

Disagreement in Persian academic discussions

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Applied Linguistics

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Declaration

This thesis is my original work as a PhD candidate in the School of Literature, Languages and Linguistics, College of Arts and Social Sciences, The Australian National University.

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Abstract

Expressing an opposing view is a complex process. Research into English casual conversation based on how disagreement tends to be structured has classified disagreement as a dispreferred or disaffiliative action or a face-threatening act. On the other hand, there are cultures in which taking an opposing position results in sociability and intimacy; and there are institutional settings where the speakers' orientation towards disagreement is determined by the interactional purposes of the setting.

This study examines the production and negotiation of disagreement in Persian academic discussions. Working within the framework of Conversation Analysis (CA), twelve multiparty discussions by Iranian Persian-speaking students of social sciences are analysed to explore how disagreement is initiated, sustained, and resolved and how preference organisation applies in this context, where there is no asymmetry of power and age relationships.

First, in terms of disagreement sequences, the findings indicate that disagreement sequences start when a speaker presents some degree of knowledgeability of a particular state of affairs through the production of a new assertion. First disagreements then come into being when a recipient of that initial assertion presents opposing knowledge of that particular issue. This means that doing disagreement is an interactional achievement because its realization depends on how both interactants design their turn for their recipient: the initial interactant designs their turn so that it presents a new assertion, the disagreeing interactant designs their turn to show epistemic superiority over the issue. The interactants' epistemic asymmetry plays an essential role in the sustainment of disagreement. That is to say, opposition is sustained if the interactants make further opposing knowledge contributions to the conversation and by that means bring about sequence expansion. The opposing interactants commonly move away from disagreement as they change the topic in a stepwise fashion, without resolving their disagreement. Disagreement resolution

occurs as one of the opposing interactants acknowledges arrival at new knowledge or displays prior access to the knowledge presented by another party. However, the sequence does not commonly come to closure with disagreement resolution as the interactants continue the talk on the topic until a stepwise topic shift takes place.

In terms of structure, the interactants in this study display a general tendency to delay and/or soften their disagreement, whether it be a first disagreement or a disagreement produced in response to a prior disagreement deep into the sequence. This suggests that in these Iranian Persian academic discussions, disagreement is oriented to as a disaffiliative action or a face-threatening act.

Many of the findings of this study are consistent with what has already been found for English conversation, thus pointing to the robustness of the CA methodology in terms of its interactional norms. But the differences that emerge suggest the great complexity of the action of disagreement which results from the interplay of several factors, including academic setting, Persian culture and the multiparty nature of the discussions.

Overall, the present study makes a significant contribution to the understanding of human communication as it gives a detailed account of the emergence and negotiation of disagreement in conversation and unveils the interactional nature of this social action. It also contributes significantly to the understanding of how disagreement is communicated in an academic context in general and in Persian academic discussions in particular. The findings of this study can highly benefit those who are interested in teaching and learning Persian as a foreign or second language. It is also beneficial to the researchers interested in cross-cultural studies as it helps them to understand how native speakers of Persian disagree in other languages.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Statement of topic

Our everyday life abounds with expressions of disagreement whereby we communicate a view or assert something which is contrary to that of a prior speaker. Since disagreement may potentially threaten interpersonal relations or social solidarity (Heritage, 1984:269; Pomerantz, 1984:70), it has motivated researchers to examine how it occurs and is executed in a range of situations and perspectives.

Research on the realization of disagreement in casual conversation has yielded contradictory results, suggesting culture influences the way people disagree with each other. While in some cultures disagreement has been viewed as a dispreferred or disaffiliative action (Pomerantz, 1984; Sacks, 1987) or a face-threatening act (Brown and Levinson, 1987) that should be avoided or mitigated, other cultures take a positive attitude toward disagreement as they regard opposition as a way of practicing sociability or promoting intimacy (Schiffrin, 1984; Kakava, 2002).

Communication of disagreement has also been investigated in some institutional contexts, where, compared to ordinary conversation, interactions show systematic variations and impose different constraints on activities and their design (Drew and Heritage, 1992:19). Judicial discourse examination, for instance, has revealed that after an accusation, unmitigated disagreement is the preferred response (Atkinson and Drew, 1979). Likewise, research in news interview settings has reported a preference for an overt or unmitigated production of disagreements (Greatbatch, 1992; Dickerson, 2001; Clayman & Heritage, 2002).

Another institutional context that has been the focus of research is academic talk. Taking a conversation analytic perspective, Kotthoff (1993) reports that disagreement turns into a preferred action once the context of argumentation has been established.

Rees-Miller (2000) analyzes academic interactions from a politeness perspective and proposes that the negative attitude towards expressing disagreement changes in accordance with the pedagogical aims of the context. Neither of these two studies, however, provides us with a detailed account of student-student interactions as Kotthoff's (1993) study focuses exclusively on student-professor interactions and Rees-Miller's (2000) study, though paying some attention to student-student conversation, mainly centers on interactions between students and professors. Lack of comprehensive research on student-student interactions, together with the potential influence of culture in how disagreement is negotiated, offers us the incentive to examine how Iranian Persian-speaking students disagree with each other in academic contexts.

Disagreement research on Persian academic discussions is limited to Hosseini's (2010) study which looks at linguistic markers of disagreement expressed in master's thesis defense sessions. Conducted within the framework of Brown and Levinson's (1987) politeness theory, Hosseini's (2010) study gives no information concerning student-student interactions. To fill this noticed gap, the present study attempts to explore how disagreement is realized in academic discussions participated solely by university students.

Using audio- and video-recorded data, the study is carried out within the framework of conversation analysis (CA) which is a bottom-up approach to the analysis of talk-in-interaction developed by Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson (1974). One of the great advantages of CA is presenting an objective analysis. This is because CA researchers and analysts look at conversation through the participants' perspective rather than their own perspective as they are not allowed to bring their prior assumptions to the analysis of data (Schegloff, 1997:166). Moreover, CA's great emphasis on "unmotivated looking" (Psathas, 1990:24, 25; 1995:45) enables the researchers to discover phenomena rather than looking for pre-specified phenomena or pre-existing categories. Additionally, its underlying assumption that every single detail of interaction is potentially significant and relevant to the understanding of how interactants make meaning and interpret that of others (Heritage & Atkinson, 1984:4; Roger & Bull,

1989:5) allows the researchers to offer a fine-grained, in-depth analysis of data. The present study is thus motivated by the following research questions:

1. How do Iranian Persian-speaking students initiate and respond to disagreement in academic discussions with their peers?¹
2. How do these students return to non-disagreement talk?

1.2 Significance of the study

Taking a look at the educational system in Iran, one can see that until recently, even in higher-education levels, classes have tended to be too teacher-centered (Arshadi, Azarmnia, Ashtarani & Eghbali, 2012:3). These classes have generally shown little if not zero tolerance for students disagreeing with their instructor, hence little in-class discussions even among the students themselves as it was not encouraged and nurtured by teachers (p. 3). This condition has presumably stemmed from the long-standing viewpoint in Iranian culture that considers teachers as men of enormous dignity owing to the crucial role they serve in the society, i.e. teaching knowledge. In his *Akhlaq-e Nasiri* (Ethics of Naseri), the thirteenth-century Persian philosopher Nasir al-Din Tusi asserts that students are more indebted to their teachers than their parents due to the knowledge they receive from them (Minavi & Heidari, 1982:271). As a result of this way of thinking, students are expected to treat their teachers with utmost respect. Showing modesty and holding back their contrary opinion from the teacher have therefore been viewed as part of students' moral duties (Sani, 1994:369). However, based on my observation, the long-established tradition is little by little breaking, especially in university settings, as more and more enthusiastic students are now taking every opportunity to open up discussions not only with their peers but with their instructors. This is also evidenced by out-of-class, academic discussions held by the student scientific societies which are now found in all universities in Iran.

¹ Persian is the official language in Iran. However, since it is spoken in other countries such as Afghanistan and Tajikistan, I refer to these students as Iranian Persian-speaking students to distinguish Iranian Persian from other varieties of Persian.

Discussions provide the students with the opportunity to exchange ideas and assessments of things, people, and events in an academic context. As a result, they increase the occurrence of academic disagreements. Previous research on the Persian language has suggested that, in casual conversations, Iranians generally tend to soften their opposite views or even avoid expressing them as they regard disagreement as a disaffiliative action that threatens their social solidarity (Asdjodi, 2001; Ramezanpour, 2005). However, it has not been demonstrated how the interplay between culture and academic context influences the way Iranian students oppose each other. It is important to see how these students communicate disagreement when there are no asymmetrical relationships in regard to power and age. As the first attempt in shedding light on the issue, the present study can significantly contribute to our understanding of how Iranian Persian-speaking students treat disagreement when they are engaged in academic discussions. The findings of the study can thus be beneficial to the researchers interested in human communication in general and in the Persian language in particular.

Previous research has acknowledged the importance of utilizing CA materials and findings in language pedagogy (see, e.g., Barraja-Rohan, 1997; Seedhouse, 2004; Huth & Taleghani-Nikazm, 2006). The findings of the present research can therefore be beneficial to teachers and learners of Persian as a foreign or second language. That is to say, teachers can use the findings of this study to instruct learners of Persian how to disagree like a native speaker of Persian, thus increasing their communicative competence to avoid possible misunderstanding or communication breakdown.

Moreover, the empirical findings from this study can benefit researchers interested in cross-cultural studies. As shown by previous cross-cultural communication research, when performing different speech acts, non-native speakers of a language may transfer their L1 strategies and patterns into the target language (see, e.g., Blum-Kulka, 1982; Olshtain & Cohen, 1989; Beebe, Takahashi & Uliss-Weltz, 1990). Such pragmatic transfer which has also been detected in the speech of Iranian learners of English when refusing offers, invitations, requests, and suggestions (Shokouhi & Khalili, 2008; Jalilifar & Dinarvand, 2013; Shishavan & Sharifian, 2013; Tavakoli & Shirinbakhsh,

2014) may lead to communication problems. The findings of this study can thus be useful for those investigating how Iranian students disagree in other languages.

1.3 Review of literature

The first part of this section (1.3.1) presents the existing literature on what disagreement means. This is then followed by a subsection (1.3.2) on how disagreement is communicated across a variety of different cultures and contexts. And the last part (1.3.3) introduces the Persian concept of *ta'arof* to the readers and provides them with the existing literature on disagreement in Persian.

1.3.1 Disagreement: contrary views

Although within the last three decades many studies have investigated the handling of disagreement, only a very limited number of them have attempted to define the term *disagreement*. In her semantic dictionary, Wierzbicka (1987) takes the verb *disagree* as nearly exact opposite of *agree* and maintains that *disagreeing* serves a double function: a) saying “what one thinks” and b) showing that “one doesn’t think the same as the earlier speaker”. As she puts it, showing that one has a view different from the earlier speaker seems to be more important than saying what s/he thinks (p. 128). Though not explicitly referring to this dual function, Edstrom (2004:1499) and Sifianou (2012:1554) reflect the same idea in their definition as they define disagreement as the expression or communication of a view or belief contrary or different from that of a prior speaker. The term has also been defined as an utterance produced in reaction to an addressee’s utterance whose propositional content or implicature negates that of the addressee (Rees-Miller, 2000:1088). Though limited to just verbal disagreement, this latter definition captures the same idea presented by Wierzbicka (1987). Looking at other disagreement studies, one can discern that a great majority of researchers have taken this core function of disagreement, i.e. indicating that one has a view different from a prior speaker’s view, for granted and have just concerned themselves with exploring how disagreement is communicated in a variety of contexts (See, e.g., Schiffrin, 1984; Greatbatch, 1992; Tannen & Kakava, 1992; Kotthoff, 1993; Lazaraton, 1997; Dickerson, 2001; Johnson, 2006; Hosseini, 2010).

1.3.2 Disagreement in different cultures and contexts

An examination of the literature on disagreement shows that a lot of researchers have approached disagreement from the perspective of conversation analysis. Conversation-analytic research on the actualization of disagreement is mainly associated with the notion of preference introduced by Sacks (1987) and developed by Pomerantz (1984) in her investigation of second assessments. Sacks (1987) identifies two types of preference in English conversation, namely preference for contiguity and preference for agreement. Preference for contiguity refers to participants' tendency to produce the second pair part of an adjacency pair exactly next to its first pair part.² Preference for agreement, however, relates to speakers' inclination to produce a second pair part that is in accord with the trajectory or design of its first pair part. It is through the interaction of these two types of preference that a preferred second pair part occurs in the beginning of the turn contiguous to its first pair part, whereas a dispreferred second pair part is pushed back into the turn or sequence in which it occurs, with a variety of components coming in front of it (pp. 58-59).

This notion of preference was later developed by Pomerantz (1984) in her examination of second assessments in American English casual conversations. In her seminal work on assessments, Pomerantz (1984:62) defines second assessments as responses to an initial assessment on the same referent(s). Through performing an action such as praise, complaint, compliment, and self-criticism, a speaker's initial assessment makes the recipient's agreement or disagreement a relevant next action. Whereas agreement is the preferred response across a wide variety of actions, disagreement is the preferred second action only in such cases as self-deprecation (pp. 63-64).

² Sequences in conversation are made up of pairs of utterances called adjacency pairs. An adjacency pair consists of two turns uttered by different speakers. These two turns which are positioned next to each other in their minimal form are always ordered. That is, the first pair part (FPP) always initiates a next action and the second pair part (SPP) always completes the initiated action. Moreover, they display discriminative relations; that is, the SPP should be of the type of which the FPP is a member. For example, as the FPP of a question-answer adjacency pair, a question should be followed by an answer because the action initiated cannot be completed by a greeting or a farewell (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973:295, 296; Liddicoat, 2007:106).

As Pomerantz (1984) further points out, agreements are preferred next actions because they provide the conversationalists with a means to support each other and practice sociability (p. 77). Therefore, agreements are commonly expressed through stated agreement components, with a minimization of gap (p. 65) or even an overlap between the completion of the prior turn and the initiation of the agreeing response (p. 69). In contrast, disagreements are dispreferred as they are seen to be offensive, wrong, compromising, or socially disruptive (p. 77). As such, they are generally characterized by delay devices such as silences, hesitation markers, requests for clarification, partial repeats, and turn prefaces such as partial agreements (pp. 70-77). This dispreferred status of disagreement can thus change the turn shape in which it is produced and/or sequential organization of talk.

Apart from the notion of preference/dispreference, disagreement studies have also been informed by the concept of face proposed by Brown and Levinson (1987) in their investigation of British English conversations. In their model of politeness, Brown and Levinson (1987) define face as the public self-image that every member of a society maintains for herself or himself. They consider two aspects for face: positive and negative. While positive face refers to one's desire to receive respect and approval from others, negative face concerns one's claim for independence of action and freedom from imposition (p. 61). In light of this definition, agreement and disagreement are concerned with positive face. Whereas agreement satisfies positive face, disagreement jeopardizes it as it shows that the speaker's evaluation of some aspect of the recipient's positive face is negative (p. 66). As a result, disagreement is regarded by Brown and Levinson as a kind of face-threatening act that should be avoided or mitigated.

While the concept of preference in CA terminology is related to repeated patterns of talk, i.e. organizational features of turns and sequences, through which social actions are performed rather than the participants' personal and subjective desires or their psychological states (Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks, 1977:362; Atkinson & Heritage, 1984:53), the notion of face in Brown and Levinson's (1987) politeness theory derives

from individual's psychological motives. Nevertheless, both frameworks consider disagreement as a detriment to interpersonal relations and social solidarity.

However, the assumption of disagreement as a dispreferred response or a face-threatening act has been challenged by some studies, including Schiffrin's (1984) research. Using a combination of methods drawn from discourse analysis, sociolinguistics, ethnography of speaking and pragmatics, Schiffrin analyzed a series of group interviews collected in a lower-middle class neighborhood in Philadelphia. The participants in her study who were three male and four female Jewish Americans (six of them were couples) managed to keep their intimate relationships in spite of disagreeing with each other overtly and repeatedly. Thus, instead of being a threat to solidarity, disagreement was found to be a means of sociability. Sociable disagreement, as Schiffrin (1984:331) asserts, while having the surface features of disagreement, is devoid of seriousness. This finding led Schiffrin to propose cultural relativity of the actualization of disagreement.

Further counter-evidence to the view of disagreement as a dispreferred second or a face-threatening act was presented by Tannen and Kakava (1992) who investigated Modern Greek conversations. As with Schiffrin's (1984) study, their research revealed the preference status of disagreement among Greeks as a way of strengthening interpersonal relationships and sociability. Taking a sociolinguistic perspective, Tannen and Kakava (1992) analyzed four tape-recorded, naturally occurring conversations among family members and friends at home. Of the four recorded conversations, two occurred among friends: one participated by three women (including Tannen) and a man, the other by Tannen and two other women.³ The third conversation was participated by two couples, and the last one by Kakava, her parents and her sister. The analysis of the data revealed that Greeks commonly tended to accompany their disagreements with two kinds of solidarity markers: terms of address (first names, diminutives of first names, or figurative kinship terms) and personal analogy (positioning one's interlocutor or oneself in an analogical situation) (p. 25). In

³ Tannen was the only participant in the study who was not Greek. As indicated by the researchers, this American participant tended to disagree indirectly.

one sense, as the researchers argue, solidarity markers may serve to neutralize the effects of disagreement. While disagreement distances interlocutors from each other, solidarity markers bring them together and enhance involvement. In another sense, however, they may strengthen the solidarity inherent in the act of disagreement as, in Modern Greek, adopting oppositional stances can give rise to involvement (p. 31).

The influence of cultural norms on the handling of disagreement was also reported by Johnson's (2006) comparative study, investigating the issue from conversation analysis and sociopragmatics perspective. Two different cultural groups of English-speaking Londoners, namely British West Africans (BWAs) and British Whites (BWs), were examined in terms of the production of agreement and disagreement. The data for the study consisted of six dyadic conversations of which three were produced by BWAs and three by BWs. The participants who either did not know each other or had met only once before were invited to talk about topics suggested by the researcher. As for the handling of disagreement, coherent patterns of discrepancy were observed. The BWs were seen to employ hesitators (e.g., *um*, stuttering), downtoners (e.g., *probably, it depends*) and hedges (e.g., *sort of, a bit*) more frequently than the BWAs. The BWs also displayed a greater tendency in producing off-record disagreements (Brown & Levinson, 1987), i.e. using devices that cause the hearer to infer disagreement rather than stating it explicitly (Johnson, 2006:55).

By contrast, the BWAs showed a higher tendency in expressing explicit contradictions and using the opposition-marker *no* (p. 55). Moreover, they tended to express disagreement without hesitation or in overlap (p. 49). This inclination to use strong disagreements on the part of the BWAs was modified by the high frequency of devices motivating harmony, such as *you know* and *you see*, or eliciting a response like *yes?* and *isn't it?* in their speech. In other words, instead of downgrading the force of their disagreements, the BWAs opted for interpersonal involvement to maintain rapport (pp. 54, 55).

As can be seen, there were no intimate relationships between the BWAs in Johnson's study. Nevertheless, like the participants in Schiffrin's (1984) and Tannen & Kakava's

(1992) studies who were either friends or family members, they displayed a preference for expressing disagreement. The observed preference for disagreement in the above studies seems to be the by-product of a cultural inclination toward interpersonal involvement. Put differently, it raises the question of whether the disposition to interpersonal involvement among the members of a society in certain cultures bestows on them a high degree of tolerance for opposing views.

Apart from the above studies, more contradictory evidence to the view of disagreement as a dispreferred response comes from the examination of interactions in institutional settings. Three studies were carried out by Greatbatch (1992), Dickerson (2001) and Clayman & Heritage (2002) who adopted a conversation analytic perspective and focused on news-interview settings. In his examination of a corpus of news interviews conducted on British television and radio between 1978 and 1985, Greatbatch (1992) observed considerable discrepancies between news interviewees and speakers in ordinary conversations in terms of the organization of their disagreements. The news interviewees rarely delayed their opposite views or mitigated them by, for example, agreement components (p. 279). Greatbatch (1992) attributed the observed differences to the news interview turn-taking system in which interviewees never address each other directly. According to Greatbatch, since the interviewees' disagreements are addressed to a moderator, i.e. the interviewer, they are automatically mitigated as mediated disagreements are inherently weaker than unmediated ones. As a result, mitigation and delay devices that render disagreements less dispreferred are largely redundant (pp. 279-280). However, Greatbatch's proposition of mediated disagreements fails to account for the large number of interviewees' disagreements that occur not in response to the interviewer but either at the possible completion of a co-interviewee's utterance or even interruptively.

A similar finding was reported by Dickerson (2001) who analyzed twenty-nine televised political interviews broadcast in the UK between 1994 and 2000. Dickerson observed that disagreements in political interviews were often produced immediately and explicitly. The interviewees did not mitigate their disagreements by prefacing them with token agreements or by hedging their assertions. When interviewees

delayed their response, other parties (typically the interviewers) did not tend to reformulate their talk (p. 218) as is usual in ordinary conversation to show the reverse preference and elicit a preferred response (Sacks, 1987:64). Dickerson (2001) related the differences in the management of disagreement to a different preference system governing news interviews in which preference for agreement is largely absent. The absence of preference for agreement within a political context, as Dickerson puts it, does not imply a preference for disagreement. Rather, it means that there is a normative orientation to expect and express disagreement (p. 219).

Subsequently, a more comprehensive study by Clayman & Heritage (2002) on 250 news interviews broadcast on American and British national TV and radio programs over the past twenty years confirmed the same finding for disagreement production in news interviews. Apart from the question-answer turn-taking system governing news interviews and the presence of a weakened preference for agreement, as demonstrated by Clayman & Heritage (2002:312-313), a third factor lies behind the immediate production of unmitigated disagreements: the design of the interviewer's questions. That is to say, the interviewer designs their questions in such a way to elicit disagreeing responses.

The hypothesis of a modified preference structure has also been suggested by Lazaraton (1997) who examined oral proficiency interviews, an institutional context that is very different from political interviews, from a CA perspective. In her analysis of twenty course placement interviews with international students, audio- and video-recorded at the UCLA over a two-year period, Lazaraton observed significant differences between such interviews and ordinary conversations concerning second assessments produced in response to self-deprecations and compliments. In ordinary conversation, as Pomerantz (1984) maintains, a preferred response to a co-participant's self-deprecation is a non-delayed disagreement with no contrastive prefaces (p. 95). As a result, negations or compliments employing terms that are in contrast with the self-deprecatory terms are frequent in such second assessments (pp. 84-85).

In Lazaraton's (1997) data, however, the interviewers' typical response to students' self-deprecatory assessments of their language ability was either silence or an acknowledgement token. As the researcher argues, in language assessment interviews, the rejection of a student's self-criticism implies that enrollment in a language class is not needed. On the other hand, explicitly confirming a self-deprecation brings the assumption of actual admittance to a course. By contrast, noncommittal responses, i.e. silences or acknowledgement tokens, provide the interviewers with a means to refrain from taking a stance on students' language ability or placement and remain objective during the interview (pp. 62, 70).

Lazaraton further noticed that when the interviewers disagreed with the students' self-deprecations through compliments, the students were caught in the dilemma of how to respond to the compliment. In ordinary conversation, the recipient of a praise assessment needs to orient to both preference for agreement and self-praise avoidance (Pomerantz, 1978:101). Therefore, in American English, a downgraded agreement component followed by a qualified disagreement is the typical response to compliments (p. 99). However, in oral proficiency interviews, any kind of student acceptance of compliments may imply admission problems. As a result, the students displayed a strong preference for rejecting compliments (Lazaraton, 1997:68).

Together with the interviewers' tendency to produce a minimal response as a second assessment to students' self-deprecations, the above observation led Lazaraton to conclude that, due to certain interactional goals, the preference organization governing these assessments is modified in such an institutional context.

The actualization of disagreement has also been investigated in the domain of academic discussion. In a conversation-analytic study, Kotthoff (1993) analyzed eight German and eight Anglo-American dyadic discussions between students and lecturers in the University of Konstanz.⁴ The participants who were all middle-class had never met each other before. All the discussions were audio-recorded during the lecturers'

⁴ Cross-cultural differences have not been discussed in this article.

consulting hours. With the occurrence of the first unmitigated disagreement by a student or lecturer, the student-lecturer conversations changed into arguments.⁵ The next disagreement confirmed the context of argumentation. As the argument became more intense, the discussants in both German and Anglo-American groups were required to defend their position and thus preference for agreement gave way to preference for disagreement (p. 205).

Kotthoff (1993:204) further pointed out that, in the context of an argument, a discussant's strong or upgraded agreement was a harbinger of their upcoming strong disagreement. The development of the argument, on the other hand, was aided by the use of partial agreements (agreements on minor points). These partial agreements occurred as a presequence to the disagreement on the main point of the argument (p. 205). In both groups, the discussants could arrive at a consensus over the main point only after both had expressed their agreement on minor points (p. 208).

The institutional context of academic discussion was also studied by Rees-Miller (2000) who took Brown and Levinson's (1987) politeness theory as its point of departure. Using pen and paper recording, she gathered naturally occurring data from 46.5 hours of observation of linguistics and history classes, seminars, and colloquia in an American research university. A total of 36 students and 14 professors produced disagreement at least once. Humor, positive comments, and inclusive first person pronouns (*we* and *us*) which are linguistic markers of positive politeness were used more often by professors when they disagreed with students than peers opposing each other or students disagreeing with professors (pp. 1096-1097). As argued by Rees-Miller, the frequent use of these positive politeness markers by professors served to improve the face of students and thus stimulated their active participation in class discussions. By contrast, markers of negative politeness, e.g., hedges such as *I think/don't know*, downtoners such as *maybe* and *not exactly*, and verbs of uncertainty like *seems* and *may*, which decrease the force of disagreement were almost equally employed by interactants irrespective of their power relationships (p. 1107).

⁵ The author of the article has not defined the term argument.

The study further revealed that aggravated disagreements occurred in situations in which the threat to the speaker's face was greater than considerations of the addressee's face. Such disagreements which were seen to be more frequent in the speech of peers than speakers of unequal power occurred when the speaker's personal beliefs or identity would be challenged if s/he did not disagree severely (pp. 1100-1101).

In another study carried out within the framework of interactional sociolinguistics, Kakava (2002) aimed at examining disagreement strategies appearing in family and friendly conversations as opposed to academic discussions. The data for her study consisted of a 25-minute conversation between Kakava, her parents, and her sister, a 60-minute conversation between Kakava and three of her friends, and a 40-hour corpus of academic discourse gathered from an undergraduate course in an American university. While the family and friends' conversations were in Modern Greek, the classroom discourse was in English.⁶ The study focused on "strong yet mitigated" disagreements, i.e., disagreements that fall in the middle of a continuum ranging from aggravation to mitigation. A notable difference observed was the use of endearment address terms and exclamatory particles (e.g., *re* which has no equivalent in English) in the intimate context (family and friends' conversations), both serving to lessen the force of an aggravated disagreement (p. 1550). Additionally, the intimate context, especially the friends' conversation, was characterized by the partial or total repetition of a prior speaker's utterance in a sarcastic tone conveying disagreement (p. 1548). By contrast, personal analogy (putting an interlocutor or oneself in an analogical situation) and the use of explicit disagreements (such as *I disagree*) followed by accounts were the strategies used in both the academic and the intimate contexts (pp. 1552-1553).

However, two features of conversations in both the intimate context and classroom discourse led Kakava (2002:1555, 1557) to propose the preference status of disagreement among Greeks. First, most of the time disagreement was foregrounded, i.e., it was not pushed back into the turn. Second, disagreement was sustained, i.e., a

⁶ For the classroom discourse, Kakava (2002) focuses on the talk produced by the Greek-origin students.

large number of turns of consecutive disagreement occurred over different topics. The abundance of such disagreements in Greek's conversations and their academic discussions, as the researcher maintains, indicates that disagreement is an interactional ritual that does not necessarily put interpersonal relationships and solidarity at risk and is thus preferred (p. 1563).

The negotiation of disagreement was also investigated in intergenerational interactions. Using a combination of conversation analysis and discourse analysis, Petraki (2005) examined disagreement strategies used by three generations of Greek-Australian women (daughter, mother and grandmother) when participating in interview-narratives. Her data consisted of eight interviews with women from eight families living in Brisbane. In each interview, the three generations of women from a family were interviewed together and asked to talk about their experiences and relationships with one another. While the first generation, i.e. grandmothers, mainly spoke Greek, the second generation, i.e. mothers, spoke both Greek and English depending on the person to whom they were talking, and the third generation, i.e. daughters, mainly spoke English (pp. 274-275). Disagreements mostly occurred in the conversations between daughters and mothers across the three generations. Despite the presence of both mitigated (weak) and aggravated (strong) disagreements in the women's interactions, Petraki (2005) focused her research on aggravated disagreements due to their prominence in the data (p. 275).

In addition to the disagreement strategies already reported by Kakava (2002) in Greek discourse, as stated by Petraki (2005), the participants employed three distinct strategies to reject each other's arguments and strengthen their opposition. First, they used the question word 'what' and a partial repetition of their coparticipant's words to hint at the irrationality of their opponent's utterance. Second, they used challenging questions usually starting with 'what' or 'why' as a prompt for their coparticipant to defend their stance, but without repeating the prior speaker's words as observed in the first strategy. Such questions were usually preceded by an initial disagreement. Third, they used tag questions to appeal to the logic and naturalness of their argument,

thereby inviting their coparticipant's agreement. However, these questions were usually followed by a disagreeing response (pp. 276-285).

To summarize, the above studies point to the fact that expressing an opposite view is a complex phenomenon. As suggested by research into friendly conversation, the way people disagree with each other can differ based on different cultural norms and values. While in some cultures disagreement is looked upon as a dispreferred or disaffiliative action, there are cultures in which taking an opposing position results in sociability and intimacy. This means that quite different disagreement patterns and strategies may be observed in certain cultures.

Systematic differences were also observed between everyday conversation and institutional talk in the negotiation of disagreement. As revealed by the above studies in institutional contexts, speakers' approach toward expressing disagreement varies in accord with the specific interactional purposes of the institutional setting.

As can be seen, while some of the above studies have adopted a top-down approach to the analysis of data and have thus concerned themselves primarily with finding features associated with disagreement, CA studies have carried out a bottom-up, qualitative analysis as, instead of looking for features and categories, they have sought to discover how disagreement is produced and interpreted by the interactants. Contrary to other methods such as Brown and Levinson's (1987) model of politeness which are theory-driven, CA analysis is data-driven. CA researchers and analysts bring no theoretical assumptions and coding categories to the analysis of the data and avoid appealing to any background or contextual factors such as power or social distance of the participants to account for their interactional behavior (Seedhouse, 2005a:167). Therefore, as opposed to top-down studies which deliberately invoke such contextual factors to interpret participants' orientation towards disagreement, CA studies refer to such factors only if close scrutiny of the details of the interaction reveal that the participants are truly orienting to them (see, for instance, Schegloff, 1992, 1997). The only context to which CA practitioners appeal is the sequential structure of disagreement especially the turns immediately preceding and following disagreement

(Sifianou, 2012:1558). This insistence upon letting just the data speak gives CA the potential of discovering unexpected findings.

This is entirely contrary to the etic approach developed by Brown and Levinson (1987). In their sociopragmatic perspective, Brown and Levinson take face considerations as the motivation of all actions and view disagreement as an inherently face-threatening act. Such an assumption is consequential for the findings as it prevents the analysts from interpreting the data objectively. The studies which approach disagreement from such a perspective have to resort to external contextual factors to justify how disagreement is handled in various contexts.

1.3.3 Disagreement in Persian

Considering the significant influence of culture and context in the way disagreement is communicated, the present study seeks to investigate how Iranian Persian speakers negotiate disagreement in academic discussions between students. However, before giving any account of disagreement research in Persian, a brief overview of the concept of *ta'arof* which is assumed to be the core notion of politeness in Persian (Amouzadeh, 2001:206) is in order.

Ta'arof, which is etymologically an Arabic word meaning *to know each other*, serves as a tool for communicating interlocutors' relationships (Koutlacki, 2002:1740). Although the word itself is Arabic and politeness in interaction has been highly recommended in the Qur'an (see, e.g., chapter 2, verse 83; chapter 17, verse 53), the origin of the concept of *ta'arof* can be traced in Zoroastrianism, the dominant religion in pre-Islamic Iran, that laid great emphasis on good thought, good deeds, and good words (Beeman, 1986:198; Asdjodi, 2001:72-73). In fact, the maxim of "good words" in the Zoroastrian religion invited its followers to use kind words and expressions in their interactions.⁷

⁷ The idea of using "good words" in interaction does not necessarily indicate today's practice of *ta'arof*.

In his study of the Persian language, Beeman (1976, 1986) finds *ta'arof* a very difficult concept with no lexical equivalent in English. He glosses *ta'arof* as “ritual courtesy” (1986:104) and maintains that the concept covers a wide variety of interactional behaviors which underline differences in social status (1976:312). According to him, lowering the status of oneself and raising the status of the addressee which is the most common strategic principle in interpersonal interaction among Iranians is realized through the language of *ta'arof* (1986:151-152). Looking at *ta'arof* as the language of politeness in Persian, Beeman argues that *ta'arof* is realized through lexical substitution in the verbal and pronominal system of Persian. For example, the neutral verb *goftæn* ‘to say’ can be replaced by *ærz kærdaæn* for self-lowering or by *færmudæn* for other-raising (pp. 142-143).

However, criticisms have been leveled at Beeman (1986) for correlating formal with polite (*ta'arof*) language and ignoring their subtle distinction. It has been argued that since *ta'arof* can be realized through both formal and informal language and formal language can be employed to communicate an impolite message as well, *ta'arof* must be taken as an abstract cultural concept rather than formal or polite language (Amouzadeh, 2001). This means that *ta'arof* can be manifested in a number of ways one of which is in lexical substitution in the verbal and pronominal system of Persian.

The concept covers a multitude of verbal and non-verbal deferential behaviors prevalent in Iranian interactions (Assadi, 1980:221). Common verbal manifestations of this concept are the use of a large number of hedges, repeated attempts to decline offers and invitations, hesitation in making or rejecting requests, (Sharifian, 2007:39; Shishavan & Sharifian, 2013:811), and the use of self-lowering and other-raising terms of address or honorifics (Keshavarz, 1988:566).⁸ An example of non-verbal behavior

⁸ In the Persian politeness system, individuals are expected to display modesty and humbleness when referring to themselves and to show respect for others when addressing them. This is realized through a set of gender-neutral personal pronouns and honorific terms. The selection of these pronouns and honorifics depends on factors such as age, gender, social status, and intimacy or distance of the participants in interaction (Keshavarz, 1988:566). For instance, the first person pronoun *man* ‘I’ which is used when interlocutors have an intimate relationship and/or are equal in social status and age can be replaced by *bande* ‘slave, servant’ by male speakers when talking to a superior in terms of age and social status (p. 567). Although the Islamic Revolution of 1979 has underlined the equality of all members of the society and promoted the use of reciprocal and solidarity forms of address, self-

associated with *ta'arof* is getting up as a sign of respect when a newcomer arrives in a room (Koutlaki, 2002:1755).

However, it must be borne in mind that the concept carries both positive and negative values (Beeman, 2001:47; Koutlaki, 2002:1741). In their Persian-English dictionary, Aryanpur and Aryanpur (1992:306) define *ta'arof* as “compliment(s), ceremony, offer, gift, flummery, courtesy, flattery, formality, good manners, soft tongue, honeyed phrases, and respect”. Thus, while some of the above meanings such as compliment, courtesy, and good manners are positively valued, meanings like flummery and flattery are negatively perceived. It is in fact the perceived intent behind *ta'arof* that allows for its positive or negative evaluation. As Beeman (2001:47) maintains, when *ta'arof* is exercised to treat others, especially guests, properly, it is positively valued as it comes out of modesty and selflessness. But, if exercised for manipulative objectives, then it is seen as flattery. The manipulative use of *ta'arof* is negatively valued as it just seeks personal interests (p. 48).

However, despite its negatively perceived meanings, *ta'arof* is so intertwined with Iranian culture that almost all Iranian interactions are expected to involve some degree of *ta'arof* depending on the interactants' relationship and the context. It is thus expected to trace the manifestations of *ta'arof* in various speech acts produced by Iranians. Using CA, Taleghani-Nikazm (1998), for instance, has shown how the preference organization of offers in Persian is under the influence of *ta'arof*. As stated by Taleghani-Nikazm (1998), although in Persian acceptance of an offer is the preferred next action and rejection is dispreferred (p. 10), when there is no intimate relationship between the participants, an offer is accepted only after several initial rejections expressed in a preferred manner, i.e. without delay (p. 6). In fact, since in Iranian culture the direction of an offer is from the lower status to the higher (Beeman, 1976:308), by rejecting the offer, the recipient raises the offerer's social status. Thus, the recipient's prompt refusal of an offer is taken as an instance of *ta'arof* and an invitation for repeating the offer (Taleghani-nikazm, 1998:6). It is worth noting that

lowering and other-raising terms are still present in Iranians' daily interactions. However, while before the revolution the use of such polite forms of address in unequal situations was often obligatory, at present conditions they are employed willingly to show modesty (p. 573).

such preferred refusals have been detected in the speech of Persian-speaking learners of English as a foreign or second language (Jalilifar & Dinarvand, 2013; Shishavan & Sharifian, 2013) and have been labeled as a source of misunderstanding (Assadi, 1980:222).

Similarly, in a comparative research on invitations in Persian and English, Eslami (2005) pointed to the abundance of ostensible invitations, i.e. invitations not intended to be taken seriously, in Iranians' daily activities, stemming from ritual politeness or *ta'arof*. Using an ethnographic approach, Eslami (2005) gathered eighty ostensible and eighty genuine tape-recorded invitations produced by a variety of native speakers of Persian in different natural settings. The researcher also interviewed twenty native speakers of Persian from a variety of age groups and occupations. The tape-recorded, semi-structured interviews were aimed at gathering information about the perceived characteristics of genuine and ostensible invitations, the cultural values associated with them, and the refusal or acceptance of these invitations. Using Isaacs & Clark's (1990) model of ostensible and genuine invitations in English, she analyzed her data quantitatively and qualitatively. The results showed that while in English the linguistic realization of an invitation serves a determining role in distinguishing an ostensible invitation from a genuine one, in Persian, the contextual factors such as time, place, the inviter's personality, and the location of the invitation in the overall interaction sequence are the decisive factors in identification of genuine and ostensible invitations (p. 472). As argued by Eslami (2005), invitations that are taken as genuine in English can be identified as ostensible by Persian speakers because of their indirect linguistic form, hesitant tone, and lack of enough persistence (p. 478). Moreover, ostensible invitations were found to be more frequent in Persian than in English. Persian ostensible invitations which were seen to be used in the opening or closing of telephone conversations or as a leave-taking act in face-to-face conversations served to enhance the face of both interlocutors, i.e. the inviter and invitee (p. 473). They enhanced the inviter's face as they showed his/her awareness of societal norms concerning hospitality and his/her adherence to them. They also enhanced the invitee's positive face as they indicated that the invitee was liked and appreciated by the inviter (p. 475).

More recently, Izadi & Zilaie (2015) investigated refusals to offers, invitations, suggestions and requests produced by Iranian Persian-speaking students, academic and non-academic staff of a university in Iran. Using an ethnographic approach, Izadi & Zilaie (2015) collected 208 refusals which were either audio-recorded or field-noted in a variety of contexts such as the university canteens, libraries and student dormitories. They classified the gathered refusals based on Beebe et al.'s (1990) refusal classification scheme and found that the interactants in their study tended to refuse offers and invitations through either indirect strategies or a combination of direct and indirect strategies when communicating with those with whom they had ongoing relationship. Providing reason and expressing gratitude were the most frequent indirect strategies observed in these refusals (p. 256). As Izadi & Zilaie (2015:261) argue, the high frequency of 'gratitude' in these refusals is due to *ta'arof* considerations as 'gratitude' commonly occurred in refusal to ostensible offers/invitations which themselves reflect ritual politeness or *ta'arof*. Since these offers/invitations are not genuine, they are socially expected to be refused or at least be refused a few times before being accepted.

However, as for the speech act of disagreement, there seems to be a lack of research focusing exclusively and comprehensively on the realization of *ta'arof* when taking an opposite position. The only findings in this area are those presented by Asdjodi (2001) and Don & Izadi (2011) whose studies investigated disagreement among other things. In order to draw a comparison between *ta'arof* in Persian and *limao* in Chinese, Asdjodi (2001) conducted a study using questionnaires and interviews. Information regarding disagreement in Persian was gathered through two questionnaires answered by Persian-speaking Iranians from different parts of Iran. The respondents were forty men and forty women, with different educational backgrounds, whose age ranged between eighteen to sixty years. They were required to express disagreement in ten different hypothetical situations, once in response to an intimate person and once a non-intimate person. Asdjodi concluded that *ta'arof* restrained Iranians from expressing disagreement when communicating with a non-intimate and higher-status person. Keeping silent, smiling, and shaking one's head as a sign of agreement were reported to be the preferred next actions in such situations. When opposite views were

expressed, they were modified for the purpose of politeness and caution (p. 83).⁹ It was also suggested that, in non-intimate interactions, women tended to agree with their addressee's opinion more than men. Moreover, compared to older adults, the youth were more likely to frankly express their opinion even in non-intimate relations (p. 86).

Following Arundale's (2010) Face Constituting Theory that considers face as both a relational and an interactional phenomenon achieved by participants as they make connection with and separation from others while co-constituting meanings and actions in conversation (p. 2088), Don & Izadi (2011) analyzed a multi-party conversation within a dissertation defense session. The interactants in the conversation were a PhD candidate, his supervisor, and two examiners. To explain how the interactants achieved face when opposing each other, in addition to *ta'arof*, they referred to three other cultural concepts reflecting the common expectations that Iranians carry into their interactions, namely *ab-e-ru*, *shakhsiyat*, and *ehteram*. *Ab-e-ru*, literally meaning *water of face*, "embodies the image of a person, a family, or a group, particularly as viewed by others in the society" (Sharifian, 2007:36). From this definition, one can infer that, in Iranian culture, an individual's face is closely connected to the face of their family as well as the group with whom they identify themselves. O'Shea (2000) glosses *ab-e-ru* as *honor* and considers it as a powerful social force. She further maintains that Iranians largely judge themselves by the honor they gradually acquire as a result of their actions and social interrelations (O'Shea, 2000:101, cited in Sharifian, 2007:37). The other two terms, i.e. *Shakhsiyat* 'character, personality, social standing' and *ehteram* 'respect, esteem', as argued by Koutlaki (2002:1742-1743), are two main components of Persian face. *Shakhsiyat* which is largely individualistic derives from a person's upbringing, education, and behavior. By contrast, *ehteram* determines the interactants' positions compared to one another and is shown through observing the rules of *ta'arof*, such as using proper honorifics, among other cultural conventions. As a result, it is achieved interactionally. Through showing *ehteram*, a speaker attends to their interlocutor's *shakhsiyat*.

⁹ The author did not provide any information as to how the participants modified their disagreement.

As argued by Don & Izadi (2011), the examiner's unhedged and direct disagreements with the PhD candidate indicated that he did not care about the candidate's *shakhsiyat* as he did not exercise *ta'arof* to pay him *ehteram*. Though criticizing the candidate's work conforms to the examiner's institutional role, the way he disagreed with him violated the societal expectations and norms as was evident from the reaction of those present, including the co-examiner who stopped him in the middle of his criticism. Therefore, the examiner's unmitigated disagreements severely threatened the candidate's *ab-e-ru* and *shakhsiyat*, thus giving rise to great separation in the examiner's relationship with the candidate (p. 3789-3790).

Asdjodi's (2001) and Don & Izadi's (2011) studies demonstrate that, when taking issue with each other, Iranians tend to soften their opposing views due to *ta'arof* considerations. Moreover, they suggest that the exercise of *ta'arof* when expressing disagreement is under the influence of factors such as age, gender, personal relations, and context. Neither of these two studies, however, gives a clear and elaborate account of the actual realization of disagreement. As stated above, Asdjodi's (2001) findings come from information obtained via questionnaires not actual instances of doing disagreement. But, as Brown & Levinson (1987:27) put it, what people say in a real situation can be different from what they think they would say in a hypothetical situation. Likewise, Don & Izadi's (2011) finding, though based on natural data, come from the analysis of a short excerpt (eighteen lines) of institutional talk. Further research is needed to confirm the above findings and bring the unknown sides of the issue to light. Two studies have already been carried out concerning disagreement in Persian, though not looking at the issue from the *ta'arof* perspective: one by Ramezanzpour (2005), using CA and Brown & Levinson's (1987) politeness theory, and the other by Hosseini (2010), performed within the framework of Brown and Levinson's (1987) politeness theory.

In an attempt to explore the strategies used in expressing agreement and disagreement in Persian, Ramezanzpour (2005) focused on casual conversations happening mostly

among friends and family members.¹⁰ Concerning disagreement, in addition to silences, clarification questions, and partial or full repeats, he pointed to the use of attention getting verbs such as *bebin* (see), *negah kon* (look), and *goosh kon* (listen) as a strategy used to attenuate the force of disagreement and attending to the addressee's face (p. 92). Although Ramezanpour made no reference to the use of hesitation markers and accounts as mitigating devices, both of them were present in the examples provided (see, for instance, pp. 45, 58). Though the study revealed considerable similarities between Persian and English in terms of the strategies used to mitigate opposite views in casual conversations, it was suggestive of possible differences (p. 99).

As opposed to Ramezanpour's (2005) study which concentrated on casual conversations, Hosseini's (2010) research aimed at investigating the institutional context of academic talk. To find the relationship between power and politeness in expressing disagreement in Persian academic discussions, Hosseini (2010) analyzed nine hours of conversations audio-taped in eight master's thesis defense sessions, using Brown & Levinson's (1987) model of politeness.¹¹ While mitigated disagreements occurred most frequently when professors (thesis referees or members of supervisory panel) disagreed with students, unmitigated disagreements were used most often when students disagreed with professors (p. 86). To account for these anomalies, the researcher refers to the institutional nature of these conversations and their dominant culture. According to him, the high frequency of unmitigated disagreements in students' speech is due to the fact that in defense sessions the transactional function of student response takes priority over its interactional function.¹² As a result, students need to frankly defend their thesis. Moreover, in order

¹⁰ Ramezanpour (2005) gives no explicit information about the amount of data used in his study. However, the abundance and diversity of sample excerpts presented in the study are indicative of a large mass of data produced by a great number of participants.

¹¹ In a defense session, the candidate for a master's degree is required to respond to questions raised by the thesis referees as well as peers or even guest lecturers present in the session.

¹² The function which language serves in transference of information is called the transactional function of language (Brown & Yule, 1983:2).

to treat the professors with respect, the students, as a young generation, resort to camaraderie rather than deference and distance, which are typically adopted by the older generation (pp. 89-90). By contrast, the professors used a lot of mitigation devices to soften their disagreements as, in Iranian culture, disagreement with a student and criticizing their work can be taken as a tacit criticism of the student's supervisor. Therefore, any threat to the student's face may be considered as a threat to the respective supervisor's face (p. 86).

As can be noted from Hosseini's above argument, Brown & Levinson's (1987) model of Politeness failed to account for the participants' behavior in the institutional context of academic discussion. As a result, Hosseini speculates on the possible reasons of the anomalies observed, without presenting any actual evidence to support his argument. This means that a more rigorous methodology is needed to furnish us with an accurate account of the realization of disagreement. Moreover, Hosseini's (2010) study mostly focuses on interactions between students and professors. No attention has been paid to student-student interactions. It is important to see how disagreement is negotiated in academic contexts when there is no asymmetry of power and age relationships.

To fill the observed gap, the present study uses audio- and video-recorded data to explore how Iranian Persian-speaking students disagree with each other when they are engaged in academic discussions. Since the main objective of the study is to find how the participants initiate and respond to disagreement and how they return to non-disagreement talk, CA which is widely known for offering a detailed qualitative analysis of natural data will be adopted for data collection and analysis. The study thus attempts to provide an in-depth account of turn and sequence structures through which disagreement is negotiated in these interactions. It can also furnish us with an accurate account of how cultural considerations influence the shape of the turn and sequences in which disagreement is realized in such context.¹³

¹³ According to Heritage (1984:268, 2006:13, 14), the preference/dispreference status of an action which is evident in the shape of the turn and/or sequence in which it is produced is closely associated with the concept of face. That is, a dispreferred turn embodies an action that is face-threatening.

1.4 Organization of the study

The present study is organized as in the table bellow:

Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 2: Methodology
Chapter 3: A preliminary to the emergence of disagreement in conversation: characteristics of first disagreements
Chapter 4: The properties of assertions leading to a first disagreement
Chapter 5: How is disagreement sustained?
Chapter 6: How is disagreement resolved?
Chapter 7: Preference organization of disagreements in Persian academic discussions
Chapter 8: Conclusion

As in the table, Chapter 2 outlines the details of participants, data collection, data, transcription, marking and analysis as well as ethical considerations for the study. This is then followed by five data-analysis chapters. Chapter 3 is a preliminary to the emergence of disagreement in conversation. It presents the characteristics of first disagreements. Chapter 4 deals with the properties of assertions which lead to a first disagreement. Chapters 5 and 6 discuss how disagreement is sustained and how it is resolved respectively. Chapter 7, the final data-analysis chapter, discusses the preference organization of disagreements in the present study. The last chapter of the study, Chapter 8, summarizes the findings of the study and presents concluding remarks.

Chapter 2

Methodology

2.1 Introduction

The present chapter aims to provide the readers with the reasons behind the selection of CA as the framework for the present study. It also presents the specifications of the methodology including participants, data collection, data, transcription, marking and analysis and ethical considerations.

2.2 Why CA?

Conversation Analysis (CA) is an empirical approach to the study of talk-in-interaction as a social action. It was developed by Harvey Sacks, Emanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson, a group of researchers in sociology who took insights from ethnomethodology, in the late 1960s and early 1970s. A basic assumption of CA is that talk-in-interaction or conversation is organized and orderly and this orderliness is constructed by participants as they use particular communicative practices in particular, actual contexts (Liddicoat, 2007:9).

Three principal reasons lie behind the selection of CA from all possible frameworks for the purpose of this study. First, CA is unique among other social sciences as it does not allow the analysts to bring their own preconceptions to the analysis (Schegloff, 1997:166). In fact, CA is a data-driven or bottom-up approach to the study of conversation in that it allows order to emerge from the data itself. As Schegloff (1997:166-167) argues, conversation analysts should remain faithful to the “orientations, meanings, interpretations, understandings, etc. of the participants” in the interaction. Put differently, in order to show the reality as it is, the analysts should avoid expressing their prior assumptions. This implies that conversation analysts look at the data through the participants’ perspective to see how they make meaning and

understand that of others and orient to this understanding. Everything which is necessary to understand and interpret talk is within the talk itself. As a result, there is no need for the analyst to appeal to background or contextual factors such as power, age, gender or ethnicity to interpret the participants' actions unless the details of the interaction present evidence that the participants themselves are orientating to them (Seedhouse, 2005a:167).

The second reason for the selection of CA is its emphasis on the use of audio or video recordings of naturally occurring instances of interaction as the basic data for analysis. CA doesn't favor interview techniques which substitute subjects' verbal reports for the observation of actual behavior. It rejects experimental methodologies in which the researcher manipulates or intervenes in the subjects' behavior. It also rejects field-note data used in observational studies and idealized or invented examples derived from the researcher's native intuitions. This is because none of these methods can reveal the details of actual interaction necessary to examine the orderliness of talk (Heritage & Atkinson, 1984:2). Instead, CA favors observations of naturally occurring situations as it considers every single detail of interaction as potentially significant and relevant (Roger & Bull, 1989:5). In fact, through the use of audio or video recordings of naturally occurring interactions, CA transcends the limitations of recollection, manipulation, selective attention or imagination frequent in social sciences (Heritage & Atkinson, 1984:3).

The empirically rich recordings used in CA not only enable the researcher to perform a detailed examination of particular events in interaction, but also allow them to repeat the analysis. Moreover, since the data are available in a raw form, they can be used for various investigations, i.e. different analytic interests (Heritage & Atkinson, 1984:4). As Heritage (1989:24) maintains, since such data are "bottled samples of social world", they can be analyzed and reanalyzed on the basis of various research questions, thus leading to the development of elaborate understandings of particular corpora of data. These data can also be used for comparative purposes the scope of which broadens as the data corpora cumulatively expand.

Additionally, these recordings enable the researcher to attend to and examine paralinguistic features of talk, such as sound quality, pauses, gaps, hand-arm gestures, postures, and gaze direction which help determine and understand actions performed through interaction (Pomerantz & Fehr, 1997:65). Still, one further advantage of these recordings is that as they are played for the audience in conversation analytic presentations, they allow others to check the analysis against the data and raise the possibility of new, unexpected noticings by them (Sidnell, 2010:22).

The third reason behind the selection of CA as the framework for the present study relates to the transcripts made out of the recordings. According to ten Have (1999:77-78), making transcripts gives the analyst the opportunity to gain a kind of access to the 'lived reality' of the interaction which is otherwise inaccessible. This means that a transcription serves as a major 'noticing device' because the analyst needs to pay close attention to the details of the interaction that would easily be ignored by an ordinary listener. However, these noticings are the result of unmotivated attention to the details when listening to the recordings. In fact, everything discovered about talk in interaction has emerged from unmotivated investigation of naturally occurring interactions, i.e. an investigation not motivated by predetermined goals but by noticings of aspects of talk which primarily appeared unremarkable (Schegloff, 1996:172).

Apart from helping the analyst pay attention to particular phenomena, transcripts can be used to create an available data archive (ten Have, 1999:78). Another major significance of these transcripts is that they prevent the analyst from taking individual preconceptions to the analysis (Heritage and Atkinson, 1984:4) and making claims that cannot be verified or challenged (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998:92). This is because the transcripts are available to the public so that anyone can check the correctness and precision of the analysis or reanalyze the data. Additionally, the public availability of transcripts results in the cumulative nature of conversation-analytic research (p. 92).

Since the present study aims to offer a fine-grained, detailed analysis of how disagreement emerges in interaction, how it is responded to and how the talk returns to its non-disagreement state, CA method is the best option.

2.3 Participants

The participants in this study were undergraduate students of both sexes, majoring in one of the fields of social sciences at Shahid Chamran University of Ahvaz, Iran. They were a total of forty-seven students (23 females and 24 males) from different classes who had joined the Student Scientific Society of the College of Economics and Social Sciences. They all volunteered to take part in the research project. At the time of data collection, their age ranged from twenty-one to twenty-seven years. They were all Iranians raised in Iran, thus native speakers of Persian.¹⁴ The reason behind the selection of social science students was that, compared to the students of other fields of study, these students had a great deal of discussion over their course readings. Discussion contexts normally enhance the occurrence of academic disagreement. Additionally, they were junior or senior students. This guaranteed their familiarity with academic discussion as well as with each other. The participants' familiarity with each other enabled the researcher to control the participants' relationship by working only with people who knew each other.

2.4 Data collection

The data for this study were collected from the discussion sessions held by the scientific society of the college. Generally, these discussion sessions were participated solely by the students. A week prior to the actual gathering of data, the researcher met the students in the office of the Student Scientific Society and briefed them on the general purpose and nature of the study.¹⁵ Then the researcher asked the participants to read about a special topic and think about a few questions related to the topic. The selection of the topic and questions was done with the help of one of the sociology

¹⁴ They were not necessarily monolingual because, in this part of the country, there are a lot of people whose first language is Arabic. As Persian is the standard language in Iran, the students with Arabic as their first language had been exposed to Persian since early childhood and were thus bilingual.

¹⁵ The students were not informed that the focus of the research was to investigate disagreement.

lecturers of the college before meeting the students. Two criteria were involved in the selection of the topics and the questions. First, they needed to address a public issue rather than issues related to certain individuals within the participant pool. This enabled participants to express their ideas openly without offending their co-discussants. Second, they needed to be on issues that were likely to arouse debate as such issues could enhance the occurrence of disagreement in the speech of the participants. Those who were willing to participate in the study were divided into groups of three to six. Each group were then scheduled to discuss the selected issue for about forty minutes in the following days/weeks.

The actual data collection took place without the presence of any class lecturer. The members of each group attended the discussion class at their scheduled time and took a seat so that they formed a round table. The classroom had already been equipped with three digital sound recorders and two video recorders that were turned on before the students' arrival. Care was taken to put the recording equipment in places that captured the least attention. To further guarantee an unobtrusive observation (ten Have, 2007:69), when the group was ready to start the discussion, the researcher left the class. The students then discussed the issue for about forty minutes or more if willing while they were being audio- and video-recorded. The same procedure was used for all groups. These data-collection sessions continued until they amounted to twelve sessions.

This data collection method has been adopted for the purposes of the present study as it provides the researcher with the body of disagreements that can be examined. It is worth mentioning that, since the recorded discussions are truly reflective of the discussion sessions typically held for non-data collection purposes, they can be considered as natural data. The unmotivated looking, as emphasized in CA methodology, was done in the analysis phase of the study.

2.5 Data

The data for this study consist of twelve discussions gathered during the above-mentioned discussion sessions. These discussions represent non-formal institutional

talk in which the type and order of turns are not pre-allocated (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998:160). In the opening phase of each discussion, one of the participants takes the lead and initiates the discussion by introducing the topic and proffering their own knowledge and opinion of the issue. The discussion continues as another participant self-selectively takes the turn to add their own knowledge of the issue, with or without first expressing agreement/disagreement with the prior speaker. The discussion goes on as other participants become involved in the conversation to make their contribution to the topic. During the discussion, the leading speaker does not act as a mediator; that is to say, the participants address each other directly. They continue talk on the topic for the specified length of time. Near the end of their time limit, one of the participants who is often the leading speaker announces the end of the session and briefly concludes the discussion.

Table 2.1 below provides us with a summary of the details of the discussions. It demonstrates the subjects discussed, number and gender of the participants, length of the discussions and the number of disagreements expressed.

Table 2.1 Details of the twelve discussions

Discussion number	Subject	Number of participants		Duration (minutes)	Number of disagreements
		Female	Male		
1	Drug addiction	3	3	57	14
2	Drug addiction	3	–	36	4
3	Drug & alcohol addiction	3	–	38	8
4	Globalization	–	4	64	21
5	Globalization	2	3	41	11
6	Globalization	2	2	58	7
7	Obstacles to a timely marriage	3	3	49	10
8	Obstacles to a timely marriage	3	–	42	9
9	Social awareness	–	3	53	6
10	Suicide	4	–	37	3
11	Development of rationality	–	3	52	16
12	Religion in society	–	3	44	8
Total		23	24	571	117

As in the table, the first three discussions center around the issue of drug addiction. The first discussion was participated by 3 female and 3 male students. Their discussion

lasted about 57 minutes during which 14 instances of disagreement were produced. The second discussion was participated by three females who discussed the issue for 36 minutes and produced 4 instances of disagreement. The third discussion, also participated by three females, included the topic of alcohol addiction as well. It continued for 38 minutes over which 8 instances of disagreement were produced.

The next three discussions, i.e., discussions 4-6, are about the issue of globalization. Discussion 4 was participated by 4 male students who discussed globalization for around 64 minutes, producing 21 instances of disagreement. Discussion 5 was performed by 2 female and 3 male students and lasted about 41 minutes during which 11 instances of disagreement were uttered. Discussion 6 was produced by 2 female and 2 male students. They discussed the issue of globalization for 58 minutes and produced 7 instances of disagreement.

The topic of talk for the next two discussions, i.e., discussions 7 and 8, is the obstacles to a timely marriage. In discussion 7, 3 female and 3 male students discussed the issue for 49 minutes and produced 10 instances of disagreement. Discussion 8 was participated by 3 female students who talked about the issue for 42 minutes, producing 9 instances of disagreement.

