caterpillar/Westinghouse diesel electric.
Speed	12 knots
Complement	36 navy, 9 scientists
Builder	Christy Corporation, Sturgeon Bay, Wis. USA

HMNZS Tui served in the US Navy as the **USS Charles H. Davis** (T-AGOR 5) from January 25 1963 to 10 August 1970 when it was passed on loan to the RNZN. **HMNZS Tui** operates for the New Zealand Defence Science Establishment (DSE) on acoustic research, but also carries out a wider range of research work including biological sampling, physical and chemical measurements and geological studies. The MOD has estimated that, if the United States recalled the vessel, replacement costs would be between NZ\$ 15 million for the conversion of a second-hand ten year old ship and NZ\$ 22 million for a purpose built ship[21] The United States, however has given no indication that it intends to recall the ship.

²⁰ MOD, *1986 Annual Report*. p. 28. See subsequent *Annual Reports* under the sub-heading Hydrographic survey.

²¹ Doug Kidd, *Questions*, 1986 Question 22.

4 Inshore Patrol Craft

HMNZS Moa	P 3553	Commissioned November 28, 1983
HMNZS Kiwi	P 3554	Commissioned September 2, 1984
HMNZS Wakakura	P 3555	Commissioned March 26, 1985
HMNZS Hinau	P 3556	Commissioned October 4, 1985

Length	26.8m
Beam	6.1m
Displacement	91.5 tonnes light; 104.9 tonnes loaded
Gun	1 x .50 inch Browning machine-gun
Main engines	2 Cummins diesels; 2 shafts; 710 bhp
Speed	12knots
Range	1000 miles
Complement	18 (5 officers - 4 training - 13 ratings)
Builder	Whangarei Engineering and Construction Co. (NZ)

The New Zealand Cabinet approved construction of the Inshore Patrol Craft (IPC) in February 1982. The four IPC are operated by Royal New Zealand Navy Volunteer Reserve (RNZNVR) divisions.

2 Inshore Survey Craft

Tarapunga	A 07	Commissioned April 9, 1980
Takapu	A 08	Commissioned July 8, 1980

Length	88m
Beam	20m
Displacement	95.1 tonnes standard; 104.9 full load
Main engines	2 Cummins diesels; 2 shafts; 710 hp
Speed	12knots
Range	1,000 miles
Complement	11 (1 officer; 10 ratings)
Builder	Whangarei Engineering and Construction Co. Ltd.

Survey Equipment	Magnavox MX1102 satellite navigation Atlas Desco 10 echo-sounder Decca Trisponder positioning fixing EG and G Mark 1B sidescan sonar (fitted, but not with Decca Hi-Fix 6)
------------------	--

The New Zealand Cabinet approved the construction of two survey craft in November 1977. Their design is the same as the inshore patrol craft. Their equipment has been designed to work with the **Monowai**. In 1985 and 1986 the **Tarapunga** and the **Takapu** were engaged in mine countermeasures surveys in the Hauraki Gulf and Bream Bay areas, and surveyed the approaches to Wellington and Gisbourne harbours - among other areas.[22]

1 Diving Tender

HMNZS Manawanui A 09 Commissioned May 28, 1979

Length	26.8m
Beam	6.1m
Displacement	91.5 tonnes light; 104.9 tonnes loaded
Main engines	2 Cummins diesels; 2 shafts; 710 bhp
Speed	12knots
Range	1000 miles
Complement	16
Builder	Whangarei Engineering and Construction Co. (NZ)

The **Manawanui** has the same hull construction as the inshore patrol craft.

1 Tug

Arataki A 10

Length	25.3m
Beam	7.6m
Displacement	170 tonnes
Main engine	Ruston 6 ARM diesel; 1,100 hp
Speed	12 knots

On September 19, 1984 the MOD authorised the purchase of the Timaru Harbour Board Tug **Aorangi** to replace the Navy's previous Tug **Arataki**. Total cost of the purchase was NZ\$ 700,000, and following a refit to update the tug to RNZN standards the total cost of the project was NZ\$ 834,721. The tug was re-named **Arataki**.

1 Sail Training Ship

Spirit of New Zealand Three masted barquentine

Length	37.8m
Beam	9.1m
Displacement	220 tons
Complement	40 trainees
Builder	Thackery, Auckland. (Laid down November 1983)

Rigid Inflatable Boats

Length	7.9m
Weight	2.4 tonnes (maximum, with crew)
Speed	29knots
Engine	200hp Volvo with Hamilton Water Jet

In early 1987 the RNZN placed a contract with a UK company for the manufacture of a prototype Rigid Inflatable Boat (RIB). Production boats will be manufactured in New Zealand beginning in October 1987. The RIB's will be used in search and rescue operations, transfer and ship to shore operations.[23]

²³ "Prototype Rigid Inflatable Boat for RNZN" *New Zealand Navy News*. Summer 1986. p. 71.

New Zealand Army

LIGHT ARMS

Pistols

Browning HP 35

Calibre	9mm
Length	20.3cm
Weight	0.8kg
Effective Range	70m
Muzzle Velocity	450m/sec
Magazine	13 round box type
Country of origin	Belgium

Introduced into the New Zealand Army in 1964.

