DEMOGRAPHY AND SOCIOLOGY PROGRAM

RESEARCH SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Postmodern fertility preferences: From changing value orientation to new behaviour

Dirk J. van de Kaa

Paper prepared for the Conference on The Global Fertility Transition
Bellagio, Italy, 18-22 May 1998

Working Papers in Demography

No. 74

1998

1. Introduction

‘Aimez-vous Brahms?’ French novelist Francoise Sagan had the audacity and imagination to turn this simple question into the title of a book. Why would one ask of someone whether he or she liked Brahms? An obvious reason would be to see whether there could be a meeting of minds with that person. If someone likes one great romantic composer, this love can probably be extended to a preference for romantic music more generally. It might even reveal a deep seated romantic value orientation. The person could be imbued with a desire for adventure, might want to live dangerously, express emotions freely, and be greatly interested in the meaning of life. So, the answer to a single question may clarify whether one is dealing with a kindred spirit.

It is, at any rate, reasonable to assume that the general cultural orientation of someone who likes Brahms may be different from someone who prefers the modern composer Eric Satie. Similarly, someone who prefers the ‘postmodern’ composer John Cage to Satie and Brahms is likely to have another outlook on life again.

In music, such terms as romantic and modern are well established. The term ‘postmodern’ is also frequently used without causing undue friction. The same is true for certain other fields of human endeavour such as literature, painting and architecture. In the latter field specific dates can even be attached to the shift from one approach to another, e.g. to modernism and postmodernism. For me the beginning of modern architecture is marked by the opening, on 12 November 1898, of the Wiener Secession; a building of concrete and steel in which Gustav Klimt’s famous Beethoven Frieze is now again displayed. According to Charles Jencks (1991:23), a very influential author on postmodern architecture, if not its guru, the modern period died in St. Louis Missouri, on July 15, 1972 at 3.32 p.m.’ when [elements of] the infamous Pruitt-Igoe scheme, ..., were given the final coup de grace by dynamite’.

But even so, the use of the term postmodernism, and of its various derivatives, is not without problems. Bertens (1995) who analyzed the history of the idea of the postmodern, describes it as an ‘exasperating term’, and elsewhere speaks of ‘...a massive but also exhilarating confusion ...’ (op. cit.:10). Since the late 1950s, he observes, the term ‘... has been applied at different levels of conceptual abstraction to a wide range of objects and phenomena in what we used to call reality. Postmodernism, then, is several things at once.’ For example, depending on the artistic discipline, it ‘...is either a radicalization of the self-reflexive moment in modernism, a turning away from narrative and representation, or an explicit return to narrative and representation. And sometimes it is both.’, writes Bertens (op.cit.: 5).

In several of the social sciences, and certainly in demography, the term postmodernism has not become part of the scientific discourse. People shy away from it, understandably find it difficult to deal with, or have the vague, intuitive notion that it is better to steer clear of such an ill-defined concept.

In this paper I aim to explore whether the term 'postmodernism', or one of its derivatives, could usefully have a place in demographic studies and population analysis. I shall, more particularly, do so with reference to the issue of fertility preferences in developed societies. Since I was challenged to write a speculative paper on the topic, I shall feel free to approach the task in an eclectic frame of mind.

2. Postmodernism: history and concepts

The term postmodernism appears to have a long history. It seems to have been used as early as the 1870s. Bertens reports that the first book having the term in its title dates from 1926. At first it was used rather sparingly. Its use became more common in the 1950s and 1960s, while it suffused the 80s and 90s. At the same time its conceptual content changed. From a term coined to describe certain artistic strategies in poetry, and literature more generally, it has become an adjective denoting a specific approach to philosophy, and a banner under which some seek to attack the ideological underpinnings of modern society.

Even though certain elements tend to recur in theorizing about the postmodern, there is no specific credo nor a list of articles of faith. Moreover, while postmodern thinking transcends the borders of disciplines and fields of human endeavour, its most pertinent theoretical propositions vary from area to area. Regarding scientific knowledge, Lyotard has made the following observation: 'Scientific knowledge cannot know and make known that it is the true knowledge without resorting to the other, narrative, kind of knowledge, which from its point of view is no knowledge at all' (1984:29). When directing his attention to society more generally, he wrote: 'Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity to metanarratives. This incredulity is undoubtedly a product of progress in the sciences:...' (op.cit.:XXIV). Indeed, the rejection of grand narratives and theories is a recurrent element in postmodern thinking. The same can be said of the role of language, as constructing our reality, and of the meaning assigned to 'texts'. In the analysis of 'texts', Derrida's notion, that it is always desirable to pose explicitly and systematically '...the problem of the status of a discourse which borrows from a heritage the resources necessary for the deconstruction of that heritage itself (1978:282), also touches upon a central theme: that of the influence exerted upon people and society by a dominant discourse. Next to a strand concerned with the history of knowledge, this type of approach introduced a strong socio-political element in postmodern theorizing (e.g. Baudrillard, 1988). Foucault (1980), in particular, has linked the development of technologies based on the production of knowledge to the exertion of power over people. In philosophy, finally, it appeared to herald the end of that discipline (see Baynes et al., 1987). In that field the idea of contingency has received a great deal of attention. Rorty, especially, has worked on that theme. A characteristic turn of phrase: '...truth is a property of linguistic entities, of sentences.' (1989:7).

I have attempted to present Bertens' stimulating historical analysis in a grossly simplified scheme, capable of clarifying the main conceptual dimensions of the term. It distinguishes three conceptual levels, as follows:

Conceptual dimensions of postmodernism

Level	Nature of the concept	Period of emergence	Main characteristics
1	Refers to anti-modernist artistic strategies	1950-60s	Questions the premises of modernism or seeks to undermine the idea of art itself
2	Denotes a certain cultural orientation	1960s	i. Refers to the radically democratic counterculture or 'new sensibility' of the 60s and rejects exclusivist liberal humanism
		1970s	ii. Drawn into poststructuralist orbit, in two phases: a. deconstructionist approach, 'language constitutes the world', (inspired by Derrida)
	'Weltanschauung' or *'Zeitgeist'*	1980s	b. 'Knowledge is power' approach (inspired by Foucault), stresses hegemony of a single discursive system, importance of difference, pluralism, emancipation. Becomes a general cultural orientation, spirit of the age.
3	Indicates new historical era	1980-1990s	Considers that around the mid-sixties, at least in Western societies, the Era of Postmodernity has begun.

The purpose of this scheme is to argue that from a social sciences perspective, not all concepts and usages of the term postmodernism have the same relevance. While it may be valuable for demographers to know how much they work through language and how strong the narrative element in their theories is (van de Kaa, 1996), the use of 'postmodern' in a sense that denies the representational function of language need not concern them. Similarly, while an awareness of the existence of strategies in various disciplines in the arts seeking to overcome the constraints set by modernism in terms of representation, purity, autonomy and intellectual content, and hence frequently called 'postmodern', is relevant in social science research, the history of the precise usage of that term in individual disciplines (dance, photography, architecture, history) is hardly pertinent. I would like to argue that postmodernism need only concern population scientists at two conceptual levels.

It is, first, quite pertinent to consider the possibility that our societies have experienced, or are experiencing, a major transformation which implies a shift from one historical period to the next. Such shifts have been recognized by historians for the past. One should expect them to continue to develop. In the sequence of historical periods the modern period would now seem to have come to an end. And since the term modern has already been usurped, the 'youngest modernism', as von der Dunk has called it (1993:66), could only be termed 'postmodern'.[1] There is much to be said for the idea that a new historical era, the **Era of Postmodernity** has begun. Defining its precise nature is not so easy, however. There are further, as we shall see, several counter arguments. The essential point to keep in mind is that postmodern theorizing, *per se*, plays virtually no role in considering this question. Central is the state of socio-economic and cultural development in these societies. What I am concerned with, is simply whether ideas and value orientations influenced by, and more or less clearly related to postmodern notions and thinking have, in a number of societies, diffused sufficiently widely to describe these as 'postmodern'.

---

[1] cf the statement by Lyotard; 'A work can become modern only if it is first postmodern' (1993:13)

It is, second, valuable to consider whether the concept of **'postmodernity'** as indicative of a *Weltanschauung,* a way of looking at the world, cannot be helpful in explaining the remarkable value changes which have been documented for industrialized societies in the last few decades. The term would thus denote a general cultural orientation; a value orientation which patterns and constrains behaviour in a postmodern fashion. Used in this context, postmodernization would refer to a process of value change: the transformation from modern to postmodern value orientations. If it should prove possible to operationalize postmodernity as a general world view, as a specific value orientation *(Weltanschaung),* or as the spirit of an age *(Zeitgeist),* it could be an important instrument in explaining the surprisingly sudden and spectacular demographic changes observed in nearly all European societies after the mid-sixties. It should again be noted that postmodern theorizing, as such, has only a very limited role to play in considering this issue. The point is not whether people subscribe to some sort of postmodern credo, which in any case, does not exist. The point is whether their outlook on the world has changed in such a way as to reflect postmodern concerns and notions.

3. An Era of Postmodernity?

Sketching the outlines of a period of Postmodernity can, obviously, only succeed if it highlights the perceived contrasts with the Modern era. The modern period is usually assumed to have begun at the end of the 15th century. It saw the demise of the feudal system, the development of nation states and national economies, of capitalism, of the process of industrialization, of mass production, of mass education, and of certain countries building up worldwide empires. Urbanization became a general process. In the late modern period secularization began to change the belief system; liberal humanist and marxist views dominated ideological positions. There existed a rather general belief in progress fuelled by Enlightenment rationality in behaviour and by the impact of scientific discoveries. In research and scholarship the search for the truth, for purity and timeless generalizations, constituted a central element. The necessity to achieve economic security through one's own efforts generated an 'industrious' revolution. Nearly everyone participated in the labour force. The need to stimulate economic growth dominated thinking about the future. Some form of representational government became the standard for civilized societies. Ultimately, the state largely assumed the responsibilities for the social security of individuals traditionally vested in the family.

Those who argue that a new era has begun can marshall an impressive list of arguments. They may point out that the *metarécits,* the meta-narratives which legitimized and underpinned the modern period, have lost their universality. The belief in progress, in the superiority of the white population, and in the value of the nation state and its sovereignty have greatly diminished or disappeared. Christianity no longer is the religion uniting different peoples. Even the shortcomings of the traditional epistemological philosophy, and of the search for 'truths', have been amply demonstrated. Economic globalization has reduced the direct influence of governments on the welfare of their populations. The development of the welfare state freed individuals in large measure from the social control exercized by families and communities. Decolonization has led to a new economic order in the world. The superiority of the Western civilisation has ceased to be self-evident. The influx of migrants has made previously homogeneous societies multi-cultural. At the same time American and European mass culture is spreading over the globe. Consumerism is rife. A tremendous de-formalization has taken place. A great variety of images, life-styles, and cultural symbols are produced by small groups and rapidly absorbed by others. The advent of the post-industrial information society has had a generation-specific impact: fragmentation, discontinuity and incongruity are standard. The populations

have become alienated from the political elites: yesterday's men are incapable of understanding the problems and desires of today's young women and men. Conflicts about ethical issues, the use of drugs, euthanasia and abortion appear impossible to resolve now that the self-evident truth and value of certain moral positions is in question. Authority on such matters has evaporated. Culture can no longer serve to maintain the existing social order. In sum, the process of modernization so characteristic of the modern era, has led to its inevitable demise. We have now entered a period without objective truths, in which people will continuously seek their identity in a self-reflexive way. They will give high priority to their well-being and to self-expression, instant gratification and play.

Equally, a whole range of criticisms can be levelled against the idea that a new era has begun. Let me mention a few. There is, first of all, no agreement on the date of its emergence. Some see having emerged following the Enlightenment of the 17th and 18th centuries, others place it around 1875. Others again speak about the 'last few decades', the 1980s and 1990s even. It seems to make much more sense, however, to date it about the mid-sixties and to associate it with the introduction of highly effective contraception and the sexual liberation that entailed; to relate it to the student revolts, the rapid expansion of social security systems, and the political changes of that time. It has also been argued that the modern period has by no means run its full course. Habermas' *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns* (1985) does not stipulate, for example, that conflicts can only be resolved if all participants accept the existence and general validity of a specific set of societal values. Agreement on procedural issues would seem to be sufficient (van Reijen, 1988). Bauman (1997:3) sees postmodernity essentially as the 'present version' of modernity. Others argue that one cannot possibly deny the existence of trans-cultural and amoral knowledge as a fact of life. Gellner, in particular, has made that argument. He abhors the cultural relativism to which postmodernistic philosophical thinking would seem to lead, and disagrees fundamentally with that approach (Gellner, 1992:54). Moreover, if such trans-cultural knowledge did not exist, how could social order be maintained? The result would be a 'de-moralisation'; a society in which people would no longer be responsible for their own actions (Lepenies). According to Himmelfarb (1995:263) it could, alternatively, lead to a new sort of 'moral correctness'. Michon (1997), who recently assessed the relevance of postmodernism for the cognitive sciences, concludes that the gulf between the two disciplines cannot be bridged. In his view, the principles adhered to in postmodern thinking about science, and about the validity of its methods and findings, cannot possibly be shared by the [cognitive] sciences. It is, finally, evident that from a socio-political point of view the idea of a postmodern era is, if it has to encompass all 'postmodern' strands of thought and theory, anathema to people to both the left and right of the political spectrum. While those of a liberal-humanist persuasion may well see diversity and pluralism within an otherwise capitalist society as quite acceptable and not more than a logical extension of Enlightenment ideas, they do not accept postmodernist views on, e.g., the subject, 'the language game', self-reflexivity or rationality. Those on the left, and most notably Marxists, reject the idea of a postmodern era that continues to be based on capitalist premises. They tend to accept the view that the autonomous, rationally acting human agent of liberal humanism is a fiction (Bertens, 1997:10). And, while at the general conference of the Academia Europaea, held in Ghent in 1997, Bertens argued that the gulf between these different visions could easily be bridged if all were to see postmodernism as '... the acknowledgement and acceptance of difference on the basis of an underlying sameness.', we have not quite reached that situation.

I would like to conclude that the idea that industrialized societies have witnessed numerous changes of very great significance in the last few decades is quite generally accepted. However, support for the

notion that a new, Postmodern Era has begun appears to decline with the precision and strictness with which the concept of postmodernity is formulated. If postmodernity is narrowly defined as relating to adherence to a specific number of controversial (philosophical or socio-political) points of view, the conclusion that we live in a postmodern era is difficult to maintain. If it is broadly defined as accepting that we live in a world markedly different from that of modern times, a world which offers much greater freedom to individuals, and which accepts diversity and unusual personal choices as a matter of course, we do indeed live in the Era of Postmodernity.

4. Postmodernity as a *Weltanschauung*

Perhaps the most essential tenet of postmodernism is that its key dynamic is cultural. The process of modernization, so the argument goes, has resulted in people being exposed to mass media, to a variety of cultural expressions, including those of a popular nature, and to many different types of behaviour. This has made them understand the limitations of their own cultural traditions. It has made them reject formerly self-evident truths about religion, the social order, the rights and obligations of individuals, sexual behaviour, gender roles and so on, with which they were confronted. Through mass education, modernization has created a fertile ground for the development of groups and individuals whose views on society differ radically from those which long prevailed. They are intent on expressing them forcefully. And, at the cost of e ver more insecurity, society has offered them ever more individual freedom (Bauman, 1997:124). Their postmodernistic outlook on the world questions the fundamentals of the meaning-giving system of modern societies (rational decision making, work, stability in relations, seeking progress). It is strongly influenced by philosophers such as Rorty and Lyotard who insist that the role of language and discourse in these matters should be reconsidered. Consequently they share what Bertens (1995:11) has described as '...:a deeply felt loss of faith in our ability to represent the real, in the widest sense. No matter whether they are aesthetic, epistemological, moral, or political in nature...'. Gibbins and Reimer, who recently wrote an interesting chapter on the topic, state the following (1995:309): 'The postmodern self is constructed in environments mediated by the mass media. But this postmodern self is an unfinished project: an identity is a role and a performance in the making, and public and private life are restless searches for self-knowledge and self-production for public consumption and recognition. Being incomplete, the self is restless, thus the postmodernist's search for identity is relentless.' And elsewhere (op.cit.: 310): 'Whereas modernists are committed to status and class segments, to means-end rationality and teleology, postmodernists are committed to the logic of the now and the immediate. At the heart of this distinction lies the belief that the modern self is being replaced by a more inner-directed postmodern self'.

