

The Politics of China-Orientated Nationalism in Colonial Hong Kong 1949-1997: A History

By

Michael Hon-Chung CHUN

B.A., M.A. (Auckland)

A thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Asian Studies) of

The Australian National University

31 July 2010

Declaration

I, the undersigned, Michael Hon-Chung Chun, declare that this thesis is my own original work; where the work of others is used, I have acknowledged accordingly throughout.

Signed _____

Michael Hon-Chung CHUN

Acknowledgements

This thesis is a personal endeavour to make sense of Hong Kong's post-war history. Yet, the project could not have been completed without the encouragement and support of various people. I am indebted to my supervisors at The Australian National University, without whom this project could not reach fruition: Professor John Makeham and Professor Jonathan Unger. They have patiently offered valuable suggestions to better both my writing skills and thinking process. I also want to thank the administrative staff of the Faculty of Asian Studies at The Australian National University, in particular Ms. Harriette Wilson for troubleshooting and help with the administrative paperwork.

I would like to thank my supervisors at the University of Hong Kong, Dr. Peter Cunich and Professor John Carroll, who provided guidance and encouragement during the first year of my doctoral degree. I am also grateful to all colleagues at the University of Hong Kong's Department of History, who provided me a welcoming atmosphere. Special thanks are due to Dr. Peter Cunich, who assisted with my transfer to The Australian National University in 2006.

This thesis owes much to the very helpful staff of the University of Hong Kong library, Chinese University of Hong Kong library, The Australian National University library, and Hong Kong Public Records Office. Special thanks are due to the staff members of the Hong Kong Special Collections in the University of Hong Kong library. I am particularly grateful to Dr. Lisa Lines, who proofread the thesis.

This thesis would also never have existed had I not pursued my undergraduate and postgraduate studies in New Zealand. Therefore, I would like to thank all staff members in the School of Asian Studies at the University of Auckland, particularly Professor Paul Clark, who supervised my MA thesis and encouraged me to pursue a doctoral degree. I would also like to thank Dr. Richard Phillips and Dr. Matthew Allen, who taught me the rigor of historical thinking.

I would like to extend my gratitude to my interviewees: Mr. Chui Pak-tai, Mr. Leung Kwok-hung, Dr. Joseph Lian, Mr. Mok Chiu-yu, and Mr. Szeto Wah, who shared their memories of the events in which they participated.

During my research work, I was aided financially by two scholarships awarded through the University of Hong Kong and The Australian National University. Of course, I should not forget the support from my parents in Hong Kong.

Abstract

This thesis is the first comprehensive study of the history of China-orientated nationalism in post-World War II (WWII) colonial Hong Kong. The thesis examines events in each decade diachronically and links them together in a broader perspective. It shows the continuities and changes in the meaning and politics of China-orientated nationalism and how the focus of that nationalism became increasingly on what was happening in Hong Kong rather than China in the long period from 1949 to 1997.

Three types of China-orientated nationalism emerged in Hong Kong during the 1949-1997 period: cultural nationalism, political nationalism, and popular nationalism. Some of the exiled Chinese intellectuals in the 1950s promoted cultural nationalism, while political nationalism in Hong Kong revolved around the Chinese Communist Party-Guomindang (CCP-GMD) struggle. Popular nationalism in the post-1967 period was tied primarily to Hong Kong politics.

This thesis demonstrates how the various nationalist sentiments were a product of the China factor, the Hong Kong factor, and colonialism. China-orientated nationalism was open to interpretation and its rise and evolution was a haphazard process. Over time, the rhetoric of political nationalism that revolved around the CCP-GMD struggle became less significant as younger generations of Hong Kong Chinese who had little interest in Chinese politics became politically active in the 1970s. In this new phase, nationalism was tied not to the pro-CCP/pro-GMD rhetoric of the 1950s and 1960s, but to young Hong Kong

people's concern about problems in Hong Kong society and Hong Kong politics. In the 1980s and 1990s, expressions of popular nationalism were linked to Hong Kong people's concern over the future of Hong Kong following the Tiananmen Square incident and on the eve of the 1997 handover.

This study of the evolution of China-orientated nationalism in colonial Hong Kong also provides an understanding of how the colonial government responded, and how some sectors of the Hong Kong Chinese community manoeuvred vis-à-vis the colonial administration and other Hong Kong-based groups by using their own strategically constructed nationalism.

Contents

Declaration	ii
Acknowledgments	iii
Abstract	v
Contents	vii
Chapter 1 The Politics of China-Orientated Nationalism in Colonial Hong Kong: An Introduction.....	1
<u>PART I - Before the Chinese Civil War 1900s-1945</u>	
Chapter 2 Dimensions of China-Orientated Nationalism in Early Twentieth Century Hong Kong: 1900s-1949.....	15
<u>PART II – After the Chinese Civil War: 1949 – 1967</u>	
Chapter 3 The China Factor, CCP-GMD Struggle and the Politics of Nationalism in the 1950s.....	50
Chapter 4 Construction and Failure of an Anti-Colonial Rhetoric in the Leftist-led 1967 Riots.....	103
<u>PART III – The Post-1967 Period: 1967-1997</u>	
Chapter 5 Hong Kong Youth and the Politics of Nationalism in the 1970s: <i>Baodiao</i> , New Left, China Complex.....	144
Chapter 6 Tiananmen 1989: Nationalism, Democracy and the 1997 Question.....	187
Chapter 7 Irredentist Nationalism as Construction: The Politics of the 1996 Defend Diaoyu Islands (<i>Baodiao</i>) Campaign.....	222
Chapter 8 Conclusion.....	264
Bibliography	278

Chapter One: The Politics of China-Orientated Nationalism in Colonial Hong Kong: An Introduction

Attachments to specific stretches of territory, and to certain places within them, have a mythical and subjective quality. It is the attachments and associations, rather than residence in or possession of the land that matters for ethnic identification.¹

- Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity*

Chinese nationalism as a phenomenon is not confined to China. Colonial Hong Kong serves as an example of how China-orientated nationalism could develop in a British colony where East met West. The Chinese community in Hong Kong had a strong emotional attachment to the ‘motherland’,² or *zuguo* (祖國). Such an attachment was not at all hampered by colonialism. The China factor, colonialism, and the Hong Kong factor all contributed to the development of China-orientated nationalism in post-1949 Hong Kong. By ‘the China factor’ I refer to political upheavals in China and by ‘the Hong Kong factor’ I refer to the social and political developments in Hong Kong, in the post-1949 period. Colonialism in this thesis refers to the actions of the Hong Kong colonial government to control its subjects. As the development of China-orientated nationalism was closely linked to Chinese and Hong Kong politics, the

¹ Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991), pp.22-23.

² Prasenjit Duara has observed that linguistically speaking the nation is a ‘gendered phenomenon’ as often its ‘common signifier is fatherland or motherland.’ See Prasenjit Duara, ‘De-constructing the Chinese Nation’, in *Chinese Nationalism* ed. Jonathan Unger (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), pp.31-55.

overarching theme of my thesis is the *politics* of this China-orientated nationalism.

This thesis is a study of China-orientated nationalism in the field of Hong Kong colonial history, focusing principally on the last four decades of that history, up to 1997 when China reasserted sovereignty over Hong Kong. In post-1949 Hong Kong, several varieties of China-orientated nationalism existed at various times, and represented a significant issue for the colonial government, for Hong Kong politicians, and for some sectors of the populace. China-orientated nationalism has been an essential part of political life throughout Hong Kong's history. Although there have been some narrow case studies of episodes representing the expression of China-orientated nationalism in the field of Hong Kong history, my thesis is the first study that covers this significant issue over a period of several decades, linking together episodes into a broader portrait and analysing changes and continuities in the meaning and politics of China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong during this long period from 1949 to 1997.

This thesis is *not* specifically about Chinese nationalism, but rather is about how various constituencies of Hong Kong residents manoeuvred vis-à-vis the colonial administration and vis-à-vis other Hong Kong-based groups by turning to their own strategically imagined constructs of nationalism. The significance of China-orientated nationalism in post-1949 Hong Kong is that, first, it prompted Hong Kong Chinese to think about what China meant for them. Second, it provided Hong Kong Chinese a means to express their concern over China as well as Hong Kong. Third, nationalism was used as a tactic by Hong

Kong-based political groups to promote their agenda and mobilise the masses. Fourth, China-centred nationalism created *both* divisions and solidarity among some sectors of the Hong Kong Chinese community through the decades. Fifth, nationalism at times jeopardised the lives of Hong Kong citizens and threatened the colony's security, and, as a result, the Hong Kong government was forced to take measures against it, and in the process, nationalism brought the coloniser and the colonised closer as both sides desired security. Understanding these various and changing facets of China-orientated nationalism provides us with a fuller and more focused insight into the forces that shaped the dynamics of Hong Kong political life over the course of this turbulent period in Hong Kong's modern history. Sixth, China-orientated nationalism permeated not only some of the major disturbances that impacted on the lives of Hong Kong residents, but also discussions about China in the Chinese-language press as well as Hong Kong-orientated political movements. Thus, China-orientated nationalism was a matter that generations of Hong Kong Chinese were exposed to whether they were politically active or not.

In more general terms, these six points highlight the fact that Hong Kong is a society of immigrants where people had both a Chinese identity and a colonial identity. To varying degrees, China-centred nationalism also underlay political factionalism in Hong Kong politics. Hong Kong Chinese, despite being colonial subjects under British rule, were willing to speak up for their interests and concerns using nationalism. Thus, nationalist movements were a major form of political activism and Hong Kong people were clearly not politically apathetic. Lastly, my study highlights the fact that political activism in Hong Kong was on

some occasions characterised by clashes between colonialism and some sectors of the Chinese community.

In the following section of this introductory chapter I discuss in brief the extant literature on China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong. I then discuss the methodology used in my research. In the section after that, I draw on some of the existing theories of nationalism to define Chinese nationalism in post-1949 Hong Kong. Finally, I briefly outline the objectives, main arguments and structure of the thesis.

Research Background: A Brief Literature Review

While much has been written about Chinese nationalism within China, little research has been conducted on China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong during the period from 1949 to 1997. Academic works on Hong Kong history tend to focus on Hong Kong identity or on the period before 1949. The only comprehensive study of China-orientated nationalism in colonial Hong Kong is Cai Rongfang's *The Hong Kong People's History of Hong Kong 1841-1945* (香港人之香港歷史). Looking at historical events diachronically, Tsai examines the complexity of China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong from 1841 to 1945. His work shows that what was occurring in both China and Hong Kong were significant in giving rise to discourses about Chinese nationalism in Hong Kong.

In *Nationalism, National Identity and Democratisation in China*, He Baogang and Guo Yingjie focus on the links between Hong Kong's democratisation, Beijing's manipulation of Hong Kong's political future, and the

political rhetoric of Chinese nationalism promoted by the People's Republic of China (PRC).³ They briefly discussed issues relating to Hong Kong's struggle for democracy. As the book's focus is Chinese nationalism in China, their discussion of Hong Kong does not examine in detail the political history of Hong Kong or Hong Kong's response to the 4 June suppression of the Tiananmen protests in 1989.

Similarly, Maria Hsia Chang's *Return of the Dragon: China's Wounded Nationalism* focuses on the history of Chinese nationalism in China and contains only a small section on Hong Kong and the Defend Diaoyu Islands (*Baodiao* 保釣) campaign in Hong Kong in 1996.⁴ In contrast, the works of Zheng Hailin (鄭海麟) are more useful for providing a documentary history of the *Baodiao* movement in Hong Kong and overseas, and the history of the Diaoyu Islands.⁵ Zheng, however, does not provide a comprehensive account of the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign in Hong Kong. Nor does he critically examine the reasons behind the emergence of the *Baodiao* fever in 1996. The 1996 *Baodiao* campaign is significant because it was the last major expression of China-orientated nationalism before the 1997 handover and the *Baodiao* fever had its origins in the 1970s. The 1996 campaign is a classic example of how Hong Kong's political situation contributed to the rise of nationalism in colonial Hong Kong.

³ He Baogang and Guo Yingjie, *Nationalism, National Identity and Democratisation* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), pp.175-176.

⁴ Maria Hsia Chang, *Return of the Dragon: China's Wounded Nationalism* (Colorado: Westview Press, 2001), pp.210-213.

⁵ Zheng Hailin 鄭海麟, *Diaoyudaolieyu zhi lishi yu falv yanjiu* 釣魚島之歷史與法理研究 (A Study of the History and Legal Issues Relating to the Diaoyu Islands) (Beijing: Zhonghuashuju, 2007); and *Zhongri diaoyutaizhizheng yu donghai hujie wenti haiwai Baodiao shinian jilu* 中日釣魚台之爭與東海劃界問題 (The Dispute over the Diaoyu Islands between China and Japan and the Problem of Territorial Divisions in the Eastern Sea: A Record of 10 Years of the Overseas *Baodiao* Movement) (Taipei: Haixia xueshu chubanshe, 2007).

A useful and significant work on post-1949 Hong Kong politics is Lam Wai-man's *Understanding the Political Culture of Hong Kong*.⁶ Lam critically examines political movements in Hong Kong and her work touches upon various the themes of political activism and nationalism. In examining various social and political movements Lam refutes the view that the Hong Kong Chinese community was politically indifferent. Although Lam does discuss China-orientated nationalism in her brief examination of the 1956 riots and the rise of nationalistic sentiments among Hong Kong youth in the 1970s, the focus of her book is social and political movements and Hong Kong people's political participation. Lam's work does not examine Hong Kong's response to 4 June in 1989, as her book focuses on events that occurred between 1949 and 1979 and the idea of political activism. The main purpose of her work is to challenge the claim that Hong Kong people were politically apathetic.