Rifles

Colt M16A1 (also used with M203 Grenade Launcher.)

Calibre	M16A1: 5.56mm M203: 40mm
Length	98cm
Weight	M16A1: 2.9kg M203: 4.98kg
Effective Ranges	M16A1: 400m M203: 350m (area target) 150m (pinpoint target)
Magazine (M16A1)	20 and 30 round box type.
Country of origin	USA

Self Loading Rifle (SLR) L1A1

Calibre	7.62mm
Length	105.3cm
Weight	4.3kg
Effective Range	500m
Magazine	20 round box type.
Country of origin	Belgium

Steyr Army Universal Gun (AUG)

Calibre	5.56mm
Length	79cm
Weight	3.6kg (unloaded, loaded magazine 0.49kg)
Effective Range	300m
Magazine	30 and 40 round detachable translucent plastic box
Country of origin	Austria

The Australian manufactured version of the SLR L1A1 entered service with the Army in 1956, and the American M16A1 in 1967. The M203 followed a year later. In December 1986 the Government announced its intention to replace these weapons with the Australian version of the Steyr AUG. Some 18,000 weapons at a cost of \$A22 million will be produced for the New Zealand Army at the Australian Government small arms factory at Lithgow in New South Wales. Delivery of the Units will start in 1989.[24] The NZ Government was able to negotiate about \$NZ 5 million in offsets for the project and will manufacture some plastic components for the Australian and New Zealand production run.[25] The New Zealand Army participated in the Australian selection trials for the Army's new light arm. However, it is known that the New Zealander's own preference was for the Canadian manufactured version of the Colt M16A2, not least because it offered considerable savings on the cost of the Australian made Steyr. Had the Army been given a free choice, it seems likely that they would have selected the Colt. In the event, however, the Government found it politically sensible to opt for the Steyr as a token of its commitment to closer ANZAC co-operation, a point which Australian officials did not refrain from making to their New Zealand counterparts. Army, for the most part, seems happy to live with the decision. It maintains that both the Steyr and the Colt fulfil their operational requirements.[26] Army is above all happy to see a replacement for weapons which are between 20 and 30 years old and increasingly prone to operational faults.

²⁴ Frank Robertson, "New guns for Australian infantryman", *Pacific Defence Reporter*. April 1986. p. 30.; "NZ to get Steyr rifle" *Dominion*. December 3, 1987.

²⁵ F.D. O'Flynn, "Introduction", *Report of the Ministry of Defence for the Year ended 31 March 1987*. (Government Printer, Wellington, 1987) p. 9.

²⁶ Interviews with NZ Army and MOD officials. See also "NZ to get Steyr rifle" *Dominion*. December 3, 1987.

Machine-guns**Bren Gun L4**

Calibre	7.62mm
Length	113.3cm
Weight	9.53kg (without magazine)
Effective Ranges	600m
Muzzle Velocity	823m/sec
Feed System	30 round box magazine
Cyclic rate	500 rpm
Country of Origin	Australia (Small Arms Factory, Lithgow, NSW)

The Bren is in use with many armed forces, but no longer manufactured.

FN-FAL/HB

Calibre	7.62mm
Length	115cm
Weight	6kg (without bayonet or magazine)
Effective Ranges	650m
Muzzle Velocity	840m/sec
Feed System	20 round steel light box magazine
Cyclic rate	650/700 rpm
Country of Origin	Belgium

General Purpose Machine-Gun L7 Series

Calibre	7.62mm
Length	125cm
Weight	10.8kg
Effective Ranges	
Bipod	800m
Tripod	1400m
Muzzle Velocity	850m/sec
Feed System	disintegrating belt unit
Cyclic rate	700-1000rpm
Country of Origin	Belgium

Introduced into the New Zealand Army in 1964.

Minimi Light Support Weapons.

Calibre	5.56mm
Length	104cm
Weight	6.875kg (with bipod) 10.0kg (with 200 rounds filled box)
Muzzle Velocity	965m/sec
Feed System	100 or 200 round belts
Cyclic rate	750-1000rpm
Country of Origin	Belgium

Introduced into the New Zealand Army in 1986.

In June 1986 Mr O'Flynn announced that the Government has approved purchase of 1000 Belgium Fabrique Nationale 5.56mm calibre Minimi 'Light Support Weapons' at a cost of \$NZ8.316 million. These weapons will replace the variety of heavy and light machine-guns presently in service which include World War Two vintage Bren guns. The urgent need for the Minimi to replace these weapons led the Government to buy direct from Fabrique Nationale in Belgium, not Australia, which will manufacture the Minimi under licence for the ADF. It is, however, likely that 5.56mm calibre ammunition for both the Styer and the Mimini will be purchased from the Australian Government Ammunition Factory at Footscray in Victoria. As a result of these purchases, both the New Zealand and Australian Armies will be equipped with the same light arms, and the standard NATO round of 5.56mm calibre has been adopted by the two countries.[27]

In tandem with the purchases of new light arms, Army has taken delivery of 610 **Infantry Weapons Effects Simulators**, at a cost of \$NZ 4.485 million, from Oscmar products of Auckland. The system is comprised laser projectors fitted to rifles or machine-guns, and sensors fitted to soldiers' jackets which will register a 'hit' when targeted.[28] The Army has also received 17 **automated test equipment stations** which "provide a sophisticated radio testing facility", at a cost of NZ\$ 3.568 million.[29]

²⁷ "New Light Machine Guns approved for the Army", *Asian Defence Journal*. July 1986. p. 101.

