

An Assessment of the ASEAN as a (Sub-)Regional Organization

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Preface

This sub-thesis constitutes the substantial revision of an attempt submitted in November, 1992. It does not, therefore, seek to comprehend changes that have taken place since that date.

The writer wishes to express his appreciation of the assistance and encouragement given by a number of people, but particularly Dr L Buszynski, formerly of the SDSC within the RSPacS at the ANU. Any deficiencies, however, must remain my own responsibility.

.....IRW

I, IAN ROBERT WHITEWAY, hereby certify that my sub-thesis was my own work and that I have made every effort to acknowledge all sources used.

SIGNED: Ian R Whiteway

13. IV. 1995.

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Chapter I: Introduction - Conceptions of Regionalism

1.1 Introduction

The period from World War II until the mid-seventies saw various attempts made to comprehend the process by which states join together. It appeared that the proliferation of regional organizations constituted the arrival of a significant new actor which would challenge the Realist state-centric view of International Relations. General theories of regional cooperation such as functionalism and neo-functionalism were produced, yet these did not prove to be adequate in their attempts to describe what was taking place. The new theories along with more traditional Realism were subjected to various refinements, which were developed chiefly to analyze the situation in Western Europe since World War II.

Since the mid-seventies, though, as Taylor¹ has noted, scholars have been wary when it comes to producing general works on regional cooperation. Whilst the number of regional organizations has continued to increase scholars have tended to retreat into area studies. This sub-thesis aims in a modest way to help to remedy this situation by considering aspects of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN), one of the more successful contemporary cases of regional cooperation. The present writer will seek to show that the insights gained by studying successful regionalism in Western Europe *do* have application to understanding the progress of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. In other words, perhaps the theorists gave up the comparative task prematurely !

In this introductory chapter, the task will be approached in the following manner: (i) the concept of regionalism will be briefly defined; (ii) a description will be offered of the main general theories historically used to describe European regionalism; (iii) the inadequacies of these theories will be demonstrated; and (iv) the foregoing analysis will be used to produce a framework which will help to explain why European regional cooperation has succeeded. Later chapters will consider regionalism in Southeast Asia and will assess the applicability of the above framework to the development of the ASEAN.

(i)

1.2 Regionalism

The most basic concept involved in this study is that of a region. In the field of International Relations, a number of attempts have been made to define regions. The more scientific approach has attempted to analyze various rates of transactions between states. It has worked on the premise that states which have greater rates of interdependent behaviour and compatibility of conduct - as gauged by criteria diverse as postal rates and UN voting patterns² - particularly when compared with their rates of transactions with other states, can be successfully grouped as a region. The greater the verisimilitude existing between different sets of data the more clearly defined is the particular region.

The more classical approach to defining a region consists in the historical tendency of the peoples in certain nations to consider themselves part of a region, usually based on geographical contiguity and ethnic, linguistic, cultural and/or religious ties. The definition is further consolidated by the cartographers and the recognition of a particular region by outsiders. By a happy coincidence the 'white coat' approach and the more descriptive approach arrive at approximately the same destinations with the latter having used somewhat fewer computer printouts ! There *is* general agreement on the existence and extent of regions such as Europe, the Middle East and Southeast Asia.³ The questionable status of borderline states such as Turkey and pariah nations such as Burma is tangential to the present purpose.

Regionalism will be taken as the willingness of particular states both to identify and to collaborate with other states in the same region to achieve common goals. The substance of such joint efforts may fall into the domains of economics, politics or security matters⁴ Regional cooperation, particularly as it intensifies and involves the subordination of national to regional interests, may lead to integration.⁵

1.3 Functionalism , Neo-functionalism and Neo-realism

European regional cooperation is generally hailed as the most successful case and therefore it is not surprising that much of the theorizing has focussed on events in Western Europe. Even before the end of World War II, Mitrany was developing ideas about how regional cooperation could help to prevent World War III.⁶ By the late fifties, Western Europe having seen the conclusion of the Treaty of Rome, was evidencing a measure of closer regional cooperation. The key question for scholars to face was, 'What was it that gave regionalism momentum ?' Related to this is the question of why some cases of regionalism such as Western Europe have achieved a measure of success whilst others in the Caribbean and Africa appeared to stagnate or whither.

The internal dynamic of intensifying regional cooperation was believed to be 'the spillover effect'.⁷ It is important to differentiate between the functionalist and the neo-functionalist definitions of this concept. In the former cooperation begins in less contentious areas and is driven on by felt need. Cooperation takes place as benefits are perceived and the domain of each act of cooperation reflects the function and therefore can vary from case to case.⁸ Functionalism does not lead to a centralized super-state. Rather, the state becomes less relevant as many important tasks are carried out instead by functionalist administrations whose territorial domain can vary.

Neo-functionalism, however, claims that low level forms of cooperation between nations in non-controversial fields will *necessitate* further nodes of cooperation both to facilitate the smooth functioning of the simpler forms and as a result of the perception that the benefits accruing from cooperation in one field may be translated into others:⁹

In its earliest form this process was thought to have a kind of deterministic quality which led to its being called 'the necessary logic' of neo-functionalism, or the 'functional imperative'.

The integration process would move forward *incrementally*. For example, the advent of a unified market would generate supporting political cooperation. Labour laws would need to be standardized to prevent employers taking advantage of lax labour laws in one part of the region to the detriment of businesses located in other member states where higher standards are enforced.¹⁰

More generally, there was a belief that economic changes would stimulate the matching political changes.¹¹ And further, related to this view of integration there has developed the concept of 'take-off'. Once a certain level of integration has taken place it will stimulate further, deeper integration and so on until political and economic union are realized.

It should be stressed at this point that advocates of the neo-functionalist spillover dynamic such as Haas did not see it as the sole determinant of regionalist behaviour. His 1958 article discusses other significant factors contributing to a proper understanding of the success or

otherwise of regional cooperation.¹² Instead, the focus here will be on the *emphasis* that was attached to the *manner* in which increased economic cooperation was believed to precipitate increased political cooperation. Economic cooperation was supposed to lead smoothly and necessarily to closer and closer ties between states and eventual political union.¹³

Not all theorizing, however, has proceeded down the path of functionalism and neo-functionalism. Some scholars have sought to emphasize that the state has in fact maintained primacy as the key political actor and that at the crucial point, the leaders of states will continue to maintain their own sovereignty. In practice, though, other actors do play a supporting role, the key actors are nation-states. The Realist concept of power was widened to include economic concerns as well as political and security ones.¹⁴ This view in some places has been termed Neo-realism. It is held that 'Regionalism' can give rise to larger states, but the basic building-block is still of the same type.

(iii)

1.7 Limitations of General Theories

By the mid-seventies the movement to codify a general theory of regionalism had run out of steam. Its end was signalled by Haas' essay proclaiming 'the obsolescence of regional integration theory' together with a work by Russett which had the effect of making further study in the area

unattractive.¹⁵ Functionalism, although a useful and interesting starting point had been ruled out as a satisfactory overall explanation.¹⁶

Haas realized the neo-functionalist approach had significant problems. De Gaulle's actions¹⁷ appeared to go in the direction opposite to that prescribed by neo-functionalism. Whilst standing for the expansion of the economic dimension of the Common Market he stood, with some success, resolutely against the extension of political integration through the ceding of greater powers to the supranational authority.¹⁸ Of course, in more recent years the United Kingdom, especially under Thatcher, has manifested elements of a similar approach.

In addition, Haas reached the understanding that the integrative process was not bound to proceed by incremental steps. He argued that such small advances were greatly susceptible to reverse. Haas' 1967 study showed that some of the most significant changes which took place in Europe rather appeared to require a strong coincidence of political will¹⁹ on the part of the key participants.²⁰ What moved a regional grouping forward in a more steadfast and enduring way was 'political will'. In effect this idea means that some moment of perceived crisis, common need or common aspiration will be the engine to drive the relevant decision-makers in a regional grouping to take steps that will intensify cooperation. Additionally such resolve on the part of decision-makers will be necessary to carry through decisions rather than to leave them as nice ideas.²¹

Haas then argued, that though the conventional neo-functionalist

theory of regionalism might have had significant power in explaining the first decade of post-War western European cooperation,²² it was less successful in the years after this time. One needed to look at other factors compelling decision makers to adopt measures that would greatly alter the nature of cooperation among the member states, as well as the role of leaders, to achieve a fuller understanding.

Haas has not been the only scholar to find fault with the general theory. Writing in 1992, Jens Henrik Haahr noted²³ that the prevailing neo-functionalist general theory of international relations had failed to allow for: the distinction between positive and negative aspects of integration; the distinction between high and low politics and the importance of the international environment; and the fact that regional policy coordination may be substituted for political integration. One also needed to allow for the role of political actors in affecting the process of regional cooperation.

So, in understanding regional integration it is difficult to reject Haahr's observation based upon Nye:²⁴

Thus, the neo-functionalist emphasis on incrementalism in economic and welfare oriented areas and on the key concepts of functional and 'cultivated' spillover (Nye, 1971, pp.200-2) as the impetus underlying continued integration was rejected as being of little relevance to an understanding of actual EC developments.

The obvious implication of this statement, is, that to obtain a grasp of European integration, it is necessary to look more directly at events in Europe itself. The general theory will not even hold for the case upon which it was predominantly based. However, the question of why European

regionalism has experienced a measure of success whilst other attempts at regional cooperation have failed remains to be answered.

(iv)

1.8 Europe Reconsidered: Context, Political Will and Leadership

Thus, the case of European regional integration shows that general theories along functionalist/neo-functionalist lines do not provide an adequate explanation of what has happened. It is also obvious, however, that a Realist description focusing on 'high politics' is also unsatisfactory. For example, 'low' political actors such as business corporations have played an important part in pushing the pace of economic reforms among the states of Western Europe.

An understanding of European regionalism must borrow from both the Realist and the neo-functionalist sides. From the former it takes the fact that the consent and at times the advocacy of those in power (corporately and individually) is required in order to initiate, maintain and expand effective regional cooperation; the latter has highlighted the vital importance of a meaningful regional context.

The success of Western European regionalism can, then, be accounted for by considering the axes of *context*, *political will* and *leadership*. *Context* has already been considered but briefly can be viewed

as the sum of existing ties, especially functional ones that exist between states in a region. It is built up over time but is not of itself sufficient to ensure successful regionalism.

Europe's context has been noted as highly favourable to regional cooperation and integration. The original Six were all democratic, industrialized countries with a long record of cultural and functional ties.²⁵ The cause of European integration has enjoyed substantial historical and ideological backing. Europe has known periods of unity such as the Holy Roman Empire under the reign of Charlemagne and more recently mechanisms such as the nineteenth century Council of Europe. Historically, religion has also played a part in providing a shared sense of European identity.²⁶

Political will is the resolution required on the part of those in power in order to initiate or intensify regional cooperation. It can be motivated by a variety of imperatives and circumstances, both internal and external to the states involved in regionalism. Among the factors likely to stimulate the exercise of political will are security and economic concerns.

Even the initial efforts to try to secure Western European integration required the conscious decision of political leaders of the time. Further down the track, the Treaty of Rome was not merely a legal spillover that was precipitated by the need to regulate Community economic cooperation. It expressed goals of greater political union. There

was the hope of a 'United Europe'.

It is quite easy to assemble an array of factors that during the lifespan of the European Community have provided leaders with the 'motivation' to agree upon moves that would increase cooperation and even centralize power away from their own administration. Such factors relate to the economic, political and security aspects of cooperation. Economically, there was the need to rehabilitate a war-ravaged Western Europe and more lately the establishment of an integrated market permits Europe to assume a more competitive position in world trade. Politically, European integration has offered Europe the opportunity collectively to occupy a place upon the world stage which was not available individually.²⁷

European integration has also offered the prospect of greater security. Germany, the aggressor in two world wars was now on the same side. A united Western Europe and American financial and military backing seemed a safer prospect in the Cold War than that of standing divided and alone. European cooperation has also fostered security within its member states through closing ranks and has limited any cross-border support to 'internal' threats such as those posed by the Basques and the Irish Republican Army. The EC does not provide a forum for criticism, or other actions that would threaten the territorial integrity of its members.

With such a coalition of supporting factors, it was not surprising that the leaders of the states that became known as 'the Six' could produce the political will to embark on and continue the process of cooperation.

Conversely, Haas pointed out that Britain and the Scandinavian countries did not, in 1950, have a clear sense that nationalism had failed them.²⁸ Unlike the citizens of states such as (West) Germany, Italy and France they lacked the impetus to look beyond their borders to a regional alternative. It is no coincidence, therefore, that the UK and Denmark have proved to be two of the most reluctant supporters of European integration.²⁹ Their relative success in maintaining faith in the nation-state has diminished their political will to merge into Western Europe as whole.

Leadership is taken as the part played by key individuals, elites or particular nations in sustaining (and at times resisting !) the regional cooperation process. In the case of the European Communities, the student gains a good understanding of the progress of regionalism by considering the dimension of leadership as well as that of context and political will.

European unity has enjoyed support from significant individuals such as Monet and Churchill. On the other hand it has been noted³⁰ that President De Gaulle (and more recently Prime Minister Thatcher) have at times acted to retard the pace of integration.

On a bureaucratic level, the EC 'Eurocrats' centred in Brussels and with delegations located around the globe also provide a form of leadership. This has been consistently in the direction of greater integration. The perception that what has become known as the European 'train' is bound for the final destination of full integration, probably expressed in a United States of Europe, has provided a sort of supreme administrative guiding

principle for the efforts of these civil servants.³¹

It is difficult to argue that any one European state has exercised a decisive leadership position over time, during the EC's history. This may be attributed to the fact that no one member nation is of such a size as to dwarf the others. Instead, it is more accurate to cite the manner in which particular states have been able to colour Community policy on various issues. The baleful role of the French in regard to furthering agricultural reforms would be a case in point.

The above analysis, then, fits Western Europe. It is next proposed to use it to consider developments in Southeast Asian regionalism. This application will not be in the sense of seeking to create the inchoate form of some new, grand general theory of regionalism. Rather, the emphasis will be placed upon considering the fruitfulness of employing context, political will and leadership as reference axes in understanding (successful) regional cooperation.

This approach will raise further questions about the comparative strengths in these three areas. Can a deficit in context be countered by a greater measure of political will and/or leadership ? Can leadership succeed in overcoming history to generate a stronger context ? In the next two chapters the groundwork necessary to answer these questions will be undertaken.

ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER I

1. On trends in writing about regionalism see Taylor, P 'Regionalism: the thought and the deed' (= pp.151-171 in Groom, A J R & Taylor, P (ed.) Frameworks for International Co-operation, Pinter Publishers, London, 1990) p.153 ff. Examples of the ongoing relevance of regionalism include Haas, E, 'The Challenge of Realism,' International Organization, Autumn, 1958, pp.440-458 'Whatever the answers may be, they compel renewed attention to the phenomenon of regionalism as a feature of our time.' p.458 and more recently Scalapino, R A & Masataha (ed.) Peace, Politics and Economics in Asia. The Challenge to Cooperate, Pergamon-Brassey's, Washington, 1988 p.12.
2. For an example of this approach see Russett, B M International Regions and the International System, Rand McNally & co., Chicago 1967.
3. On the definition of Southeast Asia see D G McCloud, System and Process in Southeast Asia. The Evolution of a Region, Westview, Boulder, Colorado, 1986 p. 8ff. who takes more of a classical approach; also Emmerson, D K "'Southeast Asia": What's in a Name?', Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Volume XV, 1, March 1984, pp. 1-21 discusses the origin and acceptance of the term Southeast Asia.
4. For further discussion of these the reader is referred to the appendix following chapter IV..
5. Haahr, J H, 'European Integration and the Left in Britain and Denmark,' Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol XXX, No. 1, March, 1992, p.79 quotes Lindberg's 1963 definition of political integration as,
'(1) the process whereby nations forgo the desire and ability to conduct foreign and key domestic policies independently of each other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the decision-making process to new central organs, and
(2) the process whereby political actors in several distinct settings are persuaded to shift their expectations and political activities to a new center.'
6. Taylor, P 'Functionalism: the approach of David Mitrany' (= pp.125-138 in Groom, A J R & Taylor, P (ed.) Frameworks for International Co-operation, Pinter Publishers, London, 1990) p. 125 notes that Mitrany's ideas re functionalism '...are the starting point of much of modern integration theory.'; Mitrany's major contribution was A Working Peace System, published in 1943.

7. See, for example, Haas, E B, The Uniting of Europe: political, social and economical forces 1950-1957, Stanford, University press, Stanford University, California, 1958 pp. 291 -299, 'The "Spillover" and Political Expectations'.
8. See Taylor, P 'Functionalism: the approach of David Mitrany' (= pp.125-138 in Groom, A J R & Taylor, P (ed.) Frameworks for International Co-operation, Pinter Publishers, London, 1990) p. 126 Hence the oft-quoted functionalist dictum that 'form follows function': the function, problem or task itself suggests the extent of the area and form of the administration within which it is to be tackled.'
9. Taylor, P 'Functionalism: the approach of David Mitrany' (= pp.125-138 in Groom, A J R & Taylor, P (ed.) Frameworks for International Co-operation, Pinter Publishers, London, 1990) p.131. For example, in reflecting upon the *early* years of the EEC, Haas was able to write in 1967, 'In short, the functional logic which may lead, more or less automatically from a common market to a political unification seemed to be neatly illustrated by the history of the EEC.' Haas E B, 'The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. V, No.4, June 1967, p. 324.
10. For example Haas, E B, 'The Challege of Regionalism', International Organization, Autumn, 1958, p. 450 regarding the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community comments, 'The new institutions were called upon to realize the benefits expected of a common market restricted to coal and steel, while being fully cognizant of the economic impossibility of acting meaningfully unless such related areas as foreign trade, taxes, wages, monetary policy and counter-cyclical measures *were also subject to regional regulation.* ' (emphasis mine).
11. This type of thinking is well illustrated by Haas, E B, 'The Challege of Regionalism', International Organization, Autumn, 1958, p. 451. In discussing the progress of European thinking he states, 'Successful "take off" is a manifestation of a previously successful "spillover": demands and expectations for further integrating measures are voiced as a result of performance in previously federated spheres of governmental activity. Performance is held inadequate because of an insufficient grant of powers or timid policy on the part of central authorities; hence the claim for new federal powers to achieve better performance is a direct outgrowth of the earlier institutional system and the realignment of group expectations produced through it.'

12. Indeed, considering that Haas wrote in the 'McCarthyist' 1950s in the USA it would be most unlikely that he would present economics as the sole determinant of relationships ! The Uniting of Europe also devotes considerable attention to the various interests groups within the European 'Six' and their role in both supporting and opposing greater cooperation in Europe.

13. Thus Haas, E B, 'The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol V, No.4, June 1967 p.315 recalled that in 1958 it had seemed that supranational economic integration reflected in the European Coal and Steel Community, the initiation of the Common market and the advent of the European Community would incrementally lead to political union.

14. On attempts to modify Realism to fit changes in the international environment see Willetts, P. 'Transactions, Networks and Systems' (= pp. 255-284 in Groom, A J R & Taylor, P (ed.) Frameworks for International Co-operation, Pinter Publishers, London, 1990) p. 266 ff.

15. Haas, E B, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory, Research Studies No. 25, Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1975; On the effect of Russett's writing see Taylor, P 'Regionalism: the thought and the deed' (= pp.151-171 in Groom, A J R & Taylor, P (ed.) Frameworks for International Co-operation, Pinter Publishers, London, 1990) p.153 f.

16. For an evaluation of functionalism, see Taylor, P 'Functionalism: the approach of David Mitrany' (= pp.125-138 in Groom, A J R & Taylor, P (ed.) Frameworks for International Co-operation, Pinter Publishers, London, 1990) p.133 ff.

17. Thus R J Harrison, 'Neo-functionalism' (= pp. 139-150 in Groom, A J R & Taylor, P (ed.) Frameworks for International Co-operation, Pinter Publishers, London, 1990) p.148 recounts that Leon Lindberg, faced with the example of General de Gaulle's intransigent opposition to the expansive logic of integration has noted, sorrowing, that 'the evidence indicates that the governments can avoid the logical consequences of integration for an unexpectedly long time..' They act as 'gatekeepers' against expansionist, spill-over pressures.

18. Haas, E B, 'The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol V, No.4, June 1967 p.315 makes the comment that under de

Gaulle's influence, Western Europe seemed both to be integrating and disintegrating at the same time ! ; pp.325-327 re role of De Gaulle.(De Gaulle also opposed geographic extension to include the UK.)

19. This term will be explained in the next section.

20. Thus, de Gaulle helped to demonstrate that, 'Integrative decisions based on high politics and basic commitment are undoubtedly more enduring than decisions based on converging programmatic expectations.' Haas, E B, 'The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol V, No.4, June 1967 p.328.

21. Thus R J Harrison, 'Neo-functionalism' (= pp. 139-150 in Groom, A J R & Taylor, P (ed.) Frameworks for International Co-operation, Pinter Publishers, London, 1990) p. 147 What has been achieved within the Community has depended upon political leadership by national elites and by political agreements between national governments. As the then President of Germany, Herr Scheel put it, 'Only political impulses will unite Europe . . . Europe has grown beyond the blind belief that political unity will automatically and inevitably follow communal institutions in the economic field. This conception has unfortunately shown itself to be false.' There has also been a tendency for power to remain with the Council of Ministers.

22. Thus, Haas, E B, 'The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol V, No.4, June 1967 p.324 'In short, the functional logic which may lead, more or less automatically from a common market to a political unification, seemed to be neatly illustrated by the history of the EEC.'

23. See Haahr, J H, 'European Integration and the Left in Britain and Denmark,' Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol XXX, No. 1, March, 1992, p.78.

24. Haahr, J H, 'European Integration and the Left in Britain and Denmark,' Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol XXX, No. 1, March, 1992, p.78.; re fall of neo-functionalism: R J Harrison, 'Neo-functionalism' (= pp. 139-150 in Groom, A J R & Taylor, P (ed.) Frameworks for International Co-operation, Pinter Publishers, London, 1990) p.148: 'More relevant for our purposes, however, is the identification of the central problem of the European Community itself, since it was the inspiration for the theory and remains the unique actual example of the strategy.'

25. R J Harrison, 'Neo-functionalism' (= pp. 139-150 in Groom, A J R & Taylor, P (ed.) Frameworks for International Co-operation, Pinter Publishers, London, 1990) p.141 referring to Haas, makes the point that 'the advanced industrial democracies. . . are considered the best perhaps the only possible candidates for integration.' In saying this he is presenting the neo-functionalist line.
26. This tendency was evidenced in the way the the Crusades were linked to the European church and the degree of unity that Europe enjoyed in pre-Reformation times. The significant differences between Reformation Protestantism and Roman Catholicism, however, should not be underestimated and could hardly be adduced as contributors to European unity.
27. A comment to this effect was made by Prof. K Minogue during a public lecture at the Australian National University on 5 August, 1992; this can also be linked to the 'third force' idea mentioned in The Challenge of Regionalism', International Organization, Autumn, 1958, p. 448.
28. Haas E B, 'The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. V, No.4, June 1967, p. 315.
29. See Haahr, J H, 'European Integration and the Left in Britain and Denmark,' Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol XXX, No. 1, March, 1992, pp. 77 - 100 for a discussion of the reluctance of Denmark and the United Kingdom to become involved in the European Community, and particularly the attitudes of the major Democratic Socialist groups within these states.
30. See p.12.
31. An example of this tendency is seen in the tone of many articles in EC News published by Delegation of the European Community to Australia and New Zealand.

Chapter II: The Genesis of the ASEAN

2.1 Introduction

This chapter will look at the birth of the ASEAN. The approach taken will be to measure the genesis of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia against the findings of chapter one. The first of two sections will deal with the background to the ASEAN, including the question of why its predecessors were relatively unsuccessful. Discussion will then move on to the factors that precipitated the formation of ASEAN and the three axes of context, political will and leadership.

2.2 Predecessors of the ASEAN

At the outset, it is worth noting that in the fifties Southeast Asian regional cooperation was limited by the fact that three later members of the ASEAN - Brunei, Malaysia and Singapore - were not yet independent while Burma had to be careful to do nothing to offend China.¹ The Indochinese states were afflicted by the after-effects of a bloody struggle for independence as well as internal divisions. Thus, the possible active participants in regional cooperation were confined in scope to Indonesia, The Philippines and Thailand.

In addition, at this time, former colonies tended to preserve close trading links with the former colonizers. The lack of industrialization and the reliance upon similar commodity bases also meant that there was little

economic interaction among states in regions such as Southeast Asia. Trading ties tended to be vertical with Europe or the USA rather than horizontal with neighbours. So, in the fifties there was no talk of the establishment of a Southeast Asian economic community along the lines of the cooperation that was occurring in Europe.

The early forays of states from Southeast Asia into cooperation with other nations essentially were of two types: politically-oriented, in the sense of being aimed at visionary political goals, and security or alliance based. Participation from within Southeast Asia in such groupings was limited compared with that from outside.

The types of politically-orientated cooperation pursued at this time were closely linked to the international climate of the period as well as the outlook of the leaders involved. In the early 1950s, it was the concern of those states such as Indonesia, that had just won independence, to seek to assert their newly acquired status on the international stage.

With the increasingly strong position of a charismatic leader such as Soekarno, it was not surprising to find Indonesia involved in early regional ventures with India and also seeking to play a prominent role in such groupings as the Afro-Asian Conferences and the Non-Aligned Movement. The aims of such forums were chiefly political. They were an attempt to cultivate Third World solidarity and to demonstrate that there was an alternative to the two sides of the Cold War. Such efforts climaxed in the Bandung Conference of 1955 but idealistic hopes were shattered by the

Sino-Indian War of 1962.

In effect, the early attempts at political cooperation were certainly visionary but their failure was inevitable due to the absence of a supporting context. There were few if any logical or functional links among the members that would be necessary to sustain meaningful regional cooperation. Indeed, the vast geographic spread of members involved in the Non-Aligned and Afro-Asian movements meant that many of them had little in common that would support regionalism.

SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Organization) was an attempt to foster regional military cooperation on a small scale, yet ironically, only a minority of its members could claim to be Southeast Asian. SEATO never gained broad support within the region. In particular, Indonesia opposed SEATO as being a continuing manifestation of the OLDEFOS (Old Established Forces) and contrary to its own independent and resilient stance. In addition to Great Britain's ties with Malaysia and Singapore, the existence of SEATO helped to divide Southeast Asia into two competing blocs.

The early sixties witnessed two other attempts at Southeast Asian regionalism, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and MAPHILINDO (Malaysia, The Philippines and Indonesia). In contrast to SEATO, the ASA and MAPHILINDO were both locally initiated. The ASA joined Malaysia, The Philippines and Thailand in a grouping that was designed to enhance cooperation across a variety of areas. In particular, it started to establish administrative machinery as well as formulating plans for practical,

functional cooperation in the field of economics.

MAPHILINDO was a short-lived proposal that included Indonesia, Malaysia and The Philippines. It was intended to demonstrate solidarity among the Malay peoples of these three nations. Also, it was supposed to ameliorate the problems that existed at the time between the three participants, particularly over the status of North Borneo and Malaysia's independence.

MAPHILINDO's early decease, as well as the ASA's immobilization owing to the effect of Confrontation, meant that neither of the initiatives would become a lasting mechanism for Southeast Asian regional integration. The ASA did, however, provide the organizational base upon which the ASEAN would build, and thus needs to be seen as the first step in the mainstream of regionalism in Southeast Asia. Unlike the type of intangible, visionary mode witnessed in such formulations as the Afro-Asian movement and MAPHILINDO, the ASA did seem to be moving towards more concrete forms of cooperation.

2.3 Reasons for the Failure of the ASEAN's Predecessors

Why, then, did the ASEAN's forerunners, and particularly the ASA, not meet with success ? Answering this question should provide clues as to why the ASEAN was successfully formed and as to why it has continued. There were two primary reasons - disputes among members and the absence of Indonesia - for the failure of the ASEAN's predecessors, as well as a

number of other secondary contributing factors, such as small memberships, political underdevelopment/inexperience, varying political outlooks and hence the lack of a commonly perceived threat. These primary and secondary factors can be analyzed under the headings of *context*, *political will* and *leadership*.