Studies that focus specifically on patriotism and nationalism in Hong Kong include Gregory P. Fairbrother's *Toward Critical Patriotism: Student Resistance to Political Education in Hong Kong and China*, and Ma Jiewei's *Aiguo zhengzhi shencha* (愛國政治審查, A Political Investigation of Patriotism).⁷ Fairbrother examines the attitudes of students in China and Hong Kong who received their secondary education in the 1990s, towards nationalism and civic education in Hong Kong and patriotic education in China. Taking into account the political and educational contexts of Hong Kong and China, Fairbrother found that Hong Kong students had a neutral and ambivalent attitude

⁶ Lam Wai-man, *Understanding the Political Culture of Hong Kong* (Armonk: M.E.Sharpe, 2004).

⁷ Ma Jiewei 馬傑偉 and Zhou Peixia 周佩霞, *Aiguo zhengzhishencha* 愛國政治審查 (A Political Investigation of Patriotism) (Xianggang: Ci wen hua tang, 2005).

towards patriotism, while mainland Chinese students were more nationalistic.⁸ While Fairbrother's work provides some information about the Hong Kong and Chinese governments' policies on political education in Hong Kong and China, and the influence of education on students' attitudes towards nationalism, his study does not tell us about the development of China-orientated sentiments outside an educational context between 1949 and the 1990s. Similarly, the limitation of Ma Kit-wai's study is that it focuses almost entirely on patriotism in post-1997 Hong Kong.

A recent book that focuses on national identity in Hong Kong is the edited volume *Hong Kong, China: Learning to Belong to a Nation* by Gordon Mathews, Ma Kit-wai and Lui Tai-lok.⁹ However, much of this book focuses on the post-1997 period and national identity vis-à-vis Hong Kong identity. It does not examine in detail the different types of nationalist rhetoric that emerged in 1949-1997, nor does it provide a detailed study of the evolution of China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong during that period.

Research Methodology

Collectively, these studies fail to provide a macro-level study of the historical development of China-orientated nationalism in colonial Hong Kong from 1949 to 1997. My thesis aims to provide a comprehensive study of China-orientated nationalism in post-1949 Hong Kong. Rather than discussing Hong Kong identity, my research focuses on the political history of China-orientated

⁸ Gregory P. Fairbrother, *Toward Critical Patriotism: Student Resistance to Political Education in Hong Kong and China* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003), p.185.

⁹ Gordon Mathews, Ma Kit-wai and Tai Lok Lui, *Hong Kong, China: Learning to Belong to a Nation* (London: Routledge, 2008).

nationalism in Hong Kong. I use the same multiple-case approach that Tsai and Lam used in their work by studying, diachronically, historical events that saw the construction and expression of a variety of China-orientated nationalistic sentiments in Hong Kong from 1949 to 1997. Although the events that I will describe only saw the participation of a minority of the Chinese community, they illustrate, when examined separately, the rhetoric of China-orientated nationalism at a particular period, and, when examined together, the evolution of nationalist discourses over 50 years. Like most historians of Hong Kong history, I have used the materials in the Hong Kong Government Records Office. As I am studying the construction of nationalist rhetoric, I also made extensive use of Chinese-language publications. However, archival materials and Chinese-language publications alone do not provide sufficient information about the personal perspectives of actors involved in nationalist movements. Therefore, I interviewed five people from diverse backgrounds who were deeply involved in nationalist movements at various periods.¹⁰

Defining Chinese Nationalism in Colonial Hong Kong: Some Theoretical Issues

At the centre of nationalism is the idea of the nation. My research on Chinese nationalism in Hong Kong was inspired by Benedict Anderson's concept of the nation as an 'imagined community'. Anderson defined the nation as an

¹⁰ Albert Ho Chun-yan (何俊仁), Martin Lee Chu-ming (李柱銘) and Tsang Kin-sing (曾建成) did not respond to my requests for an interview. Tsang Shu-ki (曾澍基) declined to be interviewed.

‘imagined political community’.¹¹ The nation also refers to an imagined ethnic and cultural community tied together by culture, language, history, and myths.¹² The term ‘nation’, as used in this thesis, is different from the term ‘state’. Studies of Chinese nationalism in China often make note of this distinction, which applies to China-orientated nationalistic movements in Hong Kong as well. The term ‘state’ refers to the political institution or sovereign ‘possessing tangible territorial, demographic, and governmental attributes regardless of ethnic or cultural divisions.’¹³ In my thesis, I refer to the PRC and the Republic of China (ROC) as Chinese *states*.¹⁴

Ethnicity is an important factor in the imagination of the nation. Anthony Smith’s idea of ethnicity provides a useful theoretical framework for understanding the origins and nature of China-orientated nationalism in post-1949 Hong Kong. In *National Identity*, Smith lists six main attributes of ethnic community: (i) a collective proper name; (ii) a myth of common ancestry; (iii) shared historical memories; (iv) one or more differentiating elements of common culture; (v) an association with a specific ‘homeland’ and (vi) a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population.¹⁵ Although Smith’s conceptual framework is useful for understanding China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong, we need to apply it carefully, for some of the attributes are

¹¹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2002), p.6.

¹² Sui Shengzhao, *A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism* (California: Stanford University Press, 2004), p.60.

¹³ *Ibid.* See also Montserrat Guibernau, ‘Globalisation and the Nation-State’, in *Understanding Nationalism* ed. Montserrat Guibernau and John Hutchinson (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), pp.242-268.

¹⁴ It should be noted that there is an exception. As I shall discuss in Chapter Three, some of the Chinese intellectuals in exile in Hong Kong viewed the ROC and the GMD as different.

¹⁵ Smith, *National Identity*, p. 21.

problematic when applied to the Hong Kong case. Attributes (i), (ii), (v) and (vi) are relevant to the case of Hong Kong, where ‘China’ was the common proper name, and was referred to as ‘motherland’ in nationalist rhetoric. In the 1950s, Chinese who fled to Hong Kong after 1949 still regarded China as their homeland. The Chinese intellectuals in exile in Hong Kong had an emotional attachment to traditional Chinese culture, which became the basis of their cultural nationalism.¹⁶ Pro-China university students in the 1970s perceived China rhetorically as the ‘motherland’. When Hong Kong people responded to 4 June 1989 in support of the Chinese democracy movement they identified themselves as being part of the Chinese nation, although their response was fuelled by concern over Hong Kong’s political future. However, (iii) and (iv) are problematic in Hong Kong’s case, for there is no evidence that ‘common culture’ was the only significant motif in the expression of China-orientated nationalism in post-1949 Hong Kong. Cultural nationalism promoted by the Chinese intellectuals in exile in the 1950s was based specifically on traditional Chinese culture, which had little impact on the development of China-orientated nationalism outside academia; and the emergence of popular nationalism from the 1970s onwards was fuelled by local politics not ‘common culture’ or ‘shared historical memories’.

Three types of nationalism emerged in Hong Kong in 1949-1997: cultural nationalism, political nationalism, and popular nationalism. By ‘cultural nationalism’ I refer to the type of nationalism tied to a revival of traditional

¹⁶ These intellectuals included Qian Mu (錢穆), Tang Junyi (唐君毅), Mou Zongsan (牟宗三), and Xu Fuguan (徐復觀).

Chinese culture. By ‘political nationalism’ I refer to the nationalist rhetoric based on pro-Chinese Communist Party (CCP)/pro-Guomindang (GMD) sentiments and nationalist sentiments that grew out of the CCP-GMD struggle. By ‘popular nationalism’, I refer to the type of nationalism that had no connection with pro-CCP/pro-GMD sentiments or the CCP-GMD struggle. The three categories accentuate the evolution of China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong in 1949-1997. Up until 1949, the focus of China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong was on China, but in the post-1949 period, increasingly the focus was on what was happening in Hong Kong rather than China.

The fact that Hong Kong is a society of immigrants helps explain the emergence of China-orientated nationalism in post-1949 Hong Kong. Many in the Chinese community fled from China during and after the Chinese Civil War of 1946-1949 and thus had a personal relationship with Chinese history. Therefore, it is possible that some of the later generations of Hong Kong Chinese inherited this emotional attachment to China due to the influence of family members. The fact that the colonial education system contributed to Chinese students’ identification with China *culturally* also helps explain the rise of nationalism.

We can see that the sense of being Chinese in Hong Kong included one’s personal background and descent, Chinese culture, emotional attachment to China as a nation, as well as, sometimes, political allegiances to the CCP or the GMD. The significance of descent in the emergence of national identity has been noted by Frank Dikotter. Dikotter used the term ‘racial nationalism’ and argues

that “a discourse of patrilineal descent has emerged as a very powerful and cohesive form of national identity in China, which has been capable of transcending the extreme diversity of religious practices, family structures, spoken languages, and the regional cultures of population groups that all define themselves as ‘Chinese’”.¹⁷ Dikotter argues that in Taiwan, Singapore and mainland China, blood and descent define ‘Chineseness’.¹⁸ To that list of places I would add Hong Kong. In this thesis, by ‘Chinese’ I refer not only to Chinese people in China but also to Hong Kong people of Chinese descent, whether they be those who were in the colony before 1949, those who fled from China during and after the Chinese Civil War, or those who grew up in Hong Kong after 1949.

Smith has noted that nationalism was not only ‘imagined’ but also ‘deeply felt and acted out’.¹⁹ The historical episodes representing the expression of China-orientated nationalism in post-1949 Hong Kong are the *actions*; and my thesis shows how nationalism in Hong Kong was not simply an act of imagination. Those in the Hong Kong Chinese community involved in nationalist movements had such a strong emotional attachment to China, whether it is to the state or the nation, that they expressed their nationalistic feelings passionately whenever the opportunity arose.

I emphasise that the nationalist movements examined in my study saw the participation of only a minority of Chinese in Hong Kong. In the post-1949 period, up until the 1980s at least, the majority of the Chinese community had

¹⁷ Frank Dikotter, ‘Culture, “Race”, and Nation: The Formation of National Identity in Twentieth Century China’, *Journal of International Affairs*, 1996, 49, 2, pp.590-605.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism* (London: Routledge, 2001), p.137.

little interest in Chinese politics, Hong Kong politics, or China-orientated nationalism. As I shall demonstrate in the chapters that follow, the evolution of China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong was also related to that of the ethnic Chinese community's political participation. In any case, ethnicity alone does not provide a satisfactory answer to the development of China-orientated nationalism in colonial Hong Kong. We must also take into account the external factors: the China factor, Hong Kong factor, and colonialism.

Main Arguments

My thesis has six main arguments. First, China and China-orientated nationalisms were constructions by some sectors of the Chinese community in post-1949 Hong Kong. These constructions demonstrate that there were always divisions among activists within nationalist movements in Hong Kong. At times, such divisions were caused by local political differences. Second, the China factor, the Hong Kong factor and colonialism contributed to the development of China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong. Third, the nature and rhetoric of China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong evolved significantly in the period between the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949 and the end of British colonial rule in 1997, and throughout that period China-centred nationalism served a variety of political purposes within Hong Kong. Fourth, many of Hong Kong's people, in reacting to events in China, particularly from 1967 onwards, imagined the Chinese nation as different from the political state. Fifth, nationalist fevers disrupted and endangered the lives of Hong Kong citizens as well as those involved in the nationalist movements. These five points highlight the complexity

of China-centred nationalism and the impact that nationalism had on Hong Kong society in the post-1949 period.

Structure of the Thesis

My thesis consists of three parts, with six case studies examined diachronically. Part 1 examines in brief the different dimensions of the politics of China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong in the first half of the twentieth century. However, the focus of the thesis is on the post-1949 period, and thus there is much more material in Parts 2 and 3. Part 2, which consists of two chapters, examines China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong in the 1950s and 1960s. Chapter Three discusses the development of cultural and political nationalisms under the influence of post-civil war politics in the 1950s revolving around the effort to recruit and mobilise supporters in Hong Kong by the local bodies in Hong Kong that backed the PRC or alternatively the Nationalist government in Taiwan. In Chapter Four I examine the construction and failure of the Hong Kong leftists' anti-colonial and anti-imperialist rhetoric during the 1967 riots inspired by the Cultural Revolution in China. In Part 3, I analyse the emergence of popular China-orientated nationalist sentiments and strategies in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, which were related more to Hong Kong politics than to Chinese politics. The subject matter of Chapter Five is the 1971 *Baodiao* campaign and the rise of the China Faction in the student movement in the 1970s. In Chapter Six I examine Hong Kong's response to the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989, and in Chapter Seven I discuss the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign. Chapter Eight serves as a Conclusion.