²⁸ "NZ company wins Army contract", *Asian Defence Journal*. July 1986. p. 101.

²⁹ MOD, *Annual Report for the year ended 31 March 1987*. (Government Printer, Wellington, 1987) p. 28, Ministry of Defence, *Notes on Estimates, 1986-87*. (MOD, Wellington, 1987) p. 161.

MORTARS**81mm L16**

Calibre	81mm
Overall Length	128cm
Weight	36.6kg
Ammunition types	High Explosive (HE) White Phosphorus Smoke Illumination
Country of Origin	UK

81mm L1A1 Mortar

Calibre	81mm
Barrel Length	128cm
Weight	36.6kg
Range	5600m
Rate of Fire	up to 15 rounds per minute
Ammunition types	High Explosive (HE) White Phosphorus Smoke Illumination
Country of Origin	UK
Introduced into the New Zealand Army in 1967	

Army is presently conducting trials for a new light mortar. It is liaising with the Australian Army with regard to the latter's trialing of a 60mm mortar. It is likely that Army will put forward a proposal for procurement in the next few years.[30]

³⁰ Information supplied by the MOD.

ANTI-TANK WEAPONS.**106MM Recoilless Rifle M40A1.**

Calibre	106mm
Length	3.35m
Weight	223kg
Effective Range	1200m stationary target 1000m moving target
Maximum Range	7700m
Rate of Fire	one round per minute
Ammunition types	High Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) High Explosive Plastic (HEPT)
Country of Origin	USA
Introduced into the New Zealand Army in 1961	

Carl Gustav M2 Rocket Launcher

Calibre	84mm
Length	113cm
Weight	14.2kg
Effective Range	HEAT: 700m HE and Smoke: 1000m Illuminating: 2000m
Time of flight	1.79 sec to 400m
Ignition	percussion
Muzzle Velocity	350m/sec
Effect	penetrates 400mm of armoured plate
Country of Origin	Sweden
Introduced into the New Zealand Army in 1965	

M72 Light Anti-Tank Weapon

Calibre	66mm
Length	89cm
Weight	2.1kg
Effective Range	200m
Maximum range	1000m
Muzzle Velocity	145m/sec
Effect	penetrates 260mm of armoured plate
Country of Origin	USA
Introduced into the New Zealand Army in 1967	

Army has identified the Improved TOW (Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided) Anti-Tank Missile (Designated BGM-71) as its preferred anti-armour weapon. To date however, the MOD has not yet given its approval for purchase. It is anticipated that Army will continue to lobby for ITOW, but in the interim the 106mm Recoilless Rifle has been improved with the addition of a laser range-finder, and ammunition with longer range has been purchased.[31]

Very Low Air-Defence System (VLADS)

Army has identified the RBS-70 as fulfilling its specifications for a man-portable surface-to-air guided missile system system. The Government, however, has yet to approve financial support for the project.[32]

³¹ Information supplied by the MOD. Specifications on the ITOW are as follows:

ITOW Anti-Tank Missile (BGM-71)

Warhead	HEAP Shaped Charge
Missile Length	117cm
Missile Diameter	15.2cm
Launch Weight	18kg
System Weight	102kg (with one missile)
Speed	Believed to be at least 100km/h
Range	Minimum: 65m; maximum: 3750m
Rate of Fire	3 launched in 90 seconds
Crew	4
Country of origin	USA

³² Information supplied by the MOD. Specifications on the RBS-70 are as follows:

RBS-70 Ray Rider Anti-Aircraft Missile System.

Guidance	Optical beam-riding on laser beam
Propulsion	Booster plus solid propellant sustainer
Warhead	Fragmentation with impact and proximity fuses
Weight	Firing unit complete: About 80kg Missile in container: 24kg
Missile container length	1.6m
Container diameter	15cm
Missile range	5km
Country of origin	Sweden (AB Bofors manufacturer)

ARTILLERY.**5.5 Inch Medium Gun.**

(NZ Army general support artillery weapon.)
 Calibre 5.5inch (139.7mm)
 Length 7.51m
 Weight 5850kg
 Effective Range 16,460m
 Rate of Fire 2 rounds per minute
 Ammunition type High Explosive (HE) 36kg
 Country of Origin UK
 Introduced to the New Zealand Army 1956

105mm L5 Pack Howitzer

(Close infantry support weapon, transportable in three UH-1H Iroquois lifts.)
 Calibre 105mm
 Length 3.65m
 Weight 1290kg
 Effective Range 10,000m
 Rate of Fire Up to 5 rounds per minute
 Ammunition type High Explosive (HE)
 Smoke
 White Phosphorus (WP)
 Illuminating
 High Explosive Plastic-Tracer (HEP-T)
 Country of Origin Italy
 Introduced to the New Zealand Army in 1963.