The next four discussions, i.e. discussions 9-12, center on four different topics. Discussion 9 which was participated by 3 male students is about social awareness. It lasted 53 minutes and contains 6 instances of disagreement. Discussion 10, participated by 4 female students, concerns the issue of suicide among the youth. It is about 37 minutes, with just 3 instances of disagreement. In discussion 11, 3 male students discussed the issue of the development of rationality in society for 52 minutes, expressing 16 disagreements. And in discussion 12, 3 male students discussed the function of religion in society for 44 minutes, producing 8 instances of disagreement.

As stated, the discussions are about eight different subjects, three of which (drug addiction, globalization and obstacles to a timely marriage) have been discussed by

more than one group. Only one-third of the discussions are mixed-gender. The rest are same-sex discussions. It is worth noting that although the present study is not going to focus on gender differences, it is important to know the gender of the participants when discussing some of the data extracts. Varying in length from 36 to 64 minutes, the twelve discussions amount to 571 minutes (or 9 hours and 31 minutes), yielding a total number of 117 instances of disagreement.

2.6 Transcription

The recorded data were subsequently transcribed by the researcher. Since the focus of this study is on the emergence and negotiation of disagreement, it was not necessary to transcribe the whole recorded data. In other words, only those parts of the recorded data that contained moments of disagreement needed to be transcribed. Thus, a first step was to identify the moments of disagreement in the recordings. The researcher carefully listened to each recording, and selected interactions where disagreement was apparent, that is, where one participant expressed, in one turn or more, a view that was contrary to something that a prior speaker had said. Then, using the Audacity software, the entire interaction, i.e. from the initial statement(s) to the contrary statement(s) and opposing view(s), were marked temporally for a subsequent transcription.

The marked data were then transcribed based on the transcription conventions developed by Jefferson (2004). In addition to verbal features of talk, i.e., words, phrases, clauses and sentences, the transcription reflects prosodic features of intonation, pitch changes, stress, loudness and elongation. It also captures other features of talk such as overlaps, silences, laughter and audible breaths. A list of the captured features and the relevant transcription conventions used in the transcripts of the present study appears in Appendix 1.

In all the transcripts, the recorded data have been transliterated into English (the list of the transliteration conventions used in the study appears in Appendix 2). In the segments of the transcripts used to exemplify the issue under discussion in the analysis of the data, the transliteration is immediately followed by a word-by-word gloss in the line below. However, since Persian and English are very different grammatically,

whenever word-by-word gloss is not possible, a morpheme-by-morpheme gloss is presented (see ten Have, 2007:110). The key to the grammatical conventions used in the gloss appears in Appendix 3. In either case, when the utterance is complete, the gloss is followed in the next line by a translation that seems natural in English (see, ten Have, 2007:110). To make the translation lines easily identifiable for the readers, they appear in bold, followed by a blank line. Note that features of talk depicted on the transliteration lines do not appear on the translation lines as Persian and English are very different grammatically. Accordingly, the punctuation markers used in translation lines are just grammatical markers. That is to say, they do not depict the terminal intonation contour.

The interactants' gaze direction has also been transcribed, using the video-recordings. The transcription of gaze followed the audio transcription as the recommended practice in CA is to begin with the audio transcription and then to add gaze or other visual details (ten Have, 2007:8). The first transcription system for gaze direction was developed by Goodwin (1979, 1980, 1981). In Goodwin's system, the speaker's gaze is marked by a line above the relevant utterance. That of the recipient appears below the utterance. A capital X which is connected to a specific point in the utterance with a bracket marks the place where one's gaze reaches the other's. Dots are used to indicate the movement of one's gaze toward the other party, whereas commas mark gazing away from the other party.

Extract 2.1 (Goodwin, 1981:52)

A: _____ """"
We went down to- (0.2) When we went back ...
[
B: ..X _____

As explained by Goodwin (1981:52), the speaker (A) is gazing at the recipient (B) from the onset of the transcribed utterance and begins gazing away from the recipient as the word "we" starts. The recipient (B) moves their gaze toward the speaker (A) from the end of the word "down" and reaches A's gaze at the end of the word "to."

Goodwin’s transcription system has been adapted by subsequent CA researchers (see, e.g., Heath, 1984; Psathas, 1990) or developed into more detailed systems (see, e.g., Rendle-Short, 2002). The present study, however, adopts the gaze transcription system devised by Rendle-Short, Skelt & Bramley (2015) which is both convenient to use by the researcher and easy to understand by the readers. Instead of using a lot of symbols, Rendle-Short et al. (2015) present a brief verbal description of the interactants’ gaze direction in italics on the line(s) underneath the relevant stretch of talk. The only symbol used is an asterisk (*) which indicates a change in gaze direction.

In the current study, the interactants’ gaze direction appears in italics on the line(s) immediately below the gloss. Whenever the gaze direction of both the speaker and the recipient is captured, the speaker’s gaze direction appears on the upper line and that of the recipient on the lower. Since a small asterisk (*) has already been used in audio transcription to mark creaky talk, a big bold asterisk (*****) is used to mark change of gaze direction. In order to simplify the transcription, gaze transcription is presented whenever relevant to the analysis of the data.

The following extract illustrates some of the transcription conventions used in the present study. The extract has been taken from the three-party discussion on the obstacles to a timely marriage. The interactants in the extract are P and S.

Extract 2.2

(Obstacles to a timely marriage II)

- | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|---|--|--------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|---------------|
| 1. | P | kheyli
very | ↑rāhat:
easily | em: (.)
em | be
to | nazare
opinion of I | man
one | ādam
one | mitune
can |
| | | <i>P gazing down at the table</i> | | | | | | | |
| 2. | | khānevādash.o
her family.DOM | qāne’
convinced | | kone.
does | =ya’ni
that is | | | |
| | | <i>P gazing down at the table</i> | | | | | | | |
| | | very easily, in my opinion, one can convince one’s own family ((not to meddle in one’s relationship)). I mean | | | | | | | |
| 3. | | man
I | kheyli
very | rāhat
easily | ma[san
for example | *age-
if | moshkeli
a problem | pish
forward | m-] |
| | | <i>P gazing down at the table</i> | | | | *P gazing toward S | | | |
| | | very easily, I, let’s say, if a problem happ- | | | | | | | |

2.7 Marking and analysis

Subsequent to transcription, the researcher marked the transcripts for all instances of disagreement. In Persian, there are both explicit and implicit ways of expressing disagreement. For instance, the sentence *man bâ shomâ mokhâlefam* ‘I disagree with you’ exemplifies an explicit disagreement. By contrast, the question *mâ khodemun moqaser nistim?* ‘aren’t we ourselves responsible?’ which has been produced in response to the sentence *inâ bâ’es shodan mardom beran be samte kânäläye mâhvârei* ‘they made people watch satellite channels’ expresses an implicit disagreement. Since implicit disagreements may be left unnoticed, a second person who is an academic expert in CA transcription and a native speaker of Persian as well also marked the transcribed data for implicit disagreement responses. Instances of discrepancy were negotiated to arrive at a consensus. This increased the reliability of marking the transcripts for instances of disagreement.

In the analysis phase of the study, through moment-by moment analysis of the data, the researcher attempted to explore how disagreement emerged in the students’ interactions, how it was initiated and responded to and how non-disagreement interaction was restored. This was done in the light of previous CA research and analysis of disagreement. The fundamental CA question ‘Why that, in that way, right now?’ (Seedhouse, 2005b:251) was asked at all stages of analysis.

2.8 Ethical considerations

The present study was carried out after obtaining ethics approval from ANU Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC). Accordingly, necessary measures were taken to protect participants of the study from any risk of vulnerability over the course of data collection, storage, analysis and publication of the results. First, participation in the study was done on a completely voluntary basis. The researcher informed the students of the general purpose and nature of the study as well as the exact timing of data collection process. They were informed that they would be audio- and video-recorded during data collection sessions. Those who were willing to participate in the study took the information sheet and signed the consent form. The information sheet provided the participants with the contact details of the researcher and supervisor of the study as

well as the ANU Human Ethics Manager. So, the participants were able to contact them in case they had any questions, concerns or complaints about data collection procedure and the study.

Second, there was no pre-existing relationship between the researcher of the study and the participants. The study was solely participated by the students. Class lecturers did not attend the discussion sessions. The students' participation in the study and their performance had no effect on their academic results and grades.

Third, the students were informed that they could withdraw from participation in the study anytime before the collection of their data or up to two weeks after being recorded. They were also informed that in either case they would not be penalized and the relevant recorded data would not be used in the study.

Fourth, all necessary steps were taken to preserve confidentiality during data collection, storage, analysis and publication of results. No identifying information was disclosed. Instead of the participants' names, letters were used in the transcripts and pseudonyms in their analysis. All the recorded data, their transcripts and analysis were kept in the researcher's password-protected laptop. Printed transcripts and analysis as well as the consent forms were stored in a locked cabinet. After publication of the results, the recorded data, transcripts, analysis, and results will be transferred to the researcher's personal hardware kept in a locked cabinet.

Chapter 3

A preliminary to the emergence of disagreement in conversation: characteristics of first disagreements

3.1 Introduction

There is very little literature available on precisely how disagreements are initiated. An early study into the emergence of disagreement in conversation by Sornig (1977) considers disagreement as a speech act and attempts to specify the conditions for the realization of disagreement in classroom discourse. According to Sornig (1977:363), disagreement comes into existence as the recipient (S2) of an assertion (A1) with a truth value, produced by a prior speaker (S1), provides a second assertion (A2) about the fact(s) stated in A1, which is different from A1. Sornig's study, however, doesn't provide any empirical data to support his speculation on how disagreement comes into existence.

Another study explaining the emergence of disagreement in conversation is Labov & Fanshel's (1977) sociolinguistic study on therapeutic discourse. In their classification of statements according to the interlocutors' shared knowledge, Labov & Fanshel (1977:100) introduce five different events as follows:

A-events:	Known to A, but not to B.
B-events:	Known to B, but not to A.
AB-events:	Known to both A and B.
O-events:	Known to everyone present.
D-events:	Known to be disputable.

As explained by Labov & Fanshel (1977:101), D-events (disputable events) are events about which both the speaker and the recipient have some previous information. They maintain that when a speaker makes an assertion about a D-event, the recipient is required to provide an evaluation of that assertion. This evaluative response can either agree or disagree with that assertion. However, as with Sornig's (1977) study, Labov & Fanshel's study doesn't present actual samples of disagreement production.

A more comprehensive research on how disagreement emerges in conversation is Pomerantz' (1984) seminal work on second assessments produced in casual conversations. Taking a CA perspective, Pomerantz (1984:61) asserts that when a speaker makes an assessment about a referent which is/was accessible to the recipient, the recipient's second assessment is the relevant next action. This second assessment can either agree or disagree with the prior assessment.

While Pomerantz' (1984) study provides details on how disagreement is produced in casual conversations, it is just focused on disagreements expressed in response to assessments and doesn't discuss disagreements produced in response to assertions. As none of the above studies investigates disagreements in response to assertions and considering the fact that in the current data set all disagreements are produced in response to assertions (see section 3.4.1), the present study seeks to fill this noticed gap.

3.2 What drives the sequence?

It appears that Pomerantz' account of the emergence of a second assessment (agreement or disagreement) follows the *conditional relevance* governing adjacency pairs (for *adjacency pairs* see Schegloff & Sacks, 1973:295-296). According to Schegloff (1968:1083, 2007:20), conditional relevance means that upon the occurrence of the FPP of an adjacency pair, the occurrence of its SPP is expectable; if this SPP does not occur, it will be seen as "officially absent". This is because the FPP of an adjacency pair initiates an action which is completed by its relevant SPP. Put differently, an action that occurs in sequence-initial position makes relevant the occurrence of a specific, second action. For instance, in case of a question-answer adjacency pair, the action of seeking information (the FPP question) initiates a sequence which is completed as the SPP answer is provided by a next speaker.

Sornig (1977), Labov & Fanshel (1977) and Pomerantz' (1984) studies make the point that an agreement or a disagreement is expressed in response to an initial action which can be an assessment or an assertion. In CA terms, the action of assessing or asserting which occurs in sequence initial position (the FPP of the adjacency pair) can render

agreement or disagreement (the SPP of the adjacency pair) the relevant next action, as in the following examples.

Extract 3.1 (SBL:2.2.3.-46) (Pomerantz, 1984:62)

1. B Well, it was fun Cla[ir,
2. A → [Yeah, I enjoyed every minute of it.

Extract 3.2 (MC:1.-13) (Pomerantz, 1984:72)

1. W I sew by hand (), -- (uh huh), I'm
2. fantastic (you never [saw anything like it)
3. L → [I know but I, I-I still say
4. that the sewing machine's quicker,

In Extract 3.1, A's agreement in line 2 is produced in response to B's initial assessment in line 1. Likewise, in Extract 3.2, L's disagreement in lines 3 and 4 is uttered in response to W's initial assessment in lines 1 and 2.

While in the above two extracts the initiating actions are assessments, in the following two extracts the initial actions are assertions.

Extract 3.3 (Holtgraves, 1997:231)

45. A But he keeps getting denied.
46. B → Right, getting denied.

Extract 3.4 (Coulter, 1990:184)

17. Sheila 'f you sleep eight hours you're gonna feel a lot more alive
18. Mary → Oh no not eight – I've never gotten along on eight hours sleep

In Extract 3.3, B's agreement in line 46 is responsive to A's initial assertion in line 45. Similarly, in Extract 3.4, Mary's disagreement in line 18 is produced in response to Sheila's assertion in line 17.

As it appears from the above four extracts, a first-positioned assertion or assessment works as the FPP of an adjacency pair and thus makes agreement/disagreement (the SPP) conditionally relevant. However, a more recent study by Stivers & Rossano (2010a) demonstrates that first assessments do not always mobilize a response. As the researchers argue, speakers employ turn-design features including interrogative lexico-

morphosyntax, interrogative prosody (rising intonation), epistemic asymmetry, and gaze to secure a response. The extracts below illustrate the point. Extract 3.5 (from Stivers & Rossano, 2010a:14), taken from a dyadic conversation between Cheng and Jill, a married couple who are eating dessert, exemplifies a first assessment failing to receive a response. Prior to this extract, Jill has offered Cheng another piece of dessert, which he has said he may eat after taking a walk. A thirty-second silence during which Cheng finishes his dessert happens just before the extract starts.

Extract 3.5 [Stivers & Rossano, 2010a:14]

1. Cheng This is pretty good.
2. → (0.2)
3. Jill #hm# ((throat clear))
4. (.)
5. Jill I wanna stop by Blake an' Cora's an' ask them
6. if they know what happened on thuh corner.

In line 1, Cheng assesses the dessert as “pretty good”. This is a first assessment because it occurs in sequence-initial position. It is devoid of response-mobilizing features: it has not been delivered with interrogative syntax and prosody (it has a declarative syntax and final falling intonation); there is no epistemic asymmetry between Cheng and Jill concerning the dessert as neither of them has prepared it (it is a gift to them); the assessment has been delivered without Cheng’s gaze at Jill. As can be seen in the following lines, no second assessment has been offered by Jill in response to this first assessment. The absence of response seems to be unproblematic as Jill after a 0.2-second silence, clearing her throat (line 3) and a micro pause (line 4) continues the conversation by suggesting stopping by a neighbor’s house (line 5) (Stivers & Rossano, 2010a:13-14). On the basis of such first assessments which are not followed by a second assessment, Stivers & Rossano (2010a) propose that, in the domain of assessments, action (assessing) and sequential position (sequence initial position) can not guarantee a response by themselves.

In contrast to the above extract, Extracts 3.6 and 3.7 present first assessments followed by a response. Extract 3.6, from Stivers & Rossano (2010a:11), is a conversation between two co-workers Nicole and Shauna, talking about Nichol’s plans for her

boyfriend's birthday. Prior to the extract, Nichol has told of her plan to go to a spa with her boyfriend.

Extract 3.6 [Stivers & Rossano, 2010a:11]

1. Nic How you think he'll handle tha:t.
2. Sha Have you ever had one there? [(before)?
3. Nic [No I haven't.
4. (.)
5. Nic Tha[t's what I'm sayin'. We gon' t' go t'gether.
6. Sha [Oh my go^:d it-
7. Sha Go t'gether. An' you'll never w- go back t'(them)
8. again.
9. Nic → So that would be cool for him hu[h.
10. Sha [That'd be gettin'
11. really coo:l.
12. Nic → [Wouldn't that be ni:ce?,
13. Sha ^Uh huh, ((nodding))
14. ((N gaze away from S))

Nichol produces two first assessments of her plans for her boyfriend's birthday in lines 9 and 12. Both assessments are delivered so that they secure a response: both are produced with Nichol's gaze at Shauna; the assessment in line 9 ends in the tag particle *huh* and the one in line 12 has interrogative syntax and prosody (rising intonation) (Stivers & Rossano, 2010a:11). As Stivers & Rossano (2010a:11-12) argue, both assessments are designed to seek agreement rather than requesting information. Shauna responds to the first one with an upgraded agreement, changing *cool* to *really cool* (lines 10 and 11) and to the second one with an agreement token *Uh huh* and nodding (line 13).

While Extract 3.6 is an instance of face to face interaction, Extract 3.7, also from Stivers & Rossano (2010a:12), is part of a phone call. Therefore, gaze cannot be employed as a resource for mobilizing response.

Extract 3.7 [Stivers & Rossano, 2010a:12]

1. Emm =Oh honey that was a lovely luncheon I shoulda ca:lled you
2. s:soo[:ner but I:] I: [lo:ved it. Ih wz just deli:ghtfu[:l.]=
3. Mar [(f) Oh:::] [°()] [Well]=
4. Mar =I wz gla[d you] (came)]
5. Emm [^nd yer f:] friends] 'r so da:rlin:ng,=

6. Mar =Oh:::[: it wz:]
 7. Emm → [e-that P]a:t isn' she a do:[:ll?
 8. Mar [iYeh isn't she pretty,
 9. (.
 10. Emm Oh: she's a beautiful girl.=

As explained by Stivers & Rossano (2010a:12), Emma's assessment of Marjorie's friend Pat, whom she has only once visited in Marjorie's house, has been delivered with three response-eliciting features: interrogative syntax, rising intonation, and recipient-tilted epistemic asymmetry. The negative interrogative not only invites an agreeing response but also is used as a means of claiming epistemic primacy (Heritage & Raymond, 2005:21). Therefore, after presenting a minimal agreement, i.e. *Yeh*, Marjorie employs the same structure (negative interrogative) (line 8) to offer a second assessment and to claim primary rights to assess Pat's beauty. So here, in addition to interrogative syntax and rising intonation, recipient-tilted epistemic asymmetry contributes to response relevance (Stivers & Rossano, 2010a:12).

As Stivers & Rossano (2010a) propose, actions can elicit response in a scalar fashion depending on how they are designed. The more response-mobilizing turn-design features accompany an action, the greater the likelihood of a response will be (p. 27) as they make the recipient of the action more accountable to provide a response.

Stivers & Rossano's (2010a) model of response relevance has been criticized on the grounds that the data excerpts examined in their study come from occasions characterized as "nonfocused" encounters (Couper-Kuhlen, 2010) or "continuing states of incipient talk" (Schegloff, 2010). In "nonfocused" interactions, instead of sustaining a single focus of attention, i.e. "just talking," the participants are involved in other activities such as fixing dinner or clearing the table (Couper-Kuhlen, 2010:35). Likewise, in "continuing states of incipient talk," common to family members in a living room, employees in an office, passengers in a car, etc., a speaker's utterance can be followed by silence which is "neither an attributable silence nor a termination, which is seen as neither the suspension nor the violation of the basic features" (Schegloff, 2010:46). As stated by Couper-Kuhlen (2010) and Schegloff (2010), talk in such circumstances is governed by an organization different from that of "focused

talk” or “continuously sustained talk.” As a result, the principle of conditional relevance does not necessarily apply to such contexts.

However, pointing to the similarity of the interactional situations exemplified in their study to many of those which Schegloff (2007) relies on to explain his views about adjacency pair and sequence expansion, Stivers & Rossano (2010b:50) argue that a theory of sequence organization should be applicable across conversational contexts. Put differently, they reject the hypothesis that response relevance is contingent upon the conversational context. Instead, they propose that action, sequential position and turn design all play a part in mobilizing response (p. 49). This means that as an action an assessment invites a second assessment but does not necessitate it; the position and design of the assessment can increase the likelihood of the response (p. 50).

Accordingly, the present study seeks to determine whether in the context of academic discussions it is just the principle of conditional relevance (Schegloff, 1968, 2007; Schegloff & Sacks, 1973) that is behind the production of agreements/disagreements or, as suggested by Stivers & Rossano (2010a), turn-design features are also involved.

Labov & Fanshel (1977) and Pomerantz’ (1984) studies consider both participants’ knowledgeability of the state of affairs necessary for the emergence of agreement/disagreement in conversation. However, neither of them shows how the participants’ knowledgeability of the issue contributes to response relevance. Moreover, there has been no systematic investigation of how other turn design features (lexico-morphosyntax, prosody, and speaker gaze) influence the emergence of agreement/disagreement in conversation. Additionally, it has not been demonstrated that whether in the context of academic discussions it is the expression of assertions, assessments or some other action that results in the production of agreement/disagreement. As can be seen from Extracts 3.1-3.4, as an initiating action, assessments and assertions seem to be similar in that both actions can form the FPP of an adjacency pair and be followed by alternative responses, i.e. agreement or disagreement. However, it has not been demonstrated that the two actions stimulate a response in the same way. Thus, the present chapter along with the next two chapters

address these issues. As the focus of this study is on the production of disagreement, after a brief reference to agreement (section 3.3), all the mentioned issues will be examined for the production of disagreement.

As will be explained in section 3.4.1 below, by definition, disagreements do not occur as an initial action in a sequence. All disagreements are in response to something. In the data gathered two types of disagreement are discernible: first disagreements and disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement. First disagreements are the first occurrence of a disagreement in a sequence of talk. They are not produced in response to a prior disagreement. Second, third or nth disagreements occur when there are a series of consecutive disagreeing turns. These disagreements are referred to as disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement. Out of 117 disagreements in the data, 59 are first disagreements and 58 belong to the group of disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement. Since there may be differences in the production of these two types of disagreement, this chapter focuses on first disagreements and disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement will be attended to in a subsequent chapter.

3.3 Agreement turns: upgraded, same evaluation and downgraded

As shown by Labov & Fanshel (1977) and Pomerantz (1984), disagreement is one of the two possible alternative responses to a first assessment or assertion, the other alternative being agreement, as in the extracts below:

Extract 3.8

(SBL:2.1.8.-5) (Pomerantz, 1984:66)

1. B She seems like a nice little [lady
 2. A → [Awfully nice little person.

Extract 3.9

(Obstacles to a timely marriage I)

1. N in kāreshun bā'es mishe ke bachehā (.)
 this their act cause becomes that children
 2. lūs: bār biän.=
 spoiled burden come (they)
This act of theirs causes children (.) to be brought up spoiled.

3. B → =vāqe'an lus [°bār biän.°°]
 really spoiled burden come (they)
be brought up really spoiled.

In Extract 3.8, taken from Pomerantz (1984:66), A provides an agreeing response to a first assessment produced by B in the previous turn. In a similar vein, in Extract 3.9, taken from the data for this study, B expresses agreement (line 3) in response to a first-position assertion produced by N in lines 1 and 2. Note that these two extracts exemplify *strong or upgraded agreements* (Pomerantz, 1984:66) because the intensifiers *awfully* (line 2 in Extract 3.8) and *vāqe'an* ‘really’ (line 3 in Extract 3.9) employed before the descriptors *nice* and *lus* ‘spoiled’ serve to upgrade the agreements.

Another type of agreement, i.e. *same evaluation*, in which the recipient presents the same evaluation as the prior speaker’s evaluation (p. 66), can be found in Extracts 3.10 (taken from Pomerantz, 1984:67) and 3.11 (taken from the data) below.

Extract 3.10

1. B I think everyone enjoyed just sitting around talking.
 2. A → I do too.

Extract 3.11

(Obstacles to a timely marriage II)

1. P be nazare man bolughe fekriam kheyli
 to opinion of I maturity of intellectual also very
2. [ta'sirgozāre..h mom]kene=
 influential is it's possible
in my opinion intellectual maturity is very influential as well. .h it's possible
3. M → [āre; unam kheyli moheme.]
 yeah that also very important is
yeah, that's very important too.
4. P =ye nafar senesh si sāl bāshe, vali
 one person her/his age thirty yea be but
someone is thirty years old, but

In Extract 3.10, using the auxiliary *do* and the adverb *too*, A expresses the same opinion (line 2) as B does in line 1. Similarly, in Extract 3.11, replacing the descriptor

ta'sirgozär 'influential' (line 2) with its synonym *mohem* 'important' (line 3), M proffers the same assessment of intellectual maturity (line 3) as P does in lines 1 and 2. As Pomerantz (1984) maintains in contrast to upgraded or strong agreements that occur just in agreement turns and sequences (p. 66), same evaluation agreements can occur not only in agreement turns and sequences but as components of disagreement turns (p. 67), as in Extracts 3.12 (taken from Pomerantz, 1984:67) and 3.13 (taken from the data) below.

Extract 3.12

1. A Yeah I like it [()]
 2. B → [I like it too but uhh hahheh it blows my mind.

Extract 3.13

(Suicide)

1. H be har hāl eh khodkoshi kardan (0.6) dar kol
 to every condition suicide do in total
2. migam; .h neshuneye za'if budane ye ādame.
 (I) say sign of infirm be one man is
anyway eh in general committing suicide (0.6) is the sign of a person's infirmity.
3. (0.5)
4. E āre dige.
 yeah DM
yeah.
5. (0.2)
6. in[:]
 this
7. Z → [n]eshuneye za'if budanesh ke hast, vali negā kon,
 sign of infirm his being that is but look (you) do
(it) is the sign of his infirmity, but look,
8. ba'zi owqāt (0.2) alān masalan man mesāle ye dokhtario
 some times DM for example I example of one girl.DOM
9. mizanam ke dākhele ye khunevādei- (0.3) zendegi mikone ke
 (I) cite that inside one family living (she) does that
10. bish az had ta'asobie. (0.6) .hh khob in dokhtar har kāri
 more than limit fanatical is DM this girl every work
11. ke bekhād bekone ye tarsi az khunevādasho dāre.
 that (she) wants (she) does one fear from her family (she) has
sometimes (0.2) for instance I give the example of a girl who lives in a family (0.3) that is excessively

fanatical. (0.6) .hh *khob*¹⁶ whatever this girl wants to do she fears her family.

As can be seen in Extracts 3.12 and 3.13, although both B and Z start their turns with same evaluation agreements, i.e., *I like it too* (line 2 in Extract 3.8) and *neshuneye za'if budanesh ke hast* 'it is the sign of his weakness' (line 7 in Extract 3.9), using a contrast conjunction, i.e., *but* in Extract 3.12 (line 2) and *vali* 'but' in Extract 3.13 (line 7), they both disagree with their prior speakers A and H respectively.

Still a third kind of agreement, namely, *downgraded agreement*, in which the prior speaker's evaluation term has been weakened, can frequently be found in disagreement turns and sequences (Pomerantz, 1984:68, 72). Extracts 3.14 (taken from Pomerantz, 1984:68) and 3.15 (taken from the data) illustrate the point.

Extract 3.14

1. A She's a fox.
2. L → Yeh, she's a pretty girl.
3. A Oh, she's gorgeous.

Extract 3.15

(Obstacles to a timely marriage I)

1. C ba'd bekhäyd biyäyd masalan tu yeki do
then (you) want (you) come for example in one two
2. säl bekhäyd in shi:va ro (.) taghir bedid,
year (you) want this manner DOM change (you) give
then if you want to change your life style (.) in, let's say, one or two years,
3. vä:qe'an s[akhte.]
really difficult is
it will be really difficult.
4. D [väqe'an] sakhte.=
really difficult is
it will be really difficult.

¹⁶ *Khob* is a Persian discourse marker with a range of different functions including floor negotiation (keeping, yielding or claiming the floor), topic management (opening, closing or changing the topic), interposition (placing supplementary information), and encoding alignment or misalignment in the interactants' positions (Mohammadi, 2018:122-137). Due to the diversity of its functions, it may be equivalent to several English discourse markers including *well*, *right*, *okay*, and *uh-huh* (p. 107). Since there is no fixed translation for *khob* in English, I gloss it as DM (discourse maker) and avoid presenting any translation for it in the English translation lines of the data extracts and their relevant discussions.

5. C =ya'ni [vāqe'an]
 meaning really
6. B → [äre khob.] sakht [ke hast, vali gheyre-]
 yeah DM difficult that is but im-
yeah khob, it will be difficult, but im-
7. C [tä- ba'd ye jähä]i ba'd
 till- then one places then
8. ye jähäi ghey:remomken mishe in.
 one places impossible becomes this
then in some stages, then in some stages it becomes impossible.
9. B h:amishe gheyremomken nist.
 always impossible (it)'s not
it's not always impossible.

In Extract 3.14, as argued by Pomerantz (1984:68), the downgraded agreement (produced by L in line 2) itself is taken by the prior speaker (A) as a disagreement and causes her to reassert her previous opinion, thus creating a disagreement sequence. In contrast to Extract 3.14, in Extract 3.15, the downgraded agreement prefaces disagreement component produced by the same speaker (B). As can be seen at line 6 in Extract 3.15, employing the contrast conjunction *vali* 'but', B is going to disagree with C's assessment in line 3. However, before expressing disagreement, she starts her turn with a downgraded agreement: while C assesses change of one's manner as *vā:qe'an sakht* 'really difficult' (line 3), B evaluates it as *sakht* 'difficult' (line 6).

Although all the agreements detected in the current data set conform to the agreement types specified by Pomerantz (1984) and there is no instance of a strong agreement followed by a disagreement, as demonstrated by Ogden (2006), lexically strong agreements may accompany disagreements (see also Kotthoff, 1993:203-205), as in the following fragment:

Extract 3.16

(Holt U88.1.10 pay) (Ogden, 2006:1770)

1. Ski that's alright I just wanted to make sure: (.)
 2. whether you'd p'hh gone back or no[t.h
 3. Fre [yes I did.
 4. no [I got that=
 5. Ski [.hhhhhh.p
 6. Fre =thanks 'n I, I've also heard about th'of course

7. about the cash in toda:[y.
8. Ski [gYes::. yes isn't that
9. good at l:ong la:[st. [((sniff))
10. Fre → [that[s- that's (.) very good
11. news. b't'v cour[se it (0.3)
12. Ski [khhhhhhhh
13. Fre we'll haf to pay out a lot a'that I [guess
14. Ski [.hhhhhh ihye:s
15. but at least it'll bring us int'th'black hhh.hhh in
16. the middle of Ma:y whi:ch is just the time when we
17. should be.kmhhhhhh.glp.tklp

The assessment presented by Ski in lines 8 and 9, *isn't that good at l:ong la:st*, is a negative interrogative. As such, it invites a positive, agreeing response (Raymond, 2003; Heritage, 2002b; Heritage & Raymond, 2005). Fre's response, however, is a disagreeing one (lines 10, 11 and 13) prefaced by the seemingly strong agreement *that's (.) very good news*. As argued by Ogden (2006:1771), although this second assessment is lexically upgraded, it does not convey a strong agreement as it is phonetically downgraded: it has a narrower pitch span than the first assessment produced by Ski and it is quieter than the following disagreement component. This means that it is not just the lexical content of an agreement that is consequential for determining what type of agreement has been expressed but the phonetic format of the agreement is as important as its lexical content.

This section has shown that agreement can be produced in response to a first assertion or assessment. Three types of agreement, i.e. upgraded, same evaluative and downgraded, as introduced by Pomerantz (1984), have been found in the present data. While upgraded agreements are seen to occur only in agreement turns and sequences, i.e. they are not followed by a disagreement, same evaluative agreements can be found not only in agreement turns and sequences but as components of disagreement turns, and downgraded agreements are frequently found in disagreement turns and sequences.

3.4 Characteristics of first disagreements

This section investigates whether first disagreements are responsive or initiating actions, how opposition is expressed in first disagreement turns, what prosodic features

are characteristic of them, whether they start at a normal transition space of the prior turn or not and whether they make use of the key words of the prior turn. It also examines the epistemic valence of first disagreements, whether they are single or multi-TCU turns and whether they contain address terms or not.

3.4.1 Primarily responsive rather than initiating actions

A fundamental characteristic of first disagreements is that they are all produced in response to an initial action. That is to say, they form the SPP of an adjacency pair, as in the following example taken from a discussion on the issue of globalization participated by two female and three male students.

Extract 3.17

(Globalization II)

- | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-----|--|------------|------------|----------------------|---------|------------|----------------|--------------|-----------------------|
| 1. | A | ye | ta' rife | ye- | mo' tabari | ke | chi | ke | hālā | mi' ge |
| | | one | definition | one | reliable | that | what | that | DM | (it) says |
| | | there's a reliable definition that says | | | | | | | | |
| 2. | | az | (zamāni) | ke | tama ^o ne | | bashar | bevojud | | umad |
| | | from | time | that | civilization | | human | into existence | | came |
| 3. | | jahāni | shodanam | | bevojud | | umad. | | | |
| | | global | become too | | to existence | | came | | | |
| | | globalization came into existence when human civilization came into existence. | | | | | | | | |
| 4. | | (0.2) | | | | | | | | |
| 5. | | hālā | dar- | dar | hiteye | | kho[desh.] | | | |
| | | DM | in | in | domain | | its own | | | |
| | | in its own domain. | | | | | | | | |
| 6. | N → | | | | | | [az] | zamāni | ke | tama ^o don |
| | | | | | | | from | time | that | civilization |
| 7. | | bevojud | | umad? | =man | migam | qabl | az | tamadonam | jahāni |
| | | into existence | | came | I | (I) say | before | from | civilization | global |
| 8. | | shodan | °vojud | [dāsh.t.°] | | | | | | |
| | | become | existence | had | | | | | | |
| | | when (human) civilization came into existence? I say globalization came into existence before civilization. | | | | | | | | |

As can be seen in the above extract, the disagreeing turn in lines 6-8, i.e. 'when (human) civilization came into existence? I say globalization came into existence

before civilization,¹⁷ does not initiate the sequence. It is responsive to the initial action in lines 2 and 3, i.e. the assertion that ‘globalization came into existence when human civilization came into existence’. The responsive action is produced by a speaker (N) different from the one expressing the initial action (A). As such, it constitutes the SPP of an adjacency pair (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973:295-96). Indeed, all first disagreements in the data show the above characteristic.

While all first disagreements are responsive actions, they can also work to initiate a next action. As will be shown in Chapter 5, first disagreements can lead to the initial-assertion producer or another participant’s subsequent disagreement. In such cases, first disagreements play a double function. Moreover, as already observed by Coulter (1990:187), simple disagreement tokens may work as *pre-counter-assertions*, thus expanding the sequence into one incorporating an insert expansion. Though with a very low frequency, the same property has been observed in the present data set. Extract 3.18 below, taken from a six-party discussion on drug addiction, is a case in point.

Extract 3.18

(Drug addiction I)

- | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|---|------------------------------|-------------------|--|------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|------------------|
| 1. | H | miduniç =agar
you know if | mä
we | <u>man’</u>
prohibited | beshim
become | az
from | ye
one | chizi, (.)
thing | hege
sense of |
| 2. | | konjkävimun
our curiosity | kh[ob,]
DM | you know, if we’re prohibited from something, (.) our sense of curiosity, khob, | | | | | |
| 3. | A | | [bish]tar
more | mishe.
(it) becomes | [bishtar
more | tara]fesh=
towards it | increases. | | |
| 4. | H | | | | [bishtar
more | mishe.]
(it) becomes | increases. | | |

¹⁷ Note that N’s disagreeing response is composed of two turn constructional units (TCUs): 1) *az zamäni ke tamadon bevojud umad?* ‘when (human) civilization came into existence?’ and 2) *man migam qabl az tamadonam jahäni shodan vojüd däsht* ‘I say globalization came into existence before civilization.’ The first TCU which is in fact a partial repeat of the prior speaker’s turn with final rising intonation serves the functions of tying N’s utterance to the prior speaker’s utterance (Goodwin, 1990:177) and more importantly specifying the problematic part of the prior speaker’s utterance. The second TCU which forms the main disagreement component of N’s turn expresses N’s opposition with the prior speaker.

5. A =m[irim.]
(we) go
we're more attracted to it.
6. H [vaqti] konjkävimunam hedäyat nashe:=
when our curiosity guidance doesn't get
when our curiosity isn't guided,
7. M → =qabul nadä[ram ino.]
acceptance (I) don't have this DOM
I don't agree with that.
8. H [mirim sam]te in ch[izä.]
we go towards this things
we're attracted to these things.
9. A [hedä]yat ne-]
guidance
10. M → [ino] qabul]
this.DOM acceptance
11. na[däram.]
I don't have
I don't agree with that.
12. E [barä chi] qabul nadä[ri.]
for what acceptance you don't have
why don't you agree with that?
13. A [va]qti migid qächäqe,] pas=
when you say forbidden is then
if it's forbidden, then
14. M [chizi ke bade:,]
anything that bad is
anything that is bad,
15. A =hedäyati[am ni:st. pas] kon[torole khäsjam nist.]
guidance also isn't therefore control special also isn't
there's no guidance. so there's also no special control (on that).
16. M [chizi ke bade:,] [na; chizi ke bade bāyad] mah-
anything that bad is no anything that bad is
17. hame jāye donyā chizi ke bade mahdud mishe:, .h valo inke
all place of world anything that bad is limited becomes even if that
18. kheyliam khähän däshte bäshe.
many also fan has had SBJN.be
anything that is bad, no, anything that is bad should be res-

all over the world, anything that is bad is restricted, .h even if many people like it.

Here, M's disagreeing turn in line 7, i.e. *qabul nadāram ino* 'I don't agree with that,' has been produced in response to H's assertion in lines 1, 2 and 4, i.e. *agar mā man' beshim az ye chizi, (.) hese konjkävimun khob, bishtar mishe* 'if we're prohibited from something, (.) our sense of curiosity, *khob*, increases.' So, it counts as a responsive action. However, as can be seen from the rest of the extract, M's disagreement which has been repeated in lines 10 and 11 triggers a *solicit* in the next turn, i.e. E's question *barä chi qabul nadäri* 'why don't you agree (with that)' in line 12, which in turn results in the production of M's counter-assertion in lines 14 and 16-18. So, while responsive to H's initial assertion, M's disagreement also initiates a next action as it serves as the FPP of the *pre-counter-assertion—solicit* adjacency pair.

It is worth noting that this type of sequence expansion occurs when the disagreeing turn consists simply of a disagreement token, i.e. no account or elaboration accompanies the disagreement token. However, in the present data set, except for a couple of cases, disagreement tokens preface accounts or elaborations in same turns.

Although earlier studies have shown that disagreements can be in response to assertions or assessments, in the current data set all first disagreements are in response to assertions, as in the above examples. This may be due to the nature of the data set because in academic discussions the discussants are generally required to present facts rather than their attitudes towards states of affairs.

3.4.2 Opposite valence

The examination of 59 first disagreements in the present data set shows that the speakers express disagreement in one of the following ways:

Negating the proposition expressed in the initial assertion: The disagreeing speaker adds the particles *na* 'no' and/or *na/ne* 'not' to the assertion expressed by the disagreed-with speaker or deletes *na/ne* 'not' from the initial assertion, as in Extracts 3.19 and 3.20 respectively.

Extract 3.19

(Obstacles to a timely marriage I)

1. B yeki az daläyete 'om:dei ke sene ezdeväj balä rafte
 one of reasons chief that age of marriage up gone
2. hamine,.hh shäya:d (.) kheyli naslhäye qabl, (.)
 this same (thing) is perhaps many generations of before
one of the chief reasons that the age of marriage has risen is this, perhaps many generations before,
3. do nasl qabl, se nasl qabl, (.)
 two generation before three generation before
two generations before, three generations before,
4. ham- ham sene mähä ke budā:n, (0.2) >kheyli 'äqeltar
 same same age of us that (they) were much wiser
5. az mä budan, =mas'ulaiyatpazirtar az mä
 than us (they) were responsibility.more accepting than us
6. budan, =shäyad ba'ziāshun sāhebe khunevāde budā:n,<=
 were perhaps some of them owner of family (they)were
when they were our age, they were much wiser than us, they had more sense of responsibility than we do, perhaps some of them had families,
7. N → =na; 'äqeltar [na]budan,=
 no wiser (they) weren't
no, they weren't wiser,

In the above extract, B's assertion in lines 4 and 5, *kheyli 'äqeltar az mä budan* 'they were much wiser than us,' is an affirmative sentence. N disagrees with this assertion by adding the opposition marker (an adverb) *na* 'no' to the beginning of the sentence and negating the verb of the sentence, using the negative prefix *na* 'not' (line 7). In contrast to the above extract, in Extract 3.20 below, the disagreeing speaker expresses a disagreement by deleting the negative particle from the initial assertion.

Extract 3.20

(Drug addiction I)

1. A motma'en bāshid jāygozine:: khāsi barā mādeye mokhader
 sure (you) be substitute of particular for substance of narcotic
2. vojūd nadāre ke be[khād [begi masan]
 being doesn't have that (it) wants (you) say for instance
there's certainly no particular substitute for narcotic drugs that can, let's say,
3. E → [nemitu[ni ino begi.]

I very easily for example if problem.IND forward
very easily, I, let's say, if a problem happ-

4. S 1st→ [vali tu ruhiat asar mi]zāre
 but in your spirit effect puts
but they influence you, Parvaneh.
5. Parvāne. .h[h] khodet qabul dāri, khānevādato rāzi
 Parvāne yourself acceptance (you) have your family.DOM satisfied
.hh you yourself accept it, you convince your family (that your relationship is OK),
6. P [e-]
7. S mikoni, vali enqad tu ruhiat asar mizāre
 (you) do but so much in your spirit effect (it) puts
but you are influenced by their opinion so much that
8. barmigardi hamuno be tarafet [migi:, va] hamin
 (you) turn the same thing to your boyfriend (you) tell and this same
you turn and pass on your parents' objections to your fiancé, and
9. P [p! .hh khob]
 DM
khob
10. S bā'ese da'vā mishe. =y[a'ni enqad tu ruhiat asar mizāre,]
 cause quarrel becomes meaning so much in your spirit effect (it) puts
this creates a disagreement. I mean their objections influence you so much

In lines 1 and 2, P makes the assertion that one can easily convince their own family not to meddle in their relationship and then continues with a second TCU to explain her opinion. However, while P is still in the middle of her TCU (line 3), S starts expressing her opposing view, commencing with the contrast marker *vali* 'but' (line 4). As can be seen, S's disagreement has not been preceded by a partial agreement.

Using formulaic expressions that show opposition: The disagreeing speaker produces a statement whose verb is one of *movāfeq nistam*, *qabul nadāram*, *nemipaziram*, all meaning 'I don't agree' or *mokhālefam* 'I disagree.' Extract 3.22 below which is part of the six-party discussion on drug addiction illustrates the point.

Extract 3.22

(Drug addiction I)

1. H miduniç =agar mā man' beshim az ye chizi, (.) hege
 you know if we prohibited become from one thing sense of

man's needs,

3. (0.2)
4. S → tamām ke nemishe goft.=
all that (it)'s impossible said
you can't say all.
5. M =tamām- bebinid, vaqtike *de:*(0.4) khob barnāme dārim.
all- look when re:: DM program we have
all- look, when (0.4) khob, there's a program.

As part of his assertion, M produces the adverb clause ‘when it (the religion) can be accountable to all of man’s needs’ in lines 1 and 2. S identifies the word ‘all’ in M’s utterance as a source of problem and expresses a disagreement with that, using a negative declarative (line 4) (For a further example, see line 3 in Extract 3.20 above).

While in the above extract disagreement has been expressed in negative declarative, in Extract 3.24 below, taken from the five-party discussion on globalization, disagreement is expressed in affirmative declarative. The extract begins with N telling the story of Abel and Cain.

Extract 3.24

(Globalization II)

1. N vakhti ke khodā goft qorbuni biārid,
when that God said sacrifice bring
when God said, “bring a sacrifice,”
2. un khodesh qorbāniye kami ovord, in ziād ovord.
that himself sacrifice a little brought this a lot brought
Cain himself brought a little sacrifice, Abel brought a lot.
3. (0.4)
4. pas ye vakhti *donyā bā mā yeksān raftār mikone,*
so one time.IND world with us same treatment does
so sometime the world treats us similarly,
5. mā (.) riakshene yeksāni neshun nemidim.
we reaction identical sign (we) don't give
(but) we (.) have different reactions.
6. (0.5)
7. A → °i' estesnā'e.°

this exception is
that's a special case.

Having told the story, N concludes that 'sometimes the world treats us similarly, (but) we have different reactions' (lines 4 and 5). A disagrees with this assertion (line 7), using an affirmative declarative.

Using rhetorical or known-answer questions: The disagreeing speaker casts doubt on the validity of the initial assertion through a rhetorical question. The extract below taken from the mixed-gender six-party discussion on obstacles to a timely marriage contains a first disagreement expressed through a rhetorical question. The extract starts with N (a female interactant) presenting an assertion about why girls enter relationships other than marriage.

Extract 3.25

(Obstacles to a timely marriage I)

- | | | |
|----|-----|--|
| 1. | N | khob dokhtarāam vaqti ke: e::h masalan: ezdevāj- moqe'iate |
| | DM | girls also when that for example marriage- opportunity |
| 2. | | ezdevāj barāshun pish nemiād .h belakhare majbur mi' shan |
| | | marriage for them forward doesn't come finally forced (they) become |
| 3. | | be [in ravābet.] |
| | | to this relations |
| | | khob because eh marriage opportunities don't come to girls, .h they have to finally settle for these relationships. |
| 4. | T → | [dokhtarāam m]otma`eni moqe'iate ezdevāj |
| | | girls also (are) you sure opportunity marriage |
| 5. | | barāshun pish [nemiād?] |
| | | for them forward doesn't come |
| | | are you sure that marriage opportunities don't come to girls? |
| 6. | D | [.h] |
| 7. | H | [dokhtarā] barāshun |
| | | girls for them |
| 8. | | [pish miād.] |
| | | forward comes |
| | | they come to girls. |
| 9. | N | [khob cher[ä;] |
| | DM | yes |
| | | khob yeah, |

10. T [BA]RĀSHUN [PISH MIĀ:D,]
 for them forward (it) comes
they come to them.

In lines 1-3 of the above extract, N asserts that girls enter relationships other than marriage because there are no marriage opportunities for them. T then asks a question about N's certainty of her assertion (lines 4 and 5). Considering the fact that T is female, the answer to this question is within her knowledge territory. Therefore, T's question is not a real question. It is a rhetorical question aimed to undermine the validity of N's assertion.

Substituting an element of the initial assertion with another element of similar structural function: The disagreeing speaker replaces the problematic item detected in the initial assertion with an item of similar structural function, as in the extract below taken from the three-party discussion on drug and alcohol addiction. At this point of the discussion, they are talking about the main reason of addiction among women.

Extract 3.26

(Drug and alcohol addiction)

1. F ya'ni dar ↑vāqe:' .h bishtar: man migam 'e late aslish
 meaning in reality more I (I) say reason its chief
2. dowlate,=.h be khātere inke: ch[o::n]
 government is to sake of that because
**I mean actually, I say, the main reason ((of addiction among women)) is the state((s wrong policy)),
 .h for the reason that, because**
3. S → [faqre.]
 poverty is
it's poverty.
4. (.)
5. S äre:.=
 yeah
yeah

In the initial assertion presented by F in lines 1 and 2, government('s wrong policy) has been identified as the main reason of women's addiction. In line 3, S disagrees with S's assertion by replacing *faqr* 'poverty' for *dowlat* 'government('s wrong policy).'

As demonstrated in this section, Persian speakers in the present study have used a variety of ways to express opposition. They have added negative particles to the initial assertion or deleted them from the assertion. Alternatively, they have used the contrast conjunction *vali* ‘but’ to show opposition. There are also certain expressions such as *mokhālefam* ‘I disagree’ that have been used to express disagreement. Asking rhetorical questions that undermine the validity of the initial assertion or substituting an element of the initial assertion with a structurally similar item are other ways of showing opposition. It is important to note that the ways used by Persian speakers in this study to express disagreement are similar to those used by English speakers reported by Muntigl & Turnbull (1998).

3.4.3 First-disagreement turn onset

In their description of turn-taking system, Sacks et al. (1974:708) maintain that, in any conversation, transition from one turn to a next commonly occurs with no gap and no overlap. They explain this based on the interactants’ orientation to the transition relevance place, the possible completion point of a TCU at which speaker change can occur. A normal transition space is made up of a single beat of silence between the end of the prior turn and the beginning of the next one: talk does not cover or latch to the previous turn, nor is it delayed (Jefferson, 1984:18, 1986:162; Schegloff, 2007:67).

In the current data set, however, only a very small number of first disagreements (3 out of 59) start in a normal transition space of their initial assertion. In fact, in a large number of cases, there seems to be an urgency to start a first disagreement, as shown in the table below:

Table 3.1 Frequency and percentage of first-disagreement turn onsets

First-disagreement turn onset	Frequency	Percentage
“Normal”	3	5.08
Urgent	39	66.1
Non-urgent	17	28.82

In the above table, first-disagreements that start in a normal transition space of their FPP have a “normal” onset (5.08%). By contrast, disagreements that start in a reduced transition space or at a point of maximal incompleteness of the prior turn have an urgent onset (66.1%) and those that start after a pause or intervening talk have a non-urgent onset (28.82%). The extracts below provide examples for each of these states. Extract 3.27, taken from the discussion on obstacles to a timely marriage participated by three female and three male students, exemplifies a first disagreement starting at a normal transition space. At this point of the discussion, the students are talking about the difficulty of changing one’s life style after getting married in a short space of time.

Extract 3.27

(Obstacles to a timely marriage I)

1. C ba'd bekhäyd biyäyd masalan tu yeki do
then (you) want (you) come for example in one two
2. sääl bekhäyd in shi:va ro (.) taghir bedid,
year (you) want this manner DOM change (you) give
then if you want to change your life style (.) in, let's say, one or two years,
3. vä:qe'an s[akhte.]
really difficult is
it will be really difficult.
4. D [väqe'an] sakhte.=
really difficult is
it will be really difficult.
5. C =ya'ni [väqe'an]
meaning really
6. B [äre khob.] sakht [ke hast, vali gheyre-]
yeah DM difficult that is but im-
yeah khob, it will be difficult, but im-
7. C [tä- ba'd ye jähä]i ba'd
till- then one places then
8. ye jähäi ghey:remomken mishe in.
one places impossible becomes this
then in some stages, then in some stages it becomes impossible.
9. B → h:amishe gheyremomken nist.
always impossible (it)'s not
it's not always impossible.

In lines 7 and 8 of the above extract, C asserts that changing one's life style will become impossible in some stages of life. As can be seen in lines 8 and 9, B's disagreement with this assertion starts in a normal transition space. There is no latching or overlap and no time delay.

In contrast to the above extract, in Extracts 3.28, 3.20, 3.23, 3.29 and 3.30 below, first-disagreement turns start with an urgency. Extract 3.28, taken from the discussion on globalization participated by four male students, exemplifies a first disagreement starting in a reduced transition space.

Extract 3.28

(Globalization I)

1. A khosusisāziam mire samte eqtesāde āzād.
privatization also goes towards economy free
privatization is part of the free-market economy.
2. (0.5)
3. D tajrobe nadāre; =khosusisāzi dar keshvare mā
experience doesn't have privatization in country of our
4. ziād tajrobe nad[āre.]
much experience doesn't have
it doesn't have presence. privatization doesn't have much presence in our country.
5. A → [taj]robe nadāre; =age tajrobe
experience doesn't have if experience
6. nadāre, .h cherā alān bānke Sāmān khosusie,
doesn't have why now bank of Sāmān private is
it doesn't have presence? if it doesn't have presence, .h why is Sāmān bank private now?
7. (0.2)

Here, A's disagreement (lines 5 and 6) with D's assertion concerning privatization (lines 3 and 4) starts in overlap with the final sounds of the last word of D's TCU, what Jefferson (1984:13) refers to as terminal overlap. A's turn is prefaced with a repeat of the last two words of D's utterance, i.e. *tajrobe nadāre* 'it doesn't have presence,' uttered with interrogative intonation but immediately followed by another TCU that explains why A has found this part of D's utterance problematic. A's turn design, together with its early onset, points to the fact that A has opted to correct the

problem he has detected with D's utterance as soon as possible, hence his urgency in taking the turn.

The urgency in expressing an opposite view is more apparent in Extracts 3.20 and 3.23. Extract 3.20 is part of the discussion on drug addiction participated by three female and three male students.

Extract 3.20

(Drug addiction I)

1. A motma`en bāshid jāygozine:: khāši barā mādeye mokhader
 sure (you) be substitute of particular for substance of narcotic
2. vojud nadāre ke be[khād [begi masan]
 being doesn't have that (it) wants (you) say for instance
there's certainly no particular substitute for narcotic drugs that can, let's say,
3. E → [nemitu[ni ino begi.]
 (you) can't this.DOM (you) say
you can't say that.
4. H → [jāygozin] vojud
 substitute being
5. dāre kh[ānome Āzā- [eh] khānome Afshāri.
 (it) has Miss Āzā- eh Miss Afshāri.
there are substitutes, Miss Āzā- eh Miss Afshāri.

In this extract, both E (line 3) and H (line 4) disagree with A's assertion that there is no substitute for narcotic drugs (lines 1 and 2). As can be seen in lines 1-4, both E and H start their turn while A is still at a point of maximal incompleteness of her TCU (she has just started an adjective clause) and both of them continue their talk so that A opts to drop out, leaving her TCU incomplete. E and H's early start and their adherence to the turn are suggestive of their urgency to express an opposite view. This urgency may in turn point to their preference to resolve the detected problem with A's assertion as soon as possible. In other words, it appears that both E and H prefer to reach common ground with A on the assertion she made concerning the existence of a substitute for narcotic drugs before A moves the discussion forward.

As with the above extract, the urgency in correcting the problem is present in Extract 3.23 below. The extract has been taken from the discussion on the function of religion in society, participated by three male students.

Extract 3.23

(Religion in society)

- | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-----|--|----------|-------------------|--------------|-------------|----------|---------|
| 1. | M | .h din | vaqti- | ghani | bāshe, | vaqti | betune | tamāme |
| | | religion | when | rich | is | when | (it) can | all |
| 2. | | pāso- | ya'ni | niāzhāye | ensāno | pāsokhgu | | bāshe, |
| | | accou- | meaning | needs of | man.DOM | accountable | | be |
| | | .h when religion is rich ((accountable to all of man's questions)), when it can be accountable to all of man's needs, | | | | | | |
| 3. | | (0.2) | | | | | | |
| 4. | S → | tāmām | ke | nemishe | | goft.= | | |
| | | all | that | (it)'s impossible | | said | | |
| | | you can't say all. | | | | | | |
| 5. | M | =tamām- | bebinid, | vaqtike | *de::* (0.4) | khob | barnāme | dārim. |
| | | all- | look | when | re:: | DM | program | we have |
| | | all- look, when (0.4) khob there's a program. | | | | | | |

Here, S's disagreement (line 4) starts upon a mid-utterance silence¹⁸ (line 3). As can be seen in lines 1 and 2, M's utterance is still incomplete because what he has produced before a pause of two tenths of a second seems to be just the adverb clause of a complex sentence, with which S interruptively disagrees. This early onset of S's disagreement can demonstrate his urgency in rectifying the problem identified in M's assertion as M's moving to the main clause of the complex sentence may decrease S's chance of expressing his opposing view about the proposition of the adverb clause.

While in the above three extracts, i.e. Extracts 3.28, 3.20 and 3.23, the SPP disagreements are seen to be put as close as possible to their FPP assertions, in Extracts 3.29 and 3.30, despite the presence of urgency in expressing disagreement, the SPP disagreements are not as close as possible to their FPP assertions. Extract

¹⁸ As demonstrated by Jefferson (1984:32), mid-utterance silence or silence-fillers are recurrently seen to be a locus of speaker change, i.e. recipients/next speakers can start speaking when a silence or silence filler occurs in the middle of an uncompleted utterance.

3.29, taken from the six-party discussion on obstacles to a timely marriage, starts at a point where B presents her idea concerning the reason why the average age of marriage has increased.

Extract 3.29

(Obstacles to a timely marriage I)

1. B yeki az da_läyele 'om:dei ke sene ezdeväj balä rafte
one of reasons chief that age of marriage up gone
2. hamine,.hh shäya:d (.) kheyli naslhäye qabl, (.)
this same (thing) is perhaps many generations of before
one of the chief reasons that the age of marriage has risen is this, perhaps many generations before,
3. do nasl qabl, se nasl qabl, (.)
two generation before three generation before
two generations before, three generations before,
4. ham- ham sene mähä ke budä:n, (0.2) >kheyli 'äqeltar
same same age of us that (they) were much wiser
5. az mä budan, =mas`ulaiyatpazirtar az mä
than us (they) were responsibility.more accepting than us
6. budan, =shäyad ba`ziäshun sähebe khuneväde budä:n,<=
were perhaps some of them owner of family (they)were
when they were our age, they were much wiser than us, they had more sense of responsibility than we do, perhaps some of them had families,
7. N → =na; 'äqeltar [na]budan,=
no wiser (they) weren't
no, they weren't wiser,
8. H [ye]
one
9. B =N[A-]
no
NO-
10. N [m]as`uliatpazirishun [kheyli bishtar az mä bude:.]
their acceptance of responsibilities much more than us been
they had much more sense of responsibility than we do.

As can be seen in this extract, although N's disagreeing response in line 7 is latched to the prior turn, showing the urgency in expressing an opposite view, it is not as close as possible to its FPP assertion, i.e. *kheyli 'äqeltar az mä budan* 'they were much wiser than us' (lines 4 and 5). Taking into account that the FPP assertion and the following

two TCUs, i.e. *mas`ulaiyatpazirtar az mä budan* ‘they had more sense of responsibility than we do’ (lines 5 and 6) and *shäyad ba`ziäshun sähebe khuneväde buda:n* ‘perhaps some of them had families’ (line 6), form a three-part list (Jefferson, 1990), N waits till the list is complete. In spite of this, N still indicates her urgency in expressing her disagreement through latching at the first possible point which is the end of the three-part list.

Whereas in Extract 3.29 more talk by FPP-assertion producer comes before the SPP disagreement, in Extract 3.30 talk by a third-party speaker comes before the SPP disagreeing response. The extract is part of the discussion on the development of rationalism in society, participated by three male students.

Extract 3.30

(Development of rationalism)

- | | | | | | | | |
|----|-----|-------------------|------------------------|------------|----------|-------------|--|
| 1. | A | man | [däram mi]gam, | poroseye | mä (.) | poro[seye | mä]= |
| | | I | (I) have (I) am saying | process of | our | process of | our |
| 2. | R | | [ämuzeš] | | | [khob, |] |
| | | | teaching | | | DM | |
| | | | | | | khob | |
| 3. | A | =ämuzešo | parvaresh | hä. | | | |
| | | teaching and | nurturing | is | | | |
| | | | | | | | I’m saying, our process (.) our process is education. |
| 4. | R | ämuzeš | parvaresh | hä:s, (.) | vali | khob’ | in ämuzeš |
| | | teaching | nurturing | is | but | DM | this teaching |
| 5. | | pa[rvaresh | shomä | chiyeç] | | | |
| | | nurturing of | your | what is | | | |
| | | | | | | | it is education, (.) but khob what’s the education (you’re mentioning)? |
| 6. | O → | [nemishe | mahdudesh |] | koni | be | ämuzeš parvaresh. |
| | | It’s not possible | restrict it | | (you) do | to | teaching nurturing |
| | | | | | | | you can’t restrict it to education. |

Here, O’s TCU in line 6 is a disagreeing response to A’s assertion in lines 1 and 3 (O is gazing at A when uttering his disagreement). This disagreeing response starts when R’s talk is still at a point of maximal incompleteness, thus pointing to O’s urgency in expressing an opposite view.