Chapter Two: Dimensions of China-Orientated

Nationalism in Hong Kong 1900s-1949

China-orientated nationalism has existed in Hong Kong since the early twentieth century. Although the focus of the thesis is on the post-1949 period, to understand how the interaction between Chinese history and Hong Kong influenced China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong it is pertinent to examine in brief the politics of China-orientated nationalism in the pre-1949 period. Up until 1949, China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong was more about China than it was about Hong Kong. By examining a series of case studies this chapter aims to provide a brief analysis of the influence of Chinese history and the social, economic, and political situations in Hong Kong on expressions of China-orientated nationalism in early twentieth-century Hong Kong. These case studies have been chosen because they clearly show how China-orientated nationalism was open to interpretation and a significant issue with which the colonial government and some sectors of the Chinese community had to grapple. In addition, these case studies accentuate the multi-dimensional nature of China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong in the pre-1949 period. In the long period between 1900 and 1949, China-orientated nationalism at times jeopardised the security and economy of Hong Kong. It was used as a tactic by both the colonial government and some in the Chinese community for political and economic purposes. It also created divisions among some sectors of the Chinese community.

In the first section, I discuss in brief the historical background of the colony in the first half of the twentieth century. In the second part of the chapter, I examine the case of Chinese elites who, although they were collaborators with the British, did have a sense of China-orientated nationalism. In the third and fourth sections, I examine the surge of nationalistic sentiments among the Chinese community in Hong Kong, as a result of the China factor, in three strikes and boycotts: the Tramway Boycotts of 1912, the May Fourth boycott of 1919 and the Canton-Hong Kong General Strike of 1925. The General Strike in particular shows how China-orientated nationalism was open to interpretation. In the fifth section, I examine the ‘national goods’ movement of the 1930s to demonstrate how China-orientated nationalism was used as a tool by Chinese businesses in Hong Kong to protect their economic interests. In the final parts of the chapter, I examine the politics of China-orientated nationalism during the Sino-Japanese conflict and the Chinese Civil War. Although Chinese businesses in Hong Kong contributed to the war effort, the fact that their business interests were tied to the British limited the ways in which they expressed nationalism. In addition, two competing expressions of nationalist rhetoric in Hong Kong emerged during the Sino-Japanese conflict as the exile community from China promoted the war effort, while the Wang Jingwei faction promoted its collaborationist agenda through its propaganda apparatus in the colony. Like the 1925 Canton-Hong Kong Strike, these competing forms of wartime nationalist rhetoric show that China-orientated nationalism was open to interpretation. The work of the Hong Kong branch of the CCP during the Chinese Civil War shows how nationalism served as a tool for the CCP to promote its political agenda.

Hong Kong in the Early Twentieth Century

Before World War Two (WWII), Hong Kong was not a particularly large city. In 1911, Hong Kong's population was approximately 450,000.²⁰ The population of the colony increased steadily from 501,304 in 1914 to 598,100 in 1919.²¹ By 1920, Hong Kong's population was about 650,000.²² There was an influx of immigrants into the colony in the 1920s and during the Sino-Japanese conflict in the late 1930s.²³ From 1921 to 1931, the Hong Kong population increased from approximately 625,000 to 850,000. According to the *Hong Kong Census Report* there were 849,751 people living in the colony in 1931, 96.85 per cent of whom were Chinese.²⁴

Hong Kong was relatively more stable, politically and economically, than mainland China. During the decades when China was plagued by political turmoil, more people came to Hong Kong to settle. Before WWII, Hong Kong was an entrepot. Although the colony's economy had been hit hard by World War One (WWI), the Great Depression, and various strikes, local commerce and

²⁰ *Hong Kong Census Report 1911*.

²¹ Steve Tsang, *A Modern History of Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2006), p.87.

²² David Faure, 'The Common People in Hong Kong History', in *Colonial Hong Kong and Modern China: Interaction and Reintegration* ed. Lee Pui-tak (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), pp.9-37.

²³ For a detailed discussion on the relationship between immigrants and the development of Hong Kong see Ding Xinbao 丁新豹, 'Yimin yu xianggang de jianshe he fazhan' 移民與香港的建設和發展(Immigrants and the Building and Development of Hong Kong), in *Lishi yu wenhua xianggangshi yanjiu gongkai jiangzuo wenji* 歷史與文化：香港史研究公開講座文集 (A Collection of Speeches and Papers from the Seminars on Hong Kong History) ed. Li Guangxiong 李光雄 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Public Libraries, 2005), pp.15-41.

²⁴ *Hong Kong Census Report 1931*.

industries began to develop in the 1920s and early 1930s and expanded rapidly a few years before 1941.²⁵

During the Sino-Japanese war there was a further influx of migrants from China into the colony. However, shortly afterwards, the population declined as many again left Hong Kong for the mainland. While the population had steadily increased in the pre-war years, Hong Kong before 1949 was an emigration port. The city's population was extremely mobile, for, up to 1939, over six million Chinese had travelled overseas from or through Hong Kong.²⁶ The Hong Kong population make-up of the 1930s was largely lower class, born in China, while the upper class compradores, merchants, and the colonisers were a minority. The professional middle class was very small.²⁷

Hong Kong occupied a special position in the history of modern China. Not only was the colony the birthplace of modern Chinese newspapers, but it was the nursery of prominent Chinese in the political circles of late-Qing and early-Republican China. Some of these prominent Chinese political figures, such as

²⁵ Chung Wai-keung, 'Made in China or Made in Hong Kong? National Goods and the Hong Kong Business Community', in *Colonial Hong Kong and Modern China: Interaction and Reintegration* ed. Lee Pui-tak (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), pp.185-198. See also Yuan Bangjian 元邦建, *Xianggang Shilue* 香港史略 (A Brief History of Hong Kong), pp.158-160. For detailed statistics on the impact of the Great Depression on the Hong Kong economy, see Liu Shuyong 劉蜀永, 'Zhanqian shangye de fazhan' 戰前商業的發展 (The Development of Commerce before the War), in *Ershi shiji de xianggang jingji* 二十世紀的香港經濟 (Hong Kong's Economy in the Twentieth Century) ed. Liu Shuyong 劉蜀永 (Xianggang: Joint Publishing, 2004), pp.37-72.

²⁶ For a detail study of emigration from Hong Kong before the Second World War, see Elizabeth Sinn, 'Emigration from Hong Kong before 1941: General Trends', in *Emigration from Hong Kong* ed. Ronald Skeldon (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1995), pp.11-34.

²⁷ Lu Hongji 陸鴻基, 'Xianggang lishi yu xianggang wenhua' 香港歷史與香港文化 (Hong Kong History and Hong Kong Culture), in *Xianggang wenhua yu shehui* 香港文化與社會 (Culture and Society in Hong Kong) ed. Xian Yuyi 冼玉儀 (Xianggang: , Xianggangdaxue yazhou yanjiuxi, 1995), pp.64-79.

Sun Yat-sen, received their education in Hong Kong.²⁸ As the China factor had such a huge impact on Hong Kong society, it was only natural for the Hong Kong government to implement specific policies to curb the development of China-orientated nationalism for the sake of maintaining political and social stability in the colony. In the next section, I shall examine how the colonial government controlled the promotion of nationalist discourses.

Colonialism: Containing and Promoting China-Orientated nationalism to Maintain Stability 1910s - 1920s

Colonialism in the early twentieth century acted as both a contributing and a limiting factor in the development of China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong. John Carroll, using the case of Ho Kai (何啟, 1859-1914), argued that the ‘Hong Kong government itself encouraged the growth of China-orientated nationalism by providing schools and selecting students for further training in Europe, and by generally encouraging the idea of citizenship’, for what the colonial officials envisioned to be a new China.²⁹ However, at the same time, for the sake of maintaining political stability, the Hong Kong government promoted Confucianism in schools in the wake of the May Fourth Movement of 1919 and the 1925 Canton-Hong Kong Strike.³⁰ The British feared that radical ideas

²⁸ Cai Baoqiong 蔡寶瓊, *Cong nuhua jiaoyu yu wenhuashamo dao bentu wenhua de taitou xianggang wenhua de fazhan yu zhongguo jindai geming de zhuanzhe* 從奴化教育與文化沙漠到本土文化的抬頭：香港文化的發展與中國近代革命的轉折 (From ‘Slave Education’ and ‘Cultural Desert’ to the Rise of Local Culture: The Development of Hong Kong Culture and the Modern Chinese Revolution) in *Jiaoyu xuebao* 教育學報 (Education Journal), 18, 2, 1990, pp.153-164.

²⁹ John Carroll, *Edge of Empires: Chinese Elites and British Colonials in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), p.115.

³⁰ Cai Rongfang, *Xianggang ren zhi xianggangshi* 香港人之香港史 (*Xianggang ren zhi xianggangshi*) (Xianggang: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp.102-107 and 164.

originating from the May Fourth Movement would undermine its rule in Hong Kong.³¹ Thus, following the 1925 Canton-Hong Kong Strike governor Clementi emphasised the need for Chinese people to learn about their own culture. Moreover, in an attempt to combat anti-British sentiments and the influence of the May Fourth movement, the Hong Kong government proposed to set up a department of Chinese at the University of Hong Kong, with an emphasis on promoting Confucianism and traditional Chinese literature.³² Chinese elites, too, emphasised the need to promote Confucianism, for like the government they were concerned about political and economic stability.³³

The colonial government in its own political interests selectively promoted certain aspects of Chinese culture and allowed only the kind of Chinese cultural nationalism that would not threaten its rule. However, colonialism was not the only factor influencing the development of China-orientated nationalism in the colony. The political and economic interests of the Chinese elites, too, served as a major influence. This is illustrated by the stories of Chinese elites who collaborated with the British.

³¹ Edward Vickers, *In Search of an Identity: The Politics of History as a School Subject in Hong Kong, 1960s-2002* (New York: Routledge, 2003), p.164.

³² Wu Lun Nixia 吳倫霓霞, 'Jiaoyu de huigu shangbian' 教育的回顧:上編 (A Review of Education: The First Chapter), *Xianggangshi xinbian* 香港史新編:下冊 (Hong Kong History: New Perspectives Volume 2) (Xianggang: Sanlian shudian youxiangongsi, 1999), pp.417-463.

³³ Cai, *Xianggang ren zhi xianggangshi*, p.106.

Patriotic Collaborators: Local Influential Chinese and China-Orientated nationalism in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century

Local influential Chinese who collaborated with the colonial government had existed in Hong Kong before the twentieth century. They formed various organisations not only to promote trade in Hong Kong, but also to help those in need. Hong Kong Chinese elites were significant in that together they formed key associations that constituted an influential force in the colony, as noted by sociologist Henry Lethbridge. He has argued that key associations in the Chinese community formed by the elites contributed to the relative stability of Hong Kong, and that these associations gave them a position of influence and allowed them to ‘sit at the right hand of the governor’.³⁴ Historically, Chinese elites were closely involved in the affairs of Hong Kong as they were consulted, or absorbed into the administrative process of the colonial government.³⁵ The elites were both representatives of the Chinese community and partners of the colonial government.

The Chinese elites’ relationship with the Hong Kong government, and with the local Chinese community was not always amicable. The Chinese elites who collaborated with the British were at times accused by other Chinese of collaborating with the British imperialists.³⁶ However, the fact that these Chinese

³⁴ Henry J. Lethbridge, *Hong Kong: Stability and Change* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1978), p.65.

³⁵ S.W.K Chiu and Ho-fung Hung, ‘State Building and Rural Society’ in *Hong Kong’s History: State and Society under Colonial Rule* ed. Tak-wing Ngo (London: Routledge, 1999), pp.74-100.

³⁶ Elizabeth Sinn, *Power and Charity: A Chinese Merchant Elite in Colonial Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003), p.211.

elites collaborated with the British did not mean that they were not patriotic. With the development of a Chinese bourgeoisie since the late nineteenth century and the emergence a new Chinese business and professional class in the early twentieth century,³⁷ a new form of nationalism emerged. Chinese elites in Hong Kong such as Ho Kai held the belief that economic and political reforms were necessary to strengthen the Chinese nation.³⁸ They also believed that working with the British through trade would help China fight other foreign powers such as Russia and France.³⁹

Analysis: Chinese Elites and Collaboration as Patriotism

The cases of Ho Kai and Chinese elites in Hong Kong in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries show that the fact that local influential Chinese collaborated with the colonial government did not mean that they were not patriotic. There are no pre-defined or objective criteria as to what it means to be a patriot. One did not need to be anti-colonial to be nationalistic. The fact that Chinese elites' political and economic interests were tied to the British meant that their nationalist rhetoric was inseparable from the colonial situation of Hong Kong and thus served as a limitation to their expression of China-orientated nationalism.

The term 'collaborationist nationalists' has been used to refer to the patriotic Chinese elites who collaborated with the British in Hong Kong.⁴⁰ Through collaboration with the colonizers, these patriotic Chinese elites sought to

³⁷ Carroll, *Edge of Empires: Chinese Elites and British Colonials in Hong Kong*, p.108.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p.118.

³⁹ Cai, *Xianggang ren zhi xianggangshi*, p.63.

⁴⁰ Cai, *Xianggang ren zhi xianggangshi*, p.225.

protect the interests of China and to contribute to the strengthening of the Chinese nation.⁴¹ However, collaborationist nationalists only sought to protect mercantile interests, not the interests of the lower classes.⁴²

Other cases also show that Chinese merchants' expressions of nationalism were at times motivated not by ethnic consciousness, but by economic interests. Cases from the WWII period show that Chinese merchants were unable to support the war effort openly due to their economic and political interests in Hong Kong. I shall discuss these cases later in the chapter. In the next two sections, I continue to explore the concept of the politics of nationalism by examining the Tramway Boycott of 1913 and the May Fourth Boycott of 1919. I have chosen these two case studies because they illustrate how the interaction between Chinese history and Hong Kong's economic and political circumstances triggered and shaped the expression of China-orientated nationalism in the colony. The two case studies also demonstrate how nationalism was used as a tactic and was open to interpretation.