2.4 Context and the Failure of the ASEAN's Predecessors

Quite clearly, very little functional cooperation existed between the states that would later form the ASEAN and this absence would certainly be an impediment to successful regionalism. Southeast Asia would have to wait a very long time indeed if incremental economic changes were in some way to precipitate regionalism. Southeast Asia had also witnessed centuries of political and cultural divisions which were exacerbated by the manner in which the various colonial powers had linked the Southeast Asian states with themselves rather than each other.

The ASEAN's predecessors lacked the minimum viable context necessary for regional cooperation. The sub-region was fractured by the existence of substantial sources of dispute among its members. In particular, Malaysia and The Philippines were in contention over the latter's claim to represent the heirs of the Sultan of Sulu and therefore constitute the rightful owners of the state of Sabah in north Borneo. The disputed ownership of this territory has remained a festering sore in relations between Malaysia and The Philippines for three decades and did its first damage by sabotaging the

ASA. The effect of the Sabah issue was magnified by the support which elements of the Filipino leadership gave to Indonesia's 'Crush Malaysia' Confrontation campaign in 1964-65.

A further problem in the dimension of context that worked against the earlier attempts at regional cooperation in Southeast Asia was the differing complexions of the governments in the region. Bangkok and Manila were firmly aligned with the West whilst Jakarta was veering East in seeking closer links with the Communist capitals of Asia. Regional bodies that have endured, such as the EC, *have* been composed of like-minded governments. For example, a prerequisite for membership of the European Community is the existence of parliamentary or presidential democracy.

Another *possible* explanatory factor for the ASA's lack of success, is that of size. It could be argued that the ASA simply did not have enough members from within the region to cooperate effectively. Thus, for example when the Sabah issue became inflamed, Malaysian - Filipino relations were severely hampered and MAPHILINDO and the ASA were reduced to bilateral cooperation. However, the three Benelux states are an example of where a very small group of states (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) *can* cooperate effectively. So size may well have contributed but on its own is not a sufficient reason for the failure of the ASEAN's predecessors.

2.5 Political Will and the Failure of the ASEAN's Predecessors

The ASEAN's predecessors were also hampered by a lack of motivation on the part of participants. The leaderships of the states of Southeast Asia had not generated sufficient determination to enable the necessary steps to be taken that would sustain and intensify regional cooperation. Ironically, the MAPHILINDO proposal did carry with it a vision - the hope of a Malay brotherhood - but the absence of a worthwhile functional context meant that the idea was quickly scuttled.

What Southeast Asia lacked until the mid-sixties were political, economic or security imperatives (either internal or external) that would act upon suitably disposed leaders to generate commitment to regional cooperation.

2.6 Leadership and the Failure of the ASEAN's Predecessors

Leadership must certainly not be underestimated in considering Southeast Asian regional cooperation. This should firstly be seen on a corporate or national level. The absence of Indonesia, the largest state in the sub-region and the obvious leader is a second basic reason for the ASA's failure to germinate. It would be difficult for any Southeast Asian regional grouping to succeed in the absence of the state that dominates the region geographically and demographically. Of course, it would prove even more difficult to pursue regional cooperation in the face of Indonesia's overt opposition, as was the case with the ASA.

The ASA's lack of success can also be related to the relatively inexperienced governments of the participants, a number of which had recently gained independence. With the exception of Thailand, (a member of SEATO and the ASA) none of the leaderships involved in these early attempts at regional cooperation had significant experience in international relations. There was no elite or bureaucratic culture to give support to regional cooperation. Yet this of itself cannot be held as an *adequate* reason since the members of the ASEAN were hardly much more experienced or politically 'developed' at the time of *its* formation.

A lack of leadership in Southeast Asian cooperation must also necessarily be seen as a deficit in *individual* leadership. In understanding the functioning of Southeast Asian politics, it is very important to allow for the leader-centric nature of government among Southeast Asian societies. The states which would form the ASEAN lacked a tradition of participatory democracy (The Philippines' American-established system constitutes an exception.) There was no popular aspiration for some type of Southeast Asia wide supranationalism or even for regional cooperation. Thus, the viewpoint of say, Indonesia, was very much that of Soekarno, or at the most the viewpoint of a Southeast Asian state is that of its ruling elite.

The ASEAN's forerunners lacked leadership in the national, elite/bureaucratic and individual senses. They also were deficient in the supply of motivation to act for common goals. And, neither MAPHILINDO or the ASA possessed the minimum context necessary for viable ongoing

regional cooperation. The product of low or zero scores in all of these dimensions could only be failure. The formation of the ASEAN, however, was a success and the remainder of this chapter will seek to ascertain the reasons for this contrasting result.

2.7 The Formation of the ASEAN

This sub-thesis will not dwell upon the basic mechanics involved in the ASEAN's formation. Instead the approach will be to consider the conditions which gave birth to the ASEAN. Again, these shall be considered against the axes of context, political will and leadership.

2.8 The ASEAN's Context for Cooperation

The context in which the ASEAN was formed was in some senses little different to that of its predecessors. In 1967 functional cooperation among the five states that would form the ASEAN was still negligible and there was still an absence of popular participatory governments which could contribute the broad support necessary to provide a firm foundation for regionalism.

What did exist, however, was the basic minimum context necessary for regional cooperation. Though relations among the Five were not perfect - issues such as North Borneo and Singapore's separation from Malaysia illustrate this - the sub-region was no longer decisively fractured. In particular Indonesia (as will be discussed later)² was now willing to participate. The governments in the five capitals were also now of a

compatible if not identical political orientation.

The ASEAN would be born in a context that no longer made a zero or even negative contribution to regional cooperation. It did, though, only make a very small positive contribution. The observer must look to the other dimensions of regional cooperation in order to learn why the ASEAN would succeed.

2.9 Political Will

The ASEAN was able to come into being due to the political and security imperatives that affected the states of Southeast Asia en masse and individually in the mid-sixties. Such imperatives worked powerfully to generate a disposition towards cooperation among the states which would form the ASEAN. The security factors which encouraged the birth of the ASEAN will be considered first.

2.10 Political Will Precipitated by Security Imperatives

The ASEAN was formed when its members had an agreed, yet implicit, goal of upholding their security. In short, these security concerns were threefold. Firstly, the ASEAN countries were worried about the role of China in fomenting the expansion of Communism in the Indochina states immediately to the North of the ASEAN. This ultimately posed the threat of military invasion, principally to Thailand.

A second concern, linked to this, was the existence of Communist

subversion within the borders of the ASEAN states themselves. The danger that this presented was illustrated most graphically by the allegedly Communist-inspired attempt to overthrow the Indonesian Government in the abortive GESTAPU Coup on 30 September, 1965. Communist insurgency was also a problem in Thailand and Malaysia, and, of course there was a tendency to see links between Southeast Asia's substantial overseas Chinese minorities and the mainland Chinese communists.

The third area of security concern was the danger which the states that would form the ASEAN had posed to each other. Indonesia, with vocal support from elements within The Philippines had prosecuted a policy of opposing Malaysia, which was deemed to be a 'neo-colonialist' plot. Indonesia's stance had even brought about armed conflict in the jungles of northern Borneo. Thus, the largest state within the region was challenging the territorial integrity of one of its neighbours. Obviously, mutual acceptance of territorial sovereignty is fundamental to the maintenance of regional stability.

When considered together, the three security concerns outlined above precipitated a vision for the ASEAN; not the dream of a politically united Southeast Asia but rather the desire to achieve a zone free of threat from within as well as from hostile powers without.

From both the accompanying statements of ministers and the Bangkok Declaration itself, security was obviously a critical consideration in the formation of the ASEAN. On the one hand, there was a concern -

particularly on the part of Indonesia and Malaysia - that the ASEAN not be seen as an organization that was closely aligned with the West. This emphasis was reflected in the statements of the Malaysian Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, to the effect that the ASEAN is not 'anti-anything',³ the emphasis that the ASEAN was open to new members⁴ and the fact that the Declaration said explicitly that foreign bases in the region were of a temporary nature.

Later this concept, espoused especially by Indonesia, was seen in the way that the ASEAN states came to realize that the major threat was internal. Thus, if they all strengthened their 'national resilience' by such means as economic development and they all worked towards the exclusion of Great Powers from their jurisdictions then they would be on the way to producing a 'resilient' region, where there would be no opportunity left for insurgents to stir up trouble.

Additionally, the formation of the ASEAN followed closely upon the resolution of the intra-regional conflict evident in Confrontation. If the Southern and maritime states of Southeast Asia were to stand against the advance of Communism it would be necessary to eliminate debilitating disputes among themselves.

There was some discussion - including comments from the Indonesian Foreign Minister - that the ASEAN could lead to more direct security cooperation,⁵ but this was down-played. Such a mode of cooperation would have challenged the infant ASEAN's early direction. The ASEAN was

not to become a new SEATO bolstered by outside powers. Indonesia and Malaysia emphasized that the security of the region needed to depend upon the countries located within it rather than upon foreign powers.

2.11 Political Will Precipitated by Political Imperatives

Apart from being an attempt to address shared security concerns, the birth of the ASEAN also helped to address important political needs of its members. The very act of forming the ASEAN was a significant political statement, even, if, as the Foreign Minister of Singapore said, the participants at the Bangkok Declaration were not quite sure what they were saying:⁶

'You may recollect at the first meeting in 1967, when we had to draft our communique, it was a very difficult problem of trying to say nothing in about ten pages, which we did. Because at that time, we ourselves having launched ASEAN, were not quite sure where it was going or whether it was going anywhere at all.'

The ASEAN, above all, was formed in an atmosphere of great apprehension. In a sense, it was a more important that unity be shown than that much be said.

Related to this was the concept that regionalism was the prevailing wind of the international climate⁷ and that for Southeast Asia to compete it was necessary that it adopt the same modus operandi. This was one thread that came through consistently from the ASEAN participants' colonial heritage and the Hobbesian view that the international environment was unsympathetic and cruel.⁸ In contrast to the political rhetoric emphasis of

say the Afro-Asian movement, however, this time the 'war' was to be waged through the means of joint economic endeavour and cooperation.

The ASEAN's founders *did* want to outgrow the narrow nationalism that had, to date, divided them⁹ and in this sense they were similar to the Europeans at the close of World War II. Indeed, at the time of the ASEAN's foundation, diplomatic links between Malaysia and The Philippines were frayed while Indonesia's links with Malaysia and Singapore were not yet established. It should be stressed, however, that the ASEAN was not a political attempt to replace narrow nationalism with supranationalism.

Thus, collectively the states that would form the ASEAN had plenty of incentive in the political and security dimensions. This impetus was reinforced by individual concerns. These individual imperatives for regional cooperation functioned in tandem with the shared security and political concerns to produce an atmosphere conducive to regionalism among the leaders of the 'Five' and helped to stimulate the political will required to take the important step forward embodied in the Bangkok Declaration. This fact can be demonstrated by a consideration in turn of each member's perspective.

2.12 National Imperatives for Regional Cooperation

2.13 Indonesia and the Formation of the ASEAN

By early 1967, Indonesia had seen the demise of the Soekarno government and the installation of the New Order administration in its place. The new government, while maintaining Soekarno's 'independent and active' foreign policy emphasis, was also keen to find friends. The Soeharto Government looked with greater favour upon cooperation with the Archipelago's neighbours and non-Communist governments generally. An aversion to Chinese-linked Communism was not surprising in view of the fact that the Communists were implicated in GESTAPU which saw the assassination of six generals.

Additionally, in the wake of Konfrontasi the Soeharto regime was keen to mend fences in the region and to pursue Indonesia's perceived rightful role as the regional leader or 'eldest brother'.¹⁰ Thus, Indonesia, which had climbed down from the World stage of the Non-Aligned and Afro-Asian movements and had brought down the curtain on the excitement and adventurism of Soekarno, was ripe to join an organization such as the ASEAN.

Further, the ASEAN was perceived as a new and Non-Aligned body which Indonesia could join from the start and not therefore suffer the ignominy of being vetted by other Southeast Asian states in order to enter an existing regional organization.

Conversely, on the part of the other states that would form the

ASEAN, there was a clear desire to bring Indonesia into the fold. There was a perception that the ASA had been unsuccessful due to the fact that Indonesia had not participated. Thus, reports of the time reveal a sort of 'off the record' collective sigh of relief that Indonesia was to be part of the new body.¹¹

Other evidence from the time reveals that Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore and Thailand were willing to go to reasonable lengths to accommodate the Indonesians. For example, the statement in the Bangkok Declaration that 'foreign bases were temporary' is taken as an attempt to placate Indonesia, which was keen to see the removal of foreign bases from the region.¹² Also, the principle that lasting regional cooperation would have to be on Indonesia's terms is reflected in the fact that the ASA had to be recast as the ASEAN before the Indonesians would join.

2.14. Malaysia and the Formation of the ASEAN

Malaysia, too, had good reasons to join a regional organization. The Federation's partiality to regional associations was illustrated by its earlier membership of the ASA. Indeed, Malaysia's early commitment to cooperation was illustrated by the fact that Tunku Abdul Rahman was the first of the leaders of the 'Five' to articulate a theory of Southeast Asian regionalism. Malaysia also had the desire to establish more favourable relations with two of its recent opponents - namely, Indonesia in Konfrontasi and The Philippines in the Sabah dispute.

Involvement in a regional organization additionally offered Malaysia

the opportunity to become less attached to its former colonial master, the United Kingdom, and in so doing would allow the Federation to assert the non-aligned strain in its foreign policy. This emphasis would find its regional analogue in Malaysian encouragement for the vision of the ASEAN as a zone of peace, free from outside interference.

Malaysia also had security concerns due to the effect of Communist infiltration from the North across the land border with Thailand. This infiltration was associated with the powerful CPM (Communist Party of Malaya). Malaysia's central location in non-Communist Southeast Asia did, however, place it at the core of regional cooperation.

2.15 The Philippines and the Formation of the ASEAN

The Republic of The Philippines had strong motivation to wish to become part of a regional organization. Like Malaysia, The Philippines had shown an earlier commitment to regionalism through its role in the ASA. Also like Malaysia, and in fact more so, The Philippines was very keen to identify itself further with Asia. This concern stemmed from The Philippines' close historical links with the United States of America, evidenced in the continued American military presence and the strong impact of American culture in the island. The Philippines was instead eager to associate itself more closely with the region and involvement in the ASEAN furthered this goal.