Contrary to the above 5 extracts, in Extracts 3.24 and 3.31 below, there seems to be no urgency in the production of disagreements as they have a late onset. Extract 3.24 is another part of the five-party discussion on globalization. At this point of the discussion, N is telling the Abel and Cain story.

Extract 3.24

(Globalization II)

1. N vakhti ke khodä goft qorbuni biärid,
when that God said sacrifice bring
when God said, “bring a sacrifice,”

2. un khodesh qorbäniye kami ovord, in ziäd ovord.
that himself sacrifice a little brought this a lot brought
Cain himself brought a little sacrifice, Abel brought a lot.

3. (0.4)
4. pas ye vakhti *donyä bä mä yeksän raftär mikone,*
so one time.IND world with us same treatment does
so sometime the world treats us similarly,

5. mä (.) riakshene yeksäni neshun nemidim.
we reaction identical sign (we) don't give
(but) we (.) have different reactions.

6. (0.5)
7. A → °i' estesnä`e.°
this exception is
that's a special case.

8. (0.7)
9. N NA'; na. (0.2) estesnä nist.
no no exception isn
no no (0.2) it's not a special case.

As can be seen in the above extract, the transition space between the FPP assertion and its SPP response is extended as A's disagreement (line 7) with N's assertion (lines 4 and 5) is produced after a gap of 0.5 second (line 6). The late onset of this disagreeing response may be suggestive of the dispreferred or disaffiliative status of disagreements as producing a disagreement after a pause is a way of delaying a disaffiliative action (Pomerantz, 1984; Sacks, 1987; Schegloff, 2007:67-68). The disaffiliative status of

this disagreement is further evidenced by a reduction in volume as can be seen in line 7.

While in the above extract the first-disagreement turn starts after a pause, in the extract below it starts after the intervening talk by other speakers. The extract is another part of the six-party discussion on drug addiction. Before the extract starts, L has been explaining how the body of a person who is breaking drug addiction restores its pre-addiction condition.

Extract 3.31

(Drug addiction I)

- | | | |
|-----|---|--|
| 1. | L | [ya'ni ye chizi mese ändrofîn. äfarin. ye] chizi
meaning one thing like endorphin bravo one thing |
| 2. | | mese ändro[fin.]
like endorphin
I mean something like endorphin. bravo! something like endorphin. |
| 3. | E | [mese] ädrenälin.
like adrenaline
like adrenaline. |
| 4. | | (0.2) |
| 5. | L | mese äder[nälin.]
like adrenaline
like adrenaline. |
| 6. | H | [vali es]tefädeye 'om:dei ke az: e:h maväde:
but use of chief.IND that from materials |
| 7. | | mokhader mese teryäk bishtar tuye hälä begim tu jâme'eye
narcotic like opium more inside of DM let's say in society of |
| 8. | | khodemun Irän hamchenin surat migereft bishtarin estefädash
ourselves Iran also face (it) takes most its use |
| 9. | | bekhätere: taskine dardhäo äläm bud.
For relief of pains and sufferings was
but the chief use of eh narcotic drugs like opium, say, in our own society Iran was for the relief of pain and suffering. |
| 10. | J | äre; () .h
yeah |
| 11. | M | unke barä bimärihä:s.
that for illnesses is
that's for illnesses. |

12. A → alān intori nis: äqäye Ha[kami.]
 now this manner isn't Mr Hakami
now it's not like that, Mr Hakami.
13. E [väse bi]märi bud[e ()]
 for disease has been
it has been for diseases ()
14. A → [alān]N[a::;]
 now no
now it's not.
15. H [alān]
 DM
16. intori bude, =hä[lä]
 this manner has been now
it has been so. now
17. A → [khə]shgozaruniäo jave dustän
 pleasure-seeking and atmosphere friends
18. bä'ese etiäd shode.
 cause of addiction has become
pleasure-seeking and bad friends are the cause of addiction.

Here, A's disagreement (lines 12, 14, 17 and 18) with H's assertion about the chief use of narcotic drugs in Iran (lines 6-9) starts after two turns by other participants (lines 10 and 11). That is to say, A waits for previous turns to be complete before she takes the turn at transition relevance place. As with Extract 3.24, the late onset of A's disagreement can be indicative of the disaffiliative nature of the action which is also evidenced by the use of the address term *äqäye Hakami* 'Mr Hakami' (line 12). Focusing on sequence-initiating actions, Lerner (2003:184-185) maintains that, in multi-party interactions, while pre-positioned address terms, i.e. address terms located in the beginning of a TCU, are regularly used to establish reciprocity, post-positioned address terms, i.e. address terms appended to a TCU, are frequently used to show a particular stance toward the recipient. Likewise, Rendle-Short (2007a:1520), focusing on news interview settings, demonstrates that post-positioned address terms are commonly used to demonstrate positive attitude and regard towards the other person. In the above example, since reciprocity has already been established through gaze (A is gazing at H while uttering the TCU 'now it's not like that, Mr Hakami', H has turned

his gaze from M to A as A started her turn), the use of the address term seems to be a way of showing regard towards the addressee, thus mitigating the disaffiliative action.

As shown in this section and Table 3.1, about two thirds of first-disagreement turns in the present data set have an urgent onset as they are latched to or overlap the previous turn or start at a point of maximal incompleteness of the prior turn. That is to say, the disagreeing speaker doesn't wait for a transition relevant place to express disagreement. This urgency in producing a disagreeing response may be due to the speakers' preference to correct the problem they detect in the FPP assertion as soon as possible in such a multiparty context. By contrast, the late onset of first-disagreement turns (less than a third of first disagreements) can be indicative of the disaffiliative nature of the action.

3.4.4 Use of pronouns and/or the same key words

In English conversations while the first mention of a referent in a sequence is commonly done through a full noun phrase, the subsequent mentions are done via pronouns (Fox, 1987:18). In a disagreement sequence, however, this substitution of a pronoun for a full noun phrase is frequently absent (pp. 62-64; see also Schegloff, 1996:453-454). That is to say, the disagreeing person often uses the full noun phrase produced by the disagreed-with person, instead of replacing it with a pronoun or anaphoric device.

In Persian, as in English, after the first mention of a referent, pronouns usually replace full noun phrases. Moreover, Persian is a pro-drop language in which the subject pronoun for all persons and numbers is usually deleted (Mahootian, 1997:206). However, the examination of the present data set reveals that in 44 instances of first disagreements (74.58%) the disagreeing person opts to use the full noun phrase employed by the disagreed-with speaker. Extract 3.25 exemplifies the point. As stated earlier, at this point of the discussion, one of the female participants (N) is arguing why girls may enter relationships other than marriage.

Extract 3.25

(Obstacles to a timely marriage I)

1. N khob dokhtarä.am vaqti ke: e::h masalan: ezdeväj- moqe'iate
DM girls.also when that for example marriage- opportunity
2. ezdeväj baräshun pish nemiäd .h belakhare majbur mi'šhan
marriage for them forward doesn't come finally forced (they) become
3. be [in raväbet.]
to this relations

khob because eh marriage opportunities don't come to girls, .h they have to finally settle for these relationships.

4. T → [dokhtaräam m]otma`eni moqe'iate ezdeväj
girls also (are) you sure opportunity marriage

5. baräshun pish [nemiäd?]
for them forward doesn't come
are you sure that marriage opportunities don't come to girls?

6. D [.h]
7. H [dokhtarä] baräshun
girls for them

8. [pish miäd.]
forward comes
they come to girls.

9. N [khob cher[ä;]
DM yes
khob yeah,

10. T [BA]RÄSHUN [PISH MIÄ:D,]
for them forward (it) comes
they come to them.

In lines 1-3, N asserts that girls have to settle for relationships other than marriage because there are no marriage opportunities for them. In the next turn (lines 4 and 5), using the rhetorical question *dokhtaräam motma`eni moqe'iate ezdeväj baräshun pish nemiäd?* 'are you sure marriage opportunities don't come to girls?', T disagrees with her. The two noun phrases *dokhtarä* 'girls' and *moqe'iate ezdeväj* 'marriage opportunities' may both appear redundant as T could alternatively ask *motma`eni baräshun pish nemiäd?* 'are you sure they don't come to them?'. The noun phrase *dokhtarä* 'girls,' which is in fact the object of the preposition *barä* 'to,' can be omitted because the pronominal clitic *shun* 'them', attached to the preposition *barä* 'to,' refers to 'girls.' And *moqe'iate ezdeväj* 'marriage opportunities,' which is the subject of the

subordinate clause *moqe'iate ezdeväj baräshun pish nemiäd* 'marriage opportunities don't come to them,' can also be dropped because it is already present in the FPP assertion in lines 1-3 and Persian is a null-subject language. Why does then T opt to keep them in her responsive turn?

One reason seems to be connecting her utterance to what N has uttered in the prior turn, a technique called format tying (Goodwin, 1990:177-181). In format tying, speakers tie or connect their utterance to the utterance produced by the prior speaker using strategies such as repetition, substitution or embedding the prior speaker's utterance within their own utterance. In the above extract, T repeats the word *dokhtarä* 'girls' and incorporates the clause *moqe'iate ezdeväj baräshun pish nemiäd* 'marriage opportunities don't come to them' into her own utterance to tie her disagreement with N's assertion in the prior turn.

A second reason is that T keeps these two seemingly redundant noun phrases to achieve epistemic primacy. In spoken Persian, in order to put special emphasis on an object of preposition, one can move the referent noun phrase of the object to the beginning of the sentence and attach its equivalent pronominal clitic to the preposition. This is what T does to lay emphasis on the word *dokhtarä* 'girls' about which N has made an assertion T takes issue with. As will be discussed in the next section, emphasizing a word and utilizing the same key words used in the FPP assertion seem to be two ways of claiming knowledge primacy in a disagreement sequence.

Note that repetition of the same key words is not limited to noun phrases. In the above extract, for instance, the prepositional phrase *baräshun* 'to them' can also be omitted. That is, T could alternatively ask *motma`eni pish nemiäd?* 'are you sure they don't come?'.
.

The high percentage of first-disagreement turns with the same key words and phrases used in their FPP assertions can allow us to consider this characteristic as a common feature of first-disagreement turns.

3.4.5 Epistemic valence

It has been argued that speakers in a conversation have their own territories of information (Kamio, 1997) or, according to Stivers & Rossano's (2010a) terminology, epistemic domains. As Heritage (2010:9, 2012:32) puts it, any two interactants in a conversation take up different positions on an epistemic gradient so that while one speaker is knowing or more knowledgeable (K+) with respect to a particular issue, the other is unknowing or less knowledgeable (K-). This relative positioning or epistemic status entails "what is known, how it is known (through what method, with what degree of definiteness, certainty, recency, etc.) and persons' rights, responsibilities and obligations to know it" (Heritage, 2013a:377).

A second notion related to epistemic domain is epistemic stance which refers to the moment-by-moment indication of epistemic status, achieved through the design of turns at talk (Heritage, 2012a:6, 2013a:377). Although epistemic stance is often congruent with epistemic status, speakers can exploit epistemic stance so as to appear more or less knowledgeable than they really are (Heritage, 2012b:33).

Conversation analytic research into epistemics has been mainly concerned with how interactants assert and defend their own knowledge claims and challenge those of others in and through turns and sequences in conversation (Heritage, 2013b: 555-556). Focusing on sequences occupied with agreement, a number of CA studies have sought to determine resources concerning sequential positioning and turn design that English speakers employ to encode epistemic primacy and subordination when making assertions and assessments. As for sequential positioning, while proffering an assertion/assessment in first position is suggestive of epistemic primacy, making an assertion/assessment in second position implies epistemic subordination due to sheer secondness (Heritage & Raymond, 2005:34; Stivers, 2005:133).

The implied epistemic primacy of first positioned assessments can then be downgraded through features of turn design. Two main resources to downgrade epistemic authority of first assessments are evidentials and tag questions (Heritage & Raymond, 2005). Evidentials (such as the verb *sound*) are indicative of mediated access to the assessable

or referent, thus demoting the authoritative claim made by the accompanying assessment. Tag questions that follow an assessment formulate the turn as a question to be answered and thus undermine the speaker's primary right to assess the referent (pp. 19-20).

There are also a number of practices to systematically upgrade the epistemic claims of a second assessment or assertion. One such practice is the use of partial/full modified repeats with a stressed copula or auxiliary as a way of confirming prior assertion (Stivers, 2005). Speakers can also deploy the confirmation plus agreement turn format (Heritage & Raymond, 2005:24) or oh-prefacing (Heritage, 2002a; Heritage & Raymond, 2005:26) to claim that they have previously and independently taken a position on the issue. Two further resources for raising the epistemic primacy of second assessments are tag questions and negative interrogatives as they form a new first pair part for the prior speaker to respond to, thus supplanting the first positioned assessment (Heritage & Raymond, 2005:28).

However, the above findings are all related to agreement environments in English conversations. It has not been demonstrated how speakers state knowledge claims in disagreement environments, whether in English or other languages. The investigation of the current data set shows that Persian-speaking producers of first-disagreements use a variety of resources to claim a higher knowledge position relative to their disagreed-with interlocutors. The following two extracts illuminate the point. Since disagreement can be a disaffiliative action, i.e. it may potentially threaten social solidarity (Heritage, 1984:269; Pomerantz, 1984:70), it can be accompanied by mitigating devices like hedges or other evidentials that are capable of downgrading epistemic authority (Chafe, 1986:270). Therefore, the following extracts have been chosen so as to typify both mitigated and unmitigated disagreements. The first extract which is part of a discussion on the role of scientific institutions in raising social awareness, participated by three male students, represents an unmitigated disagreement.

Extract 3.32

(Social awareness)

1. K khode dīn.am sābet karde ke na bā
 itself religion.also stable (it has) done that neither with
2. 'aql monāfati dāre na bā (.) 'elm monāfāt dāre.
 intellect incompatibility (it) has nor with science incompatibility (it) has
the religion itself has also proved that it's not incompatible with intellect or (.) science.
 .
 .
 ((11 lines in which K elaborates on the issue have been omitted.))
14. va siāsathāye nezāmi ke
 and policies of military that
15. un[: zamān eṭefāq miofte,]
 that time happening falls
and the military policies that happened at that time,
16. F [mishe tafāsiro qerā`at]häye jadidi az din
 it is possible interpretations.and readings new of religion
17. dāsht (.) k[e
 had that
It's possible to have new interpretations and readings of the religion that
18. K → [na::; bā hamun tafāsir, =bā hamun (.) qā`edatan
 no with same interpretation with same fundamentally
no, with the same interpretation, with the same (.), fundamentally
19. dīn °v° (.) in- (.) taghirpazir nīst.
 religion v this- changeable isn't
the religion isn't changeable.
20. fā:hm va bardāshte mā mobtani bar [inke in]=
 understanding and comprehension our based on this that this
21. B [=dīn: dar un zamān [va] makān kārboard dārad vase mā=
 religion in that time and place application has for us
23. B [.h]
24. K =motafāvet mishfan.
 different (they) become
our understanding and comprehension based on the fact that this religion has applications at a certain time and place become different.
25. (0.8)

In line 16, F asserts his opinion as to the possibility of having new interpretations and readings of the religion. By presenting this assertion which forms the FPP of an adjacency pair, he offers new information about the referent *religion*, thus taking a K+

position on the issue. However, he begins his utterance with the evidential expression *mishe* ‘it’s possible’ (Sadighi & Mobashshernia, 2012:8854), thereby downgrading the epistemic priority of this initial claim that might have been inferred because of its first positioning (Heritage & Raymond, 2005:19; Raymond & Heritage, 2006:687).

K’s response (lines 18-20, 22 and 24) which entails the SPP of the adjacency pair (line 18) is an unmitigated disagreement that begins with the negation particle *na* ‘no’. This disagreeing response is replete with signs of knowledge superiority. To upgrade his epistemic primacy, K elongates *na:::*, employs the same key words used by F (*tafsir* ‘interpretation’ and *din* ‘religion’), and lays stress on key words in his turn (*hamun* ‘same’, *din* ‘religion’, *taghirpazir* ‘changeable’, *nist* ‘isn’t’, *fa:hm* ‘understanding’, and *din* ‘religion’). Additionally, the adverb *qä’edatan* ‘fundamentally’ (line 18) in the beginning of his third TCU, i.e. *qä’edatan din* °v° (.) *in-* (.) *taghirpazir nist* ‘fundamentally the religion isn’t changeable’, emphasizes the basic truth of his statement, thus promoting his knowledge supremacy. Also, his elaboration on the issue (lines 20, 22 and 24) which presents additional knowledge of the matter further upgrades his epistemic position.

Comparing F’s initial claim and K’s subsequent disagreement in terms of epistemic primacy, we can see how K utilizes the key words to increase epistemic authority to upgrade his epistemic stance. We can now turn to the second extract which exemplifies a mitigated disagreement. The extract taken from the discussion on obstacles to a timely marriage starts at a point where S makes a general assertion or claim about boys. The interactants who are three female classmates have been talking about the advantages of getting married and starting a family as opposed to making friends from time to time before the extract starts.

Extract 3.33

(Obstacles to a timely marriage II)

- | | | | | | | | |
|----|---|----------------|--------------|---------------|-----------|-------|----------|
| 1. | S | .hh nemidunam | cherä- (0.2) | engär | pesarä | mese | dokhtarä |
| | | (I) don’t know | why | it looks like | boys | like | girls |
| 2. | | enqad | väsashun | in | <mohem | nist. | =ya’ni |
| | | this much | for them | this | important | isn’t | that is |
- .hh I don’t know why (0.2) it looks like this ((breaking up a relationship)) isn’t so important to the boys as it is to the girls. I mean**

3. [rähät] mitunan bä in kenär biän.>=
easily (they) can with this side (they) come
boys can easily come to terms with that.
4. P [kh!]
5. P 1st→ =e::h °man-° (0.2)
eh I
6. be nazare man dige- (0.2) alän sharäyet ye juri shode ke
to opinion I anymore now conditions one kind.IND become that
in my opinion (0.2) the conditions have now become such that
7. nemitunim begim .h (.)
(we) can't (we) say
we can't say .h (.)
8. beyne pešarä.o dokhtarä tu in zamine tafävat hast. =chon
between boys.and girls in this ground difference is because
there's a difference between boys and girls in this ground. Because
9. man .hh mm hälä (0.3) tuye: (0.3) aträfiäne khodam
I DM within people around myself
10. hälä- manzuram [bastegänam nist, duš]tä:=
DM my purpose my relatives isn't friends
I .hh mm (0.3) among (0.3) people around me, I don't mean my relatives, ((I mean)) friends
11. S [dustä::: °āshnähä°]
friends acquaintances
friends, acquaintances
12. P =āsh[nähä] .hhh mibinam=
acquaintances I see
acquaintances .hhh
13. M [uhum,]
uhum
14. P =ke vā:qe'an jadidan <doğhtarä:>.hh \$in khosusiati ke migim
that really recently girls this characteristic that (we) say
15. ʔbishtar darmoreqesh-\$ darmoredeshun sedq mikone. .hh ya'ni eh
more about about truth (it) does meaning
16. doğhtarä kheili rähattar peymānshekani mikonan tä pešarä.
girls much more easily breach of promise (they) do than boys
I see that this characteristic we're mentioning is really more true of girls. .hh I mean, girls break promises much more easily than boys.
17. är[e; q]abul dāram; vali miduni chiye;=

yeah acceptance (I) have but you know what is
yeah, I agree. but you know what?

In lines 1 and 2, S claims that getting married seems not to be so important to boys as it is to girls and then, in line 3, she rephrases her statement to make her point clear. The implication of this claim is that getting married and living with a certain person rather than making friends from time to time is very important to girls. This is a general statement about girls and given that both S and her recipients are female, it is expected that all be knowledgeable of the issue. Since the issue (making friends from time to time) has not been jointly experienced, i.e. they have had independent access to the matter in question, making a first assertion can imply epistemic primacy over the issue (Heritage, 2002a:200). However, S designs her turn so as to downgrade the claim of epistemic priority. As in line 1, S begins her turn with *nemidunam cherä* ‘I don’t know why’, indicating her lack of knowledge concerning the reason of what she is going to assert, and then uses the word *engär* ‘it looks like’, reducing the reliability of her assertion (Chafe, 1986:267; Stivers, 2005:138).

In the next turn, lines 5-10, by saying *nemitunim begim .h (.) beyne p̄saräo dokhtarä tu in zamine tafävot hast* ‘we can’t say there’s a difference between boys and girls in this ground’ (lines 7 and 8), P disagrees with S. Although the expression *be nazare man* ‘in my opinion’, in the beginning of P’s turn (line 6) is an evidential marker (Chafe, 1986:266) that downgrades knowledge primacy (Heritage & Raymond, 2005:19; Raymond & Heritage, 2006:687), she deploys a wide variety of resources to indicate her superior knowledge of the issue. First of all, the adverb of time *alän* ‘now’ in the beginning of her sentential TCU (lines 6-8) that encompasses the disagreeing component of her answer marks the recency of her knowledge, an indicator of epistemic primacy (Heritage, 2013a:377). Second, by referring to the change in the conditions (line 6), she indexes her knowledge of the fact that a) the issue is under the influence of conditions and b) these conditions are not in line with S’s assertion, thus laying claim to further information about the matter. Third, by offering an account for her disagreement (lines 8-10, 12, and 14-16), P presents supportive information for her

position and therefore upgrades her knowledge supremacy¹⁹. Fourth, she designs her account so that she can achieve additional epistemic primacy. She bases her account on those she has primary rights to evaluate (her friends and acquaintances) (Heritage, 2002a:213, Heritage & Raymond, 2006) and about whom she has recent, first-hand knowledge (her knowledge comes from her visual access rather than hearsay) (Raymond & Heritage, 2006:684). Moreover, she puts stress on key words and phrases (*chon* ‘because’, *aträfiäne khodam* ‘people around myself’, and *dokhtarä* ‘girls’) (Heritage, 2002a:207) and/or elongates them (*dustä*: ‘friends’, *vä:qe’an* ‘really’, and *dokhtarä*: ‘girls’). When uttering the word *dokhtarä* ‘girls’, in addition to using stress and elongation, she reduces the pace of her talk to achieve the optimum effect.

Although P initially downgrades her epistemic primacy for the sake of cultural considerations, deep into the turn she employs various devices to claim epistemic superiority over the issue. As will be discussed in Chapter 7, this contradictory behavior indicates the complexity of the action performed.

As the analysis of the above two extracts illustrates, the speakers who express disagreement in response to an initial claim demonstrate to be more knowledgeable than their disagreed-with interlocutors with respect to the issues in question. Taking a superior knowledge position involves offering new knowledge of the issue, providing accounts, and/or using linguistic resources associated with epistemic supremacy such as emphatic prosody or emphatic expressions and using the same key words as in the FPP assertions.

3.4.6 SPP prosodic features

CA research on prosody has been mainly focused on how prosodic features are used in taking turns at talk (see e.g., Ford & Thompson, 1996; Selting, 2000; Fox, 2001) and how they signal the relationships within and between TCUs (see e.g., Goldberg, 1978, 2004; Couper-Kuhlen, 2004a; Local & Walker, 2004). There are also CA studies investigating the role of prosody in action formation. Selting (1996) demonstrates how

¹⁹ As demonstrated by Mondada (2009:345, 347), a way of claiming epistemic primacy in second-positioned assessments is using accounts.

in German conversations participants orient to prosodic features of pitch and loudness to construct and interpret unmarked initiations of repair which are due to the problems of hearing or understanding versus marked initiations of repair which are due to the problems of expectations. Analyzing a telephone conversation, Schegloff (1998) demonstrates how stress is used to create contrastive situations that imply an implicit compliment followed by an implicit rejection. As Schegloff (1998:243) puts it, speakers can also employ prosodic features to show “stance, mood, uptake, or reaction, and the like”. Couper-Kuhlen (2004b), for instance, demonstrates how troubles-telling or complaint recipients use pitch change while uttering *never mind* to express either empathy or an optimistic stance towards the trouble (pp. 221-222).

In the present data set, the salient prosodic feature of first-disagreement turns seems to be stress which is present in 38 (64.4%) turns. Although elongation and loudness can also be found in the data, due to their sporadic presence (there are seven turns with elongation of a vowel or a consonant and three turns with loudness of a syllable or word), they are not considered as a common prosodic feature of these turns.

As the examination of the data shows, emphatic accent has a contrastive function which in turn seems to be mostly in the service of claiming epistemic primacy. Extract 3.33 above can well illuminate this function. In S’s FPP assertion in lines 1 and 2, i.e. *engār pesarā mese dokhtarā enqad vāsashun in mohem nist* ‘it looks like this isn’t so important to the boys as it is to the girls’, there is no stress on the word *pesarā* ‘boys’ about which the claim has been made. By contrast, in P’s disagreeing response, i.e. *be nazare man dige- (0.2) alān sharāyet ye juri shode ke nemitunim begim .h (.) beyne pēsārāo dokhtarā tu in zamīne tafāvot hast* ‘in my opinion (0.2) the conditions have now become such that we can’t say .h (.) there’s a difference between boys and girls in this ground’ the same word has been stressed.²⁰ The stress here emphasizes the contrasting view about *boys*.

²⁰ In Persian, stress can be put on any element of the sentence for a special effect (Yarmohammadi, 2002:158).

Other instances of emphatic accent in P’s turn which are also used to show contrast seem to upgrade epistemic primacy as well. The noun phrase *aträfiāne khodam* ‘people around me’ (line 9) is emphasizing that the speaker is talking about *people around her* not about *people not close to her* or *people around others*. Note that while ordinarily one word in a phrase receives the primary stress, both *aträfiāne* and *khodam* are accented. Likewise, the noun phrase *dokhtarä* ‘girls’ in lines 14 and 16 emphasizes *girls* as opposed to *boys*. Since in the present data set these emphasized words are frequently found in accounts and elaborations that accompany a disagreeing view, it can be seen that emphatic accent is an additional resource for claiming knowledge primacy.

In sum, stress appears to be a common prosodic characteristic of first-disagreement turns and is used to show contrast and/or epistemic superiority.

3.4.7 Single/multi-TCU turns

As maintained by Sacks et al. (1974:703), at each transition-relevance place speaker change can occur. This means that each speaker is at first entitled to produce a single TCU. However, based on the rule 1c of turn taking, if at a transition relevance place neither the current speaker selects a next speaker nor other speakers self-select, then the current speaker can continue the talk and produce an extended or multi-TCU turn (p. 704).

The examination of the present data set shows that the majority of first-disagreement turns (72.88%, i.e. 43 out of 59) are made up of multi-TCUs. The extracts below provide examples for both single-TCU and multi-TCU disagreements. Extract 3.23 presents a first disagreement made up of a single TCU.

Extract 3.23

(Religion in society)

- | | | | | | | | | |
|----|---|----------|---------|----------|---------|-------------|----------|--------|
| 1. | M | .h din | vaqti- | ghani | bäshe, | vaqti | betune | tamäme |
| | | religion | when | rich | is | when | (it) can | all |
| 2. | | päso- | ya’ni | niäzhäye | ensäno | päsokhgu | bäshe, | |
| | | accou- | meaning | needs of | man.DOM | accountable | be | |
- .h when religion is rich ((accountable to all of man’s questions)), when it can be accountable to all of man’s needs,**

3. (0.2)
4. S → tamām ke nemishe goft.=
all that (it)'s impossible said
we can't say all.
5. M =tamām- bebinid, vaqtike *de:*(0.4) khob barnāme dārim.
all- look when re:: DM program we have
all- look, when (0.4) *khob* there's a program.

As in the extract, S's disagreement with the adverb clause of M's utterance in lines 1 and 2, i.e. 'when it can be accountable to all of man's needs', consists of the single TCU 'we can't say all' (line 4). This single-TCU disagreement looks like a repair (other-initiated, other-repaired) as the disagreeing party (S) finds a single word, i.e. all, in M's utterance as the source of problem and attempts to show his disagreement just with that very word not the whole proposition of M's utterance. On the other hand, as can be seen in lines 4 and 5, upon the completion of S's TCU, M takes the turn to defend his own position.

In contrast to the above extract, Extract 3.33, exemplifies a multi-unit first disagreement.

Extract 3.33

(Obstacles to a timely marriage II)

1. S .hh nemidunam cherā- (0.2) engār pesarā mese dokhtarā
(I) don't know why it looks like boys like girls
2. enqad vāsashun in <mohem nist. =ya'ni
this much for them this important isn't that is
.hh I don't know why (0.2) it looks like this (breaking up a relationship) isn't so important to the boys as it is to the girls. I mean
3. [rāhat] mitunan bā in kenār biān.>=
easily (they) can with this side (they) come
boys can easily come to terms with that.
4. P [kh!]
5. P 1st→ =e:h °man-° (0.2)
eh I
6. be nazare man dige- (0.2) alān sharāyet ye juri shode ke
to opinion I anymore now conditions one kind.IND become that

in my opinion (0.2) the conditions have now become such that

7. nemitunim begim .h (.)
(we) can't (we) say
we can't say .h (.)
8. beyne p̄sarā.o dokhtarā tu in zamine tafāvot hast. =chon
between boys.and girls in this ground difference is because
there's a difference between boys and girls in this ground. Because
9. man .hh mm hālā (0.3) tuye: (0.3) atrāfiāne khōdam
I DM within people around myself
10. hālā- manzuram [bastegānam nist, du]tā:=
DM my purpose my relatives isn't friends
I .hh mm (0.3) among (0.3) people around me, I don't mean my relatives, (I mean) friends
11. S [dustā:: °āshnāhā°]
friends acquaintances
friends, acquaintances
12. P =āsh[nāhā] .hhh mibinam=
acquaintances I see
acquaintances .hhh
13. M [uhum,]
uhum
14. P =ke vā:qe'an jadidan <dokhtarā:>.hh \$in khosusiati ke migim
that really recently girls this characteristic that (we) say
15. l̄bishtar darmoreqesh-\$ darmoredeshun sedq mikone .hh ya'ni eh
more about about truth (it) does meaning
16. dokhtarā kheili rāhattar peymānshekani mikonan tā pesarā.
girls much more easily breach of promise (they) do than boys
I see that this characteristic we're mentioning is really more true of girls. .hh I mean, girls break promises much more easily than boys.
17. ār[e; q]abul dāram; vali miduni chiyeꞌ=
yeah acceptance (I) have but you know what is
yeah, I agree. but you know what?

In this extract, P's disagreement with S's assertion concerning how boys feel about breaking up a relationship (lines 1 & 2) is consisted of 5 TCUs (lines 5-10, 12, and 14-16): 1) in my opinion (0.2) the conditions have now become such that we can't say .h (.) there's a difference between boys and girls in this ground, 2) I .hh mm (0.3) among (0.3) people around me (I mean) friends, acquaintances, 3) I don't mean my relatives,

4) I see that this characteristic we're mentioning is really more true of girls, 5) I mean, girls break promises much more easily than boys.

In order to produce a multi-TCU turn, P employs a variety of methods: she rushes through one TCU to the next (line 8), uses a slightly rising intonation at the end of a TCU to project further talk to follow (line 10), breathes in audibly at the beginning of a TCU (lines 12 & 15), and uses a prospective indexical (this characteristic) (line 14), that requires further talk to make its reference clear (Goodwin, 1996:18).

As can be seen here, as opposed to Extract 3.23 in which the disagreeing party (S) produces a single TCU to express his disagreement with a single idea, in Extract 3.33, the disagreeing party (P) considers it necessary to legitimize his opposite view by presenting supportive information. Taking into account that we are dealing with academic discussions, the high percentage of multi-TCU first-disagreements seems to be reasonable as the disagreeing turns are usually inclusive of supportive information, elaborations and accounts to show epistemic superiority over the initial assertions. Moreover, as maintained in earlier CA studies (see, e.g., Heritage, 1984:266-267; Schegloff, 2007:65-69), elaborations and accounts can serve the function of mitigating a dispreferred response as they break the contiguity of first and second pair parts. As a result, whenever they precede the actual disagreeing TCU, they play two roles: mitigating the dispreferred response and enabling the speaker to claim epistemic superiority.²¹

3.4.8 Use of address terms

Previous research has shown that address terms can frequently be found in responsive turns. Within the context of casual conversations among family members and friends, address terms (first names, diminutives of first names, or figurative kinship terms) are seen to be used as a device for mitigating the disaffiliative impact of taking an opposite position (Tannen and Kakava, 1992; Kakava, 2002).

²¹ This issue will be attended to in detail in Chapter 7.

In news interview settings, as demonstrated by Rendle-Short (2007a, 2007b) and Clayman (2010, 2012), address terms serve a variety of functions. As for the use of address terms in responsive turns, whereas pre-positioned address terms can enable the politicians to take the turn and force the interviewer into reciprocity while the interviewer is still in the middle of a TCU, mid-positioned address terms can be used by either the politician or the interviewer to resolve overlapping talk and achieve reciprocity²² (Rendle-Short, 2007a:1514). Apart from gaining reciprocity, pre-positioned (Clayman, 2010:170) and mid-positioned address terms (Rendle-Short, 2007a:1518; Clayman, 2010:170) are frequently employed by politicians to delay and thus mitigate dispreferred responses. Post-positioned address terms, by contrast, are commonly used by both interviewers and politicians to demonstrate their positive attitude and regard towards the other person (Rendle-Short, 2007a:1520). Clayman (2012:173), however, argues that post-positioned address terms are frequently employed by interviewees to show that they are speaking sincerely.

In a similar study focusing on turn-initial address terms produced by politicians in response to journalists' yes/no questions, Rendle-Short (2011) demonstrates that, apart from showing friendliness and intimacy with the journalist, the address terms can play three other functions: challenging the yes/no question in the prior turn, signaling an upcoming non-conforming response, and giving the responsive turn first status in the sequence.

In the present data set, however, there are only five instances of address terms appearing in first-disagreement turns, used to show regard towards the disagreed-with person and/or attenuating the force of disagreement. Of these, three are appended to the TCU that forms the main disagreement component, as in Extract 3.31 above. The other two appear in the middle of the TCU entailing partial agreement expressed prior to the main disagreement component. Extract 3.34 below illustrates the point.

²² In Australian news interview settings, while interviewers usually address politicians either by their institutional role (e.g. Prime Minister) or by their title plus last name (e.g. Mr Latham), politicians always address interviewers by their first name (e.g. John) (Rendle-Short, 2007a).

Extract 3.34

(Religion in society)

1. S ya'ni adyän ham (.) mikhäm begam adyän ham (.) eh be har
 meaning religions too I want to (I) say religions too to any
2. häl ye maqta'e zamäni (0.2) dâ:ran.
 condition a section of temporal (they) have
meaning, religions (.) I want to say (.) eh in any case religions too are good for a certain period of time.
3. A na[zariätam kämel mishan.]
 theories also complete (they) become
theories are made complete too.
4. S [dar gozare zam]än bāyad inä .h yä: (.) yä qābeliate
 in passing of time should these either either capability of
5. en'tāfpa[ziri dāshte bāsh'ān,] ke āpdeyt=
 flexibility have (they) be that update
in the passing of time they should either (.) either be flexible,
6. M [be ruz resāni beshan.]
 to day conveying (they) become
they (should) be updated.
7. S =beshan, be ruz beshan, .h [yā age] i' qābeliate ro=
 (they) become to day (they) become or if this capability DOM
to be updated, to be up to date, .h or if they don't have this capability,
8. M [dorose,]
 that's right
that's right.
9. S =nadāran, bāyad beran kenār jāshuno be (0.3)
 (they) don't have should (they) go aside their place DOM to
they should go away (and) give their place to (0.3)
10. M a[dyän]
 religions
11. S [dine] jadid yä afkār jadid bedan ke beruztaran,
 religion new or thoughts new (they) give that (they) are more up to date
a new religion or new thoughts that are more up to date,
12. va jāme'e ro monsajectar mikonan.
 and society DOM more coherent (they) make
and make the society more coherent.
- .
 .
 ((Five lines omitted.))

18. S .hh i'-(0.3) eh qābeliate en'etāf age nadāshte bāshan, (0.3)
 this eh capability of flexibility if haven't got (they) be
.hh if (0.3) they don't have this flexibility, (0.3)
19. khob (.) to mikhāy chejuri: niāzhāye jadide kojā
 DM you want how needs of new DOM where
20. ta'rif koni. =chejur (0.4) barāvard koni.
 definition (you) do how estimate (you) do
khob (.) how are you going to define (man's) new needs? how (0.4) (are you going) to estimate (them)?
21. (.)
22. dar: qālebe ideolozhike (0.5) dar vāqe' az: zamān gozashte.=
 in framework of ideology of in reality from time past
in the framework of an (0.5) actually out-of-date ideology.
23. M → =khob ino alān: āqāye Sārami, ini ke shomā migid doroste,
 DM this.DOM DM Mr Sārami this that you (you) say right is
khob this, Mr Sarami, what you say is right,
24. din bāyad be ruz beshe. din bāyad ye .h baste be
 religion should to day becomes religion should one depending to
the religion should be kept up to date.
25. sharāyete zamānic khodesh (0.2)
 conditions temporal is itself
depending on its temporal conditions (0.2) religion should .h
26. S javābgu=
 accountable
accountable
27. M =javābgu bāshe. daqiqan. in doroste. .hh vali khob e:h
 accountable (it) be exactly this right is but DM
be accountable. exactly. that's right. .hh but khob eh
28. bebinid eh (1.2) chi- chi mikhāstam begam, din (03) bas-
 look eh what what (I) wanted (I) say religion dep-
look eh (1.2) what did I want to say? religion (0.3) dep-
29. man migam bastegi be din dāre.
 I (I) say dependence to religion has
I say it depends on the religion.
30. (0.2)
31. ke āqā faqir bāshe yā ghani.
 that DM poor (it) be or reach
whether it's poor or rich.

In lines 4, 5, 7, 9, 11 and 12 of the above extract, S asserts that religions should be kept up to date; otherwise, they should be replaced by new religions or thoughts. And then in the following lines he elaborates on his opinion. In the next turn (lines 23-25 and 27-31), M disagrees with him. As can be seen in line 23, M's disagreement is prefaced with the partial agreement '*khob* this, Mr Sarami, what you say is right' that contains a mid-positioned address term. Taking into account that before producing the address term, M has gained S's reciprocity (although S has been gazing at A while expressing the last words of his last TCU, he shifts his gaze toward M as he starts speaking and M is aware of this because he is gazing at S) the use of the address term in the middle of the TCU seems to be a way of displaying regard towards the addressee and further mitigating an upcoming disaffiliative response.

Comparing this extract with Extract 3.31, it appears that in Extract 3.31 the address term serves the same function of abiding by *ta'arof* conventions; as long before the production of the address term reciprocity has been established, the address term seems to be a resource to show regard towards the addressee despite having a contrary view. The only difference is that in Extract 3.34 the mid-positioning of the address term postpones the dispreferred part of the turn, i.e. the disagreement component.

Although address terms could occur in the beginning of a TCU and could serve the function of gaining reciprocity or resolving overlapping talk, in the present data set, all the address terms found in first-disagreement turns are either mid- or post-positioned and used to pay respect to the disagreed-with person and/or softening the force of disagreement. This may be due to the limited number of address term tokens.

3.5 Conclusion

As a preliminary step to see how disagreement emerges in academic discussions, this chapter mainly focused on the characteristics of first-disagreement turns. In the current data set all first disagreements appeared to be responsive to an initial assertion. The interactants used a variety of ways to express opposition, ranging from adding negative

particles to the initial assertion or deleting them from the assertion to using rhetorical questions. A great majority of these disagreements started either in a reduced transition space or at a point of maximal incompleteness of the prior turn. The urgent onset of these disagreements can be due to the multiparty nature of the discussions and the interactants' preference to correct the problem identified in the initial assertion as soon as possible.

Showing a greater epistemic valence compared to the initial assertion was found to be the ever-present feature of first disagreements. This finding is indeed a major contribution of the present study to the understanding of how disagreement is done. It was also found that a high majority of first-disagreement turns were made up of multi-TCUs as they included accounts, elaborations, and other supportive information that while helping to justify an opposite position were in fact in the service of claiming epistemic superiority over the initial assertion. Use of emphatic accent and repetition of the same key words as in the initial assertions proved to be two other characteristic features of first disagreements. As with multi-TCU structure, these two features work to secure epistemic primacy over the initial assertion.

Chapter 4

The properties of assertions leading to a first disagreement

4.1 Introduction

As a preliminary step to understanding the emergence of disagreement in conversation, Chapter 3 discussed the features of first-disagreement turns. The present chapter will take a step back and focus on assertions that lead to the appearance of first disagreements. The first question to focus on is where these assertions are likely to appear or, in other words, what sequential environments are capable of fostering disagreements.

In their observations on other-correction, Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks (1977:380) point to the fact that disagreement can be taken as an act of other-correction and maintain that “unlike other-initiation of repair– which, in its proper position (next turn) is unrestricted in its privilege of occurrence– other-correction is highly constrained in its occurrence.”²³ They exemplify the story-telling sequence as an environment in which disagreement can occur. In this instance, one of the recipients of an unfolding story makes use of other-correction as an offer to be the co-teller of the story (p. 380). Schegloff et al. (1977) make the point that, though restricted, the occurrence of disagreement is dependent on the interactional environment. Therefore, the first objective of this chapter is determining whether, in the context of academic discussions, disagreement has a constrained occurrence or it can appear anywhere in the discussion. To answer this question, the environments in which assertions leading to first disagreements appear will be examined. Section 4.2 of this chapter will thus focus on the above question.

The second major question addressed in this chapter is whether it is the property of conditional relevance or turn-design features of these assertions that stimulate a

²³ As stated by Schegloff et al. (1977:381-382), an evident exception to the restricted use of other-correction is adult-child interaction in which other-correction is a means of socialization.

disagreeing response. As stated earlier in chapter 3, section 3.2, in early CA research the production of a response is justified in the light of the property of conditional relevance (Schegloff, 1968, 2007; Schegloff & Sacks, 1973) which states that the occurrence of an action in sequence-initial position (FPP) makes relevant the production of a specific, second action (SPP). In her research on second assessments, Pomerantz (1984) uses the property of conditional relevance to account for the production of agreements/disagreements. She considers participants' mutual knowledge of a state of affair as the precondition of response production.

More recently, Stivers & Rossano (2010a) demonstrate that first assessments do not normatively mobilize a response. They make a distinction between canonical and noncanonical actions. Canonical actions including offers, requests for information and requests for actions, as Stivers & Rossano (2010a) maintain, normatively require a type-fitted response. In other words, they make a response conditionally relevant. Noncanonical actions including assessments, noticings and announcements do not always make a response conditionally relevant. To demonstrate that, as a noncanonical action, assessments do not normatively require a response, they provide examples of first assessments not being followed by a response (a second assessment), showing the absence of the response has not been treated as problematic (for an example presented by Stivers & Rossano, see Chapter 3, section 3.2). This means that conditional relevance cannot provide an adequate explanation for the production of second assessments. As Stivers & Rossano (2010a) argue, apart from action and sequential position, specific turn design features of interrogative lexico-morphosyntax, interrogative prosody, participants' knowledge asymmetry, and speaker gaze can increase the possibility of response production. This is because these turn design features make the recipient of a first assessment more accountable to produce a response.

Taking into account that the literature on the production of disagreement relates to assessments whereas in the present data set all FPPs resulting in a first disagreement are assertions rather than assessments, section 4.3 will consider this second question of whether in the context of academic discussions it is the property of conditional

relevance and/or turn design features of assertions that lead to disagreement production.

4.2 Environments in which assertions leading to first disagreements appear

In her examination of assessments, Pomerantz (1984:58) simply argues that first assessments come into existence as a result of speakers participating in social activities and reporting the experience. A more detailed description of the environments in which FPP assessments appear has been presented by Heritage & Raymond (2005). Distinguishing between first assessments and second assessments, Heritage & Raymond (2005:16) state:

First position assessments commonly emerge in environments that have been made “ripe” for them in various ways. For example, another speaker has made observations which clearly imply a particular evaluative stance towards the entity under discussion and which may trigger the production of an assessment. First positioned assessments are distinctive in that they take an explicit, on-record evaluative stance that is available to be agreed with or disagreed with in next turn. First positioned assessments do not “agree” or “disagree” with the previous comments that lead up to them, though they may be aligned or disaligned with the tenor of those comments.

Pomerantz (1984) and Heritage & Raymond’s (2005) descriptions relate to FPP assessments, not FPP assertions. Nevertheless, they provide us with a good starting point. In the present data set, assertions leading to first disagreements are seen to appear in one of the following four environments:

- a) A speaker makes an assertion when entering a discussion about a particular issue (Type 1 environment).
- b) A speaker makes an assertion about an issue in response to a question (Type 2 environment).
- c) A speaker makes an assertion while defending their disagreed with opinion (Type 3 environment).
- d) A speaker re-presents another speaker’s assertion (Type 4 environment).

The table below shows the number and percentage of the assertions appearing in each of these environments:

Table 4.1 Frequency and percentage of assertions leading to first-disagreements

First-disagreement environment	Frequency of assertions	Percentage of assertions
Type 1	43	72.88
Type 2	10	16.95
Type 3	4	6.78
Type 4	2	3.39

It is worth noting that while environments a, b and c all present the first mention of an assertion, environment d re-presents a first-mention assertion. Each of these environments will be exemplified in the following sub-sections.

4.2.1 Presenting an assertion when entering a discussion (Type 1 environment)

In the present data set, the majority of assertions (43 out of 59 or 72.88%) leading to a first disagreement are seen to be produced as a speaker first enters a discussion about a particular issue. Extract 4.1, taken from the six-party discussion on obstacles to a timely marriage, exemplifies this type of environment.

Extract 4.1

(Obstacles to a timely marriage I)

1. H khānevādehā alān miʔgan .hhh
families now say (they)
now families say .hhh
2. B kh[ob]
DM
khob
3. H [az] hamun aval shomā bāyad [injuri bāshin.]
from same first you should like this be
you should be like this ((what it is to live comfortably)) from the beginning ((of your marriage)).
4. B [hāmin dige,] =eshkāl
this same DM problem
5. [kār hāmine.]
work this same is
that's it. that's the very problem.
6. N [khānevāde]hā [injuri]
families like this

the families

7. H [khānevāde]hā khodeshun ba'de bist sāl
families themselves after twenty year
8. si sāl be in residan,
thirty year to this reachedn
9. va[li alan mikhān ba'de ye mäh do mäh]
but now want (they) after one month two month
families themselves have reached this ((state of living comfortably)) after twenty or thirty years, but they want ((their children to live comfortably)) after one or two months.
10. B [vali mikhān ` bachehä az ebtedä]
but want (they) children from beginning
11. dā[shte bāshan.]=
have be (they)
but they want their children to have everything from the beginning ((of their marriage)).
12. T [daghighan.]=
exactly
exactly.
13. N =nemikhān bachehäshun ye khorde sakhti bekeshe; =o:-
(they) don't want their children one bit hardship pull and
they don't want their children to suffer any hardship, and
14. N → in kāreshun bā'es mishe ke bachehä (.)
this their act cause becomes that children
15. lus: bār biān.=
spoiled burden come (they)
families' not wanting children to suffer hardship causes children (.) to be spoiled.
16. B =vāqe'an lus [°bār biān.°]
really spoiled burden come (they)
be really spoiled.
17. N [pesarā]shun gheyre: e:m mas`uliatpazir
their sons non em responsibility.accepting
18. bār (.) nayān.=
burden not come (they)
((This means that)) sons are not (.) brought up um with a sense of responsibility.
19. C =mitunim be [ye forme dige ham negā] konim.= na;=
(we) can to one form of another also look (we) do no
we can look in a different way too. no,
20. B [dokhtarā ham hamintor.]
girls also so
girls aren't either ((they aren't brought up with a sense of responsibility)).

21.	C	=man	bä	in	moväfeq	nistam .h	ke	masalan	
		I	with	this	agreed	(I)'m not	that	for example	
22.		pedar	mädar	bekhäd	lus:	bär	biäre	farzandi	masalan
		father	mother	wants	spoiled	burden	brings	a child	for example
									Rä,
									DOM
									I don't agree .h that parents want to, say, spoil their children.

In lines 1 and 3, H presents the assertion that nowadays families expect their children to have everything from the beginning of their marriage. Following B's agreement with this assertion (lines 4 & 5), H further elaborates on the issue (lines 7-9). However, as overlapped by B (line 9) stating the same idea, H drops out and lets B complete his assertion. As can be seen from lines 10-13, upon the completion of B's turn repeating the same assertion, which is synchronized with the completion of T's confirmatory remark (line 12), N takes the turn (line 13) and produces two TCUs. Her first TCU, i.e. *nemikhän bachehäshun ye khorde sakhti bekeshe* 'they don't want their children to suffer any hardship' (line 13), can be interpreted as the reason behind H's assertion in lines 1 and 3. However, her second TCU, i.e. *in käreshun bä'es mishe ke bachehä lus bär biän* 'families' not wanting children to suffer hardship causes children to be spoiled' (lines 14 and 15), while aligned with the tenor of H's assertion, presents a new assertion. As can be seen in lines 19, 21, and 22, it is with this new assertion that C disagrees. So, N's new assertion in lines 14 and 15 makes the FPP of an adjacency pair whose SPP is C's disagreement in lines 19, 21 and 22.

Note that as the apparent reason why families want their children to have everything from the beginning of their marriage (H's assertion in lines 1, 3 and 9, jointly completed by B in lines 10 and 11), N's first TCU, i.e. 'they don't want their children to suffer any hardship,' despite being a first-mention assertion, doesn't seem to be presenting anything new. That is to say, everybody takes it for granted that families want their children to have everything from the beginning of their marriage because they don't want them to suffer any hardship. Considering the fact that while N's second TCU (lines 14 and 15) results in C's disagreement (lines 19, 21 and 22), her first TCU is not responded to, it can be suggested that it is the *newness* of the second assertion in lines 14 and 15 that makes the appearance of a disagreement more likely.

The effect of a *new* assertion on stimulating a disagreement is also demonstrated in the extract below in which the first mention of an assertion follows the speaker's overt agreement with the prior speaker's position. The extract has been taken from the discussion on suicide, participated by four female students. It starts at a point where H brings the tragic story of a girl whose parents didn't give her the permission to marry her lover to an end. H is recounting the story as an instance of social issues relating to suicide.

Extract 4.2

(Suicide)

1. H ... belakhare dokhtare khaste mishe khodkoshi mikone, .h pesare
 finally the girl tired becomes suicide (she) does the boy
finally the girl kills herself because she loses hope, .h
2. ham be khātere: in dokhtare .h asan: be un hālate
 also to sake of this the girl basically to that state of
3. jonuno afsordegi mirese .h ke (0.4) alān vaz'iyatesh be
 madness and depression reaches that now his condition to
4. shekli shode ke kārtonkhāb dākhele khiābunā shode.
 form.IND become that street dweller inside of streets become
and the girl's suicide drives the boy so mad and depressed that he's a street dweller now.
5. (0.7)
6. E āre dige, hamintore;= yani- m kheyli vakhtā moshkelāte
 yeah DM it is so meaning many times problems of
7. ejtemā'ie dige,= eq- moshkelāte eqtesādiam ye bakhshē kheyli
 social is DM ec- problems of economic also a part of very
8. 'om:deishe.= ya 'ni .hh vāqe'an pul ke nabāshe kheyli az
 chief is meaning actually money that NEG. SBJN.be a lot of
9. moshkelāte masalan ravāni pish miād barā afrād.
 problems of let's say mental forward comes for persons
yeah, it is so. I mean, many a time people attempt suicide because of social problems. economic problems too are a chief reason of suicide. I mean .hh people actually run into many, let's say, psychological problems when they're penniless.
10. (0.6)
11. H → .h pul doroste; tā ye hadi man qabul dāram pulo; vali
 money right is to one extent I acceptance I have money.DOM but
.h that's right about money, to some extent I agree with you about money, but
12. be nazare man agar khānevādehā sa'y konan .h sharāyete
 to opinion of I if families effort do (they) conditions of
13. ezdevājo vāse: dokhtaro pesareshun rāhattar konan,
 marriage.DOM for daughter and their son easier do (they)

in my opinion, if families try to .h make marriage conditions easier for their children,

14. tavaqo'äto ye zare pä[ntar bi]äran, .h be nazare man=
 expectations.DOM one bit lower bring (they) to opinion of I
(and) lower (their) expectations a bit, .h in my opinion
15. Z [daqiqan.]
 exactly
exactly.
16. H =intori r: moshkel hal mishe. =dige ämäre khodkoshiam
 this way r: problem solution becomes anymore statistics of suicide also
17. taqriban [däkhele bahse 'eshqo 'äsheqi päin] miäd.
 nearly inside of discussion of love and lovesickness down comes
the problem is solved. the rate of suicide among lovers ((due to economic problems)) comes down too.

Here, after H finishes her story (line 2), E takes the turn and produces a multi-TCU turn (lines 6-9). In her first TCU, i.e. *äre dige* 'yeah', she demonstrates her agreement with the gist of H's story, and then with her second TCU, *hamintore* 'it is so', confirms it. Her third TCU, i.e. *kheili vakhtä moshkeläte ejtemä'ie dige* 'many a time people attempt suicide because of social problems', is just a re-statement of the assertion already made by a previous speaker (Z) (about one and a half minutes prior to the start of this extract) and exemplified with H's story. So, it is not taken as a new assertion and as can be seen from the extract is not responded to. However, her fourth TCU, *moshkeläte eqtesädiam ye bakshe kheyli 'om:deishe* 'economic problems too are a chief reason of suicide', is a new assertion. This assertion is then explained in E's fifth TCU, *ya'ni väqe'an pul ke nabäshe kheili az moshkeläte masalan raväni pish miäd barä afräd* 'I mean .hh people actually run into many, let's say, psychological problems when they're penniless', latched into her fourth TCU. As can be seen in lines 11-14, this new assertion constitutes the FPP of an adjacency pair because it is with this new assertion that H disagrees in the next turn. So, as with Extract 4.1, in this extract the *newness* of the assertion appears to be a key point in stimulating a disagreeing response.

The examination of the 43 assertions belonging to Type 1 environment shows that they are all new assertions. That is to say, they present new information rather than already stated or taken-for-granted information.

4.2.2 Presenting an assertion in response to a question (Type 2 environment)

Alternatively, assertions leading to first disagreements are produced in response to questions (10 out of 59 or 17%). Previous research on questions in arguments shows that participants employ uncontroversial questions to ‘entice’ a known-in-common answer from their opponent to subsequently challenge them on the basis of their own response (Gruber, 2001; Reynolds, 2011). The current study, however, shows that participants ask questions with a challenging function to elicit a response from their recipient that can subsequently be disagreed with. As a result, the assertions produced in response to such questions play a double function: on the one hand, they form the SPP answer to the FPP question, and on the other hand, they are the FPP assertion to a SPP disagreement. An important point to note is that, since these assertions are produced in response to a question, they present new information, a characteristic which makes them similar to the assertions in Type 1 environment. The extracts below illustrate the point. Extract 4.3, taken from the five-party discussion on the issue of globalization provides the first example. Before the extract starts, N has been talking about making the world homogeneous.

Extract 4.3

(Globalization II)

- | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-----|--|------------|---------|---------|------------|---------|--------------|------|----------|-----|
| 1. | A | chejuri | mikhäy | bar | che | mabnä`i | | mikhäy | hame | ro (0.2) | ye |
| | | how | you want | on | what | basis.IND | | you want | all | DOM | one |
| 2. | | dast | koni, | | | | | | | | |
| | | hand | you do | | | | | | | | |
| | | how do you want to make all the world (0.2) homogeneous? | | | | | | | | | |
| 3. | | (0.4) | | | | | | | | | |
| 4. | N | bebin, | avalo | äkhâr | che | majles | che | diktâtori | mïkh | vakhti | |
| | | look | first and | last | whether | parliament | whether | dictator | nail | when | |
| 5. | | nokesh | tiz | bâshe | mire | tu | divâr | dige, | | | |
| | | tip | sharp | SBJN.be | goes | into | wall | DM | | | |
| | | look, in any case, a nail goes into the wall if it has a sharp tip. | | | | | | | | | |
| 6. | | (0.2) | | | | | | | | | |
| 7. | L | u[hum, |] | | | | | | | | |
| | | uhum | | | | | | | | | |
| | | uhum, | | | | | | | | | |
| 8. | N → | [che | m]ajles | | ye | hokmo | | ta`id | | kone | |
| | | whether | parliament | | one | decree.DOM | | confirmation | | does | |

whether the parliament issues a decree,

9. chg ye diktätör ye hokmo ta'id kone, bāyad ye
 whether one dictator one decree.DOM confirmation does should one

10. hokm ta'id be[she.]
 decree confirmation SBJN.become

or a dictator, only one decree should be issued.

11. A [khob] age mikh bekhā bere tu divār
 DM if nail wants to go into wall

12. nokesh tiz bāshe bere tu divār, faghat az ye didgāh
 its tip sharp SBJN.be SBJN.go into wall only from one viewpoint

13. barrasish koni un dige jahāni shodan nemishe.
 examination you do that anymore global becoming doesn't become

khob if a nail should have a sharp tip in order to go into the wall, that is to say, if you examine an issue from one viewpoint, it can't be counted as globalization.

14. (1.3)

A's wh-question 'how do you want to make all the world (0.2) homogeneous?' (lines 1 & 2) which has been directed to N (A is gazing at N), is the FPP of an adjacency pair whose SPP response has been provided by N in the next turn (lines 4 & 5). However, as this SPP response, i.e. 'look, in any case, a nail goes into the wall if it has a sharp tip', has been expressed metaphorically, N presents his intended meaning in lines 8-10. That is to say, N's assertion in lines 8-10, i.e. 'whether the parliament issues a decree, or a dictator, only one decree should be issued', works as the SPP response to A's FPP question in lines 1 & 2. As can be seen in lines 11-14, it is with this SPP response that A disagrees in the next turn. In other words, N's SPP response to A's question serves as the FPP assertion to A's disagreeing respons.

While in the above example the disagreement has been produced by the same speaker asking the question, first disagreements can also be produced by a speaker other than the one asking the question, as in the extract below which is part of the three-party discussion on the issue of the development of rationalism in the society.

Extract 4.4

(Development of rationalism)

1. R shomā ajzāye ye system.o goftin darundād (.) porose (.)
 you parts of a system.DOM said (you) input process

2. khoruji.
 output

you said the parts of a system ((that can develop rationality in the society)) are input, process (.) and output.

3. (0.2)
4. inā ro kesi nemitune bāsh mokhālefat kone. .h moshkel
 these DOM nobody can't with this disagreement does problem
5. ru bahse porosas. poroseye shomā: .h hamun
 above discussion of process is process of you the same
6. farāyande shomā chi mishe,=
 process of you what becomes
nobody can disagree with these. .h the problem is with the issue of process. what is your process?
7. A → =ā[muzesho parvaresh.]
 teaching and nurturing
education.
8. R [farāyande shomā]
 process of you
your process
9. A man [dāram mi]gam, poroseye mā (.). poro[seye mā]=
 I (I) have (I) am saying process of our process of our
10. R [āmuzesh] [khob,]
 teaching DM
khob
11. A =āmuzesho parvaresh ḥas.
 teaching and nurturing is
I'm saying, our process (.) our process is education.
12. R āmuzesh parvaresh ḥa:s, (.) vali kho' in āmuzesh
 teaching nurturing is but DM this teaching
13. pa[rvareshe shomā chiye;̇]
 nurturing of your what is
it is education, (.) but what's the education (you're referring to)?
14. O [nemishe mahdudesh] koni be āmuzesh parvaresh.
 It's not possible restrict it (you) do to teaching nurturing
you can't restrict it to education.