The Politics of National Pride: The Tramway Boycott 1913 and the May Fourth Boycott 1919

The 1911 revolution sparked the rise of popular nationalism in Hong Kong. This is evidenced by the Chinese community's positive reaction to the revolution since the Wuhan uprising of 10 October 1911. Within a few days after the Wuhan uprising thousands of men in Hong Kong cut off their queue. On 18

⁴¹ *Ibid.* See also Jung-fang Tsai, *Comprador Ideologists in Modern China: Ho Kai (Ho Qi, 1859-1914) and Hu Li-yuan (1847-1916)* (PhD Thesis, University of California, 1977), pp.244-246.

⁴² Cai, *Xianggang ren zhi xianggangshi*, p.63.

October, about 400 Chinese attacked the offices of a Qing-loyalist newspaper and the Bank of China, and forced them to remove the Manchu dragon flags. When the Chinese press in Hong Kong received news (which was later found to be untrue) that Peking had fallen to the revolutionaries, there was much celebration among the Chinese community in Hong Kong.⁴³

The increased national pride among the Chinese community in Hong Kong after 1911 is evidenced by the Tramway boycott and the May Fourth boycott. In April 1912, in an attempt to strengthen the local monetary system against the flow of depreciated Chinese coins into the colony, the Hong Kong government passed the Foreign Copper Coin Ordinance.⁴⁴ The Ordinance banned the importation and circulation of foreign copper and bronze coins. The move by the colonial government was seen by many Chinese in Hong Kong as disrespectful to the new ROC.⁴⁵ The Hong Kong government's attempt to enforce the ordinance eventually led to a three-month tramway boycott during the winter of 1912-1913. In November 1912, the two tramway companies and the Star Ferry Company were told by Governor Francis Henry May to refuse Chinese coins for fare payment. However, nationalism alone did not result in the tramway boycott, for there were economic factors involved. When the new fare payment policy came into force on 18 November 1912, many European and Chinese passengers were unable to pay their fares due to a shortage of Hong Kong coins.

⁴³ Jung-fang Tsai, 'From Antiforeignism to Popular Nationalism: Hong Kong between China and Britain, 1839-1911', in *Precarious Balance: Hong Kong Between China and Britain, 1842-1992* ed. Ming K. Chan (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1994), pp.9-25. See also, Jung-fang Tsai, *Hong Kong in Chinese History: Community and Social Unrest in the British Colony, 1842-1913* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp.243-244.

⁴⁴ Ming K. Chan, 'Hong Kong in Sino-British Conflict', in *Precarious Balance: Hong Kong between China and Britain 1842-1992* ed. Ming K. Chan (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1994), pp.27-57.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

The new fare policy also had an adverse impact on the economic interests of Chinese merchants such as small bankers and traders, who made significant profits from the exchange business. Further, many Chinese employers paid their employees' salary in Chinese coins and thus the new fare policy upset Chinese workers.⁴⁶

During the boycott, which broke out shortly after the new fare policy came into effect, the trams were often stoned and shopkeepers either refused to serve those who got off the trams or charged them exorbitant prices.⁴⁷ Along the tram route there were posters threatening tramway riders with death and promoting an anti-imperialist rhetoric as well as nationalistic sentiments.⁴⁸ To combat the boycott, the Hong Kong government passed a law that essentially made boycotts illegal and allowed the government to impose a special punitive rate over a boycotting area and pay the rate to those incurring loss due to the boycott.⁴⁹ The Tramway Company also issued tickets to merchants for sale to their employees and by February, the boycott had ended.

As a nationalist movement, the Tramway Boycott grew out of the interaction between the China factor, the Hong Kong factor and nationalistic sentiments among the Chinese community in Hong Kong.⁵⁰ The economic factor, combined with the rise in nationalism in Hong Kong, served as the main trigger.⁵¹

⁴⁶ Cai, *Xianggang ren zhi xianggangshi*, pp.92-93.

⁴⁷ Ming K. Chan, 'Hong Kong in Sino-British Conflict', in *Precarious Balance: Hong Kong between China and Britain 1842-1992* ed. Ming K. Chan (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1994), pp.27-57.

⁴⁸ Cai, *Xianggang ren zhi xianggangshi*, p.93.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ Cai, *Xianggang ren zhi xianggangshi*, p.92.

⁵¹ For a more detailed analysis of the Tramway Boycott, see Chen Mingqiu 陳明錄, *Minchu xianggang huaren aiguoqingdong chutan yijiuyier zhi yisan nian dizhi dianche ji yijiuyijiu nian*

The boycott resulted in economic losses and caused inconveniences to the Chinese community. The boycott also reflected the surge of nationalistic sentiments among the Chinese community in Hong Kong following the 1911 revolution.

China-Orientated Nationalism and Anti-Japanese Sentiments: The May Fourth Boycott 1919

The May Fourth Movement resulted in a surge of nationalistic sentiments in both China and Hong Kong. There have been many studies done on the May Fourth Movement as well as its implications in Chinese history; therefore, I will only discuss it briefly.⁵² On 4 May 1919, student representatives from thirteen area colleges and universities gathered in Peking and staged a protest involving 3,000 students,⁵³ after hearing that China was unable to recover Qingdao in the Shandong province from Japan at the Versailles Peace Conference. The Shandong settlement also led to a series of nationwide demonstrations, boycotts

wusikangyi 民初香港華人愛國行動初探 - 1912-13年「抵制電車」及1919年「五四抗議」 (A Preliminary Examination of Patriotic Movements by Hong Kong Chinese in the Early Republican period - The 1912-13 Tramway Boycott and 1919 May Fourth Protests), in *Jindai zhongguo zhi chuantong yu tuibian* 近代中國之傳統與蛻變 (Tradition and Metamorphosis in Modern Chinese History) ed. Hao Yenping 郝延平 and Wei Xiumei 魏秀梅 (Taipei: Zhongyanganjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, 1998), pp.661-677.

⁵² See, for example, Milena Dolezelova-Velingerova and Oldrich Kral, *The Appropriation of Cultural Capital: China's May Fourth Project* (Harvard University Asia Centre, 2001); and Yu Yingshi 余英時, *Wu si xin lun: ji fei wenyi fuxing yi fei qimeng yundong* 五四新論: 即非文藝復興, 亦非啓蒙運動 (A New Study of the May Fourth Movement: Neither Renaissance Nor Enlightenment) (Taipei: Lianjing chubanshiyegongsi, 1999).

⁵³ Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, (New York: W.W.Norton and Company, second edition, 1999), p.299.

and strikes from late May to late June against both the Beijing regime and Japan.⁵⁴

The May Fourth Movement in China sparked boycotts of Japanese goods and anti-Japanese protests in Hong Kong as well. Many Chinese removed Japanese goods from their households.⁵⁵ The Chinese community criticised some of the major Chinese businesses in Hong Kong for selling Japanese goods. In order to protect their economic interests, these businesses decided to promote the products they sold as ‘national goods’.⁵⁶ Teachers and students, too, promoted patriotic sentiments and the idea of national goods.⁵⁷

Determined to maintain political stability, the colonial government stepped up its efforts to suppress the rise of patriotic sentiments. As mentioned previously, to combat the influence of the May Fourth Movement both the colonial government and the conservative Chinese elites promoted Confucianism. During the May Fourth protests, the education department inspected Chinese schools and checked teaching materials. The police also searched bookstores and confiscated textbooks that were ‘undesirable’.⁵⁸ Thus, two types of nationalism emerged in Hong Kong during the May Fourth Movement. One was conservative cultural nationalism promoted by the colonial government, and the

⁵⁴ Ming K. Chan, ‘Hong Kong in Sino-British Conflict’, in *Precairous Balance: Hong Kong between China and Britain 1842-1992* ed. Ming K. Chan (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1994), pp.27-57.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ Cai, *Xianggang ren zhi xianggangshi*, p.103.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ Ming K. Chan, ‘Hong Kong in Sino-British Conflict’, in *Precairous Balance: Hong Kong between China and Britain 1842-1992* ed. Ming K. Chan (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1994), pp.27-57.

other was based on anti-Japanese sentiments resulting from the May Fourth Movement.

The Hong Kong government reinforced armed police patrols on the streets. On 3 June, the Hong Kong police arrested eight students who were marching along Queen's Road Central while holding Chinese-made umbrellas bearing the Chinese characters 'national goods'. However, the arrest only served to provoke the Chinese community further as more boycotts took place and Japanese stores were stoned.⁵⁹

The May Fourth Boycott of 1919 shows that Chinese businesses supported nationalism as a tactic to protect their business interests and how colonialism served as a limiting and contributing factor in expressions of nationalist sentiments. The emergence of the two different kinds of nationalism in 1919 illustrates how China-orientated nationalism was open to interpretation. The Canton-Hong Kong General Strike of 1925, the subject of the next section, also shows how nationalism was open to interpretation as the Chinese community had different opinions on the strike. Once again, Chinese businesses turned to nationalism in combating the strike to protect their economic interests, and others who supported the strike did so in the name of patriotism.

The Canton-Hong Kong General Strike 1925-1926

The 1925-1926 General Strike-Boycott in Canton and Hong Kong was triggered by the May Thirtieth Incident (五卅慘案), which took place on 30 May

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

1925.⁶⁰ A general strike took place and it was followed by a sixteen-month boycott. In May 1925, a group of Chinese workers in Shanghai, who were on strike and locked out of a Japanese-owned textile mill, broke into the mill and destroyed some of the machinery. Japanese guards opened fire and killed one of the workers. The incident sparked public outrage, demonstrations and more strikes. On May 30, thousands of workers and students gathered in Nanjing Road to demand the release of six Chinese students who had been arrested by the British, and to protest against foreign imperialism.⁶¹

The Shakee Massacre of 23 June 1925 in which of the hundred thousand or so protesters 52 were shot dead and 167 were injured by British troops in Canton further provoked the Chinese community in Hong Kong.⁶² While it is clear that Chinese in Hong Kong were ‘spurred to action by patriotism and nationalism’,⁶³ China-orientated nationalism alone could not have sustained the strike. Other contributing factors included political forces from Canton, economic hardships of Chinese workers in the colony, Chinese students’ increased political awareness as well as the masses’ dissatisfaction with the

⁶⁰ Before the general strike there had been strikes by the seamen’s union in 1922 and the mechanic’s strike of 1920. But they were not related to China-orientated nationalism. For more details on the May Thirtieth Incident see Ren Jianshu 任建樹, *Wusayundong jianshi* 五卅運動簡史 (A Short History of the May Thirtieth Movement) (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1985); and Richard Rigby, *The May 30 Movement: Events and Themes* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1980).

⁶¹ Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, (New York: W.W.Norton and Company, second edition, 1999), p.322.

⁶² Shen Yongxing 沈永興, *Cong bodianzha dao pengdingkang lijie gangdu zhuanlue* 從砵甸乍到彭定康：歷屆港督傳略 (From Pottinger to Pattern: Brief Biographies of Hong Kong Governors) (Hong Kong: Xintian chubanshe, 1994), p.137. See also Ming K. Chan, ‘Hong Kong in Sino-British Conflict’, in *Precarious Balance: Hong Kong between China and Britain 1842-1992* ed. Ming K. Chan (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1994), pp.27-57.

⁶³ Chan Lau Kit-ching, *From Nothing to Nothing: The Chinese Communist Movement and Hong Kong 1921-1936* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1999), pp.59-60. For details on the Hong Kong strike, see also Edmund S.K. Fung, *The Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp.40-54.

colonial government.⁶⁴ Moreover, many workers were forced to go on strike by the strike committee.⁶⁵ Leftist forces in the GMD and the CCP in Canton were directly involved in organising the strike-boycott,⁶⁶ and the Chinese Communists exploited the nationalistic sentiments of Hong Kong workers sparked by the May Thirtieth Incident.⁶⁷

The strike-boycott in Canton and Hong Kong had a significant economic and social impact on the colony. The Hong Kong government's revenue decreased significantly. As many as 3,000 shops went bankrupt in November and December 1925.⁶⁸ The strike drew approximately 250,000 Hong Kong strikers and their families back to the Canton Delta, and exposed the nationalistic sentiments of the strikers, as noted by Ming K. Chan:

[T]he Hong Kong strikers not only echoed the call for the abolition of unequal treaties and the other requirements of the Shanghai May Thirtieth protesters but also presented six specific demands to the colonial regime to redress local Chinese grievances'⁶⁹

While there was confrontation between the workers and their employers, there was also collaboration between the merchants, the residents of Hong Kong, and the Hong Kong government as it was in the interest of all three sides that law

⁶⁴ Cai, *Xianggang ren zhi xianggangshi*, p.25 and 130.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.144 and 148.

⁶⁶ Ming K. Chan, 'Hong Kong in Sino-British Conflict', in *Prekarious Balance: Hong Kong between China and Britain 1842-1992* ed. Ming K. Chan (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1994), pp.27-57. See also, Chan Lau, *From Nothing to Nothing*, pp.53-61; and Fung, *The Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat*, p.42.

⁶⁷ Chan Lau, *From Nothing to Nothing*, pp.59-60.