There is every reason to accept the idea that such a postmodern view of society and the self exists. In that sense, postmodernity can obviously be taken to represent a certain *Weltanschauung.* But, how widely is that view held? I would, again, like to suggest that the more precise and strict the formulation of the concept is, the smaller the group of adherents will prove to be. If 'postmodern' is equated with: demonstrably influenced by postmodernist thinking about people, about society and its meta-narratives, and with giving high priority to well-being and cultural diversity, it is possibly such a widely held cultural orientation that for some countries it can be characterized as reflecting the spirit of the age; the *Zeitgeist.* If, alternatively, the requirement formulated is to demonstrate a clear awareness and conscious acceptance of some of the more significant theoretical or philosophical principles of postmodernity, these would, no doubt, be found not to have diffused to broad sections of any population.

5. Postmodernism and postmaterialism

An obvious point that will now have to be dealt with is the relationship between the concept of postmodernity and that of postmaterialism. The latter concept owes much, if not all, of its acceptance and use - and some would say also its notoriety - in the social sciences to the work of Inglehart. In a series of very stimulating studies (1971, 1977, 1997) he has argued that as the modernization process progresses, the emphasis on survival and economic achievement as the top priority will give way to an emphasis on the quality of life. In his words:'..., the disciplined, self-denying, and achievement-oriented norms of industrial society are giving way to an increasingly broad latitude for individual choice of lifestyles and individual self-expression' (1997:28). He characterizes that shift as one from 'materialist' values (economic and physical security) to one of 'postmaterialist' values (individual self-expression and quality of life). Materialist and postmaterialist orientations are measured with a survey instrument which may have 12 items. However, basically it asks respondents to make a choice of their first and second priority from amongst 4 items, formulated as follows (Inglehart, 1997:355):

1. Maintaining order in the country
2. Giving people more say in important government decisions
3. Fighting rising prices
4. Protecting freedom of speech.

Respondents selecting 1 and 3 as their priorities are classified as 'materialists', those giving priority to 2 and 4 as 'postmaterialists'. The prediction then formulated is that intergenerational value change in a postmaterial direction will take place as standards of living increase and younger cohorts age. The theoretical underpinning rests on two key hypotheses, which Inglehart has formulated thus:

'1. *A Scarcity Hypothesis.* An individual's priorities reflect the socioeconomic environment: one places the greatest subjective value on those things that are in relatively short supply.

2. *A Socialization Hypothesis.* The relationship between socioeconomic environment and value priorities is not one of immediate adjustment: a substantial time lag is involved because, to a large extent, one's basic values reflect the conditions that prevailed during one's preadult years.' (1997:33).

Evidently both postmodernism and postmaterialism are concerned with value change following, or emanating from, the process of modernization. What is the relation between these two approaches? What do they have in common? Where, if at all, do they differ? Should the theories, to use that term in a loose sense, be seen as being in competition with one another? Are they complementary? They certainly have in common that they seek to explain value changes as they occurred, by and large, in industrialized countries during the last few decades. They both see the wellknown series of processes characterized as secularization, urbanization, industrialization, economic development, occupational specialisation, bureaucratization, individuation, entrepreneurial motivation and mass education, as the driving forces of these value changes. And both see the shift in value orientation further triggered or strengthened by institutional shortcomings. The authority of secondary groups (churches, labour unions, political parties and the government) has eroded. They have reached the limits of their effectiveness. Hence their acceptability by the population at large is in question.

In his most recent publication, from which I quoted before, Inglehart appears to embrace the concept

of postmodernization. He posits it as a wider concept than postmaterialization. ‘The shift from Materialist to Postmaterialist priorities is a core element of the Postmodernization process’, is a formulation he uses (op.cit.:35). He feels that some of the conceptualization underlying the materialist-postmaterialist debate is outdated since that shift, though well documented through surveys, is only part of a ‘... much broader cultural shift’. A very large number of variables (about 40) used in recent surveys ‘... tap a variety of orientations from religious outlook to sexual norms’ ‘... and in most societies moved in a predictable direction from 1981 to 1990. We use the label “Postmodernization” to describe this pervasive change in worldviews.’(op. cit.:4-5). He appears to accept the idea that modernization has run its course. To quote a pertinent passage: ‘In the past few decades, advanced industrial societies have reached an inflection point and begun moving on a new trajectory that might be called “Postmodernization.” With Postmodernization, a new worldview is gradually replacing the outlook that has dominated industrializing societies since the Industrial Revolution. It reflects a shift in what people want out of life. It is transforming basic norms governing politics, work, religion, family, and sexual behaviour. Thus, the process of economic development leads to two successive trajectories, Modernization and Postmodernization. Both of them are strongly linked with economic development, but Postmodernization represents a later stage of development that is linked with very different beliefs from those that characterize Modernization. These belief systems are not mere consequences of economic or social changes, but shape socioeconomic conditions and are shaped by them, in reciprocal fashion.’ (op. cit.: 8).

I would not be surprised if those who identify themselves as convinced postmodernists would have difficulty in accepting Inglehart’s embrace. They may, first, well object to the grand theorizing involved and to the assumption that people maintain their value orientations over life. Both would seem to go against the grain of postmodernistic thinking. They may, further, well argue that Inglehart only embraced the concept after first having moulded it to his own liking. It is evident, for example, that Inglehart has little patience with those who see cultural construction as the only factor shaping human experience. ‘There is an objective reality out there too,...’ ; ‘External reality is crucial when it comes to the ultimate political resource, violence:...’; ‘,... there is a worldwide consensus among natural scientists that they are studying a reality that exists independently of their preconceptions:...’; and ‘Postmodernization does seem to be inherently conducive to the emergence of political democratic institutions.’, are some of his pertinent statements in this regard (op.cit.:12-14). The guise in which postmodernism appeals to Inglehart excludes its more extreme philosophical or theoretical manifestations; just, one may note, as Bertens’s ‘bridge’-proposition does.

It is worthwhile to try and clarify whether, from the perspective of outspoken postmodernists, postmodernism could also embrace postmaterialism. To this end I have developed a scheme which distinguishes between the three basic dimensions of human endeavour; structure, culture and technology, and which in the terminology used is heavily indebted to Gibbins and Reimer (op.cit.: 302-313).

Obviously, when one seeks to highlight contrasts rather than similarities, it is not difficult to make a list of differences suggesting that ‘... never the twain shall meet’. Gibbins and Reimer (op.cit.:303) do, in fact, argue that the two orientations cannot be collapsed into one. ‘Unlike a postmaterialist, a postmodernist can be materialist; unlike a postmodernist, a postmaterialist can be modernist.’, is the succinct way in which they phrase that conclusion. Instead of postmodernization embracing postmaterialization, postmodernism would here seem to go well beyond postmaterialism. It represents,

as it were, tendencies latently present in postmaterialism when it was conceptualized in the 1970s, in a very specific, postmodern form - represents them as an *avant-garde*.

The world view of a 'postmodernist' and 'postmaterialist' in extreme contrasts

Postmodernist	Postmaterialist
Structural dimension	
Rejects meta-narrative on progress	Development, progress oriented
Socio-economic future uncertain	Teleological view of the future
Accepts risks and insecurity	Stresses well-being in security
Questions capitalist system	Accepts liberal humanist system
Seeks re-evaluation political system	Ready to function under authority
Not motivated to participate in workforce etc.	Willing participant in societal change
Cultural dimension	
Seeks self-expression, new structures of feeling	Seeks self-realization
Relishes the image, the simulated and representation	Enjoys the real, the authentic, the natural
Seeks immediate gratification and enjoyment	Seeks fulfillment on developmental scale
Sees language as producing reality	Sees language as window on the world
Accepts idea constant reconstruction of identity	Assumes stable socialization
Reserved attitude to formal education	Stresses value formal and higher educat.
Seeks exposure mass media, popular culture	Values 'elitist' cultures
Welcomes plurality, heterogeneity, differences	Accepts plurality, values homogeneity
Rejects epistemological philosophy	Sees epist. philosophy as yardstick truth
Rejects meta-narratives of morality etc.	Does not question their societal value
Technological dimension	
Doubts objectivity of research, science	Sees important role R.& D.
Attacks the modernization it entails	Welcomes its potential benefits in welfare

The conclusion I would like to draw from comparing and contrasting the two concepts postmodernism and postmaterialism, is that again depending on the preciseness and strictness with which the first concept is defined, postmodernism can either be seen as encompassing postmaterialism or as a specific value orientation which goes well beyond it. This, and the conclusions reached in the previous section, lead to the following overview regarding the relevance and applicability of the concept of postmodernity in demographic research:

Postmodernity

	Broadly defined	Narrowly defined
Can denote a new historical era	Yes	No
Can denote the contemporary world view	Yes	No
Can denote an avant-gardistic value orientation	No	Yes

6. The application and operationalization of postmodernity

6.1 The Postmodern Era and the Second Demographic Transition

It is characteristic of the concept of postmodernity that in many disciplines its use preceded its definition. It is frequently in hindsight that certain books, poems, or paintings have been recognized and labelled as postmodern. When in the mid-1980s Lesthaeghe and I developed the idea of the Second Demographic Transition and related the demographic changes observed in Western Europe to changes in the value orientation of the population, we did not use the term 'postmodern' to describe these changes (Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa, 1986; Van de Kaa, 1987, 1988 or 1994; Lesthaeghe and Meekers, 1986). But both of us referred to the ideas Inglehart had expounded in his book aptly entitled 'Silent Revolution' (1977) and highlighted the profound attitudinal changes in the population. I noted, for example, that in the Netherlands the acceptance of divorce, abortion and homosexuality had all increased spectacularly over a brief timespan; evidently they were interrelated (1987:8). Elsewhere, I wrote: 'The strong emphasis on individualism requires people to search constantly for guiding and stabilizing orientations, for an individual life style and a personal identity. People are equal moral agents. This puts them under a great deal of strain and has clearly resulted in ... value pluralism.'(1988:21). The shift towards greater 'progressiveness' was described in some detail and it was linked to the materialist-postmaterialist dimensions identified by Inglehart. His approach was also used analytically (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn,1988). But to the best of my knowledge, the term 'postmodern' was not part of the discourse at the time. It would now seem that it could well have been used to highlight that the phenomena observed were so radically different that, from a demographic perspective, it seemed as if the region had entered a new era. What demographic analysis drove forcefully home was that, almost simultaneously in all Western European countries, a whole series of trends showed a marked inflection in the mid-1960s. As time went by, other European or industrialized populations, experienced similar demographic shifts.

That the changes in family formation and fertility were linked to socio-economic development, to the process of modernization, was obvious. Lesthaeghe, who attempted to provide a general interpretation of the second transition, concludes, however, that '... explanations solely relying on either the ideational changes or on structural economic factors are non-redundant, yet insufficient,'(1991:23). Hoffmann-Nowotny, who gave a careful description of the structural and ideational factors at work during the transition, thereafter presented a Dürkheim/Tönnies-inspired theoretical framework for its comprehension, which he called the Structure/Culture Paradigm (1987, 1997). It incorporates two important shifts. The shift from 'solidarité mécanique' to 'solidarité organique' identified by Dürkheim as basic to modernization, and the shift from 'Gemeinschaft' to 'Gesellschaft' distinguished by Tönnies as elementary in that process. It posits interdependency between structure (the position of societal units i.e. individuals, families etc.) and culture (values, norms, institutions etc.). The outcome of societal modernization, it is then argued, presents people with various dilemmas. Freedom and options increase, but choices have to be made taking into account societal expectations, individual interests, and personal resources (bounded rationality). Though attractive, this paradigm of the modernization process does not predict a point of inflection once the process has sufficiently advanced. The Inglehart concept of modernization owes more to Weber. By stressing as its two central dimensions the shift from (a) survival to well-being and (b) traditional authority to secular-rational authority, it is capable of predicting a non-linear course of events. The approach also leaves more room for the impact of technological innovations. Coherent cultural patterns exist, concludes Ingelhart, '...and are linked with economic and technological

development.' (op. cit.:69). As I have argued earlier, the link with technological change is of particular significance in relation to the Second Demographic Transition. The spread of efficient contraception undoubtedly enabled and helped generate that transition (van de Kaa, 1994:105).

In fact, if one develops an overview of the demographic sequences together constituting the Second Demographic Transition, the enabling role of efficient modern contraception is quite apparent. The introduction of highly efficient and effective means of contraception around the mid-sixties, in most countries supplemented at some stage by legislative changes allowing sterilization and/or making abortion relatively freely available, increased the demographic options of successive cohorts considerably. It is, further, quite apparent that the choice made regarding family formation and fertility by a given cohort both limited and enriched the options of the next. 'Mental' cohorts intent on increasing the freedom of choice of individuals, supportive of pluralistic ideas and seeking gender equity and the emancipation of minority sections in the population, exerted considerable influence on demographic preferences. The change in value orientations involved is well-documented in the shift towards postmaterialism, and, one must assume, in the postulated broader shift towards postmodernity. The demographic patterns resulting from the Second Demographic Transition, I should like to argue, have to reflect the advent of the Postmodern Era. This leads to the hypothesis that countries which have moved farthest in a postmaterialist/postmodernist direction will also have advanced most in terms of the sequences of the Second Demographic Transition.

Overview of demographic sequences in the Second Demographic Transition (based on observations covering the period 1965-1995)

1. Decline in TFR due to reduction in fertility at higher ages: decline higher order birth rates
2. Avoidance of pre-marital pregnancies and 'forced' marriages
3. Notwithstanding that, the mean age at first marriage continues to decline for a while
4. Postponement of childbearing within marriage, fertility among young women declines, lower order birth rates decline, this accentuates decline in period TFR
5. Increase in judicial separation and divorce (when allowed)
6. Postponement of marriage largely replaced by pre-marital cohabitation, increase in age at first marriage
7. Cohabitation becomes more popular, marriage postponed until bride is pregnant, increase in premarital births, increase in mean age at first birth
8. Legislation permitting sterilization and abortion further reduce unwanted fertility: fertility at border ages of childbearing declines further
9. Cohabitation gains further support, is frequently also preferred by the widowed and the divorced
10. Cohabitation increasingly seen as alternative to marriage, extra-marital fertility increases
11. TFR's tend to stabilize at low levels
12. TFR's increase slightly where women who postponed births start their fertility careers; increase of lower order birth rates at higher ages of childbearing
13. Not all postponed births can be born in years of childbearing remaining
14. 'Voluntary' childlessness becomes increasingly significant
15. Cohort fertility appears to stabilize below replacement level

Source: van de Kaa, 1997

The overview recognizes both a marital and a fertility transition. In order to investigate the relationship between the stages of these two transitions and the level of postmaterialism as documented by Ingelhart through the World Value surveys around 1990, I have used a summary measure, based on the above scheme, for each of the two.

The measure of the stage of the marital transition is based on three standard demographic variables and one somewhat less frequently available, more specific variable.

(a). The period total first marriage rate of women below the age of 50: with the underlying assumption that the lower this rate is, the more important cohabitation and/or the postponement of marriage are likely to be;
(b). The mean age of women at first marriage: the older women are when they marry, the more advanced the marital transition;
(c). The total divorce rate, which is meant to measure the reduced stability of marriage; and,
(d). The prevalence of cohabitation.[2]

The fertility transition measure is based on four standard demographic indices.

(a). The proportion of the TFR that can be ascribed to women aged 30 and over: meant to capture the characteristic ageing of fertility;
(b). The proportion of all births born out of wedlock. The underlying assumption here again is: the higher the measure, the more advanced the transition;
(c) and (d).Two other measures are meant to reflect the level and change in the TFR. The period TFR for 1992 is used as an indication of the fertility level at the time of the surveys. The idea here is that the further the transition has progressed, the more the TFR will have recovered from the temporary effect of the postponement of births. The change in TFR between 1980 and 1995 is used as an indication of the degree of volatility in the societies concerned. The idea is, that the farther the transition has run its course, the more stable the fertility level is likely to have become.

The demographic data used for the various countries are given in Appendix Table 1. In each instance the transition measure represents the mean of the standardized z-scores of the variables selected. Table A1 also gives the country scores on postmaterialism and subjective well-being as reported by Inglehart[3] and the country code used in the graphs. The correlation matrix is shown in Table 1. The fertility and marriage indicators evidently capture different aspects of the demographic transition process, with the relationships having the expected signs. The total divorce rate and the proportion of extra-marital births appear to have quite distinct positions in the marital and fertility transitions respectively.

The divorce rate does not measure the dissolution of cohabiting unions. In some countries that number is reportedly higher than the number of divorces (Manting,1994). One also has to keep in mind here that legal provisions may play an important part in both instances. Divorce may be very difficult to realize, while people are likely to hesitate having births outside marriage where the legal position of the children born is adversely affected.