In line 6 of the above extract, R asks A the question ‘what is your process?’. This is a real wh-question seeking information. A’s answer to this question, i.e. ‘education’, ‘I’m saying, our process (.) our process is education’ (lines 7, 9 and 11) serves not only as the SPP answer to R’s question but also as a FPP assertion presenting new information which results in the production of the disagreement expressed by O in line

14, i.e. ‘you can’t restrict it to education’. So, in both the above examples, the newness of the assertion seems to be a key factor in arousing a disagreeing response.

4.2.3 Presenting an assertion while defending their disagreed-with opinion (Type 3 environment)

Assertions leading to first disagreements can also be produced as a speaker attempts to defend their disagreed-with opinion (4 out of 59 or 6.78%). That is to say, these assertions are presented in an already-established disagreement context. As with assertions in Type 2 environment, these assertions serve a double function: a) they are responsive to a prior disagreeing turn and b) they form the FPP assertion to a SPP disagreement. The extract below,²⁴ also taken from the six-party discussion on obstacles to a timely marriage, illuminates the point.

Extract 4.5

(Obstacles to a timely marriage I)

- | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|---|--|---------|-------------|---------------|-------------|--------------------------|-------------------|-------------|
| 1. | N | alān | dige | pesarā | be e:h | asan | raf'e | niāzhāshun | yā |
| | | now | DM | boys | to eh | basically | removal | their needs | or |
| 2. | | mesan | m | niāzhāye | 'ātefio | | ināshuno .h | | dākhele ye |
| | | for example | m | needs of | emotional and | | the like. of theirs. DOM | | inside of a |
| 3. | | chize | dige'i | [mikhān] | | peydā | [konan.] | =dākhele= | |
| | | thing | another | want (they) | | apparent | do (they) | inside of | |
| | | now boys want to satisfy their needs, let's say their emotional needs and the like, through something else. | | | | | | | |
| 4. | D | | | [.hh] | | | | | |
| 5. | B | | | | | | [uhum,] | | |
| | | | | | | | uhum | | |
| | | | | | | | uhum, | | |
| 6. | N | =ravābeti | gheyr | az | ezdevāj | mikhān | peydā | bekonano: | |
| | | relations | other | from | marriage | want (they) | apparent | (they) do and | |
| | | they want to satisfy their needs through relationships ((with girls)) other than marriage, and | | | | | | | |
| 7. | | dokhtarā | [ham | majbur] | mishan | | belakhare .h | [be in ra]vābet= | |
| | | girls | also | forced | become (they) | | finally | to this relations | |
| 8. | C | | [faqat | ke] | | | | [°°albate°°] | |
| | | | only | that | | | | of course | |

²⁴ Note that the FPP assertions in lines 1-3, 6, 7 and 9 are instances of assertions produced as a speaker first enters a discussion (type 1 environment). However, since the focus of this extract is on type 3 environment, they are not discussed here.

9. N =tan bedan.
body give (they)
girls have to settle for these relationships ((against their better judgment)).
10. C °albate° faqat pēsārā nisan.
of course only boys aren't (they)
of course, it's not just boys ((who are after such relationships)).
11. (0.2)
12. C .h
13. (0.8)
14. N khob äre=
DM yeah
khob yeah,
15. C =p! yek asle ravānshenāsi mige (0.3) tā: (.) dōkhtar (0.3) cherāghe
one principle psychology says till girl light of
16. sabz neshun nade pēsar [nemire] tarafesh.
green sign doesn't give boy doesn't go towards him
a psychology principle says that (0.3) unless (.) girls (0.3) give boys a green light, they don't approach them.
17. D [.hhh]
18. N khob belakhare
DM finally
19. pe[sarā] dige az in eh mas`uliat paziriye]=
boys anymore from this eh responsibility acceptance of
20. C [>in as:le ravānshenāsiye dige. =ravānshenāsi esbāt karde ino.<]
this principle psychology is DM psychology proof done this.DOM
that's a psychology principle. psychology has proved it.
21. N =ezdevāj khārej shodan.. tarafe in samte in: ravābet
marriage out become (they) towards this towars is relation
22. → raftan. =khob dokhtarā.am vaqti ke: e::h masalan: ezdevāj-
went (they) DM girls.also when that for example marriage-
23. moqe`iate ezdevāj barāshun pish nemiād .h belakhare majbur
opportunity marriage for them forward doesn't come finally forced
24. mi fshan be [in ravābet.]
become (they) to this relations
khob boys have lost their sense of responsibility. they have gone towards these relationships. Khob because eh marriage opportunities don't come to girls, .h they have to finally settle for these relationships.
25. T [dokhtarāam m]otma`eni moqe`iate
girls also (are) you sure opportunity of
26. ezdevāj barāshun pish [nemiā]d?]
marriage for them forward doesn't come

are you sure that marriage opportunities don't come to girls?

In lines 1-3, 6, 7 and 9 of this extract, N presents two new assertions:²⁵ 1) nowadays boys tend to satisfy their emotional needs through relationships other than marriage, and 2) girls have to settle for these relationships. In the next turn, C disagrees with N's first assertion, stating that it's not just boys who are after these relationships (line 10). As can be seen in lines 14 and 15, while N has just produced an agreement token (line 14), C expresses his disagreement with N's second assertion, stating that boys don't approach girls without their consent (lines 15 and 16). In defending her assertions, N produces 3 TCUs (lines 18, 19 and 21-24). Her first two TCUs are both repetitive: her idea concerning boys' lack of sense of responsibility has been uttered about two minutes earlier into the discussion (as can be seen in Extract 1, lines 17 and 18), and her idea about boys' tendency to have relationships other than marriage first appears in lines 1-3 and 6. However, her third TCU, while repeating her earlier-stated utterance in lines 7 and 9 (girls have to settle for these relationships), adds the new assertion that the reason behind girls' settling for these relationships is that marriage opportunities don't arise to them (lines 22-24). As can be seen in lines 25 and 26, it is this new assertion that T takes issue with in the next turn. N's old assertions didn't result in a response. So, as with assertions produced in Type 1 (Extracts 4.1 and 4.2) and Type 2 (Extracts 4.3 and 4.4) environments, this extract confirms that the *newness* of an assertion is important in eliciting a disagreeing response. Moreover, as can be seen from the extract, N's new assertion has a double function: it constitutes the response to C's disagreement and also forms the FPP to T's subsequent disagreement.

4.2.4 Re-presenting another speaker's assertion (Type 4 environment)

In the fourth type of environment, a speaker re-presents the prior speaker's assertion(s), highlighting a specific part of it (2 out of 59 or 3.39%). Extract 4.6 taken from the four-party discussion on globalization illustrates the point. The participants

²⁵ As can be seen in line 6, adding the clitic *o* 'and' to the end of the verb of her first assertion, i.e. *peydä bekonano* '(they) find and', N manages to produce another TCU (lines 7 and 9) which forms her second assertion.

have been discussing whether globalization can be viewed as a process or a project since the beginning of their discussion.

Extract 4.6

(Globalization I)

1. C mishe goft dar in porose: (0.3) yek porozhei hās:
becomes (it) said in this process one project is
it can be said that there's a project within this process:
2. (0.5)
3. yek porozhei ke- qaräre (.) e:h (0.5) .h az in porose
one project that is going to eh from this process
4. be naf'e khodesh: (.) °estefāde kone; =va:-° porozhehāye
to interest of itself use does (it) and projects of
5. khodesho mobtani bar in porose (1.1) piāde- piā*de:[:* kone.]
itself.DOM based on this process on foot on foot does
a project which is going to take advantage of this process, and set up its objectives based on this process.
6. A → [pas:]
so
7. be e'teqāde shomā: e:h porozhe mishe zirmajmu'eye
to opinion of you eh project becomes (it) subset of
8. (0.4) ((tongue click)) porose taqriban.
process almost
so, in your opinion, eh the project is almost the subset of (0.4) the process.
9. (0.3)
10. C mishe goft.
becomes (it) said
it can be said.
11. (0.6)
12. A a[z: porose: (.) nāshi mishe;]=
from process resulting becomes (it)
it results from process.
13. D [na:, eṭefāqan az ham jodfān.]
no accidentally from each other are separate
no, actually they're not linked to each other.
14. A =nash`at migire.=
emerging takes
it emerges (from process.)

As can be seen in lines 1 and 3-5, C considers globalization as a process within which there is a project which is going to use this process to its own advantage and set up its objectives based on it. What A utters in the following turn (lines 6-8) is in fact a re-presentation of C's assertion which has the following features:

- a) It is a summary or conclusion of C's turn as evidenced here with the word *pas* 'so' (line 6), a conjunction used to introduce a concluding remark.
- b) It demonstrates that the assertion is originally made by C as evidenced with the phrase *be e'teqāde shomā* 'in your opinion' (line 7).
- c) It highlights a specific part of C's turn as 'the project is almost the subset of the process' (lines 7 and 8) is in fact an implication of C's first TCU, i.e. 'it can be said that there's a project within this process'.
- d) It invites the prior speaker's confirmatory response as, in the next turn (line 10), C provides the weak confirmatory statement *mishe goft* 'it can be said'.

Garfinkel and Sacks (1970) and Heritage and Watson (1984) have already termed this re-presenting action 'formulation.' In his study on news interviews, Heritage (1985) demonstrates that interviewers' formulations make the interviewee's agreeing or disagreeing response the relevant next action. In the above example, although C confirms A's formulation of C's prior turn, another speaker (D) takes issue with this assertion (line 13). So, it appears that re-presenting a prior speaker's assertion can stimulate an agreeing or disagreeing response.

Considering that in the previous types of disagreement environment (Type 1, 2 and 3) the newness of an assertion seems to be the key factor in eliciting a response, the question arises as to why the initial assertion itself doesn't provoke the response while its re-presentation can result in a response. As it appears from the above example, re-presenting a prior speaker's assertion can bring the newness of that assertion to light. In other words, re-presentation of an assertion can occur when the proposition of that initial assertion is not clear enough for the recipients to either agree or disagree with. This can be evidenced by the half-a-second pause (line 2) following C's TCU in line 1 and the two increments (lines 3-5) produced by C after the pause. In their investigation

of turn increments, Ford, Fox & Thompson (2002:25) classify this type of increment as an Extension increment because it continues the action of the extended turn. As they maintain, in an environment of lack of reciprocity, an Extension increment creates a second TRP at which the intended recipient could demonstrate reciprocity. In the above extract, after half-a-second pause (line 2) that follows C's assertion in line 1 and in the absence of any response, C adds two increments giving more information about his initial assertion. It is nearly at the end of the second increment, i.e. 'and set up its objectives based on this process' (line 5), that A takes the turn and re-presents C's initial assertion.

4.2.5 Summary: Newness of an assertion

As observed in sections 4.2.1-4.2.4, in the present data set, the vast majority of first disagreements are responsive to new assertions which are produced when a speaker first enters a discussion about a particular issue (Type 1), or in response to a question (Type 2) or while defending a disagreed-with opinion (Type 3). Occasionally, the newness of an assertion is reiterated in a re-presented turn (Type 4).

Turning back to the beginning of section 4.2, we can see that, compared to first assessments that are produced as a result of taking "an explicit, on-record evaluative stance that is available to be agreed with or disagreed with in next turn", without expressing agreement or disagreement with the prior comments (Heritage & Raymond, 2005:16), first assertions (assertions leading to first disagreements) come into existence when a speaker either presents or re-presents a new assertion about a particular issue.

Moreover, the diversity of the environments in which new assertions leading to first disagreements appear shows that, like story-telling contexts and adult-child interactions stated by Schegloff et al. (1977), the context of academic discussion is prone to the appearance of disagreement.

The question now arises as to whether it is sufficient to present a new assertion to provoke a disagreeing response.²⁶ As evidenced in the following extract, the answer is no because not all new assertions result in a response. The extract has been taken from the discussion on the development of rationality in the society.

Extract 4.7

(Development of rationality)

1. R bargard boro be dorâne bāstān.
return (imperative) go (imperative) to times ancient
go to the ancient times.
2. (0.5)
3. bozorgtarin nezāme mohandesie jahān (0.3) dore e::h (0.2)
the greatest system of engineering of world era of eh
4. hokumate ki bude?=
rule of who has been rule of Hakhāmanesh bude.
Achaemenid has been
In whose ruling era did the greatest engineering system of the world exist? It existed in Achaemenid ruling era.
5. (0.3)
6. .h chejur mitune (0.2) bozorgtarin nezāme mohandesie donyā: (0.6)
how can (it) the greatest system of engineering of world
7. ke taqribān (0.3) aksare manāteqe donyā (0.2) zire seytareye
that about most of regions of world under dominance of
8. ye hokumate (0.2) 'aqlāniat nabāshe.
a rule is rationalism not be.SUB
how is it possible that ((an empire with)) the greatest engineering system of the world, about most of the regions of the world were under whose dominance, be irrational?
9. (0.7)
10. chejur mitune.
how can (it be)
how is it possible?
11. (0.5)
12. chejur mitune nezāme mohandesi (0.2) bā in azematio (0.3) bā
how can (it) system of engineering with this grandeur with
13. ehsās shekl begire.
impression form get.SUB
how can an engineering system with such grandeur be based on impression ((rather than rationality))?

²⁶ Bearing in mind that disagreement is one of the two alternative responses to an assertion, the other being agreement, a further question is whether an agreeing response is stimulated under the same conditions. This question will be attended to later in section 4.5.

14. A pas ya'ni shomā [migid ke 'aqlān]iat: bude dar zamāni=
so meaning you say that rationalism has been in sometime
so, you say there has once been rationalism ((in our society)).

R's question 'in whose ruling era did the greatest engineering system of the world exist?' (lines 3 and 4) is a rhetorical question as he immediately provides the answer to his own question (line 4). R's answer forms a new assertion: the greatest engineering system of the world existed in the era of Achaemenid empire. As can be seen from the rest of the extract, this new assertion provokes no response from the recipients, either agreement or disagreement, and the absence of response is not treated as problematic. This is evidenced by the fact that, after a 0.3-second silence (line 5), R presents a second rhetorical question (lines 6-8) presenting another new assertion. This time the absence of response is a problem as, after a 0.7-second lapse (line 9), R twice redoes his question, once in line 10 and another time in lines 12 and 13, so that he can receive a response. As can be seen in line 14, A takes the turn and re-presents R's second assertion.

On the basis of the above example and other similar examples in the present data set, it can be argued that, in order for an assertion to result in a disagreeing response, the newness of the assertion seems to be necessary but not sufficient. This means that, in addition to presenting a new assertion, the assertion producers may design their turn for their recipients in such a way to provoke a disagreeing response. This issue will be attended to in the following section.

4.3 Turn design features of assertions resulting in disagreement

This section examines the features of assertions resulting in disagreement including turn design features of prosody (intonation (section 4.3.1), stress, elongation and loudness (section 4.3.2), syntax (4.3.1), speaker's epistemic authority (4.3.3), and speaker gaze (4.3.4). Since, in spoken Persian, intonation plays a key role in

distinguishing yes/no interrogatives from declarative sentences,²⁷ syntax and intonation will be examined together.

4.3.1 Disagreement, intonation and syntax

Prior CA research has shown that interrogative syntax and rising intonation hold the recipient of a first assessment more accountable to provide a response (Pomerantz, 1984:61; Stivers & Rossano, 2010a). This means that assessments uttered in a question format are more likely to receive an agreeing or disagreeing response.

In the present data set, the vast majority (56 out of 59 or 94.92%) of the assertions followed by a first disagreement have declarative syntax which are ending either in a falling (53 cases or 89.84%) or in a slightly rising intonation (3 cases or 5.08%). Only 3 assertions (5.08%) leading to a first disagreement have been uttered in interrogative syntax. Extracts 4.1-4.6 above all exemplify assertions with declarative syntax and falling intonation (the majority of cases). The high percentage of these assertions shows that in academic discussions the normal pattern of an assertion resulting in a first disagreement is declarative syntax and falling intonation. Even in the three assertions with declarative syntax and a slightly rising intonation, the rising intonation doesn't serve to elicit the recipient response (In Persian, as in English, yes/no interrogatives are uttered in rising intonation. So, rising intonation serves to elicit the recipient response.). Extract 4.8 below, taken from the six-party discussion on obstacles to a timely marriage, illuminates the point. The extract starts at a point where B presents her idea concerning the reason why the average age of marriage has increased.

Extract 4.8

(Obstacles to a timely marriage I)

- | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|---|------------|----|-------------|---------|------|------------------|----------|----------|-------|
| 1. | B | yeki | az | dalāyele | 'om:dei | ke | se _{ne} | ezdevāj | balā | rafte |
| | | one | of | reasons | chief | that | age of | marriage | up | gone |
| 2. | → | hamine,.hh | | shāya:d (.) | kheyli | | naslhāye | | qabl (.) | |

²⁷ In formal Persian, together with a final rising intonation, the optional question word *āyā* comes at the beginning of a declarative sentence to transform it to a yes/no interrogative. However, in ordinary spoken Persian, it is just rising intonation contour that changes a declarative statement to a polar question (Mahootian, 1997:8; Hayati, 2005:77, 78; Ahmad Soltani, 2007:50).

- this same (thing) is perhaps many generations of before
one of the chief reasons that the age of marriage has risen is this, perhaps many generations before,
3. do nasl qabl se nasl qabl (.)
two generation before three generation before
two generations before, three generations before,
4. ham- ham sene mähā ke buḍa:n (0.2) >kheyli 'äqeltar
same same age of us that (they) were much wiser
5. az mā budan, =mas'ulaiyatpazirtar az mā
than us (they) were responsibility.more accepting than us
6. budan, =shäyad ba'ziashun sähebe khuneväde buda:n,<=
were perhaps some of them owner of family (they)were
when they were our age, they were much wiser than us, they had more sense of responsibility than we do, perhaps some of them had families,
7. N =na; 'äqeltar [na]budan,=
no wiser (they) weren't
no, they weren't wiser,
8. H [ye]
one
9. B =N[A-]
no
NO-
10. N [m]as`uliatpazirishun [kheyli bishtar az mā bude:.]
their acceptance of responsibilities much more than us been
they had much more sense of responsibility than we do.

In lines 1 and 2 of the above extract, B states that 'one of the chief reasons that the age of marriage has risen is this' and then she presents a three-part list²⁸ (Jefferson, 1990): 1) 'perhaps many generations before, two generations before, three generations before, when they were our age, they were much wiser than us' (lines 2-5), 2) 'they had more sense of responsibility than we do' (lines 5 and 6), 3) 'perhaps some of them had families' (line 6). Note that although using a prospective indexical (Goodwin, 1996:18), i.e. *hamin* 'this' (line 2), and a list (which is here the referent of the prospective indexical) are two common ways of producing a multi-TCU turn at talk,

²⁸ Although the above list seems to be three-parted, as evidenced by the slightly rising intonation contour at the end of the third part, i.e. 'perhaps some of them had families,' it could have had more than three parts if N had not latched her TCU (line 7) to the end of the third part of the list to express her disagreement with the first part.

they cannot guarantee the right to an extended turn. Therefore, as a possible, further move to achieve a long turn, B ends her declarative TCUs in a slightly rising intonation as a way of indicating that she has more to say.²⁹ In other words, this rising contour is indicative of the speaker's inclination to produce an extended turn (see Ahmad Soltani, 2007:43-44) rather than a means of eliciting recipient response.

In the same way, the slightly rising contour at the end of the other two assertions leading to a first disagreement indicates further talk by the same speaker to come rather than stimulating the recipient response. So, these three assertions are not deviant cases. Rather, they support the argument that the normal pattern for assertions leading to a first disagreement is declarative syntax and falling intonation.

A similar argument applies to the other three cases in the data set which are seemingly deviating from this normal pattern as they have been uttered in interrogative syntax. One of these three cases appears in Extract 4.9 below. The extract is another part of the three-party discussion on the development of rationality in the society.

Extract 4.9

(Development of rationality)

- | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-----|--|------|--------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|
| 1. | R | age | az | eslähäte | 'abäs Mirzäo | Amir Kabir | begzarim, | az: (.) |
| | | if | from | reforms of | 'abäs Mirzä and | Amir Kabir | we pass | from |
| 2. | | Aminodole | az | inā | begzarim, | miäym | miresim be | ki, .h |
| | | Aminodole | from | these | (we) pass | (we) come | (we) reach to | whom |
| | | If we pass 'abäs Mirzä and Amir Kabir's reforms, (if) we pass (.) Aminodole (if we pass) these, who do we come to, .h | | | | | | |
| 3. | | (0.4) | | | | | | |
| 4. | | mohemtarin | | me'märe | | eslähätesh | mishe | <u>ki</u> ? |
| | | leading | | architect of | | its reforms | becomes | who |
| | | who is the leading person of the reforms? | | | | | | |
| 5. | | (0.6) | | | | | | |
| 6. | | ke | tu | tärikh[e:] | | | | |
| | | that | in | history of | | | | |
| | | that in the history of: | | | | | | |
| 7. | A → | | | [be] hich | va[jh | mohemtarin | me']märe | eslähät= |

²⁹ In English, the use of slightly rising intonation, commonly referred to as “continuing intonation,” is a strategy to signal another TCU to come by the same speaker (Couper-Kuhlen, 2012:282).

to nothing aspect leading architect of reforms
the leading person of the reforms has by no means

8. R [eqdāmātesh]
 actions
9. A =Reza Shāh nabude. =hā[lä in bahse]
 Reza Shāh hasn't been DM this discussion of
 been **Reza Shāh. the discussion of**
10. R [na; mohem]tarin
 no leading
11. [me'märe eslähät ki-]
no; who (was) the leading person of the reforms?
12. A [bahse eslähät ke] az bahse nahādinesā[zie 'aq]lāniat=
 discussion reforms that from discussion of institutionalization of rationalism
13. R [na;;]
 no
no;;
14. A =be na[zaram] khārej hast,
 to my opinion out is
the discussion of the reforms, in my opinion, has nothing to do with the discussion of institutionalization of rationalism,
15. R [na;;]
 no
no;;
16. (.)

In line 4 of the above extract, R asks the question *mohemtarin me'märe eslähātesh mishe ki?* 'who is the leading person of the reforms?'.³⁰ This is analyzed as a rhetorical question for the following reasons. As evidenced by the adverb of negation *be hich vajh* 'by no means' in the beginning of A's answer in line 7, and given that exactly prior to this extract R has mentioned *Rezā Shāh* as the figure who brought people from ignorance to rationalism, A's answer is a disagreeing response rather than a response providing the sought-after information. Accordingly, R's wh-question in line 4 is not a real question seeking information, but a rhetorical question making a claim or an

³⁰ Note that in Persian, as in English, wh-questions normally start with the interrogative word and have a final falling intonation. However, since in Persian it is the interrogative word that receives the stress and the rising of voice (Hayati, 2005:94-95) and with some wh-questions this word can appear at the end of the question as well, R's question in line 4 ends in rising intonation.

assertion (Koshik, 2005:2), here, ‘*Rezā Shāh* is the leading person of the reforms,’ as it is within R’s epistemic domain (Heritage, 2012a:22, 23, 2013a:385-386).

Since the other two instances followed by a first disagreement and expressed in interrogative syntax are also rhetorical questions which are in fact making an assertion, these three instances do not deviate from the normal pattern: they imply a claim or an assertion rather than being a request for information.

As shown in this section, the normal pattern for assertions resulting in a first disagreement is declarative syntax and falling intonation. However, as shown by previous literature (see for instance Stivers & Rossano, 2010a), neither of these two features are involved in stimulating the recipient response, hence no expectation that there would be a response, either agreement or disagreement, if there is no other stimulus.

4.3.2 Prosodic features of stress, elongation and loudness³¹

In the present data set, speakers use prosodic resources to emphasize or focus the listeners’ attention on particular words or their meanings, including putting stress on an unstressed syllable, putting additional stress on a normally stressed syllable, and elongating the vowel in a stressed or unstressed syllable.

The examination of the data shows that 28.8% of the assertions leading to a first disagreement contain a stressed syllable and/or an elongated vowel in their key words. There were no instances of overt loudness in assertions resulting in first disagreements. Extract 4.10 below, taken from the discussion on drug and alcohol addiction by three female students, provides an example of an assertion with stressed and elongated key words (For more examples on stress and elongation see Extracts 4.1-4.4 above).

³¹ As described by Ladefoged & Johnson (2011:111), a stressed syllable is usually heard to be louder, longer, and with a higher pitch compared to unstressed syllables. So, elongation of a vowel and loudness are usually part of the process of putting stress on a syllable or word. However, since in the present data set there are instances of elongation of the vowel in unstressed syllables or instances of syllables or words uttered in overtly loud voice, they will also be considered as separate prosodic features.

Extract 4.10

(Drug & alcohol addiction)

1. Z hälä masalan ye jäye dige ham darmorde hälä
DM for example one place another also about DM
2. masalan yeki az mavāde mokhader shi:she,
for example one from substances narcotic crystal
for example in another case about one of the narcotic drugs, crystal,
3. (0.2)
4. S äre,
yeah
yeah,
5. (.)
6. Z ke alān khey:li masalan rā:[yeje vo]
that now very for example common is and
that is now very, let's say, common and
7. F → [alān ke na,] alān
now that no now
now it's not, now
8. F cok kheyli: (.) [ham] jadide ham inke: .h kheyli dāran=
coke very also is new also that very (they) have
9. Z [cok?]
coke
coke?
10. F =be samte cok [mira:n.]
to direction of coke (they) go
coke is very (.) new and .h many people are turning to it.

In lines 2 and 6, Z asserts that crystal is a narcotic drug which is currently very common. By elongating a vowel in the key words *shi:she* ‘crystal’ and *rā:yej* ‘common’, and putting additional stress on the first syllable of *khey:li* ‘very’³² and elongating its vowel, she is attracting the recipients’ attention to the assertion she is making, thereby stimulating their response.

However, these prosodic features are present in just less than a third of assertions leading to a first disagreement. This, together with the occasional presence of these

³² In Persian, stress usually falls on the last syllable of simple words (Ferguson, 1957:125; Hayati, 2005:52). However, the simple word *kheyli* ‘very’ is an exception to this rule as the stress is on the first syllable (*kheyli*).

features in assertions not leading to a response (see, for instance, Extract 4.1 above (line 13)), either agreement or disagreement, leads us to consider them as a contributing rather than a determining factor in provoking the recipient response.

4.3.3 Speaker gaze

The influence of speaker gaze on eliciting recipient response has already been the focus of a number of studies. Kendon (1967) points to the regulatory function of speaker gaze while speaking at length. According to him, within long turns, speaker gaze at the listener works to elicit the listener's response which shows either their attentiveness or their agreement to what the speaker is saying (pp. 43-44). Bavelas, Coates & Johnson (2002:576-577) propose "gaze-window" hypothesis according to which the listener produces a response, such as mhm and nods, as the speaker looks at them while telling a story and the speaker looks away shortly after the listener produces the response.

While Kendon (1967) and Bavelas, et al. (2002) focus on English conversations, Rossano, Brown & Levinson (2009) investigate gaze behavior in question sequences in Italian, Tzeltal (a Mayan language) and Yéli Dnye (spoken in Papua New Guinea). They show that in all three languages speakers demonstrate a strong tendency to look at the addressee while asking questions (p. 207). In a similar vein, Stivers, et al. (2009) examine ten different, non-European languages for the timing of responses to polar questions. They show that in nine of the ten languages examined, speaker gaze at the recipient, while asking questions, results in earlier production of recipient response (p. 10588). More recently, Stivers & Rossano (2010a), focusing on English and Italian, demonstrate that speaker gaze is one of a multiple of resources that can be employed to exert pressure on the recipient of a noncanonical action, i.e. actions that may not make a response conditionally relevant (assessments, announcements and noticings) (see section 4.1 for canonical and noncanonical actions), to provide a response.

Examination of the present data reveals that 98.3% of assertions (58 out of 59) leading to a first disagreement are expressed with the speaker gaze directed at one of the participants. 62.1% (36 out of 58) of the first disagreements produced in response to

these assertions are expressed by the recipient of the speaker gaze and 37.9% (22 out of 58) by a participant who is not gaze recipient. Only one assertion is expressed while the speaker is gazing down at the table. The extracts below illustrate these three situations. Extract 4.11, which is part of the discussion on globalization participated by four male students, provides an example of a first disagreement expressed by the recipient of the assertion producer's gaze.³³

Extract 4.11

(Globalization I)

1. A khosusisāziam mire samte eqtesāde āzād.
 privatization also goes towards economy free
A gazing toward D
D gazing toward A
privatization is part of the free-market economy.
2. (0.5)
3. D tajrobe nadāre; =khusisāzi *dar keshvare mā
 experience doesn't have privatization in country of our
D gazing toward A **D gazing down*
4. *ziād tajrobe nad[āre.]
 much experience doesn't have
**D gazing toward A*
(it) doesn't have presence. privatization doesn't have much presence in our country.
5. A → [taj]robe nadāre; =age tajrobe
 experience doesn't have if experience
6. nadāre, .h cherā alān bānke Sāmān khosusie,
 doesn't have why now bank of Sāmān private is
(it) doesn't have presence? if it doesn't have presence, .h why is Sāmān bank private now?
7. (0.2)

Having received A's opinion about privatization (line 1), D asserts that '(it) doesn't have presence' (line 3) and continues with a second TCU repeating the same assertion in more detail (lines 3 and 4). As can be seen in lines 3 and 4, except for the time D produces the utterance 'in our country', his gaze direction is towards A. In fact, even before starting and then finishing his turn, D is gazing at A. As in the next turn (lines 5 and 6), it is A who provides a disagreeing response to D's assertion.

³³ Following Rendle-Short, Skelt & Bramley (2015), an asterisk (*) has been used to indicate change of gaze direction.

In contrast to the above example, Extract 4.12 exemplifies a first disagreement expressed by a participant who is not gaze recipient. The extract has been taken from the discussion on drug addiction, participated by three female and three male students.

Extract 4.12

(Drug addiction II)

1. H miduni_ç =agar mä man' beshim az ye chizi, (.) hesè
you know if we prohibited become from one thing sense of
H gazing toward A
you know_ç=if we're prohibited from something, (.) our sense of curiosity, *khob*,
2. konjkävimun kh[ob,]
our curiosity DM
H gazing toward A
you know_ç=if we're prohibited from something, (.) our sense of curiosity, *khob*,
3. A [bish]tar mishe. [bishtar tara]fesh=
more (it) becomes more towards it
A gazing toward H
increases.
4. H [bishtar mishe.]
more (it) becomes
H gazing toward A
(it) increases.
5. A =m[irim.]
(we) go
A gazing toward H
we're more attracted to it.
6. H [vaqti] konjkävimunam hedäyat nashe:=
when our curiosity guidance doesn't get
H gazing toward A
when our curiosity isn't guided,
7. M → =qabul nadäram ino.
acceptance (I) don't have this
M gazing toward H
(I) don't agree with that.

Here, M's disagreement in line 7 (*qabul nadäram ino* 'I don't agree with that') is a response to H's assertion *agar mä man' beshim az ye chizi, (.) hesè konjkävimun khob, bishtar mishe* 'if we're prohibited from something, (.) our sense of curiosity, *khob*,

increases' in lines 1, 2 and 4. As can be seen in the extract, it is A not M who is the recipient of H's gaze while he is presenting his opinion.³⁴ In multi-party conversations, gazing at a co-participant during the production of a sequence-initiating action is a resource used by a current speaker to select the next speaker (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974:717; Lerner, 1993:224-225, 2003). Taking into account that M is aware of the mutual gaze between H and A (M has been looking at H and A since the beginning of H's assertion), he knows that 1) he (M) has not been selected by H to provide a response to his assertion and 2) A is aware that A is H's addressed recipient and thus the one accountable to provide a response to his assertion. Nevertheless, M self-selects urgently to express his opposite stance on the issue. This points to the fact that, in the context of multi-party academic discussions in which the participants need to prove themselves as capable discussants, they need to express their knowledge of the issue at every possible opportunity even if they are not the selected recipient of an assertion.

Extract 4.13 below illustrates the assertion expressed while the speaker withholds her gaze from other participants.

Extract 4.13

(Obstacles to a timely marriage II)

- | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-----|--|-----------|---------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|---------|---------|
| 1. | P | kheyli | ↑rāhat: | em: (.) | be | nazare | man | ādam | mitune |
| | | very | easily | em | to | opinion of I | one | can | |
| | | <i>P gazing down at the table</i> | | | | | | | |
| 2. | | khānevādash.o | qāne' | | kone. | =ya'ni | | | |
| | | her family.DOM | convinced | | does | that is | | | |
| | | <i>P gazing down at the table</i> | | | | | | | |
| | | very easily em (.) in my opinion, one can convince one's own family ((not to meddle in one's relationship)). I mean | | | | | | | |
| 3. | | man | kheyli | rāhat | ma[san | *age- | moshkeli | pish | m-] |
| | | I | very | easily | for example | if | problem.IND | forward | |
| | | <i>P gazing down at the table</i> | | | | <i>*P gazing toward S</i> | | | |
| | | very easily, I, let's say, if a problem happ- | | | | | | | |
| 4. | S → | | | | [vali | tu | ruhiat | asar | mi]zāre |
| | | | | | but | in | your spirit | effect | puts |

³⁴ A's attempt to jointly complete H's assertion (lines 3 & 5) denotes her agreement with H over this particular issue.

S gazing toward P
but it affects you, Parvaneh.

5. Parvāne.
Parvāne

As in lines 1-3, P makes an assertion about convincing one's family while she is gazing down at the table. It is just after S starts producing an urgent disagreeing response (line 4) to P's assertion that P directs her gaze towards S.

The production of the majority of first disagreements by gaze recipients indicates that speaker gaze is an important factor in mobilizing recipient response. However, the rather high percentage of first disagreements (37.9%) produced by participants who are not gaze recipients, together with the existence of an assertion leading to a first disagreement and produced by a speaker withholding her gaze from other participants (Extract 4.13) suggest that, in the context of academic discussions, speaker gaze can be an important rather than an essential feature of assertions leading to a first disagreement.

4.3.4 Epistemic valence

The epistemic asymmetry between the interlocutors has already been claimed to drive sequences of talk-in-interaction. As Heritage (2012b) maintains, sequences of interaction are motivated as a speaker displays the imbalance of information between herself/himself and the recipient and are brought to a close as the interactants arrive at knowledge equilibrium (p. 32). In other words, sequences of interaction are initiated when a speaker, either K⁺ or K⁻, displays their stance on the epistemic gradient and thereby turns the gradient into a seesaw which will be in motion as long as there is knowledge discrepancy between the interactants.

However, the performance of the epistemic seesaw has just been examined in contexts where one interactant is knowing and the other is unknowing, i.e. requests for information and story tellings/announcements. It has not been demonstrated how the epistemic engine of knowledge imbalance works in disagreement contexts where the

referent falls within both interactants' epistemic domains, i.e. when both interactants are knowledgeable about the referent state of affairs.

As demonstrated in Chapter 3, section 3.4.5, the initial assertion producers appear to be less knowledgeable than their disagreement producers with respect to the particular issue under discussion. To show a superior knowledge (or K+) position, first-disagreement producers use a variety of resources including offering new knowledge of the issue, providing accounts, and/or using linguistic resources associated with epistemic supremacy such as emphatic prosody (stress, loudness and elongation) or emphatic expressions, and using the same key words as in the FPP assertions.

It can then be suggested that, in the context of academic discussions, where the interactants are required to present themselves as competent discussants, the epistemic engine of knowledge imbalance is more of a tug-of-war than a seesaw, whereby the interactants claim and counter-claim their knowledge as superior. The contest starts when an assertion producer pulls the rope towards themselves and thereby takes an initial K+ position, i.e. presents some degree of knowledgeability of a particular state of affairs. By so doing, they seem to be inviting their co-interactant(s) to present their own knowledge of the issue. First-disagreement producers make their contribution to the contest by claiming to be more knowledgeable than their respective assertion producers. Note that as first disagreements are produced, the initial assertion producers' K+ (more knowledgeable) position turns into K- (less knowledgeable).

As observed in sections 4.3.1-4.3.4, among turn design features capable of stimulating the recipient response, i.e. interrogative syntax, interrogative prosody, participants' knowledge asymmetry, and speaker gaze, it is just participants' epistemic asymmetry that appears to be a necessary feature of these turns, with the disagreeing turn appearing to have a greater epistemic valence. As for syntax and prosody, it has been demonstrated that the vast majority of the assertions resulting in a first disagreement are expressed in declarative syntax and falling intonation, neither of which are involved in mobilizing recipient response. Prosodic features of stress and elongation as

well as speaker gaze are seen to be influential rather than necessary in eliciting recipient disagreeing response.

4.4 Conditional relevance or turn design features?

In section 4.2, assertion environments, it has been demonstrated that the newness of an assertion seems to be a necessary factor in eliciting recipient disagreeing response. This is evidenced by the fact that all instances of first disagreement are seen to be responsive to a new assertion rather than an already-stated (or old) assertion or a taken-for-granted assertion.

However, since in the current data set there are instances of new assertions not being followed by a response (as in Extract 4.7), it can be concluded that a) the newness of the initial assertion seems to be necessary but not sufficient to provoke a disagreeing response and b) the production of first disagreements is not governed by the property of conditional relevance.

The investigation of turn-design features capable of stimulating recipient response (section 4.3) shows that the only turn-design feature always involved in producing a disagreeing response is the interactants' epistemic asymmetry. All first disagreements in the present data set seem to enjoy a greater epistemic valence compared to their respective initial assertion. Recipient-directed speaker gaze and the prosodic features of stress and elongation seem to have an important but not necessary part in provoking a disagreeing response.

So, as it appears from this investigation, in the context of academic discussions, in order for an initial assertion to result in a first disagreement, the newness of the assertion and the turn design feature of participants' epistemic asymmetry are two necessary factors. Once a new assertion is presented by one of the participants, an extra knowledge of that particular issue is required by the recipient(s) to produce a disagreeing response to that initial assertion.

4.5 Are agreeing responses produced under the same conditions?

The question now arises as to whether the same conditions apply to the production of agreements. The examination of the data shows no instances of an agreeing response to an old assertion. All agreements have been responsive to a new assertion. That is to say, it appears that in the context of academic discussions, as with first disagreements, for an initial assertion to result in an agreeing response, the newness of the assertion is necessary.

However, the epistemic valence of an agreeing response can be either greater or lesser than that of the initial assertion. Previous CA research on agreement sequences in English shows how sequential positioning and turn design resources are used to encode knowledge primacy and subordination (Heritage, 2002a; Heritage & Raymond, 2005; Stivers, 2005). Although producing an assessment or assertion in sequence initial position is suggestive of knowledge primacy, there are a variety of resources used by producers of an agreeing response to claim knowledge primacy from a second position (for a full account of these, see Chapter 3, section 3.4.5). The examination of agreement sequences in the current data set shows that, as in English, an agreeing response can have a greater or lesser epistemic valence compared to the initial assertion. The extracts below illuminate the point.

Extract 4.14

(Obstacles to a timely marriage I)

1. N in kãreshun bã'es mishe ke bachehä (.)
 this their act cause becomes that children
2. lus: bãr biãn.=
 spoiled burden come (they)

This act of theirs causes children (.) to be brought up spoiled.

3. B → =väqe'an lus [°bãr biãn.°°]
 really spoiled burden come (they)
be brought up really spoiled.

In the above extract, B uses the intensifier *väqe'an* 'really' before the descriptor *lus* 'spoiled' (line 3) to upgrade his agreeing response to N's assertion in lines 1 and 2, thus claiming a greater epistemic knowledge. In contrast to the above extract, in Extract 4.15, it is the initial assertion that shows epistemic superiority.

Extract 4.15

(Obstacles to a timely marriage II)

1. P be nazare man bolughe fekriam kheyli
to opinion of I maturity of intellectual also very
2. [ta'sirgozäre..h mom]kene=
influential is it's possible
in my opinion intellectual maturity is very influential as well. .h it's possible
3. M → [äre; unam kheyli moheme.]
yeah that also very important is
yeah, that's very important too.
4. P =ye nafar senesh si säl bäshe, vali
one person her/his age thirty yea be but
someone is thirty years old, but

Although P has already tried to modify her knowledge primacy of the issue through the use of the evidential marker (Chafe, 1986:266) *be nazare man* 'in my opinion' in the beginning of her turn (lines 1 and 2), M's response (line 3) shows no sign of epistemic superiority as she starts her response with an agreement token, i.e. *äre* 'yeah,' and continues with a repetition of P's assertion without using the same key words (*bolughe fekri* 'intellectual maturity' and *ta'sirgozär* 'influential'), and without using emphatic prosody (stress, elongation and loudness) or expressions (she could have used the intensifier *väqe'an* 'really' instead of *kheyli* 'very') to upgrade her knowledge position.

Therefore, although in the present data set agreeing and disagreeing sequences seem to be similar with respect to the presence of a new assertion, they appear to be different concerning the turn-design feature of epistemic asymmetry. While first disagreements always show a greater epistemic valence compared to their initial assertion, agreements can have either a greater or lesser epistemic valence.

4.6 Conclusion

With a focus on the assertions leading to first disagreements, this chapter shows that, in the context of academic discussions, not all assertions are capable of stimulating a disagreeing response: it is only new assertions that can lead to a first disagreement.

However, as evidenced by examples of new assertions not being followed by any response in the present data set, the newness of the initial assertion seems to be necessary but not sufficient to provoke a response. This also points to the fact that in the context of academic discussions the production of disagreement is not controlled by the property of conditional relevance.

The examination of different turn-design features of the assertions resulting in a first disagreement demonstrates that the participants' epistemic asymmetry is a necessary factor in the production of a disagreeing response. In order to disagree with an initial assertion, the recipient of the assertion is required to claim a greater knowledge of the issue.

So, as the present data show the action of doing disagreement is an interactional achievement because its fulfillment depends on how both interactants design their turn for their recipient. While the initial interactant is required to design their turn so that it presents a new assertion, the disagreeing interactant should design their turn to show epistemic superiority over the issue.

Chapter 5

How is disagreement sustained?

5.1 Introduction

Chapter 4 demonstrated that first disagreements were produced only in response to new assertions rather than already-stated (or old) assertions or taken-for-granted assertions. However, not all new assertions in the data were followed by a response. In those instances it was concluded that a) in order for an initial assertion to result in a disagreeing response, the newness of the assertion was necessary but not sufficient and b) the production of first disagreements could not be justified based on conditional relevance.

The examination of turn-design features capable of mobilizing recipient response showed that the speakers' epistemic asymmetry was the only feature that was always present in producing a disagreeing response. All first disagreements appeared to have a greater epistemic valence compared to their initial assertions. It was then concluded that the production of first disagreements is contingent on the newness of the initial assertion and the speakers' epistemic asymmetry. That is to say, once one of the participants presented a new assertion, an extra knowledge of that particular issue was required to be presented by the recipient(s) to disagree with that initial assertion.

This chapter aims at demonstrating how disagreements uttered in response to a prior disagreement emerge in conversation. As will be shown in section 5.3.2, such disagreements appear when in the face of a disagreement a speaker holds to the position s/he or someone else has already taken up in a prior turn and thereby brings about sequence expansion.

5.2 Review of present literature

In his discussion of sequence expansion, Schegloff (2007:117) maintains that, as opposed to preferred or agreeing responses that generally result in sequence closure, dispreferred or disagreeing responses tend to result in sequence expansion. That is to say, the sequence is not taken by the participants as complete at the end of a second pair part disagreeing response, hence the expansion of the sequence. Schegloff (2007) further considers rejecting/challenging/disagreeing with a second pair part a type of non-minimal post-expansion as 1) the rejection/challenge/disagreement is produced after the second pair part of an adjacency pair, 2) it is still part of the same sequence, and 3) it projects at least one more turn to come as it (the rejection/challenge/disagreement) is a first pair part in its own right (pp. 148-49, 159). The extract below taken from Schegloff (2007) which contains rejection of a second pair part justification produced in response to a first pair part complaint illuminates the point.

Extract 5.1 (Schegloff, 2007:159, 160)

SN-4, 5:01-40

1		((door squeaks))
2	She:	Hi Carol.=
3	Car:	=H[i : .]
4	Rut:	[CA:RO]L, HI::
5	She: F _b ->	You didn' get en icecream sanwich,
6	Car: S _{b1} ->	I kno:w, hh I decided that my body didn't need it,
7	She: ->	Yes but ours di:d=
8	She:	=hh heh-heh-heh [heh-heh-heh ['hhih
9	???:	[ehh heh heh [
10	???:	[()
11	Car: S _{b2} ->	hh Awright gimme some money en you c'n treat me to
12		one an I'll buy you a:ll some [too.]
13	She: ->	[I'm] kidding, I don't
14		need it.
15		(0.3)
16	???:	(hih)
17	Car:	I WA:N' O:N[E,
18	Ru?:	[ehh heh-hu[h
19	Car:	
		[hheh-uh 'hhh=
20	Car: S _{b3} ->	=No they [didn' even have any Ta:(h)b.=
21	Ru?:	[hheh
22	Car: S _{b3} ->	=This is all I c'd find.
23		(.)
24	Rut: ->	Well then there's ez many calories ez that prob'ly
25		in en ice cream sa:nwich=so yih jis':, yih know.
26		()
27	Car: S _{b4} ->	I know(.) an icecream sanwich is better, but I di'n
28	->	feel like going down tuh P ₂₀ an seeing all those weird
29	->	people.an have them st[a:re at me.]
30	Rut:	[In yer slipper]sɿ

31 (0.2)
32 Car: Yes.
33 (0.8)
34 Car: I don't want them tih see me when I l(h)ook t(h)his
35 good.
36 (0.2)
37 R?C: ((cough)) (H) (H) UH 'hHH=
38 Car: =N(h)o one des(h)erves it. ((hoarse voice))
39 (0.2)
40 ???: (Tch 'hh=
41 Car: I'll see you all later,
42 Rut: Awri:ght,
43 (1.4) ((door opening))

In the above extract, as explained by Schegloff (2007:160-161), in response to Sherry's FPP complaint in line 5, Carol presents a SPP justification in line 6. This dispreferred response (a preferred response to a complaint is an offer of remedy, agreeing with, or joining the complaint) is then rejected by Sherry in the next turn (line 7). The outright rejection of Carol's SPP justification results in the expansion of the sequence as Carol accepts Sherry's rejection (line 11) and presents an alternative SPP (lines 11 and 12) to the initial FPP complaint. As can be seen from the rest of the extract, due to the rejection of this second SPP response (line 13), the sequence gets further expanded.

Although Schegloff's exemplification shows us what non-minimal post-expansion looks like, it does not provide us with an example of a disagreement in response to a prior disagreement, nor does it explain what drives the sequence to get expanded beyond its SPP.

In his work on argument sequences, Coulter (1990:189) maintains that recycling of a position after a SPP disagreeing response is sequentially expansive as it is conducive to further disagreements. He demonstrates that disagreements perform two functions: on the one hand, they respond to the prior speaker's assertion, and on the other hand, as assertions they proffer a position that the prior speaker needs to respond to. As a result, disagreement sequences can take the form of chainable adjacency pairs (p. 194), with conditional relevance as their driving force.

Apart from Coulter's (1990) study, previous research into conversational interaction that involves disagreements produced in response to a prior disagreement has been

mainly concerned with determining whether disagreeing with a prior disagreement is a dispreferred response or a face threatening act. For example, using a combination of methods drawn from discourse analysis, sociolinguistics, ethnography of speaking and pragmatics, Schiffrin (1984) analyzed a series of family and friendly conversations in American English and demonstrated that for Jewish Americans sustained disagreement is a way of practicing sociability. In addition to “increased volume, rapid tempo, contrastive stress and exaggerated intonation contours,” Schiffrin (1984:318) points to continuous attempts to take the floor and the use of intensifiers in repetitions uttered in overlap with the prior turn as characteristic features of disagreeing turns.

Kakava’s (2002) interactional sociolinguistic study on friends’ casual conversations and classroom discourse showed that in Greek culture sustained disagreement is frequent because disagreement is taken as an ‘interactional ritual’ (p. 1563) and is thus a preferred action. Together with “accelerated tempo, high pitch and contrastive stress”, “competitive overlaps or latches” are the features Kakava (2002:1561) enumerates as characteristic of disagreeing turns.

Schiffrin (1984) and Kakava’s (2002) studies attribute the preferred status of sustained disagreement to the influence of culture. In contrast, Kotthoff’s (1993) research of German and Anglo-American discussions relates the preference for sustained disagreement to the context. Analyzing eight German and eight Anglo-American dyadic discussions between students and lecturers within the framework of Conversation Analysis (CA), Kotthoff (1993) demonstrated that in both German and Anglo-American groups, with the second disagreeing turn, the preference for agreement turned into preference for disagreement. That is to say, disagreements were less and less mitigated. As Kotthoff (1993:213) argues, the change of preference organization is due to the fact that in the context of a dispute the discussants are expected to constantly defend their position because failure to do so can be taken as submissiveness.

The influence of context on the sustainment of disagreement has also been reported by Gruber (1998) who focused on conflict sequences in Austrian talk shows participated

by specialists and ordinary people. The discussants frequently expressed unmitigated disagreements in overlap with the prior disagreeing turn while discussing current cultural, political and social issues. Based on this observation, Gruber (1998) proposed a change in the preference organization in disputes.

In another line of research, Muntigl & Turnbull (1998), taking a social psychological pragmatic perspective, focused on family and university students' discussions in Canadian English to examine the influence of face concerns on three-turn arguing exchanges. These exchanges consisted of Speaker A's initial claim in turn 1, followed by Speaker B's disagreement in turn 2, which is in turn followed by Speaker A's disagreement in turn 3, either through directly supporting their claim in turn 1 or directly disagreeing with B's disagreement in turn 2. As maintained by Muntigl & Turnbull (1998:252), the more B's disagreement in turn 2 threatens A's face, the more likely A's response in turn 3 directly supports their claim in turn 1.

As can be understood from the above studies, in previous research the sustainment of disagreement has been justified in the light of face concerns. However, whether disagreeing with a previous disagreement is disaffiliative or not is not the focus of the present chapter and will be attended to in Chapter 7. Since, neither the above studies nor any other research has investigated the influence of turn design features capable of mobilizing response on opposition sustainment, there is a gap in this domain. This provides the impetus for the present chapter. However, before attending to turn design features that can be involved in stimulating response (section 5.4), there is a section (5.3) presenting an overview of what disagreements produced in response to a prior disagreement would look like with respect to features not related to response mobilization.

5.3 Features not related to response mobilization

This section aims at examining how opposition is expressed in disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement and whether they make use of the key words/phrases of the prior disagreeing turn. It also examines whether disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement start at a normal transition space of their prior

disagreeing turn, whether they are commonly single or multi-TCU turns and whether they are produced by the same speakers or not. It is worth noting that although in Chapter 5 there was a section on address terms in first disagreements, there would be no comparable section in this chapter as the examination of the whole data set points to no instances of address terms in disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement.

5.3.1 Opposite valence

The examination of 58 disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement shows that the speakers employ the same ways used in the production of first disagreements to express opposition in disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement. The observed ways, based on the frequency of their occurrence in the present data set, have been listed below. Due to the exact similarity of these ways with those in the production of first disagreements and the limited space of the present chapter, the readers are referred to other sections for examples of each way.

Using a declarative that indicates opposition with the proposition of the prior disagreeing turn: The speaker expresses opposition with the prior disagreeing turn through an affirmative (Extract 5.3, line 23; Extract 5.8, lines 3,4 and 6; Extract 5.9, line 28) or a negative declarative (Extract 5.4, lines 25 and 26; Extract 5.9, line 35).

*Using the contrast conjunction *vali/ama* ‘but’:* The speaker presents a contrasting assertion prefaced by the contrast conjunction *vali/ama* ‘but’ (Extract 5.2, lines 25, 26 and 28; Extract 5.5, lines 42, 44-46, 48 and 50; Extract 5.6, lines 17 and 19).

Negating the proposition expressed in the prior disagreeing turn: The speaker adds the particles *na* ‘no’ and/or *na/ne* ‘not’ to the prior disagreeing turn (Extract 5.5, line 26; Extract 5.7, line 12) or deletes them from the prior disagreement (Extract 5.4, line 18).

Using formulaic expressions that show opposition: The speaker produces a statement whose verb is one of *moväfeq nistam*, *qabul nadäram*, *nemipaziram*, all meaning ‘I don’t agree’ or *mokhälefam* ‘I disagree’ (Extract 5.3, lines 37 and 39; Extract 5.8, lines 116 and 117).

Using rhetorical or known-answer questions: The speaker casts doubt on the validity of the prior disagreement through a rhetorical question (see Extract 5.9, lines 25 and 27).

Substituting an element of the prior disagreement with an element of similar structural function: The disagreeing speaker replaces the problematic item detected in the prior disagreement with an item of similar structural function (Extract 5.8, line 124).

As stated in this section, in disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement, opposition is expressed in a variety of different ways which are similar to those used in the production of first disagreements.

5.3.2 Repetition of the same key words/phrases

As demonstrated in Chapter 3, section 3.4.4, use of the same key words/phrases as in the initial assertions leading to first disagreements is a common feature of first-disagreement turns. The first-disagreement producers repeated the key words/phrases of the initial assertion to tie their disagreement with the initial assertion and also to achieve knowledge primacy from a second position.

In order to see whether disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement share this feature, i.e. repetition of the same word/phrases, with first disagreements, the 58 disagreements were examined. In 77.59% of these disagreements (45 out of 58) the speakers use the same key words/phrases used in their prior disagreeing turn, as in the following extract taken from the six-party discussion on drug addiction.

Extract 5.2

(Drug addiction I)

- | | | | | | | |
|----|---|--|-----------------|----------------|--------------|-----------|
| 1. | L | [ba'd | kheili | jäle]be, | äre, .h | märijuänä |
| | | DM (then) | very | interesting is | yes | marijuana |
| 2. | | be | hich | vajh .h | e[tiäde]= | |
| | | to | no | aspect | addiction of | |
| 3. | A | | | [vali:] | | |
| | | | | but | | |
| 4. | L | =jesmäni | nadäre.= | | | |
| | | physical | it doesn't have | | | |
| | | then it's so interesting, yeah, marijuana is not physically addictive at all. | | | | |

.
.
(Fourteen lines over which A and L disagree with each other about another characteristic of marijuana have been deleted.)

19. H [na:] na; m^o[(injur)] nis.^o=
no no like this it's not
no, no. that's not true.
20. L [khob in]
DM this
khob this
21. H 1st→ =[ba'd inke] migid [shomä e'tiäd] nadäre=
then (DM) that you say you addiction doesn't have
then, that you say it's not addictive
22. J [()] [()]
23. H =ke sad dar sad e'tiäd däre m[ärijuänä.]
that hundred in hundred addiction it has marijuana
but it's a hundred percent addictive.
24. L 2nd→ [e'tiäd]
addiction
25. d[äre, amä e'tiäde märi e'tiäd be märijuänä (.) kämelan=
it has but addiction mari addiction to marijuana totally
it is addictive, but its addiction (.) is totally psychological.
26. A [e'tiäd däre,]
addiction it has
it's addictive.
27. L =ravänie. =ya'ni jsmäni nist.
psychological meaning physical it isn't
I mean it's not physically addictive.

In lines 1, 2 and 4, L asserts that 'marijuana is not physically addictive at all' (initial assertion). This assertion is then followed by a discussion between A and L over another property of marijuana (lines 5-18). H then takes the turn and, after siding with A (line 19), disagrees (first disagreement) with L's assertion in lines 1, 2 and 4. As can be seen in lines 21 and 23, H designs his utterance so that it first embeds L's initial assertion as its subject (noun clause), i.e. *inke migid shomä e'tiäd nadäre* 'that you say it's not addictive' (line 21), and then repeats the same assertion, substituting the

emphatic adverb *sad dar sad* ‘one hundred percent’ for its negative equivalent *be hich vajh* ‘in no way’ (line 2) in L’s assertion, and deleting the negative prefix attached to the verb of L’s assertion, i.e. *na-* in *nadäre* ‘doesn’t have’ (see line 23). Additionally, H opts to repeat the key word *mārijuanā* ‘marijuana’ (the subject of L’s assertion in lines 1, 2 and 4) at the end of his utterance (line 23) while he could drop it as Persian is a pro-drop language (Mahootian, 1997:206).

In her discussion of format tying in English speaking children’s argumentative sequences, Goodwin (1990) talks about how to connect a turn to prior speaker’s turn. She refers to incorporating prior speaker’s talk as an embedded part of one’s utterance, adding/removing negation and substitution as three different strategies speakers commonly employ to connect their turn to a prior speaker’s turn (p. 180). In so doing, the speakers reuse the wording of the prior speaker’s turn and thus connect their utterance to that.

Linking to the prior turn is also evident in the next turn (lines 24, 25 and 27) in which L disagrees (second disagreement) with H’s disagreement. As can be seen in lines 24 and 25, L’s disagreement is prefaced by a partial repetition of H’s utterance, i.e. *e’tiād däre* ‘it’s addictive.’ Note that although this partial repetition could be replaced with an agreement token such as *äre* ‘yeah’ or a confirmation such as *doroste* ‘that’s right,’ L prefers to repeat the key phrase used in the prior speaker’s talk. Following that, using the contrast marker *amā* ‘but,’ L presents the main component of her disagreement, i.e. *e’tiād be mārijuanā kāmēlan ravānie* ‘marijuana addiction is totally psychological’ (lines 25 and 27’). Although L could totally drop the noun phrase *e’tiād be mārijuanā* ‘marijuana addiction’ (it is the subject of the sentence and Persian is a pro-drop language) or at least replace ‘marijuana’ with its pronominal clitic *sh* ‘its’ as in *e’tiādesh* ‘its addiction,’ she chooses to repeat the two key words.

So, one reason behind the repetition of the key words of the prior disagreeing turn in a subsequent disagreement is tying the current turn to the prior one. A second reason is claiming epistemic superiority from a second position. As demonstrated in Chapter 3,

section 3.4.5, one way of claiming epistemic priority in disagreements is using the same key words as in the initial assertions.

In sum, the speakers' high tendency (77.59%) to repeat the key words/phrases/utterances used in the prior speaker's turn points to the importance of this strategy in building connection between turns in disagreement sequences. Apart from this function, the repetition of key words used in a disagreed-with turn can serve the function of claiming epistemic primacy.

5.3.3 Turn onset

A third key feature of first-disagreement turns, as shown in Chapter 3, section 3.4.3, is that the majority of them (66.1%) had an urgent onset, i.e. started in a reduced transition space or at a point of maximal incompleteness of their prior turn. Less than a third of first disagreements (28.82%) had a non-urgent onset, i.e. started after a pause or intervening talk. Only a very small percentage of them (5.08%) started at a normal transition space of their initial assertions. As argued before, while the urgency in expressing a disagreeing response may point to the speakers' preference to rectify the problem detected in the initial assertion as soon as possible, the lateness of first disagreements can be suggestive of the disaffiliative nature of doing disagreement.

The examination of the onset of disagreements produced in response to a prior disagreement in the current data set reflects the following results:

Table 5.1 Frequency and percentage of the onset of disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement

disagreement turn onset	Frequency	Percentage
“Normal” ³⁵	8	13.79
Urgent	41	70.69
Non-urgent	9	15.52

³⁵ As mentioned in Chapter 3, section 3.4.3, the word “normal” is taken from Jefferson (1984, 1986) and Schegloff (2007) as part of their definition of normal transition space.