⁶⁸ Cai, *Xianggang ren zhi xianggangshi*, p.146.

⁶⁹ Ming K. Chan, 'Hong Kong in Sino-British Conflict', in *Prekarious Balance: Hong Kong between China and Britain 1842-1992* ed. Ming K. Chan (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1994), pp.27-57.

and order be maintained and things return to normal as soon as possible.⁷⁰ The Hong Kong government under Sir Reginald Stubbs believed that there was a Communist plot going on,⁷¹ and was determined to suppress Communist influence in the colony. The fact that the General Strike and Boycott of 1925 had its roots in the May Thirtieth Incident shows that the surge of nationalistic sentiments in Hong Kong was triggered by events in China.⁷²

Not all in the Chinese community supported the strike. Chinese elites such as Shouson Chou (周壽臣) were caught in a difficult position, for although they did not support the strike due to economic interests, they were reluctant to oppose it openly for political reasons, as they did not wish to sever their relations with the Canton government.⁷³ In any case, local Chinese businesspeople and the Hong Kong government took steps in an attempt to stop the general strike. In fact, Chinese businesses turned to China-orientated nationalism in an attempt to persuade workers to return to work by saying that ‘true patriots’ should return to work and they accused the Canton government of being a ‘traitor’ and puppet of the Soviet Union.⁷⁴ The disruption caused by the Communists to business in Hong Kong, and other areas in China, gave rise to anti-Communist sentiments among Chinese merchants in Hong Kong in

⁷⁰ Cai, *Xianggang ren zhi xianggangshi 1841-1945*, pp.132 and 138.

⁷¹ Chan Lau Kit-ching, ‘Business and Radicalism: Hong Kong Chinese Merchants and the Chinese Communist Movement, 1921-1934’, in *Colonial Hong Kong and Modern China: Interaction and Reintegration* ed. Lee Pui-tak (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), pp.169-183.

⁷² Chan Lau Kit-ching, *China, Britain and Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1990), p.180.

⁷³ Zheng Hongtai 鄭宏泰 and Zhou Zhenwei 周振威, *Xianggang dalao* 香港大老 (Hong Kong Big Guns: Shouson Chou) (Xianggang: Sanlian shudian, 2006), p.160.

⁷⁴ Cai, *Xianggang ren zhi xianggangshi*, pp.143-146.

particular. Chan Lau Kit-ching has even argued that ‘the entire Hong Kong society could be said to be anti-Communist’.⁷⁵

Analysis: China-Orientated nationalism and the Canton-Hong Kong Strike Boycott

As far as the politics of China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong is concerned, the strike-boycott illustrates several matters. First, as a nationalist movement the strike-boycott was sparked by both the Chinese political context as well as by Hong Kong’s social context. Second, because the strike-boycott, as an expression of nationalism, adversely affected Hong Kong’s economy as well as the livelihood of those who were forced to leave Hong Kong or those who stayed in Hong Kong, a sense of fear for the Communists began to emerge among the Hong Kong population. Third, the strike illustrates how an event in China could stir up nationalist sentiments among the Chinese community in Hong Kong. Fourth, for the CCP and the GMD, the interests of the people of the colony were only secondary to politics and the country itself.⁷⁶

The strike illustrates how the tide of nationalism originating from the Mainland could sweep across the British colony, and how nationalism was open to interpretation as the strike resulted in political divisions within the Chinese community in Hong Kong. On the one hand, there were the strikers and students who supported the Canton revolutionary government as a way to express their

⁷⁵ Chan Lau Kit-ching, ‘Business and Radicalism: Hong Kong Chinese Merchants and the Chinese Communist Movement, 1921-1934’, in *Colonial Hong Kong and Modern China: Interaction and Reintegration* ed. Lee Pui-tak (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), pp.169-183.

⁷⁶ Cai, *Xianggang ren zhi xianggangshi*, p.161-162.

patriotism. On the other hand, the local merchants and right-wing workers who opposed the strike claimed that they did so in the name of nationalism as they believed the strikes would have an adverse effect on Chinese businesses in the colony.⁷⁷ Both sides claimed to be ‘nationalistic’ and criticised each other as ‘traitors’.⁷⁸

The debate over nationalism during the 1925 General Strike accentuates two features of nationalism in pre-1949 Hong Kong. First, the socio-economic and socio-political environment of the colony had a significant impact on the expressions of nationalism. Secondly, Chinese elites and businesses in Hong Kong would make use of China-orientated nationalism to protect their economic and political interests. In fact, at times Chinese businesses used China-orientated nationalism as a tactic to promote their products. In the following section, I examine the dynamics of that nationalism in the business context in the 1930s.

Chinese Businesses in Hong Kong and the Politics of China-Orientated nationalism in the Late 1920s and 1930s

Chinese businesses in Hong Kong at times turned to nationalism to protect their economic interests. The marketing of Hong Kong products as *guohuo* (國貨), or ‘national goods’, and the use of nationalist rhetoric by Chinese businesspeople in Hong Kong in the 1930s illustrate how issues of identity and China-orientated nationalism extended to the commercial scene.⁷⁹ Local

⁷⁷ Cai, *Xianggangren zhi xianggangshi*, pp.142-143, 146.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p.146.

⁷⁹ Chung Wai-keung, ‘Made in China or Made in Hong Kong? National Goods and the Hong Kong Business Community’, in *Colonial Hong Kong and Modern China* ed. Lee Pui-tak (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), pp.185-198. See also, Huei-ying Kuo, ‘Chinese

industries expanded in the 1920s and 1930s, as Hong Kong became an industrial society.⁸⁰ At that time Hong Kong products were not regarded as Chinese products in mainland China, but in the Exhibition of Chinese Products held in February 1938, most of the participants were Hong Kong-based factories and companies. The irony is that Hong Kong products became *guohuo* (Chinese national goods) in the exhibition, yet the manufacturers seldom labelled their goods as *guohuo*.⁸¹ The Chinese Manufacturers' Union of Hong Kong, established in 1934 tried to promote to the public a Chinese identity for Hong Kong goods.⁸²

In the 1930s, Chinese businesses in Hong Kong were faced with the imposition of high tariffs in China on non-Chinese goods, and were disadvantaged by the British Imperial Preference System, which was designed to protect British capitalists' interests at the expense of Hong Kong-Chinese merchants' interests.⁸³ In response to these challenges, Chinese businesses in Hong Kong turned to nationalism by promoting their products as 'national goods'. However, their quest for 'transnational economic citizenship' failed because the Chinese Nationalist government did not officially recognise products made in Hong Kong as national goods.⁸⁴

Bourgeois Nationalism in Hong Kong and Singapore in the 1930s', *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 36, 3, 2006, pp.385-405.

⁸⁰ David Faure, 'The Common People in Hong Kong History', in *Colonial Hong Kong and Modern China: Interaction and Reintegration* ed. Lee Pui-tak (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), pp.9-37.

⁸¹ Chung Wai-keung, 'Made in China or Made in Hong Kong? National Goods and the Hong Kong Business Community', in *Colonial Hong Kong and Modern China* ed. Lee Pui-tak (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), pp.185-198.

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ Huei-ying Kuo, 'Chinese Bourgeois Nationalism in Hong Kong and Singapore in the 1930s', *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 36, 3, 2006, pp.385-405.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

During the first phases of the Sino-Japanese conflict, Chinese businesses in Hong Kong once again turned to patriotism to promote their products. In commercial advertisements, for example, Chinese businesses claimed that buying their products meant supporting the war in China. In other words, Chinese businesses attempted to exploit the Chinese community's anti-Japanese patriotism by claiming that using their products was supporting China.⁸⁵ Chinese businesses also chose names for their companies that carried a nationalistic tone.⁸⁶ In fact, the tactic of exploiting nationalism for the sake of protecting business interests had been used by Chinese merchants in the 1905 anti-United States (US) boycott and the 1908 anti-Japanese boycott.⁸⁷

Moreover, Chinese elites and businesses in Hong Kong took a cautious approach in supporting the war against Japan. For example, when the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce and the Tung Wah Hospital organised a fundraising campaign during the Jinan Incident of 1928, they emphasised that the Jinan Incident was only one of the many disasters in China that needed donations, thus downplaying the political implications of the Sino-Japanese conflict.⁸⁸ The Chinese General Chamber of Commerce Hong Kong and the Tung Wah Hospital ensured that the fundraising campaign was conducted as a charitable movement rather than a nationalist one. They wired the donations to the Red Swastika Society rather than the Nationalist Army.⁸⁹

⁸⁵ Cai, *Xianggang ren zhi xianggangshi*, pp.186 and 187.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p.185.

⁸⁷ For brief discussions on the 1905 anti-American boycott and the 1908 anti-Japanese boycott, see Cai, *Xianggang ren zhi xianggangshi*, pp.71-81.

⁸⁸ Huei-ying Kuo, 'Chinese Bourgeois Nationalism in Hong Kong and Singapore in the 1930s', *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 36, 3, 2006, pp.385-405.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

Analysis: Chinese Elites and Businesses Confronting and Supporting China-Orientated nationalism

In the 1920s and 1930s, Chinese elites and businesses in Hong Kong possessed an ambivalent attitude towards China-orientated nationalism. On some occasions they confronted nationalism out of fear that the surge of nationalist sentiments would have an adverse impact on their economic interests, which were tied to British interests in the colony. At times, Chinese businesses turned to China-orientated nationalism as a tactic to protect their economic interests by promoting their products as ‘national goods’ and thus China-orientated nationalism was essentially a construction in the business context.

That business interests served as a limiting factor in expressions of nationalism was reflected clearly in Hong Kong’s response to the Sino-Japanese conflicts. Chinese businesses were unable to support the war effort openly as their interests were tied to colonialism and the Hong Kong government was determined to maintain neutrality during the Sino-Japanese conflict. In this sense, private interests and colonialism acted as limitations on expressions of China-orientated nationalism.

With the outbreak and escalation of the Sino-Japanese conflicts in the 1930s and 1940s, there was a surge of anti-Japanese sentiments in Hong Kong. The colony became a secondary battleground for Chinese political propaganda. The national crisis in China became the new source of the rise of China-orientated nationalism in the colony. I will examine briefly the responses of the Chinese community to the Shenyang Incident in 1931 and the emergence of two

competing types of nationalist rhetoric during the Sino-Japanese conflict: resistance and collaboration.

The Politics of Anti-Japanese Patriotism I: Violent and Non-Violent Expressions of Nationalism

There were numerous examples of how the Chinese community in Hong Kong reacted to the Sino-Japanese conflicts following the Shenyang Incident in the early 1930s, and made substantial contributions, financial or otherwise, to the war effort in the late 1930s and early 1940s.⁹⁰ For example, some left Hong Kong for China to contribute to the war effort, including students and professionals.⁹¹ Numerous anti-Japanese and relief societies emerged in Hong Kong during the war.⁹² Due to space limitations, I am unable to examine in detail Hong Kong's response to the Sino-Japanese conflicts. In this section, I will discuss briefly how nationalism was expressed through violent and non-violent means.

The surge of anti-Japanese sentiments among the Chinese community in Hong Kong following the Shenyang Incident resulted in a series of anti-Japanese riots in September 1931. There was violence against Japanese residents in Hong

⁹⁰ For a detailed study of the Hong Kong Chinese community's responses to the Sino-Japanese conflict, see Ma Yiu-chung, *Hong Kong's Responses to the Sino-Japanese Conflicts from 1931-1941: China-orientated nationalism in a British Colony*, M.Phil Thesis, University of Hong Kong, 2001.

⁹¹ Liang Keping 梁柯平, 'Xianggang xuesheng de kangri jiuwang yundong' 香港學生的抗日救亡運動 (Hong Kong Students and their Anti-Japanese and National Salvation Movement), in *Xianggang kangzhan dongjiangzongdui gangjiu dulidadi lunwenji* 香港抗戰東江縱隊港九獨立大隊論文集 (The Defence of Hong Kong: Collected Essays on the Hong Kong-Kowloon Brigade of the East River Column) ed. Chen Jingtang 陳敬堂 et.al. (Xianggang: Xianggang kangle ji wenhua shiwushu, 2004), pp.55-73.

⁹² Chan Lau, *China, Britain and Hong Kong*, p.267.

Kong and Japanese shops were stoned. Victims of the violence included Japanese families and children.⁹³ However, not all in the Chinese community supported the use of violence in the expression of nationalism. Chinese elites and some journalists condemned the use of violence against Japanese residents. Some in the Chinese community chose to express their patriotism by more peaceful means such as the boycott of Japanese goods.⁹⁴

Collaboration vs. Resistance: Competing Nationalist Rhetoric in the Sino-Japanese Conflict

The Hong Kong government's determination to preserve Hong Kong's neutrality, and its lack of preparation for the war contrasted sharply with the dynamics of Chinese wartime politics in the colony. As the Japanese pushed towards the south in China, several well-known Chinese newspapers and publications moved to Hong Kong in 1937.⁹⁵ As a result of the activities of mainland writers and journalists who supported either the war against Japan, or collaboration with Japan, there emerged two types of nationalist rhetoric during the Sino-Japanese conflicts in the Chinese-language press.