---

2 Since cohabitation is not an event routinely recorded by statistical offices, indications of its significance in the different European societies in the early 1990s had to be obtained from survey data. The World Values surveys allowed the calculation of a uniform measure: the proportion of cohabiting women aged 25-29. Supporting evidence was gleaned from the literature. Carmichael (1995) has provided an extremely useful review of the information on consensual partnering in all more developed countries, while Prinz (1995) and Kiernan (1995) assessed the situation in various European populations.

3 Since Australia and New Zealand did not participate in the World Value survey programme, the prevalence of postmaterialism in these two countries had to be estimated. This was achieved by comparing Australia's and New Zealand's scores on attitudes regarding abortion and divorce in the International Social Survey Programme with those of the three other English speaking countries, Canada, Great Britain, and the United States, which participated in both international endeavours. See references to Evans and Kelley.

Table 1 Correlation matrix of demographic variables, postmaterialism and subjective well-being

	MARRATE											
VARIABLE		MARAGE	COHAB	DIVORCE	FERT30+	FERT.DIFF	TFR1992	EXNUPT	FERT.TRANS	MARTRANS	POSTMAT	SUBWELL
Period total first marriage rate (MARRATE)		-0.520**	-0.696**	-0.093	-0.319	0.314	-0.182	-0.780**	-0.633**	-0.199	-0.352*	-0.476**
Mean age at first marriage (MARAGE)	-0.520**		0.654**	0.026	0.761**	-0.462**	0.087	0.335	0.513**	0.610**	0.719**	0.810**
Cohabitation amongst women 25-29 (COHAB)	-0.696**	0.654*		0.429*	0.471**	-0.658**	0.251	0.598**	0.535**	0.744**	0.522**	0.647**
Total divorce rate (DIVORCE)	-00.93	0.026	0.429*		-0.052	-0.572**	0.468**	0.414*	0.172	0.658**	-0.018	0.099
Proportion TFR women <30 (%FERT30+)	-0.319	0.761**	0.471**	-0.052		-0.474**	0.195	0.054	0.516**	0.433*	0.806**	0.800**
Fertility change1980-1995 (FERT.DIFF)	0.314	-0.462**	-0.658**	-0.572**	-0.474**		-0.495**	-0.324	-0.292	-0.752**	-0.580**	-0.661**
Total fertility rate 1992 (TFR1992)	-0.182	0.087	0.251	0.468**	0.195	-0.495**		0.353*	0.545**	0.320	0.016	0.379*
Proportion extra marital births (%EXNUPT)	-0.780**	0.335	0.598**	0414*	0.054	-0.324	0.353*		0.727**	0.296	0.042	0.315
Fertility transition score (FERT.TRANS)	-0.633**	0.513**	0.535**	0.172	0.516**	-0.292	0.545**	0.727**		0.245	0.302	0.603**
Marital transition score (MAR.TRANS)	-0.199	0.610**	0.744**	0.658**	0.433*	-0.752**	0.320	0.296	0.245		0.459**	0.584**
Postmaterialist score (POSTMAT)	-0.352*	0.719**	0.522**	-0.018	0.806**	-0.580**	0.016	0.042	0.302	0.459**		0.757**
Subjective well-being (SUBWELL)	-0.476**	0.810**	0.647**	0.099	0.800**	-0.661**	0.379*	0.315	0.603**	0.584**	0.757**	

** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level

***** correlation is significant at the 0.05 level

The table illustrates that although there is a significant correlation between postmaterialism and several of the individual fertility and marital variables, the relation between postmaterialism and the overall fertility transition measure is weak and not significant. There is a negative correlation with fertility decline over the period 1980-1995, while the level of postmaterialism clearly is not a good predictor of the current fertility level. The correlation between postmaterialism and the marital transition score is highly significant statistically. Apparently, postmaterialists cohabit, marry late, and have their children late.

Graphs 1 and 2 show the regression of cohabitation and the ageing of fertility against the levels of postmaterialism as established by Inglehart. Although the level of postmaterialism was treated as the independent variable in the regressions, it should be understood that this does not imply the assumption of a one-sided causal relation. Scatterdiagram 1 indicates that as regards the ageing of fertility, the industrialized countries can be divided in two quite distinct groups. In the countries of the former East bloc, the ageing process still has to begin. Their currently low levels of fertility are, therefore, most likely to some extent associated with the postponement of births. In the other industrialized countries the ageing of fertility is well advanced. Very high proportions of children are being born to women over 30 in The Netherlands and, less surprising, Ireland. The other English speaking countries (US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Britain) form a neat cluster. In the Southern European countries Spain and Italy, the proportion of children born to women over 30 is comparable to that of some of the Nordic countries (Finland, Iceland, Norway, Denmark). The much lower fertility levels they currently experience are, thus, strongly related to the extremely low age specific fertility rates below age 30.

The scatterdiagram relating cohabitation to postmaterialism is also instructive. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe again appear to constitute a separate group. The variation amongst the other countries is quite considerable. In three Nordic countries (Norway, Iceland and Denmark) cohabitation is more popular than the level of postmaterialism would suggest. The opposite is the case in several other countries with a protestant tradition (Finland, The Netherlands). In countries with a roman catholic tradition such as Italy, Spain, Belgium and Ireland, cohabitation remains below the level the acceptance of postmaterialist ideas would suggest.

Given the extremely difficult economic situation the populations in the former East bloc countries currently face, the correlation between the fertility and marital transition indices and the subjective level of well-being in countries as reported in the World Values surveys was also investigated.

Graph 1 The relationship between postmaterialism and fertility at the higher ages of childbearing



Graph 2 The relationship between postmaterialism and cohabitation



Graphs 3 and 4 show the results. It is rather evident that the fertility transition score and the level of subjective well-being are closely related (R .603). The Central and Eastern European countries constitute a separate group, the implied suggestion being that the low levels of fertility observed do to a large extent reflect the difficult socio-economic circumstances encountered (see Katus and Zakharov, 1997). The former East Germany and Poland take a more intermediate position; they find themselves closely positioned with the other countries with a roman catholic tradition. 'The extremes touch' in the case of Ireland, Iceland and Sweden, due to the exceptional position of the first country in Europe's demographic setting.

The relation of subjective well-being with the marital transition mean standardized z-score is weaker (R.584) The correlation is, however, still highly significant. The Nordic group of countries are all in the upper right hand corner of Graph 4. The US and Canada fit well into the general pattern. The three Southern European countries under consideration - Italy, Spain and Portugal - lie fairly close together, which testifies to the enduring nature of cultural similarities and differences. Their marital transitions have not progressed as far as their fertility transitions (Sardon, 1997). As one would expect, fertility patterns appear to be more sensitive to conditions which pertain during a given period of time than marital patterns. However, East Germany is an outlier in the scatterdiagram (Graph 4), precisely because of the exceptionally low levels of marriage and divorce it experienced in the first few years after reunification.

It is, at first sight, surprising perhaps to find that subjective well-being is much more closely related to the two demographic transition processes considered than postmaterialism is. But it becomes understandable if attention is given to the correlation coefficients between postmaterialism, subjective well-being and the demographic measures used to arrive at the transition scores. Subjective well-being is much more closely related to those indicators which measure the current situation, the Total Fertility Rate in 1992, for example, than postmaterialism is. It is also more closely related to the fertility indicator measuring recent change. It would, no doubt, have been better if the fertility transition score could have been based partly on cohort measures (completed family size, or proportions ultimately childless, for example), but such data are rarely available for so wide a selection of countries and could not be incorporated. That the postmaterialist score is highly significantly related to the marital transition score and not to the fertility transition score is not only understandable, it is a quite interesting fording. It suggests that the fertility transition process is much more volatile and subject to period fluctuations than the marital transition process. It also suggests that in many countries that process is still under way. Consequently, current fertility levels need not be good predictors of ultimate family size.

Notwithstanding the above, it should be noted that it has sometimes been felt that the postmaterialist score was too sensitive to period fluctuations to serve as an indicator of deep-seated changes in value orientation. Inglehart himself has drawn attention to this and has further shown that this sensitivity affects all birth cohorts (1997:136). A critical analysis of the materialist/postmaterialist dichotomy performed by Scarbrough (1995) yielded the same finding. Thus, if one seeks to obtain insight into the longer term future, a measure which incorporates elements of greater permanence could be helpful.


Graph 3 The relationship between subjective well-being
and the fertility transition score
Subjective Well-being
Fertility Transition Score
100
80
60
40
20
0
-20
-1
-1
0
1
1
2
ICE
NET
DEN
NOR
IRE
BEL
US
WG
IT
CA
SP
FR
AU
PO
EST
POR
CZ
SL
RO
UT
LAT
BUL


Graph 4 The relationship between subjective well-being
and the marital transition score
Subjective Well-being
Marital Transition Score
100
80
60
40
20
0
-20
-2
-1
-1
0
1
1
2
ICE
NET
NOR
IRE
US
BEL
FIN
DEN
IT
SP
CA
WG
FR
EG
PO
AU
POR
HU
CZ
EST
SL
RO
UT
LAT
BUL

I would like to conclude that, so far, the findings are compatible with the notion that a Second Demographic Transition is in progress and that this process of demographic change is closely associated with the advent of a new historical era. But the transition process has by no means run its course. And, while in some countries the shift in value orientation is very marked, in quite a few other industrialized countries the shift is far from complete. But, if the increase in postmaterialism documented for a number of frequently surveyed countries can be interpreted as signifying a broader shift towards postmodernity, this would establish a direct link between the Second Demographic Transition and the advent of the Era of Postmodernity.

6.2 The operationalization of postmodernity as a *Weltanschauung*

6.2.1 The 'truly' postmodern

As I concluded in Section 5, in demographic research the concept of postmodernity as a *Weltanschauung* can be operationalized from at least two different perspectives. The first would attempt to identify the, most likely still fairly small, groups of individuals having a very outspoken postmodernist value orientation: the 'truly postmodern' who share a certain 'structure of feeling' as Gibbins and Reimer characterize them (op.cit.: 315). Such an approach would probably be useful if one aimed to concentrate on trendsetting behaviour, or sought to investigate specific issues such as voluntary childlessness or procreation in 2nd or 3rd marriages. In such an effort, the operationalization of 'postmodernism' as undertaken by Gibbins and Reimer for the political sciences could be useful. Along the lines I highlighted earlier, they argue that '... at the centre of the postmodern self is a value orientation which can collectively be called expressivism'. By this they mean '... a desire to actualize self-constructions or identities.' This may be focussed on clothing, possessions, etc. but also on social self-expression, lifestyle, movements, and the like. According to Reimer and Gibbins two groups of postmodernists may be distinguished. 'Instrumental postmodernists focus on private life and material goods; humanist postmodernists focus on the public world and social goods' (op.cit.: 312-313). The first combine expressivism with instrumentalism, the second with humanism.

Since to date surveys explicitly investigating the issue of postmodernism have not been undertaken, Gibbins and Reimer, understandably, tried to exploit existing data sets, the 1981 and 1990 European Values survey, for their purposes. Two items were used to operationalize expressivism. In order to be classified in the expressive category, respondents had to consider individual development important. They were then given a score 1. If they also shared a feeling of restlessness the score went up to 2. All others were assigned a score of 0. The humanist and instrumentalist dimensions were captured as follows. Those who either claimed to believe that most people can be trusted, or that it is an important aspect of a job that it is useful to society, were classified as humanists (score 1). Instrumentalists were considered to be all respondents who either believed that it was an important aspect of a job that it paid well, or who felt that placing less emphasis on money and material possessions in our way of life, would be a bad thing (score 1). The scores were then transformed into a three-point scale from 0-2.

Gibbins and Reimer found that in the European countries studied, instrumental postmodernism was practically unrelated to the materialism-postmaterialism dichotomy. But in most countries humanist postmodernism showed a significant correlation with postmaterialism. Table 2 gives an overview of the

mean scores on the humanist and instrumentalist postmodernist scale for twelve European countries.

Table 2 The humanist and instrumentalist postmodernist scores in 12 European countries in 1990.

Country	Mean humanist postmodernist score	Mean instrumental postmodernist score
Belgium	0.56	0.76
Denmark	0.80	0.70
France	0.48	0.64
Germany	0.75	1.01
Great Britain	0.63	0.78
Ireland	0.69	0.86
Italy	0.73	0.82
The Netherlands	0.90	0.87
Norway	0.88	0.72
Poland	0.66	0.75
Spain	0.66	0.86
Sweden	0.86	0.81

Source: Gibbins and Reimer, 1995: table 11.1

It is, obviously, of interest to consider the relationship between these measures of postmodernity and the demographic variables used in arriving at the means of the standardized z-scores for the marital and fertility transitions as they are contained in Appendix Table 1. If the postmodernist scores are regressed on the demographic variables no significant correlations are found. There is one exception to this rule: the correlation coefficient between instrumental postmodernism and the proportion of births born to women 30 years and older is significant at the .05 level. It is rather unexpected that the relationship between humanist postmodernism and the demographic indicators is so weak. I would have expected those with a focus on the public world and social goods to have an open eye for the social value of children.

Evidently, the operationalization undertaken by Gibbins and Reimer for the purposes of research in the political sciences cannot be successfully transferred to demographic research. An alternative is required; ideally an alternative that is not sensitive to short-lived fluctuations and period effects.

6.2.2 A measure of postmodernity

The second approach to the operationalization of postmodernity as a *Weltanschauung,* as a world view, clearly is to try and capture a much broader value orientation. That is, to explore whether the two dimensions which Inglehart has identified through factor analysis can be used. These two factors, it may

be recalled, are traditional versus secular-rational authority, and survival versus well-being. Inglehart has further provided a list of 40 variables, grouped in 5 categories, which were found to have correlations above the .125 level with Materialist/Postmaterialist Values in the 1981 World Values surveys (Inglehart, 1997:269).[4]

The list of variables under these categories certainly is representative of the broader shift towards postmodernity I would like to capture. Moreover, some of the variables are particularly relevant from the perspective of fertility preferences and demographic behaviour more generally. Further prior information in this regard can be gleaned from a recent article published by Lesthaeghe and Moors (1995). They used the pooled 1990 World Values survey data of Belgium, France, The Netherlands and West Germany to describe the pattern of living arrangements, socio-economic position and values among young adults (aged 20-29) in these countries. Thirty variables were used to develop 11 scales. They cover such issues as religiosity, requirements for a successful marriage, gender roles and socialization. Principal component analysis yielded three underlying value dimensions. Factor 1 is characterized by high religiosity and strict ethical standards. Factor 2 corresponds with right wing political convictions and aversion to emancipation and sexual minorities. They report that the Materialist items on the Inglehart scale also correlate strongly with this factor. Factor 3, finally, describes conservatism regarding gender roles (op. cit.: 39).

This leads to the conclusion that postmodernity is probably best ascertained by looking at attitudes regarding a fairly wide range of issues and not by considering whether an individual holds a particular view on a few quite specific points. It is a general world view, not a particular opinion, that concerns us here. The aim is not to identify those who would describe themselves as postmodernists. The aim is to capture a group which may never have heard of the concept but who, nevertheless, can be characterized as such. These people have a strong postmaterialist leaning or orientation, aim at selfrealization, value their personal freedom greatly, place well-being and the quality of life above material assets, question meta-narratives in the sense of not adhering to the tenets of a religion and of wanting to determine their own life style and pattern of personal relations. They similarly do not accept authority without question, are tolerant of the behaviour of others, want to be able to express themselves freely, support emancipatory (human rights, ecological, gender) movements, are in favour of diversity, and look without prejudice at developments leading to multiculturalism.

Keeping in mind that for present purposes demographic variables are best left aside as being 'dependent', that type of postmodernity is likely to be reflected most pronouncedly in answers to questions about, for example:

- whether one should try to get the best out of life
- the importance of attention for individual development
- the rejection of outgroups (ethnocentricitv)

---

[4] These categories refer to:

I. Norms concerning (a) respect for authority, (b) sexual and marital behaviour, and (c) civil behaviour
II. Religious norms
III. Norms concerning parent-child ties
IV. Norms concerning (a) conventional and (b) unconventional political participation
V. Norms concerning (a) control of business and industry, (b) Left-Right self-placement, and (c) confidence in authoritarian institutions.

- the approval of emancipatory movements (e.g. human rights or ecological movement)
- the degree of tolerance of the behaviour of others (e.g. sexual freedom)
- the degree of support for female labour force participation
- the importance of personal freedom in comparison with equality
- the way respondents place themselves in the political spectrum

The problem with resorting to that sort of survey question is, however, that in most industrialized societies the process of postmodernization is now so far advanced that the proportions giving a 'postmodern' answer have largely lost their power to differentiate. Table 3 which is based upon the World Values surveys, illustrates this situation for a few questions which would otherwise have been potentially valuable for analytical purposes.

Table 3 Proportion of respondents with a different value orientation agreeing with, or approving of certain statements. World Values surveys, 1990 round.