As in the table, above two thirds of these disagreements (70.69%) have an urgent onset; that is, they start in a reduced transition space or at a point of maximal incompleteness of their prior turn. Disagreements that start at a normal transition space of their prior disagreement (13.79%) together with those that have a non-urgent onset (15.52%), i.e. start after a pause or intervening talk, constitute less than a third of disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement. The examination of disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement also shows that, as with first disagreements, the urgency in producing these disagreements can be due to a preference to correct the detected problem in the prior disagreeing turn as soon as possible. By contrast, the non-urgency in expressing such disagreements can point to the disaffiliative nature of the action. The extract below taken from the mixed-gender, four-party discussion on globalization contains urgent and non-urgent disagreements.

Extract 5.3

(Globalization III)

1. S Zhāpon ke osulan modern nist.
Japan that basically modern isn't
Basically, Japan isn't modern.
2. (1.0)
3. H osulan modern nist?
basically modern isn't
it's not modern basically?
4. S \$osula(h)n modern n[ist.\$]
basically modern isn't
it's not modern basically.
5. H → [al'ä]n mo[derntarin]
now the most modern
at present, the most modern
6. S [talfiqe] moderno tajadode.
combination of modern and modernity is
it's a combination of modern and modernity.
7. (0.2)
8. moderno sonate. =khob nemishe.
Modern and tradidion is DM it doesn't become
It's a combination of modernity and tradition. *khob* that's impossible.

9. H 1st→ na; na; na. =man goftam hălă harfämo. =bebin, =Zhä:pon (.)
no no no I I said DM my word look Japan
no, no, no. I said my words. look,
10. yä Kor- Koreye jonubi alän: e:h asan (0.5) ruhe amperiälisti
or South Korea now eh basically spirit of imperialism
11. däkhele Koreye jonub[ie.]
inside of South Korea
Japan or South Korea, now the spirit of imperialism is basically within South Korea.
12. S 2nd 1→ [Kor]e Jonubi (ke jod[äs])
South Korea that separate is
South Korea is different
13. H [yä] Zhäpone.] Zhä[pon] mage- agar=
or Japan Japan except if
14. S 2nd 2→ [na:]
no
15. H =khasise amperiälisti nadäsht, sabr kon,
characteristic of imperialistic didn't have patience do.IMP
or Japan, if Japan didn't have an imperialistic characteristic, wait (a moment)!
16. Z .h[h]
17. H [ne]miumad tu jange jahäni sher[kat kone.]
It didn't come in war of world participation it does.SBJN
it wouldn't participate in the world war.
18. S 2nd 3→ [na, äkhe] ye chi-
no DM a thin-
19. ma[qule: K]o[re]
case of Korea
no, the case of Korea
20. H [doroge?]
right is
is that right?
21. Z [ba[le.]
yes
yes.
22. H [ne]miäd masalan hamle bekone be (.)
it doesn't come for example attack it does.SBJN to
it wouldn't, for example, attack (.)
23. S 2nd 4→ na, äkhe maquleye Kore bä Zhon- bä Zhäpon motafävet[e.]
no DM case of Korea with Jan- with Japan different is
no, the case of Korea is different from Japan.

24. H [ä]re,
yes
25. motafäivate ch[on az: nazare täríkhi]
different is because from opinion of historically
yes, it's different because from a historical view
26. S [Kore: mitune modern beshe]
Korea it can modern it becomes.SBJN
Korea can become modern,
27. (0.5)
28. Kore mitune modern beshe,
Korea it can modern it becomes.SBJN
Korea can become modern,
29. (0.4)
30. H p! khob,=
MRT
khob,
31. S =vali Zhäpo:n (0.2) aslan khodesh qabl az inke modern ham
But Japan basically itself before from that modern also
32. biäd dākhele farhange kohanesh (.) nemudhäi az (.) mm hamun chiz
it comes.SBJN within culture of its ancient aspects from same DM
33. bude az hamun (0.3) e:h modern bude,
has been from same eh modern has been
but basically, before the appearance of modernity, Japan itself had aspects of modernity within its ancient culture.
34. (.)
35. mese hamun: (.) räsionälite.
like same rationality
like the rationality.
36. (0.2)
37. H 3rd→ n[a: tch na. qabul na]däram=
no no acceptance I don't have
38. S [masalan mesle hamun näsionälism.]
for example like same nationalism
for example, like the nationalism.
39. H =ino:.
this DOM
no, no. I don't accept that.

In the above extract, S's initial assertion that Japan is not modern (line 1) results in H's disagreeing response (first disagreement) in lines 9-11, 13, 15 and 17. This first

disagreement shows H's orientation to the disaffiliative nature of the action as it has been expressed after a rather long silence of one second (line 2) and a clarification question (line 3), both of which foreshadow a dispreferred second pair part (Pomerantz, 1984:70, Schegloff, 2007:102).

S then makes several attempts to take the turn and disagree (second disagreement) with H's first disagreement before H completes his extended turn. As can be seen from lines 12-18, S's first three attempts to take the turn (lines 12, 14 and 18) which occur in overlap with H's unfolding response are all abortive as H manages to either re-take (lines 13 and 20) or hold (line 13) the turn. S's fourth attempt to take the turn (line 23) after a micropause in H's utterance (line 22) occurs at a point of maximal incompleteness of H's TCU as H's TCU needs an object of preposition. However, as demonstrated by Jefferson (1984:32), recipients/next speakers recurrently start speaking when a silence occurs in the middle of an uncompleted utterance. Although this time S manages to complete his sentence that 'the case of Korea is different from Japan,' once more he attempts to take the turn (line 26) from H (who has taken the turn to apparently express his agreement with S concerning the two countries' difference) at a point of maximal incompleteness to explicate in what respect South Korea and Japan are different. S's urgent attempts to take the floor are suggestive of his preference to correct the problem he has identified in H's assertion concerning Japan's resemblance to South Korea (lines 9-11) as soon as possible.

By contrast, H's subsequent disagreement (third disagreement) occurs with delay (line 37). As in lines 25-28, as S's first bit of information about the difference between Japan and South Korea (line 26) has been expressed in complete overlap with H's utterance (line 25), after half a second silence (line 27) and in the lack of a response, he repeats the same bit of information (line 28) in a slightly rising intonation to secure a response. After a gap of four tenths of a second (line 29), the only response that H presents is the minimal response token *khob* (line 30), demonstrating he has understood S's talk thus far and wants him to continue (Sharifi & Azadmanesh, 2012:114; Mohammadi, 2018:123). Note that the use of the continuer *khob* here can be

suggestive of H's upcoming disagreement because H could have produced an agreement token like *doroste* 'right' or *bale* 'yes' instead.

Upon the possible completion of H's turn, S takes the turn (line 31) and asserts 'but basically, before the appearance of modernity, Japan had aspects of modernity within its ancient culture' in a slightly rising intonation to provoke a response. However, after a micro silence (line 34) and in the absence of H's response, S adds the increment 'like the rationality' (line 35). As Heritage (2006:22) puts it, increments can provide speakers with the means to anticipate and forestall a disaffiliative action. So, this increment seems to be produced in anticipation and prevention of H's forthcoming disagreement. As can be seen from the rest of the extract, despite S's preventive action, after a gap of two tenths of a second (line 36), H presents a disagreeing response (lines 37 and 39). H's delay in producing a disagreeing response can thus be indicative of the disaffiliative nature of doing disagreement.

As shown in the above extract, the urgent onset of a disagreement responsive to a prior disagreement points to the speaker's preference to rectify the problem detected in the prior disagreement as soon as possible in the context of multi-party discussion. By contrast, the non-urgent onset of disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement is indicative of the speakers' orientation toward disagreement as a disaffiliative action.

Moreover, the comparison of the percentages of the turn onset of disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement with those of the onset of first-disagreement turns ("normal": 5.08, urgent: 66.01, non-urgent: 28.82) shows that while the percentages of turns with a "normal" or urgent onset have increased, the percentage of disagreeing turns with a non-urgent onset has decreased. This might point to a change in the preference organization in the context of disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement. That is to say, disagreements that are expressed in response to a prior disagreement might show fewer dispreferred features than first disagreements. This is an issue that will be attended to in Chapter 7.

5.3.4 Single/multi-TCU turns

The examination of disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement in the current data set shows that, as with first disagreements, a great majority of these disagreements (49 out of 58 or 84.48%) have been composed of more than one TCU. There are only 9 disagreements (15.52%) that have been made up of single TCUs. Extract 5.4 below, taken from the six-party discussion on drug addiction, contains an example of a multi-TCU and a single-TCU disagreeing turn.

Extract 5.4

(Drug addiction I)

- | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|---|--|--------------------------|--|--------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|---------------|
| 1. | L | mārijuānā .h
marijuana | toriye
is such | ke
that | vaqti
when | fard
person | masraf
use | mikone, (.)
does | shād
happy |
| 2. | | mishe;
becomes
marijuana is such that when a person takes it, (.) s/he becomes happy; | | | | | | | |
| 3. | M | uhu[m,]
uhum | | | | | | | |
| 4. | L | [ya'ni- mm
meaning | kheili
very | mokararo
frequent and | bedune
without | hich
any | dalili
reason | haminjuri
like this | |
| 5. | | mizane zire khande,
strikes under laughter
I mean s/he bursts into laughter very frequently and without any reason. | | | | | | | |
| 6. | | .hh yā
or | inke:
that | khābe: (.)
sleep | nādorosti
unsound | dāre,
has | mārijuānā
marijuana | masraf
use | kone,
does |
| 7. | | mārijuānā bā'es mishe khābe rāhati dāshte bāshe;=
marijuana cause becomes sleep restful have be.SBJN
or if s/he doesn't sleep well, marijuana helps them to have a sound sleep. | | | | | | | |
| 8. | A | =°ta[nzim
Regulation | mikone: ?°]
does | | does it regulate sleep? | | | | |
| 9. | L | [ba'd
DM (then) | kheili
very | jāle]be,
interesting is | āre, .h
yes | mārijuānā
marijuana | | | |
| 10. | | be
to | hich
no | vajh .h
aspect | e[tiāde]=
addiction | | | | |
| 11. | A | [vali::]
but | | | | | | | |
| 12. | L | =jesmāni
physical | nadāre.=
doesn't have | then it's so interesting, yeah, marijuana is not physically addictive at all. | | | | | |

13. A 1st → =migin:: khābo rāhat mikone, =shomā ke migin shādi
you say sleep.DOM restful does you that you say happiness
14. ro a[fzāyesh mide,] =kesi ke hayajān o shādish=
DOM increase gives anyone who excitement and his/her happiness
15. M [mārijuānā etiād]
marijuana addiction
16. A =mire bālā dige kho kh↑ā:b [nadāre] aslan.=
goes up DM (anymore) DM (well) sleep doesn't have at all
(that) you say it brings a sound sleep, you're saying it increases happiness, (but) anyone who is excited or overly happy can't sleep at all.
17. M [°°khāb°°]
sleep
18. L 2nd → =khāb dā:re.
sleep has
they can sleep.
19. (.)
20. ejāze bedid,= masan da:r e:h (.) sare kelās hālā masalan
permission give for example in eh head of class DM for example
21. tu zendegiye ruzmarash bish az: baqiye shāde:, khob?
in life of her/his everyday more than others happy is DM
just a minute. say, in the class, say, in their everyday life, they're happier than others, khob?
22. M uhum,
uhum
uhum,
23. L moqeye khābidanesham mm kheili tanzimtaro kheili ruformtar
when her/his sleeping also much more organized and much in better shape
24. az baqi[ye afrade.]
from rest of individuals is
also when sleeping, they'd be much more organized and in much better shape than other people.
25. A 3rd → [be nazare] man in dotā bā ham jur dar
to opinion of I this two with together match in
26. nemi[ān.]
don't come
in my opinion, these two don't go together.
27. H [na:] na; m °[(injur)] nis.°=
no no like this it's not
no, no. that's not true.
28. L [khob in]
DM this
Khob this

As in the extract, in response to A's disagreement that 'anyone who is excited and overly happy can't sleep at all' (first disagreement) (lines 14 and 16), L produces a disagreeing turn (second disagreement) (lines 18-21, 23 and 24) consisting of 5 TCUs: 1) 'they can sleep,' 2) 'just a minute,' 3) 'say, in the class, say, in their everyday life, s/he is happier than others,' 4) 'right' and 5) 'also when sleeping, they'd be much more organized and in much better shape than other people.'³⁶ In the next turn, as L's explanation does not seem convincing to A, once more she disagrees with L (third disagreement), using the single TCU 'in my opinion, these two don't go together' (lines 25 and 26).

The high percentage of multi-TCU disagreement turns seems to be related to the turn design feature of epistemic valence. As will be shown in section 5.4.2, in order to disagree with a prior disagreement, speakers are required to present accounts or other supportive information to show their epistemic supremacy compared to the disagreed-with party, hence producing multi-TCU turns. In the above extract, for instance, in the second disagreement of the sequence which is a multi-TCU turn, after expressing opposition (line 18), L presents supporting information (lines 20, 21, 23 and 24).

5.3.5 Same or different speakers?

Out of 58 disagreements expressed in response to a prior disagreement, 56 (96.5%) are expressed by the speaker who was disagreed with in the prior turn. There are only 2 instances of disagreement (3.5%) produced by a speaker different from the one being disagreed with in the prior turn. Extract 5.4 above exemplifies same-speaker disagreements.

As in the extract, in lines 1 and 2, L presents the assertion that 'marijuana is such that when a person takes it, s/he becomes happy,' and then adding that it makes the person burst into frequent laughter (lines 4 & 5) and regulates their sleep (lines 6 & 7)

³⁶ Note that L's second TCU, i.e. 'just a minute,' and fourth TCU, i.e. 'right,' have not been used to make propositional contribution to L's disagreement. The expression 'just a minute' has just been uttered as a request to secure the right to a turn and the interrogative 'right' aims to invite the recipients' agreement with the proposition of L's third TCU before she moves to her fifth TCU.

elaborates on this assertion. Asserting that ‘anyone who is excited and overly happy can’t sleep at all,’ A disagrees with L’s assertion (lines 13, 14 and 16) (first disagreement). As can be seen in the next turn (lines 18, 20, 21, 23 and 24), it is L herself who disagrees (second disagreement) with A’s first disagreement by defending her own initial assertion. As can be observed from lines 25 and 26, L’s account does not appear convincing to A. As a result, A maintains her previous stance and once more disagrees with L (third disagreement).

The very high percentage (96.5%) of the disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement that have been expressed by the speaker who was disagreed with in the prior turn can be justified on three grounds. First, as stated earlier (see section 5.2), apart from being responsive to a prior speaker’s assertion, disagreements introduce a position that the prior speaker needs to respond to. Second, it may be due to the bias in the turn-taking system in favor of the ‘speaker just prior to current speaker to be selected as next speaker’ (Sacks et al., 1974:708). Third, it can be related to speaker gaze as these disagreements have all been expressed by the gaze recipient of the prior disagreement producer. As will be discussed in section 5.3.1, in the context of disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement, speaker gaze has a great influence in mobilizing the recipient disagreeing response.

However, due to the multi-party nature of the discussions, it is possible that a speaker other than the one being disagreed with in the prior turn takes the turn and disagree with the prior disagreement. As demonstrated by Coulter’s (1990:191-192) study on argument sequences, speakers can latch into a developing argument via self-selection to affiliate themselves to one of the opposing parties. In the present data set, there are two instances of disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement being produced by a speaker different from the one being disagreed with in the prior turn who latch into the developing argument through self-selection. Extract 5.5 below taken from the three-party discussion on drug and alcohol addiction presents one of the two cases.

Extract 5.5

(Drug and alcohol addiction)

1. S .h yā masalan ba'ziyā migan e'tiād bimāriye:, [ke man] asan=
 or for example some say addiction is a disease that I at all
2. Z [uhum,]
 uhum
3. S =qabul nadāram e'tiād bimāriye. =nemidunam
 acceptance I don't have addiction is a disease I don't know
or, for example, some say (drug) addiction is a disease that I don't accept at all.
4. (0.5)
 .
 .
 ((Twelve lines over which S presents her opinion about alcohol addiction have been omitted.))
17. vali inke bekhāy (0.3) to be 'onvāne ye māda:r shoru'
 but that you want.SBJN you to title of a mother start
18. koni ravandī ke be bachat in āzādi ro bedi
 you do.SBJN a trend that to your child this freedom DOM give.SBJN
19. °fekr miko[nam°]
 thought I do
but if you as a mother want to start giving your child the freedom to drink alcohol, I think
20. Z 1st→ [hālā] dar morede ma[shrub hālā mā bishtar] hālā=
 DM in case of alcohol DM we more DM
about alcohol, we tend to
21. S [kamtar pish biād.]
 less front it comes.SBJN
it's not common.
22. Z =masalan e'tiād bekhāym begim
 for example addiction we want.SBJN we say
talking about addiction,
23. hālā shomā migi masan e'tiād bi:māri hesābesh nemikoni, vali
 DM you say for example addiction disease its consideration you don't do but
24. be nazare man masalan .hh bimāri hesāb [mishe.]
 to opinion of I for example disease account becomes
you say you don't take addiction as a disease, but in my opinion it's a disease.
25. S [bimāri][ye::?]
 disease is
is it a disease?
26. F 2nd→ [BIMĀ]RI ništ:
 disease isn't
27. be in dalil ke miduni cherā, =chonke bi:māri (.) gheyre
 to this reason that you know why because disease non

28. erādiye,
volitional is
it's not a disease. do you know why? because a disease is non-volitional.
29. (0.3)
.
.
.
(Nine lines omitted.)
39. F [vali] khob .hh e'tiād kheyli erādeye khodet rush ta'sir [dāre.]
but DM addiction very volition of yourself on it influence has
but *khob* .hh addiction is highly under the influence of one's own volition.
40. S [daqi]qan.
exactly
exactly.
41. (0.3)
42. Z 3rd→ °ʔinam [ʔha::st, vali khob° age] az ye=
these is but DM if from one
that's true, but *khob*
43. F [va inke pishgiriām mituni bekonī.]
or that prevention also you can you do.SBJN
and you can also prevent it.
44. Z =senini be nazare man bāshe ke nākhās:te ye
ages to opinion of I be.SBJN that unwantedly one
45. nafar masalan hamin .h bachehäye khiyābunio inā ke .h
person for example these children of of street and these that
46. yā masalan bachei ke asan mādar mo'tāde asan mo[ʔād] be=
or for example a child that basically mother is addicted basically addicted to
47. S [āre,]
yeah
48. Z =donya: miā:d,=
world comes
49. S =°ä[re,°]
yeah
50. Z [.h i]n che- che ekhtiāri khodesh dāsh:te?
this what what option her/himself has has
in my opinion, if it starts at an early age, as in street children or children basically born to addicted mothers, how can it be within their control?

Here, in lines 1 and 3, S asserts that addiction is not a disease. Z then disagrees with this initial assertion, stating that she considers addiction a disease (lines 23 and 24) (first disagreement). As can be seen from the rest of the extract, although S makes an

early attempt to take the next turn (line 25) to support her initial assertion (evidenced by her confirmation of F's assertion in line 40), it is F who, increasing her volume, manages to latch into the argument (line 26) and disagree (second disagreement) with Z's disagreement, asserting that while catching a disease is not on a person's own volition (lines 27 and 28), becoming addicted is within their control (line 39). As in lines 42, 44-46, 48 and 50), Z then disagrees (third disagreement) with F's disagreement.

Therefore, in a multiparty discussion, it is possible that a disagreement responsive to a prior disagreement be expressed by a speaker different from the one disagreed with in the prior turn, who latches into the developing argument self-selectively. This is compatible with the fact that in any conversation 'turn order is not fixed' and is 'locally controlled' (Sacks et al., 1974:708).

As shown in section 5.2, disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement share features with first disagreements. In disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement, opposition is expressed in a number of different ways similar to those used in first disagreements. As with first disagreements, in disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement speakers make use of the key words and phrases of the prior disagreeing turn to both connect their utterance to the prior turn and claim epistemic supremacy from a second position. Moreover, like first disagreements, the majority of these disagreements have an urgent onset. The urgency in the production of these disagreements in the context of multi-party discussions points to the speakers' preference to rectify the detected problem in the prior disagreeing turn as soon as possible. Similar to first disagreements, the vast majority of disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement have been composed of more than one TCU. As will be discussed in section 5.3.2, this is due to the fact that the disagreeing speaker is required to present accounts or supportive information to show knowledge primacy. It has also been demonstrated that the vast majority of disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement have been produced by the speaker who has been disagreed with in the prior turn. This seems to be related to the speakers' tendency to select the prior speaker as the next speaker.

So far, we have examined features not related to response mobilization. In what follows we will examine the effect of turn design features capable of mobilizing response on the sustainment of opposition.

5.4 Turn design features capable of mobilizing response

In Chapter 4, Section 4.3, it was demonstrated that among the turn design features of interrogative syntax, interrogative prosody, participants' knowledge asymmetry, and speaker gaze, the epistemic asymmetry was the only feature that played an essential role in eliciting the recipient disagreeing response. All first disagreements showed a greater epistemic valence compared to their initial assertion. Concerning syntax and intonation, it was observed that the vast majority of the assertions leading to a first disagreement were expressed in declarative syntax and falling intonation. However, neither of these are relevant to response mobilization because, as shown by Stivers & Rossano (2010a), interrogative syntax and rising intonation are the features that make the recipient accountable to provide a response. As for the prosodic features of stress and elongation, it was found that they provided the initial assertion producers with a means of attracting the recipients' attention to contrasting ideas, thus provoking their disagreeing response. However, these two features were labeled influential rather than essential in stimulating the recipient disagreeing response as they were present in just less than a third of assertions leading to a first disagreement. Concerning gaze, the initial assertion producer's gaze at the recipient appeared to be an important factor in eliciting a disagreeing response as the majority of first disagreements have been produced by gaze recipients of the initial assertion producers.

We are now going to see whether disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement are produced under the same conditions as with first disagreements. Therefore, this section examines the influence of gaze, speakers' epistemic asymmetry, syntax and intonation, and the prosodic features of stress, elongation and loudness, in sustaining disagreement.

5.4.1 Speaker gaze

In Chapter 4, section 4.3.3, it was revealed that the majority of first disagreements (62.1%) in the present data set were expressed by those who were gaze recipients of initial assertion producers. However, the fairly high percentage of first disagreements (37.9%) expressed by those who were not gaze recipients leads us to suggest that, in the context of academic discussions, speaker gaze is not an essential feature of assertions leading to a first disagreement.

By contrast, the analysis of disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement reveals that 56 out of these 58 disagreements (96.55%) are produced by those who are gaze recipients of the prior disagreement producer. Only 2 disagreements are expressed by a participant other than the gaze recipient(s) of the prior disagreement producer. Extract 5.5 exemplifies both situations.

Extract 5.5

(Drug and alcohol addiction)

1. S .h yā masalan ba'ziyā migan *e'tiād bimāriye:, [ke man] asan=
or for example some say addiction is a disease that I at all
S gazing toward F **S gazing toward Z*
2. Z [uhum,]
uhum
Z gazing toward S
3. S =*qabul nadāram *e'tiād bim*āriye. =nemidunam
acceptance I don't have addiction is a disease I don't know
**S gazing toward F* **S gazing toward Z* **S gazing toward F*
or, for example, some say (drug) addiction is a disease that I don't accept at all.
4. (0.5)
.
.
((Twelve lines over which S presents her opinion about alcohol addiction have been omitted.))
17. vali inke bekhāy (0.3) to be 'onvāne ye māda:r shoru'
but that you want.SBJN you to title of a mother start
S gazing toward Z
18. koni ravandi ke be bachat in āzādi ro bedi
you do.SBJN a trend that to your child this freedom DOM give.SBJN
S gazing toward Z
19. °fekr miko[nam°]
thought I do
S gazing toward Z

but if you as a mother want to start giving your child the freedom to drink alcohol, I think

20. Z 1st→ [hālā] dar morede ma[shrub hālā mā bishtar] hālā=
DM in case of alcohol DM we more DM
Z gazing toward S
about alcohol, we tend to,
21. S [kamtar pish biād.]
less front it comes.SBJN
S gazing toward Z
it's not common.
22. Z =*masalan e'tiād bekhāym begim
for example addiction we want.SBJN we say
**Z gazing down*
talking about addiction,
23. hālā shomā migi masan *e'tiād bi:māri hesābesh nemikoni, vali
DM you say for example addiction disease its consideration you don't do but
*Z gazing down *Z gazing toward S*
24. be nazare man masalan .hh bimāri hesāb [mishe.]
to opinion of I for example disease account becomes
Z gazing toward S
you say you don't take addiction as a disease, but in my opinion it's a disease.
25. S [bimāri][ye::]
disease is
S gazing toward Z
it's a disease
26. F 2nd→ [BIMĀ]RI nīst:
disease isn't
F gazing toward S
27. be in dalil ke *miduni cherā, =*chonke bi:māri (.) gheyre
to this reason that you know why because disease non
**F gazing toward Z *F gazing toward S*
28. erādiye,
volitional is
F gazing toward S
it's not a disease. do you know why? because a disease is non-volitional.
29. (0.3)
.
.
(Nine lines over which F is explicating her position while gazing at either Z or S omitted.)
39. F [vali] khob .hh e'tiād *kheyli erādeye khodet rush *ta'sir [dāre.]
but DM addiction very volition of yourself on it influence has

possible completion of Z's utterance (line 24), it is F who manages to take the next turn (line 26) and disagrees (second disagreement) with Z's disagreement. Note that F is not the recipient of Z's gaze.

By contrast, F's multi-TCU disagreeing turn (lines 26-39) is produced while she is gazing at either S or Z. As can be seen from the rest of the extract, after a three-tenth-of-a-second silence (line 41) following S's confirmative response (line 40), Z takes the turn (line 42) and disagrees with F (third disagreement). So, while the second disagreement has been produced by a participant who has not been the gaze recipient of the first-disagreement producer, the third disagreement has been expressed by a gaze recipient of the second-disagreement producer.

Although the vast majority of the disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement are produced by a gaze recipient of the prior disagreement producer, the existence of two disagreements not produced by a gaze recipient of the prior disagreement producer leads us to consider gaze as an important but not an essential feature of disagreeing turns leading to another disagreement. That is to say, gaze is an important factor in mobilizing the recipient disagreeing response.

5.4.2 Epistemic valence

In chapter 4, section 3.4.7, it was demonstrated that all first disagreements had a greater epistemic valence in comparison with their respective initial assertions. To indicate their superior knowledge of an issue, the speakers used a variety of resources. They presented new, opposing information of the issue, accompanied by accounts or other supportive information. They based their accounts on those they had primary rights to evaluate (for example, their friends and acquaintances) (Heritage, 2002a:213, Heritage & Raymond, 2006). They emphasized the recency of their knowledge (Heritage, 2013a:377) or presented first-hand knowledge (e.g., knowledge that comes from visual access rather than hearsay) (Raymond & Heritage, 2006:684). They also used linguistic resources associated with epistemic primacy such as emphatic prosody and emphatic expressions and the repetition of the key words of the prior turn.

The fact that all first disagreements had a greater epistemic valence compared to their initial assertions led us to suggest that, in the context of academic discussions, the epistemic engine of knowledge imbalance can be treated more as a tug of war than a seesaw. The contest starts with an assertion producer taking an initial K+ position through presenting some degree of knowledgeableability of a particular state of affairs. First-disagreement producers move the contest forward and get the upper hand by claiming to be more knowledgeable than their respective, initial assertion producers. If a disagreement sequence is going to extend beyond its SPP disagreeing turn (first disagreement), then the tug of war needs to go on which will be realized if further opposing K+ contributions are made to the discussion.

The examination of the data set reveals that the vast majority of disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement (56 out of 58 or 96.55%) show knowledge superiority compared to their respective, prior disagreements. There are only two consecutive disagreements (3.45%) in the whole data set that seem not to be superior than their prior disagreements in their epistemic valence. The extracts below illuminate the point. The first two extracts, i.e. Extracts 5.6 and 5.7, exemplify disagreements that show a greater epistemic valence compared to their prior disagreements. They are then followed by Extract 5.8 which contains the two disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement that don't show a superior epistemic valence compared to their prior disagreements. Since disagreement can be accompanied by mitigating devices like hedges, evidentials or partial agreements which are capable of downgrading epistemic authority (Chafe, 1986:270), the first two extracts have been selected so that the first one (5.6) contains downgraders and the second one (5.7) does not. Extract 5.6, which was already presented in Chapter 3 as Extract 3.28 and is now re-presented with the ensuing turns, has been taken from the three-party discussion on obstacles to a timely marriage. It starts at a point where S makes a general assertion about boys. S, P and M, three female classmates, have been talking about the advantages of getting married and starting a family as opposed to making friends from time to time before the extract starts.

As discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.4.5, in this extract, P claims epistemic primacy while producing a first disagreement (lines 5-10, 12 and 14-16) in response to S's initial assertion (lines 1 and 2). In the present extract, S disagrees (lines 17 and 19-27) with P's first disagreement, using a number of resources to indicate her own knowledge superiority.

Extract 5.6

(Obstacles to a timely marriage II)

1. S .hh nemidunam cherä- (0.2) engär pesarä mese dokhtarä
(I) don't know why it looks like boys like girls
2. enqad vāsashun in <moheh nist. =ya'ni
this much for them this important isn't that is
.hh I don't know why (0.2) it looks like this (breaking up) isn't so important to the boys as it is to the girls. I mean
3. [rähət] mitunan bä in kenär biän.>=
easily (they) can with this side (they) come
boys can easily come to terms with that.
4. P [kh!]
5. P 1st→ =e::h °man-° (0.2)
eh I
6. be nazare man dige- (0.2) alän sharäyet ye juri shode ke
to opinion I anymore now conditions one kind.IND become that
in my opinion (0.2) the conditions have now become such that
7. nemitunim begim .h (.)
(we) can't (we) say
we can't say .h (.)
8. beyne pēsārā.o dokhtarä tu in zamine tafāvot hast. =chon
between boys.and girls in this ground difference is because
there's a difference between boys and girls in this ground. Because
9. man .hh mm hālā (0.3) tuye: (0.3) atrāfiāne khodam
I DM within people around myself
10. hālā- manzuram [bastegānam nist, duš]tä:=
DM my purpose my relatives isn't friends
I .hh mm (0.3) among (0.3) people around me, I don't mean my relatives, ((I mean)) friends
11. S [dustā::: °āshnähä°]
friends acquaintances
friends, acquaintances

12. P =āsh[nähä] .hhh mibinam=
acquaintances I see
acquaintances .hhh
13. M [uhum,]
uhum
14. P =ke vä:qe'an jadidan <dokhtarā:>.hh \$in khosusiati ke migim
that really recently girls this characteristic that (we) say
15. l̄bishtar darmoreqesh-\$ darmoredeshun sedq mikone. .hh ya'ni eh
more about about truth (it) does meaning
16. dokhtarā kheili rāhattar peymānshekani mikonan tā pesarā.
girls much more easily breach of promise (they) do than boys
I see that this characteristic we're mentioning is really more true of girls. .hh meaning, girls break promises much more easily than boys.
17. S 2nd→ ār[e; q]abul dāram; vali miduni chiye_o=
yeah acceptance (I) have but you know what is
yeah, I agree. but you know what?
18. M [äre.]
yes
yes.
19. S =dokhtarā tu ye seŋi in kārō mikonan; =man
girls in one age this act DOM (they) do I
girls do that at a certain age.
20. bā tavajoh be inke khābgāhi budam
with regard to this that from dorm (I) was
considering that I was a dorm resident,
21. dokhtarāye ziyādi l̄dida:m. .hh
girls many (I) saw
(I)'ve seen many girls, .hh
22. (miduni) dokhtarā masalan tu seŋe hizhda: tā bis-o-pa'y shish s-
(y' know) girls for example at age eighteen to twen'y-five six s-
(y' know) girls, let's say, at the age of eighteen to twen'y-five (or twen'y)-six
23. bis-pa'y masa'n linā: la' li' kārā mikona:n.
twen'y-five for example the like of this acts (they) do
twen'y-five and the like, let's say, do things like that.
24. .hh dus dāran dust beshan, =beran
friend (they) have friend (they) become (they) go
.hh they wish to make friends, to

25. bä taraf dust beshan, =khosh begzarunano inä, =vali
with fellow friend become happy (they) pass and the like but
make friends with the guy, enjoy themselves an' everything, but
26. az ye seni .h
from one age.IND
from a certain age .h
27. hatä dige dust Inadāran beran birun bä tara:f.
even anymore friend (they) don't have (they) go out with fellow
they even don't like to go out with the guy anymore.

As in line 17, S's disagreement is prefaced with a partial agreement *äre; qabul dāram* 'yes; I agree', showing that S has arrived at a knowledge balance with P and at this point of the conversation she is aligned with her. However, the contrast conjunction *vali* 'but' indexes that she has additional information about the issue which is not in alignment with P's opinion about the girls. The formulaic pre-announcement *miduni chiyeç* 'you know whatç' (line 17), coming before the actual disagreement component (line 19), notifies P that some news is going to be presented (Liddicoat, 2007:137). In other words, using this formulaic expression, S makes it explicit that what is to follow is information of which P is unaware, thus establishing her own knowledge primacy.³⁷

In line 19, S presents the new information that there is a certain age at which girls break promises. However, before explicating her claim (lines 22-27), she adds 'considering that I was a dorm resident, I've seen many girls,' (lines 20 & 21). By saying this, she points to the facts that her information is first-hand as it comes from her visual experience rather than hearsay (line 21) (Raymond & Heritage, 2006:684) and it is about a large number of girls (line 21) as she was a dorm resident (line 20). Thereby she emphasizes the reliability of her assertion and thus upgrades her epistemic primacy.

As shown in the above extract, in order to follow *ta'arof* conventions, S initiates her disagreeing turn with a partial agreement (line 17) that downgrades her knowledge

³⁷ Note that, after asking the formulaic question 'you know what,' she doesn't leave any space for P to take the turn and provide a go-ahead response. This provides further evidence that she assumes P doesn't know the information.

primacy. However, she continues her turn with a variety of resources that help her claim epistemic superiority about the issue compared to P's disagreement.

An important point to note here is that while S's initial claim (getting married seems not to be so important to boys as it is to girls) (lines 1 & 2) was epistemically downgraded, her disagreement with P's disagreeing response is upgraded. This movement in epistemic stance from a downgraded position to an upgraded one conforms to the different roles she plays in the ongoing conversation: an initially contest inviter and a subsequently serious contestant. That is to say, while a downgraded K+ position was used to initiate the contest, an upgraded K+ position was employed to win the contest.

In contrast to Extract 5.6, Extract 5.7 below contains no downgraders. The extract has been taken from the mixed-gender, five-party discussion on globalization. It starts with N telling the story of Abel and Cain to justify the plausibility of equality of rights for all people.

Extract 5.7

(Globalization II)

1. N .h yekishun keshavarz bud, yekishun dāmdār. =un
 one of them farmer was one of them stockbreeder that
.h one of them was a farmer, one of them a stockbreeder.

2. dāme farāvāni dāsht, in zamine porbāri dāsht.
 livestock plentitude had this land fertile had
Abel had a lot of livestock, Cain had a fertile land.

3. (0.6)
4. vakhti ke khodā goft qorbuni biārid,
 when that God said sacrifice bring
when God said, "bring a sacrifice,"

5. un khodesh qorbāniye kami ovord, in ziād ovord.
 that himself sacrifice a little brought this a lot brought
Cain himself brought a little sacrifice, Abel brought a lot.

6. (0.4)
7. pas ye vakhti *donyā bā mā yeksān raftār mikone,*
 so one when.IND world with us same treat does
so sometime the world treats us similarly,

8. mä (.) riakshene yeksäni neshun nemidim.
 we reaction identical sign (we) don't give
((but)) we (.) have different reactions.
9. (0.5)
10. A 1st→ °i' estesnä`e.°
 this exception is
°that's a special case.°
11. (0.7)
12. N 2nd→ NA'; na. (0.2) estesnä nist. =etefäqan daqiqan khode 'eyne
 no no exception isn't actually exactly itself very
 'amal hamine.
 act this same is
no, no. (0.2) it's not a special case. actually that's exactly the very act itself.
14. (0.5)

Having told the Abel and Cain story, N concludes that 'sometimes the world treats us similarly, but we have different reactions' (lines 7 and 8). In line 10, claiming that the story is a special case, A disagrees with N. In the next turn (lines 12 and 13), by uttering 'no, no. (0.2) (it)'s not a special case. actually that's exactly the very act itself.' N expresses an unmitigated disagreement with A's disagreement. In order to show his knowledge priority, in addition to raising his volume when uttering his first 'no,' N underscores the truth of his initial claim, using a series of emphatic words (*etefäqan*³⁸ 'actually', *daqiqan* 'exactly', *khode* 'itself', *'eyne* 'very', and *hamin* 'same') all together in one sentence and stressing the key word *'eyne* 'very.'

The above two extracts show that disagreements responsive to an initial assertion are similar to first disagreements in that they display a higher K+ position relative to their prior turn.

However, as opposed to the above examples, two cases of disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement did not display epistemic superiority. These two cases appear in

³⁸ In Persian, the emphatic word *etefäqan* can also be used as a single-word TCU to show opposition (Ramezanpour, 2005:61).

the extract below which is part of the discussion on globalization, participated by four male students.

Extract 5.8

(Globalization I)

1. A ölaviate asli bä eqtesāde.=
 priority main with economy is
the main priority is economic relations.
2. D 1st→ =k[i goft.] =ölaviate a[sli bä far]h fange.=
 who said priority main with culture is
who said that? the main priority is cultural relations.
3. A 2nd→ [i' räyzani] [räyzanihäye-]
 this consultation consultations
4. =räyzanihäye farhangi ye chiziye ke fa[qat=e h ke faqat f]aqat=
 consultations cultural one thing is that only eh that only only
5. D [farha:ng bä khodesh]
 culture with itself
6. A =raväbete düstāne ro estehkām [mibakhshe.]
 relations friendly DOM strength grants
these cultural consultations are things that only strengthen friendly relations.
7. D 3rd→ [bebin, far]hang eqtesādo
 look culture economy and
8. siäsato tu khodesh †ha:zm mikone aslan. =farhang
 politics DOM in itself digestion does basically culture
look, basically culture absorbs economy and politics into itself.
9. bar kole: mardom ghäleb mishe. = kole mardom .h ye
 over all people dominant becomes all people a
culture affects all people.
 .
 .
 .
((105 lines omitted.))
115. D ham darāmadeshun bishtare.
 also their income is more
they have also a higher income.
116. A 6th→ 'i' harfä chiye, na:, ° man bä harfe shomä movāfeq
 this words what is no I with word of you agreed
117. nistAM, NA[ZARE MAN]
 I'm not opinion of I
nonsense! no, I don't agree with you. in my opinion

118. D [aslan] bebin, jahāni [shodan]
DM look global become
look, globalization
119. A [eh be n]jazare
eh to opinion of
120. man eqteSĀ:D päyeye avale olaviate avale
I economy base of first priority of first
121. jahāni shodane,
global become is
in my opinion, economy is the first priority of globalization.
122. (0.3)
123. ya['ni,]
meaning
124. D 7th→ [man] migam man [mig]am far[hang.]
I say I say culture
I say I say culture ((is the first priority of globalization)).
125. A → [na-] [jahāni] shod[an nash]'t=
re- global become rise
126. D [asan]
DM
127. A =gerefte az eqtesāde. =aval
gotten from economy first
128. eqte[sād jahāni shod, ba'd baqiye] zaminehä.
economy global became then other grounds
no, globalization results from economy. first, economy was globalized, then other grounds.
129. B [kho' hālā Āmrika (.) tu tavarom] Āmrika- [Ir]āno: p! tahrim=
DM DM (now) America in inflation America Iran DOM sanction
130. ? .hh[h]
131. B =karde, kho'?
has done Okay
now America has put sanctions against Iran ((while inflation is rising)), Okay?

In the above extract, after A presents the initial assertion that the top priority of globalization is economic relations (line 1), D responds with the unmitigated disagreement 'who said that? the main priority is cultural relations' (line 2).³⁹ To claim knowledge primacy, D begins his first-disagreement turn with the question 'who said

³⁹ In her research on correction and disagreement in children's conversations, Goodwin (1983) calls disagreement turns starting with an other-initiated repair, such as partial repeats or wh-questions, immediately followed by the disagreement component (as D's disagreement in line 2) aggravated disagreements because the repair initiator doesn't leave a turn space for the repaired party to revise their statement.

that' with emphatic accent on the key word 'who' to imply that no one considers economic relations as the top priority of globalization, thereby downgrading A's epistemic authority. Moreover, he fully repeats A's utterance, substituting the key word 'economic' with the word 'cultural' uttered with rising intonation.

In the next turn (lines 3, 4 and 6) (second disagreement), A disagrees with D's disagreement. To claim superior knowledge, A presents the new information that cultural consultations can only strengthen friendly relations, using the emphatic word 'only' to simultaneously downgrade the importance of cultural relations.

In the following turn (lines 7, 8 and 9) (third disagreement), D disagrees with A's disagreement. To display epistemic primacy, he first presents the new information 'basically culture absorbs economy and politics into itself,' using the adverb 'basically' to emphasize the truth of his assertion. And then adds the new information 'culture affects all people,' accenting and elongating the emphatic word *kole*: 'all.' In the subsequent talk (lines 10-115), the opposition between A and D continues for 106 more lines (105 lines omitted due to the shortage of space) over which A and D, in turn, use a variety of resources to demonstrate their superior knowledge of the issue.

However, the two consecutive disagreements the first of which starts in line 116 seem to be void of this feature. As can be seen in lines 116, 117, 119-121, 123, 125, 127 and 128), A once more disagrees with D over the issue of what constitutes the top priority of globalization (sixth disagreement). Out of the six TCUs produced by A, i.e., 1) 'nonsense,' 2) 'no,' 3) 'I don't agree with you,' 4) 'in my opinion, economy is the first priority of globalization,' 5) 'globalization results from economy,' 6) 'first, economy was globalized, then other grounds', the first three TCUs are just formulaic expressions of opposition, the fourth one is simply a repetition of his assertion in line 1 and the last two paraphrase that initial assertion. Likewise, D's disagreeing response in line 124 (seventh disagreement) is just a repetition of his initial position. That is to say, neither of the parties makes any epistemic contribution to the ongoing topic.

The repetition or recycling of positions already taken without presenting accounts or explanations has been reported to be characteristic of children's disputes (Brenneis & Lein, 1977:56; Goodwin, 1983, 1990:159; Corsaro & Rizzo, 1990:32). In his article on epistemic engine, Heritage (2012b:45) maintains that sequences of interaction atrophy when the interactants stop making epistemic contribution to the interaction. In the above extract, the interaction between A and D over the issue of what makes the priority of globalization continues as long as they make epistemic contribution to the sequence. When they stop their contribution and suffice to the mere repetition of their already-stated stances (lines 116-128), the sequence atrophies and another speaker (B) comes in and takes the turn (line 129). This confirms the essential importance of displaying epistemic primacy for a disagreeing turn if the disagreement sequence is going to expand.

So, although the deviant cases in Extract 5.8, i.e. the sixth and seventh disagreements, looked as if they may have contradicted the hypothesis that disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement should display a greater epistemic valence compared to their prior disagreement, in fact they confirm the hypothesis.

On the whole, the above examples suggest that in disagreement sequences produced in the context of academic discussions, the epistemic engine of knowledge imbalance keeps working as interactants add further opposing K+ contributions to the conversation and thereby cause sequence expansion.

5.4.3 Syntax and intonation

As stated in Chapter 4, section 4.3.1, in the present data set, the vast majority of assertions leading to a first disagreement (56 out of 59 or 94.92%) had declarative syntax ending either in a falling (53 cases or 89.84%) or in a slightly rising intonation (3 cases or 5.08%). Only 3 assertions (5.08%) resulting in a first disagreement had an interrogative syntax. The high percentage of assertions with declarative syntax and falling intonation led us to consider declarative syntax with falling intonation the normal pattern of assertions leading to a first disagreement.

Subsequent examination of the data revealed that assertions with declarative syntax and slightly rising intonation or those with interrogative syntax were not deviant cases. In fact, the slightly rising intonation contour was used to show the speaker's inclination to produce further talk. Likewise, sentences with interrogative syntax proved to be rhetorical questions making an assertion rather than being a real question seeking information. Therefore, they supported the hypothesis that the normal pattern for assertions leading to a first disagreement was declarative syntax and falling intonation.

As for disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement, the examination of the current data set shows that out of 58 disagreements leading to a subsequent disagreement 57 (98.27%) are uttered in declarative syntax and falling intonation (see previous extracts in this chapter). There is only one disagreement that is uttered in interrogative syntax. However, our analysis shows that it is a rhetorical question and thus it is not treated as a real question. This disagreement appears in the following extract taken from the four-party discussion on globalization. About 3 minutes prior to the start of this extract, D asserts that globalization results in the appearance of a central ruling center (initial assertion), with which A disagrees in line 1 of the extract.

Extract 5.9

(Globalization I)

- | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|---------|--|------------|-------------|------|---------------|------------|-----------------|-----------|--------------|
| 1. | A 1st → | vaqtike | shomā | migin .h | yek | hokumate | markazi | be | vojud | |
| | | when | you | you say | one | government of | central | to | existence | |
| 2. | | biād | | unam | az | tarafe | qodrathāye | markaz .h | man | bā |
| | | it comes.SBJN | | that also | from | side of | powers of | center | I | with |
| 3. | | i' | harf (.) | mokhālefam. | | | | | | |
| | | this | word | I disagree | | | | | | |
| | | when you say a central government will appear from the central powers, I disagree with you. | | | | | | | | |
| 4. | B | be | nazare | to | be | [vojud | | nemiād i'? | | |
| | | to | opinion of | you | to | existence | | it doesn't come | | |
| | | you say it won't come into existence? | | | | | | | | |
| 5. | D 2nd→ | | | | [i' | ke | sad | dar | sad] | [be vojjud= |
| | | | | | this | that | hundred | in | hundred | to existence |
| 6. | A | | | | | | | | | [na:] |
| | | | | | | | | | | no |

no.

7. D =miäd. =bebin, =sad [dar sad yeki]
it comes look hundred in hundred one
it will appear with no doubt. look, with no doubt a
.
.
((Twelve lines omitted.))
20. (0.2)
21. D daqiqan Orupä markaze donyäst.
exactly Europe center of world is
Europe is exactly the center of the world.
22. (1.0)
23. dä- d- Orup[ä däre hokumat mikone. =Orupä däre hame]ye:
Europe it has government it does Europe it has all
Europe is ruling the world. Europe is
24. C [Ämrikä in vasat chekâras]:
America this middle what does it do
what's the part of America in globalization?
25. A 3rd→ pas I[rän chekâra; Chin chekâ]ras; Rusie=
then Iran what does it do China what does it do Russia
26. D [Orupäo Ämrikä, =manzuram bä ↑inäs.]
Europe America my purpose with these are
Europe and America. I mean these two together.
27. A =chekä- chekâras,=
what do- what does it do
then what's the part of Iran? what's the part of China? what's the part of Russia?
28. D 4th→ =as[1: asl inän.]
principal principal these are
the heads are these.
29. A [(boluke sharqihä)] kola[n az ham jo↑dän.]
district of the Eastern totally from each other separate are
the Eastern bloc countries are totally separate from one another.
30. D [asl: asl] inän.
principal principal these are
the heads are these.
31. (0.2)
32. asl inän.
principal these are

the heads are these.

33. (0.5)

34. aslesh [inäs.]
its principal these are

the heads of globalization are these.

35. A 5th→ [hame chi]am daste inä nist. =alän eqtesāde
all thing also hand of these isn't now economy of

36. Chin alän dāre az unā jelä-jel[o mizane.]

China now it has from these front it hits

it's not true that everything is in their hands. now China's economy is getting ahead of theirs.

In lines 1-3, A disagrees (first disagreement) with D's initial assertion, using declarative syntax and falling intonation. D then disagrees (second disagreement) with A's disagreement, first emphasizing his initial assertion (lines 5 and 7) and then, after some elaboration, presenting the assertion 'Europe is exactly the center of the world' in declarative syntax and falling intonation (line 21). After a one-second silence (line 22), as no one takes the floor, D rephrases his assertion (line 23), again using declarative syntax and falling intonation.

In response to this assertion, A asks three successive questions 'then what's the part of Iran? what's the part of China? what's the part of Russia?' (lines 25 and 27), all ending in falling intonation as common for wh-questions in Persian. However, as evidenced by D's subsequent response (lines 28, 30, 32 and 34), rather than being real questions seeking information, A's questions are rhetorical questions which all together make an assertion (Iran, China and Russia are leading countries) that disagrees (third disagreement) with D's assertion in prior turn. If they were real questions, then based on the property of conditional relevance (Schegloff, 1968:1083, 2007:20; Schegloff & Sacks, 1973:295-296), D would be accountable to provide the relevant, sought-after information (information concerning the role of Iran, China and Russia in globalization). But, as in the extract, such information is not provided by D or any other participant and its absence is not treated as problematic. Instead, what D presents in response (line 28) turns to be a disagreement (fourth disagreement) with the hidden assertion of A's rhetorical questions. As in lines 28-36, this disagreement and its

repetitions and A's following disagreement have all been expressed in declarative syntax and falling intonation.

As discussed above, the detected disagreement with interrogative syntax is not a deviant case as it is not a real question seeking information. It is a rhetorical question that makes an assertion. Therefore, as with initial assertions leading to a disagreement, the normal pattern of disagreements leading to a recipient disagreeing response is declarative syntax and falling intonation. However, as stated in Chapter 4, section 4.3.1, neither of these two features are involved in stimulating the recipient disagreeing response.

5.4.4 Stress, elongation and loudness

The prosodic examination of the data reveals that in 53.45% (31 out of 58) disagreements followed by a disagreeing response the speakers put stress on an unstressed syllable or put additional stress on a normally stressed syllable to place emphasis or focus the recipients' attention on the key words in their turn. They also elongated a vowel or a consonant in a key word in 24.14% (14 out of 58) of these disagreements. No instances of overt loudness for the purpose of attracting the recipients' attention to the key words were detected in the data. To illuminate the point, we can examine Extract 5.5 above in which the discussants disagree with each other over the issue of whether drug addiction is a disease or not.

As in lines 1 and 3 of the extract, S who believes that drug addiction is not a disease (initial assertion) has not used stress or elongation while uttering the key word *bimäri* 'disease.' By contrast, Z who produces the first disagreement (lines 20 and 22-24) of the extract puts stress on the first syllable of the word *bi:märi* 'disease' and elongates its vowel (line 23). In the next turn, while disagreeing (Second disagreement) with Z, F uses both stress and elongation to utter the key word *n̄ist*: 'is not' (line 26), elongates the first vowel in *bi:märi* (line 27), and puts stress on the key words *gheyre erädi* 'non volitional' (lines 27 and 28) and *kheyli* (line 39).⁴⁰ In the next turn (third

⁴⁰ F's use of loudness while uttering the key word *bimäri* in line 26 seems to be for the purpose of getting heard while talking in overlap with S and thus winning the floor.

disagreement), disagreeing with F, Z uses stress and/or elongation while uttering the key words *nākhās:te* ‘unwantedly’ (line 44), *be donyā: miä:d* ‘is born’ (lines 46 and 48) and *ekhtiäri* ‘option’ (line 50).

In all the above instances, the speakers seem to use stress and elongation to attract the recipients’ attention to the key words of their talk to emphasize their contrasting view, thus stimulating a response. Note that since the speakers frequently use stress and elongation to emphasize the key words in the accounts and elaborations that accompany their disagreement, these prosodic features are also a resource for claiming epistemic primacy.

However, since these two prosodic features are not present in all disagreeing turns, they are an important but not an essential feature of disagreeing turns leading to another disagreement.

5.5 Conclusion

Focusing on disagreements uttered in response to a prior disagreement, the present chapter shows what disagreement sequences would look like with respect to the general features of turn onset and the internal structure of turns and their connectedness. It also shows whether these disagreements are produced by the same or different speakers. As for turn design features capable of stimulating recipient response, i.e. epistemic asymmetry, speaker gaze, syntax and intonation, and the prosodic features of stress, elongation and loudness, it shows that it is just the speakers’ epistemic asymmetry that plays an essential role in sustaining opposition. That is to say, sequences of disagreement can get expanded if and only if speakers make further opposing K+ contribution to the conversation. Speaker gaze and the prosodic features of stress and elongation are just contributing factors in eliciting the recipients’ disagreeing response.

Chapter 6

How is disagreement resolved?

6.1 Introduction

In Chapter 4, we saw that disagreement sequences started when a speaker presented some degree of knowledgeability of a particular state of affairs through the production of a new assertion. First disagreements then came into existence when a recipient of that initial assertion presented extra, opposing knowledge of that particular issue.

With a focus on subsequent disagreements (second, third or nth disagreements) produced in response to a first disagreement, Chapter 5 demonstrated how opposition was sustained. Among turn design features having the ability to mobilize a response, i.e. interrogative syntax, interrogative prosody, participants' knowledge asymmetry, speaker gaze, and the prosodic features of stress, elongation and loudness, only epistemic asymmetry was found to be always involved in sustaining disagreement. That is to say, in order for a disagreement sequence to get expanded, a disagreement uttered in response to a prior disagreement needed to display a greater epistemic valence compared to its prior disagreeing turn. In other words, the speakers were required to present superior, opposing knowledge of the issue in question compared to their prior disagreeing party.

Although not always present, speaker gaze and the prosodic features of stress and elongation were also observed to be involved in mobilizing a disagreeing response to a prior disagreement. The vast majority of disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement were expressed by a gaze recipient of the prior disagreement producer. Likewise, in the majority of disagreements followed by a subsequent disagreement, the speakers used stress and/or elongation to focus the recipients' attention on the key words of their turn, thus emphasizing their own view and stimulating a disagreeing response. However, as with first disagreements, since speaker gaze and the prosodic

features of stress and elongation were not present in all disagreements followed by a disagreeing response, they were suggested to have just a contributing role in response mobilization.

If the motivation and expansion of disagreement sequences is contingent on the speakers' display of epistemic supremacy, then the closure of these sequences can also be related to the speakers' epistemic symmetry. As Heritage (2012b:32) maintains, sequences of interaction are motivated as a speaker displays the imbalance of information between herself/himself and the recipient and are brought to a close as the interactants arrive at knowledge equilibrium. In other words, sequences of interaction are initiated when a speaker, either K+ (knowing/more knowledgeable) or K- (unknowing/less knowledgeable), displays their stance on the epistemic gradient and thereby turns the gradient into a 'seesaw.' This 'epistemic seesaw' will be in motion as long as there is knowledge discrepancy between the interactants. That is to say, sequences get expanded as further K+/K- contributions are made to the interaction. As the interactants achieve epistemic balance, the 'seesaw' stops and thus the sequence of talk comes to closure (Heritage, 2012b). Taking into account that in the context of academic discussions the epistemic engine resembles a tug of war rather than a seesaw, we need to determine how the opposing interactants signal the end of the contest and the emergence of epistemic balance.

However, as demonstrated by Heritage (2012b:48, 2013a:389-390) there are sequences in which the topic shifts in a stepwise fashion as the interactants make indirect or subtle K+/K- contributions to the unfolding sequence. If this is the case with disagreement sequences, then the interactants may be allowed the possibility of moving away from disagreement without achieving any resolution.

Thus, the present chapter undertakes to show how in the context of academic discussions the opposing interactants resolve disagreement, either by reaching resolution or by moving away from disagreement without reaching resolution. The chapter will thus include a section reviewing the existing literature on general ways of sequence or topic closure (section 6.2). This will be followed by a detailed section on

the detected ways of moving away from disagreement (section 6.3). The chapter will come to an end with the concluding remarks (section 6.4).

6.2 Literature on sequence/topic closure

As shown by Schegloff (2007), sequences of interaction can be brought to a close either through sequence-closing thirds (SCTs) or sequence-closing sequences. A sequence-closing third, which is taken as a minimal post-expansion, is in fact a single turn coming after the second pair part (preferred or dispreferred) of an adjacency pair to propose closure to the sequence (p. 118). Common forms typifying SCTs are the information receipt token ‘oh,’ the acceptance token ‘okay,’ ‘assessments’ used to convey the FPP speaker’s stance toward a SPP, and the combination of these forms, as in the extracts below. The first extract exemplifies the use of ‘okay’ after a dispreferred SPP.

Extract 6.1 (Davidson, 1984:127 in Schegloff, 2007:121)

1	Ali: FPP	You wan’ me <u>bring</u> you anything?
2		(0.4)
3	Bet: SPP	<u>No</u> : no: <u>nothing</u> .
4	Ali: SCT →	<u>AW</u> :kay.

Here, following the SPP rejection (line 3) of the FPP offer in line 1, the FPP speaker accepts the rejection and brings the sequence to closure (Schegloff, 2007:121). In contrast to the above extract, Extract 6.2 below in which Deb doubts whether she has sent her cousin a baby gift exemplifies a composite sequence-closing third.

Extract 6.2 (Schegloff, 2007:131)

1	Deb: FPP	[I don’t think I ever sent M]arcia
2		a birth- a present for her baby did I?=or did we buy
3		something t’ <u>gether</u>
4		(0.3)
5	Deb:	Mo:m,
6	Ann: SPP	<u>Yeah</u> I <u>think</u> we di:d.
7	Deb SCT →	Oh:, good.
8		(1.2)

In lines 1-3, Deb looks for her mother’s reassurance that they have sent a gift to her cousin (FPP). Her mother’s SPP response in line 6 plays the dual function of confirming the information and reassuring Deb about her concern. Deb’s subsequent

turn made of the information receipt ‘oh’ and the reassurance assessment ‘good’ is thus a composite SCT bringing the sequence to its closure (Schegloff, 2007:131).

However, when sequences are substantially expanded after their base SPP, they can get closed through sequence-closing sequences (Schegloff, 2007:181). In its basic form, a sequence-closing sequence consists of three turns (pp. 186-187):

1. An initial turn suggests the possible termination of the immediately preceding sequence or topic of talk. Examples of such initial turns are summaries, assessments, or idiomatic expressions.
2. The recipient of the initial turn can cooperate in closing the sequence/topic down by presenting an agreeing or aligning response. Alternatively, they can withhold their cooperation by, for instance, remaining silent, or even resist closure of the sequence/topic by continuing talk about the sequence/topic, thus aborting the sequence/topic closure.
3. In case of the recipient’s collaboration, the initiator of the closure may produce a third turn, confirming the recipient’s agreement or alignment with sequence/topic closure. The same speaker may then start a new sequence/topic in the same turn.

While the production of these three successive turns commonly occurs with decreasing volume and pitch, the production of the new sequence/topic in the second part of the last turn is marked with sharply increasing volume and pitch (p. 187). Extract 6.3 below in which Bee is bringing to closure the talk about a course she is recently taking provides an example of a sequence-closing sequence. The letters a, b and c in the extract point to the three successive turns of the sequence-closing sequence respectively (pp. 187-188).

Extract 6.3 (Schegloff, 2007:187, 188)

1	Bee:	<u>Yeh</u> we[[l y'know it's true we can't hear him::=
2	Ava:	[()].
3	Ava:	=[ye:ah.
4	Bee:	=[^nd uh,
5	Ava:	Yeah. [hhhh!
6	Bee:	a → [^n:: he wz too much::
7	Ava:	[()].