Writers from China continued to promote the war effort after fleeing to Hong Kong, and the Nationalist government endeavoured to rally the Chinese community in Hong Kong to China's defence by organising fund-raising activities in the colony. Conversely, Wang Jingwei (汪精衛) and his people

⁹³ For details, see Ma Yiu-chung, *Hong Kong's Responses to the Sino-Japanese Conflicts from 1931-1941: China-orientated nationalism in a British Colony*, M.Phil Thesis, University of Hong Kong, 2001, pp.18-24.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.27-30.

⁹⁵ Chan Lau Kit-ching, *China, Britain and Hong Kong 1895-1945* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1990), p.267.

involved in the ‘peace movement’ (和平運動) collaborated with Japan and used Hong Kong as a base for propaganda purposes.⁹⁶ In Hong Kong the Wang Clique (汪派) used its propaganda arm the *South China Daily News* (南華日報) to promote its political agenda.⁹⁷ Initially the Wang Clique kept a low profile in its activities but began promoting its collaborationist agenda and criticised the idea of ‘the war of resistance’ in the late 1930s.⁹⁸ Following Wang’s defection in 1939 the *South China Daily News* continued to actively promote the Wang Clique’s collaborationist agenda by claiming that only by making peace with Japan could China be revived and rebuilt (復興建設).⁹⁹

Promoting the War of Resistance I: Chinese Writers in Hong Kong (1930s and 1940s)

During the war, prominent writers who came to Hong Kong from China contributed to a new wave of cultural development in the colony. It has been argued that at this time Hong Kong ‘prospered briefly as a centre of literary activity’.¹⁰⁰ Even though Hong Kong was lagging behind the New Culture Movement on the mainland, the colony remained closely connected to China

⁹⁶ For more information on Wang Jingwei see John Hunter Boyle, *China and Japan at War 1937-1945: The Politics of Collaboration* (California: Stanford University Press, 1972).

⁹⁷ Other unofficial newspapers of the Wang Clique included the *Tianyan ribao* (天演日報) and the *Ziyou ribao* (自由日報). See Xie, *Xiangang kangri fengyun lu*, p.146. For a detailed study of the Wang Clique newspapers in Hong Kong and Shanghai, see Chiu Ming Wah, *Resistance, Peace and War: The Central China Daily News, the South China Daily News and the Wang Jingwei Clique during the Sino-Japanese War 1937-1945*, M.Phil Thesis, University of Hong Kong, 2005.

⁹⁸ Chiu, *Resistance, Peace and War*, p.75.

⁹⁹ See, for example, *South China Daily News*, 1 April 1940, p.1; 1 January 1941, p.1; 4 January 1941, p.1.

¹⁰⁰ Leo Ou-fan Lee, ‘Literary Trends: The Road to Revolution 1927-1949’, in *The Cambridge History of China Volume 13 Republican China 1912-1949 Part 2* ed. John K. Fairbank and Albert Feuerwerker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, reprint, 1990), pp.421-491.

socially and culturally.¹⁰¹ With the influx of prominent nationalistic cultural figures from China into Hong Kong, there was a high level of anti-Japanese sentiments in the colony and much propaganda for the war of resistance.¹⁰² Mainland publications such as the *Dazhong shenghuo* (大眾生活), whose editor was Zou Taofen (鄒韜奮), moved to Hong Kong after the fall of Shanghai to the Japanese in the late 1930s. Writers in these publications promoted the war of resistance and criticised the Wang clique as traitors.¹⁰³

The promotion of the war of resistance in the cultural scene was connected to Chinese politics. The CCP did a great deal of work in Hong Kong in contacting and organising the Chinese writers in Hong Kong in promoting the war effort. For the CCP the ultimate goal of such a move was to promote their agenda and to gain the support of both the international community as well as the Chinese community in Hong Kong.¹⁰⁴ This is another example of how China-orientated nationalism was used as a tool for promoting one's political agenda.

¹⁰¹ See also Cai Baoqiong 蔡寶瓊, *Cong nuhua jiaoyu yu wenhuashamo dao bentu wenhua de taitou xianggang wenhua de fazhan yu zhongguo jindai geming de zhuanzhe* (從奴化教育與文化沙漠到本土文化的抬頭：香港文化的發展與中國近代革命的轉折 From 'Slave Education' and 'Cultural Desert' to the Rise of Local Culture: The Development of Hong Kong Culture and the Modern Chinese Revolution) in *Education Journal* (教育學報), Vol.18, No.2 (December, 1990), pp.153-164.

¹⁰² Luo Huanzhang 羅煥璋, 'Xianggang yingjun fangyu rijun jingong zuozhan de pingjia' 香港英軍防禦日軍進攻作戰的評價 (An Evaluation of the Defensive Warfare of the British Forces in Hong Kong in the War of Resistance against Japanese), in *Xianggang kangzhan dongjiangzongdui gangjiu dolidadui lunwenji* 香港抗戰東江縱隊港九獨立大隊論文集 (The Defence of Hong Kong: Collected Essays on the Hong Kong-Kowloon Brigade of the East River Column) ed. Chen Jingtang 陳敬堂 et.al. (Xianggang: Xianggang kangle ji wenhua shiwushu, 2004), pp.75-87.

¹⁰³ See, for example, the editorial in *Dazhong shenghuo* 大眾生活 (Public Life), Issue 8, July 1941, p.169. (Reprinted version)

¹⁰⁴ Yuan Xiaolun 袁小倫, *Yuegang kangzhan wenhuashi lungao* 粵港抗戰文化史論稿 (Research Writings on the History of the Culture of the War of Resistance in Canton and Hong Kong) (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 2005), p.155. See also, Xie Yongguang 謝永光,

Promoting the War of Resistance II: The Politics of China-Orientated nationalism in the Cinema

In the Hong Kong film industry, too, there was a surge of nationalistic sentiments triggered by the Sino-Japanese war. Poshek Fu's study of the Hong Kong cinema during the war against Japan has shown how local filmmakers remained politically aloof in their productions, whilst filmmakers who fled from Shanghai attempted to promote a nationalist discourse in the colony.¹⁰⁵

The war-related nationalist fever put Chinese filmmakers in Hong Kong in a difficult position. They were told not to produce patriotic films expressing anti-Japanese sentiments by the Hong Kong government, which was determined to maintain neutrality in the war and banned several Chongqing-made short films. At the same time, local filmmakers were under pressure from the Nationalist government and the exile community to produce films with a nationalist rhetoric for promoting the war effort. Some local filmmakers even received death threats. Between 1937 and 1938, a number of war-related films were released. However, such 'patriotic' films were 'suffused with commercial generic [sic] elements', and attracted criticisms from the Nationalist government.¹⁰⁶ The popularity of

Xianggang kangri fengyun lu 香港抗日風雲錄 (A Chronicle of the Dynamics of Anti-Japanese Activities in Hong Kong) (Xianggang: Tianditushu youxiangongsi, 1995), p.44-47.

¹⁰⁵ Poshek Fu, 'Between Nationalism and Colonialism: Mainland Emigres, Marginal Culture, and Hong Kong Cinema 1937-1941', in *The Cinema of Hong Kong: History, Arts, Identity* ed. Poshek Fu and David Desser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp.199-226.

¹⁰⁶ Poshek Fu, *Between Shanghai and Hong Kong: The Politics of Chinese Cinemas* (California: Stanford University Press, 2003), p.78.

patriotic films declined soon after 1938 as the patriotic fever in the colony started to fade away after Canton fell to the Japanese late that year.¹⁰⁷

The promotion of patriotism in Chinese cinema in Hong Kong during the Sino-Japanese war shows how Chinese politics influenced the development of China-orientated nationalism in the colony. Even though on the surface war story films appeared to be ‘patriotic’ films, in essence they were commercial films typical of the Hong Kong cinema in the 1930s. In this sense, the Hong Kong factor once again served as a limitation to the expression of China-orientated nationalism. The fact that popularity of patriotic films declined quickly illustrates how a nationalist fever was often short-lived. Local filmmakers suffered at the hands of China-orientated nationalism politically as they were threatened and criticised by the exile community and the Nationalist government. They also suffered financially as some of the war-related films were ‘box-office disasters’.¹⁰⁸

The emergence of two competing nationalist discourses in Hong Kong in the late 1930s and early 1940s showed that China-orientated nationalism was open to interpretation. For some Chinese, being a patriot meant supporting the war of resistance. For others, such as those in the Wang Clique, only through collaboration with Japan could China be saved. Hong Kong essentially became a secondary battleground for propaganda purposes and the Chinese press in Hong Kong served as an important platform for the promotion of nationalist rhetoric. Wartime China-orientated nationalism was not simply a rhetoric, for the Hong

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p.80.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

Kong Chinese community acted out their patriotism by making substantial financial contributions to the war effort and by participating in a series of anti-Japanese boycotts.

The Politics of Anti-Japanese Patriotism II: Chinese Politics and the Hong Kong Students' Relief Association

While the Hong Kong Students Relief Association (香港學生賑濟會) served as a significant force in supporting the war effort,¹⁰⁹ it was not immune to the influence of Chinese politics, which ultimately led to an internal split. Many in the patriotic student movement favoured the nationalist rhetoric of fighting the Japanese promoted by the CCP. In an attempt to combat Communist influence, the GMD not only recruited in GMD-controlled schools but also interfered in the affairs of the Hong Kong Students Relief Association. Some schools were pressured by the GMD to remove some of their representatives from the association. Some students who were GMD members joined the association and there were political divisions within the association. As a result of such divisions, member groups began leaving and the association eventually disappeared by early 1940.¹¹⁰

The case study of the Hong Kong Students Relief Association shows how Chinese students in Hong Kong in particular formed a significant voice in the

¹⁰⁹ For a detailed study of student movements in Hong Kong during the second Sino-Japanese war, see Liang Keping 梁柯平, *Kangri zhanzheng shiqi de xianggang xueyun* 抗日戰爭時期的香港學運 (Student Movements in Hong Kong during the War of Resistance against the Japanese) (Xianggang: Xianggang gejie jinian kangzhan huodong chouweihui youxiangongsi xianggang gejie wenhua cujinhui youxiangongsi, 2005).

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.155-157.

expression of nationalism during the Sino-Japanese conflict. In fact, in the post-1949 period, too, Hong Kong students and young people would continue to be major actors in the construction of nationalist rhetoric, particularly in the 1970s. However, as with any nationalist movement in Hong Kong, there were divisions among the Hong Kong Chinese who participated in them. The split within the Hong Kong Students Relief Association due to GMD influence is a classic example. Divisions within the Chinese community were also evidenced by the fact that some Chinese chose to express their patriotism through violence in anti-Japanese riots, while others did so by participating in the peaceful boycott of Japanese goods.

The Hong Kong government, determined to maintain political neutrality, took steps to censor the media promoting anti-Japanese feelings. In August 1939, the Hong Kong government established a special office, which checked all Chinese magazines and newspapers. All anti-Japanese comments in the Chinese publications were replaced by either crosses or squares.¹¹¹ In addition, the Hong Kong government banned Chongqing-made films promoting the war effort and patriotism. In this sense, colonialism once again served as a limitation to the expressions of China-orientated nationalism in the colony.

Armed Resistance *versus* Collaboration: Hong Kong under Japanese Rule (1940s)

In the 1940s, under the Japanese occupation the Chinese community in Hong Kong expressed its patriotism in two ways: armed resistance against the

¹¹¹ Xie, *Xianggang kangri fengyunlu*, p.72.

Japanese and collaboration with them. During the Japanese invasion, Hong Kong was in chaos and the British surrendered the colony on 25 December 1941 after only eighteen days of fighting. Thereafter, the resistance efforts were mainly carried out by two groups, the British Army Aid Group (BAAG), led by Lieutenant Colonel Lindsay Ride, and the Chinese guerrilla fighters, the most famous of whom was the Hong Kong-Kowloon Brigade of the East River Column (東江縱隊港九獨立大隊). The brigade was primarily led by the Chinese Communists, although many of the soldiers were born in Hong Kong or in other British colonies such as Singapore and Malaya.¹¹² Several detachments of the Column were formed in the early 1940s. One of these was the Hong Kong-Kowloon Anti-Japanese Guerrilla established by the Chinese Communists and local villagers in Sai Kung on 3 February 1942. Many guerrilla members were local young anglers.¹¹³ Other young Hong Kong Chinese also contributed to the fight against the Japanese in the urban areas during the occupation period.¹¹⁴ The Chinese Communists developed a bond with the local residents,

¹¹² Chan Sui-jeung, *East River Column: Hong Kong Guerrillas in the Second World War and After* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009), p.59.

¹¹³ Deng Zhennan 鄧震南, 'Xi gung qu de youji zhanzheng' (西貢區的游擊戰爭 Guerilla Warfare in Sai Kung District), *Xianggang kangzhan dongjiangzongdui gangjiu duli dadui lunwenji* 東江縱隊港九獨立大隊論文集 (The Defence of Hong Kong: Collected Essays on the Hong Kong-Kowloon Brigade of the East River Column) ed. Chen Jingtang 陳敬堂 et.al. (Xianggang: Xianggang kangle ji wenhua shiwushu, 2004), pp.175-187. See also Tsang, *A Modern History of Hong Kong*, pp.129-130; and Zhou Yi, 周奕, *Xianggang yingxiong ernu dongjiang zongdui gangjiu dadui kangri zhanshi* 香港英雄兒女：東江縱隊港九大隊抗日戰史 (Hong Kong's Heroes: Wartime History of the Hong Kong-Kowloon Brigade of the East River Guerillas) (Xianggang: liwen chubanshe, 2005), pp.78-88.