Statement	Post-modernist	Mixed	Modernist	Total	Total observations
The meaning of life is that you try to get the best out of it	80	78	77	78	32463
Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person	74	67	65	68	32582
Greater emphasis on the development of the individual is good	90	86	88	87	36351
Do you approve of the human rights movement at home or abroad?	97	95	95	95	35317

The operationalization I have ultimately chosen aims to get around this problem by assuming that the measurement of postmaterialism provides a good guide as far as the placement of individual respondents on the survival versus well-being dimension is concerned. To ascertain the position of respondents on the traditional versus secular/rational authority dimension two questions were looked at:

- how important is religion in your life?, and
- what would you think about a development towards greater respect for authority?

It was felt that maintaining the postmaterialist/materialist dimension would ensure an element of continuity with the previous analysis. One might, moreover, hope that by bringing in the dimension of religiosity and respect for authority the sensitivity of the measure to period fluctuations would be further reduced. It was further felt that those who answer that for them religion is unimportant and that more respect for authority would be a bad thing, explicitly show the incredulity with meta-narratives commonly associated with postmodernity. It should, finally, be noted that in their study Lesthaeghe and Moors identified religiosity (The belief in God) as a powerful determinant of marital choices.

Classified as 'postmodern', then, were all respondents who would qualify as being postmaterialist on Inglehart's scale who replied that religion was not very, or not at all important in their life, and/or that greater respect for authority would be a bad thing. Those who replied that religion was not very, or not at all important in their life, and/or that greater respect for authority would be a bad thing, and had

shown a leaning towards postmaterialism by indicating at least one of the two postmaterialist items in Inglehart's scale as a one of their priorities, were similarly classified as 'postmodern'. The 'modern' were identified as those who qualified as materialist on the Inglehart scale, replied that religion was very important in their life, and/or that greater respect for authority would be a good thing. Those who had shown a certain leaning towards materialism by indicating at least one of the two materialist items in the Inglehart battery as a priority, replied that religion was very important in their life, and/or that more respect for authority would be a good thing were also considered to be 'modern'. All other respondents form the category 'mixed' or 'undecided'.

The proportions postmodern and modern obtained by this procedure are given in Table 4. They show a plausible pattern, but the variation from country to country is quite considerable. The amplitude is greater than I would have expected. Postmodernity would appear to be most extensive in Sweden, Finland and the two Germanies. Low fractions are found in most of the former East bloc countries, Ireland and, rather surprisingly, Iceland. The pattern for the modern mirrors that for the postmodern to a large extent. The association with age has the expected shape. Postmodernists comprise 19 % of the 45-49 year olds and 29 % of those aged 20-24. And, while the modern constitute only 13 % in the latter group, they form 25 % of those aged 45-49.

Table 4 Proportion postmodern and modern as calculated from the World Values Surveys (WVS).

Country	Postmodern	Modern	Sample size
Austria	27	20	1383
Belarus	9	31	902
Belgium	23	21	2551
Britain	16	26	1436
Bulgaria	10	30	911
Canada	18	24	1650
Czech. R.	14	22	1382
Denmark	30	11	961
E. Germany	27	16	1276
Finland	48	5	468
France	23	22	901
Hungary	7	39	930
Iceland	11	22	675
Ireland	8	47	990
Italy	16	26	1945
Lithuania	13	24	913
The Netherlands	33	19	986
Norway	28	19	1193
Portugal	9	39	1097
Russia	7	35	1715
Slovenia	12	31	913
Spain	18	29	3767
Sweden	48	7	997
Switzerland	24	20	1219
USA	10	43	1756
W. Germany	43	12	1964

This measure of postmodernity is significantly correlated with three of the four indicators of the marital transition and two of the four indicators of the fertility transition. The correlation coefficients tend to be stronger than those with postmaterialism, particularly as regards the relation with divorce and ex-nuptial births. The sign of the relationship with the current level of fertility has become negative. As a result the measure of postmodernity is more highly correlated with the fertility transition score than postmaterialism, while its correlation with the marital transition score is highly significant statistically (R .548). Its correlation with postmaterialism is high. But, presumably through the inclusion of the item on religion, the measure of postmodernity is much less closely associated with subjective well-being than postmaterialism is. It clearly taps into an orientation with a high degree of continuity in people's lives.

Table 5 Correlation of demographic variables with postmodernism

Variables	**POSTMOD** %	**MODERN** %
Proportion with postmodern orientation (%POSTMOD)		-0.940 **
Proportion with modern orientation (%MODERN)	-0.940 **	
Period total first marriage rate (MARRATE)	-0.535 **	0.525 **
Mean age at first marriage (MARAGE)	0.646 **	-0.628 **
Cohabitation amongst women 25-29 (COHAB)	0.692 **	-0.697 **
Total divorce rate (DIVORCE)	0.161	-0.224
Proportion TFR women <30 (%FERT30+)	0.450 *	-0.287
Fertility change 1980- 1995 (FERT.DIFF)	-0.544 **	0.495 *
Total fertility rate 1992 (TFR1992)	-0.083	0.017
Proportion extra marital births (%EXNUPT)	0.259	-0.294
Fertility transition index (FERT.TRANS)	0.318	-0.257
Marital transition index (MAR.TRANS)	0.548 **	-0.597 **
Postmaterialist score (POSTMAT)	0.701 **	-0.535 **
Subjective well-being (SUBWEI.L)	0.543 **	-0.485

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level

The correlation matrix relating the measures of postmodernity and modernity to the fertility and marital variables used demonstrates that the correlation of postmodernity with the mean age of women at first marriage, the total first marriage rate for women, the proportion of cohabiting women, the ageing of fertility, and the amount of fertility change are strong, to very strong. Graphs 5 and 6 show the scatterdiagrams of the associations between the level of postmodernity and the state of the fertility and marital transitions in the 26 countries considered.

Graph 5 The relationship between postmodernity and the fertility transition score



Graph 6 The relationship between postmodernity and the marital transition score



The graphs are rather striking. The regression of postmodernity against the fertility transition score shows that the correlation (R .318 and not significant) is affected by not less than 5 outliers: West Germany, Finland, Sweden, Iceland and Ireland. The latter two countries have rather low levels of postmodernity compared with the other Western and Northern European countries, while the level of postmodernity measured for the first three is unusually high, even for that part of Europe. Replying that religion is unimportant in one's life apparently is not difficult in these three societies. The remaining countries form a fairly tight cluster. But, interestingly enough, all Western and Northern European countries are situated above the regression line; the North American countries and those of Southern Europe lie below it.

The outlier position of Sweden, Finland and West Germany is rather less marked in Graph 6, which shows the association between postmodernity and the marital transition (R .548**). The other European countries with a mainly protestant tradition (Norway The Netherlands and Denmark) fall in the same top right hand corner of the diagram. East Germany now shows up as an outlier due to its exceptional marriage and divorce figures in the first few years the after the fall of the Wall. This temporary phenomenon is reflected in the graph which, after all, refers to the early 1990s. The grouping of the countries as this emerges from the scatterdiagram suggests that in several Central and Eastern European nations the era of postmodernity is still some way off. The cultural heritage of countries, and the institutional considerations which follow from that, give the marital transition a distinct regional flavour (Micheli, 1996).

7. Postmodernity as a value orientation and demographic attitudes

7.1 Values, attitudes and behaviour

The scientific literature about the concept of 'values' as used in the social sciences is very extensive. The same can be said about its relation to attitudes and behaviour. I do not wish to review or discuss it. But it is probably desirable to indicate briefly how the term 'value orientation' is used in this paper and how I see its relation to attitudes and behaviour. Since the aim is to look at the possible relation between postmodernity as a value orientation and fertility preferences, it is fairly obvious that there is no purpose at all in equating value with preference. It is similarly not a sensible research strategy to posit a direct and one-sided relationship between value and attitude. In line with the approach Inglehart has taken in the matter of postmaterialism, I start with the assumption that values cannot be observed directly. A value orientation, such as postmaterialism or postmodernity, will make its presence felt through the way it patterns and constraints attitudes. In a well-argued contribution Van Deth and Scarbrough (1995) have recently pointed out that one must assume a reciprocal relationship between values and attitudes. '...: values will change as attitudes are changing, and attitudes are modified if values change. At the aggregate level, these individual-level changes may provide a clue to the understanding of processes of social and political change ...' (op.cit.:33). I should also like to follow them in the way they highlight two other aspects of values, namely: (a) that they indicate conceptions of the desirable, and (b) that they are used in moral discourse, with particular relevance to behaviour. In this way value orientations derived from empirically observed patterns and constraints in attitudes serve as a heuristic device in understanding these attitudes, e.g. in their role as immediate antecedents to behaviour.

Van Deth and Scarbrough see such a conceptualization of values in a research strategy as quite compatible with the proposal of Sniderman et al. that values are ‘a general consistency generator’ (op.cit.:41).

7.2 Postmodernity and attitudes pertaining to fertility behaviour

The World Values surveys asked a number of questions which aimed to assess the attitudes of respondent regarding a broad variety of issues. Some of those attitudes are quite interesting from a demographic perspective. Table 6 gives the reactions of the respondents classified as postmodernist and modernist to six such questions. These were formulated as follows:

1. If someone says a child needs a home with both a father and a mother to grow up happily, would you tend to agree or disagree?

2. Do you think a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled, or is this not necessary?

3. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? Marriage is an outdated institution.

4. If a woman wants to have a child as a single parent but she doesn’t want to have a stable relationship with a man, do you approve or disapprove?

5. Which of the following two statements best describes your views ... Parents’ duty is to do their best for their children even at the expense of their own well-being/ Parents have a life of their own and should not be asked to sacrifice their own well-being for the sake of their children.

6. Do you approve or disapprove of abortion where a married couple do not want to have more children?

Since the sample sizes of the World Values surveys frequently are very small, no attempt has been made to distinguish between male and female respondents. It is evident that the differences in attitude between postmodernists and modernists as they emerge from Table 6 almost invariably go in the expected direction. Postmodernists do not as frequently agree that a child should grow up with two parents as modernists, although, overall, there is a large measure of support for the idea that children need to grow up with a father and mother. As Kaufmann (1988) has earlier pointed out, the taboo on putting children in the world if one is not willing to accept the responsibility of providing long term care for them, is still strong. It is an attitude bound to keep fertility levels low. On the whole, postmodernists do not feel that a woman needs a child. The differences between certain countries - Denmark vs The Netherlands and the other Nordic countries are, at least at first sight, baffling. It could be that the Danes have interpreted the question in the sense that women have the right to have a child independent of their marital status or other considerations, but there may well be a simple technical explanation. It is, at any rate, evident that support for the idea that women may elect to be a single parent is exceptionally high in Denmark and Iceland, but is even higher in Spain. The idea of a married couple seeking recourse to abortion is well accepted in the countries of Eastern Europe, where for a long time it was the most important means of fertility regulation, and in the Nordic countries which tend to emphasize the free decision of women/couples in the matter. Agreement with the statement that marriage is an outdated institution is very limited. It is, however, without exception higher amongst the postmodern than the

modern. The shift to emphasis on personal fulfilment is reflected in the degree of support for the idea that parents do not need to sacrifice their own well-being for the sake of their children. Although the responsibility towards children is obviously still taken quite seriously, frequently about a third of those classified as postmodern support this idea.

Table 6 Proportions of respondents with a modernist/postmodernist value orientation agreeing/approving of certain statements. World Values surveys, 1990s.

Country	Agree child needs parents		Agree woman needs child		Yes, marriage is outdated		Approve woman single parent		Yes, parents own life priority		Approve abortion couple not want. child	
	PM	**M**	**PM**	**M**	**PM**	**M**	**PM**	**M**	**PM**	**M**	**PM**	**M**
France	90	96	64	82	46	18	45	34	22	15	57	39
Britain	65	80	18	27	28	14	49	25	22	14	51	33
W.Germany	91	100	27	74	25	6	34	9	48	15	43	9
Italy	90	98	48	78	31	8	57	29	17	6	49	15
The Netherlands	65	89	4	28	36	8	63	16	27	13	47	9
Denmark	62	88	82	86	24	17	78	39	46	29	73	43
Belgium	86	94	29	54	33	18	43	23	25	23	34	17
Spain	85	95	29	59	39	7	85	50	19	12	61	17
Ireland	70	86	24	28	25	7	46	15	27	12	17	7
USA	59	81	12	26	12	6	61	27	19	13	61	12
Canada	71	85	16	33	23	8	53	23	23	17	56	12
Hungary	97	99	100	95	22	12	59	32	38	27	79	61
Norway	80	90	18	29	14	7	35	15	12	6	57	28
Sweden	81	94	15	24	16	5	30	10	16	15	58	31
Iceland	68	87	24	60	16	4	78	80	36	20	43	18
Finland	83	91	12	29	17	0	69	14	27	9	71	20
Poland	100	98	73	83	29	5	18	17	36	18	25	20
Switzerland	.	.	20	46	20	7	51	27	23	12	.	.
Belarus	.	.	96	98	23	12	53	44	25	24	72	63
Czech R.	99	99	86	89	13	9	29	18	27	22	42	29
E.Germany	96	99	56	78	20	6	42	19	32	14	62	23
Slovenia	87	94	45	66	16	14	62	64	14	15	86	59
Bulgaria	92	96	74	94	16	7	68	40	42	19	89	72
Portugal	91	96	48	73	35	20	53	28	12	11	49	24
Austria	91	95	28	69	18	10	51	10	44	19	40	17
Lithuania	94	94	87	93	14	9	69	47	59	50	61	37
Russia	97	97	90	95	14	11	44	42	51	31	76	61

A . denotes not available: PM= Postmoderrust, M= Modernist

The general conclusion is that the 'conception of the desirable' differs systematically between the two groups. Almost invariably the category 'mixed'- which is not shown takes an intermediate position. The differences between countries are quite marked.

8. Postmodernity and fertility preferences

8.1 Preferences and behaviour: an illustration

Interest in fertility preferences obviously is based on the assumption that such preferences are related to fertility behaviour.

In surveys, particularly in those surveys which do not have a clear demographic orientation, the question of preferences is usually dealt with in two ways. Respondents are asked to state what they consider to be the 'ideal' number of children, while they may also be asked how many they personally 'desire'. If the orientation of the surveys is more demographic, women are commonly also asked whether they are currently pregnant, whether that pregnancy was wanted and planned, whether they want to have another) child sometime, and how many children are wanted, sometimes expected, in all. The Eurobarometer surveys of the European Union and the World Values surveys referred to earlier, are surveys of the first type (Coleman, 1996). The Fertility and Family Surveys (FFS) undertaken in the countries of the ECE region, and special fertility surveys undertaken in other individual countries, are of the second type.

Table 7 Average number of children per woman expected by and born to women of different birth cohorts in three successive surveys. The Netherlands, 1982-1993.

Birth cohort	Year of interview	Number of children ultimately expected	Number of live-born children
1950-54	1982	2.02	1.35
	1988	1.96	1.74
	1993	1.97	1.89
1955-59	1982	2.00	0.48
	1988	1.97	1.22
	1993	2.00	1.71
1960-64	1982	1.99	0.04
	1988	1.93	0.45
	1993	2.11	1.09
1965-69	1988	1.82	0.06
	1993	2.11	0.33
1970-74	1993	2.13	0.04

Source: de Graaf,1995: Staat 3

I have no doubt that, from the perspective of forecasting demographic behaviour, the most valuable information is that regarding the number of children respondents ultimately expect to have. In The Netherlands a number of birth cohorts have been asked that question on three successive occasions in the *Onderzoeken Gezinsvorming* of the Central Bureau of Statistics. This allows an assessment of both the consistency and reliability of the expectations. De Graaf (1995), who has reported on the results of such an evaluation, concludes that the cohorts interviewed are rather stable in their expectations. If the data obtained in the 1982, 1988 and 1993 surveys are tabulated, it is evident that women born in 1950-1954 have, as time went by, slightly reduced their estimates (Table 7). But the average number of live births reported in 1993 (1.89) still comes remarkably close to the number expected in 1982 (2.02). And, that women adjust their estimates over time as they are confronted with divorce, death of a partner, or medical problems, is quite understandable. Respondents were also asked to indicate how certain they were about their expectations. It turned out that the proportions who did not know whether to expect (another) child were usually below 10 percent. Moreover, with time the degree of uncertainty appears to have decreased (de Graaf, op.cit.:19).

8.2 Differentials in FFS-Findings on expected and ideal numbers of children

Given such results, it seemed very worthwhile to tabulate FFS-data on expected number of children for the still limited number of countries for which such information has been published or could be made available.[5] However the FFS-programme is based on the voluntary co-operation of countries providing their own resources and, consequently, they are free to vary the questionnaire on the basis of their own requirements. The figures presented in Appendix Table 2 are, as the footnotes specify, therefore not fully comparable.