2.16. Singapore and the Formation of the ASEAN

The Republic of Singapore had significant incentives to join the ASEAN. The island state had only just gained an unscheduled independence and so was keen to establish links in the region. It would, as well, be prudent to be on the same team as Singapore's much larger neighbours. Further, membership offered Singapore the opportunity to emphasize its position as a member of a predominantly Malay region rather than as a Chinese, and therefore suspect, island in a Malay Sea. All in all, the internationally-oriented Singapore could not afford to remain outside the ASEAN.

2.17. Thailand and the Formation of the ASEAN

The Kingdom of Thailand, boasting a far longer period of independence and hence more assured in dealing with outsiders, also had early shown its commitment to regional cooperation. This had been evident in the Thais' involvement both in the ASA and the important part they played in the establishment of the ASEAN. Thailand's long land borders and its traditional rivalry with Vietnam, coupled with the instability of the smaller Indochinese buffer states made it particularly vulnerable and therefore in need of supporters.

Thus, all of the states which would make up the ASEAN had, by 1967, attained an outlook that was favourable toward regional cooperation.

2.18 Leadership and the Formation of the ASEAN

In accounting for the successful formation of the ASEAN the dimension of leadership must also be considered. Again this can be treated at the national, elite and individual levels. Aspects of the first two of these three, have already been analyzed. It has been seen that the establishment of the ASEAN permitted Indonesia to assume a leading role in the region. This leadership was not that of heading a supranational organization but was more along the lines of primus inter pares.

By contrast, Southeast Asian regionalism did not enjoy bureaucratic leadership. It did not at this stage have a pro-ASEAN constituency which extended significantly beyond the ruling circles in the states which formed the Association. It was, then, essential that the ASEAN proposal enjoyed the support of those right at the top.

The formation of the ASEAN was certainly facilitated by the backing of the individual leaders of members states. For example, Thanat Khoman, who possessed a valuable rapport with the Malaysians, was among those who played a very important role in the birth of the grouping.¹³ Tunku Abdul Rahman and Tun Abdul Razak were able to contribute to the ASEAN's early conceptual direction.¹⁴ Other leaders such as Lee Kuan Yew and Soeharto were supportive of regionalism.

The formation of the ASEAN was also fundamentally consistent with the prevailing nature of traditional Southeast Asian politics spelled out by McCloud.¹⁵ In the traditional (Buddhist) Southeast Asian kingdom, power was vested in the person of the ruler and focused in the court. The ruler did

not rule for the people. Instead the populace could merely expect a form of benign protection and little interference.¹⁶ Arguably, the wider stage of the ASEAN could be seen to bring greater prestige to rulers such as Soeharto. It would remain, however, government-to-government prestige and not supranational.

2.19 An Assessment

How well does the birth of the ASEAN, fit with the theory explained in chapter one ? Firstly, it provides no evidence of the spillover effect, the essential dynamic of the neo-functionalist model of regional growth. Functional cooperation in Southeast Asia until 1967 was minimal. The ASEAN was not an attempt to map politically that which was already taking place incrementally in the realm of economics.

And secondly, when measured against the axes of context, political will and leadership the infant ASEAN's performance varied. It had achieved only the minimum viable context required for regional cooperation.¹⁷ It scored positively with regard to leadership in the national and individual senses but still lacked a wider elite constituency.

It was, however, political will that made the difference at this stage of the ASEAN's existence. Shared and individual political and security imperatives gave the ASEAN leaders the motivation required to initiate sub-regional cooperation successfully. The next chapter will consider the factors that have permitted the ASEAN to reach its silver jubilee.

ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER II

1. Jorgensen-Dahl, A Regional Organization and Order in South-East Asia, St Martin's Press, New York, 1982 p.87 notes that Burmese foreign policy is governed by the fact that it is the Southeast Asian country possessing the longest land border with the People's Republic of China.
2. See page 38 ff.
3. The Bangkok Post, 10 August, 1967; similarly, Tunku Abdul Rahman in The Straits Times, 5 August, 1967 is quoted as stating that the ASEAN was not to be a military alliance aimed at others.
4. Ibid.
5. Thus, Malik, The Bangkok Post, 11 August, 1967 proposed that there could in the future be a defence role for the ASEAN, a comment echoed in The Manila Chronicle, 11 August, 1967, editorial, 'The possibility that the ASEAN may graduate from a purely "cultural, economic, social, technical, scientific and administrative grouping" into a military or semi-military alliance cannot be overlooked, although for the present the countries are merely interested in interests other than military.'
6. Mr S. Rajaratnam at the 1974 ASEAN Meeting, quoted in Australia and ASEAN, Report of the The Parliament of Australia, Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, AGPS, Canberra, 1984 p. 5.
7. Thus, Thanat Khoman's conference comments to the effect that there was a global trend towards closer cooperation and even integration quoted in The Bangkok Post, 9 August, 1967. Also instructive is the presentation of Mr Rajaratnam's view conveyed in the same newspaper five days earlier. Advanced states, it was held, were headed towards large-scale economic cooperation.
8. Jorgensen-Dahl, A Regional Organization and Order in South-East Asia, St Martin's Press, New York, 1982 p.71 notes that the ASEAN states tend to perceive the outside world as waiting to consume them.
9. Thus, Tun Abdul Razak, "The Southeast Asian region is emerging from the 'heroic' phase of nationalism into 'an era of interdependence, mutual cooperation and regional development.'" , The Bangkok Post, 9 August, 1967. Somewhat similar were the comments of Rajaratnam: 'After twenty years of decolonization we have found that nationalism

alone has not provided the means to a better way of life. Now it has become necessary to marry national thinking with regional thinking'.

10. Malik referred to Indonesia as the 'big brother' in Straits Times, 13 February, 1976.

11. Straits Times, 10 August, 1967 sums up such thinking with the comment, "... Indonesia's membership of the new association is one of the strongest reasons why ASEAN may command success". Also Ramos' pre-departure statement published in The Manila Chronicle, 4 August, 1967 expresses the view that Indonesia must be involved for the new organization to be truly regional.

12. For example, The Manila Chronicle, 9 August, 1967, attributes this understanding to 'conference sources'.

13. An interview published in Asia Week on 5 August, 1977 p. 14 f. provides Thanat's perspective on the founding of the ASEAN and discloses the important part played by himself, Tunku Abdul Rahman and the leadership of The Philippines.

14. Thus, Tun Abdul Razak spoke of the shared responsibility to prevent domination and interference from the outside the region as well as the aim of preventing intra-regional disputes. The Bangkok Post, 9 August, 1967. Some illustrations of the views and aspirations held regarding the ASEAN's progress (showing a conceptual link to Europe) Rajaratnam, The Straits Times, 4 August, 1967: 'I don't believe that, even if we start now, however modestly, we can have effective regional cooperation for a long time. After all, in Western Europe, the countries took the best part of two decades to solidify the European economic community. I hope we don't have to take that long because I don't think we have that much time.' The example of Western Europe taking 10 - 15 years is also present on the front page of The Bangkok Post, 5 August, 1967; The idea that other regional bodies should serve as a model is also contained in the analysis of Tunku Abdul Rahman's views and the further discussion of the perspectives of Malaysia and The Philippines contained in pp. 19 and 20 respectively of Jorgensen-Dahl, A Regional Organization and Order in South-East Asia, St Martin's Press, New York, 1982.; Another example of this tendency to try to compare and contrast the ASEAN with the European experience is seen in Lee Kwan Yew's speech at the opening of the 1976 ASEAN Heads of Government Meeting, as quoted in Strait Times, 24 February, 1976, 'Even the European nations of the EEC, nearly nineteen years after they

signed the Treaty of Rome in 1957, continue to have strong disagreements from time to time.' Also, 'But there was a vague analogy between the births of the two organisations. The EEC, he pointed out, was set up as a result of pressure of a competing and different political and economic system, Comecon, the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe . . . In Asean, this competition would come from the new Marxist-socialist systems of the three Indochina countries.'

15. On the nature of the traditional Southeast Asian state see D G McCloud, System and Process in Southeast Asia. The Evolution of a Region, Westview, Boulder, Colorado, 1986 pp. 60 ff.

16. Perhaps, the traditional model of a ruler would best apply to President Soeharto who retains peculiarly Javanese elements in his approach to leadership. One of the best-known illustrations of this was the occasion when he took Australian Prime Minister, E G Whitlam to visit a cave in Central Java with traditional mystical associations. The more strongly Muslim states of Southeast Asia, Brunei and Malaysia have also been dominated by a ruling elite and the same situation has prevailed in secular Singapore.

17. To put it in terms of the model of Dosser et al, at the time of the ASEAN's launching, there were modest hopes that realistic functional cooperation might be pursued. There was a perception that one day moves toward freer trade could eventuate. The ASEAN was not, though, formed to achieve a common market and in this sense it was not even on the runway let alone heading for 'take-off' to higher levels of integration. Douglas Dosser, David Gowland & Keith Hartley The Collaboration of Nations A Study of European Economic Policy, Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1982 pp. 62-64.

Chapter III: The Growth of the ASEAN

3.1 Introduction

The chief argument of this chapter will be that the progress of the ASEAN from its inception to the present time has continued to be driven by the determination, or political will, of its leaders to further regionalism and that this determination has been fuelled by security and economic imperatives. These imperatives have been crucial in the development of the ASEAN in the continuing absence of a strong supporting functional context. Further, it will be shown, that, the dimension of leadership, particularly in its national and individual forms, must also be considered if one is to understand the first twenty-five years of the ASEAN.

3.2 Context

As the previous chapter noted, the ASEAN was founded with the minimum viable supporting context. Very little functional cooperation existed among the members, yet the Association *was* formed when the Five were at peace and when all were willing to participate.

During the twenty-five years of the ASEAN's existence, there has been some strengthening in functional cooperation among the member states. This has included measures to boost intra-ASEAN trade¹ - which will be treated in the section on economic imperatives - as well as an increase in cultural links. Writing in 1991 Simandjuntak observed:²

Culturally, a number of events have also come into being with ASEAN as initiator, helping to create a regional identity of the highly pluralistic societies of ASEAN spread over diverse aspects of life. However, it is difficult to gauge the loyalty of this constituency.

The context of the ASEAN is in thus a little stronger but it is doubtful as to whether this can make a decisive contribution to the continued strengthening of regionalism.

The ASEAN gained a secretarial structure with a wide variety of committees designed to foster cooperation in such areas as trade, industry, finance, food, transport and communications, culture, science and technology and social development.³ A Food Security Reserve Scheme was established. By 1988 thirty NGOs (Non-Government Organizations) as well as a Chamber of Commerce and Industry were affiliated to the ASEAN Secretariat. With the admission of Brunei, the ASEAN's geographic extent was also enlarged.

The only major impediments⁴ caused by context were related to The Philippines. These were connected to Sabah dispute and the unwillingness of the other ASEAN leaders to prop up the Marcos regime in its dying days.⁵ Having said this, the ASEAN still lacked the calibre of functional cooperation which would act as a significant stimulus either to maintain regionalism or at least to make a cessation of regional cooperation unattractive. In order to see what has kept the Association functioning it is again necessary to consider the dimensions of political will and leadership.

3.3 Political Will

Various stimulants have provided the ASEAN leaders with the motivation to maintain regional cooperation over the past two and half decades. This fact will be illustrated by considering the areas of security (especially Cambodia and events surrounding the Manila Summit); economics (responses to specific matters such as the ICAP dispute and Japanese synthetic rubber as well as larger international developments); and the accomodation of the Indochinese 'Boat People'.

3.4 Political Will Precipitated by Security Imperatives

For most of the history of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, security concerns have played a vital role in maintaining regional cooperation. This illustrate the way in which such concerns have helped to bring about a number of the, sometimes clumsy, attempts at fostering economic and other functional cooperation on an ASEAN basis.

With the cases of South Vietnam and Old Order Indonesia before them, it was not difficult for the ASEAN states to make the connection that economic dissatisfaction would make their countries most vulnerable to Communist subversion. Indeed, even the most powerful nation on the planet was unable to resist the popularly supported forces of Ho Chi Minh in the environment of South Vietnamese economic mismanagement.

The reaction of the ASEAN states was encapsulated in the idea known as national resilience. This had been a tenet of Indonesian foreign policy since 1964/65 and was based on the idea that if a nation was strong in a variety of dimensions, including politics, social cohesiveness and economics then it would be able to stand against external foes.⁶ The New Order of Indonesian 'technocrats' was particularly happy with this concept as it allowed them to maintain continuity of direction while at the same time shifting the focus away from ideology to practical development.

The concept could be readily translated to the ASEAN context through the formulation of 'regional resilience'. In this way all of the countries in the Association would strive to become strong and so deny a foothold to insurgents and other destabilizing forces.⁷ This thinking went hand-in-hand with the Malaysian proposal for the neutralization of Southeast Asia which eventually became known as ZOPFAN. Southeast Asia was to be a Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality and in the Malaysian view was not beholden either to East and West and would not provide either bloc with a battle venue.

The role of security concerns in driving regional cooperation can be seen in the Bali Summit of February, 1976. Despite the fact that the ASEAN had been in existence for almost decade it had seen minimal functional cooperation. The shared commitment among ASEAN leaders that produced the Bangkok Declaration was not enough to see the organization intensify as an expression of Southeast Asian regionalism. The ASEAN lacked joint

economic programmes or plans, had no meetings of economic ministers and did not even possess a secretariat.

It took a security-related imperative to alter this situation and to generate the resolve among member governments to subscribe to the more intensive regionalism that was agreed upon at Bali. This security concern was caused by fall of Indochina to Communism. The vigorous round of shuttle diplomacy and the preparations for the Bali Summit evidence this concern. The panic generated by the new situation was sufficient to bring the ASEAN heads of government together for the first time. It also caused speculation that the ASEAN would develop a military dimension.⁸

The actual outcome of the meeting was clearly directed at preventing the expansion of Vietnam-backed Communism. Apart from the obvious danger of more dominoes toppling, there was the concern that Vietnam would continue to act as a funnel for the involvement of external powers, notably China and the Soviet Union, in the region. This, and the fact that Vietnam was willing to support insurgency movements within the ASEAN states, represented a direct challenge to two pillars of the ASEAN vision: non-interference from outside the region and respect for the territorial integrity of other states within the region.