105mm M101A1 Howitzer

(Close infantry support, deployed usually in batteries of six, air transportable in C-130 Hercules aircraft.)
 Calibre 105mm
 Length 5.99m
 Weight 2258kg
 Effective Range 11,000m
 Rate of Fire Up to 5 rounds per minute
 Ammunition type High Explosive (HE)
 Smoke
 White Phosphorus (WP)
 Illuminating
 High Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT)
 Country of Origin USA
 Introduced to the New Zealand Army in 1968.

105mm L118/119 Light Gun

(Close infantry support Weapon)

Calibre	105mm
Length [33]	7.01m
Weight	1860kg
Range Maximum	17,000m
Minimum	2,400m
Rate of Fire Intense	8 rounds per minute
Normal	3 rounds per minute
Ammunition type	High Explosive High Explosive Squash Head (HESH)
Country of Origin	UK, Manufactured by Australian Ordnance Factory, Bendigo.

Introduced to the New Zealand Army in 1986-89.

In March 1986 the MOD authorised the expenditure of \$NZ21 million for the purchase of 24 105mm Howitzers of British L118/119 design. Designated Project Hamil, the Australian Ordnance Factory at Bendigo is manufacturing 59 105mm's for the Regular Army and 46 for the Army Reserve. A Light Gun was loaned to the NZ Army for familiarisation purposes. Army intends to phase the Italian L5 out of service as it can no longer safely achieve its maximum range.[34] Army has maintained for some years that the 5.5 inch medium guns - now over thirty years in service - need replacement. In late 1986 it reported that; "Spares are almost impossible to find and the only ammunition manufacturer is Armscor of South Africa. The guns are no longer serviceable and cannot be live-fired." [35] \$NZ2.7 million was allocated to finding a replacement of the 5.5 inch medium guns in the 1985/86 defence financial estimates but this was not spent following a Government decision to defer the purchase pending the Defence Review. As of late 1987 it appears that the project has been dropped altogether by the Government, which considers that a 155mm howitzer is not relevant to New Zealand's defence needs. Army still maintains, however, that this is a necessary capability for its Integrated Expansion Force.[36]

³³ The following specifications relate to the L118's in use with the Australian Army, it is possible that the New Zealand Army will use different ammunition types.

³⁴ "New Field Gun for Army", *Asian Defence Journal*. July 1986 p. 101.

³⁵ Information supplied to Doug Kidd, MP, by the MOD, in his capacity as Member of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence. October 1986.

Question No # 32. (Herein after referred to as Doug Kidd, *Questions*.)

³⁶ Interviews with NZ Army and MOD officials.

ARMOURED VEHICLES

Scorpion Light Tank (Tracked Fire Support Vehicle)

Armament	76mm main gun with 7.62mm coaxial machine-gun
Dimensions	H: 2.1m L: 4.8m W: 2.2m
Weight	7960kg
Speed	80kph
Engine	Jaguar 6-cylinder, water cooled, petrol
Range	644km
Country of Origin	UK

Introduced into the New Zealand Army in 1982.

Initial authority for the purchase of 26 Scorpion tracked fire support vehicles was given in May 1980. In February 1985 the final payment was authorised, creating a total project cost of \$NZ 23.58 million.

M113A1 Armoured Personnel Carrier

Armament	.50 inch Browning machine-gun .30 inch Browning machine-gun
Dimensions	H: 2.74m L: 4.86m W: 2.68m
Weight	11,913kg
Speed	65kph (6kph 'swimming')
Engine	GMC V-6 Diesel
Range	480km
Country of Origin	USA

Introduced into the New Zealand Army in 1969

M577A1 Command Post Carrier

Armament	.50 inch Browning machine-gun
Dimensions	H: 2.56m L: 4.86m W: 2.68m
Weight	11,422kg
Speed	65kph (6kph 'swimming')
Engine	GMC V-6 Diesel
Range	480km
Country of Origin	USA

Introduced into the New Zealand Army in 1969

M548 Tracked Load Carrier

Armament	.50 inch Browning machine-gun
Dimensions	H: 4.24m L: 9.08m W: 4.24m
Weight	7,422kg (fully laden: 12,877kg)
Speed	60kph (6kph 'swimming')
Engine	GMC V-6 Diesel
Range	480km
Country of Origin	USA
Introduced into the New Zealand Army in 1969	

The Army has a fleet of some 78 M113A1 APC's of which the M577A1 and the M548 are adaption. Six additional M113's have recently been bought from Australia. These will be overhauled by 1 Base Workshops at Trentham (Wellington). Sixty-four of the original 78 M113's have recently been overhauled by the Ministry of Works at their heavy engineering facility at Turangi. The total cost was \$NZ 1.9 million. Apparently the NZ Army began talks with Australia about participation in project WALTER, which sought to replace the Australian Army's M113's with an APC of local design. The project was cancelled in 1985. At present the New Zealand Government has no plans to replace its M113's. Army anticipates that the overhaul process of the existing APC's will begin again in 1990.[37]

³⁷ Doug Kidd, *Questions*. 1986 Question #35, J.H. Beaglehole, "New Zealand: Highly professional, but upgrading a slow process" *Pacific Defence Reporter*. July 1984. pp. 15-20. p. 16. MOD, *Annual Report for the year ended 31 March 1987*. (Government Printer, Wellington, 1987) p. 28.