It would appear that the expectations, hopes, wishes and intentions of the younger age groups are not, in general, markedly lower than those of the older age groups. The expectations of the older ages groups are, of course, tempered by experience and knowledge, and there is little doubt that the averages calculated for the younger age groups represent upper limits. From that perspective it would seem likely that future levels of fertility in Eastern Europe will remain below replacement level. An interesting contrapoint is provided by Norway, Sweden and, to a lesser extent, The Netherlands. The trend towards gender equity (McDonald, 1997) may there have progressed sufficiently to make higher expectations realistic. The wishes and expectations of women tend to exceed those of men in the same age groups. Of the 72 matched pairs Table A2 contains, the average for men is higher in 15 cases only. Women ultimately expect more children than men of the same age group in 33 instances.

If distributional aspects are considered, a strong clustering on two children proves to be the normal pattern. From 40 to 60 percent of all women expect or want that number. As Table A3 demonstrates, relatively few of the younger women expect to have no children at all, while the corresponding figures for women aged 35-39 at the time of interview are also surprisingly low. Much, much lower, no doubt, than one would expect on the basis of careful cohort estimates (Prioux, 1993; Rowland, in press). That beliefs and expectations about numbers of children

---

[5] In addition to the countries mentioned in one or other of the FFS tables, The United States and New Zealand are among the participants in the programme.

may become more realistic with age is confirmed by the proportions of women ultimately expecting one child. In age group 35-39 the percentage expecting/wanting one child frequently is twice as high as in the age group 20-24. Another noticeable feature of Table A3 is that the 'Don't knows' are so much more numerous in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that are in economic transition, than in some others. While in Sweden less than 2 percent could not give, or declined to give, an answer, figures up to 20 percent were recorded elsewhere. The contrast between Finland, Sweden and France is also striking. It may reflect differences in fieldwork practices or language.

The trend toward late childbearing characteristic of the Second Demographic Transition is well illustrated by the FFS-Findings. Almost invariably women aged 30-34 with one child or no children at all do not consider their childbearing years to have passed (Table A4). Once they have had two children and have reached that age, a large majority considers the active childbearing period completed.

The relation between level of education and fertility is well established (Santow and Bracher, 1997). Women whose formal education is limited tend to have relationships and children earlier than other women, while those whose formal level of education is high tend to have children later and fewer of them. With increasing levels of education in European populations this phenomenon would, *ceteris paribus,* lead to the inevitable conclusion of a further decline in fertility. However, analysis of the series of surveys undertaken in the Netherlands since 1982 has revealed that the fertility differential associated with the level of education is declining (de Graaf, op.cit.: 17). The fertility behaviour of women having the three levels of formal education normally distinguished would seem to have converged. De Graaf notes that a similar finding has been reported for the UK by Cooper and Shaw. FFS-Findings on the matter are reported in Tables A5 and A6. As regards the number of children ultimately expected, the older age groups do indeed show the customary pattern: the higher the level of education, the smaller the average number of children. For the younger age groups a reverse association appears to hold. Better educated women aged 20-24 or 25-29 frequently expect to have more children than those with a low or intermediate level of education. But being better educated does not necessarily imply being a better judge of one's future behaviour. And, if results of numbers of children expected to be born in the future are tabulated by level of education (Table A6) it becomes rather obvious that, with a few notable exceptions, higher educated women expect many more births than women with less education. The postponement of childbearing amongst the better educated is particularly marked in countries such as Canada, France, Norway and The Netherlands. Thus, whether the educational differential will decline may to a large extent depend on the biological and social constraints the better educated will encounter.

In a few of the countries participating in the FFS program, questions allowing the classification of respondents according to Inglehart's criteria of 'materialists', 'mixed', and 'postmaterialists', have been asked during the interview. Table A7 gives an overview of the aggregate data on expected (wanted, intended or hoped for) number of children of women for those countries which currently have released that information for analysis.[6]

---

[6] The classification followed Inglehart's algorithm for the four-item index (1997:389). The results differ from the scores as contained in Appendix Table A1.

The figures are at first sight surprising perhaps. Female respondents classified as postmaterialists do not appear to expect or want fewer children than those classified as materialist or, for that matter - although not shown in the table -, those whose reactions were mixed. Young postmaterialist women aged 20-24, in particular, seem to value children and tend to expect a larger number than their materialist counterparts. It is difficult to detect any systematic pattern amongst the older age groups: as a rule the differences are small. Leaving the provisional data for Switzerland aside, there are 47 matched pairs. In 25 of those cases the materialist figure is the higher; in 21 the postmaterialist. This value orientation clearly does not differentiate as far as expectations, hopes, or wishes are concerned. If attention is focussed on children already born, a much clearer pattern emerges (Table A8). Respondents classified as postmaterialists have almost always given birth to fewer children than those classified as materialists (41 out of 51 matched pairs). As has become clear already from the regression analysis, postmaterialist women begin their reproductive career later than materialists. To some extent this will reflect an educational differential: postmaterialists tend to be better educated. But it will also be indicative of a difference in attitude towards intimate relationships, and the proper ages for marriage and childbearing. It is likely that postmaterialist women overestimate the number of children they will ultimately have: the postponement is so substantial that catching up with the materialists will prove to be difficult. But if that is going to be the case it is the outcome of a process which is difficult to control, rather than a result achieved intentionally.

That having children as such is appreciated quite positively by postmaterialist men and women is evident from Table A9. It may constitute an important element in their perception of wellbeing and self-realization. Amongst the younger respondents postmaterialists almost invariably report a higher average number of children as ideal for a family in the country they live in than their materialist counterparts. One could postulate here that, as the process of postmodernization continues, postmaterialists might find it easier the combine childbearing with other activities and might then be able to match or exceed the numbers of children born to materialists. The results for W. Germany and Sweden point in that direction. However, as yet support for that persuasive thesis is not strong, even though postmaterialists score highest in 33 out of 49 matched pairs. The differences in ideal family size from country to country are quite substantial. While figures well above replacement level are seen as ideal in the Nordic countries, for example, in the Germanies the average number of children considered ideal remains way below that.

8.3 Ideal and real numbers of children as reported by respondents with a different value orientation in the World Values surveys

Interestingly enough, a question on ideal family size has also been asked in the World Values surveys. The FFS-findings and World Values results by materialist/postmaterialist value orientation can therefore be looked at in conjunction. The most significant finding is again that in North America and Europe ideal family sizes exceed observed fertility levels substantially. There are only three instances in which the overall average falls below 2.25 (postmaterialists in Norway, and both groups in E. Germany). Averages above 3 are equally rare (materialists in Iceland and both groups in Ireland). The ideal family size still is two or three children. Comparison of the means calculated for both sexes combined for each age group (under 25, 25-34, 35-44 and 45+) confirms that the materialist/postmaterialist value orientation dichotomy does not lead to predictable or systematic differentials between age groups or countries. In

about half of the pairs the postmaterialist average exceeds that of the materialists. In three countries - Russia, Ireland and Denmark- the overall average for the two categories is exactly the same. In France, Britain, West Germany, Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland, Belarus, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria the overall average for the postmaterialists exceeds that of the materialists, but usually by not more than a few percentage points. In all other countries the opposite is true, but the differences are, again, very small (Table A10).

Table 8 presents what respondents with postmodernist and modernist value orientations see as the ideal family size. In view of the small sizes of the samples, figures for the sexes have, again, been combined[7] and broad age groups have been used. The overall mean ideal family size remains, of course, well above observed fertility levels. Averages between 2.5 and 2.7 children per family are very common. The lowest value obtained is that of 2.02 for postmodernists in East Germany. But what is striking is that the differences between postmodernists and modernists are much greater than between materialists and postmaterialists. In 10 out of 26 countries the postmodern ideal lies from 10 to 16 percentage points below that of modernists, while there are only two cases - Belgium and Sweden - in which the overall average of the postmodernists exceeds that of the modernists. Evidently, in terms of fertility preferences, the modernist/postmodernist divide discriminates more than the distinction between materialism and postmaterialism. It is rather interesting to observe that the postmodernist preferences of younger age groups (<25 and 25-34) are rather high in several countries that are more advanced in the Second Demographic Transition, such as Sweden, Norway, Iceland, West Germany, Switzerland and Great Britain. There postmodernity has become the dominant *Weltanschauung.* Whether this is a highly significant fording is difficult to judge; there is, after all, quite a gap to bridge between a conception and a 'conception of the desirable'. But, at the very least, it suggests that postmodernity does not necessarily imply having a preference for very low fertility.

The World Values surveys also contain a fairly simple question on having children, as follows: 'Have you had any children? If YES, how many?'. Since no distinction is being made between the nature of the relationship between the children and the respondent, the figures are of doubtful value demographically. Nevertheless, for those countries for which the information appears acceptable, the FFS finding that postmaterialists/postmodernists have their children later, and ultimately have fewer, is confirmed (Table 9). Tabulation of averages by broad age groups of women and the postmodernist/modernist dimension shows striking differences in virtually all countries. To date postmodernity, obviously, is associated with having children late and with having only a few.

---

[7] This probably is not a serious matter. While at the individual level expectations of men and women frequently differ, at the aggregate level they tend to be very close (Beets, 1983).

Table 8 Average number of children considered ideal by respondents of different age groups at time of interview and modern/ postmodern val orientation WVS-Findings.

Country	Value orientation	<25	25-34	35-44	+ 45+	Total	Base
France	Modern	2.55	2.91	2.76	2.77	2.77	195
	Postmodern	2.58	2.62	2.62	2.65	2.62	208
Britain	Modern	2.64	2.47	2.42	2.79	2.69	376
	Postmodern	2.59	2.64	2.47	2.69	2.61	223
W. Germany	Modern	2.17	2.21	2.36	2.67	2.61	238
	Postmodern	2.38	2.41	2.22	2.42	2.36	841
Italy	Modern	2.59	2.56	2.63	2.76	2.69	500
	Postmodern	2.39	2.42	2.23	2.49	2.38	314
Netherlands	Modern	3.27	3.04	2.93	3.01	3.02	321
	Postmodern	2.68	2.47	2.54	2.77	2.60	187
Denmark	Modern	2.67	2.76	3.09	2.76	2.79	104
	Postmodern	2.49	2.34	2.62	2.71	2.55	290
Belgium	Modern	2.33	2.52	2.54	2.64	2.59	544
	Postmodern	2.73	2.67	2.75	2.55	2.67	573
Spain	Modern	2.56	2.28	2.46	2.74	2.62	1099
	Postmodern	2.35	2.29	2.25	2.47	2.33	658
Ireland	Modern	3.11	3.09	3.25	3.51	3.38	467
	Postmodern	2.88	2.96	3.00	2.29	2.93	74
USA	Modern	2.63	2.61	2.67	2.87	2.77	757
	Postmodern	2.62	2.36	2.31	2.53	2.43	174
Canada	Modern	2.70	2.69	2.89	3.07	2.94	396
	Postmodern	2.54	2.44	2.61	2.78	2.60	300
Hungary	Modern	2.33	2.56	2.42	2.57	2.52	362
	Postmodern	2.50	2.13	2.00	2.23	2.18	62
Norway	Modern	2.38	2.17	2.38	2.60	2.51	335
	Postmodern	2.43	2.36	2.01	2.34	2.28	221
Sweden	Modern	2.30	2.71	2.73	2.58	2.59	68
	Postmodern	2.68	2.82	2.81	2.74	2.76	479
Iceland	Modern	3.25	2.63	3.00	3.39	3.17	151
	Postmodern	2.73	2.94	2.72	3.22	2.88	77
Finland	Modern	-	3.25	3.17	3.08	3.13	23
	Postmodern	2.36	2.55	2.79	2.57	2.63	224
Switzerland	Modern	2.83	2.39	2.47	2.80	2.69	242
	Postmodern	2.88	2.51	2.57	2.56	2.58	292
Belarus	Modern	2.33	2.58	2.52	2.87	2.68	280
	Postmodern	2.25	2.64	2.29	2.88	2.50	78
Czech R.	Modern	2.10	2.26	2.29	2.56	2.44	297
	Postmodern	2.24	2.14	2.34	2.45	2.27	188
E. Germany	Modern	1.60	2.42	2.21	2.27	2.25	205
	Postmodern	1.78	2.01	2.05	2.14	2.02	346
Slovenia	Modern	2.42	2.36	2.56	2.68	2.59	279
	Postmodern	2.33	2.25	2.17	2.57	2.35	113
Bulgaria	Modern	2.33	2.23	2.29	2.47	2.38	269
	Postmodern	2.00	2.21	2.18	2.78	2.30	93
Portugal	Modern	2.18	2.11	2.55	2.66	2.52	423
	Postmodern	2.26	2.32	2.08	2.53	2.30	101
Austria	Modern	2.69	2.48	2.46	2.66	2.63	272
	Postmodern	2.39	2.31	2.15	2.34	2.30	377
Lithuania	Modern	2.84	2.76	2.75	3.16	3.03	222
	Postmodern	2.78	2.45	2.47	2.60	2.59	120
Russia	Modern	2.43	2.54	2.62	2.75	2.67	599
	Postmodern	2.64	2.38	2.72	2.53	2.56	116

Table 9 Average number of of children reported* by respondents of different age groups at time of interview and modern/ postmodern value orientation. WVS-Findings.

Country	Value orientation	<25	25-34	35-44	45+	Total
France	Modern	0.55	1.91	2.76	2.20	2.06
	Postmodern	0.10	0.76	1.78	2.15	1.20
Britain	Modern	0.29	1.26	2.14	1.98	1.86
	Postmodern	0.15	1.10	1.92	2.21	1.46
W. Germany	Modern	0.00	0.84	1.91	2.28	2.09
	Postmodern	0.04	0.58	1.35	1.77	0.99
Italy	Modern	0.29	0.89	1.90	2.24	1.76
	Postmodern	0.21	0.55	1.22	1.77	0.93
Netherlands	Modern	0.18	1.22	1.93	2.55	2.15
	Postmodern	0.17	0.51	1.44	2.27	1.12
Belgium	Modern	0.44	1.31	1.86	2.11	2.81
	Postmodern	0.11	0.95	1.58	1.76	1.12
Spain	Modern	0.15	1.27	2.08	2.49	2.10
	Postmodern	0.07	0.64	1.67	2.43	0.90
Ireland	Modern	0.11	1.32	2.75	2.65	2.35
	Postmodern	0.20	0.75	2.17	3.08	1.20
USA	Modern	0.83	1.59	2.13	2.60	2.21
	Postmodern	0.57	1.08	1.24	2.27	1.47
Canada	Modern	0.52	1.22	2.33	2.74	2.20
	Postmodern	0.16	0.93	1.56	2.36	1.38
Hungary	Modern	0.38	1.39	1.96	1.83	1.72
	Postmodern	0.50	1.47	1.59	2.00	1.44
Norway	Modern	0.23	1.00	1.84	2.17	1.88
	Postmodern	0.27	0.82	1.91	2.04	1.38
Sweden	Modern	0.50	1.43	2.27	2.00	1.71
	Postmodern	0.35	0.99	1.65	1.97	1.34
Iceland	Modern	0.19	1.46	2.37	2.97	2.30
	Postmodern	0.27	1.09	2.17	2.33	1.32
Finland	Modern	-	1.00	2.33	2.77	2.35
	Postmodern	0.16	1.12	2.21	1.95	1.61
Switzerland	Modern	0.17	0.87	1.88	2.35	2.02
	Postmodern	0.06	0.68	1.48	2.02	1.25
Czech R.	Modern	0.81	1.86	1.95	2.33	2.10
	Postmodern	0.40	1.44	1.81	1.79	1.36
E. Germany	Modern	0.30	1.53	1.68	2.17	1.97
	Postmodern	0.17	1.18	1.91	1.76	1.38
Slovenia	Modern	0.63	1.52	2.00	2.04	1.86
	Postmodern	0.13	1.00	1.60	1.91	1.26
Bulgaria	Modern	1.06	1.60	1.83	2.03	1 85
	Postmodern	0.79	1.17	1.55	1.70	1.31
Portugal	Modern	0.29	1.26	2.06	2.23	1.84
	Postmodern	0.04	0.77	1.85	2.37	0.87
Austria	Modern	0.50	1.57	2.04	2.16	2.00
	Postmodern	0.19	0.86	1.74	1.84	1.24
Lithuania	Modern	0.26	1.24	1.67	1.74	1.76
	Postmodern	0.13	1.21	1.65	1.72	1.02
Russia	Modern	0.57	1.65	1.85	1.87	1.74
	Postmodern	0.36	1.44	1.67	1.74	1.35

* in reply to the question: ‘Have you had any children? IF YES, how many?’