Thus, a range of economic measures including the ASEAN Industrial Projects (AIPs) and the Preferential Tariff Arrangements (PTAs) that would enhance the regional resilience of the ASEAN states received assent. It should be stressed, however, that at this stage of the ASEAN's development

the economic cooperation was far more of a 'display' than of a practical nature. The measures agreed upon at Bali constituted political attempts to create economic cooperation.

For reasons that will be discussed later in this chapter,⁹ the ASEAN leaders were not at this time prepared to implement measures that would lead to a significant freeing of trade within the sub-region. The Heads of Government were attempting to impose an artificial top-heavy mode of functional cooperation rather than building upon a more natural growth emanating from genuine need and economic benefits.

At the same time, the ASEAN states nearest to the Cold War fault line were keen to profess that Vietnam's perception of the ASEAN as an 'imperialist' bloc was entirely misplaced. As with Western Europe the idea was to win the Cold War with non-military means.¹⁰

Therefore, the security-driven nature of the ASEAN's increased commitment to regionalism and the consequent attempts artificially to induce functional cooperation were in evidence by 1976. This tendency was continued in the August, 1977 Kuala Lumpur Heads of Government Meeting through the establishment of the SWAP scheme, by which member states could be assisted with short term currency problems. Such monetary problems constituted an impediment to smooth trade. Other ASEAN measures in the early years that were designed to guard against unnecessary instability included schemes to provide emergency supplies of fuel and rice to other ASEAN countries.

3.5 Security and the Cambodian Issue

Indochina and, particularly the Cambodian issue, however, was to prove to be the most significant and enduring security concern of the ASEAN states and the one that generated sustained and deepening political cooperation for a decade. Though it must be conceded that some of the economic measures agreed upon at the Bali and Kuala Lumpur summits could not realistically be expected to yield dramatic results, it must also be agreed that the ASEAN appeared to lose some of the momentum for regional cooperation that had apparently been accumulated. This apparent drop in intensity can be paralleled with changes in perceptions of regional security.

In the years 1976-78, the security situation in Southeast Asia *did* seem to be improving. The dominoes were not continuing to fall and the Vietnamese leadership was giving assurances of its peaceful intentions.¹¹ These promises of Vietnam's desire to live at harmony with its neighbours were uttered by the Vietnamese Prime Minister, Phan Van Dong, during visits to the ASEAN capitals in September and October, 1978. The invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam soon rekindled fears and again fuelled greater cohesion among the ASEAN members.¹²

Vietnam's actions brought Thailand up to the front line, and represented an obvious challenge to the principles upon which the ASEAN was built. The invasion jeopardized the preservation of post-colonial borders and violated the territorial integrity of another state within the region. Further, Vietnam's alliance with the Soviet Union continued the involvement

of outside powers in Southeast Asia. The Sino-Soviet split which saw China at war with Vietnam exacerbated this situation.

The ASEAN strategy was threefold. Firstly, it included a strident diplomatic offensive. This move was designed to rob the Vietnamese-backed Heng Samrin government in Phnom Penh of legitimacy and so to keep the situation on the international political agenda. The ASEAN members were able initially to delay the derecognition the Pol Pot regime and later to muster support for the recognition of the more universally palatable Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea. The ASEAN states were also vocal in calling for self-determination to be given to the people of Cambodia. Throughout the eighties, the ASEAN position won majority support in the United Nations General Assembly.

Allied to this offensive were attempts to bring the rival factions to the negotiating table. This part of the strategy was evident in such events as the International Conference on Kampuchea held in New York in July, 1981 as well as the convening of other informal meetings. The use of the latter methods, for a time, was dubbed 'cocktail diplomacy'.¹³ Its aim was to initiate informal talks in the hope that they in turn would lead to more structured negotiations.

The third prong of the ASEAN strategy was that of holding out the 'olive branch' to Vietnam. Discussions were kept open through the ASEAN's unofficial interlocutor, Indonesia. In addition, the ASEAN's professed emphasis on economic development and its reestablishment of trade links

offered Vietnam the opportunity of gaining valuable investment assistance with the reconstruction of her shattered economy as well as the chance to participate in an economically dynamic region. The cost of admission would be the settlement of the Cambodian issue.

The goal of the ASEAN's approach, as articulated in the 'Kuantan Doctrine',¹⁴ was to bring Vietnam into the Southeast Asian security zone. Vietnam would then end both its alliance with the Soviet Union and the conflict with China. This would allow the Cambodian issue to be settled and also significantly lessen the involvement of outside powers in Southeast Asia.

From the point of view of ASEAN cooperation, the value of Cambodian issue lay in the fact that it provided an object for joint action as well as the way in which it caused the members to subordinate differing approaches to the maintenance of a united front. Writing in 1990, Frost commented:¹⁵

... but differences of emphasis between some ASEAN members particularly Thailand and Indonesia, have not prevented ASEAN from maintaining a credible image of cohesion over the issue. Indeed, the existence of different emphases towards regional security among the members has probably increased ASEAN's flexibility in pursuing possible avenues for discussion over Cambodia.

The ASEAN's continued unity on the Cambodia issue was particularly significant in view of the serious potential for division.

At the two poles of the ASEAN perspective were Thailand and Indonesia. Thailand perceived its traditional enemy Vietnam as the number one threat to regional security and therefore provided covert support to the

the guerrilla forces opposing the Vietnamese-sponsored government in Phnom Penh. The People's Republic of China was viewed as an ally.

Indonesia, on the other hand, was more partial to the side of Vietnam. This sympathy with the Vietnamese has often been traced to the Archipelago's high degree of empathy with Vietnam, stemming from their shared revolutionary emergence from the colonial cocoon. In addition, Indonesia maintained a suspicion of Communist China and an instinctive dislike of 'Great Power' involvement in the region. The ASEAN was able to maintain a common stand on this issue of regional security rather than submit to the obvious temptation to divide into those supporting the Soviet Union backed Vietnam and those more sympathetic to China.

It would certainly be an exaggeration to say that the ASEAN brought about Vietnam's decision to withdraw from Cambodia. The evaporation of effective Soviet support - following rapprochement with China and then the end of the Cold War - combined with the disastrous effects of economic isolation were the major determinants in forcing Vietnam's leaders to seek a solution to the Cambodian problem. It is true, however, that the ASEAN's strategy was successful both in preventing an early solution amicable to the Vietnamese and in providing a focus for ASEAN regionalism.¹⁶

3.6 Security and the Manila Summit

The task of ensuring regional security was also manifest in the attempts of the ASEAN to conduct a third Summit. The Second Summit at

Kuala Lumpur had resolved that Manila, consistent with alphabetical order of the member states, would be the next venue for an ASEAN Heads of Government Meeting. At first, the Manila Summit was delayed for security reasons but finally it was held because to have done otherwise, it was believed would, ironically, have jeopardized regional security.¹⁷ This argument is sustained by a brief consideration of the events surrounding the December, 1987 meeting.

In the early 1980s, Brunei's independence celebrations as well as the Sultanate's accession to ASEAN membership would both have constituted suitable excuses for holding a heads of government meeting.¹⁸ The leaders of the other ASEAN states were, however, reluctant to lend legitimacy to the putrefying Marcos regime by holding a high-level meeting in The Philippines' capital.¹⁹ Malaysia would have had even greater reluctance owing to Marcos' failure to make good his promise to end Filipino designs on the Malaysian state of Sabah.²⁰ Helping to keep the Marcos government in power could have seen ASEAN leaders faced with the accusation that they were supporting a regime that was destabilizing the region.

Once 'people power' had installed Mrs Aquino, however, the major deterrent was removed and after an early postponement²¹ it was agreed to convene the Summit in December, 1987. The months leading up to the meeting saw debate over whether or not it would be safe to conduct such a meeting in view of the danger posed to security in The Philippines both by Leftist rebels and Right-wing army factions.²²

There were suggestions that the meeting should be moved to Bangkok.²³ There was also debate over whether other ASEAN leaders should be asked to bring along their own security forces to bolster the protection that The Philippines' could provide. Indeed, after the Summit, Lee Kuan Yew revealed that his security adviser had counselled him not to attend²⁴ ! Holding the meeting became important in order to foster the national resilience of The Philippines and thereby the security of the regime.²⁵ In addition, the inability to hold a Summit would have cast grave doubts upon the viability of the ASEAN and would therefore have made the ASEAN appear weak in the eyes of observers in Indochina and further afield.²⁶ It would have brought into question the viability of the ASEAN vision.

The events surrounding the Manila Summit again demonstrate the pattern: security imperatives precipitate the resolution among ASEAN leaders to sustain regionalism. This mechanism is a vertical chain of cause and effect rather than a horizontal spillover process.

3.7 Political Will Precipitated by Economic Imperatives

Attempts to deepen cooperation among the ASEAN members have reflected international economic circumstances. This relationship has been demonstrated by the practice of joint lobbying. Faced with the realization that, individually, they carry very little economic clout, the ASEAN states have banded together to secure trade and other benefits from third parties. In effect, a political response has been used to seek economic concessions.

Such a modus operandi has been most appropriate for the level of regional cooperation involved in the ASEAN. It involves little if any sacrifice by members and involves no transfer of power to any supranational entity

A prime case of this was when the ASEAN states joined together to oppose the expansion of Japanese synthetic rubber production.²⁷ Such an expansion would have hurt ASEAN producers of natural rubber such as Malaysia, though Singapore would remain relatively unaffected. The ASEAN's joint lobbying was successful in securing a Japanese pledge to limit production.

Externally oriented cooperation among the ASEAN states was also evident in the International Civil Aviation Policy (ICAP) dispute.²⁸ In late 1978, Australia attempted to introduce a new policy for international air traffic. One of the results of this policy would have been damage to the position of Singapore as a stopover destination on the long haul flight between Australia and Europe. Singapore was able to invoke the aid of the ASEAN members to make a joint representation to the Australian Government. This effort was able to extract some alterations to the Australian position, though it did not produce all of the changes that the Singaporeans had desired.

The significance of ICAP was that it constituted a case of the ASEAN members joining together to support the economic interests of one member, when four of the ASEAN countries had little to gain from such lobbying. In fact, it was likely that some of the other ASEAN members would actually

have profited from the introduction of ICAP. It should be noted, too, however that the ASEAN position was put as a cooperative, intergovernmental effort. The ASEAN does not have the supranational machinery to provide a representative who can function along the lines of say an EC delegation.

Aside from joint lobbying directed externally, the link between economic stimulants and ASEAN cooperation has been evidenced with regard to the international economic climate. Such a relationship was illustrated by the Bali Summit. This meeting came on the back of the major shake-up of the world economy stemming from the first 'oil shock'. Though, security concerns played a large part in motivating the economic measures adopted at Bali, it is also true that economic issues were instrumental in moving the hands of ASEAN leaders.

Economically, there was the shared perception that the ASEAN must increase the level of cooperation. The ASEAN had been in existence for more than eight years but had produced very little tangible evidence of its commitment to regionalism.²⁹ The Declaration of ASEAN Concord which emanated from the Bali Summit included a decision to 'intensify cooperation in economic and social development'.³⁰ The streamlining of the ASEAN economic committees was another result of the Declaration.

The Bali Summit also agreed upon the establishment of the Preferential Trading Arrangement (PTA) scheme. Under this, the ASEAN member states would agree to nominate lists of items upon which they would impose reduced tariffs if the goods originated from another country

within the Association. Although impressive lists of PTA items were produced the scheme had little practical benefit. Intra-ASEAN trade comprised only seventeen to twenty per cent of the members' total trade and even this figure was boosted by Singapore's entrepot role. Further, there was an unwillingness to include 'sensitive' items within the preference lists. For example, Indonesia did not want the growth of its infant manufacturing sector to be jeopardized by a flood of imports from established plants in Singapore.

Another consequence of the Bali Summit was an agreement to set-up the ASEAN Industrial Projects(AIPs). These were to be showcases of ASEAN cooperation and were to be established in fields that would not damage existing industries within countries of the Association. Each of the members was allocated a project: Urea Fertiliser (Indonesia and Malaysia), Superphosphate (The Philippines), Diesel Engines (Singapore) and Rock-Salt Soda Ash Project (Thailand).

The world economic climate had played a part in encouraging the ASEAN leaders to adopt *some* measures for economic cooperation but the ASEAN was not yet ready to move with much haste in this field. This fact became obvious when the Kuala Lumpur Summit in the following year revealed very little substantial progress resulting from the measures - such as the establishment of the Industrial Projects - adopted at Bali.³¹

A similar phenomenon was evident in December 1987 when the ASEAN members met in Manila.³² This meeting fell not long after the stock

market crash at a time when even the ASEAN economies, which had remained buoyant when many Western economies stagnated, were facing troubled times. Most importantly, 1985 and 1986 witnessed the ASEAN states having to face the increasingly protectionist policies of the United States.

This climate generated the willingness to agree upon a range of economic measures which were designed to boost intra-ASEAN trade including expansion of the PTAs along with a deepening of the Margin of Preference. There was also US\$2 billion of loan guarantees forthcoming from visiting Japanese Prime Minister Takeshita. Again, however, there was no dramatic acceleration of economic cooperation.

As was the case with the economic measures agreed upon at the first and second summits, once the individual ASEAN economies improved much of the resolution needed to enhance intra-ASEAN economic cooperation significantly tended to evaporate.³³ Commitment to the ASEAN seems to be open to fluctuation and is affected by the health of the member's own economy.

The exception to this phenomenon has been the growth of private sector collaboration, which, though encouraged by the ASEAN organization has not produced the type of political integration that the neo-functionalist thesis would dictate. These cooperative ventures have continued to operate under national law and have not required supranational regulation to iron out problems in what remains a series of national markets (rather than a

single integrated one). Significantly, however, this new trend among the ASEAN economies represents a healthy movement away from the focus upon the artificial attempts of governments to produce 'symbols of cooperation' of questionable economic worth.

More formally, the process of externally focused political cooperation aimed largely at economic ends has been seen in the Dialogue Partner process whereby, the ASEAN foreign ministers follow their regular meetings by consultations with the representatives of Australia, Canada, the EC, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and the USA. Economic issues have been one of the concerns of these dialogue meetings.