8	Bee:	a →	['hh Bu:t uh I <u>h</u> ope it gets bettuh. as it goes o:[n.
9	Ava:	b →	[Well
10		b →	you nevu <u>h</u> know.
11	Bee:	c →	Nye::h, en my u- my two ar' classes 'r pretty good I
12			en- I'm enjoying them b't=

Bee's assessment of the course instructor (line 6) and her stance toward the course (line 8) form the initial turn of the sequence-closing sequence (Schegloff, 2007:188). Although not explained by Schegloff (2007), we can see that, in the following turn (lines 9 and 10), Ava displays her alignment with closing the sequence. Subsequently, using the ratification token *Nye::h* (line 11), Bee completes the sequence-closing sequence. Then, as stated by Schegloff (2007:188), in the same turn she starts a new sequence, talking about her art classes (lines 11 and 12).

However, this type of closing a sequence/topic and starting a new one is not frequent, especially for topic talk (Schegloff, 2007:192). In fact, during the course of a conversation, speakers commonly move from one topic to another in a step-by-step or gradual fashion (Sacks, 1995 vol. II:301; Schegloff, 2007:192). In her discussion of stepwise topic shift in troubles-telling, Jefferson (1984:202-203) identifies the following moves participants make to move away from talk about a trouble:

1. “*summing up the heart of the trouble*” (by the troubles-teller)
2. “*turn[ing] to matters that, although on-topic with and part of the trouble, are not at the heart of the matter, but are ancillary*” (by the troubles-teller)
3. “*produc[ing] talk that topically stabilizes the ancillary matters*” (by the troubles-recipient)
4. “*produc[ing] a pivotal utterance; one that, though recognizably on topic, has independent topical potential*” (by the troubles-recipient)
5. arriving at the *target* matter (by the troubles-recipient)

Extract 6.4 below furnishes us with an example of stepwise topic shift and the above-mentioned moves. The extract is a conversation between L (troubles-teller) and E (troubles-recipient). L's mother-in-law is dying (the trouble) and L's husband has flown out to be with his mother.

Extract 6.4 [NB:IV:14:12-14] (Jefferson, 1984:200-201)

1 L: 1 → But eh-it's-it's terrible to keep people ali:ve and
2 [you know and just let them suffer [day in and day=
3 E: [Right. [r:Right.
4 L: =out, [it's-
5 E: [They don't do that with an animal.((sniff))
6 (0.5)
7 E: (You kno[:w.)
8 L: [Yeah.
9 E: Oh well [bless his heart Well, we don't know what=
10 L: [((sniff))
11 E: it's all about I g-I-((sniff)) Don't get yourself=
12 L: =[Oh I'm not. I just- you know I wish]=
13 E: =[Honey you've got to get aho:ld of your- I know]=
14 L: 2 → =I'd- I'd kind of liked to gone out there but I was
15 afraid of the fog I was gonna drive him in:- l- hh
16 last [nɪ:ght. but,
17 E: 3 → [·hh Oh it was terrible coming down ev[en this=
18 L: [But-
19 E: =morning.((sniff))
20 L: But San Diego? I c- I couldn't believe it last
21 night. We left there about, ·hh eleven thirty (.)
22 and it w- (.) it[was clear all the way up until we=
23 E: [((sniff))
24 L: =hit, (1.0) u-uh:: the, the uh Fashion Square here
25 in Balboa. [I couldn't believe it [and we went into,=
26 E: [((sniff)) [()
27 L: =you couldn't even see:.
28 E: 4 → Oh God it's terrible. ((sniff)) That's why well we
29 didn't get home til two o'clock. God it's-
30 (0.2)
31 E: [beautiful-]
32 L: [It was ter]rible in to:wn?
33 E: ·hhh[hh
34 L: [((snort))
35 E: ·h Oh we just got into bed at two:I wasn't gonna
36 (.) go down, wait let me turn this fa- uh:
37 (0.5)
38 E: 5 → You know we w-this par:ty and then we went to
39 another little party a:fterward.s and oh I met so
40 many f:fa::bulous pees- (.) people and danced with
41 my poor old toes with no t(h)oenails and I was
42 [in- ·hhhh hh(h)igh (h)h(h)eeels and ·hahhh and oh:=
43 L: [hnh hnh
44 E: =we (.) just had a (.) beautiful time.

As Jefferson (1984:202-204) explains, the extract starts with L summing up the talk about her mother-in-law's terribly bad health condition (move 1). Then, in lines 14 and 15, she turns to an ancillary matter (move 2): her inability to drive her husband to the airport because of the fog. By producing the agreeing assessment in lines 17 and 19, *it was terrible coming down even this morning*, E (the troubles-recipient) stabilizes the ancillary (move 3). Subsequently, E produces the pivotal utterance *Oh God it's terrible. That's why well we didn't get home til two o'clock* (lines 28 and 29) (move 4) which allows her to turn to other matters: the report of their going to a couple of parties which accounted for their returning home late (lines 38-42) (move 5), leading to the assessment *we (.) just had a (.) beautiful time* (line 44).

So, while the extract starts with L commenting on her husband's mother's terribly bad condition, it ends with E reporting the beautiful time they had at the parties. Sacks (1995 vol. II:566) describes such transitions in this way: "a new topic has not been started, though we're far from wherever we began."⁴¹ Note that, whether it is troubles-talk or any other type of talk, what makes a stepwise transition feasible is the use of a pivotal utterance or item which is connected to both topics. According to Sacks (1995 vol. II:300), a pivotal utterance can be made up of two parts: the first part is connected to the prior topic and the second part is linked to the first, not to the prior topic. In the above example, the first part of the pivotal utterance, i.e. *Oh God it's terrible*, is related to the prior topic (L's mother-in-law's poor health) as it is assessing the *fog* which prevented L from driving her husband to the airport. The second part of the utterance, i.e. *That's why well we didn't get home til two o'clock*, has something (getting home late) which is connected to the *fog* (for further examples of a pivotal utterance, see Schegloff, 1996c:66-67).

As stated earlier, stepwise shift is the most common form of transition from a sequence or topic to a next, especially for topic talk (Sacks, 1995 vol. II:301; Schegloff, 2007:192). Speakers can also move from a sequence/topic to a next disjunctively. In a disjunctive sequence/topic shift, which is a "unilateral" way of terminating expanded sequences of talk, a speaker ends a sequence/topic by launching a new one which is not topically coherent with the prior one (Schegloff, 2007:181). The extract below exemplifies a disjunctive shift. Frieda and Rubin (a couple) are eating dinner at the home of Kathy and Dave (another couple). Frieda and Kathy are old friends. Frieda is talking about offering their country home which had been already made available to Kathy and her husband to another friend of hers (Schegloff, 2007:182).

Extract 6.5 (KC-4, 13:22-14:31) (Schegloff, 2007:182, 183)

1	Fri:	But uh[m as a matter of fact y'know uh th' thee- thee=
2	???:	[(y'know)
3	Fri:	=uh my girlfriend. who uh (1.0) I: -offered the house
4		to up in the countr[y.
5	Dav:	[Mhhm
6	Fri:	She has a- an invalid m:othah.

⁴¹ In the article 'Opening up closings,' Schegloff and Sacks (1973:305) have referred to the same procedure as "topic shading."

7 Dav: Mhmm
8 Fri: Who's be:d ridded.
9 Dav: Mhmm
10 Fri: They still haven't figured out, (.) how they're gonna
11 get to the country:<who's gonna take care of huh mo:thah.
12 while [they're- y'know 'p in the country.on the weekends.
13 Dav: [Mm
14 (0.2)
15 Fri: So: (.) you know,
16 (0.8)
17 Fri: An besides tha[:t,
18 Rub: [You c'n go any[way
19 Dav: [Don'- Don' git- don [get]
20 Fri: [they
21 won't be:
22 Dav: Y'know there- there's no- no long explanation is
23 necessary.
24 Fri: ↑Oh nono↑no: I'm not- I jus:: uh-wanted: you to know that
25 you can go up anyway.=
26 Rub: =Yeah:.
27 (0.2)
28 Fri: You know.
29 (0.2)
30 Fri: Becaus-ah
31 (3.3)
32 Rub: They don mind honey they're jus not gonna talk to us
33 ever again.=
34 Dav: =(hehem)/(ri:(h)ight)
35 (0.8)
36 Kat: We don mind<[we jus ne:ver gonna talk to you e:ver (hh heh)
37 Dav: [(No, b't)
38 Rub: heheheheh
39 Kat: [No::] that's awright
40 Fri: [So::]
41 Dav: [()]
42 Fri: [You know what we're gonna-] in fact I'm- she I haven't
43 → seen her since I spoke to you but I'm going to talk
44 → to=whatayou making?
45 (0.2)
46 Kat: It's a ↑bla:nket.
47 Fri: Did yu weave tha[t yourse:lf]
48 Kat: [I w o : :]ve this myself.=
49 ((continues on the blanket))

As argued by Schegloff (2007:182), up to line 44, the sequence is related to the country house. However, at line 44, Frieda, apparently motivated by something Kathy is weaving, suddenly abandons her unfolding utterance and starts a new sequence/topic on the piece of weaving. As can be seen in the rest of the extract (lines 45-49), the talk continues on the piece of weaving as Kathy collaborates with Frieda on this new topic.

While in the above extract the disjunctive shift has been initiated by the same speaker in the middle of her own utterance, in the extract below it has been started by the recipient of the prior topic.

Extract 6.6 [NB:IV:1:R:2:Standard Orthography] (Jefferson, 1993:4)

1 E: I ↓think I ought to go↓ home,
 2 (0.2)
 3 E: I don't know maybe Bud would like me to stay hh
 4 I do(h)n't ↓know.
 5 L: [hhhh[h °↓h[n°
 6 E: [h [I think he'd like t- me to
 7 sta-:-y khhh[°hhh
 8 L: [°hm h[m°
 9 E: [BUT FOR ORNERINESS I'm
 10 going ho:me, mhh!=
 11 L: → =Ye:ah.=
 12 E: =hnh huh, °hhh[h
 13 L: → [↑God I see in the paper there's sure
 14 a lot of halibut being cau:ght down that coa:st,
 15 (0.3)
 16 E: Ye:ah. Bo:y well: it sure is ↑goo::d, we had some it was
 17 really goo:d.

Though it has not been explained by Jefferson (1993), we can see that, up to line 10, the sequence concerns E going home or staying with L. At line 11, L, the so-far recipient, produces the acknowledgement token *Ye:ah* to display his engagement with the prior topic (Jefferson, 1993)⁴² and then disjunctively shifts the sequence/topic to something different (lines 13 and 14), i.e. the news on halibut.

The above-mentioned practices are the common ways speakers bring a topic/sequence of talk to an end or alternatively move from one topic to a next without closing the sequence. The rest of this chapter will unveil whether disagreement sequences in the present study are brought to closure or do the interactants move away from opposition without coming to resolution.

6.3 Moving away from disagreement or coming to resolution

To determine what happens to disagreement sequences in the context of academic discussions, 59 disagreement sequences have been examined.⁴³ In about two-thirds of sequences (40 instances or 67.8%) the opposing interactants move away from

⁴² As demonstrated by Jefferson (1993), acknowledgement tokens, assessments and commentaries are recurrently used by recipients to show their attention to their co-participant's talk before disjunctively moving to another topic. Compared to acknowledgement tokens, assessments show more interactional engagement with the prior topic. Commentaries are even more engaged than assessments (p. 15).

⁴³ Note that the total number of disagreement sequences equals the number of first disagreements. Out of these 59 disagreement sequences, 27 have more than one disagreeing turn and 32 have just one disagreeing turn.

disagreement through stepwise topic shift. Only in 19 sequences (32.2%), has the participants' disagreement been resolved. The resolution is achieved through knowledge equilibrium being acknowledged by one of the opposing parties. These two different ways, i.e. moving away from disagreement or coming to resolution, will be examined in the following subsections.

6.3.1 Moving away from disagreement through stepwise topic shift

In the current data set, interactants commonly move away from disagreement through stepwise topic shift (Jefferson, 1984; Sacks, 1995 vol. II), without settling their disagreement. Since our data are academic discussions, not troubles-telling talk, the five separate stages of stepwise topic shift identified by Jefferson (1984) in her investigation of troubles-telling have not been discerned here. However, pivotal elements which establish the connection between the topics (Sacks, 1995 vol. II:300) are easily discernable in the data. Extract 6.7 below, taken from the six-party discussion on obstacles to a timely marriage, presents an instance of stepwise topic shift. Here, a disagreement occurs between N and C over the issue of whether parents spoil their children.

Extract 6.7

(Obstacles to a timely marriage I)

- | | | | | | | | |
|----|---|---|-----------------|---------------------|-----------------------|----------|--------------------------|
| 1. | N | =nemikhän | bachehāshun | ye | khorde | sakhti | bekeshe; =o:- |
| | | (they) don't want | their children | one | bit | hardship | SBJN.pull and |
| | | they don't want their children to suffer any hardship, and | | | | | |
| 2. | | in | kāreshun | bā'es | mishe | ke | bachehā (.) |
| | | this | their act | cause | becomes | that | children |
| 3. | | lus: | bār | biän.= | | | |
| | | spoiled | burden | come (they) | | | |
| | | families' not wanting children to suffer hardship causes children (.) to be spoiled. | | | | | |
| 4. | B | =väqe'an | lus | [^{oo} bār | biän. ^{oo}] | | |
| | | really | spoiled | burden | come (they) | | |
| | | be really spoiled. | | | | | |
| 5. | N | | [| pesarā]shun | gheyre: | e:m | mas`uliatpazir |
| | | | | their sons | non | em | responsibility.accepting |
| 6. | | bār (.) | nayän.= | | | | |
| | | burden | not come (they) | | | | |
| | | ((This means that)) sons are not (.) brought up um with a sense of responsibility. | | | | | |

7. C 1st→ =mitunim be [ye forme dige ham negä] konim.= na;=
 (we) can to one form of another also look (we) do no
we can look in a different way too. no,
8. B [døkhtarä ham hamintor.]
 girls also so
girls aren't either ((they aren't brought up with a sense of responsibility)).
9. C =man bä in moväfeq nistam .h ke masalan
 I with this agreed (I)'m not that for example
10. pedar mädar bekhäd lūs: bär biäre farzandi masalan Rā,
 father mother wants spoiled burden brings a child for example DOM
I don't agree .h that parents want to, say, spoil their children.
11. .h mikhäd- refähe farzandesh.o mikhäd,
 wants welfare their child.DOM wants
.h they want their children's welfare.
12. khosh:bakhtiye farzandesh.o >mikhäd.<
 happiness of their child.DOM wants
they want their children's happiness.
13. .h khoshbakhtid- hamishe nemitunim ta'rifesh.o
 happiness always (we) can't its definition.DOM
14. begim [refäh.o rähati.]
 (we) say welfare.and comfort
.h we can't always define happiness as welfare and comfort.
15. B [joz'e ravandi] az
 part of a process of
16. bozorg [shodane.]
 grown up becoming is
it's part of the process of growing up.
17. N [kho[shbakhti] hamishe] yedafei=
 happiness always all at once
18. D [ye seri ham kesäei haşan,]
 one series also people are
there are also a number of people
19. N =ijad nemishe,=
 creation doesn't become
happiness isn't always created all at once.
20. B =ä[re; joz'e ravandi az: bozorg] [shodane.]
 yeah part of a process of grown up becoming is
yeah, it's part of the process of growing up.

21.	N	[khosbakhti	bāyad	be	voju:d	biād.]	
		happiness	must	to	existence	(it) comes	
		happiness must be created.					
22.	C					[az: malzu]mätesh	=az
						from	its requirements from
23.		malzumätesh	‘eshqe	beyne	tarafeyn	has:t,	
		its requirements	love of	between	the two parties	(it) is	
		one of its requirements is mutual love.					

In lines 1-3 of the above extract, N asserts that parents spoil their children as they don't want them to suffer hardship. C disagrees with her (lines 7 and 9-14), displaying his epistemic superiority through presenting new information about parents (lines 11 and 12), and stressing the key words (*mikhād* 'wants', *refāh* 'welfare', and *khosh:bakhti* 'happiness'). He then adds the information 'we can't always define happiness as welfare and comfort' (lines 13 and 14). This utterance works as a pivot because, though related to the prior topic, it has the potential of leading to a new topic. As can be seen in lines 15-23, following the introduction of this pivotal utterance, other participants including the disagreed-with speaker make K+ contributions to the issue of how to define happiness. The conversation moves away from the prior topic to a new one so that the extract which began with N talking on parents spoiling their children ends with C asserting the requirements of happiness (lines 22 and 23). Thus, a stepwise topic shift occurs without a display of achieving epistemic balance by either party. That is to say, participants move from one topic to a related one without resolving their disagreement as they make K+ contributions to the topic.

In the current data set, in the majority of sequences with stepwise topic shift (37 out of 40), we can discern a subtle movement away from disagreement, as in the above extract. However, there are 3 disagreement sequences in which the change of topic does not seem to be that subtle. Nevertheless, due to the fact that their occurrence is triggered by a pivot and they do not show the characteristics of a disjunctive topic shift, they have been classified as a less subtle type of stepwise shift. Extract 6.8 below, taken from the same-sex four-party discussion on globalization, provides us

with an instance of such a less subtle shift. Here, a disagreement occurs between A and D.

Extract 6.8

(Globalization I)

1. A 1st → vaqtike shomā migin .h yek hokumate markāzi be vojud
 when you you say one government of central to existence
 2. biād unam az tarafe qodrathāye markāz .h man bā
 it comes.SBJN that also from side of powers of center I with
 3. i' harf (.) mokhālefam.
 this word I disagree

when you say a central (global) government will appear from the central powers (main global powers), I disagree with you.

4. B be nazare to be [vojud nemiād i' ?]
 to opinion of you to existence it doesn't come
you say it won't happen?

5. D 2nd → [i' ke sad dar sad] [be vojjud=
 this that hundred in hundred to existence
 6. A [na:]
 no
no.

7. D =miād. =bebin, =sad [dar sad yeki]
 it comes look hundred in hundred one
one hundred percent it will happen. look, one hundred percent

((Twelve lines omitted.))

20. (0.2)
 21. D daqiqan Orupā markaze donyāst.
 exactly Europe center of world is
Europe is exactly the center of the world.

22. (1.0)
 23. dā- d- Orupā dāre hokumat mikone. =Orupā dāre hame]ye:
 Europe it has government it does Europe it has all
Europe is ruling the world. Europe is

24. C [Āmrikā in vasat chekāras]:
 America this middle what does it do
what's the role of America in globalization?

25. A 3rd → pas I[rān chekāra; Chin chekā]ras; Rusie=

26. D then Iran what does it do China what does it do Russia
 [Orupäo Āmrikä, =manzuram bā †inäs.]
 Europe America my purpose with these are
Europe and America. I mean these two together.
27. A =chekä- chekāras.=
 what do- what does it do
then what's the role of Iran? what's the role of China? what's the role of Russia?
28. D 4th→ =as[1: asl inän.]
 principal principal these are
these (America & Europe) are the main ones.
29. A [(boluke sharqihä)] ko[la[n az ham jo†dän.]
 district of the Eastern totally from each other separate are
the Eastern bloc countries are totally separate from one another.
30. D [asl: asl] inän.
 principal principal these are
these are the main ones.
31. (0.2)
32. asl inän.
 principal these are
these are the main ones.
33. (0.5)
34. aslesh [inäs.]
 its principal these are
these are the main ones in globalization.
35. A 5th→ [hame chi]am daste inä nist. =alän eqtesāde
 all thing also hand of these isn't now economy of
36. Chin alän dāre az unä jelä- jel[o mizane.]
 China now it has from these front it hits
it's not true that everything is in their hands. now China's economy is getting ahead of theirs (America & Europe's economies).
37. D 6th→ [alän ke jelo] nazade.
 now that front it hasn't hit
it (China's economy) isn't ahead of theirs (America & Europe's economies) now.
38. alän ke ha[st.]
 now that it is
everything is in their (America & Europe's) hands now.
39. A 7th→ [dä]re jelo mizane.

it has front it hits
it (China's economy) is getting ahead of theirs.

40. (0.5)
41. chizi tä jelo zadan namunde.
 anything to front hit it hasn't remained
China is catching up with them (America & Europe).
42. (0.3)
43. p! Ämrikä khodesh eh de- dige (0.2)
 America itself anymore
44. B hälä [be nazare shomä]
 now to opinion of you
now in your opinion
45. A [tu:- bahse eq]te[sädi inä]
 in discussion of economic these
in economic matters and the like, America itself
46. D [hälä: hälä be] nazaret bāyad
 now now to your opinion should
47. mā (.) jazbesh konim yā na? in: farhango,
 we its absorption we do or not this culture
now, in your opinion, should we absorb this culture or not?
48. A mām: betun gofTAM,
 we also to you (I) said
I told you,
49. (0.2)
50. goftam age- bekhāym tu: eqtesād vāredesh konim
 (I) said if SBJN.want (we) into economy enter it (we) do
I said if we want to globalize the economy,

As in lines 1-45, the disagreement between A and D over the issue of whether in the future there will be a central global government or not continues for several consecutive turns. Each time they take the turn, they make a K+ contribution to the topic under discussion and drive the disagreement sequence forward. There is no sign of disagreement resolution offered by either party. But then, in line 46, D takes a K- position and uses interrogative syntax to seek information from A concerning whether he thinks 'this culture' should be accepted or not. At first glance, it appears like a disjunctive shift because there seems to be a break between the prior talk and the

present question. However, it can still be considered a stepwise shift because the talk is connected to the prior talk through the demonstrative adjective *in* ‘this’ referring to the concept of ‘global.’

In his discussion of stepwise topic shift, Sacks (1995 vol. II:300) states “the character of the *stepwise movement for topics* is that if you have some topic which you can see is not connected to what is now being talked about, then you can find something that is connected to both, and use that first.” Elsewhere, Sacks (1995 vol. I:757) talks about finding “co-class membership” relations between items of seemingly unconnected utterances to see how stepwise topic shift works.

In the above extract, the demonstrative adjective *in* ‘this’ (line 47) in D’s question ‘now, in your opinion, should we absorb this culture or not’ (lines 46 and 47) refers to the concept of ‘global’ which is in fact the pivotal element of the prior topic. In other words, the beginning and the end of the sequence are linked with each other via the concept of global. If before the start of this question the sequence is about a ‘central (global) government’, now it is about a co-class related item, a ‘(global) culture.’

An interesting finding about the above extract and the other two disagreement sequences with less subtle shift is that the change of topic starts with a discourse marker. In the example above, topic shift is marked with the turn-initial discourse marker *hālā* ‘now’ (Shokouhi & Kamyab, 2004:138). As argued by Alami (2016:260), *hālā* serves a variety of functions: breaking the boundary between past (event time) and present (discourse time), taking/holding the floor, elaborating on the topic, and adding to the coherence between two propositions. In the above extract, as can be seen in lines 43-46, while there has already been a competition between A and B for the floor, D takes the turn, using *hālā* in turn-initial position. Additionally, *hālā* contributes to the coherence between the two propositions of ‘the appearance of a central global government’ and ‘the acceptance of the global culture,’ thus helping a stepwise rather than a disjunctive shift.

One further point concerning the above extract and the other two disagreement sequences with a less subtle shift is the opposing parties' tacit agreement to disagree. Taking a look at the above extract, one can see that, after D's disagreeing turn in lines 37 and 38 (the sixth disagreement of the sequence), A once more takes the turn (line 39) and repeats his earlier stated opinion that China's economy is getting ahead of America & Europe's economy. After half-a-second silence (line 40) and in the absence of any response from the opposing party, A adds the increment 'China is catching up with them' (line 41). This is followed by no response from the opposing party too, either agreement or disagreement. As a result, after a 0.3-second silence (line 42), in the pursuit of a response, A attempts to add one more increment (lines 43 and 45). However, instead of presenting an agreeing or disagreeing response, D, making a request for information (lines 46 and 47), shifts the topic while A is still at a point of maximal incompleteness of his TCU. As can be seen in the rest of the sequence (lines 48-50), A, who has already dropped out (line 45), aligns with D in shifting the topic as he attempts to provide D with the sought-after information. So, they are not problematizing their disagreement and agree to disagree without clearly stating it.

As discussed in this section, in the present data set the opposing interactants commonly move away from disagreement without resolving it. This is achieved through stepwise topic shift, using a pivotal element or utterance, as they make either K+ (as in Extract 6.7) or K- (as in Extract 6.8) contributions to the topic under discussion.

6.3.2 Disagreement resolution through epistemic equilibrium

As maintained by Heritage (2012b:32, 2013a:390), sequences of interaction are brought to closure as the interactants' knowledge imbalance is resolved. Our data exhibit two different ways in which the redress of epistemic imbalance is acknowledged. To do so, one of the opposing parties displays either their arrival at new knowledge or their prior access to the knowledge. However, the participants' epistemic balance does not commonly result in sequence closure as the interactants add further K+ contributions on the topic. Section 6.3.2.1 will thus demonstrate the

two ways of acknowledging epistemic balance and section 6.3.2.2 will discuss why disagreement sequences commonly expand after disagreement resolution.

6.3.2.1 Epistemic equilibrium

As mentioned above, in the present data set, epistemic equilibrium is achieved as one of the opposing parties either acknowledges arrival at new knowledge or displays prior access to the knowledge. For ease of presentation, these two ways will be examined in the following subsections.

6.3.2.1.1 Acknowledging arrival at new knowledge

One way of putting an end to disagreement is the acknowledgement of arrival at new information by one of the opposing parties. This practice is observed in 14 disagreement sequences (23.73%). An important point concerning these sequences is that in the vast majority of them (13 out of 14 sequences) the sequence continues even after disagreement has been resolved. The extracts below provide examples of disagreement resolution through acknowledgement of the arrival at new knowledge. The first extract has been taken from the three-party discussion on the obstacles to a timely marriage. It starts at a point where P presents her opinion about how to handle parents' meddling. S then disagrees with her.

Extract 6.9

(Obstacles to a timely marriage II)

- | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|--------|--|-----------|---------|-------------|--------------|-------------|---------|---------|
| 1. | P | kheyli | ↑rāhat: | em: (.) | be | nazare | man | ādam | mitune |
| | | very | easily | em | to | opinion of I | one | can | |
| 2. | | khānevādasho | qāne' | | kone. | =ya'ni | | | |
| | | her family.DOM | convinced | | does | that is | | | |
| | | very easily em (.) in my opinion, one can convince one's own family ((not to meddle in one's relationship)). I mean | | | | | | | |
| 3. | | man | kheyli | rāhat | ma[san | age- | moshkeli | pish | m-] |
| | | I | very | easily | for example | if | problem.IND | forward | |
| | | very easily, I, let's say, if a problem happ- | | | | | | | |
| 4. | S 1st→ | | | | [vali | tu | ruhiat | asar | mi]zāre |
| | | | | | but | in | your morale | effect | puts |
| | | but it affects you, Parvaneh. | | | | | | | |
| 5. | | Parvāne. .h[h] | khodet | qabul | | dāri, | khānevādato | rāzi | |

21. to opinion of I if to that maturity.DEF reached.PRF
 bāshe, =na, in moshkelam pish nemiād. =hamuntor
 SBJN.be no this problem also front (it) doesn't come just as
in my opinion, if she has come to maturity, she won't face this problem.
22. ke barā khode manam pish nayumad. .hh khob migam
 that for self.EZ me also front (it) didn't come DM I say
just as I didn't face it. khob I say
23. man aksare chizām khub bud, ideāl bud, vali az
 I most of my things good was ideal was but from
24. ba'zi chizā ham goz[ashtam.]
 some things also I gave up
most of my wishes were met, but there were things that I let go ((to make things work)).
25. M [äre; ädam] mitune cheshmesho bebande,
 yeah one can their eyes SBJN.close
26. gushesho begire, harfe baqye ro nashnavē.
 their ear.DOM SBJN.take word of others DOM NEG.SBJN.hear
27. chi migan.
 what they say
yeah, one can close their eyes and stop their ears to what others say.
28. (0.2)
29. P daqiqan.
 exactly
exactly.
30. S ba'd man didam kasāi ke: masalan .h vāqe'an avali ke
 then (DM) I saw persons that for example really first that
31. zendegishuno shoru' mikoʔnan .h eh tavāne hamdiga ro mibinan.
 their life.DOM beginning they do ability of each other DOM they see
then I have seen those who, let's say, really see each other's abilities when they first start their life.

In lines 4 and 5 of the above extract, S disagrees (first disagreement) with P's claim about how to deal with parents' meddling, adding the new information 'but they influence you, Parvaneh', and then offers additional information on the issue as she elaborates on her opposite view (lines 5, 7, 8, and 10), thus taking a K+ (more knowledgeable) position on the epistemic gradient. In the next turn starting at line 11, P first produces a partial agreement (*doroste* 'that's right'), indicating that their knowledge imbalance has temporarily been resolved. Then, using the contrast conjunction *vali* 'but', she incorporates into her turn the new information that what S has asserted is under the influence of intellectual maturity and thus disagrees with S's

disagreement. At this point of the conversation, it is P who is in the K+ status relative to S.

As can be seen in lines 13 and 14, while P has not yet come to the possible completion of her TCU that encompasses the disagreement component, S expresses her alignment with P's new assertion through the agreement token *äre* 'yeah' followed by the confirmation expression *dorošte* 'that's right'. However, as P further elaborates her disagreeing position (lines 13, 15 and 16), once more S produces the same response confirming that epistemic balance has been achieved. Note that, this time, while the agreement token *äre* 'yeah' (line 17) is produced near the possible completion of P's last TCU, the expression *dorošte* 'that's right' (line 19) is expressed after the possible completion of P's TCU, hence a stronger possibility of sequence closure.

Comparing S's agreement responses with P's partial agreement in line 11, we can notice two differences between them. First, whereas P's partial agreement is composed of a single TCU, *dorošte* 'that's right', S's agreement responses consist of two TCUs, the agreement token *äre* 'yeah' followed by *dorošte* 'that's right'. In their investigation of claims of epistemic authority in agreement sequences, Heritage & Raymond (2005:26) pointed to the production of *that's right* before the agreement token *yes* as a means of upgrading epistemic authority in second position assessments. It might be the case that the production of a single *dorošte* as a partial agreement before expressing disagreement is a way of claiming prior access to the knowledge offered by the disagreed-with party. By contrast, the production of the agreement token *äre* 'yeah' before *dorošte* 'that's right' is suggestive of the fact that S has treated the information offered by P as new information.

Second, while P's partial agreement ends in a slightly rising intonation showing that she has more to say, the two components of S's agreements end in falling intonation. This falling intonation contour indicates that the achieved epistemic balance is not temporary, i.e. S is not going to present further knowledge of the issue that contradicts P.

At this point of the conversation the sequence can come to closure as the interactants' knowledge imbalance has been resolved (Heritage, 2012b:32, 2013a:390). S's noticeably reduced volume while expressing her confirmatory TCU 'that's right' (line 19) can be suggestive of her orientation toward closing the sequence. However, as can be seen in lines 20-24, P further elaborates her view by giving the example of her own experience. The sequence is more expanded as another participant, M, first expresses her agreement with P (line 25) and then presents the assertion 'one can close their eyes and stop their ears to what others say' (lines 25-27). Since this assertion has already been implied by P, it is confirmed by her in the following turn (line 29). Subsequently, S takes the turn and, using the discourse marker *ba'd* 'then,' shifts the topic to a related one (lines 30 and 31).

So, although in the above extract the interactants' disagreement comes to an end with the display of epistemic balance, the sequence undergoes further expansion until a stepwise topic shift takes place. The examination of the 14 sequences in this group shows that only in one sequence, disagreement resolution results in sequence closure (the sequence will be examined in detail in section 6.3.2.2.1). That is to say, there seems to be a strong tendency for sequence expansion after disagreement resolution. As will be discussed in section 6.3.2.2.1, one reason for this is the interactants' gaze behavior. That is to say, the disagreed-with recipient's sustained gaze at the speaker as they approach epistemic balance causes the speaker to continue talk on the topic. A second reason might be the inadequacy of the agreeing response used to acknowledge epistemic balance. In the above example, S suffices to the agreement token *äre* 'yeah' and the formulaic expression *doroste* 'that's right' to show epistemic equilibrium. Likewise, in the other 12 sequences expanded after disagreement resolution, the agreeing response consists of just agreement tokens and/or formulaic expressions. As such, they do not make any propositional contribution to the sequence. Extract 6.10 below, which is part of the three-party discussion on drug and alcohol addiction, further illuminates the point.

Extract 6.10

(Drug and alcohol addiction)

1. Z masan sigär keshida:n kheyli qobhesh: masalan ziäd
 for example cigarette pull very its indecency for example much
2. bud tu jäme'eye mä hađe[äqa[:l.]
 was in society of us at least
for example, smoking was a very indecent behavior at least in our society ((in the past)).
3. S [ä[re,]
 yeah
yeah,
4. F [°bi]shta[r°]
 more
5. Z [E]nqad [shoy]u'=
 this extent prevalence
6. S [äre,]
 yeah
yeah,
7. Z =nadä:sht. .h vali †al'än .h alän man *khodam* be 'eyne
 (it) didn't have but now now I myself to eye
8. masalan tu khiäbun injä räh mira:m b- az har chär panshtä
 for example in street here way (I) go from each four five
9. bache dabirestäni†am ädam masalan: yä ha†ä pä:'intar
 child high school also human for example or even lower
10. mibine .h kheyli rahat [°sigär mikeshe.°]
 sees very easy cigarette smokes
it wasn't that common. but now ((it's no longer indecent because)) .h when walking in the street, for example, I see that, from every four or five high school or even younger children, one smokes very easily ((it's very prevalent among young children)).
11. S 1st → [vali bāz bā] vojudi ke mesan
 but again with existence that for example
12. räyej shode: (0.3) hanuz (.) zesh:tisho dā:r[e.]
 common (it) has become still its indecency.DOM (it) has
although it has become common, it still looks indecent.
13. Z → [d]ä:re; ä[re.]
 (it) has yeah
it does. yeah.
14. S [ya'ni
 meaning
15. bāz:=e:h baräye: hađeaqal: yeki mese bachehä hanuz: vaqti az
 again for at least one such as children still when from
16. kenäresh migzari mibinid °masan° däre sigär mikeshe .h

17. his/her side (you) pass (you) see for example (s/he) has cigarette (s/he) smokes
 a'säbet khord mishe:
 your nerves broken (it) becomes
I mean, again eh at least for children, still when you pass them and, say, see them smoking, you get very annoyed.
18. (0.2)
19. Z → °äre; äre.°
 yeah yeah
yeah; yeah.
20. S man: e:h chiz ke budam e:h un säkhtemun ke budam, .h
 I DM that (I) was that building that (I) was
when I was in the other building,
21. poshte keläs: persarä miumahan sigär mikeshidan.
 behind class boys (they) came cigarette (they) smoke
boys smoked behind the class.
22. Z uhum
 uhum
uhum,
23. S kheyli nārāhat mishoda[m.]
 very upset (I) became
I became very upset.
24. Z [är]e[:.]
 yeah
yeah.
25. S [ya]´ni asan delam mikhäst beram
 meaning DM my heart (it) wanted (I) go
26. biruno masan bāshun dā´vā konam, .hh chon asan
 outside and for example with them quarrel (I) do because DM
I mean I liked to go out and quarrel with them because
27. hesē badi bem dast midād ke engär inā .h dā:neshjua:n,
 feeling of bad to me hand (it)gave that as if these (they) are students
I had a bad feeling that they were students
28. khob eh (0.9) yā khābgāhian, dūr az khānevādashunan,
 DM eh or (they) are dorm residents far from their families are
khob eh (0.9) or dorm residents, they're away from their families,
29. hamashunam dore hamdige, neshashte sigär mikeshe, .h hālā
 all of them around each other sitting cigarette (s/he) smokes now (DM)
they're all together, sitting and smoking,

30. masalan in che hesje ke däre besh das mide?
 for example this what feeling is that (it) has to him hand (it) gives
now what feeling do they have?
31. h yä hälä ke väqe'an masan lazat mibare yä inke: (0.3)
 or DM that really for example pleasure (he) takes or that
32. bishtar mikhän inä hamgarä beshan?
 more (they) want they convergent SBJN.become (they)
do they really, say, enjoy it or want to be in harmony?
33. (0.3)
34. Z uhu[m, hamin.]
 uhum the same
uhum, that's it.
35. S [moshäbeh] besh[an,]
 similar SBJN.become (they)
to look alike.
36. Z [är]e, tuye masalan pesarä
 yeah in for example boys
37. kh[eyli shoyu'] däre.
 very prevalence (it) has
yeah, it's very common to boys.

In lines 1, 2, 5 and 7-10, Z presents the initial assertion that smoking is not taken as an indecent behavior any longer. S then disagrees with her, stating that smoking is still regarded as an indecent behavior for children (lines 11, 12 and 14-17). As can be seen in lines 13 and 19, Z twice takes the turn to express her alignment with S: once at the possible completion (line 12) of S's first TCU which presents her main disagreement component (lines 11 and 12) and another time after a 0.2-second silence (line 18) following S's elaboration of her opposing view (lines 14-17).

Z's agreeing turn in line 13 is composed of a partial modified repeat, i.e. *dä:re* 'it does,' and the agreement token *äre* 'yeah,' both ending in falling intonation. Previous research on English language has shown that speakers systematically use partial repeats with a stressed copula/auxiliary to confirm a prior assertion/assessment (while agreement rather than confirmation is relevant), thus claiming epistemic primacy over the issue from a second position (Stivers, 2005). It appears that Z's repetition of the

verb of S's prior utterance and laying stress on it serves the same function, i.e. claiming epistemic primacy.

In contrast, Z's second agreeing turn (line 19) consists of two consecutive instances of *äre* 'yeah' which is a neutral agreement token, uttered with falling intonation contour, showing that she is not going to add further information to the sequence. Moreover, Z's quiet voice while uttering her agreement can be suggestive of her readiness to close the topic/sequence as common in sequence-closing sequences (Schegloff, 2007:187). However, as can be seen in the rest of the extract, in spite of Z's display of arrival at knowledge balance, S further elaborates her view by presenting personal experience (lines 20-21, 23 and 25-29).

Z's subsequent alignment with S continuing the sequence is apparent in line 22 in which she presents the continuer *uhum*. As maintained by Gardner (2001:25), recipients use continuers to pass up the opportunity of talk to a prior speaker to produce an extended turn. So, it can be argued that although the acknowledgement of epistemic balance marks the end of disagreement between the two opposing parties, it does not guarantee the end of the sequence/topic.

A point to note here concerns the role of agreement in disagreement resolution. As observed in the above two extracts, when the information presented by a speaker to support their position is considered as convincing or adequate by the opposing party, the opposing party displays epistemic balance by acknowledging their arrival at new knowledge, hence the resolution of disagreement. The examination of the 14 sequences in this group shows that arrival at new knowledge is acknowledged through the use of either the agreement token *äre* 'yeah' followed by a confirmatory expression/statement such as *doroste* 'that's right' or two consecutive instances of *äre*. In either case, by prefacing the turn with the agreement token *äre*, the speaker is acknowledging the epistemic primacy of the opposing party.

The analysis of these 14 sequences shows that, except for one sequence that comes to a close as one of the opposing parties acknowledges arrival at epistemic balance, the rest

undergo further expansion after disagreement resolution until the topic shifts in a stepwise fashion.

6.3.2.1.2 Displaying prior access to the knowledge

A slightly different way of acknowledging epistemic equilibrium and hence resolving disagreement is the display of prior access to the knowledge by one of the opposing parties. This practice which is observed in 5 disagreement sequences (8.47%) is illustrated in the extract below taken from the mixed-gender discussion on obstacles to a timely marriage. Here a disagreement occurs between T and N, two girls, over the issue of whether marriage opportunities occur to girls or not. Before the extract starts, the students have been talking about extramarital relationships.

Extract 6.11

(Obstacles to a timely marriage I)

- | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------|--|--|------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|
| 1. | N | khob
DM | dokhtarä.am
girls.also | vaqti
when | ke: e::h
that | masalan:
for example | ezdeväj-
marriage- | moqe'iate
opportunit |
| 2. | | ezdeväj
marriage | baräshun
for them | pish
forward | nemiäd .h
doesn't come | belakhare
finally | majbur
forced | mi'ashan
(they) become |
| 3. | | be
to | [in
this | raväbet.
relations |] | | | |
| | | | khob because eh marriage opportunities don't come to girls, .h they have to finally settle for these relationships. | | | | | |
| 4. | T 1st→ | | [dokhtaräam
girls also | m]otma'eni
(are) you sure | moqe'iate
opportunity | ezdeväj
marriage | | |
| 5. | | baräshun
for them | pish
forward | [nemiäd?]
doesn't come | | | | |
| | | are you sure that marriage opportunities don't come to girls? | | | | | | |
| 6. | D | | [.hh] | | | | | |
| 7. | H | | [dokhtarä]
girls | baräshun
for them | | | | |
| 8. | | [pish
forward | miäd.]
comes | | | | | |
| | | they come to girls. | | | | | | |
| 9. | N 2nd→ | [khob
DM (well) yes | cher[ä;] | | | | | |
| | | khob yeah, | | | | | | |
| 10. | T | [BA]RÄSHUN
for them | [PISH
forward | MIÄ:D,]
(it) comes | | | | |

they come to them.

11. N [moqe'iat pish] miäd, opportunity forward comes
opportunities come to them,
12. [vali sathe tava[qo'ät bälä] rafte.
but level of expectations up gone
but the level of expectations has gone up.
13. T → [VALi: (.) tava-[äfarin,]
but expec- bravo
but expec- bravo!
14. D [sakhtgiriä]
strictures
high expectations (rigid standards)
15. C hamin; doroste, man bä in moväfeqam.
this very thing that's right I with this I agree
yeah, that's right. I agree with that.
16. ? .h[h]
17. N [°ä]re.°
yeah
yeah.
18. T KHÄnevädäye khode dokhtar mige ke: dokhtare man bäyad
family of herself girl says that daughter of I should
19. darsesh tamum beshe, bere sare kär, \$dastesh tu
her studies complete become.SBJN go.SBJN head of work her hand in
20. jibe kho[desh bäshe,\$]
pocket of herself be.SBJN
the girl's family say that their daughter should finish her studies, go to work, put her hand in her own pocket,
21. B [\$khänome kho]desh be[she:,\$]
lady of herself becom.SBJN
be her own woman,
22. T [khäno]me khodesh beshe, =täze
lady of herself SBJN.become DM
be her own woman,
23. pesari ke miäd väšash s- masalan che midunam
the boy who comes for her for example what I know
the boy who proposes to her, like, I don't know,

certainty of the issue, T reduces the reliability of N's claim and thus demonstrates her own knowledge primacy.

In response, N first produces a partial agreement (lines 9 and 11), indexing a temporary knowledge balance. Then, using the contrast conjunction *vali* 'but', she presents further knowledge of the issue (line 12) to reclaim a K+ position. However, what T produces in overlap with N's last TCU, *vali sathe tavaqo'ät bälä raftē* 'but the level of expectations has gone up', indicates that this information is not new to her. Apart from the first two words of T's utterance in line 13, i.e. *vali tava-* 'but expect-' which are suggestive of offering similar information, the assessment expression *äfarin* 'bravo' points to the fact that T has already been aware of this information. Accordingly, it demonstrates that their knowledge imbalance has been resolved and thus their disagreement has come to an end.

However, as with Extracts 6.9 and 6.10, the sequence doesn't come to closure with the resolution of disagreement. As can be seen in the rest of the extract, after C, a so-far recipient in this sequence, expresses his agreement with the assertion made by N and acknowledged by T (line 15), N produces an agreement token *äre* 'yeah' (line 17). This stand-alone 'yeah' seems to be closure-implicative because it has been uttered with falling intonation and in a quiet voice. However, T chooses to elaborate on the agreed-with assertion (starting at line 18). As can be seen in line 25, N aligns with T expanding the sequence as she collaborates with her on constructing her TCU in lines 23 and 24. Thus, the sequence expands until a stepwise topic-shift occurs.

While in Extracts 6.9 and 6.10 the display of epistemic equilibrium implies arrival at new knowledge, in Extract 6.11, it implies prior access to the knowledge. Nevertheless, in both situations, the participants' disagreement is resolved as knowledge balance is acknowledged by one of the speakers. However, as with the majority of disagreement sequences in which the display of epistemic balance implies arrival at new knowledge, the disagreement sequences in this group are not brought to closure with disagreement resolution as the sequence undergoes expansion until the topic shifts gradually.

The examination of these five sequences indicates that the speakers in the present study used the expressions *äfarin/bärikallä* ‘bravo’ or *daqiqan* ‘exactly,’ along with a partial repetition of the opposing speaker’s utterance, not only to demonstrate an achieved agreement on the issue but to claim prior access to the information presented by the opposing party, thus claiming epistemic primacy from a second position. Therefore, while in sequences in which disagreement resolution is achieved through acknowledging arrival at new knowledge there is “epistemic primacy congruence” (Hayano, 2011; Heinemann, Lindström & Steensig, 2011) between the speakers, in these five sequences the opposing speakers demonstrate “epistemic primacy incongruence.” This is because both parties have the claim of epistemic primacy.

On the whole, section 6.3.2.1 shows that the opposing interactants’ disagreement comes to an end as one of them acknowledges epistemic equilibrium. This is achieved through displaying either arrival at new knowledge (using the agreement token *äre* ‘yeah’ alone or accompanied by a confirmatory component) or prior access to the knowledge (using expressions such as *äfarin* ‘bravo’). Thereafter, no further disagreement is presented on the topic.

Moreover, the examination of the sequences coming to resolution reveals that the majority of them (14 out of 19 sequences or 73.68%) contain just one disagreeing turn, as in Extracts 6.10 and 6.11. This means that the possibility for disagreement resolution is higher when the sequence contains a single disagreeing turn. In other words, as the number of disagreements in a sequence increases, the possibility of moving away from opposition through stepwise topic shift mounts up.

Another interesting point concerning the 19 sequences coming to resolution is that in the vast majority of them (17 out of 19 sequences or 89.5%) the disagreeing speaker has mitigated their response due to *ta'arof* considerations. For instance, in Extracts 6.9, S who produces the first disagreeing turn of the sequence employs an address term to attend to P (the disagreed-with speaker)’s face. P’s disagreeing response to S which constitutes the second disagreement of the sequence is also mitigated as P begins her turn with a partial agreement with S. Similarly, in Extract 6.10, S incorporates a partial

agreement with Z's assertion into her disagreeing response to Z. And in Extract 6.11, T employs a rhetorical question to attenuate the force of her disagreement. The high percentage of sequences coming to resolution with mitigated disagreement(s) suggests that by reducing the threat to their opposing party's face the disagreeing speakers provide the grounds for disagreement resolution.

However, except for one sequence that will be discussed in the next section, these disagreement sequences do not come to a close with disagreement resolution. They undergo expansion as the disagreeing speaker opts to elaborate on their view after the display of epistemic equilibrium. The other interactants including the opposite party align with the expansion of the sequence as they pass up the floor to the speaker expanding the sequence or take the floor to make K+ contribution to the topic. Thus, the sequence expands until the topic shifts in a gradual fashion.

6.3.2.2 Why do disagreement sequences commonly expand after disagreement resolution?

As demonstrated in sections 6.3.2.1.1 and 6.3.2.1.2, the disagreement sequences examined in the present study tend to continue even after the opposing interactants' disagreement has been resolved. Two reasons have been detected behind further expansion of these sequences: the disagreed-with interactant's sustained gaze at the disagreeing speaker as they approach epistemic equilibrium and the inadequacy of the agreeing response produced to acknowledge epistemic balance. These two reasons will be attended to in section 6.3.2.2.1.

Moreover, as mentioned in section 6.3.2.1.1, the disagreed-with interactant's volume reduction while expressing agreement can be indicative of their orientation toward closing the sequence/topic. If the disagreed-with interactants sustained gaze at the disagreeing speaker while approaching epistemic balance aims at further talk by the disagreeing speaker, then their volume reduction appears to be a contradictory behavior. Section 6.3.2.2.2 will attend to this issue.

6.3.2.2.1 Reasons for sequence expansion after disagreement resolution

As demonstrated in section 6.3.2.1, in the vast majority of sequences in which disagreement is resolved, the sequence expands after disagreement resolution. One reason for this seems to be the disagreed-with recipient's continuous gaze at the speaker as they approach knowledge balance.

Previous research has demonstrated interactants' orientation to gaze withdrawal when closing a sequence. In their discussion of assessments as a means of bringing topics to closure, Goodwin & Goodwin (1987, 1992) show that, along with reducing the volume of talk, speakers commonly withdraw their gaze from their co-interactant to propose topic/sequence closure. Rossano (2013:320) takes it further and demonstrates that the closure of the sequence is dependent on both interactants' gaze withdrawal. He argues that if both interactants withdraw their gaze from each other when approaching sequence closure, there is a high probability (84%) that the sequence will not get expanded. However, if both interactants keep gazing at each other, the sequence gets expanded in the vast majority of cases (95%).

Gaze findings of the present study are consistent with the findings of the above studies. As stated earlier, out of 19 disagreement sequences in which the interactants' disagreement has been resolved, only 1 sequence comes to closure. In the other 18 sequences, the sequence undergoes further expansion until the topic shifts in a stepwise fashion. The examination of the interactants' gaze behavior in the 18 sequences getting expanded shows that the opposing interactants continue gazing at each other as they approach epistemic equilibrium. It appears that the disagreed-with interactant (recipient)'s sustained gaze at the disagreeing speaker as they approach epistemic equilibrium is a strong stimulus for the speaker to continue talk on the topic and expand the sequence. The extract below which is in fact part of Extract 6.10, already discussed in section 6.3.2.1.1, illuminates the point.

Extract 6.12

(Drug and alcohol addiction)

1.	Z	masan	sigär	keshida:n	kheyli	qobhesh:	masalan	*ziäd
		for example	cigarette	pull	very	its indecency	for example	much

- Z gazing down* **Z gazing at S*
2. bud tu jäme'eye mä haqe[ʔaqa[:l.]
was in society of us at least
- Z gazing at S*
for example, smoking was a very indecent behavior at least in our society ((in the past)).
3. S [ä[re,]
yeah
S gazing toward Z
yeah,
4. F [°bi]shta[r°]
more
5. Z [E]nqad [shoy]u'=
this extent prevalence
Z gazing toward S
6. S [äre,]
yeah
S gazing toward Z
yeah,
7. Z =nadä:sht. .h *vali ʔal'än .h alän man *khodam* *be 'eyne
(it) didn't have but now now I myself to eye
**Z gazing away* **Z gazing at S*
8. *masalan tu khiäbun *injä räh mi*ra:m b- az har chär panshtä
for example in street here way (I) go from each four five
**Z gazing away* **Z gazing toward S* **Z gazing away*
9. bache *dabirestāni ʔam ädam masalan: yä haʔä pä:'intar
child high school also human for example or even lower
**Z gazing toward S*
10. mibine .h kheyli rahat [°sigär mikeshe.°]
sees very easy cigarette smokes
Z gazing toward S
it wasn't that common. but now ((it's no longer indecent because)) .h when walking in the street, for example, I see that, from every four or five high school or even younger children, one smokes very easily ((it's very prevalent among young children)).
11. S 1st → [vali bäs bäs] vojudi ke *mesan
but again with existence that for example
S gazing toward Z **S gazing at F*
Z gazing toward S
12. rävej *shode: (0.3) *hanuz (.) zqsh:tisho *dä:r[e.]
common (it) has become still its indecency.DOM (it) has
**S gazing toward Z* **S gazing toward F* **S gazing toward Z*
Z gazing toward S
although it has become common, it still looks indecent.

13. Z → [d]ä:re; ä[re.]
(it) has yeah
Z gazing toward S
S gazing toward Z
it does. yeah.
14. S [ya 'ni
meaning
S gazing toward Z
Z gazing toward S
15. bāz:=e:h *barāye: haḍcaqal: *yeki mese baḥehā hanuz: vaqti az
again for at least one such as children still when from
**S gazing toward F *S gazing toward Z*
Z gazing toward S
16. kenāresh migzari mibinid °masan° dāre sigār mikeshe .h
his/her side (you) pass (you) see for example (s/he) has cigarette (s/he) smokes
S gazing toward Z
Z gazing toward S
17. *a'sābet khord *mische:
your nerves broken (it) becomes
**S gazing toward F *S gazing toward Z*
Z gazing toward S
I mean, again eh at least for children, still when you pass them and, say, see them smoking, you get very annoyed
18. (0.2)
19. Z → °äre; äre.°
yeah yeah
Z gazing toward S
S gazing toward Z
yeah, yeah.
20. S man: e:h *chiz ke budam e:h un säkhtemun ke budam, .h
I DM that (I) was that building that (I) was
**S gazing down*
Z gazing toward S
when I was in the other building,
21. *poshte kelās: *persarā miumadan sigār mikeshidan.
behind class boys (they) came cigarette (they) smoke
**S gazing toward Z *S gazing toward F*
Z gazing toward S
boys smoked behind the class.
22. Z uhum,
uhum
Z gazing toward S

S gazing toward F

uhum,

23. S kheyli nārāhat *mishoda[m.]
very upset (I) became
S gazing toward F **S gazing toward Z*
Z gazing toward S
I became very upset.
24. Z [är]e[:.]
yeah
Z gazing toward S
S gazing toward Z
yeah.
25. S * [ya]’ni asan *delam mikhäst beram
meaning DM my heart (it) wanted (I) go
**S gazing down* **S gazing toward F*
Z gazing toward S
26. biruno *masan bāshun dā’vä konam, .hh *chon asan
outside and for example with them quarrel (I) do because DM
**S gazing toward Z* **S gazing away*
Z gazing toward S
I mean I liked to go out and quarrel with them because
27. hege *badi bem dast midad ke *engär inä .h *dā:neshjua:n,
feeling of bad to me hand (it)gave that as if these (they) are students
**S gazing toward Z* **S gazing away* **S gazing at Z*
Z gazing toward S
I had a bad feeling that they were students
28. *khob eh (0.9) *yā khābgāhi *an, *dür az khānevādashunan,
DM eh or (they) are dorm residents far from their families are
S gazing away* **S gazing toward Z*S gazing toward F* **S gazing toward Z*
Z gazing toward S
khob eh (0.9) or dorm residents, they’re away from their families,
29. *hamashunam dore hamdige, *neshashte sigär mikeshe, .h *hälä
all of them around each other sitting cigarette (s/he) smokes now (DM)
**S gazing away* **S gazing toward Z* **S gazing away*
Z gazing toward S
they’re all together, sitting and smoking,
30. masalan in *che hesie ke däre *besh das mide?
for example this what feeling is that (it) has to him hand (it) gives
**S gazing toward Z* **S gazing away*
Z gazing toward S
now what feeling do they have?

Taking a look at the gaze behavior of the opposing interactants S and Z, we can see that as S starts expressing her disagreement with Z (line 11), Z fixes her gaze on S. S's gaze direction is mainly toward Z. So, she is aware of Z's gaze toward her. As discussed in section 6.3.2.1.1, despite Z's attempts to show that their disagreement has been resolved (once in line 13 and another time in line 19) and her use of falling intonation and lowered volume which can signify readiness for sequence closure, the sequence continues as S continues talk on the topic (line 20). It appears that Z's continuous gaze at S as they approach epistemic balance provides a strong stimulus for S to continue talk on the topic.

Gaze examination of the 18 disagreement sequences getting expanded after the display of epistemic equilibrium points to the intended (disagreed-with) recipient's sustained gaze at the speaker as they approach epistemic balance. By contrast, gaze examination of the only disagreement sequence that comes to closure shows that the disagreed-with recipient withdraws her gaze from the speaker when approaching epistemic balance. Extract 6.13 below taken from the four-party discussion on drug and alcohol addiction presents the situation. The extract starts at a point where H looking at E presents an assertion about suicide. Z then disagrees with that assertion.

Extract 6.13

(Suicide)

- | | | | | | | | | |
|----|---|---|----------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|------------------|---------------------|
| 1. | H | be
to | har
any | hāl eh
present | khodkoshi
suicide | kardan (0.6)
doing | dar
in | <u>kol</u>
total |
| | | <i>H gazing toward E</i> | | | | | | |
| | | <i>E gazing toward H</i> | | | | | | |
| 2. | | migam .h
I say | neshuneye
sign of | za'if
weak | budane
being.EZ | ye
a | ādame.
man is | |
| | | <i>H gazing toward E</i> | | | | | | |
| | | <i>E gazing toward H</i> | | | | | | |
| | | anyway, generally speaking, suicide is the sign of a human's weakness. | | | | | | |
| 3. | | (0.5) | | | | | | |
| 4. | E | äre
yeah | dige.
DM | | | | | |
| | | <i>E gazing down</i> | | | | | | |
| | | <i>H gazing toward E</i> | | | | | | |
| | | yeah. | | | | | | |
| 5. | | (0.2) | | | | | | |

6. in[:]
this
E gazing down
H gazing toward E
7. Z → [n]eshuneye *za'if budanesh *ke hast, vali negā kon, ba'zi
sign of weakness his being that is but look do (you) some
Z gazing toward H **Z gazing down*
**H gazing toward Z*
it's the sign of the human's weakness, but look,
8. owqāt (0.2) alān masalan man mesāle ye dokhtario mizanam
times DM for example I example of a girl.DOM I hit
Z gazing down
H gazing toward Z
sometimes (0.2) for example, I'm giving an example of a girl
9. ke dākhele ye khunevādei- (0.3) zendegi mikone ke *bish az
that inside of a family life does (she) that more from
Z gazing down **Z gazing toward H*
H gazing toward Z
10. had ta'asobie. (0.6) .hh *khob in dokhtar har kāri ke
limit fanatical is DM this girl any work that
Z gazing toward H **Z gazing down*
H gazing toward Z
11. bekhād bekone *ye tarsi az khunevādasho dāre. .h
she wants.SBJN she does.SBJN a fear from her family.DOM (she) has
Z gazing down **Z gazing toward H*
H gazing toward Z
who has an overly fanatic family. khob whatever she wants to do, she's afraid of her family.
12. *to tasavor kon masalan barādaresh behesh
you imagination you do for example her brother to her
**Z gazing down*
H gazing toward Z
13. mige agar folān kāro bekoni, man *mikoshamet.
(he) says if such and such work.DOM (you) do.SBJN I (I) kill you
Z gazing down **Z gazing toward H*
H gazing toward Z
imagine, for example, her brother tells her, 'if you do such-and-such a thing, I'll kill you.'
14. (0.4)
15. .h un barādaram *vāqe'an hamchin kārio *mikone,
that brother also really such work.DOM (he) does
Z gazing toward H **Z gazing toward E* **Z gazing toward H*
H gazing toward Z
and the brother will really do such a thing.