GENERAL SERVICE VEHICLES**Landrover V8**

Dimensions H: 1.98m L: 4.58m W: 1.74m
 Weight 1,725kg (unladen); 2,820kg (laden)
 Engine Rover V8, aluminium, twin-carburetter, 3,528cc, petrol
 Range 450km (on road)
 Country of Origin UK
 567 in service
 Introduced into New Zealand Army service in 1982.

Mercedes-Benz Unimog U1300L

Dimensions H: 2.85m L: 5.48m W: 2.3m
 Weight 5,250kg (unladen); 7,500kg (laden)
 Seating Cab: three; Tray: eight
 Engine Mercedes-Benz, OM 352 6-cylinder, diesel, 5,675cc
 Range 800km (approx)
 Country of Origin West Germany
 210 in service
 Introduced into New Zealand Army service in 1982.

Mercedes-Benz Unimog UL1700L

Dimensions H: 3.16m L: 6.65m W: 2.3m
 Weight 6,900kg (unladen); 12,200kg (laden)
 Seating Cab: three; Tray: 16
 Engine Mercedes-Benz, OM 352A 6-cylinder, turbo-charged, diesel, 5,675cc
 Range 625km (approx)
 Country of Origin West Germany
 298 in service as at March 31 1987 (projected total of 412)
 Introduced into New Zealand Army service in 1982.

Mercedes-Benz 2228/41

Dimensions H: 3.39m L: 9.1m W: 2.43m
 Weight 10,520kg (unladen); 22,000kg (laden)
 Seating Cab: three; Tray: 24
 Engine Mercedes-Benz, OM 422 8-cylinder, diesel, 14,616cc
 Range 1,280km (approx)
 Country of Origin West Germany
 73 in service as at March 31, 1987 (projected total of 118)
 Introduced into New Zealand Army service in 1983.

Honda XL250RC Motorcycle

Dimensions	H: 1.23m L: 2.21m W: .865m
Weight	124kg
Seating	Cab: three; Tray: 24
Engine	Honda, air cooled, 4-stroke, petrol
Range	300km (approx)
Country of Origin	Japan
124 in service	
Introduced into New Zealand Army service in 1983.	

As of June 1980 the MOD began a major replacement programme of its 'B' Vehicles (General Purpose Vehicles). Both Land Rover and Mercedes-Benz contracts involved assembly in New Zealand. The 1986/87 MOD *Notes on Estimates* put the total estimated cost at \$NZ 115,685,255. As of March 1987, the programme is nearly at completion. Supplementary to the B Vehicle programme, Army has acquired 26 16 tonne trailers, 42 'medium trailers', 55 6 tonne trailers, and has undertaken evaluation of light trailer prototypes. 19 ambulances have been bought, using Mercedes-Benz Unimog 1300 trucks and interiors designed in New Zealand. The Unimog 1300 is compatible with the 1300L. A variety of specialist containers are being developed in New Zealand to be carried by the Unimogs. These will be used in such roles as load carriers, signals huts, field workshops, bloodbanks and laboratories. The MOD proposes to call for tenders for 1933 camouflage nets. Finally, the Army has also received four heavy lift tractor units, 16 dump trucks and is in the process of tendering for ten heavy recovery vehicles.[38]

³⁸ Doug Kidd, *Questions*, 1986 Question #29, MOD, *Annual Report for the year ended 31 March 1987*. (Government Printer, Wellington, 1987) p. 28, Vernon Wright, "The Army: In the firing line", *New Zealand Listener*, March 22, 1986. pp. 18-20. p. 20, "Army gets latest German ambulance technology", *Asian Defence Journal*. November 1986. p. 106.

Royal New Zealand Air Force.

STRIKE AIRCRAFT

McDonnell Douglas A4K & TA4K Skyhawk

Power Plant	Pratt and Whitney 352-P-8A turbojet developing 9,300 pounds of thrust.
Dimensions	
Wing Span	8.38m
Length	A-4K 12.27m TA-4K 12.98m
Height	A-4K 4.57m TA-4K 4.68m
Max level speed	615knots (1141km/h)
Max Range with external tanks	A-4K 3250km TA-4K 2850km
Combat payload	3727kg of bombs, rockets and cannon in any combination
Entered service	1970.

The 22 Skyhawks (19 A-4K and 3 TA4K) is the RNZAF main strike wing. The aircraft carry Maverick (AGM - 65) air-to-surface missiles, Sidewinder (AIM -9) air-to-surface missiles, and laser-guided bombs. In June 1984 New Zealand bought 10 Douglas A-4G Skyhawks from the Royal Australian Navy, which was disposing of all fixed wing aircraft in the fleet air-arm at a cost of A\$50 million. The aircraft were subsequently updated to A-4 level. Under the name 'Project KAHU', the RNZAF is undertaking an extensive structural refurbishing and avionics update programme. Phase one of the project was authorised on June 25, 1984 at a cost of NZ\$68.596 million to refurbish and extend the structural life of the aircraft. Eighteen wing sets are to be constructed and installed at RNZAF base Woodbourne over a five year period beginning in March 1986. The US aircraft firm Lear Siegler Inc. (LSI) was awarded the contract for the second half of the project. On May 1, 1985 the government authorised the expenditure of NZ\$148.351 million on a modernisation package for the avionics systems of all Skyhawks. Some NZ\$12 million of this will be sub-contracted to New Zealand firms. The first production aircraft is due to re-enter service in March 1988, and the last a year later.[39] The avionics update includes the following items of equipment:

- Radios
 - AN/ARC 182 UHF/VHF
 - AN/ARC 159 stand-alone UHF
- Navigation Aids
 - ARN 182 Tacan
 - VIR - 130 VOR/ILS
 - AN/ARA 50 ADF
 - APX - 72 IFF

Flight Instruments

- AN/APN 194 radar altimeter
- ADI - 350 R altitude indicator
- Horizontal Situation Indicator 122260

Main Components of the Nav/Attack System (NAS)

- MIL - STD 1553B Multiplex data bus
- Ferranti FD 4513 head-up display
- Two IES 272 multi-function displays
- AN/APG 66 (NZ) radar
- Litton Inertial Nav Unit LN 39. Laser ring giro
- Date transfer module/System 3245

Other Ancillary Items

- AN/ALR - 66 (VE) RWS
- AN/ALE - 39 Chaff and Flare dispenser
- Ferranti FD 6802 video tape recorder
- Cockpit Television Sensor (part of HUD) [40]

In addition, the government has made expenditure provision for the acquisition of Sidewinder missiles (NZ\$ii.650 million) and Maverick Missiles (NZ\$11,230 million). It was reported in May 1987 that the RNZAF bought a quantity of Maverick AGM-65A missiles from the Royal Jordanian Airforce.[41]

40 Information provided to author by the MOD.

41 The purchase was reported in the 'Briefs' section of *Australian Aviation*. May 1987.
p. 79.

Lockheed P3K Orion

Power Plant	4 Allison T56-A-14 turboprop engines, each developing 4910 eshp
Crew	11
Dimensions	
Wing Span	30.37m
Length	33.61m
Height	10.29m
Transit cruise speed	350knots (650km/h)
Patrol cruise speed	260knots (484km/h)
Range	8064km+
Entered service	1966.

New Zealand purchased five P3-B Orion Long Distance Maritime Patrol aircraft in 1966, and a sixth at a cost of NZ\$34.673 million on March 26, 1987. The purpose of the Orions is firstly to conduct Maritime surface surveillance missions (which are carried out on only in the EEZ but also over Island EEZ at the request of the Island governments), and secondly, ASW. The present Orions are capable of monitoring 30,000 square miles of surface activity in one hour. Following feasibility studies in the late 1970's, funding was authorised on February 25 1980 to update the Orion surface surveillance capability with the Boeing Aerospace Company. For an estimated total cost of NZ\$84.594 million, the update programme called RIGEL phase 1 installed a new Data Handling System (DHS) based on Boeings Universal Display and Control System (UDACS). The system is comprised of the following elements:

- The Mil-Std 1553 Data Bus
- Three AYK-14 Digital Computing Units; (DCU)
- Four display generator Units; (DGU)
- Three multi-purpose displays
- Pilot's display and pilot display control
- ASH-33 Digital Magnetic Tape System; (DMTS)
- Video recorder reproducer; (VRR)
- High speed printer
- Multi-Function Keysets

Sensors included in Phase one of the project include:

APS-134 radar
AAS-36 infra-red detection set
LTN - 72 Inertial Navigation System
LTN-211 Omega Navigation System

Technical specifications for these items of equipment can be found in the MOD Briefing Paper entitled *RNZAF P3-K Modernisation*. (No date, probably 1985/1986) Phase two of the RIGEL project has yet to go ahead, and no date has been set for its commencement. It would, however, address the ASW element of the P3-K function. Already its radar capability is claimed to give it the capacity to detect a submarine periscope at 25 nautical miles in high seas, and fishing vessels at 100 miles. The RNZAF maintains that once the refit programme is complete, it will then have "...one of the most modern, most capable and cost effective long range maritime patrol aircraft in the world." [42]

⁴² RNZAF, *Briefing Paper on RNZAF P3-K Modernisation*. (No date, probably 1985/1986) p. 6. See also, Benjamin M Elson, "New Zealand Updates P-3B Electronics" *Aviation Week and Space Technology*. January 9, 1984. pp. 75-81; MOD, *Briefing Paper on Surveillance Sensors Fitted to Orion Aircraft*. (May 8, 1984)

HELICOPTERS

Bell UH/IH Iroquois

Power Plant	One Lycoming T53-L-13 turboshaft developing 1,400shp
Crew	3 (plus up to 9 passengers)
Dimensions	
Main rotor diameter	14.63m
Body Length	12.77m
Height	4.42m
Normal cruise speed	110knots (204km/h)
Entered service	1966.