The role of external economic factors in precipitating the determination required for integrative changes was demonstrated most recently in the Singapore Heads of Government Meeting. Firstly, the structure of the world trading system was in question. The Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations was encountering serious difficulties in reaching a conclusion. Further, there were signs that the world was in danger of fragmenting with the formation of two protectionist trading blocs focused on Europe and North America. Both of these developments posed potential problems for the ASEAN due to the fact that they risked being shut out of markets and because of the fact that the Single Integrated Market (SIM) and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) would prove to be very strong lures for international investors.³⁴ Both of these groupings would permit access to vast 'internal' markets.

The magnitude of the changes facing the ASEAN provided the impetus to produce what, at least on paper, seems to be a significant step forward in (sub-)regional economic integration. In the first place, the Heads of Government agreed upon substantial and definite measures that would lead to the creation of a free-trade zone. This move had been promoted by the government of Thai Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun - who pointed to the examples of NAFTA and Europe's Single Internal Market (SIM) - and found ready support from Singapore.

It was Indonesia that proposed the Common Preferential Effective Tarriffs (CEPT) scheme which provides for tariff reduction and elimination across a variety of export categories accounting for ninety per cent of intra-Asean trade. There would be provision both for acceleration on the 'six minus x' basis and for individual states to exclude sensitive items. Indonesia, now more amenable to trade liberalization, caused surprise by agreeing to have the tariff cuts extend to the category of capital goods.³⁵ Also, a group would be set-up to supervise the implementation of CEPT.

The acceptance of the 'six minus x' formula was both a demonstration of the ASEAN's real confidence (since it would now allow some members to break with the conventional consensus approach on economic issues without fearing that this would disrupt or destroy the ASEAN's solidarity) and an endorsement of the fact that trilateral cooperation was now achieving signal success through the growth triangle concept.³⁶ 'Six minus x' cooperation allows the more advanced ASEAN

economies to accelerate cooperation.

A further move towards greater economic cooperation stemming from the volatile international trading situation has been the East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) proposal championed by Malaysia. This was to be a support group with membership open to the states on the Western rim of the Pacific Ocean. The Singapore Summit statement mentioned the EAEC but did not give it the immediate green light for reasons to be discussed in the next chapter.³⁷

3.8 Political Will Precipitated by the 'Boat People'

One other notable catalyst for outward-facing ASEAN cooperation, which does not fit readily into the category of economics or security, was the response of association members to the arrival of Indochinese refugees, the so-called 'boat people'.³⁸

From mid-1978 onwards the ASEAN states faced the problem of accommodating thousands of Vietnamese and Cambodians who were fleeing the conflict in their homelands. This precipitated joint representations by the Five to the United Nations. Additionally, they sought third countries for resettlement and tried to persuade Vietnam to curtail departures. The ASEAN's united efforts did help to solve the refugee problem. Consistent with cooperation driven by more plainly security or economic imperatives, gains for members were achieved without the sacrifice of national sovereignty to a supranational entity.

3.9 Leadership

The third axis for measuring regional cooperation advocated here is that of leadership. Again this will be considered at the national, elite/bureaucratic and individual levels.

Just as Indonesia was a vital ingredient in the formation of the ASEAN, the role of the Archipelago is of great importance when it comes to understanding the group's progress. Indonesia has significantly affected the pace of regional cooperation. To put it more strongly, the ASEAN moves no faster than Indonesia permits.

This law was illustrated on a number of occasions in the area of trade cooperation. At the Bali Conference, the Indonesians were opposed to any early moves toward a free trade zone, fearing that such a development would merely act as a 'Trojan Horse' by means of which multinationals (as well as the Singaporeans) could gain unfettered access to Indonesia's internal market.³⁹ Thus, Singapore's and The Philippines' advocacy of greater free trade within the ASEAN could not succeed at this early stage. There was a perception that the good of one hundred and forty million Indonesians certainly outweighed that of the two million inhabitants of the ASEAN's smallest member.⁴⁰

Similarly, at Manila the Indonesians were still saying that economic cooperation should expand gradually and the outcome of the meeting was consistent with this.⁴¹ By the time of Singapore Summit, Indonesia's stance had changed. The Archipelago now had a substantial export-oriented

manufacturing sector. Growing industrial confidence⁴² and presumably the realization that TNCs(Trans-National Corporations) were not always a menace, meant that Indonesia was ready to permit a quickening in the pace of economic cooperation, and, not surprisingly the outcome of the Singapore Summit reflected this perspective.

Whilst Indonesia has continued to supply the ASEAN with a measure of *national* leadership, the organization has still seen little of the *bureaucratic* type of support enjoyed by the EC. As Frost points out⁴³ the ASEAN structure has remained very decentralised with the Secretariat at Jakarta remaining relatively weak. The decision-making power resides with government representatives and inter-governmental meetings. The bureaucrats who remain firmly anchored to national governments have little if any capacity to push the organization along.

Individual leadership has, however, continued to play a very significant part in the ASEAN's development. The two main players in this regard have been Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and, especially President Soeharto.⁴⁴ By the time of the Manila Summit these two leaders were the only heads of member governments who had remained in office since the time of the ASEAN's foundation. The events surrounding the third ASEAN Heads of Government Meeting provide three clear examples illustrating the role of individuals in affecting the ASEAN's rate of progress.

Firstly, in the lead up to Manila, The Philippines' newly appointed Foreign Minister Manglapus attempted to float the idea that the ASEAN

should offer corporate endorsement to the continued presence of US bases in The Philippines.⁴⁵ Manglapus' efforts, which found some initial support from the Singapore Prime Minister,⁴⁶ prompted an official, as well as a media, rebuke from Indonesia.⁴⁷

In the weeks prior to the Summit, Soeharto was able to meet with both Manglapus and Lee. Mr Manglapus emerged from his meeting with President Soeharto to agree that it would indeed be inappropriate for the ASEAN to make a corporate expression of support for the Clark and Subic bases.⁴⁸

Secondly, President Soeharto managed to shore up this position in the significant pre-summit conference at Batam between with Prime Minister Lee. The ASEAN veterans agreed that the US bases issue would not be on the agenda for the Summit.⁴⁹ The two also reached an accord on the fact that the assistance cake that was to be forthcoming from the Japanese would be distributed on an equitable basis and that the ASEAN's two rich, little members would not miss out.⁵⁰ So, Soeharto was able to prevail on the issue of the US bases and Soeharto and Lee were able to agree in advance upon another matter of contention.⁵¹

A third Manila related area where an individual was important is seen in the role that Soeharto played in making the Summit actually take place. It was Soeharto who took the initiative in announcing that he would *definitely* attend. This step made it very difficult for other leaders not to attend and therefore made sure the meeting happened.⁵²

Thus, the role of individual leaders must be seen as very important in understanding the progress of Southeast Asian regionalism. In particular, Soeharto's steadying hand has been instrumental both in slowing and maintaining the pace of regional cooperation.⁵³

3.10 An Assessment

This survey of the growth of the ASEAN over the twenty-five years of its existence has lent weight to the premise that the *political will* necessary for regional cooperation has been sustained by a combination of external stimuli. In the main, these motivating factors have been of a security and an economic nature. The growth of the ASEAN cannot, however, be understood without the at times powerful influence exerted by prominent, at times, dominant individuals. In a similar vein, history has shown that the ASEAN is by its very nature unable to move at a pace significantly different to that allowed by the Indonesian colossus. The ASEAN's strength in the dimensions of *political will* and *leadership* has continued to enable the organization to more than compensate for its weakness in *context*.

ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER III

1. Amina Tyabji 'The Six Asian Economies: 1980-88' (= pp.32-57 in Broinowski, Alison(ed.) ASEAN into the 90s, Macmillan, London, 1990) p.48 f provides World Bank 1987 figures for the proportion of the ASEAN states' trade within the region. It is significant to note, however, that despite the moves to boost intra-ASEAN trade, the IMF figures presented by D S Simandjuntak in 'Reinventing ASEAN Between Globalism, Regionalism and Nationalism' Indonesian Quarterly, XIX, 2, 1991, p. 185 show a substantial decline in the proportion of the ASEAN members' trade within the sub-region between 1983 and 1989. Though Simandjuntak offers some explanation for the reduction he concludes, 'Nevertheless, a weakening interdependence between members 'is not a good foundation on which one can build a cohesive regional grouping.'(same reference)
2. D S Simandjuntak in 'Reinventing ASEAN Between Globalism, Regionalism and Nationalism' Indonesian Quarterly, XIX, 2, 1991, p. 178.
3. A helpful diagram of the 1983 ASEAN Secretarial structure is provided on p. 60 f. of Srikanta Chatterjee, 'ASEAN Economic Cooperation in the 1980s and 1990s' (= pp. 58 - 81 in Broinowski, Alison(ed.) ASEAN into the 90s, Macmillan, London, 1990).
4. Djiwandono, J. Soedjati ASEAN: an Emerging Regional Community ? , Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, 1991, p.1 quotes Weatherbee's 1984 observation that " At a most basic level, ASEAN already is, . . . a 'security community', in which expectations about warlike behavior by members of the community toward each other have been virtually eliminated." This situation must be reckoned a positive contribution to the ASEAN's context.
5. See section 3.6 of this chapter for further discussion of the Manila Summit.
6. A similar idea is seen in Straits Times, 7 February, 1976 from the leaders of Malaysia and Singapore: 'As Datuk Hussein Onn put it, with the backing of Mr Lee: "We attach great importance to economic development as a means of national resilience, the ultimate guarantee of security and stability."
7. There was a perception among Indonesians that they were educating some of the other states in Southeast Asia. Thus, Indonesian Observer, 18 August, 1967, 'Everyone is glad that Indonesia can uphold its active and independent foreign policy and

eventually will change the minds of other East Asian countries which have never tasted a really independent nationhood because of their belief that the communist danger can only be overcome with Western assistance.'

8. See, for example, Lee Kuan Yew's answer to this in Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 January, 1976 p.11; also report in Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 February, 1976 p. 10f.; also Straits Times, 3 & 7 February, 1976.

9. See the section on 'Economic imperatives' (= p.58 ff.) and particularly Indonesia's influence upon the intensity of cooperation within the ASEAN.

10. The report in Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 March, 1976 p.28 mentions that Hanoi's criticism of the ASEAN had intensified. The ASEAN states did speak out strongly against North Vietnam but also continued to emphasize that the ASEAN supported peaceful coexistence within the region. Far Eastern Economic Review, 6 February, 1976, includes the comment that Thailand had been particularly keen to assure Hanoi that the ASEAN was *not* another SEATO.

11. The Asia Yearbook for 1977 p. 54 f. noted both that Vietnam had appeared to moderate its attack upon the ASEAN as well as a belief within the ASEAN that the emphatic Vietnamese nationalism of the last thirty years would not readily give way to a subservient relationship to the Soviet Union.

12. For a brief summary of the ASEAN and the Cambodian issue see Frost 'Introduction: ASEAN since 1967 - Origins, Evolution and Recent Developments.' (= pp. 1-31) in Alison Broinowski (ed.) ASEAN into the 90s, Macmillan, London, 1990, pp.15-18; A more detailed and critical account is provided by M R Sukhumband Paribatra, 'ASEAN and the Kampuchean Conflict', (= pp.146 -166) in Scalapino, R A & Masataha (ed.) Peace, Politics and Economics in Asia. The Challenge to Cooperate, Pergamon-Brassey's, Washington, 1988.

13. See, for example, Asnani Usman, 'Kampuchea Problem: Cocktail Party as a Mechanism' in Indonesian Quarterly, Vol. XIV, No.1, 1986 pp. 18-21.

14. The term stems from a meeting between President Soeharto of Indonesia and Prime Minister of Onn of Malaysia at Kuantan in March, 1980. As noted by A Gyngell, 'Looking Outwards: ASEAN's External Relations' (= pp. 115-143) in Alison Broinowski (ed.) Understanding ASEAN, Macmillan, London, 1982, p.132.

15. See Frank Frost, 'Introduction: ASEAN since 1967 - Origins, Evolution and Recent Developments.' (= pp. 1-31) in Alison Broinowski (ed.) ASEAN into the 90s, Macmillan, London, 1990, p.18.
16. For an evaluation of the results and effectiveness of the ASEAN's position (up to 1988) see M R Sukhumband Paribatra, 'ASEAN and the Kampuchean Conflict', (= pp.146 -166) in Scalapino, R A & Masataha (ed.) Peace, Politics and Economics in Asia. The Challenge to Cooperate, Pergamon-Brassey's, Washington, 1988 pp. 155-164.
17. The Philippines was in danger of becoming a pocket of instability and therefore a danger to regional security.
18. As noted by Antolik, M ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accomodation. An East Gate Book/M E Sharp Inc. Armonk, New York; London, England 1990 p.149.
19. According to Antolik, M ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accomodation. An East Gate Book/M E Sharp Inc. Armonk, New York; London, England 1990 p.152 'A summit was impossible in early 1984 because other leaders did not wish to identify with the Marcos regime, which was viewed as unstable and inept in the aftermath of the August 1983 assassination of Marcos' rival, Benigno Aquino.' Two months after, Marcos' demise the ASEAN leaders were able to agree upon a summit date.
20. The promise was made, amongst significant publicity, at the Kuala Lumpur summit, that he would take steps to end The Philippines' claims to the possession of Sabah as an integral part of The Philippines' territory.
21. For example, The Jakarta Post of 12 September, 1987 carried a report headed, 'Third ASEAN summit won't be canceled' and containing a statement from the Indonesian foreign Minister, Mr Mochtar, adamant that the Summit would go ahead despite the coup attempt against Mrs Aquino on 28 August; November, 1987 also saw a bomb defused at the Summit venue, reported in The Jakarta Post, 5 November, 87.
22. Examples of The Jakarta Post issues relating to this topic: 12, 26 & 28 September + 7, 17 & 23 October.
23. For example, The Jakarta Post, 26 September, 1987 reported a Singapore legislator as saying that The Philippines should stand down and give over organization of the Third ASEAN summit to Thailand.
24. See The Jakarta Post, 16 December, 1987.