9. Discussion and speculations

Postmodernity is an elusive concept. Combining the term 'postmodern' with fertility preferences does not, therefore, immediately increase our understanding of recent fertility change in the industrialized world. But it certainly raises, as I have found, the interest of demographers in fertility preferences. The notion that the unusually low levels of fertility currently experienced in those countries have something to do with 'postmodernity' is invariably accepted. And, the idea that there could be such a thing as a set of postmodern fertility preferences tends to create excitement. Yes, there should be a name for the new demographic behaviour described by so many (Carmichael, 1995; Coleman, 1996; Hoem. and Hoem, 1992; Jensen, 1997; Katus and Zaharov, 1997; Hobcraft and Kiernan, 1995; Jain and McDonald, 1997; Klijzing and Macura, 1997; Lapiere-Adamcyk, Pool and Dharmalingam, 1997; Morgan, 1996; Pinnelli and De Rose, 1997; Rowland (in press); Roussel, 1994; Sardon, 1997; Santow and Bracher, 1997). And yes, changing preferences are at the heart of the matter. Values have changed: what we observe are its consequences. But then the conversation ends; how does one define that vexed concept of postmodernity? Can it be used in demography?

I have argued in the paper that three lines of approach appear possible. Postmodernity may be defined as an avant-gardistic value orientation. In political science such an attempt has been made by Gibbins and Reamer. The way in which they sketch the basic traits of a postmodernist does not augur well for the predictability of demographic behaviour in the decades to come. For if a postmodernist is an 'unfinished project', restlessly seeking and changing identity, 'inner-directed' and 'committed to the logic of the now and immediate', his/her demographic behaviour is, almost by definition, impossible to predict. Such a person's value orientation is likely to show little stability, and the choice of today will not be tomorrow's. The group of people meeting the criteria of a 'true' postmodernist undoubtedly is small. It would be foolish, however, to disregard them for that reason. In present day society, new, unexpected, imaginative, shocking, and blatantly non-conformist behaviour will be broadcast widely and may easily become trendsetting. New role models may be created through media exposure of celebrities from different walks of life. Thus, a clever way of anticipating developments probably is to envisage the options the postmodern *avant-garde will* dream up and select. A slackening of the taboo not to procreate if one cannot, or does not want to, look after children might lead to an increase in fertility. A similar effect could result from a further individualization/personalization of the choice for children. As shown before, in many countries the proportion of the population agreeing that single women can make their own choice in the matter is no longer negligible. But the options will offer themselves to the young, the still uncommitted. They are likely to surprise most of the current generation. The presence of a category of 'truly' postmodern citizens in industrialized societies increases, in my view, the difficulties a rather teleological discipline like demography will encounter.

Firmer ground can be found if postmodernity is defined as a world view *(Weltanschauung)* heralding a new historical era: the Era of Postmodernity. It should then be seen as a broader concept than postmaterialism. It would encompass that concept, but would widen it and increase its stability over time. I have attempted to operationalize it by using an existing data source. No doubt, improvements can/have to be made before we have a dependable, easily usable scale. But the notion that a broad change in value orientation, generated by the irresistible social and economic progress of our societies, is upon us, is highly attractive. It also

yields theoretically attractive propositions and can give guidance to our expectations. These propositions are strongly Inglehart inspired. They can rest on his most recent formulation as well as on other discussions which have taken place around the general theme of the genesis of value change and of new behaviour. Their underpinning rests on three hypotheses, which I should like to formulate thus:

1. A needs hierarchy hypothesis. As societies become more modern, the emphasis people place on higher order needs will increase. That is to say, they will increasingly seek self-expression, and will focus their attention on their own well-being and on actions which they perceive as giving meaning to their lives. In sum, they will become postmodern.

2. A socialization hypothesis. The effects of specific forms of socialization, or of socialization in specific environments, should in principle be traceable in society as birth generations pass through the age pyramid. This hypothesis assumes that socialization in pre-adult years leaves its traces in individuals for many years.

In view of the fact that one is dealing with changes in value orientations towards greater postmodernity, I would like to add a third hypothesis to the above. To this end I first (re)introduce the concept of a 'mental' cohort. While it is customary in demography to define cohorts on the basis of a shared vital event such as year of birth or year of first marriage, cohorts may also be distinguished on the basis of their common outlook on the world. The vital event they have in common is that they have acquired the same value orientation as their 'consistency generator'. Such 'mental' cohorts are likely to straddle several birth cohorts (van de Kaa, 1997). The third hypothesis therefore is:

3. A 'mental' cohort hypothesis. Mental cohorts sharing 'postmodernity' as a world view are, through the very nature of that view, less likely to show stable value orientations than other mental cohorts, modernist cohorts in particular. Their incredulity with meta-narratives and their secularized view on society, and on their role and responsibilities in it, will give them a much greater flexibility in switching life styles than previous cohorts. The value they place on children, and the qualities they expect in them, are likely to vary over time.

The combination of the three hypotheses leads to the following speculations/predictions about the first and second demographic transitions, and about the very low levels of fertility currently observed in many industrialized societies. Social, economic, technological and cultural changes influence each other in reciprocal fashion. As societies develop the classical demographic transition will begin. But at a certain, rather advanced state of development, an inflection will occur. A second demographic transition will inevitably follow. That transition is related to the advent of the Era of Postmodernity. In societies were postmodernity as a world view gains a foothold, that value orientation will begin to act as a 'consistency generator'. If the regulation of fertility is at the discretion of individuals and their partners, a sequence of events is set in motion (van de Kaa, 1979). As new options present themselves, people with a postmodern value orientation will seek to use those which suit them best. But, the conditions under which parental and other roles in society can be easily combined are not, as yet, fulfilled. Consequently, the transition process is accompanied by a phase in which fertility is very low and certain new forms of behaviour (cohabitation, extra-marital fertility) are still relatively uncommon. Through a whole series of well researched processes of decision making (Lee and Casterline, 1996) partners seek solutions satisfying as many of their conflicting demands as possible. Where combining roles is extremely difficult, society may divide into a family and a non-family sector (Dorbritz and Hoehn, 1997). This may explain the extremely low levels of

fertility wanted in Germany. It may increase the difference between wish and realization. In a paper of 1997, Bodrova shows that in that same year women in Russia reported an average of 2.11 children as ideal, an average of 2.07 as desirable, but an average expected number of only 1.38. Elsewhere demographic behaviour may be adjusted to maintain a high standard of living or to meet other important requirements people have (Macunovich and Easterlin, 1990). The variation in fertility levels observed during the transition period is quite marked. It reflects both the cultural heritage of countries and their ability/readiness to adjust to the new historical era (Kuijsten, 1996). But, postmodernists do value having children; not as much as modernists perhaps, but enough to ensure that fertility levels come sufficiently close to replacement level not to cause grave political concerns. However, they like to have them late, and circumstances at that stage in their lives should permit it. The Nordic countries illustrate how under favourable circumstances preferences and the transition trajectory may evolve as new generations enter the reproductive period. It should be noted that the modernists in these countries have become so small a group that one may conclude that in that region at least, the Era of Postmodernity is well and truly established. There is, by the way, not a great deal governments can do during the transition phase other then to accept and facilitate the process of change.

Do you love postmodernism? It is a bit as with music. Ultimately the love for music should have precedence over the love for a particular composer or style of music. It is easy to love Brahms. Satie is beautiful for those who have learned to appreciate his music. The same will be true for the work of Olivier Messiaen or John Cage. But, of course, some postmodern inventions will never gain sufficient support to become dominant and, ultimately, the new modern.

Acknowledgments

This paper was drafted while I was Visiting Fellow in the Demography Program (Co-ordinator Peter F. McDonald) in the Institute of Advanced Studies, Research School of Social Sciences, of the Australian National University in Canberra. Generous and expert research assistance was provided by Ann Evans, while Jacomien van Teunenbroek assisted greatly in the search for literature. I'm very grateful to both of them. In the conceptual stage of the paper I benefitted from a presentation to the Demographic Speculators of the Program (Convenor Geoff McNicoll). Special thanks for advice and comments are due to Erik Klijzing of the ECE Population Team, Michael Bracher, Gordon Carmichael, Adrian Hayes and Peter McDonald. I wish to thank the Advisory Group of the FFS programme of comparative research for its permission, granted under identification number 39, to use the FFS data on which part of this study is based. I gratefully acknowledge the use of data from the World Values surveys 1990-93. Machine Readable Data File. ICPSR No. I6160.

Dirk J. van de Kaa is Professor of Demography, University of Amsterdam. Correspondence: van Hogenhoucklaan 63, 2596 TB The Hague, The Netherlands.

APPENDIX TABLES

Table A1 Various demographic rates and measures used to calculate fertility and marital transition scores.

Country	% TFR by women over 30 (around 1990)	TFR 1992	TFR 1980	TFR 1995	Stability of TFR (1980/ 1995)	% extra mar births 1992	% cohab women 25-29 1991-3	Mean age first mar 1992	Total first mar rate 1992	Total divorce rate 1992	Country code
Australia	40	1.90	1.92	1.82	105	24	n.a	25.0[4]	54	.40[2]	AUS
Austria	28	1.49	1.65	1.40	118	25	12	25.7	57	.34	AU
Belarus	16	1.75	2.00	1.39	144	10	4	21.7	n.a.	.39	B
Belgium	28	1.66	1.69	1.66	102	12	10	27.5	68	.39	BEL
Britain	34	1.79	1.89	1.69	112	31	12	22.5	59	.44	BR
Bulgaria	11	1.53	2.05	1.24	165	19	0	21.6	66	.15	BUL
Canada	35	1.73	1.67	1.60	93	26	12	24.8[1]	59	.38	CA
Czech. R.	14	1.72	2.07	1.28	162	11	6	21.7	77	.34	CZ
Denmark	37	1.76	1.55	1.81	86	46	41	28.2	61	.42	DEN
E. Germany	16	.83	1.94	.77	252	42	6	25.1	32	.08	EG
Estonia	20	1.69	2.02	1.32	153	34	8	23.0	57	.46	EST
Finland	40	1.85	1.63	1.81	90	29	25	26.9	56	.43	FIN
France	38	1.73	1.95	1.70	115	33	23	26.3	53	.34	FR
Hungary	19	1.77	1.92	1.57	122	16	2	21.6	65	.28	HU
Iceland	39	2.21	2.48	2.08	119	57	35	27.8	50	.38	ICE
Ireland	48	1.99	3.23	1.87	173	18	2	26.8	63	n.a.	IRE
Italy	40	1.33	1.68	1.26	133	7	2	26.1	67	.07	IT
Latvia	20	1.73	1.90	1.25	152	18	8	22.4	74	.60	LAT
Lithuania	20	1.89	2.00	1.49	134	8	0	22.0	89	.37	LIT
The Netherlands	50	1.59	1.60	1.53	105	12	15	26.6	63	.29	NET
New Zealand	32	2.12	2.03	2.04	100	37	13	25.1[4]	50	.37[2]	NZ
Norway	36	1.88	1.72	1.87	92	43	28	26.6	49	.40	NOR
Poland	22	1.93	2.28	1.61	142	7	3	22.2	75	.12	PO
Portugal	30	1.54	2.19	1.41	155	16	0	24.5	87	n.a.	POR
Romania	17	1.51	2.45	1.34	183	15	4	22.1	86	.21	RO
Russia	19	1.55	1.90	1.40	136	17	3	22.5	86	n.a.	RU
Slovenia	20	1.34	2.11	1.29	164	28	14	24.1	52	.15	SL
Spain	40	1.32	2.21	1.24	178	11	4	26.1	67	n.a.	SP
Sweden	38	2.09	1.68	1.74	97	50	17	27.8	50	.43	SW
Switzerland	44	1.58	1.55	1.47	105	6	12	26.8	71	.34	SZ
USA	29	2.06	1.84	2.01	88	28	8	21.9[5]	75	.55	US
W. Germany	39	1.40	1.45	1.35	107	12	20	26.5	62	.32	WG

n.a. In cases where indicator was not available in the appropriate form, the value has been estimated on the basis of available literature.

Notes: Data based on years in column heading unless otherwise indicated.

2. 1990; 3. 1991; 4. 1989; 5. 1988

Sources: Council of Europe: Recent Demographic Developments in Europe, 1996; Monnier and Guibert-Lantoine, 1995 and 1996 ; Coleman, 1996; World Values Survey 1990-93; United Nations, 1990; United Nations, 1993; Carmichael, 1995 and personal communication; Carmichael, Webster and McDonald, 1997; Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1993; Statistics New Zealand, 1996.

Table A2 The number of children ultimately expected*, by age group of respondents at time of interview. FFS-Findings.

Country	Year	M/F	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	Base
Austria	95/96	F	.	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.7	2.4	2757
		M	.	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	1269
Canada	1990	F	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.1	1.8	1.7	.	2643
		M	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.3	2.2	1.9	.	2937
	1995	F	2.1	2.3	2.3	2.1	2.1	2.0	2.0	3472
		M	2.2	2.3	2.2	2.1	2.1	1.8	2.1	3622
Finland	89/90	F	.	.	2.3	2.2	2.1	.	.	1724
		M	.	.	2.1	.	2.1	.	2.0	1613
France	1994	F	.	2.1	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.3	2.2	2906
		M	.	2.1	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.2	1919
Hungary	92/93	F	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.0	.	2484
		M	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.8	1904
Latvia ***	1995	F	2.2	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.1	2.0	2.0	2029
		M	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.3	2.2	2.1	1.9	1314
Lithuania***	94/95	F	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.2	1.9	1.9	2602
		M	1.7	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.0	2.2	1764
Norway**	88/89	F	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.2	2.2	2.3	.	4002
		M	.	.	2.3	.	.	2.3	.	1533
Netherlands****	1993	F	2.27	2.28	2.19	2.11	1.98	1.96	.	4515
		M	2.16	2.10	2.16	2.11	2.00	2.04	.	3702
Poland	1991	F	2.0	1.7	2.1	2.3	2.2	2.3	2.3	4130
		M	2.0	1.7	1.8	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.2	4250
Slovenia	94/95	F	2.1	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.1	2.0	2622
		M	2.0	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.2	1788
Sweden	92/93	F	.	2.4	2.6	2.5	2.3	2.2	.	2484
		M	.	.	2.3	2.4	.	2.1	.	1833

In the FFS-tables read: 'wanted' for Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, Spain and Switzerland.

For Finland: 'How many do you hope to have?'; for Sweden: 'How many do you believe you will have?', for Canada (1990 and 1995), 'How many do you intend to have?'.
** Ages: 20, 23, 28, 33, 38 and 43. *** Age group 18-19. **** Age groups 18-19 and 40-42.

Table A3 The proportions of women expecting* given numbers of children : selected age groups at time of interview. FFS-Findings.

Country	Age group	None	1	2	3	4+	Don't know	Average number	Base
Austria	20-24	6.3	19.5	52.6	16.6	4.9	.	2.0	662
	35-39	7.0	20.7	47.4	18.0	7.0	.	2.0	591
	Total	5.5	19.0	52.5	17.1	6.0	.	2.0	2764
Canada	20-24	4.4	6.3	48.2	25.5	8.8	6.7	2.3	427
(1995)	35-39	10.4	11.4	39.7	20.6	9.9	8.8	2.1	581
	Total	9.5	9.9	43.4	20.9	8.7	7.5	2.1	3472
Finland	25-29	5.7	7.0	45.1	18.9	3.5	19.9	2.3	500
	35-39	6.1	13.1	36.5	17.7	8.7	18.0	2.1	563
France	20-24	4.2	9.3	59.2	20.1	4.1	3.1	2.1	468
	35-39	4.8	15.7	35.8	22.8	14.8	6.1	2.4	522
	Total	5.4	14.3	42.5	22.1	10.1	5.7	2.3	2906
Latvia	20-24	1.3	9.9	58.2	18.4	1.8	10.4	2.1	385
	35-39	0.8	20.2	44.5	16.2	6.3	12.0	2.1	382
	Total	1.2	15.5	47.6	17.2	4.2	14.2	2.1	2029
Lithuania	20-24	2.8	10.0	51.2	15.0	1.8	19.1	2.0	492
	35-39	2.8	14.1	48.2	18.3	5.8	10.8	2.2	398
	Total	4.2	13.1	48.7	15.8	3.8	14.5	2.0	2602
Hungary	20-24	1.2	8.5	60.5	14.2	3.8	11.8	2.1	739
	35-39	2.3	17.1	53.9	14.7	5.0	7.0	2.1	904
	Total	1.6	13.4	53.8	15.2	4.2	11.9	2.1	3400
Norway	23	1.2	3.0	44.9	31.2	7.7	12.0	2.5	692
	38	5.9	11.6	45.9	22.3	8.0	6.2	2.2	627
Netherlands	20-24	5	4	52	20	9	10	2.28	914
	35-39	12	12	46	19	7	4	1.98	867
Poland	20-24	12.5	6.1	38.9	8.5	0.9	33.1	1.7	574
	35-39	4.8	11.9	41.3	18.9	8.4	14.6	2.2	787
	Total	6.1	11.5	39.2	16.7	7.7	18.9	2.2	4130
Slovenia	20-24	0.6	6.4	51.8	25.8	4.3	11.1	2.3	415
	35-39	1.5	12.5	48.5	20.9	6.6	9.9	2.3	451
	Total	1.3	10.0	52.6	20.4	5.0	10.7	2.2	2622
Sweden	23	1.3	3.3	57.6	27.9	8.5	1.6	2.4	540
	38	5.6	12.0	45.1	26.7	9.6	1.0	2.3	447

* See notes Table A2

Table A4 The proportion of women having a given number of children and ultimately expecting* that number, by age group at time of interview. FFS-Findings.