Westland Wasp

Crew	6
Max Take-off weight	2,495kg
Max speed	104 knots
Mission Range max	263 knots
Weapons	2 Mark 44 torpedoes

Specifications for the Wasp are taken from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), *Tactical and Strategic Anti-Submarine Warfare*. (MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1974) pp 114-115. The RNZAF has seven Wasps, four of which are flown off the *Leander* frigates in a basic anti-submarine and general-purpose shipborne role. They are now considered to be obsolete, having been introduced into the British Navy in 1963. The 1978 Defence review noted that they would have to be replaced by the middle of the 1980's. The 1987 Defence White Paper makes no mention of any studies presently being conducted on a replacement, but both the NSC project and the specifications for the logistic support ship indicate that the RNZN will maintain some level of helicopter-borne ASW capability.

Bell 47G-3B-1 and 47G 3B-2 Sioux

Power Plant	47G-3B-1 Lycoming TVO-435-DIB turboshaft 47G-3B-2 Lycoming TVO-435-GIB turboshaft
Crew	3
Dimensions	
Main rotor diameter	11.32m
Body Length	9.90m
Normal cruise speed	65knots (120km/h)
Entered service	1965.

FIXED-WING TRANSPORTS

Lockheed C-130H Hercules

Power Plant	4 Allison T56-A-15 turboprop engines each developing 4915 eshp
Crew	6
Dimensions	
Wing Span	40.41m
Length	29.78m
Height	11.73m
Normal cruise speed	300knots (556km/h)
Range	2160km with maximum load
Entered service	1965.

The 1983 defence review reported that since the purchase of the Boeing 727's, the C-130's have been relieved of most passenger carrying duties. Their main use is now freight transport

Boeing 727-100C

Power Plant	3 Pratt and Whitney JT8D -7 turbofan engines each producing 14,500 pounds of thrust.
Crew	5 plus up to 4 cabin staff (plus up to 126 passengers)
Dimensions	
Wing Span	32.9m
Length	40.5m
Height	10.3m
Normal cruise speed	460 knots (854km/h)
Patrol cruise speed	260 knots
Range	4,800 km at maximum weight
Entered service	1981.

Two Boeing 727-100C aircraft were acquired from the United States in 1981, and have been specially modified to increase their range. The 1983 Review indicated that their purchase would lead to the phasing out of service of the Andover aircraft

Hawker Siddeley Andover C Mk 1

Power Plant	2 Rolls Royce RDa12 Mk 201C engines each delivering 2400 eshp
Dimensions	
Wing Span	29.95m
Length	23.77m
Height	9.15m
Normal cruise speed	210knots (385km/h)
Entered service	1976

The Andovers perform medium range transport operations, as well as a variety of rolls such as troop lift, paratrooping, paradropping of supplies, casualty evacuation and VIP transport. They can carry up to 44 passengers. In 1986 the MOD had seven Andovers in operational service, and three kept in short term storage "pending a decision on the future of the Andover fleet, as part of the defence review process".[43] As yet there has been no public announcement made about the future of the fleet.

Cessna 421C Golden Eagle

Power Plant	2 280kw(375hp Continental GTS10-520-L flat-six geared and turbocharged engines
Crew	2 plus up to 5 passengers
Dimensions	
Wing Span	12.53m
Length	11.09m
Height	3.49m
Normal cruise speed	201knots (390km/h)
Entered service	1981
Used for light transport tasks and VIP flights throughout New Zealand.	

FIXED-WING TRAINING

BAC 167 Strikemaster Mk 88

Power Plant	Rolls Royce Bristol Viper Series 20 Mk 535 turbojets of 3410 pounds thrust
Crew	2 pilot and instructor
Dimensions	
Wing Span	11.23m
Length	10.27m
Height	3.34m
Maximum speed	450knots (835km/h)
Entered service	1972

The Strikemasters are used for advanced training of student pilots and operational training of pilots destined to fly the Skyhawks. Fifteen of the original aircraft delivered in 1972 are still in service, although the entire fleet was grounded for the third time in twelve months in August 1986 when large cracks were found in the upper wing attachment lug of one aircraft. On October 4, 1985 the government approved the purchase of six sets of wings, and a further set on January 26, 1987 at a total cost of NZ\$11.201 million. This will extend the life of the Strikemasters until 1990. Nevertheless the problem of wing fatigue is a major one, which has inclined the MOD to undertake studies for a replacement training aircraft which would be able to provide for both initial and advanced pilot training. It is anticipated that the government will announce world wide tenders for up to 20 aircraft before the end of 1987. The RNZAF studied six possible replacements; the Embraer/Shorts Tucano, Promavia Squalis, Pilatus PC7 and PC9, Siai Marchetti and the Aermacchi MB339. The Swiss manufactured Pilatus PC-9 has been selected by the RAAF for training purposes. It is therefore at least possible that a joint acquisition project could be undertaken.[44]

⁴⁴ Doug Kidd, *Questions*. 1986 Questions, No. # 75 a to ; Graeme Kennedy, "RNZAF trainer decision" *Aircraft* (Australia) September 1987. p. 15; "RNZAF Strikemasters grounded again" *Australian Aviation*. November 1986. p. 72.

Aerospace CT4-B Airtrainer

Power Plant	Continental 10.36H six cylinder engine of 210hp.
Crew	2; pilot and instructor
Dimensions	
Wing Span	7.92m
Length	7.06m
Height	2.59m
Normal cruise speed	125 knots (232 km/h)
Entered service	1976
A New Zealand built trainer.	