¹¹⁴ Yang Sheng 楊聲, 'Chengshi youjizhan' 城市游擊戰 (Urban Guerilla War), *Xianggang kangzhan dongjiangzongdui gangjiu duli dadui lunwenji* 東江縱隊港九獨立大隊論文集 (The Defence of Hong Kong: Collected Essays on the Hong Kong-Kowloon Brigade of the East River Column) ed. Chen Jingtang 陳敬堂 et.al. (Xianggang: Xianggang kangle ji wenhua shiwushu, 2004), pp.226-242.

and promoted China-orientated nationalism among them.¹¹⁵ The guerrilla members were well-known for assassinations of Chinese collaborating with the Japanese.¹¹⁶

The Chinese guerrilla fighters' resistance efforts were not immune from the influence of Chinese politics. The Communists served as command and political commissars in the East River Column. Knowing that the BAAG had formal relations with the GMD, the Communists did not wish to absorb Chinese personnel from the BAAG as they suspected that the Chinese staff might be working for the GMD or the Wang Jingwei faction.¹¹⁷

Conversely, Chinese elites and merchants collaborated with the Japanese. Some of them did so not only to protect themselves but also to help the Chinese community. There were also those who were forced to collaborate with the Japanese for the sake of restoring law and order, and those who wholeheartedly and actively supported the Japanese.¹¹⁸

The response of the Chinese community to Japanese rule during the occupation period shows that there were different ways to express patriotism.

¹¹⁵ Deng Zhennan 鄧震南, 'Xigong de youji zhanzheng' 西貢的游擊戰爭 (Guerrilla Warfare in the Sai Kung District), *Xianggang kangzhan dongjiangzongdui gangjiu duli dadui lunwenji* 東江縱隊港九獨立大隊論文集 (The Defence of Hong Kong: Collected Essays on the Hong Kong-Kowloon Brigade of the East River Column) ed. Chen King-tong, Rosa S.K. Yau and Sunny K.L. Chan (Xianggang: Xianggang kangle ji wenhua shiwuchu, 2004), pp.175-187.

¹¹⁶ Chan, *East River Column*, p.75-76.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.62.

¹¹⁸ For details, see Cai, *The Hong Kong People's History of Hong Kong*, pp.252-265. For detailed discussions of Chinese collaboration with Japan and resistance against the Japanese in other parts of the world, see Li Yinghui 李盈慧, *Kangri yu furi huaqiao guominzhengfu wangzhengquan* 抗日與附日：華僑、國民政府、汪政權 (Resistance against Japan and Collaboration with Japan: Overseas Chinese, the Nationalist Government, and the Wang Jingwei Regime) (Taipei: Shuiniu chubanshe, 2003).

Chinese elites and merchants once again became collaborationist nationalists, only this time they collaborated with Japan instead of the British.

Outbreak of the Chinese Civil War and the Politics of Anti-War Nationalism

With the outbreak of the Chinese Civil War in 1946, there emerged anti-war sentiments among the Chinese community in Hong Kong. Several pro-democracy political groups that opposed the Chiang Kai-shek regime were set up in Hong Kong. At the same time, the Hong Kong branch of the CCP made use of the rise in anti-war and pro-democracy patriotic sentiments in the colony to promote its anti-Chiang agenda. For example, the Hong Kong branch made contact with pro-democracy activists in exile in Hong Kong and promoted patriotism and democracy in its newspapers in Hong Kong.¹¹⁹

From the response of the Chinese community to the Chinese Civil War, we see how nationalism was promoted by not only democracy activists in exile but the CCP as well. For the CCP, the fact that many Chinese democracy activists fled to Hong Kong and the rise of anti-war and pro-democracy nationalism in the colony were a valuable asset for promoting its political agenda. In this sense, nationalism in Hong Kong once again served as a tool in the context of Chinese national politics.

¹¹⁹ Deng Kaisong 鄧開頌 Lu Xiaomin 陸曉敏, *Yuegang guanxishi* 粵港關係史 (A History of Canton-Hong Kong Relations) (Hong Kong: Qilin shuye youxiangongsi, 1997), pp.227-228 and 232.

Conclusion: The Multi-Dimensional Nature of China-Orientated nationalism in Pre-1949 Hong Kong

The interaction between Chinese history, the Hong Kong factor and colonialism contributed to the development of China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong. Expressions of China-orientated nationalism were not always motivated by ethnic consciousness, as nationalism was used on some occasions as a tactic by the Chinese community to protect their economic interests. Both Chinese business interests and colonialism served as contributing and limiting factors in the expression of China-orientated nationalism. Concerned about internal political stability, the Hong Kong government took steps to promote traditional Chinese culture in an attempt to combat the progressive ideas, particularly anti-imperialism, brought about by the May Fourth Movement in China.

The Sino-Japanese conflict led to a surge of nationalistic sentiment in Hong Kong. Students in particular were actively involved in supporting the war effort. As far as wartime propaganda was concerned, two competing types of nationalist rhetoric emerged during the Sino-Japanese conflict: collaboration and resistance. The emergence of these two competing types of rhetoric showed that nationalism was open to interpretation and how a national crisis could unite the Chinese community in Hong Kong. Determined to remain politically neutral, the colonial government attempted to limit the expression of China-orientated nationalism. During the Japanese occupation, some in the Chinese community chose to collaborate with the Japanese to protect the Chinese community while

others chose to fight the Japanese and kill Chinese who collaborated with the Japanese.

In the 1930s, Japanese residents in Hong Kong became victims of China-orientated nationalism, for the surge of anti-Japanese sentiments in the late 1930s led to a series of violent acts against Japanese in the colony and boycotts of Japanese goods. In fact, violence would continue to be a central motif in nationalist movements in the post-1949 era. The 1956 riots and the 1967 riots, which I shall discuss in Chapters Three and Four, were examples of violent political nationalism.

The split in the Hong Kong Students' Relief Association shows that political differences among activists involved in nationalist movements are unavoidable. Indeed, history would repeat itself as the 1971 Defend Diaoyu Islands movement was also plagued by political differences among the activists. The discourses of nationalism continued to be influenced by Chinese politics in the civil war period as the war resulted in the rise of anti-war nationalist sentiments in the colony. Further, the rise of anti-war sentiments provided the CCP with a tool to promote its political agenda in Hong Kong.

In the following chapters, I shall demonstrate how the interaction between the China factor, colonialism, and the Hong Kong factor continued to be significant in influencing the development of China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong after the Chinese Civil War. However, the focus of China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong in 1949-1997 was increasingly on what was happening in Hong Kong rather than in China.

Chapter Three: The Chinese Civil War, the CCP-GMD

Struggle and the Politics of Nationalism in the 1950s

Political upheavals in China continued to be a significant contributing factor in the expression of China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong in the post-1949 period. After the Chinese Civil War, Hong Kong became a significant battleground for both the CCP and the GMD in terms of political propaganda. Nationalism in Hong Kong in the 1950s was a product of the Chinese Civil War and an extension of the CCP-GMD struggle, and was open to interpretation. The case studies in this chapter demonstrate that China-orientated nationalism was a significant political issue in the 1950s, which concerned the Hong Kong government as well as some sectors of the Hong Kong Chinese community. Nationalism created political divisions among some in the Chinese community and was a tactic used by several Hong Kong-based groups to promote their political agenda. Some promoted nationalism to express their concern over China's future and to seek solutions to China's political problems. China-centred nationalism also jeopardised the lives of Hong Kong citizens and threatened the colony's security, to the dismay of the colonial government.

I begin my investigation with the discussion of the post-war, socio-political environment of Hong Kong as well as the Cold War context, which to some extent contributed to the dynamics of nationalism in Hong Kong in the 1950s. I then examine case studies of political nationalism based on pro-CCP and pro-GMD sentiments, and discuss a third type of political nationalism that was neither pro-CCP nor pro-GMD. In the final section of the chapter, I examine

the case of Chinese intellectuals who fled to Hong Kong and promoted cultural nationalism with a focus on traditional Chinese culture.

Post-war Hong Kong: Rebuilding

The colony was plagued by economic problems in the immediate post-war years. Economically and socially, Hong Kong had been devastated by the Japanese occupation. According to the *Annual Report on Hong Kong for the Year 1946* published by the Hong Kong Government, during the Japanese occupation from 1941 to 1945 the colony's population dropped significantly. In 1941, it was estimated to be 1,600,000, but at the time of the Japanese surrender, it was less than three quarters of a million.¹²⁰ There was a shortage of the essentials and food, much of which had to be imported from Guangzhou.¹²¹ Rice was imported from Siam and rations provided.¹²² Despite a shortage of personnel and the shortage of food and housing faced by the Military Administration,¹²³ which was established in August 1945 and lasted until May 1946, civil government was restored in May 1946. The economy improved quickly. After the end of the Second World War, Hong Kong's population increased steadily. By the end of 1946, it was approximately 1.6 million.¹²⁴ With the outbreak of the Chinese Civil War, the population of Hong Kong increased significantly again as there was an influx of refugees from mainland China into the colony, some of

¹²⁰ Government of Hong Kong, *Hong Kong Annual Report 1946* (Hong Kong: Government of Hong Kong, 1947), p.9.

¹²¹ Deng Kaisong 鄧開頌 and Lu Xiaomin 陸曉敏 (eds), *Yuegang guanxi shi* 粵港關係史 (A History of Guangdong-Hong Kong Relations) (Hong Kong: Qilin shuye youxian gongsi, 1997), p.216.

¹²² *Hong Kong Annual Report 1946*, p.4.

¹²³ Tsang, *A Modern History of Hong Kong*, p.145.

¹²⁴ Government of Hong Kong, *Hong Kong Annual Report 1946* (Hong Kong: Government of Hong Kong, 1947), p.9.

whom went to the New Territories. In early 1950, the colony's population was estimated to be close to 2.4 million.¹²⁵

Global Context: Impact of Cold War Politics and Political Insecurity

Although Hong Kong did not play a major role in the Cold War, it was certainly not immune to the Cold War's influences, as it was sandwiched between two major Cold War blocs, with its fate directly determined by China, an ally of the Soviet Union, and Britain, an ally of the US. During the Cold War, the US sought to contain Communism by setting up bastions around Asia. With the outbreak of the Korean War, Hong Kong was put in an even more precarious position. Since Britain was an ally of the US, Hong Kong became a base to support British military operations in Korea.¹²⁶ As I will discuss in detail later in this chapter, certain publications promoting anti-Communist sentiments were supported by US funding. A brief case study of Rennie's Mill, too, illustrates that Hong Kong was certainly not completely shielded from Cold War politics.

The political future of Hong Kong depended on not only the New Territories lease but Cold War politics as well.¹²⁷ With the victorious anti-imperialist Communist state just across the border, the colony where a million refugees had fled to was an embarrassment to the PRC.¹²⁸ However, British Hong Kong as a colony continued to exist for two reasons. Firstly, Britain was

¹²⁵ *Hong Kong Annual Report 1952*, p.27.

¹²⁶ Tsang, *A Modern History of Hong Kong*, p.157.

¹²⁷ William Heaton, 'Maoist Revolutionary Strategy and Modern Colonialism: The Cultural Revolution in Hong Kong', *Asian Survey*, 10, 9, 1970, pp.840-847.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*

determined to keep Hong Kong because of the economic benefits it provided to Britain, whose industrial economy was in decline. Secondly, China, like Britain, was making financial gains from the colony. I shall discuss Britain's economic policy towards Hong Kong in more detail in the next chapter in relation to the causes of the 1967 riots. In any case, both Chinese and British governments sought to use Hong Kong for their own advantage for economic and strategic reasons.

The China Factor: Impact of the Chinese Civil War on Hong Kong

The Chinese Civil War between the CCP and the GMD proved to be a watershed not only in Chinese history but also in the history of Hong Kong. As noted, the Civil War resulted in an influx of refugees from the mainland into the colony. Moreover, Hong Kong was now, in the words of Steve Tsang, 'torn between two Chinese regimes'.¹²⁹ Hong Kong was caught in the struggle between the CCP and the GMD as both sides sought to use the colony as a base to promote their opposing political agendas. We need to understand Hong Kong's special geo-political position if we are to understand how China-orientated nationalism turned out to be a historical paradox in the context of colonial Hong Kong. It was a paradox because on the one hand many who fled mainland China did not wish to be caught in the turmoil of Chinese politics again. On the other hand, the Chinese Civil War had a significant influence on the development of nationalist rhetoric, and precipitated a division within the ethnic

¹²⁹ Steve Tsang (ed), *A Documentary History of Hong Kong: Government and Politics* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1995), p.241.

Chinese community in Hong Kong in terms of political allegiance to the CCP or GMD.

Hong Kong in the late 1940s and early 1950s experienced social instability and labour conflicts. Economic difficulties caused by WWII were one of the causes of the workers' grievances.¹³⁰ As the workers were fighting for better terms for themselves on both the physical and the ideological level, a new form of China-orientated nationalism began to emerge in the colony, coinciding with the founding of the PRC in 1949.

Migrants and the Politics of China-orientated Nationalism

Migrants who fled from China to Hong Kong following the Civil War generally fell into two categories: those who did not wish to become involved in politics while staying in Hong Kong, and those who not only supported the GMD but also would use Hong Kong as a base to promote their pro-GMD and/or anti-Communist agenda. There were also Chinese in Hong Kong who were pro-CCP.