16. (0.3)
17. E uhum,
uhum
E gazing toward Z
uhum,
18. Z kho' un dokhtar az tarsesh khey:li oqät momkene ke dast
well that girl from her fear many times possible is that hand
Z gazing toward H
H gazing toward Z
19. be khodkoshi beza[ne.]
to suicide SBJN.hit (she)
Z gazing toward H
H gazing toward Z
well, it's highly possible that the girl commits suicide because of her fear.
20. E [är]e.
yeah
E gazing toward Z
H gazing toward Z
yeah.
21. (0.3) *H gazing toward Z*
22. Z az *tarse (.) *masalan inke .hh jeloje khunevädash *biäberu beshe.
from fear of for example that before her family disgraced (she) becomes.SBJN
*Z gazing H *Z gazing down* *Z gazing toward H
H gazing toward Z *H (turning her head away and) gazing down
the fear of, let's say, being disgraced before her family.
23. (1.6) *H gazing down*
24. E uhum.
uhum
E gazing toward Z and then down
H gazing down
uhum.
25. H khäne- äre, =khob khäneväde ham mitune naqshe *asäsi däkhele
fa- yeah DM family also (it) can role of essential inside
H gazing down *H gazing toward E
E gazing toward H
26. *kho[dkoshi däshte bäshe.]
suicide had.PRF SBJN.be
H gazing toward E
*E gazing down
yeah, khob families can play an essential role in ((stimulating children to commit)) suicide too.
27. E [äre dige, hamin] *e:h* hamin: khäneväde kheyli naqshe
yeah DM the same the same family very role of

- E gazing down*
28. mo^hemi dāre, .hh ba 'd man hālā ehsās mikonam bejoz u:n
important (it) has DM then I DM feeling (I) do except that
- E gazing down*
- yeah, that's it. families have a very important role. I think,**
29. ya 'ni bejoz in chizāyi ke *hālā goftimo ina .h shāyad
meaning except this things that DM (we) said and these maybe
- E gazing down* **E gazing toward H*
- except for what we said and the like,**
30. masalan lāzem bāshe ye shivei masalan *ye- eh
for example necessary SBJN.be a method for example a
- E gazing toward H*
31. ā āmuzeshe ākādemik* masan rājebe .h che midunam shiveye
education of academic for example about what (I) know method of
32. raftāre khānevādehā bā farzandāshun tu ye maqta' e khāsi
behavior of families with their children in a stage of special
33. ke masalan .h hanuz shekl nagereftan shāyad lāzem
that for example still form (they) haven't taken perhaps necessary
34. bāshe ye āmuzeshe khāsi be khode khānevādeh[ā bedan,]
be.SBJN a education of special to itself families (they) give
- maybe, let's say, it's necessary to give the families a special education, say, an academic education about, I don't know, the way they treat their children at a certain stage when they aren't formed ((behaviorally)) yet.**

In lines 1 and 2 of the above extract, H presents the initial assertion 'suicide is the sign of a human's weakness.' Z takes issue with this assertion, using an example of a girl from an overly fanatic family (lines 7-15, 18, 19 and 22). Following a long gap (line 23) and the non-addressee recipient E's agreeing response (line 24), H displays her arrival at epistemic balance with Z (lines 25 and 26). In so doing, H produces two TCUs. The first TCU is the agreement token 'yeah' (coming after the false start *khāne-'fa-*) (line 25). And the second one is in fact the implied moral of Z's story of the girl (lines 25 and 26). As can be seen in the rest of the extract (lines 27-34), overlapping the last words of H's second TCU, E takes the turn and closes the sequence by expressing her agreement with H and Z (lines 27 and 28).⁴⁴ Then, after an audible inhalation (line 28), she raises her volume and starts a new sequence⁴⁵ on a related

⁴⁴ As will be discussed in section 6.5, the final turns of this disagreement sequence seem to form a sequence-closing sequence.

⁴⁵ In her article 'Prosody and sequence organization in English conversation: The case of new

topic, using the discourse marker *ba'd* 'then' (Alami, Sabbah & Iranmanesh, 2012; Alami, 2016) (line 28). It is worth noting that although it is E who closes the sequence and starts a new one, Z makes no attempt to take the floor and continue talk on the topic.

The interactants' gaze examination shows that when Z begins expressing her disagreement with H (line 7), H, who is sitting next to Z and has already been gazing at E, turns her head toward Z and starts gazing at Z. As can be seen in lines 7-19, H continues gazing at Z as she reaches the end of her turn (line 19). However, at the possible completion point of Z's utterance, it is E who presents a response (an agreement token) (line 20). H remains non-responsive while still gazing at Z. As a result, after a gap of 0.3 of a second (line 21), Z adds the increment in line 22 to both create another transition relevance place at which H, her intended recipient, could display reciprocity (Ford et al., 2002:25) and forestall a disaffiliative action (Heritage, 2006:22), here a disagreement.

When Z drops her gaze down in the beginning of her increment (line 22), H turns her head and starts gazing down. As in lines 22-25, H's gazing down continues up until she is midway through her own turn (line 25). At that point, H starts gazing at E rather than Z, thus selecting E as the next speaker (Lerner, 2003). As can be seen in line 27, it is E who takes the next turn and, ratifying H's assertion, closes the sequence.

H's gaze withdrawal from Z when she is still at a point of maximal incompleteness of her TCU (line 22) seems to be the sign of her loss of interest in the subject, thus a proposal for sequence closure. This is evidenced by the long gap⁴⁶ that follows Z's increment while H is accountable for a response as well as H's selection of E as the next speaker when expressing her agreement with Z. So, in the above extract, the

beginnings,' Couper-Kohlen (2004) demonstrates that, after audible inbreathing, speakers frequently start a new sequence disjunctively by increasing their volume and pitch. Although in the above extract the new sequence is not disjunctive, after an audible inhalation (line 28), E launches a new sequence, increasing the volume of her talk.

⁴⁶ Jefferson (1988:192) has found that the 'standard maximum tolerance' for an inter-turn silence in English conversations is 1.0-1.24 seconds. Longer intervals are accountable. Research is needed to confirm whether the same standard holds for Persian conversations or not.

intended (disagreed-with) recipient's gaze withdrawal from the disagreeing speaker prepares the ground for sequence closure.

A second point to note here relates to the recipients' agreement response to display epistemic equilibrium. As demonstrated in section 6.3.2.1.1, in sequences that undergo further expansion after disagreement resolution, the disagreed-with interactants' agreement response used to acknowledge epistemic balance seem to be inadequate. This is because the agreement response usually consists of agreement tokens and/or formulaic, confirmatory expressions as in Extract 6.12 above (Z's agreements in lines 13 and 19). However, in the above extract, when expressing their agreement with Z, in addition to the agreement token *äre* 'yeah' (H and E) and the confirmatory expression *hamin* 'that's it' (E), both H (lines 25 and 26) and E (lines 27 and 28) opt to present a propositional sentence. That is to say, they do not consider it enough to close the sequence with agreement tokens or formulaic, confirmatory expressions. However, to determine whether it is a general tendency not to suffice to agreement tokens or confirmatory expressions to close a disagreement sequence, more samples are needed.

Still a third possible reason for sequence expansion after disagreement resolution may be the institutional nature of the discussions. The students participating in the discussion sessions were required to talk about specified topics for a specified minimum amount of time, and they may have felt the need to keep their conversation going on that topic to comply with these institutional requirements.

In summary, this section has shown that, in sequences with disagreement resolution in the present data set, the disagreed-with recipient's sustained gaze at the speaker, together with their inadequate agreement response to show epistemic balance, result in sequence expansion. By contrast, the disagreed-with recipient's gaze withdrawal from the disagreeing speaker, together with their detailed agreement response to acknowledge epistemic balance, seem to bring the sequence to closure. However, due to the fact that there is only one disagreement sequence in the present data set that comes to closure, it cannot be said whether it is always the case or not.

6.3.2.2.2 Change of volume

In his discussion of sequence-closing sequences, Schegloff (2007:187) states that the three consecutive turns of a sequence-closing sequence are usually produced with decreasing volume. Though not clear-cut, the final turns of the only disagreement sequence coming to closure in the present data set look like a sequence-closing sequence. Taking a look at Extract 6.13, we can see that Z's turn in line 18 presents a concluding statement, thus forming the first turn of a sequence-closing sequence. Due to a lack of response from her intended recipient H, Z then adds the increment in line 22 to her concluding statement. H's collaborative response to close the sequence (lines 25 and 26) is finally produced after a brief agreement by E (line 24) which in turn follows a long silence (line 23). Subsequently, E (now H's intended recipient as evidenced by H's gaze direction) ratifies H's alignment with Z and thus closes the sequence (lines 27 and 28) and then initiates a new sequence (line 28) in the same turn. The examination of the speakers' volume before and during the production of the final turns of this disagreement sequence points to a decline in H and E's volume while producing their final turns.

Bearing in mind that H's agreeing response in lines 25 and 26 is in fact a display of arrival at epistemic balance with Z and thus the resolution of their disagreement, it is expected to observe the disagreed-with (intended) recipients' orientation toward volume reduction while approaching epistemic equilibrium in the other 18 sequences with disagreement resolution. The examination of the disagreed-with speakers' volume in these sequences points to a volume reduction in 11 sequences (see, for example, Extracts 6.9 and 6.10). The question now arises as why these 11 sequences are not brought to closure if the recipients' volume reduction is suggestive of their orientation toward sequence closure.

As mentioned in section 6.4, in all the 18 sequences not coming to closure the disagreed-with recipient is gazing at the speaker while approaching epistemic balance. If the recipient's sustained gaze at the speaker implies expectation of more talk on the topic from the speaker, then their volume reduction while approaching epistemic balance seems to be a contradictory behavior.

Taking a look at Extract 6.13, we can see that, Z, the disagreeing speaker, has presented a detailed account (lines 7-15, 18, 19 and 22) to justify her opposite view before H, the intended recipient, acknowledges arrival at epistemic balance with Z (lines 25 and 26). This means that, since there is no need for further explanation by Z, H withdraws her gaze from Z when approaching epistemic balance and simultaneously reduces her volume to show her orientation toward sequence closure. However, this is not the case with the 18 sequences undergoing further expansion after disagreement resolution. As the examination of these sequences shows, the speakers' account for their disagreeing view follows the recipient's display of epistemic equilibrium (see, for example, Extracts 6.9, 6.10 and 6.11), hence the recipients' sustained gaze toward the speaker when displaying epistemic balance.

Based on the above argumentation, we are led to suggest that, in the 18 sequences not coming to closure despite disagreement resolution, the recipients' volume reduction while approaching epistemic equilibrium is not showing their orientation toward closing the sequence. Rather, it can signal that they are not going to present further opposing views on the issue under discussion. This is evidenced by the data as in none of these 18 sequences the recipient produces further disagreements on the issue.

6.4 Conclusion

The analysis of the data shows that the discussants in the present study commonly move away from disagreement through stepwise topic-shift without resolving their disagreement. Alternatively, they can resolve their disagreement through either acknowledging arrival at new knowledge or displaying prior access to the knowledge presented by an opposing party. However, even the resolution of disagreement does not commonly result in sequence closure as the interactants show a strong tendency to continue talk on the topic until the topic shifts in a stepwise fashion.

The examination of the sequences not coming to closure with disagreement resolution shows that the recipient's gaze toward the disagreeing speaker while reaching epistemic equilibrium together with their inadequate agreement response to display knowledge balance stimulate the speaker to continue talk on the topic and expand the

sequence. It has been argued that the reason behind the recipient's sustained gaze at the speaker while approaching epistemic balance seems to be the disagreeing speaker's insufficient account for their opposite view. Therefore, the recipient's sustained gaze gives the speaker the go-ahead to present accounts or explanations and thus expand the sequence.

Data examination has also pointed to the intended recipient's tendency to reduce the volume of their talk when displaying epistemic balance with their disagreeing interactant. It has been argued that this reduction of volume is suggestive of the recipient's avoidance of presenting further opposing views on the issue under discussion.

There is no instance of disjunctive topic shift in the sense described by Jefferson (1993) and Schegloff (2007) in the whole data set which seems to be due to the institutional nature of academic discussions. Jefferson (1993) and Schegloff's (2007) data seem to be casual conversations which allow the possibility of disjunctive topic shift. However, in the institutional setting of academic discussion, the interactants are restricted to talk about a certain subject. So, this is a key point of difference between casual conversation and academic talk found in the present study.

Chapter 7

Preference organization of disagreements in Persian academic discussions

7.1 Introduction

In previous chapters, I examined what characterizes disagreements in academic discussions (Chapters 3 and 5), how disagreement sequences emerge interactionally (Chapter 4), how disagreement can be sustained (Chapter 5) and how it can finally be resolved (Chapter 6). However, in these chapters I mainly focused on the influence of the immediate context in the production and negotiation of disagreement. Little attention was paid to the influence of culture. Therefore, with a focus on the influence of culture on disagreement production, the present chapter is going to examine whether in the context of academic discussions disagreement is considered a preferred or dispreferred action.

In Conversation Analysis the concept of preference characterizes interactional situations in which participants can choose among alternative courses of action arising in the areas of first/second pair part production (or initiating and responsive actions), lexical selection/interpretation, repair, turn taking and the like (Atkinson & Heritage, 1984a:53; Pomerantz & Heritage, 2013:210). Since these alternatives are not “symmetrical” (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973:314) or “equally valued” (Schegloff, 2007:59), there is a ranking of alternatives in each area (Atkinson & Heritage, 1984:53), with one alternative being the preferred one and others the dispreferred. For example, in the area of repair, as demonstrated by Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks (1977), there is a preference for self-correction (the preferred alternative) over other-correction (the dispreferred alternative).

As mentioned above, preference is operative in a wide variety of interactional situations. However, due to the limited scope of the present chapter, I confine the

discussion on preference to responsive actions, to which disagreement, the subject of investigation in the present study, belongs. A responsive action is the SPP of an adjacency pair produced in response to its FPP or initial action.

As discussed in Chapter 4, the production of first disagreements in the present study is not governed by the property of conditional relevance. This is because not all assertions in the data set are followed by a response. Nevertheless, the situation is similar to an adjacency pair as a) alternative types of responses, namely, agreement and disagreement, can follow an initial assertion, and b) as evidenced in the data gathered for the present study,⁴⁷ these two alternatives are not generally produced in the same way.

As maintained by Schegloff (1979:36; 2007:58-59), except for a limited number of sequence types,⁴⁸ the FPP of an adjacency pair not only makes the production of one of a set of type-conforming responses the relevant next action but sets a preference for one type of the alternative responses. For instance, FPP requests display a preference for grants over rejections. Offers or invitations prefer acceptances to declinations (see Davidson, 1984).

The ranking of alternatives as preferred or dispreferred is done on the basis of the accomplishment of the activity initiated by the FPP of the respective adjacency pair. A SPP or responsive action that aligns with the action initiated by its FPP and supports the progress or the accomplishment of that activity is called a preferred response. The alternative which does not favor the accomplishment of the activity is dispreferred (Schegloff, 2007:59).⁴⁹ For example, for a summons-answer adjacency pair, a go-

⁴⁷ For examples of agreement turns in our data set, see Section 3.3, Chapter 3.

⁴⁸ For example, in greeting or farewell adjacency pairs, although there are different forms that can be used as the SPP, they all belong to one type of response. In other words, we can't classify greeting or farewell responses as either preferred or dispreferred.

⁴⁹ This classification of the alternative responsive actions comes from Sack's (1987) description of the preference for agreement. Analyzing sequences of polar questions in English conversations, Sacks (1987:58) identifies two concurrent preferences: the preference for contiguity and the preference for agreement. The preference for contiguity refers to the tendency of the SPP of an adjacency pair to occur

ahead response is preferred as it displays the aligned reciprocity or attentiveness of the SPP producer for further talk and a blocking response is dispreferred as it displays a problem with the speaker's availability or attentiveness (p. 59).

It is worth noting that the concept of preference in CA relates to the structural features of turns and sequences not the psychological states or motives of the interactants, i.e. what the speaker or the recipient personally prefers (Atkinson & Drew, 1979: 59; Atkinson & Heritage, 1984:53; Heritage, 1984a:267; Brown & Levinson, 1987:38; Sacks, 1987:69; Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998:43, 44; Schegloff, 2007:61).⁵⁰ This means that preferred and dispreferred alternatives are produced in noticeably different ways (Atkinson & Heritage, 1984a:53; Pomerantz, 1984:64; Sacks, 1987:55; Schegloff, 2007:63). In English, while preferred responses are commonly produced directly and with no delay, dispreferred responses are usually stated indirectly and characterized by inter- and/or intra-turn delay, prefaces, mitigation and accounts (Levinson, 1983:307; Atkinson & Heritage, 1984:53; Heritage, 1984a:267; Pomerantz & Heritage, 2013:214),⁵¹ as in the invitation sequences below.

Extract 7.1 (Amy and Jane) (Liddicoat, 2007:117)

1. Amy w'd yuh like tuh come over t'morrow night
2. Jane → yea:h.= that' d be nice.

Extract 7.2 (Lunch) (Liddicoat, 2007:117)

1. Harry I don' have much tuh do on We:nsday.
2. (.)
3. w'd yuh like tuh get together then.
4. (0.3)
5. Joy → huh we: rllhh I don' really know if yuh see
6. i's a bit hectic fuh me We:nsday yih know
7. Harry oh wokay

exactly next to its FPP. The preference for agreement, however, refers to the tendency of a SPP to be in accord with the trajectory or design of its FPP.

⁵⁰ However, as Schegloff (2007:61) states, the structural preference often coincides with the psychological inclination.

⁵¹ As Sacks (1987:58-59) maintains, it is because of the interaction of the preferences for contiguity and agreement that a preferred SPP occurs in the beginning of the turn contiguous to its FPP, whereas a dispreferred SPP is pushed back into the turn or sequence in which it occurs, with a variety of components coming in front of it.

As explained by Liddicoat (2007:117), in Extract 7.1, Jane’s SPP acceptance (a preferred response) starts with the acceptance token *yeah* produced immediately at the possible completion of Amy’s FPP invitation. In contrast, in Extract 7.2, Joy’s SPP declination (a dispreferred response) has not been stated overtly and is replete with delay devices: a 0.3-second silence (line 4), an audible exhalation (line 5), a turn-initial marker (*well*), a hedge (*I don’ know*) and a warrant (line 6).

Note that the above findings concerning preferred/dispreferred responses relate to the English language. However, as pointed out by Mey (2001:166), although the concept of preference may be universal, the way preferred and dispreferred responses are expressed is not. In Persian, for instance, as in English, the preferred response to an offer is acceptance; rejection is dispreferred. However, in formal contexts, as demonstrated by Taleghani-Nikazm (1998), offers are first rejected prior to being accepted. These rejections display a preferred format as they are produced without delay, as in the extract below. Zad and Moo, two Iranians who know each other very slightly, are guests at a party. They are in the line to serve themselves food. Zad, who is in front of Moo, hasn’t served herself food and is busy, talking with the hostess and host. Moo should pass Zad if he wants to reach the buffet and serve food for himself. But, etiquette requires him to offer her the chance to take her turn first. The extract starts with Moo offering Zad to serve herself food (Taleghani-Nickazm, 1998:4-5).

Extract 7.3 Offer-acceptance: The negotiation of taarof (Taleghani-Nickazm, 1998:4-5)

- | | | | |
|----|-----|---|-------------------------------------|
| 1. | Moo | Befarmaain
Please
Go ahead | .((moves right hand toward buffet)) |
| 2. | Zad | Na khaahesh mikon[am
No beg [I
No please | ((moves hand to buffet)) |
| 3. | Moo | [Na befarmaain
[No please
[No go ahead
[khaahesh mikonam.
[beg I
[please | |
| 4. | Zad | [Na [khaahesh [mikonam
[No [beg
[No [please | |
| 5. | Moo | [Befarmaain [()
[Go ahead [() | |

As Taleghani-Nickazm (1998:5) explains, by producing *na* ‘no’ (line 2), Zad first rejects Moo’s offer in line 1 and then, using the expression *khaahesh mikonam* ‘please’ and a hand gesture, offers him the chance to serve himself food. Zad’s counter offer is followed by Moo’s rejection and second offer (line 3). In response, Zad rejects Moo’s offer once more and then presents a second offer (line 4). Subsequently, Moo issues a third offer (line 5) which is accepted by Zad as evidenced by her moving toward the buffet and serving herself food. Unlike rejections in English, Zad and Moo’s rejections are not accompanied by delay devices, mitigation and accounts. Rather, they consist of a simple *na* ‘no,’ expressed upon the completion of the prior turn or in terminal overlap with that (p. 6). As explained previously in section 3.2, Chapter 1, in Iranian formal contexts, such initial rejections before accepting the offer are a manifestation of *ta’arof*, politeness in Persian.

A similar approach toward offers has been observed in Saudi Arabian culture. As shown by Abu Abah (2015, cited in Clift, 2016:165, 167), in Saudi Arabic conversations offers are refused, often repeatedly, before being accepted. That is to say, while acceptance of an offer is a preferred response, it is routinely preceded by refusals expressed in a preferred format.

Both Taleghani-Nickazm (1998) and Abu Abah’s (2015) studies point to a difference in the preference organization of offers in these languages compared to English conversations. They are thus suggestive of the fact that the preference organization of a responsive action can be under the influence of cultural considerations. The following section will focus on the preference organization of disagreement as a responsive action to an assessment or assertion in English and a variety of other languages and contexts.

7.2 Preference organization of disagreements

An early CA study on the preference organization of dis/agreements is Pomerantz’ (1984) seminal work on second assessments in American English casual conversations. Second assessments are assessments responsive to an initial assessment about a referent accessible to the recipient (p. 61). A second assessment can be either

an agreement or a disagreement. As Pomerantz (1984:63-64) states, while agreement is the preferred response to a wide variety of initial actions, disagreement is preferred only in response to such actions as self-denigration. That is to say, disagreements are generally dispreferred. She maintains that, in the context of assessments, agreements are preferred second actions because they are socially supportive (p. 77). As a result, they are frequently uttered through stated agreement components, with a minimization of gap (p. 65) or even an overlap between the completion of the prior turn and the initiation of the agreement turn (p. 69). Extract 7.4 below in which A's agreeing response starts in overlap with the final word of B's initial assessment provides an instance of agreement turn.

Extract 7.4 (SBL:2.1.8.-5) (Pomerantz, 1984:66)

- | | | |
|----|-----|------------------------------------|
| 1. | B | She seems like a nice little [lady |
| 2. | A → | [Awfully nice little person. |

In contrast, disagreements are dispreferred second actions because they can threaten social solidarity (Pomerantz, 1984:77). As such, they commonly incorporate delay devices such as silences, hesitation markers, requests for clarification, partial repeats, and turn prefaces such as partial agreements (pp. 70-75). Consequently, the shape of the disagreement turn and/or sequence is markedly different from that of an agreement turn/sequence. The extracts below exemplify the point.

Extract 7.5 (TG:3) (Pomerantz, 1984:71)

- | | | |
|----|-----|--------------------------------------|
| 1. | A | ... You sound very far <u>away</u> . |
| 2. | | (0.7) |
| 3. | B | I <u>do</u> ? |
| 4. | A | Meahm. |
| 5. | B → | mNo? I'm no:t, |

Extract 7.6 (JG:II:1.-27) (Pomerantz, 1984:72)

- | | | |
|----|-----|---|
| 1. | C |hh a:n' uh by god I can' even send my kid tuh public school b'cuz they're so god damn lousy. |
| 2. | D | We::l, that's a generality. |
| 3. | C | .hhh |
| 4. | D | We've got sm pretty [(good schools.) |
| 5. | C → | [Well, yeah but where in the hell em I gonna <u>live</u> . |

As demonstrated by Pomerantz (1984:70, 71), in Extract 7.5, B, who is going to disagree with A's assessment, uses two delay devices to withhold their disagreeing response from early positioning into the sequence. First, upon the completion of A's

assessment, B responds with a 0.7 second silence (line 2). Second, B uses a repair initiator or clarification question ‘I do?’ (line 3). In Extract 7.6, C employs two delay devices to push her second pair part disagreement back into the turn: the discourse marker ‘well’ and the agreement token ‘yeah’ (p. 72).

So, while the preference for contiguity (Sacks, 1987:58) requires that the SPP of an adjacency pair be placed contiguous to its FPP, the delay devices used in the above two extracts push the SPPs deep into the turn or sequence. By breaking the contiguity of first and second pair parts, these delay devices let the FPP producer anticipate a disagreeing response and give them the opportunity to modify their position (Pomerantz, 1984:76; Sacks, 1987:63, 64; Schegloff, 2007:70-71), as in the following extract:

Extract 7.7 (SBL:3.1.-8) (Pomerantz, 1984:77)

- | | | |
|----|-----|--|
| 1. | B | ... an' that's not an awful lotta <u>fruitcake</u> |
| 2. | | (0.1) |
| 3. | B | course it is. A little piece goes a long way. |
| 4. | A → | well that's right. |

As the recipient of B's assessment in line 1 responds with silence (line 2), B anticipates a disagreeing response, thus resuming talk (line 3) with the reversal of their earlier position. B's modified assessment can then elicit A's agreeing response (line 4) (Pomerantz, 1984:76). The SPP producers' inclination toward delaying/withholding their disagreement, along with the FPP speakers' modification of their stance, results in the minimization of stated disagreements and maximization of stated agreements (p. 77).

Speakers' general tendency toward agreement or avoidance of disagreement has also been proposed in Brown and Levinson's (1987) politeness theory which classifies speech acts as either face-enhancing or face-threatening (see also Leech's (1983) agreement maxim of the politeness principle). The concept of face which was originally introduced into social psychology by Goffman (1967) refers to “the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact” (p. 5). Drawing on Goffman's (1967) notion of face,

Brown and Levinson (1987:61) define face as the public self-image that a person maintains for himself/herself and consider two aspects for it: positive and negative. Positive face refers to one's desire to be approved by others, whereas negative face concerns one's desire to have independence of action and freedom from imposition. As Brown and Levinson (1987:66) argue, while agreement satisfies the recipient's positive face, disagreement puts it into danger as it shows the speaker's negative evaluation of some aspect of the recipient's positive face. So, Brown and Levinson regard disagreement as a face-threatening act that should be avoided or mitigated (see also Grimshaw's (1990) sociolinguistic study in which disagreement is claimed to have a negative impact on social relations).

Note that face considerations and preference organization are closely related to each other (Heritage, 1984:268; Holtgraves, 1992:148; Lerner, 1996; Pillet-Shore, 2017). Lerner (1996) demonstrates how anticipatory completion of an ongoing turn by another speaker which aims to preempt a dispreferred action provides a basis to locate face concerns. As Lerner (1996:312) maintains, the prevention of an emerging disagreement through anticipatory completion of a current turn by its recipient and changing it to an agreement is a speaking practice that supports a preference for agreement over disagreement.

Generally, it has been argued that preferred actions promote affiliation because they are face-preserving. By contrast, dispreferred actions promote disaffiliation because they are face-threatening. As a result, while preferred actions are supportive of social solidarity, dispreferred actions are mostly destructive of social solidarity (Heritage, 1984:268; Holtgraves, 1992:148; Pillet-Shore, 2017:3-4).

The above discussion on the preference status of disagreement concerns American and British English casual conversations. However, further research shows that the interactants' orientation toward disagreement is contingent on the interactants' culture and interactional context. There are cultures in which taking issue with fellow interactants does not jeopardize their interpersonal relationships. For instance, Schiffrin's (1984) research shows that Jewish Americans manage to keep their

intimate relationships despite disagreeing with each other overtly and repeatedly. Katriel's (1986) study on the Israeli speech style called *dugri* demonstrates a similar orientation toward disagreement in Israeli Sabra culture. *Dugri* is characterized as a direct speaking style because it is explicit, simple and brief and uses the "bold-on-record" strategy that allows for unmitigated face-threatening acts (p. 114). As Katriel (1986) maintains, the Israeli Sabras show a normative tolerance for confrontation and direct disagreement. Likewise, Tannen & Kakav (1992) and Kakava's (2002) studies on Greek family and friendly conversations reveal that Greeks regard disagreement as a means of strengthening interpersonal relationships and their frequent use of explicit, foregrounded (not pushed back into the turn) and sustained disagreements is an interactional ritual that does not endanger solidarity. A similar orientation toward disagreement by British West Africans with no intimate relationships has been observed by Johnson (2006). As the researcher states, British West Africans tend to disagree with each other explicitly (p. 55), without hesitation or in overlap (p. 49).⁵² In fact, as the above studies show, in these cultures disagreement is a means of promoting sociability and intimacy.

Apart from the interactants' culture, the interactional context can change the way disagreement is negotiated. Research into the UK and US news interview settings demonstrates that news interviewees rarely delay their disagreements or mitigate them by agreement components or hedging devices (Greatbatch, 1992; Dickerson, 2001; Clayman & Heritage, 2002). The observed differences in disagreement production in the news interview context seem to be related to several factors. First, the turn-taking system of news interview settings is such that the interviewees cannot address one another directly. Since the interviewees' disagreements are expressed in response to the interviewer's questions, they are automatically mitigated (Greatbatch, 1992:279-280; Clayman & Heritage, 2002:312). Second, the situation has been devised so that disagreement is the normative or expected course of action (Dickerson, 2001:219; Clayman & Heritage, 2002:312). Third, the interviewer's questions are designed to project disagreement as their preferred response (Clayman & Heritage, 2002:312).

⁵² For more information concerning the above studies, see Chapter 1, section 1.3.2.

Examining the context of international students' oral proficiency interviews, Lazaraton (1997) shows that interviewers' assessments produced in response to students' self-deprecations are different from those in ordinary conversations. While in ordinary conversation a preferred response to a co-interactant's self-deprecatory assessment is an immediate disagreement with no contrastive prefaces (Pomerantz, 1984:95), in Lazaraton's (1997) study the interviewers' common response to students' self-denigration is either silence or an acknowledgement token. As Lazaraton argues, such noncommittal responses allow the interviewers to refrain from taking a stance on the students' performance and remain objective (pp. 62, 70).

Likewise, in the area of academic discussions, analyzing German and Anglo-American dyadic discussions between students and lectures, Kotthoff (1993) observes a change in the preference organization of disagreements. As Kotthoff (1993:205) maintains, with the occurrence of the first unmitigated disagreement, the conversation turns into an argument and the preference for agreement is replaced by a preference for disagreement as the discussants are required to defend their stance.

A preference for disagreement in disputes has also been reported by Gruber (1998). In his examination of conflict sequences mainly occurring in a series of Austrian talk shows in which specialists and ordinary people discussed current cultural, social or political issues, Gruber (1998) observes frequent use of unmitigated disagreements produced in overlap with the prior disagreeing turn. This observation leads Gruber to propose a change in the preference organization in conflict talk. So, as can be understood from these studies, the interactants' orientation toward disagreement is influenced by the setting and its interactional goals.⁵³

As for communicating disagreement in Persian, as far as culture is concerned, Iranians are expected to attenuate their disagreements to observe the rules of *ta'arof* (Asdjodi,

⁵³ As Clift (2016) states, preferences governing ordinary conversation may not hold for institutional talk because in task-based interactional contexts there is less emphasis on the promotion of interpersonal affiliation.

2001; Don & Izadi, 2011),⁵⁴ the core notion of politeness in Persian (Amouzadeh, 2001:206). There are two studies focusing on disagreement in Persian conversations: one carried out by Ramezanpour (2005) on casual conversations and the other by Hosseini (2010), investigating the institutional context of academic talk.

Using CA and Brown & Levinson's (1987) politeness theory, Ramezanpour (2005) investigated casual conversations mostly produced by friends and family members. He showed that, apart from silences, requests for clarification, partial/full repeats, and accounts, the speakers used attention-getting verbs such as *bebin* 'see,' *negah kon* 'look,' and *gush kon* 'listen' to reduce the force of their disagreement and attend to their addressee's face (p. 92). Ramezanpour (2005) made no explicit reference to the use of hesitation markers as a mitigating device. However, there were instances of them in the excerpts presented in his study (see, for instance, p. 45).

In the second study, Hosseini (2010) employed Brown & Levinson's (1987) model of politeness to explore the relationship between power and politeness in negotiating disagreement in the academic context of defense sessions. The data for his study came from nine hours of Persian conversations audio-taped in eight master's thesis defense sessions. Use of positive comments, inclusive 'we,' jokes, partial agreements, clarification questions, hedges, downtoners, and impersonalization and stating general rules were the reported strategies to mitigate disagreement. As stated by Hosseini (2010), contrary to Brown & Levinson's (1987) speculations, whereas mitigated disagreements were used most often when professors (thesis referees and the supervisory panel) disagreed with students, unmitigated disagreements were expressed most frequently when students disagreed with professors (p. 86). Hosseini (2010) attributes the observed anomalies to the institutional nature of defense sessions. As Hosseini (2010) argues, since in a defense session the transactional function of student response is more important than its interactional function, the students are expected to frankly defend their thesis (pp. 89-90). The high frequency of mitigated disagreements in professors' talk, by contrast, is due to the fact that disagreement with a student and

⁵⁴ For a full description of *ta'arof*, see section 1.3.3 of Chapter 1.

criticizing their work implies criticizing the student's supervisor, hence threatening the supervisor's face (p. 86).

As can be understood from the above explanation, Brown & Levinson's (1987) politeness theory was not able to justify the interactants' behavior in the academic context of defense sessions. Therefore, Hosseini (2010) speculates on the reasons behind the observed anomalies, without providing any actual evidence to support his argument. Moreover, the study gives little information concerning student-student interactions, where there is no asymmetry of power and age relationships. Thus, the present chapter aims to unravel how Iranian Persian-speaking students negotiate disagreement when they are involved in academic discussions with their peers.

Previous research on German and Anglo-American disputes (Kotthoff, 1993; Gruber, 1998) points to a change in the preference organization of disagreement sequences after the first disagreeing turn. That is to say, while the first disagreeing turns were commonly observed to be mitigated, with the second disagreeing turns onward, preference for agreement gave way to preference for disagreement and therefore disagreements were less and less mitigated (see also Bilmes, 1988:175).

Further research, however, leads us to cast doubt on the change for a preference for disagreement in argument sequences in all contexts. In their examination of family discussions in Canadian English, Muntigl & Turnbull (1998) presented three-turn sequences consisting of Speaker A's initial claim in turn 1, Speaker B's disagreement with A's claim in turn 2 and Speaker A's subsequent disagreement in turn 3. As evidenced by the data presented by Muntigl & Turnbull (1998), the preference for agreement is commonly operative in the third turn as in the majority of these turns the disagreement component has been preceded by dispreference markers such as delays and hedges.

Driven by such diverse observations, Dersley & Wootton (2000) investigated antagonistic arguments in which the behavior of a co-present party was complained about. Previous literature pointed to a preference for denial in complaint and

accusation sequences (Garcia, 1991; see also Atkinson & Drew, 1979). However, Dersley & Wootton (2000:381-382) found that, in the vast majority of the responsive turns to complaints (about 85%), the complainee implicitly confirmed the occurrence of the complained-of action while simultaneously and more explicitly providing grounds to render the action excusable or justifiable. This finding leads Dersley & Wootton (2000:389) to cast doubt on the existence of a simple preference for denial in complaint sequences. Instead, they propose that in such contexts the complainee is faced with both the preference for agreement and the avoidance of culpability or blame. They also bring into question whether a preference for disagreement is operative throughout all contexts of argumentation (p. 403).

Accordingly, in the present chapter, first disagreements and disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement will be investigated in separate sections with regard to their preference/dispreference structure. This enables us to examine whether in the present data there is a reversal of the preference for agreement when disagreement is sustained.

7.3 First disagreements

As widely stated in CA literature, preferred responses are produced without delay and are brief and direct. By contrast, dispreferred responses are characteristically delayed, elaborated and indirect (see, e.g., Schegloff, 2007; Church, 2009; Pomerantz & Heritage, 2013; Pillet-Shore, 2017). Such uniform characteristics are not observable across the current data set. There are many multi-TCU disagreeing turns in which opposition has been stated overtly in turn-initial position. That is to say, they are direct but elaborated. In such disagreements, the TCUs following the first TCU (actual disagreement component) provide accounts or other supportive information that display the speaker's epistemic superiority over the issue (a defining characteristic of first disagreements). On the other hand, there are disagreements that are indirect but brief (as in Extract 7.10). It is therefore impossible to categorize these disagreements as either preferred or dispreferred. However, the examination of the data based on the positioning of the disagreeing TCU and its content points to the existence of two different categories of disagreement.

Table 7.1 Frequency and percentage of un/mitigated first disagreements

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Mitigated disagreements	37	62.71
Unmitigated disagreements	22	37.29

In the first category to which the majority of first disagreements belong (37 instances or 62.71%), the disagreements contain at least one marker of dispreference, coming either before or while producing the actual disagreement component or TCU. The markers observed are silences, hesitation markers, partial agreements, hedges, clarification questions, accounts (see, e.g., Levinson, 1983:334; Heritage, 1984:266-67; Pomerantz, 1984:70-75; Schegloff, 2007:65-70), repeats (Pomerantz, 1984:70), audible inhalations (Lidicoat, 2007:114; Nevile & Rendle-Short, 2009:83; Sidnell, 2010:78), discourse markers, address terms, items for monitoring/managing talk (or attention getting verbs) (Tanaka, 2008), inclusive pronoun *mā* ‘we’ (Hosseini, 2010), conditionals (Goodwin, 1983:666; Tanaka, 2008), rhetorical questions (Koshik, 2005; Ramezanpour, 2005:90) and prefatory statements. As will be shown in section 7.3.1, these markers serve to break the contiguity of the initial assertion and its disagreeing response and/or attenuate the force of disagreement. The disagreements in this category have been labeled as mitigated disagreements and will be discussed in section 7.3.1.

In the second category, i.e. unmitigated disagreements, in the vast majority of cases (20 instances out of 22 disagreements), the turn is commonly taken urgently and begins with the main disagreement component (the disagreeing TCU) which has been stated directly and without any attenuation (there are no dispreference markers coming before or while producing the disagreeing TCU). In two cases (which will be discussed in section 7.3.2), the main disagreement component is preceded by a question or a partial repeat of the prior turn uttered in rising intonation (thus resembling a clarification question). However, following Goodwin (1983, 1990) and Pomerantz (1984), these turns are categorized as unmitigated disagreements because the question/partial repeat is immediately followed by a disagreement component in the same turn. In her investigation of children’s conversations, Goodwin (1983, 1990)

demonstrates that children frequently aggravate their disagreement by partially repeating the prior turn in a falling-rising intonation contour and then immediately producing a disagreement in the same turn, thus leaving no space for the prior speaker to modify their view. A similar strategy has been observed in responses to self-deprecations in adult conversations. As a second assessment, disagreement with a prior speaker's self-deprecation is a preferred action (Pomerantz, 1984). A common strategy to express such a disagreement is a partial repeat of the prior turn followed by a disagreement component in the same turn (p. 83). That is to say, the aim of partially repeating the prior utterance is not to provide the initial speaker with the opportunity to change their position. Rather, it serves to highlight opposition. Accordingly, the two instances of first disagreement in the present data set which are prefaced by a question or a partial repeat of the prior turn, immediately followed by the main disagreement component in the same turn, have been labeled as unmitigated disagreements.

These two categories, i.e. mitigated and unmitigated first disagreements, will be discussed in detail in sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2 respectively.

7.3.1 Mitigated first disagreements

As stated above, in mitigated disagreements the disagreeing speaker used at least one marker of dispreference either before or while producing the disagreeing TCU. These markers help to push the disagreeing TCU back into the turn and/or soften the disagreement. The extracts below provide examples for such disagreements. The first extract which is rich in dispreference markers exemplifies the use of silence, audible inhalation, partial agreement, the hedging device *be nazare man* 'in my opinion' and conditional structure. The extract has been taken from the discussion on suicide among youths participated by four female students. Before the extract starts, H has been telling the story of a girl who committed suicide after failing to obtain her parents' permission to marry a man who was educated but unemployed.

Extract 7.8
(Suicide)

1.	E	äre	dige,	hamintore;=	yani- m	kheyli	vakhta	moshkeläte
		yeah	DM	it is so	meaning	many	times	problems of
2.		ejemä'ie	dige,=	eq-	moshkeläte	eqtesädiam	ye	bakhshe kheyli

3. social is DM ec- problems of economic also a part of very
 'om:deishe.= ya 'ni .hh väqe'an pul ke nabäshe kheyli az
 chief is meaning actually money that NEG. SBJN.be a lot of
4. moshkeläte masalan raväni pish miäd barä afräd.
 problems of let's say mental forward comes for persons
yeah, it is so. I mean, many a time people attempt suicide because of social problems. economic problems too are a chief reason of suicide. I mean .hh people actually run into many, let's say, psychological problems when they're penniless.
5. (0.6)
6. H → .h pul doroste; tä ye hadi man qabul däram pulo; vali
 money right is to one extent I acceptance I have money.DOM but
.h that's right about money, to some extent I agree with you about money, but
7. be nazare man agar khänevädehä sa'y konan .h sharäyete
 to opinion of I if families effort do (they) conditions of
8. ezdeväjo väse: dokhtaro pesareshun rähattar konan,
 marriage.DOM for daughter and their son easier do (they)
in my opinion, if families try to .h make marriage conditions easier for their children,
9. tavaqo'äto ye zare pä[ntar bi]äran, .h be nazare man=
 expectations.DOM one bit lower bring (they) to opinion of I
(and) lower (their) expectations a bit, .h in my opinion
10. Z [daqiqan.]
 exactly
exactly.
11. H =intori r: moshkel hal mishe. =dige ämäre khodkoshiam
 this way r: problem solution becomes anymore statistics of suicide also
12. taqriban [däkhele bahse 'eshqo 'äsheqi päin] miäd.
 nearly inside of discussion of love and lovesickness down comes
the problem is solved. the rate of suicide among lovers (due to economic problems) comes down too.

Here, H's response to E's assertion concerning the crucial importance of economic problems in committing suicide (lines 2-4) starts after a gap of 0.6 second (line 5). As discussed in section 3.4.3, Chapter 3, this late onset can be suggestive of the dispreferred status of doing disagreement. According to Pomerantz (1984:77) and Heritage (1984:273), an inter-turn silence is a delay device serving to maintain interactants' social solidarity when the responsive action is dispreferred. The dispreferred status of H's response is further evidenced by H's audible in-breath when taking the turn (line 6). As shown in CA literature, an audible in-breath in the beginning of a responsive turn breaks the contiguity of the FPP and its SPP and signals

an upcoming dispreferred action (see e.g., Liddicoat, 2007:114; Nevile & Rendle-Short, 2009:83; Sidnell, 2010:78). The audible in-breath is then followed by the partial agreement *pul doroste; tā ye hadi man qabul dāram pulo* ‘that’s right about money, to some extent I agree with you about money’ (line 6). Like silences and audible inhalations, agreement components that preface a disagreement serve to break the contiguity of the first and second pair part and thus delay the production of the disagreeing response (Pomerantz, 1984:72-74; Schegloff, 2007:69-70). It is after this partial agreement that H, using the contrast conjunction *vali* ‘but’ (line 6), presents the opposite view that if parents lower their expectations concerning the economic status of the person whom their child wants to marry (and therefore give them the consent for marriage), then the rate of suicide linked to economic reasons comes down (lines 7-9, 11 and 12).

Note that H’s main disagreement TCU has also been modulated. First, it has been expressed in a conditional format. A conditional is a compound TCU (Lerner, 1991, 1996) whose *if* clause presents an option leading to a possible outcome the occurrence of which is dependent on the particular option being taken (Ford, 1993:42). Here, the decrease in the rate of suicide is contingent on parents lowering their expectations. Therefore, it instantiates something that is possible, not definite. The fact that H’s disagreement involves a possible rather than an actual event attenuates the force of disagreement (Goodwin, 1983:666; Tanaka, 2008:495). Second, it has been accompanied by the hedging device *be nazare man* ‘in my opinion’ (see, e.g., Alavi-Nia & Jalilifar, 2013:16) appearing once before the subordinate clause of the conditional (line 7) and once before its main clause (line 9). As this hedging device indicates uncertainty, it reduces the force of disagreement (Tanaka, 2008:499). Third, both the *if* clause and the hedge *be nazare man* ‘in my opinion’ serve to delay the gist of the disagreement, i.e. ‘the problem is solved. the rate of suicide among lovers (due to economic problems) comes down too’ (lines 11 and 12), (Tanaka, 2008). That is to say, they further defer the gist of the disagreement within the turn.

As can be seen in the above extract, the contiguity of the initial assertion and the disagreeing TCU has been broken by a variety of delay devices intervening between

them and pushing the disagreeing TCU back into the turn. In the following extract, the disagreeing TCU has been pushed not only back into the turn but deep into the sequence as the disagreement has been first preceded by a clarification question and then by partial repeats, an anticipatory account and discourse markers. The extract is part of the six-party discussion on drug addiction.

Extract 7.9

(Drug addiction I)

- | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|-----|---|--------------------------|----------------------------|--|------------------------|------------------------|---------------------|------------------------|
| 1. | L | mārijuānā .h
marijuana | toriye
is such | ke
that | vaqti
when | fard
person | masraf
use | mikone, (.)
does | shād
happy |
| 2. | | mishe;
becomes
marijuana is such that when a person takes it, (.) s/he becomes happy; | | | | | | | |
| 3. | M | uhu[m,]
uhum | | | | | | | |
| 4. | L | [ya']ni- mm
meaning | kheili
very | mokarar
frequent | o
and | bedune
without | hich
any | dalili
reason | haminjuri
like this |
| 5. | | mizane zire khande,
strikes under laughter
I mean s/he bursts into laughter very frequently and without any reason. | | | | | | | |
| 6. | | .hh yā
or | inke:
that | khābe: (.)
sleep | nādorosti
unsound | dāre,
has | mārijuānā
marijuana | masraf
use | kone,
does |
| 7. | | mārijuānā bā'es
marijuana cause | | | | | | | |
| | | mishe khābe rāhati dāshte bāshe;=
becomes sleep restful have be.SBJN
or if s/he doesn't sleep well, taking marijuana helps them to have a sound sleep. | | | | | | | |
| 8. | A | =°ta[nzim
Regulation | mikone:
does | | ?°] | | | | |
| | | does it regulate (sleep)? | | | | | | | |
| 9. | L | [ba'd
DM (then) | kheili
very | jāle]be,
interesting is | äre, .h
yes | mārijuānā
marijuana | | | |
| 10. | | be
to | hich
no | vajh .h
aspect | e[tiāde]=
addiction of | | | | |
| 11. | A | [vali::]
but | | | | | | | |
| 12. | L | =jesmāni
physical | nadāre.=
doesn't have | | then it's so interesting, yeah, marijuana is not physically addictive at all. | | | | |
| 13. | A → | =migin::
you say | khābo
sleep.DOM | rāhat
restful | mikone,
does | =shomā
you | ke
that | migin
you say | shādi
happiness |
| 14. | | ro
a[fzāyesh mide,] | =kesi
ke | | hayajān | | o
shādish= | | |

		DOM	increase	gives	anyone	who	excitement	and	his/her happiness
15.	M		[märijuänä etiäd]						
			marijuana	addiction					
16.	A	=mire	bälä	dige		kho	kh↑ä:b	[nadäre]	aslan.=
		goes	up	DM (anymore)		DM	sleep	doesn't have	at all
									(that) you say it brings a sound sleep, you're saying it increases happiness, (but) anyone who is excited and overly happy can't sleep at all.
17.	M						[°°khäb°°]		
							sleep		
18.	L	=khäb	dä:re.						
		sleep	has						
									they can sleep.

In the above extract, upon the possible completion of L's assertion concerning the effect of marijuana on taking a sound sleep (lines 6 and 7), A produces the clarification question *tanzim mikone?* 'does it regulate (sleep)?' (line 8). L's response to this question is the agreement token *äre* 'yeah' (line 9), coming after her utterance 'then it's so interesting' (which has been produced in overlap with A's clarification question) (line 9) and followed by another new assertion, 'marijuana isn't physically addictive at all' (lines 9, 10 and 12), which in fact explicates what is interesting about using marijuana in the same turn. As a pre-disagreement, a clarification question furnishes the FPP producer with the opportunity to back down and modify their position (Pomerantz, 1984; Liddicoat, 2007:116). Since L doesn't change her stance, A makes an early attempt to take the turn while L is still in the middle of her last TCU, producing the contrast conjunction *vali* 'but' that signals an upcoming disagreement. Then, upon the possible completion of L's TCU (line 12), A takes the turn (line 13) to express her disagreement.

Taking a look at A's turn in lines 13, 14 and 16, we can discern three TCUs: 1) '(that) you say it brings a sound sleep' (line 13), 2) 'you're saying it increases happiness' (lines 13 and 14) and 3) '(but) anyone who is excited and overly happy can't sleep at all' (lines 14 and 16). Of these three TCUs, it is in fact the third one that embodies the actual disagreeing response to L's assertion concerning the effect of marijuana on sleep. The first TCU specifies the point with which A is going to take issue and the second one reiterates a related point made by L, both containing partial repeats of L's assertions. Given that it is the third TCU that forms the main disagreement component,

the first and second TCUs serve to defer the disagreement component to the end of the turn.

Even the third TCU itself has been constructed so that the gist of disagreement, i.e. *khāb nadāre aslan* ‘can’t sleep at all,’ appears at the end of the TCU. This late positioning of the gist of disagreement has been done through the use of the adjective clause *ke hayajān o shādish mire bālā* ‘who is excited and overly happy’ that modifies the subject of the sentential TCU, i.e. *kesi* ‘anyone,’ and the discourse markers *dige* ‘anymore’ and *kho* ‘well.’ The adjective clause serves as an anticipatory account (Schegloff, 2007:68-69) because it presents the reason why a person taking marijuana can’t sleep. Given that this account could be expressed as an adverbial clause of reason in the final slot of the TCU, as in *hamchin kesi dige kho khāb nadāre aslan chon hayajān o shādish mire bālā* ‘such a person can’t sleep at all because s/he is excited and overly happy,’ its appearance in the beginning of the TCU helps to delay the production of the gist of disagreement. As such, it works as a dispreference marker.⁵⁵ The two discourse markers *dige* and *khob* serve the same function. In English, as demonstrated by Tanaka (2008), discourse markers are among syntactically mobile elements that help to delay a dispreferred response. In Persian, as in English, discourse markers are flexible and can occur in the beginning, middle or at the end of a TCU (see, e.g., Shokouhi & Kamyab, 2004:138-150). Considering that *dige* and *khob* could also be produced at the end of the TCU,⁵⁶ their positioning in the middle of the TCU serves to postpone the gist of disagreement.

While in the above two extracts the disagreeing response is accompanied by a variety of dispreference markers that break the contiguity of the initial assertion and the disagreeing TCU, in the extract below there is just one marker of dispreference, a rhetorical question. The extract which is part of the mixed-gender, six-party discussion

⁵⁵ As discussed in Chapter 4, accounts are one of the resources speakers use to claim superior knowledge of the issue. Although the majority of the disagreements in the current data set have been accompanied by an account, based on the above definition for mitigated disagreements, accounts are taken as a dispreference marker only when they occur before or within the disagreeing TCU. This is because they break the contiguity of the initial assertion and the disagreeing TCU. Those that follow the disagreeing TCU just serve the function of claiming epistemic supremacy.

⁵⁶ For the functions of *dige* in turn-final position, see Taleghani-Nikazm (2015).

on obstacles to a timely marriage starts at a point where N in response to C (the prior speaker) claims that girls enter relationships other than marriage because marriage opportunities don't come to them (i.e., no one proposes to them, for instance). T then takes issue with this claim.

Extract 7.10

(Obstacles to a timely marriage I)

1. N khob dokhtarā.am vaqti ke: e::h masalan: ezdevāj- moqe'iate
DM girls.also when that for example marriage- opportunity
2. ezdevāj barāshun pish nemiād .h belakhare majbur mi'fshan
marriage for them forward doesn't come finally forced (they) become
3. be [in ravābet.]
to this relations

khob because eh marriage opportunities don't come to girls, .h they have to finally settle for these relationships.

4. T 1st→ [dokhtarāam m]otma'eni moqe'iate ezdevāj
girls also (are) you sure opportunity marriage

5. barāshun pish [nemiād?] doesn't come
for them forward
are you sure that marriage opportunities don't come to girls?

6. D [.hh]

7. H [dokhtarā] barāshun
girls for them

8. [pish miād.]
forward comes
they come to girls.

9. N 2nd→ [khob cher[ā;]
DM yes
khob yeah,

10. T [BA]RĀSHUN [PISH MIĀ:D,]
for them forward (it) comes
they come to them.

11. N [moqe'iat pish] miād,
opportunity forward comes
opportunities come to them,

12. [vali sathe tava[qo'āt bālā] rafte.
but level of expectations up gone
but the level of expectations has gone up.

13. T [VALi: (.) tava-[āfarin,]

but expec- bravo
but expec- bravo!

N's claim in lines 1-3 is followed by T's question 'are you sure that marriage opportunities don't come to girls?' (lines 4 and 5). Taking into account that T is a female student, the issue of marriage opportunities for girls falls within her knowledge domain. Therefore, rather than being a real question seeking information, it is a rhetorical question used to express a disagreement with N's assertion. As maintained by Koshik (2005), speakers employ a rhetorical question to express an assertion off the record, to propose a possible disagreement which can be avoided if the recipient backs down from their already-taken position (p. 152). That is to say, a rhetorical question works as a pre-disagreement. However, in the above extract, N treats T's question in lines 4 and 5 as a disagreement with her stance in lines 1-3. This is evidenced by N's subsequent disagreeing response in lines 9, 11 and 12. In CA literature, indirectness of action has been associated with dispreferred responses (see, e.g., Heritage, 1984; Tanaka, 2008). So, it can be argued that T's use of a rhetorical question instead of an assertion conveying an opposite view is a dispreference marker serving to attenuate the force of disagreement.

As can be seen in the above extract, there is an urgency in the production of this disagreement as it starts in overlap with the final words of the prior turn. Nevertheless, it has been classified as a mitigated disagreement because it has been expressed in an indirect way to reduce the force of disagreement. As maintained by Schegloff (2007:63), "it can happen that a preferred SPP is delivered with some feature characteristic of dispreferred turn types and vice versa." To illustrate the point, Schegloff (1988:454; 2007:67) presents an example of a dispreferred response (a negative answer to a question designed to receive a positive response) that starts immediately and in the initial position of the turn. Such dispreferred turn types have also been observed in English speaking children's disputes (Church, 2009). In children's arguments, disagreements with a dispreferred turn shape are characterized by inter-turn pauses, hesitation/delay markers and accounts (p. 80). However, it has been observed that accounts are sometimes produced immediately as a way of expressing opposition (p. 93).

In the current data set, mitigated first disagreements that start urgently, i.e. in a reduced transition space or at a point of maximal incompleteness of the prior turn, have a high frequency of occurrence. In fact, out of 37 mitigated first disagreements, 19 instances (51.35%) have an urgent onset. As discussed in Chapter 3, the urgency in the production of a first disagreement may be due to the multi-party nature of the interaction and the preference to resolve the detected problem in the prior turn as soon as possible. In the above extract, as already stated, N's initial assertion concerning marriage opportunities for girls has been produced in response to the prior speaker C. Given the bias in the turn-taking system for the "speaker just prior to current speaker to be selected as next speaker" (Sacks et al., 1974:708) and the fact that N has actually selected C as the next speaker through her continuous gaze at C while producing the utterance in lines 1-3, it is the speaker C, not T, who has the legitimate right to the next turn. Therefore, to be able to take the next turn and rectify the problem identified in the prior turn before the discussion moves forward to something else, T produces an urgent disagreement which is otherwise in a mitigated format as it has been expressed indirectly.

The urgency to rectify the detected problem as soon as possible is also evident in Extract 7.9 in which the contiguity of the initial assertion and the disagreeing TCU has been broken by a variety of delay devices. A's clarification question in line 8 and her subsequent disagreeing turn in line 13, both starting in a reduced transition space of their prior turns, together with her aborted attempt (line 11) to take the turn at a point of maximal incompleteness of L's turn point to the urgency felt by A to resolve the identified problem with L's assertion as soon as possible. A is not the selected next speaker because L's assertions about marijuana have been uttered in response to another speaker, M, and except for the time when producing the response to A's clarification question, L's gaze is directed at either M or E (another speaker who was involved in collaborative completion of M's utterance). That is to say, it is the speaker M or E who has the right to the next turn. Moreover, at line 9, L has moved the discussion to another characteristic of marijuana which further reduces A's chance of expressing her disagreement with L concerning the effect of marijuana on sleep.

Therefore, the urgent onset of A's clarification question and subsequent disagreement is an attempt to secure the right to a turn and express disagreement.

As can be understood from the above discussion, the urgent onset of these disagreements which are otherwise mitigated signifies the complexity of the action performed. On the one hand, to abide by *ta'arof* considerations, the speakers need to mitigate their disagreements, thus delaying their response. On the other hand, to prove themselves as competent discussants as required by the institutional setting of academic discussions, they have to take every opportunity to express their knowledge of the issue under discussion. Given the multiparty nature of the discussions which makes turn-taking highly competitive at times, the speakers have to make a choice between the two seemingly incompatible requirements of expressing their opposite stance before losing the opportunity and delaying it for cultural considerations.

As shown in this section, in mitigated first disagreements, the disagreeing speaker used at least one marker of dispreference either before or while producing the disagreeing TCU.⁵⁷ These markers serve to break the contiguity of the initial assertion and the main disagreement component and/or reduce the force of disagreement.

7.3.2 Unmitigated first disagreements

In unmitigated disagreements, the turn is commonly taken urgently and starts with the disagreeing TCU in which opposition has been stated directly and without any attenuation. No dispreference marker appears before or within the disagreeing TCU. Two common strategies to express direct opposition in such turns are the following:

- a) Starting the turn with a negation adverb such as *na* 'no' or *be hich vajh* 'by no means'

⁵⁷ Due to the limited space of the present chapter, some dispreference markers observed in the data have not been exemplified here. For an example of a hesitation marker, see line 5 of Extract 3.33, Chapter 3. For examples of a prefatory statement as well as the inclusive pronoun *mā* 'we', an address term and an attention getting verb, see line 7 of Extract 6.7, line 4 of Extract 6.9 and line 7 of Extract 6.13, Chapter 6, respectively.

- b) Starting the turn with statements whose verbs are one of *qabul nadāram*, *nemipaziram*, *movāfeq nistam*, all meaning ‘I don’t agree,’ or *mokhālefam* ‘I disagree’

As stated earlier, included in this category are two disagreements beginning with a wh-question or a partial repetition of the prior turn, followed immediately by the disagreeing TCU in the same turn. The reason behind the inclusion of these two disagreements in this category is that the wh-question/partial repetition doesn’t serve to provide a space for the prior speaker to back down or modify their position. Rather, it bolts opposition.

The following extracts exemplify unmitigated first disagreements. While the first two extracts illustrate the two common strategies to express direct opposition, the third extract exemplifies a less frequent way of expressing direct opposition and the fourth one presents the unmitigated disagreement starting with a partial repetition of the prior turn. The first extract, Extract 7.11, taken from the three-party discussion on social awareness, illustrates a first disagreement starting with the negation particle *na* ‘no.’⁵⁸

Extract 7.11

(Social awareness)

- | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|---|--|-------------------|---------------------|----------------|---------------|-------------|-----------------|---------------|--|
| 1. | K | <i>khode</i> | <i>djn.am</i> | <i>sābet</i> | <i>karde</i> | <i>ke</i> | <i>na</i> | <i>bā</i> | | |
| | | itself | religion.also | stable | (it has) done | that | neither | with | | |
| 2. | | <i>’aql</i> | <i>monāfati</i> | <i>dāre</i> | <i>na</i> | <i>bā</i> (.) | <i>’elm</i> | <i>monāfāt</i> | <i>dāre</i> . | |
| | | intellect | incompatibility | (it) has | nor | with | science | incompatibility | (it) has | |
| | | the religion itself has also proved that it’s not incompatible with intellect or (.) science. | | | | | | | | |
| | | . | | | | | | | | |
| | | . | | | | | | | | |
| | | ((11 lines in which K elaborates on the issue have been omitted.)) | | | | | | | | |
| 14. | | <i>va</i> | <i>siāsathāye</i> | <i>nezāmi</i> | <i>ke</i> | | | | | |
| | | and | policies of | military | that | | | | | |
| 15. | | <i>un[:</i> | <i>zamān</i> | <i>eṭefāq</i> | <i>miofte,</i> | <i>]</i> | | | | |
| | | that | time | happening | falls | | | | | |
| | | and the military policies that happened at that time, | | | | | | | | |
| 16. | F | <i>[mishe</i> | <i>tafāsiro</i> | <i>qerā`at]hāye</i> | <i>jadidi</i> | <i>az</i> | <i>din</i> | | | |

⁵⁸ For an unmitigated first disagreement starting with the adverb *be hich vajh* ‘by no means,’ see Extract 4.9 in Chapter 4.