Country	Number	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	Total
Austria	0	.	9	14	43	69	17.9
	1	.	20	30	58	79	45.6
	2	.	51	75	89	95	85.3
	3	.	100	73	93	93	92.2
Canada 95	0	10	6	13	25	58	24.1
	1	35	25	21	36	60	51.0
	2	67	39	48	73	90	84.0
	3	.	61	72	82	93	92.6
Finland	0	.	.	9	25	53	.
	1	.	.	20	38	72	.
	2	.	.	42	65	89	.
	3	.	.	59	68	90	.
France	0	.	5	5	21	43	18.6
	1	.	6	10	38	78	52.2
	2	.	60	46	63	82	79.1
	3	.	98	69	84	90	91.6
Latvia	0	-	2	4	-	19	5.6
	1	5	14	18	30	73	40.3
	2	50	36	52	67	83	75.8
	3	-	-	58	71	86	81.5
Lituania	0	12	6	7	29	39	16.5
	1	11	13	20	34	63	36.1
	2	-	63	58	70	83	77.6
	3	-	-	75	91	84	86.9
Hungary	0	1	2	4	17	36	6.7
	1	11	8	22	52	84	40.1
	2	25	58	68	81	93	81.7
	3	-	62	78	82	91	86.1
Norway	0	2	2	8	28	62	.
	1	3	6	11	38	73	.
	2	23	25	37	66	89	.
	3	-	-	60	83	91	.
Netherlands	0	3	6	10	28	71	.
	1	.	5	12	24	62	.
	2	.	.	52	69	93	.
	3	.	.	.	77	89	.
Poland	0	3	22	34	47	51	26.9
	1	18	13	15	35	63	48.0
	2	-	56	59	77	85	82.2
	3	-	78	79	81	96	91.4
Slovenia	0	2	1	0	19	49	4.4
	1	-	3	14	28	60	30.6
	2	.	44	55	62	79	71.6
	3	-	76	65	83	92	80.7
Sweden	0	.	2	5	14	68	.
	1	.	5	7	35	66	.
	2	.	29	36	60	94	.
	3	.	-	67	76	90	.

*See notes Table A2. A . denotes data not given; a - too few observations, nil or negligible

Table A5 Average number of children ultimately expected* by women in different age groups and with different levels of education (ISCED) at time of interview. FFS-Findings

Country	ISCED	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	Total
Austria	0-2	.	1.95	1.94	2.15	1.98	2.84	2.32	2.03
	3-4	.	2.01	2.03	1.97	2.01	2.64	2.30	2.02
	5-6	.	1.92	1.88	2.04	1.95	2.86	-	1.96
Canada	0-2	2.05	2.28	2.26	2.21	2.41	2.44	2.27	2.22
(1995)	3-4	2.24	2.26	2.22	2.09	2.05	2.04	1.98	2.11
	5-6	-	2.60	2.42	1.90	2.08	1.57	1.84	2.01
Finland	0-2	.	.	2.5	2.2	2.3	.	.	.
	3-4	.	.	2.2	2.2	2.1	.	.	.
	5-6	.	.	2.4	2.4	1.8	.	.	.
France	0-2	.	2.02	2.52	2.42	2.83	2.54	2.50	2.52
	3-4	.	2.14	2.01	2.18	2.05	2.06	1.97	2.08
	5-6	.	2.22	2.37	2.53	2.06	2.02	1.66	2.17
Latvia	0-2	2.07	1.97	2.08	2.38	2.47	2.00	1.78	2.09
	3-4	2.31	2.13	2.21	2.29	2.19	1.91	2.09	2.16
	5-6	-	2.19	2.00	2.14	1.88	2.06	1.68	1.99
Lithuania	0-2	1.76	2.19	3.29	2.40	2.38	2.13	1.94	2.05
	3-4	1.97	2.02	2.14	2.18	2.28	2.02	1.88	2.09
	5-6	-	2.06	2.10	1.99	1.87	1.67	1.79	1.91
Hungary	0-2	2.28	2.13	2.35	2.45	2.30	2.33	.	2.31
	3-4	2.14	2.14	2.01	2.02	1.95	1.82	.	2.03
	5-6	-	2.20	2.12	2.09	1.93	1.93	.	2.05
Norway	0-2	.	2.5	2.4	2.6	2.3	2.4	2.5	.
	3-4	.	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.2	2.1	2.2	.
	5-6	.	2.6	2.6	2.4	2.3	2.1	2.2	.
Netherlands	0-2	2.33	2.21	2.21	2.13	2.05	2.11	.	.
	3	2.28	2.29	2.24	2.23	2.00	2.03	.	.
	4, 5, 6	2.12	2.30	2.07	1.87	1.78	1.50	.	.
Poland	0-2	1.94	1.79	2.35	2.56	2.59	2.57	2.53	2.41
	3-4	2.00	1.61	1.95	2.00	1.98	2.03	2.07	1.95
	5-6	-	-	1.40	1.79	1.99	1.65	1.68	1.73
Slovenia	0-2	2.14	2.25	2.30	2.36	2.48	2.37	2.15	2.28
	3-4	2.14	2.33	2.31	2.23	2.17	1.94	1.92	2.21
	5-6	-	2.29	2.18	2.39	2.11	2.02	1.84	2.19
Sweden	0-2	.	2.5	2.6	2.4	2.4	2.1	.	.
	3-4	.	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.1	2.1	.	.
	5-6	.	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.1	2.0	.	.

* See notes Table A2 ; a - denotes too few observations, amount nil or negligible ; a . no data provided

Table A6 Average number of children expected* in the future by women in different age groups and with different levels of education (ISCED) at time of interview. FFS-Findings.

Country	ISCED	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	Total
Austria	0-2	.	1.57	1.02	0.43	0.19	-	-	0.80
	3-4	.	1.69	0.95	0.33	0.13	-	-	0.76
	5-6	.	1.54	0.83	0.22	0.22	-	-	0.68
Canada	0-2	1.98	1.37	0.78	0.25	0.06	-	-	0.93
(1995)	3-4	2.22	2.02	1.33	0.57	0.24	0.05	-	0.78
	5-6	2.00	2.60	2.09	1.13	0.29	-	-	0.85
Finland	0-2	.	.	1.0	0.3	0.1	.	.	.
	3-4	.	.	1.5	0.5	0.1	.	.	.
	5-6	.	.	1.9	1.1	0.2	.	.	.
France	0-2	.	1.53	1.08	0.39	0.29	0.06	-	0.43
	3-4	.	1.97	1.35	0.66	0.14	-	-	0.80
	5-6	.	2.19	2.02	1.61	0.42	0.07	-	1.15
Latvia	0-2	1.83	1.13	0.38	0.23	0.11	-	-	0.87
	3-4	2.21	1.70	0.94	0.30	0.14	0.05	-	0.73
	5-6	-	0.72	0.86	0.91	0.48	-	-	0.62
Lithuania	0-2	1.56	1.31	0.57	0.60	0.25	0.13	0.03	0.88
	3-4	1.90	1.44	0.78	0.38	0.21	0.09	0.03	0.72
	5-6	0.50	1.73	1.19	0.62	0.25	0.11	-	0.62
Hungary	0-2	1.80	1.09	0.35	0.15	0.08	-	.	0.35
	3-4	2.07	1.76	0,72	0.22	0.09	0.06	.	0.78
	5-6	.	2.02	1.24	0.60	0.17	0.07	.	0.78
Norway	0-2	.	2.0	1.4	1.0	0.2	0.1	-	.
	3-4	.	2.4	2.1	1.1	0.3	0.1	-	.
	5-6	.	2.6	2.5	1.8	0.7	0.2	-	.
Netherlands	0-2	2.29	1.90	1.23	0.51	0.14	0.04	.	.
	3	2.28	2.22	1.74	0.82	0.12	0.06	.	.
	4, 5, 6	2.12	2.29	1.90	1.10	0.32	0.10	.	.
Poland	0-2	1.80	0.89	0.35	0.12	0.07	-	-	0.29
	3-4	1.97	1.20	0.65	0.23	0.06	0.03	-	0.37
	5-6	-	2.00	0.69	0.26	0.16	-	0.05	0.21
Slovenia	0-2	2.13	1.45	0.69	0.49	0.26	0.06	-	1.08
	3-4	2.12	1.98	1.00	0.51	0.27	0.06	-	0.96
	5-6	-	1.95	1.44	0.93	0.19	0.12	-	0.80
Sweden	0-2	.	1.6	0.9	0.5	0.1	-	.	.
	3-4	.	2.0	1.2	0.5	0.1	-	.	.
	5-6	.	2.2	1.7	0.8	0.2	-	.	.

* See notes Table A2. A , denotes data not available; a - amount nil or negligible, or too few observations

Table A7 Average number of children ultimately expected* by women of different age groups at time of interview and materialist/postmaterialist value orientation. FFS-Findings.

Country	Value orientation	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	Base
Belgium	Materialist	.	1.84	1.96	1.88	2.06	-	.	403
	Postmat.	.	1.87	2.00	2.18	2.07	1.77	.	958
Finland	Materialist	.	2.52	1.83	2.03	1.90	2.86	2.84	295
	Postmat.	.	2.35	2.30	2.32	1.98	2.57	2.49	546
W.Germany	Materialist	.	1.66	2.02	1.91	1.74	.	.	436
	Postmat.	.	1.78	1.81	2.03	1.80	.	.	487
E. Germany	Materialist	.	1.58	1.84	2.01	1.95	.	.	146
	Postmat.	.	1.85	2.01	1.92	2.03	.	.	58
Hungary	Materialist	2.07	2.08	2.08	2.16	2.03	2.06	.	1263
	Postmat.	-	2.28	2.05	2.19	2.10	-	.	92
Norway	Materialist	2.39	2.51	2.57	2.27	2.40	2.25	.	679
	Postmat.	2.53	2.49	2.29	2.06	2.08	2.19	.	418
Slovenia	Materialist	2.35	2.42	2.15	2.32	2.39	2.20	2.00	609
	Postmat.	2.05	2.41	2.40	2.32	2.08	2.11	1.72	225
Spain	Materialist	2.39	2.10	2.14	2.16	2.23	2.26	2.43	643
	Postmat.	2.01	2.28	2.18	2.15	2.13	1.99	2.36	697
Sweden	Materialist	.	2.26	2.70	2.61	2.30	2.21	.	198
	Postmat.	.	2.49	2.57	2.56	2.28	2.16	.	604
Switzerland"	Materialist	-	2.40	2.50	2.52	n.a.	n.a.	n.a	173
	Postmat.	-	2.39	2.45	2.22	n.a.	n.a	n.a.	554

*See notes Table 8.2. A . denotes data not given; a - too few observations, nil or negligible.
** provisional

Table A8 Average number of children considered ideal by women of different age groups at time of interview and materialist/postmaterialist value orientation. FFS-Findings.

Country	Value orientation	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	Base
Belgium	Materialist	.	2.13	2.06	2.09	2.11	-	.	405
	Postmat.	.	2.31	2.24	2.29	2.29	2.37	.	981
Finland	Materialist	.	2.24	2.30	2.38	2.13	2.66	2.38	349
	Postmat.	.	2.38	2.52	2.45	2.69	2.45	2.53	685
W.Germany	Materialist	.	1.82	1.91	1.87	1.93	.	.	657
	Postmat.	.	1.88	1.75	1.99	2.19	.	.	660
E.Germany	Materialist	.	1.63	1.56	1.80	1.73	.	.	186
	Postmat.	.	1.81	1.78	1.74	1.75	.	.	80
Hungary	Materialist	2.20	2.11	2.11	2.15	2.11	1.19	.	1462
	Postmat.	-	2.25	2.52	2.28	2.21	-	.	101
Norway	Materialist	2.48	2.52	2.58	2.52	2.54	2.49	.	798
	Postmat.	2.55	2.49	2.52	2.52	2.56	2.44	.	510
Slovenia	Materialist	2.35	2.42	2.15	2.32	2.39	2.20	-	609
	Postmat.	2.05	2.40	2.40	2.32	2.08	2.11	-	225
Spain	Materialist	2.07	2.01	2.02	2.15	2.10	2.20	2.32	694
	Postmat.	2.31	2.19	2.12	2.20	2.21	2.21	2.13	743
Sweden	Materialist	.	2.27	2.44	2.48	2.39	2.47	.	229
	Postmat.	.	2.35	2.44	2.45	2.50	2.48	.	676
Switzerland*	Materialist	-	2.30	2.26	2.47	-	-	-	72
	Postmat.	-	2.33	2.49	2.44	2.45	2.25	2.45	287

See notes Table A2. A . denotes data not given: a - too few observations, nil or negligible.
* provisional

Table A9 Average number of children born* to women of different age groups at time of interview and materialist/postmaterialist value orientation. FFS-Findings.

Country	Value orientation	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	Base
Belgium	Materialist	.	0.24	0.99	1.52	1.89	-	.	403
	Postmat.	.	0.08	0.72	1.62	1.86	1.61	.	958
Finland	Materialist	.	0.33	0.63	1.72	1.82	2.01	2.16	295
	Postmat.	.	0.18	0.67	1.58	1.81	1.82	1.76	546
W.Germany	Materialist	.	0.37	1.12	1.34	1.63	.	.	436
	Postmat.	.	0.09	0.45	1.53	1.76	.	.	487
E.Germany	Materialist	.	0.58	1.47	1.89	1.92	.	.	146
	Postmat.	.	0.42	1.16	1.76	2.00	.	.	58
Hungary	Materialist	0.09	0.47	1.34	1.89	1.98	2.03	.	1263
	Postmat.	-	0.20	1.35	1.63	1.79	-	.	92
Norway	Materialist	0.20	0.52	1.46	2.01	2.31	2.25	.	679
	Postmat.	0.19	0.30	0.85	1.48	1.99	2.19	.	418
Slovenia	Materialist	-	0.47	1.36	1.83	2.09	2.12	-	609
	Postmat.	-	0.51	1.01	1.48	1.74	2.05	-	225
Spain	Materialist	0.04	0.25	0.87	1.63	2.00	2.19	2.38	643
	Postmat.	0.05	0.15	0.47	1.26	1.79	1.81	2.31	697
Sweden	Materialist	.	0.37	1.17	2.05	2.13	2.17	.	198
	Postmat.	.	0.34	0.94	1.71	2.13	2.12	.	604
Switzerland**	Materialist	-	0.02	0.36	1.46	1.93	1.84	2.17	173
	Postmat.	-	0.03	0.32	1.09	1.63	1.52	1.64	554

See notes Table A2. A . denotes data not given; a - too few observations, nil or negligible
*including current pregnancy
** provisional

Table A10 Average number of children considered ideal by respondents of different age groups at time of interview and modern/postmodern value orientation. WVS-Findings.