25. Thus, the comments from Kompas published in The Jakarta Post, 26 October, 1987: 'The willingness of the ASEAN leaders to participate in the Manila summit will further strengthen the determination of the Aquino government to solidify its authority and settle the country's security problems.' Also The Jakarta Post, 1 December, 1987 noted that the holding of the Manila Summit would be vital to the prestige of The Philippines' government.
26. It even reached the stage where the success of the meeting was to be judged by whether it was successfully carried through rather than what would be achieved. So, The Jakarta Post, 1 December, 1987, '. . . the success of the Manila Summit will to a significant degree be determined by its speedy completion without mishap.'
27. For an account of the role of rubber in relations between Japan and the ASEAN countries, see Alan Rix, 'ASEAN and Japan: More than Economics' (=pp. 169-195 in Broiwnowski, Alison (ed.) Understanding ASEAN, Macmillan/AIIA, London, 1982) pp. 179-181.
28. For a summary of the ICAP dispute see Australia and ASEAN, Report of the The Parliament of Australia, Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, AGPS, Canberra, 1984 pp. 86-88.
29. The fact that the ASEAN should be headed toward more intensive economic cooperation seems inherent in comments of the time. Observers such as The New Strait Times, Malaysia, 6 February, 1976 (editorial) as quoted in Straits Times, 7 February, 1976 contrasts the ASEAN's progress with that of the European Community, which is described as a 'mature supranational community'; In the Straits Times, 11 February, 1976, the Singapore Foreign Minister, Rajaratnam, is reported as accepting that differing rates of development within the ASEAN states would preclude *rapid* moves toward an economic community. (Emphasis mine).
30. From the Declaration of ASEAN Concord as quoted in Narongchai Akrasanee, 'ASEAN Economic Cooperation' (= pp. 99 - 125) in Linda G. Martin, The ASEAN Success Story, East-West Center, Honolulu, 1987, p. 101; p. 100 ff. of same source contains a summary of the Bali Summit's implications for economic cooperation.
31. Aptly summed up the comment that KL 'was still talking about Bali rather than building upon it' (Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 August, 1977 p. 27). There was also a

feeling that the industrial projects had been agreed upon too hastily (Asia Week, 19 August, 1977 p.13). In fact, only two of the AIPs - the urea plants - have become reality ! On problems with the AIPs see 'The Summit: ASEAN holds the Aces', Asia Week, 5 August, 1977 pp. 9 -11.

32. In this vein, the editorial of The Jakarta Post, 3 November, 1987 commented, 'The momentum for closer ASEAN economic cooperation has been boosted by the uncertainty about the world economic situation ...'

33. Thus Dr Mari Pangestu in The Jakarta Post, 27 January, 1992 noted that the Manila Summit had been held at a time when the ASEAN economies were in recession and had produced high hopes for greater economic cooperation. The implication is, that as the ASEAN economies improved, the impetus to rely on each other declined.

34. Thus, Prime Minister Goh of Singapore commented upon the attractiveness of the EC and NAFTA to investors. 'Therefore, he added, ASEAN should press ahead with its Afta program not only to bolster the economies of the member countries, but also to make them more attractive to investors.' Quoted in The Jakarta Post, 28 January, 1992; Similar comments from Mr Goh are recorded in Singapore Bulletin, Vol 19, No. 4, though in this case they are used to support membership in a wider economic grouping such as the East Asia Economic Grouping proposal or APEC.

35. Thus The Jakarta Post, 25 January, 1992: 'Officials of other ASEAN countries were rather surprised by Indonesia's great enthusiasm about Afta, notably the inclusion of capital goods which together with industrial basic materials, make up more than 85 per cent of Indonesia's imports.'

36. For example, the Singapore-Johore-Batam growth triangle.

37. In particular, Indonesia opposed the proposal unless it was safely under the wing of APEC.

38. See Frank Frost, 'Introduction: ASEAN since 1967 - Origins, Evolution and Recent Developments.' (= pp. 1-31) in Alison Broinowski (ed.) ASEAN into the 90s, Macmillan, London, 1990, p.15

39. Thus, Far Eastern Economic Review, 6 February, 1976, 'The Indonesians fear that a free trade zone would be a 'Trojan Horse' within ASEAN with multinationals in its belly'.

40. Thus, for example Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 June, 1973, 'It is Indonesia that

is the most difficult country to convince. It believes it is destined to be the economic power of the region in the long run . . . It sees no reason for the smallest neighbours to be helped to maintain their present advantage over Indonesia in terms of living standards or levels of development.' Indonesia's 'leadership' is also illustrated by a report in Straits Times, 13 February, 1976, stating that Indonesia was able to enforce leadership with regard to the location of the ASEAN Secretariat and also to forestall any rapid moves toward free trade. Another apparent example of Indonesia's veto power was seen in successful opposition to Thailand's proposal that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council be asked to sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. See The Jakarta Post, 20, 23 and 24 January, 1992.

41. Thus The Jakarta Post, 15 December, 1987 'Presiden [Indonesian title] Soeharto said that the regional organization must avoid ambitious cooperative programs that may sacrifice the interests of one or several of its members.

42. For example, the Minister of Trade, Arifin Siregar, commented (The Jakarta Post, 24 January, 1992) that the rapid industrialization over the last seven or eight years, especially in Indonesia had opened the way for increased ASEAN cooperation in this regard. The Jakarta Post of 31 January, 1992 also carried a report from Indonesian officials confirming that Indonesian made cars would indeed be competitive in the context of ASEAN trade liberalization.

43. Frank Frost, 'Introduction: ASEAN since 1967 - Origins, Evolution and Recent Developments.' (= pp. 1-31) in Alison Broinowski (ed.) ASEAN into the 90s, Macmillan, London, 1990, p.19.

44. Antolik ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accomodation. An East Gate Book/M E Sharp Inc. Armonk, New York; London, England 1990 p.153 includes some details of Soeharto's role throughout the history of the ASEAN as a stabilizing influence.

45. Regarding the US bases issue in the lead-up to the Manila Summit see The Jakarta Post 11, 12, 13, 14 and 16 November, 1987.

46. In line with this Lee Kuan Yew is reported in The Jakarta Post, 12 November, 1987, as seeing the continuance of US bases in The Philippines as providing part of the context for the ASEAN's prosperity.

47. In The Jakarta Post, 14 November, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mr Mochtar

emphasized that Lee Kuan Yew did not speak for the ASEAN; an editorial two days later also promoted the view that Manglapus was wrong to seek the ASEAN's and, in particular, Indonesia's endorsement.

48. Thus The Jakarta Post, 17 & 19 November, 1987.

49. As reported in The Jakarta Post, 1 December, 1987.

50. Ibid.

51. It is perhaps not unfair to describe Soeharto, in particular, as the 'permanent member' of the ASEAN Council. In a similar vein, The Jakarta Post, 28 January, 1992 refers to '. . . Soeharto, the most senior of the six heads of governments (sic).'

52. According to Jakarta Post, 16 December, 1987, Lee followed the example of Soeharto in attending the Manila Summit. Another Indonesian publication, Merdeka quoted in The Jakarta Post, 19 December, 1987 makes the point that in thus standing by The Philippines, Soeharto was ensuring ASEAN solidarity.

53. To put it another way, Haas' modification concerning the role of key individuals has been borne out in the case of the ASEAN. See for example, Haas E B, 'The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. V, No.4, June 1967, pp.325-327 re role of De Gaulle.

Chapter IV: Conclusion: Dimensions of Regionalism

4.1 Introduction

Four tasks are involved in concluding this sub-thesis. The first will be to dispose of the possibility that the ASEAN has neatly conformed to a general theory of regionalism (and thereby succeeded where the EC failed !). Secondly, by juxtaposing the ASEAN with the EC, the utility of the three dimensional approach formulated in chapter one and applied in chapters two and three will be demonstrated. Next, it will be shown that both the European and Southeast Asian cases imply that successful regional cooperation requires a 'critical volume' (the product of the measurements in the three dimensions). And, the final undertaking will be to consider where the ASEAN might be headed.

4.2 The ASEAN and General Theories of Regionalism

The first task of this conclusion will be briefly to verify that general theories of regionalism have indeed not properly comprehended the birth and growth of the ASEAN. Firstly, it must be observed that the ASEAN's development has not conformed to Mittrany's brand of functionalism. Indeed, the level of functional cooperation among members of the ASEAN has only become significant in recent years. Thus, it is impossible to cite 'passive spillover' as a motive force in the ASEAN's growth.

Neo-functionalism with its more active spillover mechanism also

draws a blank. Twenty-five years ago, when Haas wrote his article¹ proclaiming that the conventional neo-functionalist view of intensified regional cooperation did not provide an adequate explanation for what had occurred in the sixties in Western Europe, he could not have known the manner by which regionalism would develop in Southeast Asia. His conclusion has though, proved, to be accurate.

The ASEAN has not displayed the key dynamic of incremental, functionally driven growth towards more intensive levels of cooperation. The ASEAN's dealings have remained strictly based on national units and therefore have not required means of regulation beyond the national level. There has been no evidence of the spillover effect.

The ASEAN has, however, displayed some compatibility with the Neo-realist outlook. The state has remained the key actor and the key unit of decision-making. Yet the state-centric view is also not quite adequate. The ASEAN leaders have been keen to foster the cause of regional identity. The ICAP dispute certainly illustrates a realization that the necessity to deal in and support a unit larger than the nation-state might well require the subordination of national interests.

The ASEAN is something more than the conventional nation-state but does not seek to replace that entity with some sort of mega-state. Regionalism both in the European case and that of Southeast Asia has demonstrated a longevity, an attractiveness and a pervasiveness that demands serious attention yet defies general theories.

4.3 *The ASEAN and Europe: Context, Political Will and Leadership*

Having confirmed that general theories cannot adequately comprehend the genesis and growth of the ASEAN, it is now time to test the utility of the reference dimensions proposed in chapter one and employed in chapters two and three. This will be accomplished by considering each axis in turn. The procedure will be to recapitulate briefly on the European case and then to make application to the ASEAN.

Both the ASEAN and the EC² have been greatly affected by their respective *contexts*. European cooperation has been founded upon extensive functional links and a shared political and cultural heritage. Western Europe is also made up of states which are internally integrated and are democratic in character. Further, it was shown in chapter one that the end of World War II left a core of Western European states in a frame of mind - both at the government and popular levels - that was ripe for regional cooperation. Thus, European regionalism was greatly facilitated by its context.

The ASEAN has also been greatly affected by its context, yet in a very different way. The Association's context has proved to be a constraint. The ASEAN started among states with minimal functional links and a history of division. Additionally, the ASEAN's membership included countries that were only newly independent and still establishing their nationhood within their own borders. Southeast Asia did not have a heritage of regional identity and lacked popular support for regionalism. The ASEAN's context has placed a definite limit upon what can be realistically achieved in terms of regional

cooperation.

A second axis for measurement of regional cooperation is that of *political will* . It has been shown that regionalism is fuelled by various imperatives that stimulate key decision-makers to initiate or to intensify regional cooperation. Commitment to European cooperation has been maintained by the challenge of Communism in the East, along with the perception that tangible economic gains can be achieved by working together. There is a recognition that supranational institutions have a part to play in advancing European integration. To some extent, the vision of a united Europe which it is hoped will regain for its members a place of preeminence upon the world stage has also facilitated European regionalism.

Particular imperatives such as security and economic concerns have likewise served to galvanize the will to act on the part of the ASEAN leaders. The response, though, has been significantly different. The ASEAN states have tried to achieve stability within the region by seeking the acceptance by all states in Southeast Asia of the principles of mutual respect for the post-colonial borders and for territorial integrity.

Economic concerns for most of the ASEAN's history have given rise to little more than showcase cooperation (such as the AIPs and PTAs). The context - primarily the lack of complementarity among the ASEAN economies and Indonesia's desire to protect its infant manufacturing sector - would not permit anything else. Within the confines of the Southeast Asian situation, the imperatives that have stimulated the best results have been those that

required little or no sacrifice upon the part of the ASEAN members. Examples included the joint lobbying over Japanese synthetic rubber, Australia's ICAP³ and the accommodation of boat people as well as the Cambodian issue. Southeast Asian regionalism has not generated in its members a willingness to hand over any aspects of sovereignty to a supranational authority. Such an idea is foreign to the ASEAN's experience as well as its vocabulary.

The third reference dimension of *leadership* will firstly be treated on the *individual* level. De Gaulle upset the theory by acting as a brake upon more intensified political cooperation while economic integration continued. Chapter three of this sub-thesis illustrated the role of key statesmen, principally Soeharto and Lee Kuan Yew, in modulating the pace of Southeast Asian cooperation. Thus, both the ASEAN and the EC have shown that they are susceptible to the influence of one or two leaders affecting their pace and direction.

This phenomenon leaves room for a variety of disparate outcomes that students of regional cooperation are unlikely to be able to predict. Indeed, because the ASEAN depends so heavily upon the commitment of national elites, in the absence of popular support, it is particularly open to having a leader such as Soeharto placing his stamp upon its direction. And obviously, leaders' world views, which inform their actions, can differ markedly. Consequently, the fact that individual leaders are able to have a significant impact upon the nature of regional cooperation in both Southeast Asia and the EC is more likely to be a source of divergence than similarity.

The concept of leadership has also been considered in the *national* and *bureaucratic/elite* senses. In the European case single states have been unable to exercise a long-term dominance of the group's direction. Europe has a number of similarly-sized larger members (France, Germany and the United Kingdom). It also has in Brussels an elite bureaucratic culture with an in-built motivation for pushing along the EC's development.

The ASEAN by contrast has one giant member, Indonesia. The previous two chapters have demonstrated that Indonesia has played a most significant part in allowing the group's formation and in modulating its progress. The ASEAN's bureaucratic machinery remains minimal and therefore contributes little as an extra source fostering regional cooperation.

The present writer submits that the approach advocated here succeeds in providing a useful tool in understanding regionalism, and especially the case of Southeast Asia. It also accounts for the frustration experienced by those seeking to establish a general theory of regionalism. The three measures suggested for which cases of regional cooperation are most readily comparable, do, paradoxically, give rise to the largest discrepancies. Thus, the most profound similarities between the European Community and the ASEAN - context, political will and leadership - actually give rise to some of the greatest practical differences.

4.4 The Formula for Successful Regionalism ?

The above analysis can be taken a little further by considering the *comparative strengths of context, political will and leadership* . Once more, the principle will be outlined for Europe and then it will be applied to the Southeast Asian situation.

Europe has great strength in context; *has* had significant political, security and economic imperatives, and *continues* to have economically generated imperatives for increased cooperation; and is strong in terms of bureaucratic leadership, yet is at times hampered by national and individual leadership. The size of the first two multiplicands is sufficient to more than compensate for occasional fluctuations in the third and so regional cooperation and integration is sustained.