AE.SL 16/24 Airtourer

Power Plant	Lycoming 0.320 four cylinder engine of 150hp
Crew	2 pilot and instructor
Dimensions	
Wing Span	7.29m
Length	6.17m
Height	2.13m
Normal cruise speed	115 knots (213 km/h)
Entered service	1970
A New Zealand built aircraft for elementary flying training.	

Fokker F27-120 Friendship

Power Plant	2 Rolls Royce Dart RDa 6 Mk 514-7 turboprop engines developing 1,670 shp
Crew	1 instructor, 3 students (plus additional seating capacity for up to 20 passengers)
Dimensions	
Wing Span	29.0m
Length	23.36m
Height	8.50m
Normal cruise speed	210 knots (390 km/h)
Entered service	1980
A New Zealand built aircraft for elementary flying training.	

The Fokker Friendships are used for navigation air electronics and telecommunications training. They are additionally used for patrolling the EEZ.

List of Sources.

Material referenced here is only that which was not referred to in the text of this thesis.

David Anderson, *Equipment of the Australian Defence Forces: An Inventory and Capabilities*. Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Legislative Research Service, Canberra, Basic Paper No. # 1, 1985/86)

"Army gets latest German ambulance technology", *Asian Defence Journal*. November 1986. p. 106.

Carl D Corse, Jr, *Introduction to Shipboard Weapons*. (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1975)

Benjamin M Elson, "New Zealand Updates P-3B Electronics" *Aviation Week and Space Technology*. January 9, 1984. pp. 75-81

Norman Friedman, *Naval Radar*. (Conway Maritime Press, Greenwich, 1981)

Michael Field, "High-tech gunfire system for RNZN" *Evening Post*. May 27, 1987.

Ross Gillett (Ed), *Australia's Armed Forces of the Eighties*. (Child & Henry, Sydney, revised 1986 edition)

Ian V Hogg (Ed), *Jane's Infantry Weapons 1985-86 and 1986-87*. (Jane's Publishing, London.)

Mike Howarth, "Combat aircraft upgrades for smaller airforces" *International Defence Review*. February, 1987. pp. 161-165.

Jane's Defence Weekly (London, various issues)

Graeme Kennedy, "RNZAF trainer decision" *Aircraft* (Australia) September 1987. p. 15

MOD Public Relations Directorate, Army Pictorial Cards. (A series of 'post card' size photographs with descriptions. No date)

MOD Public Relations Directorate, *RNZN ship specifications and pictures*. (A series of 'post card' size photographs with descriptions. No date)

Captain J E Moore (Ed), *Jane's Fighting Ships 1985/86 and 1986/87*. (Jane's Publishing, London.)

"New field gun for Army" *Asian Defence Journal*. July 1986. p. 101.

"New Light Machine Guns approved for the Army", *Asian Defence Journal*. July 1986. p. 101.

"New tanker for the Navy", *Asian Defence Journal*. September 1986. p. 123.

- "NZ company wins Army contract", *Asian Defence Journal*. July 1986. p. 101.
- "NZ to get Steyr rifle" *Dominion*. December 3, 1987.
- Ronald T Petty (Ed), *Jane's Weapons Systems 1985-86 and 1986-87*. (Janes, London, 1985)
- "Prototype Rigid Inflatable Boat for RNZN" *New Zealand Navy News*. Summer 1986. p. 71.
- Doug Richardson, *Naval Armament*. (Jane's Publishing, London, 1981)
- Frank Robertson, "New guns for Australian infantryman", *Pacific Defence Reporter*. April 1986. p. 30.
- RNZAF, *Aircraft Types and Specifications*. (MOD, Public Relations Directorate, No date. photocopied sheet)
- RNZAF, *Briefing Paper on RNZAF P3-K Modernisation*. (No date, probably 1985/1986)
- "RNZAF evaluating PC-9 Amidst growing aircrew shortage" *Australian Aviation*. September 1987. p. 101.
- "RNZAF Strikemasters grounded again" *Australian Aviation*. November 1986. p. 72.
- Royal New Zealand Navy, "Backgrounder: HMNZS Southland" (Press release, no date)
- Royal New Zealand Navy, "Backgrounder: Lake Class Patrol Craft" (Press release, no date)
- Royal New Zealand Navy, "Backgrounder: Logistic Support Ship", MOD, *Press Statements*. No. # 10. August 13, 1987. pp 8-12.
- Will F Schaefer, "A-4 Skyhawk: retrofit and modernisation extends service life" *Asian Defence Journal*. May 1985. pp. 60-66.
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *Tactical and Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare*. (The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1974)
- Vernon Wright, "The Army: In the firing line", *New Zealand Listener*, March 22, 1986. pp. 18-20.
- P. Lewis Young, "The RNZAF: Tough Going Ahead" *Asian Defence Journal*. August 1985. pp. 76-81.
- Thomas-Durell Young, "Uncertain outlook for the Royal New Zealand Navy" *Proceedings of the US Naval Institute*. Vol 112/12/1006 December 1986. pp. 103-4.