Country	Value orientation	<25	25-34	35-44	45+	Total	Base
France	Materialist	2.56	2.86	2.67	2.72	2.72	200
	Postmaterialist	2.56	2.76	2.84	2.90	2.78	241
Britain	Materialist	2.42	2.40	2.30	2.66	2.54	286
	Postmaterialist	2.73	2.68	2.47	2.77	2.69	268
W. Germany	Materialist	1.93	1.97	2.24	2.55	2.42	288
	Postmaterialist	2.41	2.50	2.36	2.49	2.45	580
Italy	Materialist	2.51	2.40	2.44	2.56	2.51	467
	Postmaterialist	2.50	2.53	2.40	2.35	2.44	470
Netherlands	Materialist	2.67	2.75	2.63	2.76	2.73	105
	Postmaterialist	2.62	2.62	2.64	2.75	2.66	337
Denmark	Materialist	2.17	2.43	2.90	2.75	2.63	157
	Postmaterialist	2.35	2.41	2.86	2.77	2.63	152
Belgium	Materialist	2.39	2.46	2.49	2.57	2.52	559
	Postmaterialist	2.77	2.68	2.87	2.68	2.74	611
Spain	Materialist	2.40	2.19	2.43	2.66	2.53	916
	Postmaterialist	2.40	2.35	2.28	2.59	2.40	781
Ireland	Materialist	3.24	2.89	3.21	3.39	3.28	232
	Postmaterialist	3.06	3.17	3.25	3.52	3.27	191
USA	Materialist	2.85	2.52	2.72	2.85	2.75	299
	Postmaterialist	2.50	2.55	2.57	2.76	2.64	405
Canada	Materialist	2.73	2.58	2.69	3.03	2.80	193
	Postmaterialist	2.54	2.63	2.72	2.99	2.78	424
Hungary	Materialist	2.30	2.37	2.36	2.52	2.46	449
	Postmaterialist	2.56	2.25	2.13	2.42	2.33	40
Norway	Materialist	2.37	2.14	2.22	2.47	2.36	347
	Postmaterialist	2.53	2.20	1.94	2.30	2.21	116
Sweden	Materialist	2.29	2.73	2.67	2.52	2.54	143
	Postmaterialist	2.72	2.81	2.84	2.74	2.78	229
Iceland	Materialist	3.03	2.57	2.97	3.29	3.01	178
	Postmaterialist	2.83	2.93	2.65	3.07	2.88	74
Finland	Materialist	-	2.83	2.67	3.00	2.88	34
	Postmaterialist	2.33	2.52	2.91	2.67	2.66	170
Switzerland	Materialist	3.00	2.42	2.52	2.70	2.64	190
	Postmaterialist	2.63	2.68	2.69	2.74	2.69	324
Belarus	Materialist	2.22	2.41	2.38	2.85	2.56	328
	Postmaterialist	2.42	2.56	2.50	2.81	2.58	64
Czech R.	Materialist	2.16	2.09	2.19	2.39	2.28	366
	Postmaterialist	2.28	2.19	2.45	2.67	2.37	146
E. Germany	Materialist	1.75	2.00	2.00	2.24	2.18	158
	Postmaterialist	1.89	2.10	2.17	2.29	2.15	301
Slovenia	Materialist	2.09	2.21	2.46	2.65	2.50	289
	Postmaterialist	2.50	2.23	2.07	2.59	2.38	68
Bulgaria	Materialist	2.32	2.14	2.15	2.47	2.33	281
	Postmaterialist	2.11	2.41	2.32	2.67	2.39	92
Portugal	Materialist	2.30	2.11	2.49	2.62	2.48	414
	Postmaterialist	2.22	2.39	2.47	2.56	2.36	118
Austria	Materialist	2.83	2.35	2.20	2.54	2.51	199
	Postmaterialist	2.38	2.33	2.30	2.40	2.36	362
Lithuania	Materialist	2.69	2.64	2.80	3.05	2.90	254
	Postmaterialist	2.76	2.52	2.73	2.94	2.74	117
Russia	Materialist	2.36	2.56	2.58	2.76	2.65	762
	Postmaterialist	2.71	2.43	2.80	2.76	2.66	116

References

Ankersmit, F. R. and Varga, A. K. (eds.) (1993). *Akademische Beschouwingen over het Postmodernisme.* KNAW, Mededelingen van de Afdeling Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks, Deel 56 (1), Amsterdam etc., Noord Hollandsche.

Australian Bureau of Statistics (1993). *Births Australia* 1992. Canberra, ABS

Baynes, K., Bohman, J. and McCarthy T. (eds) (1987). *After Philosophy. End or Transformation?* Cambridge (Mass). etc., The MIT Press.

Baudrillard, J. (1988). *Selected Writings.* Cambridge/Oxford, Polity Press.

Bauman, Z. (1997). *Postmodernity and its Discontents.* New York, New York University Press.

Beets, G. C. N. (1983). Vruchtbaarheidsverwachtingen van Mannen en Vrouwen, *Maandstatistiek van de Bevolking,* 31 (2) : 26-36.

Bertens, H. (1986). The Postmodern *Weltanschauung* and its Relation with Modernism: An Introductory Survey. Pp. 9-51 in D. Fokkema and H. Bertens (eds.), *Approaching Postmodernism.* Amsterdam/Philadelphia, John Benjamins Publ. Company.

Bertens, H. (1995). *The Idea of the Postmodern: a History.* London, Routledge.

Bertens, H. (1997). *Postmodernism and the Left: A Reconciliation.* MS of lecture held in Ghent.

Bodrova, V. (1997). *The Ideal, Desirable and Expectable Number of Children in Russia,* 1997. Paper presented to the IUSSP General Conference, Beijing, 11-17 October.

Bracher, M., Santow, G., Morgan, S. P. and Trussell, J. (1993). Marriage Dissolution in Australia: Models and Explanations, *Population Studies,* 47 (3), 403-427.

Carmichael, G. A. (1995). Consensual Partnering in the More Developed Countries. *Journal of the Australian Population Association,* 12 (1), 51-87.

Carmichael, G. A., Webster, A. and McDonald, P. (1997). Divorce Australian Style: A Demographic Analysis. *Journal of Divorce and Remarriage,* 26(3/4), 3-37.

Casterline, J. B., Lee, R. D. and Foote, K. A. (eds.) (1996). *Fertility in the United States. New Patterns, New Theories.* Supplement to PDR, Vol. 22, New York, The Population Council.

Coleman, D. (ed.), (1996). *Europe's Population in the* 1990s. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Coleman, D. (1996). New Patterns and Trends in European Fertility: International and Sub-National Comparisons. Pp. 1-61 in D.Coleman (ed), *Europe's Population in the 1990s.* Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Council of Europe (1996). *Recent Demographic Developments In Europe 1996,* Strasbourg, Council of Europe Publishing.

De Graaf, A. (1995). Vrouwen zijn Minder Onzeker over hun Kindertal. *Maandstatistiek van de Bevolking (Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics), (1),* 14-20.

Derrida, J. (1978). *Writing and Difference.* London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Dorbritz, J. and Hoehn, Ch. (1997). *The Future of the Family and Future Fertility Trends in Germany.* MS, Wiesbaden.

Evans, M. D. R. and Kelley, J. (1996). *Divorce for Couples with Children: Attitudes in* 22 *Nations.*

Worldwide Attitudes, Vol. 1996-09-02.

Foucault, M. (1980). *Power/Knowledge. Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977.* New York etc., Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Gellner, E. (1992). *Postmodernism, Reason and Religion.* London, Routledge.

Gibbins, J. R. and Reimer, B. (1995). Postmodernism. Pp. 301-330 in J. W. van Deth and E. Scarbrough (eds.), *The Impact of Values,* Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Habermas, J. (1985). *Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns.* 2 Vol., Frankfurt a. M., Suhrkamp.

Himmelfarb, G. (1995). *The De-moralization of Society: from Victorian Virtues to Modern Values.* New York, A. A. Knopf

Hobcraft, J. and Kiernan, K. (1995). Becoming a Parent in Europe. Pp. 27-61 in *Evolution or Revolution in European Population.* European Population Conference, Milano 1995. Milano, FrancoAngeli.

Hoem, J. M. and Hoem, B. (1992). The Disruption of Marital and Non-marital Unions in Contemporary Sweden. In Trussell, J., Hankinson, R. and Tilton, J. (eds), *Demographic Application of Event History Analysis. Oxford, Clarendon Press.*

Hoffmann-Nowotny, H. J. (1987). The Future of the Family. Pp. 113-200 in *Plenaries, European Population Conference,* Jyvaskyla.

Hoffmann-Nowotny, H. J. (1997). *Fertility and New Types of Household and Family Formation in Europe. A Theoretical Analysis.* MS, Zurich.

Huinink, J. (1995). *Warum noch Familie? Zur Attraktivität von Partnerschaft and Elternschaft in Unsere Gesellschaft.* Frankfurt/New York, Campus Verlag.

Hullen, G. (1997). *The Second Decline of Fertility in Germany.* Paper presented to the IUSSP General Conference, Beijing, 11-17 October.

Inglehart, R. (1971). The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-industrial Societies. *American Political Science,* 65 (4), 991-1017.

Inglehart, R. (1977). *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics.* Princeton , NJ., Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, R. (1997). *Modernization and Postmodernization. Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies.* Princeton, NJ., Princeton University Press.

Jain, S. K. and McDonald, P.F. (1997). Fertility of Australian Birth Cohorts: Components and Differentials. *Journal of the Australian Population Association,* 14(1), 31-46.

Jencks, Ch. (1991). *The Language of Post-modern Architecture.* London, Academic Editions. (6th ed.).

Jensen, A-M. (1997). New Forms of Reproductive and Family Behaviour in Contemporary Europe: A Review of Recent Findings. Pp. 869-885 in Vol.2, IUSSP *General Conference, Beijing 1997,* Liege.

Katus, K. and Zakharov, S. (1997). *Demographic Adaptation to Socioeconomic Changes in the USSR Successor States.* Paper presented at the IUSSP General Conference, Beijing, 11-17 October.

Kaufmann, F..X. (1988). Familie and Modernität. Pp. 391-415 in Lüscher, K., Schultheis, F. and Wehrspaun, M. (eds), *Die "Postmoderne Familie",* Konstanzer Beiträge zur Socialwissenschaftlichen Forschung, Band 3.

Kelley, J. and Evans, M. D. R. (1996). *International Differences in Attitudes toward Abortion.* Worldwide Attitudes, Vol. 1996-07-08.

Kiernan, K. (1996). Partnership Behaviour in Europe: Recent Trends and Issues. Pp. 62-92 in D. Coleman (ed.), *Europe's Population in the 1990s*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Klijzing, E. and Macura, M. (1997). Cohabitation and Extra-marital Childbearing: Early FFS Evidence. Pp. 885-903 in Vol. *2, IUSSP General Conference, Beijing 1997,* Liège.

Kuijsten, A. C. (1996). Changing Family Patterns in Europe: A Case of Divergence? *European Journal of Population,* 12, 115-143.

Lapierre-Adamcyk, E., Pool, I. and Dharmalingam, A. (1997). *New Forms of Reproductive and Family Behaviour in the Neo-Europes: Findings from the "European and Family Survey" on Canada and New Zealand.* Paper presented at the IUSSP General Conference, Beijing, 11-17 October.

Lee, R. D. and Casterline, J. B. (1996). Introduction. Pp. 1-19 in Casterline, J. B., Lee, R. D. and Foote, K.A., *Fertility in the United States. New Patterns, New Theories.* Suppl. to Vol. 22 of PDR, New York, Population Council.

Leridon, H., Charbit, P., Collomb, P., Sardon, J. P. and Toulemon, L. (1987). *Le Seconde Révolution Contraceptive, la Régulation des Naissances en France de 1950 à 1985,* INED, Travaux et Documents, Cahier No. 117.

Lesthaeghe, R. and van de Kaa, D. J. (1986). Twee Demografische Transities? (Two Demographic transitions?). In D. J. van de Kaa and R. Lesthaeghe (eds.), *Bevolking: Groei en Krimp (Population: Growth and Decline),* Deventer, Van Loghum Slaterus.

Lesthaeghe, R. and Meekers, D. (1986). Value Changes and the Dimensions of Familism in the European Community, *European Journal of Population,* 2, 225-268.

Lesthaeghe, R. and Surkyn J. (1988). Cultural Dynamics and Economic Theory of Fertility Change, *Population and Development Review,* 14(1), 1-47.

Lesthaeghe, R. (1991). *The Second Demographic Transition in Western Countries: An Interpretation.* IDP-Working Paper 1991-2, Interuniversity Programme in Demography, Brussels.

Lesthaeghe, R. and Moors, G. (1995). Living Arrangements, Socio-economic Position, and Values among Young Adults: A Pattern Description for Belgium, France, The Netherlands and West Germany, 1990. Pp. 1-57 in H. van den Brekel and F. Deven (eds.), *Population and Family in the Low Countries 1994,* Dordrecht etc., Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Lyotard, J-F. (1993). *The Postmodern Explained. Correspondence 1982-1985.* (Translation of Le Postmoderne expliqué aux enfants). Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.

Lyotard, J-F. (1994). *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge.* Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.

Macunovich, D. J. and Easterlin, R. A. (1990). How Parents Have Coped: the Effect of Life Cycle Demographic Decisions on the Economic Status of Pre-school Age Children, 1964-87. *Population and Development Review,* 16 (2), 301-325.

McDonald, P. (1997). *Gender Equity, Social Institutions and the Future of Fertility.* Working Papers in Demography No. 69, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra.

Manting, D. (1994). *Dynamics in Marriage and Cohabitation. An Inter-temporal, Life Course Analysis of First Union Formation and Dissolution.* Amsterdam: PDOD Publications, Thesis Publishers.

Micheli, G. A. (1996). New Patterns of Family Formation in Italy. Which Tools for Which Interpretations?, *Genus* LII, 15-52.

Michon, J. A. (1998). *Cognitiewetenschappen en Postmodernisme.* MS, Leiden.

Monnier, A. and De Guibert-Lantoine, C. (1995). The Demographic Situation of Europe and the Developed Countries Overseas: An Annual Report. *Population*. *An English Selection,* No. 7, 187-202.

Morgan, S. P. (1996). Characteristic Features of Modern American Fertility. Pp. 19-67 in Casterline, J. B., Lee, R.D. and Foote, K. A., *Fertility in the United States. New Patterns, New Theories*, Suppl. to Vol. 22 of PDR, New York, Population Council.

Pinnelli, A. and De Rose, A. (1997). *Micro and Macro Determinants of Family Formation and Dissolution.* Paper presented to the IUSSP General Conference, Beijing, 11-17 October.

Prioux, F. (1993). L'infécondité en Europe. Pp. 231-255 in Blum, A. and Rallu, J-L. (eds), *European Population. II Demographic Dynamics.* Montrouge, John Libbey Eorotext.

Prinz, C. (1995). *Cohabiting, Married or Single.* Aldershot, Avebury: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.

Rorty, R. (1989). *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Roussel, L. (1994). Fertility and the Family. Pp. 35-110 in *Proceedings European Population Conference, Geneva, 1993. Vol. I.* Strasbourg, Council of Europe.

Rowland, D. R. (in press). Cross-National Trends in Childlessness. In Dijkstra, P. and Vaughan, D. (eds), *Ageing Without Children.*

Sagan, F. (1959). *Aimez-vous Brahms?* Paris, R. Juilliard

Santow, G. and Bracher, M. (1997). Whither Marriage? Trends, Correlates, and Interpretations. Pp. 919-941 in Vol. 2, *IUSSP General Conference, Beijing 1997,* Liège

Sardon, J-P. (1997). *L'évolution Récente de la Fécondité en Europe de Sud.* Paper presented to the General Conference of the IUSSP, Beijing, 11-17 October .

Scarbrough, E. (1995). Materialist-Postmaterialist Value Orientations. Pp. 124-159 in J. W. van Deth and E. Scarbrough (eds.), *The Impact of Values,* Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Statistics New Zealand (1996). *Demographic Trends 1996.* Wellington, SNZ.

United Nations (1990 and 1993). *Demographic Yearbook 1990 and 1993.* New York, United Nations.

Van de Kaa, D. J. (1987). Europe's Second Demographic Transition. *Population Bulletin,* 42 (1), Washington, The Population Reference Bureau.

Van de Kaa, D. J. (1994). The Second Demographic Transition Revisited: Theories and Expectations. Pp. 81-126 in G. C. N. Beets et al. (eds.). *Population and Family* in *the Low* Countries *1993.* Lisse, Zwets and Zeitlinger. (Updated and abbreviated version of PDOD *Werkstukken No. 109*, 1988).

Van de Kaa, D. J. (1996). Anchored Narratives: The Story and Findings of Half a Century of Research into the Determinants of Fertility. *Population Studies, 50,* 389-432.

Van de Kaa, D. J. (1997). Options and Sequences: Europe's Demographic Patterns. *Journal of the Australian Population Association*, 14 (1), 1-30.

Van Deth, J. W. and Scarbrough, E. (1995). The Concept of Values. Pp. 21-47 in J. W. van Deth and E. Scarbrough (eds.), *The Impact of Values*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Van Reijen, W. (1988). Moderne en Postmoderne Filosofie. Habermas versus Lyotard. *Acta Political* 2, 199-223.

Von der Dunk, H. W. (1993). Bestaat er een "Postmodernistische" Geschiedbeoefening? Pp. 65-70 in F. R. Ankersmit en A. K. Varga (eds.), *Akademische Beschouwingen over* het Postmodernisme. Amsterdam etc., Noord Hollandsche.