The ASEAN measures up quite differently. Its singular achievement has been compensating for its fragile *context* through the *determination of its leaders*. This determination has been generated by a variety of propitious circumstances related to economic, security and other concerns. It has been much assisted by the role of key individuals and the steadying hand of Indonesia.

Thus, successful regional cooperation can use different combinations of strength in the three key dimensions of context, political will and leadership. It requires not a sum but a *critical volume*. The three dimensions must reach a particular product though the sizes of the individual multiplicands may vary. A zero or negative score in a particular

dimension will prevent successful regional cooperation. A small score in one dimension will require a compensatory larger measurement in one or both of the other two.

Europe's volume should be seen as similar to a cube, with good measurements in all three dimensions. The ASEAN's shape, however, is akin to a wall, the narrow dimension being context. Whether it is likely to topple, to be given a broader foundation or to be absorbed into something larger, is the concern of the next section.

4.5 The Future of Regionalism in Southeast Asia

The final task for this sub-thesis is to make a few comments upon the likely future direction of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia in the light of the foregoing analysis.⁴ This can be achieved by considering the three foci used above: context; motivation to cooperate; and leadership.

Firstly, what influence is the ASEAN's context likely to have upon its future ? Economic cooperation among 'the Six' is increasing. This has been brought about by the increasing industrialization of the member economies. This has allowed for greater economic diversity among the member economies and therefore more opportunities for intra-ASEAN trade.

Various functional organizations based on the ASEAN concept *are* being formed. Another significant trend is the movement towards more democratic governments. This has been evident particularly in Thailand and

The Philippines. The development of democratic government can contribute to regionalism in that it can broaden the role of the population in supporting both national and regional cohesiveness. Thus, the particular country is more able to respond to opportunities for regional cooperation without at the same time being worried about its own national integrity and is less susceptible to changes of attitude to regional cooperation stemming from a change in leader.

If this gradual increase in linkages between the ASEAN states continues into the future it could provide a healthier milieu for regional cooperation. The picture is complicated by the fact that the Association's Southeast Asian context is likely to expand over the next decade with the admission of new members. Through signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Papua New Guinea, Laos and Vietnam have all acquired observer status within the ASEAN, the first step in seeking to join the organization.

Despite the fact that a context of functional cooperation certainly assists in the development of regionalism, this sub-thesis has argued that it is necessary to look further. Thus, it is necessary to consider what imperatives are likely to stimulate Southeast Asian leaders to look to regional cooperation. Again the major dimensions to be considered are security and economics.

With the end of the Cold War, ASEAN decision-makers have begun to recast their defence policies. Indochina has been removed as a focus for

unified ASEAN efforts. Vietnam is no longer part of a hostile rival bloc supported by the Soviet Union. Indeed, Vietnam has accepted the ASEAN's terms to enter the region. The picture has also been altered by the diminishing American presence in Southeast Asia and the consequent possibility that the major guarantor of stability in the Western Pacific will leave behind a vacuum.

The ASEAN, then, has to grapple with the possible expansion of Chinese, Japanese and Indian power. One response has been to elevate the profile of security issues in ASEAN meetings, including those with the Dialogue partners. In responding to the uncertainties of the new multipolar situation it is probable that the ASEAN will have to look to a wider grouping, perhaps a structure that includes one or more of the powers on the edge of the region listed above.

Economics will also remain a very important stimulant of cooperation among Southeast Asian Nations. There is a fear among ASEAN policy-makers that protectionism could take root in both USA and the EC and that the World economy could fragment into trade blocs. This concern gave added impetus to the moves at the Singapore Summit to establish an ASEAN Free Trade Area.

There is, however, within the Association a perception that it will need to look further in responding to the new situation. As with security, the ASEAN on its own is just too small. One alternative is the East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) proposal. In the lead-up to the Fourth ASEAN Heads of

Government, Malaysia put considerable diplomatic effort into promoting this idea as evidenced by the enthusiastic and ongoing support it received in the pages of New Straits Times, Malaysia.⁵ The United States, however, was opposed to the idea⁶ and this was echoed in a lukewarm response in turn from Japan, Indonesia, and less vocally, Singapore. The latter two of course have very extensive trade with the USA and therefore would not wish to offend the Americans, even if the Malaysians appeared to have less qualms about doing so.⁷

The main plank in Indonesia's position was, however, that the EAEC should be constituted under the umbrella of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum which would include the Pacific Rim 'Anglo-Saxon' states (but was arbitrarily large from the Malaysian viewpoint.)⁸ It is tempting to make the observation that the EAEC would tend to merge the Indonesian-led ASEAN into an organization where Japan and the People's Republic of China would hold key positions.⁹ Once again, the ASEAN was not permitted to move faster than Indonesia allowed.

The economic imperatives for regional cooperation are not likely to go away and real questions must be asked as to whether the ASEAN will prove capable of coping with the demands of the world trade environment of the twenty-first century. Perhaps the 'ASEAN way' will dictate that Indonesia remains the head of a sub-bloc within a larger economic grouping.

It is difficult to foresee major changes to the ASEAN at the levels of national and bureaucratic leadership. In the long-term, an increase in the

Association's membership, especially through the admission of Vietnam, could serve to decrease marginally the power of Indonesia; the establishment of a significant supranational ASEAN civil service still seems a dim prospect.

Individual leaders are also likely to remain important for the future of Southeast Asian regionalism. The generation of leaders in power at the time of the ASEAN's formation, who were supporters of regional cooperation, has almost entirely left the scene.¹⁰ Their replacements have also so far backed the ASEAN. The key baton-change, however, will come with the succession to President Soeharto. If, for example, the next Indonesian President returned the Archipelago to a policy of strident nationalism - unlikely though this is - then the ASEAN would be as crippled as were its predecessors. While the ASEAN remains an organization of leader-centric states, it will remain susceptible to the unpredictable behaviour of individuals. In considering the future, therefore, the student must leave room for the unexpected and for the unpredictability of individuals.

The security and economic imperatives outlined above could well see the ASEAN submerged into a larger grouping such as the EAEC or APEC. In which case, it would be possible to say that the ASEAN 'would have served its purpose.'¹¹ Such a scenario would merely be consistent with what nations have been doing for decades - joining together for common purposes and then moving on when the particular partnership has lost its pertinence.

The progress of the ASEAN does not neatly conform to a general theory of regionalism, yet the three axes of *context*, *political will* and *leadership* are very useful in charting its course. A fruitful avenue for further research could be to see how effective the three reference axes employed here prove to be in explaining the success or failure of other examples of regional cooperation. This would enable the student to test the idea that successful regionalism, such as in the cases of Western Europe and Southeast Asia, requires the attainment of a critical volume the component dimensions of which can vary.

ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER IV

1. Haas, E B 'The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. V, No. 4, June 1967 pp.315-343
2. Certainly, it is not difficult mount a superficially strong argument detailing the manifold similarities between ASEAN and the EC. Some examples of superficial similarities between the EC and the ASEAN are as follows: both started with grand ideas but had to settle for a more humble and concrete beginning; both commenced with a core of about half a dozen; both were founded on the basis of consent rather than compulsion; the two groupings were initiated from within their respective regions; both groupings were the response of like-minded governments to a perceived common fear/threat; ASEAN as well as European cooperation started with the blessing of the USA; both had their Communist shadows in the other half of their region and the two cases were each born in the context of frustration with nationalism at the end of a period of conflict within the region.
3. For a discussion of ICAP see chapter III. It is only fair to point out that apart from Singapore, the other 'four' had little to gain from the action directly.
4. For a discussion of the current situation and prospects of regionalism in Southeast Asia see Buszynski, L 'Southeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era: Regionalism and Security', Asian Survey, Vol. XXXII, No. 9, September, 1992, pp. 830 -847. A number of the ideas that follow are based on this paper.
5. Especially on 21-25 January 1992.
6. For example New Straits Times, Malaysia, 18 January, 1992.
7. For example, in New Straits Times, Malaysia, 6 January, 1992, the Malaysian Foreign Minister was on record a saying it was for Asian states, not the US to decide upon whether EAEC would go ahead; also, the editorial comment of 7 January, 1992 that APEC was the 'blue-eyed baby of the USA'. The Indonesians though were keen to refute the charge that they were acting to appease the Americans. Thus 'Indonesia Denies opposing EAEC out of fear of US'. Indonesian Observer, 26 January, 1992; also 'Indonesia not appeasing U.S. on EAEC: Alatas, The Jakarta Post, 27 January, 1992.
8. New Straits Times, Malaysia, editorial of 7 January, 1992 argued against APEC on the grounds that it lacked a logical geographical definition and therefore was open to too

broad a range of members.

9. Thus, The Jakarta Post, 27 January, 1992 (article by Dr Mari Pangestu of CSIS) notes that Indonesia opposes EAEC since it would dilute ASEAN and would exclude the USA. It was therefore seen as 'institutional' and 'confrontationalist'. S Mangkusuwondo, 'ASEAN: Future Directions', The Indonesian Quarterly, XIX, 2, 1991 p.175 f. makes the point that Europe was again joining the USA and East Asia as a major destination for Indonesian exports. 'It should, therefore, not come as a surprise that Indonesia is not too keen about the possible formation of a regional economic bloc consisting of Japan, the Asian NIEs and ASEAN (plus possibly Australia and New Zealand). Indonesia prefers to link its development to all three powerhouses, the US, Japan and East Asia, and Western Europe , rather than depending on only one powerhouse such as for example Japan.'

10. As Frank Frost, 'Introduction: ASEAN since 1967 - Origins, Evolution and Recent Developments.' (= pp. 1-31) in Alison Broinowski (ed.) ASEAN into the 90s, Macmillan, London, 1990, p.20 put it : 'However, the fact that ASEAN is largely relevant to and maintained by, its members' elites raises the question of how ASEAN would be affected if the ruling elites in any of its members were to change substantially.'

11. Buszynski, L 'Southeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era: Regionalism and Security', Asian Survey, Vol. XXXII, No. 9, September, 1992, p.847.

Appendix: Substance of Regional Cooperation

The following additional material on the substance of regional cooperation has been placed in an appendix so as not to disrupt the main argument of the sub-thesis. Three categories of regional cooperation will be briefly outlined:

5.1 Regional Economic Cooperation

Economic cooperation leading to integration can be viewed as taking place on a number of levels of intensity. According to Dosser et al,¹ these are, in ascending order, the Free Trade Area (no restrictions in trade among members; national variation in dealing with outsiders); the Customs Union (Free Trade within; a Common External Tariff applying to outsiders); the Common Market (Customs Union plus removal of internal restrictions on factor movements); Economic Union (free commodity and factor movements as well as some harmonization of economic policy); and finally, Total Economic Integration (the unifying of all monetary, fiscal and other policies as well as the hegemony of a supranational body that can make decisions binding on members).

The same authors argue further that only the first and the last of these forms of interaction are stable:²

Intermediate forms of integration are non-viable.
The best historical examples of long-surviving unions are completely integrated states or federations of states.

The gist of the argument is that once the threshold of the Common Market

stage is successfully negotiated then an irresistible momentum will drive regional cooperation onwards to Total Economic Integration. On the other hand, since it requires so little effort to maintain, a regional grouping can comfortably simmer along indefinitely as a Free Trade Area.

5.2 Regional Political Cooperation

Closely related to economic cooperation is political cooperation. Again there are different modes by which this can take place. At one end of the spectrum is intergovernmental cooperation. In this form, sovereignty remains vested firmly in the national governments. Decisions are made by consensus or limited in their application to those states which assent. More intensified political integration can take the form of binding majority decision-making (as provisioned for in the Act of Europe).

Political integration can also be achieved through the ceding of elements of sovereignty to supranational bodies which are able to take decisions that bind all members. Political integration can be expressed finally in a new government with sovereignty over the components. Historical examples of this result include such states as Switzerland (a confederation) and the United States of America (a federation).

5.3 Regional security cooperation

Security provides the third significant category of regional cooperation. Once more it is important to distinguish between differing levels

of intensity. In the terminology of Haas,³ writing at a time when global security concerns were very much on the agenda, the two major forms are the pluralistic security community and the amalgamated security community. In the former case, the real power remains firmly in the hands of the national administrations and the emphasis is on complementary individual efforts to prevent conflict from gaining a foothold in the region and to build confidence so that an enduring stability is established. Ideally, the participants in the region no longer view each other as a threat and so will abandon the use of words and actions likely to precipitate any hostility.

In the amalgamated community, on the other hand, security is maintained through the pooling of military forces for the prosecution of common goals. NATO's concerted efforts under a single high command to deter a possible Soviet invasion of Western Europe provided an example of the operations of an amalgamated security community. As Haas reported over three decades ago,⁴ it is far harder to sustain an amalgamated security community than a pluralistic one.

ENDNOTES FOR APPENDIX

1. Douglas Dosser, David Gowland & Keith Hartley The Collaboration of Nations A Study of European Economic Policy, Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1982 pp. 62-64.
2. Douglas Dosser, David Gowland & Keith Hartley The Collaboration of Nations A Study of European Economic Policy, Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1982 p.64.
3. See Haas, E B, 'The Challenge of Regionalism', International Organization, Autumn, 1958, pp.442-445, reiterating the findings of the Princeton study on regionalism in Europe and North America; also Deutsch, K W, The Analysis of International Relations, Englewood, Cliffs, New Jersey, 1968 pp.193-201.
4. Haas, E B, 'The Challenge of Regionalism', International Organization, Autumn, 1958, p. 442 again following the findings of the Princeton study, 'Pluralistic security communities are easier to attain and maintain than more formal unions, provided that the central aim is merely the preservation of peace among the participants.'

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Journal of Common Market Studies

Journal of Southeast Asian Studies

The Manila Chronicle

New Straits Times, Malaysia

Singapore Bulletin

The Straits Times

The Washington Post

A Note on Asian Newspapers

The nature of some of these publications posed three major problems with their use firstly, the bias towards their governments' view can tend to impair the particular paper's objectivity; secondly, Southeast Asian writers in general habitually portray the ASEAN as a success and are unwilling to apply their scalpel deeply; and thirdly, at least one of these publications (The Bangkok Post 1976/77 issues, not cited directly) saw fit to publish prominent massage parlour advertisements. Some, including the present writer, find the last-mentioned objectionable. Therefore, the use of these publications in no sense implies blanket endorsement of their contents.