17. it is possible interpretations.and readings new of religion
 däsht (.) k[e
 had that
It's possible to have new interpretations and readings of the religion that
18. K → [na::; bä hamun tafäsir, =bä hamun (.) qä'edatan
 no with same interpretation with same fundamentally
no, with the same interpretation, with the same (.), fundamentally
19. din °v° (.) in- (.) taghirpazir nist.
 religion v this- changeable isn't
the religion isn't changeable.
20. fa:hm va bardäshte mä mobtani bar [inke in]=
 understanding and comprehension our based on this that this
21. B [h h]
22. K =din: dar un zamän [va] makän kərbord dārad vase mā=
 religion in that time and place application has for us
23. B [h]
24. K =motafävet mishfan.
 different (they) become
our understanding and comprehension based on the fact that this religion has applications at a certain time and place become different.
25. (0.8)

K's disagreement with F's assertion concerning the possibility of having new interpretations of the religion (lines 16 and 17) that starts in overlap with F's utterance begins with the opposition marker *na* 'no' (line 18) which has even been elongated to reinforce its effect. A turn-initial "no" shows unequivocal opposition right from the beginning of the turn (Goodwin, 1983:669). The opposition is further strengthened as K opts to use the opposite of the key term in F's assertion: *hamun tafäsir* 'the same interpretations' (line 18) instead of *tafäsiro qerä`athäye jadidi* 'new interpretations and readings' (line 16). This is then followed by another overt disagreement component, i.e. the negative statement *qä'edatan din °v° (.) in- (.) taghirpazir nist* 'fundamentally the religion isn't changeable' (lines 18 and 19). As can be seen, opposition has been stated overtly right from the beginning of the turn; there are no dispreference markers that either defer or attenuate K's disagreement. So, this disagreement is considered as an instance of unmitigated disagreement.

The second common strategy to express unmitigated disagreement observed in the data set is illustrated in Extract 7.12 below. The extract which is part of the mixed-gender, six-party discussion on drug addiction starts with H, asserting that drug prohibition results in people getting more attracted to it. M then disagrees with him.

Extract 7.12

(Drug addiction I)

1. H miduniç, =agar mā man' beshim az ye chizi, (.) heçe
 you know if we prohibited become from one thing sense of
H gazing toward A
2. konjkävimun kh[ob,]
 our curiosity DM
H gazing toward A
you know, if we're prohibited from something, (.) our sense of curiosity, *khob*,
3. A [bish]tar mishe. [bishtar tara]fesh=
 more (it) becomes more towards it
A gazing toward H
increases.
4. H [bishtar mishe.]
 more (it) becomes
H gazing toward A
increases.
5. A =m[irim.]
 (we) go
A gazing toward H
we're more attracted to it.
6. H [vaqti] konjkävimunam hedäyat nashe: =,
 when our curiosity guidance doesn't get
H gazing toward A
when our curiosity isn't guided,
7. M → =qabul nadä[ram ino.]
 acceptance (I) don't have this DOM
M gazing toward H
I don't agree with that.
8. H [mirim sam]te in ch[izä.]
 we go towards this things
we're attracted to these things.
9. A [hedä]yat ne-]
 guidance

10. M [ino] qabul]
this.DOM acceptance
11. na[dāram.]
I don't have
I don't agree with that.
12. E [barā chi] qabul nadā[ri,]
for what acceptance you don't have
why don't you agree with that?
13. A [va]qti migid qächäqç,] pas=
when you say forbidden is then
if it's forbidden, then
14. M [chizi ke bade:,]
anything that bad is
anything that is bad,
15. A =hedäyati[am ni:st. pas] kon[torole khäsjam nist.]
guidance also isn't therefore control special also isn't
there's no guidance. so there's also no special control (on that).
16. M [chizi ke bade:,] [na; chizi ke bade bäyad] mah-
anything that bad is no anything that bad is
17. hame jäye donyā chizi ke bade mahdud mishe:, .h valo inke
all place of world anything that bad is limited becomes even if that
18. kheyliam khähän däshte bäshe.
many also fan has had SBJN.be
**anything that is bad, no, anything that is bad should be res-
all over the world, anything that is bad is restricted, .h even if many people like it.**
19. A ba[:le.]
yeah
yeah.
20. M [ye chi]zi hast shomā migid ke äqä khob man
a thing.IND is you say that Sir DM I
21. mitunam alän bäsht modärä konam, khob, ...
(I) can now with that toleration SBJN.do (I) DM
there is something you say khob you can tolerate now, khob, ...

Here, while H is still in the middle of his utterance in line 6 (H has just finished the subordinate clause of his sentence), M takes the turn (line 7) to express his disagreement with H's assertion concerning drug prohibition in lines 1, 2 and 4 (that M is addressing his disagreement to H is evidenced by M's gaze toward H when M is

expressing his disagreeing TCU). M's utterance, *qabul nadāram ino* 'I don't agree with that,' is an unequivocal disagreement that shows opposition right from the beginning. Note that because the main clause of H's utterance, i.e. 'we're attracted to these things' (line 8), overlaps M's disagreeing TCU, M first repeats his disagreeing TCU, inverting the object position (*ino qabul nadāram* 'I don't agree with that') (lines 10 and 11) and then presents the account for his disagreement (lines 14, 16-18, 20, 21, ...). There are no dispreference markers attenuating M's disagreement or pushing it back into the turn. Therefore, it is an unmitigated disagreement.

Note that although opposition is expressed directly in turn-initial position, the disagreeing turn is elaborated as the main disagreement component is followed by M's account and supportive information. As stated earlier, the elaborateness of such disagreements prevents us from classifying them as preferred responses. The fact that M's disagreement is urgent and direct but elaborated suggests the complexity of the action. To show that he is a competent discussant, M needs to take the floor and express his opposite view. Additionally, he needs to adequately support his view to show epistemic superiority over the issue. However, since M is not H's addressee (H is continuously gazing at A when uttering his assertion) and thus eligible for the next turn and also due to the highly competitive nature of the discussion which is evidenced by the great number of overlaps in the extract, M is faced with the problem of not finding the opportunity to express opposition. To overcome the problem, M takes the turn (line 7) at a point of maximal incompleteness of H's utterance (line 6) and expresses direct opposition right from the beginning of the turn, using the formulaic expression 'I don't agree with that' which is capable of triggering the disagreed-with speaker or other participants' question as to the reason for M's opposition.⁵⁹ As can be seen from lines 7-12, M's tactic works and E's question 'why don't you agree (with that)' (line 12) gives M the legitimate right to the next turn (lines 14, 16-18, 20, 21, ...) to elaborate on the reasons for his opposition.

⁵⁹ As stated in Chapter 3, Section 3.4.1, Coulter (1990:187-188) uses the terms 'pre-counter-assertion' to refer to such a disagreement and 'solicit' for the question occasioned by the disagreement.

The above two extracts exemplify unmitigated first disagreements produced with the two common strategies to show direct opposition in the current data set. However, there are other ways of showing direct opposition which are not very frequent in the present data set. Extract 7.13 below illustrates the use of substitution as a way of expressing opposition in an unmitigated first disagreement.⁶⁰ The extract has been taken from the three-party discussion on drug and alcohol addiction. At this point of the discussion, the discussants are talking about the main reason of addiction among women.

Extract 7.13

(Drug and alcohol addiction)

- | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|-----|--|----------------|-------------|-------------------|----------------------|---------|-----------|------------------|
| 1. | F | ya'ni | dar | ↑vāqe:'h | bishtar: | man | migam | 'eḷate | aslish |
| | | meaning | in | reality | more | I | (I) say | reason | its chief |
| 2. | | <u>dowlate</u> ,=h | be | khātere | inke: | ch[o::n] | | | |
| | | government is | to | sake of | that | because | | | |
| | | I mean actually, I say, the main reason ((of addiction among women)) is the state(('s wrong policy)),
.h for the reason that, because | | | | | | | |
| 3. | S → | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | [faqre.] | | | |
| | | | | | | poverty is | | | |
| | | | | | | it's poverty. | | | |
| 4. | | (.) | | | | | | | |
| 5. | S | äre:.= | | | | | | | |
| | | yeah | | | | | | | |
| | | yeah | | | | | | | |
| 6. | F | =faqr | ke | [hichi | | | | | |
| | | poverty | that | nothing | | | | | |
| 7. | S | | | [faqro | bi]:kasi, | bihemāyat (0.3) | hich | | |
| | | | | poverty and | lack of relatives | lack of support | no | | |
| 8. | | he[māyati | nadāri. | =hich | sarpanāhi | | | | |
| | | support | you don't have | nothing | shelter | | | | |
| | | poverty and lack of relatives and support. they have no support, no shelter | | | | | | | |
| 9. | F | [khob | vaqti | ye | chizi | tu | ye | keshva]ri | mamnu' bāshe: .h |
| | | DM | when | a | thing | in | a | country | banned SBJN,be |
| 10. | | khob | qeymate | vāred | kardan | forukhtanesham | ziāde | dige. | |
| | | DM | cost of | imported | do | its selling also | is high | DM | |

⁶⁰ For another way of expressing opposition in an unmitigated disagreement, see line 14 of Extract 4.4, Chapter 4.

khob when something is banned in a country, *khob* its import will be costly and it will be sold at a high price.

In lines 1 and 2, F first asserts that the chief reason of women's drug addiction is the government's wrong policy and then latches another TCU to her utterance to explain the reason behind her view. However, while she is still at a point of maximal incompleteness of her second TCU, S, using the substitution strategy (Goodwin, 1990:180), disagrees with her (line 3) and then following a micro pause (line 4) confirms her own view (line 5). Note that S not only starts her disagreement urgently but uses no dispreference markers to soothe the impact of her opposition. As F takes the floor to defend her own position (line 6), S once more interrupts her to take the turn (line 7) and elaborate her view, again using no dispreference markers.

While in the above three extracts the disagreeing TCU occupies the turn-initial position, in the following extract the initial position of the disagreeing turn is filled with a partial repeat of the prior turn. Nevertheless, the disagreement is unmitigated.⁶¹ The extract is part of the mixed-gender five-party discussion on globalization.

Extract 7.14

(Globalization II)

- | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|---------|---|------------|------|--------------|------|------------|----------------|--------|-----------|--------------|
| 1. | A | ye | ta' rife | ye- | mo' tabari | ke | chi | ke | hālā | mi' tge | |
| | | one | definition | one | reliable | that | what | that | DM | (it) says | |
| | | there's a reliable definition that says | | | | | | | | | |
| 2. | | az | (zamāni) | ke | tamaḍone | | bashar | bevojud | | umad | |
| | | from | time | that | civilization | | human | into existence | | came | |
| 3. | | jahāni | shodanam | | bevojud | | umad. | | | | |
| | | global | become too | | to existence | | came | | | | |
| | | globalization came into existence when human civilization came into existence. | | | | | | | | | |
| 4. | | (0.2) | | | | | | | | | |
| 5. | | hālā | dar- | dar | hiteye | | kho[desh.] | | | | |
| | | DM | in | in | domain | | its own | | | | |
| | | in its own domain. | | | | | | | | | |
| 6. | N 1st → | | | | | | [az] | | zamāni | ke | tamaḍon |
| | | | | | | | from | | time | that | civilization |

⁶¹ For the unmitigated first-disagreement that is prefaced by a *wh*-question immediately followed by the disagreeing TCU in the same turn, see Extract 5.8 in Chapter 5.

7. bevojud umad? =man migam qabl az tamadonam jahāni
 into existence came I (I) say before from civilization global
8. shodan °vojud [dāsht.°]
 become existence had
when (human) civilization came into existence? I say globalization came into existence before civilization.
9. A 2nd→ [hāle-] (.) qabl az: tamadonam manam migam
 now (DM) before from civilization also I also I say
10. (.) ke dar u: ertebāthāye mahdud, amā dar ertebātāi
 that in those communications restricted but in communications
11. ke vāqe’an bekhāym begim ke ye esme jahāni
 that really SBJN.want (we) SBJN.say (we) that a name of global
12. rush bezārim az zamāni ke .h tamadone bashar
 on it SBJN.put (we) from time that civilization of human
13. bevojud umad jahāni shodan bevojud umad.
 into existence came global become into existence came
even before civilization, I say ((that’s right)) for those restricted communications, but for the communications which we can really call global, globalization came into existence when human civilization came into existence.

As can be seen in lines 6-8, N’s disagreement which starts in terminal overlap with A’s utterance consists of two components. The first component, *az zamāni ke tamadon bevojud umad?* ‘when (human) civilization came into existence?’, is a partial repetition of A’s assertion in the prior turn, ending in rising intonation. In Persian, final rising intonation is used for polar questions (see, e.g., Hayati, 2005:77-78). However, N doesn’t give A the opportunity to provide a response (or modify his position) because the question is immediately followed by N’s disagreeing TCU ‘I say globalization came into existence before civilization.’ Therefore, N’s partial repetition of the prior turn doesn’t work as a dispreference marker. Rather, it emphasizes opposition. Additionally, there are no dispreference markers in N’s disagreeing TCU that reduce the force of his utterance.⁶² Rather, opposition has been intensified as N commences the disagreeing TCU with *man migam* ‘I say’ (line 7) which gives his utterance an assertive tone.

⁶² Note that, although the disagreement in Extract 3.28 in Chapter 3 is made up of a partial repetition of the prior turn ending in rising intonation, followed immediately by a disagreement component, it is considered a mitigated disagreement. This is because the disagreement component is a rhetorical question expressed through conditional structure. As stated earlier, both rhetorical questions and conditional structures are dispreference markers.

As shown in Extracts 7.11-7.14, in unmitigated disagreements, the turn is commonly taken urgently and the disagreeing TCU is not accompanied by dispreference markers. That is to say, the disagreeing speaker makes no attempt to push their disagreement back into the turn and/or attenuate it.

However, all in all, section 7.3 shows that in the majority of first disagreements in the present data set the disagreeing speaker attempts to mitigate their disagreement. In so doing, they use a variety of resources to defer their disagreement within the turn or sequence and/or reduce the force of their disagreement.

As maintained in CA literature, responsive actions are mitigated when they are capable of promoting disaffiliation or threatening the addressee's public face (Heritage, 1984:268; Pomerantz, 1984:70; Pillet-Shore, 2017:4). Therefore, the interactants' general tendency in the present study to delay and/or soften their disagreeing response (first disagreements) points to their orientation toward disagreement as a disaffiliative or face-threatening act.

Moreover, this finding of the study is consistent with the findings of Asdjodi (2001) and Don & Izadi's (2011) studies that maintain that Iranians are generally expected to mitigate their opposite view to observe the rules of *ta'arof*.

7.4 Disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement

The examination of 58 disagreements produced in response to a prior disagreement points to the fact that, as with first disagreements, these disagreements can not be categorized as either preferred or dispreferred. There are many disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement which have been produced immediately or in overlap with the prior turn and in which opposition has been stated overtly in the beginning of the turn, but the turn is elaborated. Likewise, there are disagreements that are indirect but short.

However, as with first disagreements, disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement can be classified as either mitigated or unmitigated based on the

positioning of the disagreeing TCU and its content. In mitigated disagreements, at least one marker of dispreference occurs either before or within the disagreeing TCU, pushing the disagreeing TCU back into the turn or attenuating the force of disagreement. In unmitigated disagreements, opposition has been stated overtly in turn-initial position with no dispreference marker coming before or within the disagreeing TCU. Although, compared to first disagreements, there is a slight increase in the percentage of unmitigated disagreements (24 instances or 41.38%), mitigated disagreements are still in the majority (34 instances or 58.62%).

The following extracts provide us with examples of mitigated/unmitigated responsive disagreements. The first two extracts represent disagreement sequences with a small number of disagreeing turns. The first extract which is part of the three-party discussion on the obstacles to a timely marriage contains a second disagreement accompanied by more than one dispreference marker. The extract starts with S presenting her idea about boys breaking a relationship.

Extract 7.15

(Obstacles to a timely marriage II)

1. S .hh nemidunam cherä- (0.2) engär pesarä mese dokhtarä
(I) don't know why it looks like boys like girls
2. enqad vāsashun in <mohem nist. =ya'ni
this much for them this important isn't that is
.hh I don't know why (0.2) it looks like this (breaking up a relationship) isn't so important to the boys as it is to the girls. I mean
3. [rāhat] mitunan bā in kenār biän.>=
easily (they) can with this side (they) come
boys can easily come to terms with that.
4. P [kh!]
5. P 1st→ =e:h °man-° (0.2)
eh I
6. be nazare man dige- (0.2) alān sharāyet ye juri shode ke
to opinion I anymore now conditions one kind.IND become that
in my opinion (0.2) the conditions have now become such that
7. nemitunim begim .h (.)
(we) can't (we) say
we can't say .h (.)

8. beyne p̄sarä.o dokhtarä tu in zamine tafävot hast. =chon
between boys.and girls in this ground difference is because
there's a difference between boys and girls in this ground. Because
9. man .hh mm hälä (0.3) tuye: (0.3) aträfiäne khodam
I DM within people around myself
10. hälä- manzuram [bastegänam nist, dus]tä:=
DM my purpose my relatives isn't friends
I .hh mm (0.3) among (0.3) people around me, I don't mean my relatives, (I mean) friends
11. S [dustä:: °äshnähä°]
friends acquaintances
friends, acquaintances
12. P =äsh[nähä] .hhh mibinam=
acquaintances I see
acquaintances .hhh
13. M [uhum,]
uhum
14. P =ke vä:qe'an jadidan <dokhtarä:>.hh \$in khosusiati ke migim
that really recently girls this characteristic that (we) say
15. †bishtar darmoreqesh-\$ darmoredeshun sedq mikone. .hh ya'ni eh
more about about truth (it) does meaning
16. dokhtarä kheili rähattar peymänshekani mikonan tä pesarä.
girls much more easily breach of promise (they) do than boys
I see that this characteristic we're mentioning is really more true of girls. .hh I mean, girls break promises much more easily than boys.
17. S 2nd→ är[e; q]abul dāram; vali miduni chiye;=
yeah acceptance (I) have but you know what is
yeah, I agree. but you know what?
18. M [äre.]
yes
yes.
19. S =dokhtarä tu ye seqi in käro mikonan; =man
girls in one age this act DOM (they) do I
girls do that at a certain age.
20. bä tavajoh be inke khäbgähi budam
with regard to this that from dorm (I) was
considering that I was a dorm resident,

As S presents her idea concerning boys breaking a relationship (lines 1-3), P takes the turn and disagrees with her (the first disagreement in the sequence) (lines 5-10, 12 and 14-16). P mitigates her disagreement, using a variety of resources including the hesitation marker *eh* (line 5), pauses (lines 5 and 6), the hedging expression *be nazare man* ‘in my opinion’ (line 6) and the inclusive pronoun *mā* ‘we’ (line 7). Subsequently, S disagrees with P’s disagreement (the second disagreement in the sequence) (lines 17, 19 and 20). This disagreement has also been mitigated as the disagreeing TCU has been preceded by a partial agreement and a formulaic expression (line 17). It is worth noting that S’s partial agreement is composed of two components: the agreement token *äre* ‘yeah’ and the statement *qabul dāram* ‘I agree.’ Taking into account that she could have used just one of these two components to express a partial agreement, it can be argued that S uses both agreement components to further push her disagreement component back into the turn. S further withholds her disagreement from early positioning into her turn through the use of the formulaic pre-announcement *miduni chiye* ‘you know what’ (Liddicoat, 2007:137) (line 17), before expressing the actual disagreement component, i.e. *dokhtarā tu ye seni in kāro mikonan* ‘girls do that at a certain age’ (line 19). So, this extract demonstrates that, as with the first disagreement, the second disagreement of the sequence has been mitigated.

The next extract contains an unmitigated disagreement produced in response to a mitigated disagreement. The extract which was already presented as Extract 7.9 is now re-presented with the ensuing turns. It starts with L expressing three different assertions about marijuana (first assertion: lines 1, 2; second assertion: lines 6, 7; third assertion: lines 9, 10 and 12) which lead to the appearance of a disagreement sequence with two parts. In the first part, a disagreement occurs between A and L over L’s second assertion. In the second part, H, who has already sided with A in the first part, disagrees with L over her third assertion.

Extract 7.16

(Drug addiction I)

- | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|---|---------------------------|---|------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|---------------------|---------------|
| 1. | L | mārijuānā .h
marijuana | torīye
is such | ke
that | vaqti
when | fard
person | masraf
use | mikone, (.)
does | shad
happy |
| 2. | | mishe;
becomes | marijuana is such that when a person takes it, (.) s/he becomes happy; | | | | | | |

3. M uhu[m,]
uhum
4. L [yaʼni- mm kheili mokararo bedune hich dalili haminjuri
meaning very frequent and without any reason like this
5. mizane zire khande,
strikes under laughter
I mean s/he bursts into laughter very frequently and without any reason.
6. .hh yä inke: khäbe: (.) nädorosti däre, märijuänä masraf kone,
or that sleep unsound has marijuana use does
7. märijuänä bä'es mishe khäbe rähati däshte bäshe;=
marijuana cause becomes sleep restful have be.SBJN
or if s/he doesn't sleep well, taking marijuana helps them to have a sound sleep.
8. A =°ta[nzim mikone: ?°]
Regulation does
does it regulate (sleep)?
9. L [ba'd kheili jäle]be, äre, .h märijuänä
then very interesting yes marijuana
10. be hich vajh .h e[tiäde]=
to no aspect addiction
11. A [vali:;]
but
12. L =jesmäni nadäre.=
Physical doesn't have
well, it's so interesting, yeah, marijuana is not physically addictive at all.
13. A 1st → =migin:: khäbo rähät mikone, =shomä ke migin shädi
you say sleep.DOM restful does you that you say happiness
14. ro a[fzäyesh mide,] =kesi ke hayajän o shädish=
DOM increase gives one who excitement and his/her happiness
15. M [märijuänä etiäd]
marijuana addiction
16. A =mire bälä dige kho kh↑ä:b [nadäre] aslan.=
goes up anymore DM sleep doesn't have at all
(that) you say it brings a sound sleep, you're saying it increases happiness, (but) anyone who is overly excited and happy can't sleep at all.
17. M [°khäb°°]
sleep
18. L 2nd → =khäb dä:re.
sleep has
they can sleep.
19. (.)
20. ejäze bedid,= masan da:r e:h (.) sare keläs hälä masalan

21. permission give for example in eh head of class DM for example
 tu zendeğiye ruzmarash bish az: baqiye shāde:, khob?
 in life of her/his everyday more than others happy is DM
just a minute. say, in the class, say, in their everyday life, they're happier than others, khob?
22. M uhum,
 uhum
uhum,
23. L moqeýe khābidanesham mm kheili tanzimtaro kheili ruformtar
 when her/his sleeping also much more organized and much in better shape
24. az baqi[ye afrade.]
 from rest of individuals is
also when sleeping, they'd be much more organized and in much better shape than other people.
25. A 3rd→ [be nazare] man in dotā bā ham jur dar
 to opinion of I this two with together match in
26. nemi[ān.]
 don't come
in my opinion, these two don't go together.
27. H [na:] na; m °[(injur)] nis. °=
 no no like this it's not
no, no. that's not true.
28. L [khob in]
 DM this
khob this
29. H 1st→ =[ba'd inke] migid [shomā e'tiād] nadāre=
 then (DM) that you say you addiction doesn't have
then, that you say it's not addictive
30. J [()] [()]
31. H =ke sad dar sad e'tiād dāre m[ārijuānā.]
 that hundred in hundred addiction it has marijuana
but it's a hundred percent addictive.
32. L 2nd→ [e'tiād]
 addiction
33. d[āre, amā e']tiāde māri e'tiād be mārijuānā (.) kāmēlan=
 it has but addiction mari addiction to marijuana totally
it is addictive, but its addiction (.) is totally psychological.
34. A [e'tiād dāre.]
 addiction it has

it's addictive.

35. L =ravānie. =ya'ni jesmäni nist.
psychological meaning physical it isn't
I mean it's not physically addictive.

As already explained in section 7.3.1, A's first disagreement (lines 13, 14 and 16) with L's assertion concerning the effect of marijuana on sleep (lines 6 and 7) has been mitigated, using a variety of dispreference markers. However, the second disagreement in the sequence which has been uttered by L has not been mitigated. Upon the possible completion of A's last TCU (line 16), L takes the turn (line 18) and directly disagrees with A's disagreement, deleting the negation in A's utterance *khäb nadäre aslan* 'they can't sleep at all.' L's disagreement is an unmitigated one as there are no dispreference markers coming before or within L's disagreeing TCU.

Taking a look at the rest of the sequence, we can see that since L's subsequent elaboration on her stance (lines 20, 21, 23 and 24) does not appear convincing to A, once more A disagrees with her (third disagreement) (lines 25 and 26). However, A's disagreement has been prefaced by the hedging device *be nazare man* 'in my opinion' (line 25) which makes the disagreement mitigated. So, although the third disagreement of the sequence has been produced in response to an unmitigated disagreement, it has been mitigated.

The disagreement sequence continues further as another speaker, H, first sides with A (line 27) over L's second assertion and then disagrees with L's third assertion (lines 29 and 31). Note that H's utterance in line 27 that starts urgently with the opposition marker *na* 'no' is in fact an agreeing response to A's disagreement in lines 25 and 26 which is a negative assertion. However, H's subsequent utterance, *ba'd inke migid shomä e'tiäd nadäre ke sad dar sad e'tiäd däre märjuänä* 'then, that you say it's not addictive, but it's a hundred percent addictive' (lines 29 and 31), is a disagreement with L's third assertion. This disagreement is taken as a first disagreement on a related topic. Note that although it is not as close as possible to its initial assertion, it is still urgent as it has been latched to H's prior utterance. However, despite the urgency in its onset, this disagreement has been mitigated as the main disagreement component, i.e.,

sad dar sad e'tiäd däre märijuänä 'marijuana is a hundred percent addictive,' has been prefaced. In order to shift the topic to L's third assertion, H uses the discourse marker *ba'd* 'then' (Alami, Sabbah & Iranmanesh, 2012; Alami, 2016) and continues with a structure that embeds L's assertion as its subject. Incorporating the prior speaker's words into one's utterance is a common way of connecting a disagreeing turn to the disagreed-with speaker's turn (Goodwin, 1990:180). However, the prefatory part of H's disagreement not only serves the function of connecting H's responsive turn to its initial assertion but pushes the disagreement component back into the turn.

L's subsequent disagreement (lines 32, 33 and 35) with H is mitigated as it starts with the partial agreement *e'tiäd däre* 'it is addictive.' Note that L who has produced an unmitigated disagreement earlier in the sequence mitigates her disagreement deep into the sequence.

Note that L's inconsistency in mitigating her disagreeing responses points to the intricacy of doing disagreement in this context. It seems that L does not mitigate her first disagreement due to the exigencies of the local context of talk. Although A's disagreement (lines 13, 14 and 16) in response to which L produces her first disagreement is mitigated, it is still strong as A opposes L directly by negating the verb of L's assertion (line 16), brings her utterance to an end with the adverb of emphasis *aslan* 'at all' (line 16), and bases her argument on L's own assertions. The forceful design of A's disagreement prompts L to vigorously defend her position if she wants to prove a capable discussant. However, taking a look at lines 13 to 18, we can see that before L takes the turn to disagree with A's disagreement, M makes two attempts to take the floor, once in overlap with the last two words of A's second TCU (line 15) and another time at possible completion of A's third TCU (line 17), thus putting L's chance of taking the next turn at risk. L's insecurity to take the turn is further evidenced by the expression *ejäze bedid* 'just a minute' (line 20) which she utters after the production of the main disagreement component of her turn, i.e. *khäb dä:re* 'they can sleep' (line 18). This insecurity which stems from the multiparty nature of the discussion, together with the necessity to vigorously defend her position, causes L to

take the turn urgently and express unmitigated, direct disagreement right from the beginning of the turn (line 18).

The general tendency to mitigate disagreement is even more apparent in the following extract which begins with unmitigated disagreements. The extract has been taken from the three-party discussion on the development of rationality in the society. It begins at a point where R asserts that rationality can also develop in absolute ruling systems. This forms the initial assertion in the sequence. A then takes an opposite position.

Extract 7.17

(Development of rationality)

- | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------|---|-------------------|------------------|-----------------|-------------------|---------------|------------|
| 1. | R | age: | age | hokuma:t (0.2) | age | hokumat | motlaqam | bäshe (.) |
| | | if | if | rulership | if | rulership | absolute also | SBJN.be |
| 2. | | hich | tori | nist. | | | | |
| | | no | manner.IND | isn't | | | | |
| | | if the ruling system is absolute, there will be no problem ((for the development of rationality)). | | | | | | |
| 3. | | (.) | | | | | | |
| 4. | | eshkäli | nadäre. .h | chonke | hokumate | motlfaq (.) | qod e:h | |
| | | problem | (it) doesn't have | because | rulership.EZ | absolute | pow eh | |
| | | eqtedär | mishe. =eqtedär | ya'ni | [zure BAR]TAR,= | | | |
| | | power | becomes | power | meaning | force of | superior | |
| | | there's no problem. because absolute rulership becomes the power. Power means the superior force. | | | | | | |
| 5. | A 1st→ | | | | [ma- | ma- | | |
| | | | | | I | I | | |
| 6. | | =ma' | ino | nemipaziram. | =in[ke | ye] | hokumat | |
| | | I | this.DOM | (I) don't accept | this that | a | rulership | |
| | | I don't agree with that. | | | | | | |
| 7. | R | | | | [na:. |] | | |
| | | | | | no | | | |
| | | | | | no | | | |
| 8. | A | motlaq | bä[she | hich | eshkäl | nadäre. | =bebin, | jä]me'eye= |
| | | absolute | SBJN.be | no | problem | (it) doesn't have | look | society.EZ |
| | | ((I don't agree)) that if a ruling system is absolute, there will be no problem. look | | | | | | |
| 9. | R | | [| man | dalil | däram | barät. |] |
| | | | | I | reason | (I) | for you | |
| | | I give you reasons. | | | | | | |
| 10. | A | ='aqläni: .h | jäme'ei | ke | nahädhäye | 'aqläni | daresh: .h | be |
| | | rational | society.IND | that | institutions of | rational | in which | to |

SBJN.go (we)

Rome was not built in a day.

27. R 2nd₃ → ['aq][āniat chizi nis ke] ye shabe bekhäy=
rationality thing.IND isn't that a night SBJN.want (you)
28. A 3rd₂ → [bebin, mä alän forsati]
look we now chance.IND
look, now we (don't have) time
29. R =besh bere[si.]
rationality is not something you can achieve overnight.
30. A 3rd₃ → [mä] alän forsati baräye äzmuno khatä nadärim.
we now chance.IND for trial and error (we) don't have
now we don't have time for trial and error.
31. (0.2)
32. kheyli az javäme' in räh ro raftan. =in 'aqlāniat .h
many from societies this path DOM (they) went this rationality
33. nahädine kardane 'aqlāniat ro raftan. .h forsati baräye äzmuno
institutionalized do.EZ rationality DOM (they) went chance.IND for trial and
34. khatä vojud nadäre ke mä dobä- dobäre ye si säl .h
error existence doesn't have that we again a thirty year
35. yä- (0.2) se nasl asan mä beri:m, .h ye rähi ro berim
or three generation basically we SBJN.go (we) a path.IND DOM SBJN.go
36. bebinim 'aqlāniat nahädinesäzish (0.6) javäb mide yä na.
SBJN.see (we) rationality its institutionalization response (it) gives or no
many societies examined this way. they have institutionalized rationality. there's no time for trial and error so that we examine a way over thirty years or over three generations to see whether the institutionalization of rationality works or not.
37. (0.7)
38. R 4th → khob mo[salaman in doros]te, .h vali (.) inam nis=
DM definitely this right is but this also isn't
khob definitely that's right , but
39. A [in kār anjām shode.]
this work fulfillment (it) has become
it has been done.
40. R =ke (.) na injuri na unjuri; =e'tedäl miäne; =negä
that no this manner no that manner moderation middling look
41. kon, .h age mä bekhäym taqlid mm taqlid konim, khob
you do if we SBJN.want (we) imitation imitation SBJN.do (we) DM
42. nemishe.
(it) doesn't become
(we need to find) the middle ground. look, we khob can't imitate (those societies).

As can be seen in lines 5 and 6, A's urgent disagreement with R's initial assertion (first disagreement) starts with the negative statement *ma' ino nemipaziram* 'I don't agree with that,' an unmitigated, direct way of expressing opposition. A then presents the account that a rational society can't tolerate an absolute ruling system (lines 8 and 10-12) and explicates it (lines 15-20).

R's subsequent disagreement with A (second disagreement) is also unmitigated as it starts with the opposition marker *na* 'no' (lines 14 and 21) and continues with the statement *'aqlāniat chizi nis ke ye shabe bekhäy besh beresi* 'rationality is not something you can achieve overnight' which is void of any dispreference markers (lines 21, 22, 27 and 29).

However, the third disagreement of the sequence which has been produced by A in response to R's disagreement has been mitigated. As can be seen in lines 23, 28 and 30-36, although A's disagreement has an urgent onset, its main disagreement component, i.e. *mä alän forsati baräye äzmuno khatä nadärim* 'now we don't have time for trial and error' (line 30), contains the inclusive pronoun *mä* 'we' which is a dispreference marker. Considering that, in accordance with his prior turn, A could have used the word *jäme'e* 'society' instead of *mä* as the subject of his utterance or could have used a statement like *alän forsati baräye äzmuno khatä nist* 'there's no time for trial and error,' A's use of the inclusive *mä* seems to be a way of finding common ground with R.⁶³

The tendency to mitigate opposite view is even more apparent in R's subsequent disagreement (fourth disagreement) which contains three dispreference markers. As can be seen in lines 37 and 38, R's disagreement starts after a gap of 0.7 second (line 37) and is prefaced by the turn initial *khob* and the partial agreement *mosalaman in doroste* 'definitely that's right' (line 38), pushing his main disagreement component

⁶³ Although the attention getting imperative *bebin* 'look' is also present in A's incomplete utterances in lines 23 and 28, it seems to be used for the purpose of taking the turn rather than mitigating the disagreement. This is evidenced by the fact that in both cases there is an overlap between A's utterance and other speaker's talk.

back into the turn. So, although both disagreeing interactants in this extract have first produced an unmitigated disagreement, they have preferred to soften their subsequent disagreement.

As demonstrated in the above three extracts, the interactants' inclination to soften their disagreement is evident in the majority of disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement even if they are deep into the sequence. Interestingly, although there are a number of disagreement sequences in which the final disagreements have not been mitigated (see, for example, Extract 5.8 in Chapter 5), in the majority of the sequences in the present data set the final disagreements contain dispreference markers that reduce the force of opposition.

This finding is unlike Kotthoff (1993) and Gruber's (1998) findings. Kotthoff (1993:205) observes that, in German and Anglo-American academic discussions, the preference for agreement is replaced by a preference for disagreement and therefore disagreements become less and less mitigated. Likewise, focusing on Austrian talk shows, Gruber (1998) points to the frequent use of unmitigated disagreements uttered in overlap with the prior disagreeing turn. Given that both of these studies have examined institutional contexts, the discrepancy observed can be attributed to the cultural constraint.

7.5 Conclusion

As discussed in this chapter, the disagreements in the present study cannot be classified as either preferred or dispreferred as they do not display uniform characteristics of preferred/dispreferred responses widely reported in CA literature. This incongruity of features which stems from the interaction of several factors including multi-party nature of the discussions, Persian culture and academic setting points to the great complexity of the action.

However, the interactants in the present study show a general tendency to mitigate their opposite view as they employ a variety of resources to defer their disagreement within the turn or sequence and/or decrease the force of disagreement. This finding of

the study accords with Asdjodi (2001) and Don & Izadi's (2011) finding that Iranians are generally expected to soften their disagreement because of *ta'arof* considerations. This general tendency is observable not only in first disagreements but in disagreements responsive to a prior disagreeing turn even if they are deep into the sequence. This further confirms the influence of cultural norms in how disagreement is communicated in such an institutional setting as Kotthoff's (1993) study on German and Anglo-American academic discussions and Gruber's (1998) research into Austrian talk shows are suggestive of the preferred status of disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement.

It is also observed that the interactants in this study make use of a wide variety of resources to mitigate their opposite view which are similar to those used by English speakers.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

8.1 Introduction

The present study aimed to explore how Iranian Persian-speaking students disagree with each other when they are engaged in academic discussions. Using the CA methodology developed by Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson (1974), it sought to examine how these interactants initiate and respond to disagreement and how they return to non-disagreement talk. To achieve the objectives, it presented a detailed examination of the characteristic features of these disagreements. It also investigated the sequential environments in which the initial assertions leading to these disagreements come into existence. Additionally, it examined how disagreement is sustained and how non-disagreement talk is restored in such contexts. The study also investigated the preference organization of disagreement in these academic discussions.

This concluding chapter summarizes the main findings of the study in each area and discusses them in light of the previous research and in terms of their implications for future research. It also presents the limitations of the study as well as possible directions for future research.

8.2 Summary of findings

With a focus on first disagreements, Chapter 3 demonstrated that all first disagreements in the present research were expressed in response to an assertion. Opposition was expressed in a number of different ways, ranging from adding negative particles to the initial assertion or deleting them from the initial assertion to asking rhetorical or known-answer questions. The various ways to express disagreement in these discussions were seen to be similar to those in English discussions among family members or university students reported by Muntigl & Turnbull (1998). That is to say,

Persian speakers used the same strategies employed by English speakers to express opposition.

The examination of the onset of first-disagreement turns revealed that about two thirds of these disagreements started in a reduced transition space or at a point of maximal incompleteness of the prior turn. This urgency, however, did not point to the preferred status of doing disagreement in the context of academic discussions. This is because, as demonstrated in Chapter 7, there were a lot of first disagreements starting urgently but in an otherwise mitigated format as they contained dispreference markers used before and/or within the disagreeing TCU. Rather, the urgency in starting a disagreeing turn appeared to be due to the multiparty nature of the discussions and the interactants' preference to correct the detected problem as soon as possible in such a context. By taking the turn urgently, the disagreeing speaker secured herself/himself a turn at talk to express disagreement before the initial assertion producer moved the discussion forward to something else or another participant took the turn. By contrast, the late onset of first-disagreement turns pointed to the disaffiliative nature of doing disagreement as these disagreements were usually accompanied by other dispreference markers as well.

The ever-present feature of these disagreements which is a new contribution from this study was found to be showing a greater epistemic valence compared to their respective initial assertion. In order to claim greater knowledge of the issue, the disagreeing speaker offered new knowledge of the issue under discussion, provided accounts or other supportive information and used linguistic resources connected with epistemic supremacy such as emphatic prosody, emphatic expressions and use of the same key words and expressions as in the initial assertion.

Other features common to first disagreements, including having multi-TCU composition, repetition of the same key words and phrases used in the initial assertion and emphatic prosody, proved to be in the service of claiming epistemic superiority as well as serving other functions. A great majority of first disagreements were composed of multi-TCUs. This allowed the disagreeing speaker to present accounts, elaborations

and other supportive information to justify their opposite position which in turn helped the speaker to achieve epistemic primacy. Likewise, repetition of the same key words and phrases used in the initial assertion was observed in a high percentage of first disagreements. This repetition not only helped the disagreeing speaker to tie their disagreeing response to the initial assertion, as observed in English (Goodwin, 1990:177-181), but provided them with a means of claiming epistemic supremacy from a second position. Similarly, emphatic accent which was present in the majority of first-disagreement turns served to highlight a contrasting view, as also observed by Schegloff (1998) in English. Moreover, since the stressed words were frequently observed in accounts and elaborations that formed part of a first-disagreement turn, emphatic accent was taken as a resource for claiming epistemic superiority.

With a focus on assertions leading to a first disagreement, Chapter 4 showed that first disagreements in the present study were produced in response to new assertions, i.e., assertions that presented new information rather than already stated or taken-for-granted information. This means that the newness of the assertion was a necessary condition for the production of first disagreements. However, due to the presence of new assertions in the data set not being followed by a response, it was concluded that the newness of the initial assertion was necessary but not sufficient to stimulate a disagreeing response. It was also inferred that the production of first disagreements was not controlled by the property of conditional relevance (Schegloff, 1968, 2007; Schegloff & Sacks, 1973) used by Pomerantz (1984) to account for the production of agreements/disagreements in response to assessments.

Therefore, following Stivers & Rossano (2010a) who demonstrated that, in addition to action and sequential position, turn design features could increase the possibility of response production, it was sought to determine whether turn design features of initial assertions were involved in mobilizing a disagreeing response. Data examination revealed that the initial-assertion producer's gaze toward the recipient(s) and the prosodic features of stress and elongation increased the possibility of disagreement production. However, these turn design features played an important rather than essential role in eliciting a disagreeing response because they were not present in all

initial assertions. The only turn design feature that served an essential part in eliciting a disagreeing response was found to be participants' epistemic asymmetry. All initial-assertion producers appeared to be less knowledgeable than their disagreement producers concerning the issue under discussion. This means that while the initial-assertion producers designed their turn to present some degree of knowledgeability of a particular issue, first disagreement producers designed their turn to present a greater knowledge of that issue.

It was then proposed that doing disagreement was indeed an interactional achievement because its fulfilment is contingent on how both the initial-assertion producer and the disagreeing speaker design their turns. While the initial-assertion producer should design their turn to present a new assertion, the disagreeing speaker should design their turn to display epistemic superiority over the issue under discussion.

Chapter 4 also revealed that, as with first disagreements, for an initial assertion to lead to an agreeing response, the newness of the assertion was necessary. However, agreements and disagreements were found to be different with respect to the turn design feature of epistemic asymmetry. While first disagreements always displayed a greater epistemic valence compared to their initial assertion, agreements showed either a greater or lesser epistemic valence.

Chapter 5 examined the features of disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement and how these disagreements emerged in conversation. It was observed that in these disagreements opposition was expressed in a variety of different ways similar to those used in the production of first disagreements. A common feature of disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement proved to be repetition of the key words/phrases used in the prior speaker's disagreeing turn. In addition to making connection between turns in disagreement sequences, the repetition of the key words/phrases of the prior disagreeing turn provided the speaker with a means of claiming epistemic primacy from a second position. Moreover, similar to first disagreements, a great majority of these disagreements had a multi-TCU structure as they contained accounts, elaborations or other supportive information. Apart from helping the speaker to justify

their position, this feature enabled them to show their epistemic superiority over the issue compared to the disagreed-with speaker.

Another common feature of these disagreements appeared to be their urgent onset. Over two-thirds of these disagreeing turns started in a reduced transition space or at a point of maximal incompleteness of their prior turn. Previous research by Gruber (1998) on conflict sequences in Austrian talk shows demonstrated that disagreements were frequently produced in overlap with the prior disagreeing turn. As stated by Gruber (1998:481-482), instead of waiting for transition relevance places, the opponents started their disagreements at “disagreement relevance points,” i.e. points in a turn that provide the opponent an easy opportunity to express disagreement. The examination of the internal structure of these disagreements pointed to their unmitigated nature (pp. 482-84). In the present study, however, the majority of the disagreements with an urgent onset were mitigated as they contained at least one dispreference marker coming before or within the disagreeing TCU. As a result, it can be argued that the urgent onset of these disagreements does not point to the dispreferred status of the action. Rather, as with first disagreements, this urgency points to a preference to correct the detected problem in the prior disagreeing turn as soon as possible in a multi-party interactional context.

It was also observed that the vast majority of these disagreements (96.55%) were expressed by the same speaker who was disagreed with in the prior turn. One reason for this can be the bias in the turn-taking system which gives priority to the speaker just before the current speaker to take the next turn (Sacks et al., 1974:708). A second reason relates to the turn design feature of speaker gaze as these disagreements were all expressed by the gaze recipient of the prior disagreement producer.

So, as a turn design feature capable of stimulating recipient response, speaker gaze appeared to have a great influence on the sustainment of opposition. This finding of the study is consistent with the findings of previous research on the influence of gaze in eliciting recipient response (Kendon, 1967; Bavelas, et al., 2002; Stivers, et al., 2009; Stivers & Rossano, 2010a). However, due to the existence of a small number of

disagreements in the data set not being produced by a gaze recipient of the prior disagreement producer, gaze was considered an important rather than an essential feature of disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement.

As for the prosodic features of stress, elongation and loudness, it was found that in about half of the disagreements followed by a disagreeing response the speakers put stress on an unstressed syllable or put additional stress on a normally stressed syllable to emphasize or focus the recipients' attention on the key words in their turn. Elongation of a vowel or a consonant in a key word was observed in about a quarter of these disagreements. But there were no instances of overt loudness for the purpose of attracting the recipients' attention to the key words in the data. Therefore, the prosodic features of stress and elongation were labeled as important but not essential in eliciting the recipient disagreeing response. It is worth noting that these prosodic features also served the purpose of claiming epistemic primacy as they frequently appeared in accounts and elaborations that constituted part of these disagreement turns.

Concerning syntax and intonation, the examination of the data revealed that, as with initial assertions leading to a first disagreement, the normal pattern for disagreements leading to a recipient disagreeing response was declarative syntax and falling intonation. However, neither of these two features are capable of stimulating the recipient disagreeing response.

The examination of these disagreements for the turn design feature of epistemic asymmetry showed that the vast majority of them (96.55%) enjoyed a greater epistemic valance compared to their respective, prior disagreements. In those instances which seemed to be deviant cases, the disagreeing speakers sufficed to the mere repetition of their already-stated position. That is to say, they did not make any epistemic contribution to the sequence. As maintained by Heritage (2012b:45), sequences of interaction atrophy when the interactants make no further epistemic contribution to the interaction. In the present study, when in face of a co-interactant's disagreement the interactants just repeated their prior position without making any further epistemic contribution to the discussion, another participant intervened and

changed the discussion in a stepwise fashion. It can, therefore, be argued that these disagreements were not deviant cases as they confirmed the necessity of displaying epistemic superiority for a disagreement responsive to a prior disagreement.

All in all, Chapter 5 demonstrated that, in the context of academic discussions, the turn design feature of participants' epistemic asymmetry plays an essential role in the sustainment of disagreement. That is to say, if opposition is going to continue, a disagreement produced in response to a prior disagreement should demonstrate superior knowledge of the issue compared to its prior disagreement. The disagreed-with speaker's gaze at the recipient and their use of the prosodic features of stress and elongation while uttering their disagreement are just contributing factors in eliciting the recipient disagreeing response.

The next chapter, i.e., Chapter 6, investigated how the interactants returned to non-disagreement talk. It unveiled that the discussants commonly moved from one topic to another in a stepwise fashion, without resolving their disagreement. Alternatively, they resolved their disagreement by acknowledging that their epistemic imbalance was redressed.

As shown in this chapter, in the majority of disagreement sequences (67.8%) the opposing interactants moved away from disagreement through stepwise topic shift (Jefferson, 1984; Sacks, 1995 vol. II). This was done with the help of pivotal elements/utterances (Sacks, 1995, vol. II:300) which made a connection between topics. These elements/utterances enabled the participants to move from one topic to a related one without resolving their disagreement as they either supplied or requested further knowledge of the issue.

While stepwise topic shift commonly occurred in a subtle way, there were a few disagreement sequences in which the change of topic did not seem to be that subtle as it was marked by a turn-initial discourse marker. Nevertheless, these sequences fell in the category of stepwise topic shift because their change of topic was still occasioned by a pivot and they didn't display the characteristics of a disjunctive topic shift.

Disagreement resolution was detected in just less than a third of the sequences. Resolution was achieved as one of the opposing parties acknowledged their epistemic equilibrium. In so doing, they commonly displayed their arrival at new knowledge, using the agreement token *äre* ‘yeah’ alone or with a confirmatory expression such as *doroste* ‘that’s right’. Or, less commonly, one of the opposing parties displayed their prior access to the knowledge, using expressions such as *äfarin* ‘bravo’ or *daqiqan* ‘exactly.’

It was noted that the majority of sequences coming to resolution contained just one disagreeing turn. This implies that the likelihood of opposition resolution in sequences with a single disagreeing turn is higher than those with multi-disagreement turns. Put differently, as the number of disagreements in a sequence increases, the possibility of moving away from disagreement through stepwise topic shift mounts up.

It was also noted that disagreement resolution did not commonly result in sequence closure as the disagreeing speaker opted to elaborate on their position even after epistemic balance was acknowledged. As a result, the sequence expanded until a stepwise topic shift took place. The expansion of the sequence after opposition resolution can be justified on two grounds. First, the disagreed-with interactant’s sustained gaze at the disagreeing speaker while approaching epistemic equilibrium signaled the disagreeing speaker that their account for their opposite position was not sufficient. Second, the agreeing response produced to acknowledge epistemic equilibrium was not adequate as they simply consisted of agreement tokens or formulaic, confirmatory expressions. By contrast, the examination of the only disagreement sequence that came to closure with the display of epistemic balance pointed to the disagreed-with recipient’s gaze withdrawal from the disagreeing speaker when approaching epistemic balance and their detailed agreement response to show epistemic equilibrium. This points to the interactional nature of closing the disagreement sequence.

Another important finding concerns the disagreed-with speaker's volume reduction while approaching epistemic balance detected in the majority of these sequences. Considering that the disagreed-with interactant's sustained gaze at the speaker implied expectation of more talk on the topic from the disagreeing speaker, their volume reduction appeared to be a contradictory behavior because it normatively shows the speaker's orientation toward sequence closure. However, data examination revealed that the disagreed-with speakers' volume reduction was not aimed at sequence closure. Rather, it signaled that the disagreed-with speaker was not going to present further opposing view on the issue under discussion.

On the whole, the chapter demonstrated that, in the context of academic discussions, non-disagreement talk was overwhelmingly restored through stepwise topic shift, whether the opposing interactants resolved their disagreement or not. This finding of the study is in harmony with Sacks (1995 vol. II:301) and Schegloff's (2007:192) observation in English that the most common form of transition from a sequence or topic to a next is stepwise shift. The absence of disjunctive topic shift as described by Jefferson (1993) and Schegloff (2007) in the present data set can be due to the institutional nature of academic discussions. Jefferson (1993) and Schegloff's (2007) data seem to be casual conversations which allow the possibility of disjunctive topic shift. Since, in the institutional context of academic discussion, the interactants are expected to talk about a certain issue, the absence of disjunctive shift seems quite normal.

The last data-analysis chapter, Chapter 7, focused on the preference organization of disagreement in the context of academic discussions. A preliminary examination of the data revealed that the usual preferred/dispreferred action classification was not applicable to the disagreements in the present study, whether first disagreements or disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement. This was due to the fact that these disagreements did not consistently demonstrate the characteristic features associated with preferred/dispreferred responses widely observed in CA literature (see, e.g., Schegloff, 2007; Church, 2009; Pomerantz & Heritage, 2013; Pillet-Shore, 2017). The incongruity of these features which results from the interplay of several factors, i.e.,

multi-party discussions, academic setting and Persian culture, shows the complexity of the action of disagreement.

Subsequent examination of the data pointed to the existence of two different categories of disagreement, namely mitigated/unmitigated disagreements, based on the positioning of the disagreeing TCU and its content. In mitigated disagreements, at least one marker of dispreference appeared either before or within the disagreeing TCU. These markers enabled the speaker to push the disagreeing TCU deep into the turn or sequence and/or reduce the force of disagreement. The dispreference markers observed were silences, audible inhalations, hesitation markers, hedges, repeats and partial agreements, clarification questions, accounts, discourse markers, address terms, items for monitoring/managing talk (or attention getting verbs), the inclusive pronoun *mā* 'we,' conditionals, rhetorical questions and prefatory statements. Interestingly, the markers observed in this study are similar to those English speakers commonly use to mitigate their dispreferred responses.

In unmitigated disagreements, the turn was commonly taken urgently and began with the disagreeing TCU stated directly and without any attenuation as no dispreference marker was used before or within the disagreeing TCU. Following Goodwin (1983, 1990) and Pomerantz (1984), two disagreements beginning with either a wh-question or a partial repetition of the prior turn, followed immediately by the disagreeing TCU in the same turn were included in this category. This was due to the fact that the wh-question or the partial repetition didn't serve to provide the disagreed-with speaker with the opportunity to modify their position. Rather, they functioned to highlight opposition.

Concerning first disagreements, it was found that in a great majority of these disagreements the speaker attempted to mitigate their disagreeing response. To do so, they implemented a variety of dispreference markers to defer their disagreement within the turn or sequence and/or reduce the force of their opposition. The participants' general tendency to delay and/or soften their disagreeing response points to their orientation toward disagreement as a disaffiliative or face-threatening act. That is to

say, in the context of academic discussions, Iranian Persian-speaking students generally mitigated their disagreements to attend to their fellow interactants' face' i.e., minimize the threat to the disagreed-with interactant's face. This finding of the present study confirms Asdjodi (2001) and Don & Izadi's (2011) observation that Iranians are generally expected to mitigate their opposite view because of *ta'arof* considerations.

Interestingly, more than half of the mitigated first disagreements in the current study had an urgent onset. That is to say, they commenced in a reduced transition space or at a point of maximal incompleteness of the prior turn. As discussed in Chapter 3, the urgency in the production of a first disagreement can be ascribed to the multi-party nature of the interaction and the preference to rectify the detected problem in the initial assertion as soon as possible. In order to be able to take the next turn and resolve the problem before the discussion moved forward to something else, the speaker produced an urgent disagreement which was otherwise mitigated as it contained dispreference markers. This was especially observable when the disagreeing speaker did not have the legitimate right to the turn.

As for disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement, it was discovered that, despite a slight increase in the percentage of unmitigated disagreements, mitigated disagreements still made up the majority. That is to say, the interactants in the present study commonly mitigated their disagreements which were produced in response to a prior disagreement. Interestingly, there were many instances of mitigated disagreements responsive to unmitigated disagreements. Moreover, in the majority of multi-disagreement sequences the final disagreements were accompanied by dispreference markers that reduced the force of opposition.

This finding of the study is not consistent with the findings of Kotthoff (1993) and Gruber's (1998) studies. Kotthoff's (1993:205) study showed that, in the context of German and Anglo-American academic discussions, the preference for agreement gave way to preference for disagreement and therefore disagreements produced in response to prior disagreements became less and less mitigated. In a similar vein, Gruber (1998) demonstrated that, in the institutional context of Austrian talk shows,

the interactants frequently produced unmitigated disagreements in overlap with the prior disagreeing turn. Taking into account that, as with the present study, these two studies examined institutional contexts, the observed differences can be justified on cultural considerations.

8.3 Implications of the study

The present study presents a detailed account of how Iranian Persian-speaking students disagree with each other when engaged in academic discussions. Through an in-depth analysis of data, it brings to light how they interactionally initiate, sustain and eventually resolve or move away from disagreement. It, therefore, makes a considerable contribution to the understanding of how disagreement is communicated in an academic context in general and in Iranian Persian academic discussions in particular. It also contributes significantly to the understanding of human communication as it uncovers how they make use of a variety of verbal and non-verbal resources to exchange information, ideas and feelings.

The findings from this study can benefit those who are involved in language pedagogy. The study provides material designers and teachers of Persian to speakers of other languages with useful insights into the interactional practices used by native speakers of Persian to communicate disagreement in an academic context. It also provides them with information concerning what disagreement looks like in terms of the internal structure of turns as well as the overall sequential organization. Moreover, material designers and teachers can use the naturally-occurring conversations presented in this study to provide learners of Persian as a second or foreign language with authentic examples of how native speakers of Persian communicate disagreement.

Additionally, the findings from this study can be beneficial to the researchers interested in cross-cultural studies and those who are investigating how native speakers of Persian disagree in other languages. These findings help them understand what strategies and patterns native speakers of Persian may transfer to the target language which may result in communication problems.

Many of the findings of the present study correspond to what has already been found for English conversation. For example, the interactants in this study overwhelmingly returned to non-disagreement talk through stepwise topic shift which has already been claimed to be the most common form of transition from a sequence or topic to a next in English (Sacks, 1995 vol. II:301; Schegloff: 2007:192). Likewise, the dispreference markers used by the interactants in this study to mitigate disagreement are similar to those used by English speakers. The observed similarities suggest the robustness of the CA methodology in terms of its interactional norms.

On the other hand, some of the findings of the present study are not consistent with the findings of previous CA research. For example, while the disagreements responsive to a prior disagreement in the present study are commonly mitigated, Kotthoff's (1993) study points to a change in the preference organization of disagreements in German and Anglo-American academic discussions. These differences point to the complexity of the action and suggest further investigation of other factors such as culture and multi-party interaction that contribute to the preference organization.

8.4 Limitations of the study and directions for future research

Although the data used in the study were collected from both male and female participants, gender difference has not been addressed in the present research. As demonstrated by previous research (see, for instance, Tannen, 1994, 2003; Holmes, 1995; Itakura & Tsui, 2004), women use a more supportive style in their conversations. It is therefore worth detecting whether gender can play an effective role in how disagreement is communicated in such an institutional setting.

Moreover, while the present study investigated how the interactants moved away from or resolved disagreement and how they oriented toward disagreement as a preferred or dispreferred action, due to the limited scope of the study, it has not been demonstrated whether there is a link between disagreement resolution and mitigation. This provides a good basis for a future study. It is also worth exploring how, in the context of multi-party discussions, other participants take side with the opposing parties and whether their side-taking has any effect on disagreement resolution or sustainment.

An interesting observation during data analysis in the present study was how the opposing interactants changed word order and what clausal structures they employed to break the contiguity of the prior turn and their disagreeing response and thus mitigate their disagreement. Obviously, the investigation of these issues needs a larger collection of data.

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Appendix 1

List of the transcription conventions used in the extracts

hello.	falling terminal
hello;	slight fall
hello_	level pitch terminally
,	slight rise
¿	rising intonation, weaker than that indicated by a question mark
?	strongly rising terminal
=	latched talk
hello	emphasis
↑	marked rising shift in pitch
↓	marked falling shift in pitch
he:llo	an extension of a sound or syllable
HELLO	talk is louder than surrounding talk
hel-	talk that is cut off
.hh	audible inhalation
.hh	strong inhalation through the nose
hh	audible exhalation
hh	strong exhalation through the nose
[]	overlapping talk
()	uncertainty or transcription doubt
(())	analyst's comments
(.)	a short untimed pause
(1.0)	timed interval
hello	creaky talk
°hello°	talk is quieter than surrounding talk
°°hello°°	talk is very quieter than surrounding talk
>hello<	talk is faster than surrounding talk
<hello>	talk is slower than surrounding talk
\$hello\$	smiley talk
t!	dental click
tch	strong dental click meaning no
p!	bilabial click
kh!	back palatal click
he he heh	laughter pulses
(h)	laughter within talk
→	point of interest

Appendix 2

List of the transliteration conventions used in the study

1. Vowels and consonants that are similar or equal to English sounds:

English letter used in transliteration		English words
a	similar to the vowel in	man, fan
e		bed, red
o		short
ä		rod, father
i		sleep, kid
u		food, should
b	similar to the first consonant in	bed
p		pet
t		tall
j		jack
ch		cheap, church
d		doll
r		red
z		zebra
s		sad
sh		shade
f		face
k		car
g		game
l		lamp
m		mad
n		need
v		vacation
h		hall
y		year

2. Consonants with no equivalents in English:

English letter(s) used	Description of the sound	Example
kh	voiceless velar/uvular fricative	<i>kheyli</i> 'many'
q	voiceless uvular stop	faqr 'poverty'
gh	voiced velar/uvular fricative	ghazä 'food'

Appendix 3

Grammatical abbreviations used in the extracts

DOM	direct object marker
DEF	definite
EZ	ezäfe or 'addition', as in possessives
IMPF	imperfective
IND	indefinite
NEG	negative
SBJN	subjunctive