Many in the Hong Kong Chinese community still regarded China as their home. In his analysis of whether Hong Kong would become independent like other colonies, Governor Grantham stated in his memoirs that local Chinese were as 'transient' as the Europeans were, and 'politically apathetic':

Hong Kong is also different in that the Chinese – and 99% of the population in Hong Kong is Chinese – are, generally speaking, politically apathetic. Provided that the government maintains law and order, does not tax them too much and

¹³⁰ Tai-lok Lui and Stephen W.K. Chiu, 'Social Movements and Public Discourse on Politics', in *Hong Kong's History: State and Society under Colonial Rule* ed. Tak-wing Ngo (London: Routledge, 1999), pp.101-118.

that they can get justice in the courts, they are content to leave the business of government to the professionals and the comparatively small number of private citizens who, out of civic spirit or the honour and glory they get out of it, are willing to serve on government councils and boards. The majority of Chinese in the colony also had little loyalty to Hong Kong. Like the Europeans, they came to Hong Kong to work until they retired home to China, just as the Europeans returned home to Europe. Not inaptly Hong Kong has been likened to a railway station, and its inhabitants to the passengers who pass in and out of the gates. The Chinese who have lived all their lives in the colony and intend to leave their bones there, are a small minority; as are the Eurasians who have no other home. They are the true citizens of Hong Kong, but their total number is insignificant. The picture is changing since China went Communist, as few Chinese in Hong Kong now intend to return to the country of their birth. They are becoming permanent citizens.¹³¹

The ‘migrant mentality’ (移民心態) explains why most Chinese in Hong Kong wished to distant themselves from politics,¹³² yet at the same time there existed a strong Chinese identity.

As far as political inclinations were concerned, the Hong Kong Chinese community could be divided into several groups. The majority simply wanted to live peacefully in the colony and were afraid that the Communists would disrupt their lives. However, while many Chinese had fled in the late 1940s from the Mainland to Hong Kong in fear of the Communist regime, not all of them were

¹³¹ Alexander Grantham, *Via Ports: From Hong Kong to Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1965), pp.111-112.

¹³² See for example Joseph Y.S. Cheng, ‘Political Participation in Hong Kong: Theoretical Issues and Historical Legacy’, *Political Participation in Hong Kong: Theoretical Issues and Historical Legacy* ed. Joseph Y.S. Cheng (Hong Kong : City University of Hong Kong Press, 1999), pp.1-24

specifically anti-Communist.¹³³ Many came to Hong Kong for economic reasons, to earn a living for their family. Among them some were pro-Communist, some favoured the GMD, while others became ‘completely disillusioned’ with both the CCP and the GMD.¹³⁴

Political/Factional Nationalism: Emergence of Two National Identities

Hong Kong in the 1950s saw the emergence of two types of nationalism: cultural and political nationalism.¹³⁵ As I shall discuss later, the type of nationalism based on Confucianism promoted by the Chinese intellectuals who fled to Hong Kong could be called cultural nationalism. In the 1950s, Chinese political nationalism revolved around the conflict between the CCP and the GMD, as Hong Kong was caught in the struggle between the two. There was no official ‘state nationalism’ in colonial Hong Kong. This is because the colonial government was not a state that officially promoted China-orientated nationalism. In fact, in the context of education the colonial government took steps to prevent the influence of Chinese politics.

It has been argued that ‘both pro-Nationalist and pro-Communist activists saw the colony as the last bastion of their unfinished political and ideological contentions, giving rise to bitter disputes that challenged and destabilised the

¹³³ Lau Siu-kai, *Society and Politics in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1984), pp.11-12.

¹³⁴ Bernard Hung-Kay Luk, ‘Chinese Culture in the Hong Kong Curriculum: Heritage and Colonialism’, *Comparative Education Review*, 35, 4, 1997, pp.650-668.

¹³⁵ I have borrowed the terms ‘cultural nationalism’ and ‘political nationalism’ from Guo Yingjie’s study of nationalism in China. See Guo Yingjie, *Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary China: The Search for National Identity under Reform* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004) p.17.

British position'.¹³⁶ Lam Wai-man has used the term 'factional nationalism' to describe the type of political nationalism manifested in the 1956 riots. Lam defines 'factional nationalism' as follows:

A central feature of factional nationalism was the intense identification with Communist-Nationalist antagonism and the fact that the leftists and rightists in the territory were organisationally connected among themselves and to the respective party's central mechanism. Because of such sentiments and interconnection, factional nationalism also embodied strong identification with the rule of the respective states (statism) and a radical drive to eliminate the 'other'. In postwar Hong Kong, this type of nationalism was acted out in the continual struggle between the traditional left-and right-wing groups, as manifested in a continuous stream of propaganda, campaigns to attract sympathisers, constant maneuvering for political influence, and measure of violence.¹³⁷

The concept of 'factional nationalism' is relevant to our discussion of the kind of political nationalism, which came into existence in the 1950s and 1960s. Labour unions as well as other organisations, for example, had long been under the influence of the CCP-GMD conflict, and thus had their own political agendas.¹³⁸

¹³⁶ Kenny Ng, 'Political Film Censorship in Colonial Hong Kong', paper presented at the Conference on Cold War Factor in Hong Kong Cinema, 1950s-1970s, 27-29 October 2006.

¹³⁷ Lam Wai-man, *Understanding the Political Culture of Hong Kong: The Paradox of Activism and Depoliticisation* (Armonk: M.E.Sharpe, 2004), p.188.

¹³⁸ Xian Yuyi 冼玉儀, 'Shehui zuzhi yu shehui zhuanbian' 社會組織與社會轉變 (Community organisations and Social Change), in *Xianggangshi xinbian* 香港史新編 (Hong Kong History: New Perspectives) ed. Wang Gungwu 王廣武 (Xianggang: Sanlian shudian, 1998), pp.157-210.

Post-1949 Debates in the Print Media and the Hong Kong Government's Response

The influence of post-Civil War Chinese politics on the discourses of nationalism in Hong Kong in the 1950s was obvious in the print media.¹³⁹ Some Chinese-language newspapers served as propagandists for the CCP and the GMD. For example, *Wen Hui Pao* (文匯報), *Ta Kung Pao* (大公報), and *New Evening Post* (新晚報) were backed by the PRC while the *Hong Kong Times* (香港時報) was launched by the Nationalists.¹⁴⁰ Some other pro-ROC newspapers were not under the direct control of the GMD such as *Kung Sheung Daily News* (工商日報) and *Wah Kiu Yat Pao* (華僑日報). Even the more neutral sectors of the Chinese-language press chose to focus on Chinese politics instead of criticising the colonial government, as this was less likely to upset the authorities.¹⁴¹

Leftist newspapers such as the *Ta Kung Pao* not only promoted pro-CCP nationalism but also called the Nationalists *jiangfei* (蔣匪), meaning ‘bandits of Chiang Kai-shek’.¹⁴² The term ‘New China’ (新中國) was often used in the pro-

¹³⁹ Alice Y.L. Lee, ‘The Role of Newspapers in the 1967 Riot: A Case Study of the Partisanship of the Hong Kong Press’, *Press and Politics in Hong Kong: Case Studies from 1967-1997* ed. Clement Y.K. So and Joseph Man Chan (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1999), pp.33-65.

¹⁴⁰ Carol P. Lai, *Media in Hong Kong: Press Freedom and Political Change 1967-2005* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007), p.9. See also Li Gucheng 李谷城, *Xianggang baoye bainian cangsang* 香港報業百年滄桑 (A Hundred Years of the Hong Kong Press) (Xianggang: Ming bao chubanshe, 2000), pp.193-195.

¹⁴¹ Lai, *Media in Hong Kong*, p.13.

¹⁴² *Ta Kung Pao* 大公報, 12 December 1949, p.4. See also *Ta Kung Pao* 大公報, 29 January 1950, p.4.

CCP newspapers to refer patriotically to the PRC on the 1 October national day celebrations that honoured the Liberation of Beijing.¹⁴³

Conversely, the Chinese-language newspapers that promoted pro-ROC and anti-Communist sentiments¹⁴⁴ sometimes employed the term Republic of China (中華民國) as the official name (國號) for China, and celebrated the Double Tenth as China's national day. They refused to accept the PRC's status as the political state and were clearly anti-Communist.¹⁴⁵ For example, in an editorial of the anti-Communist *Gongshang Ribao* (工商日報) titled 'Does the CCP really have "patriots"?' (中共真有愛國主義者嗎?), which appeared on 12 April 1950, the concept and definition of China-orientated nationalism was discussed in detail. Due to the newspaper's anti-Communist stance, it was only natural that the editor was sceptical about whether the Chinese Communists were truly 'nationalistic', and whether the CCP represented the interests of the people. The pro-ROC Chinese-language newspapers constantly painted a very negative picture of the CCP.¹⁴⁶ Moreover, post-1949 pro-Nationalist rhetoric such as 'counterattack on the Mainland' (反攻大陸) was often used in the pro-ROC

¹⁴³ See, for example, *New Evening Post* 新晚報, 2 October 1952, p.4.

¹⁴⁴ See, for example, Ping Gong 平公 (pseud.?), *Shuangshijie kan zhongguo de jianglai* (雙十節看中國的將來, Looking at the Future of China from October 10) in *Wah Kiu Yat Pao* (華僑日報), 10 October 1949; the editorial of the *Kung Sheung Daily News* (工商日報), 12 April 1950, 21 February 1950, and 25 February 1950. The editorial of the *Kung Sheung Daily News* clearly displayed its anti-Communist stance and discussed the situation of China every few days. It should be noted that not all newspapers that promoted pro-ROC and anti-Communist sentiments were controlled by the GMD. *Sing Tao Daily News* 星島日報, for example, used the ROC name and celebrated the Double Tenth, but it has been classified by scholars as a 'centrist' commercial newspaper. See Alice Y.L. Lee, 'The Role of Newspapers in the 1967 Riot: A Case Study of the Partisanship of the Hong Kong Press', *Press and Politics in Hong Kong: Case Studies from 1967-1997* ed. Clement Y.K. So and Joseph Man Chan (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1999), pp.33-65. See also, Lai, *Media in Hong Kong*, p.10.

¹⁴⁵ Non-leftist newspapers often used the ROC name for dates.

¹⁴⁶ See, for example, *Kung Sheung Daily News* 工商日報, 2 February 1950, p.2; 13 March 1956, p.3.

newspapers, especially during the Double Tenth celebrations.¹⁴⁷ Apart from political reasons, it is possible that the rightist media promoted anti-Communist sentiments and the idea of a ‘counterattack on the Mainland’ to boost their sales, for such ideas were appealing to the large number of refugees from China¹⁴⁸ According to the Hong Kong government’s estimation, there were approximately 60,000 ‘politically conscious Chinese in Hong Kong’ who were ‘essentially anti-Communist and in consequence to some extent pro-GMD’.¹⁴⁹

In the 1950s there also emerged a number of anti-Communist Chinese-language magazines such as the *Democratic Review* (民主評論), founded by Xu Fuguan (徐復觀), and *Daxue shenghuo* (大學生活),¹⁵⁰ and the *Chinese Students Weekly* (中國學生周報). Some of these anti-Communist publications were a product of the Cold War as well as the Chinese Civil War. The *Chinese Students Weekly* and *Daxue shenghuo* were backed by US funding and aimed to promote an anti-Communist agenda.¹⁵¹ Writers in the *Chinese Students Weekly*, for

¹⁴⁷ *Kung Sheung Daily News* 工商日報, 10 October 1956, p.3.

¹⁴⁸ Alice Y.L. Lee, ‘The Role of Newspapers in the 1967 Riot: A Case Study of the Partisanship of the Hong Kong Press’, *Press and Politics in Hong Kong: Case Studies from 1967-1997* ed. Clement Y.K. So and Joseph Man Chan (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1999), pp.33-65. According to a government report released in the late 1950s, there was an influx of over 700,000 refugees from mainland China since 1949. See Commission of Labour and Commissioner of Mines, *Annual Report, 1957-1958*, pp.60-61, quoted in *A Documentary History of Hong Kong: Society* ed. David Faure (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1997), p.249.

¹⁴⁹ Letter from G.W. Aldington to E.T. Biggs, 5 August 1953, CO1023/101.

¹⁵⁰ On the overall tone of *Daxue shenghuo*, see, for example, *Daxue shenghuo* 大學生活, 1, 8, p.2.

¹⁵¹ The *Chinese Students Weekly* was published by the Union Press (友聯出版社), which also published other Chinese publications promoting anti-Communist agenda. According to a former editor of the *Chinese Students Weekly*, the publication was funded by the United States Asia Foundation (美國亞洲基金會). See Hong Kong Oral History Archive, Accession number 017. For more details on the *Chinese Students Weekly*, see Mayuko Masuda 增田真結子, *Cong zhongguo xuesheng zhoubao kan liushi niandai xianggang wenhua shenfen de xingcheng* 從中國學生周報電影版看六十年代香港文化身份形成 (An Examination of the Formation of 1969s Hong Kong Cultural Identity: The Movie Section in the Chinese Students Weekly), *E-Journal on*

example, criticised the CCP for the ‘massacre’ of the Chinese people and destruction of Chinese culture as well as of the education system.¹⁵² The rightist publications also served as a platform for Chinese intellectuals who fled to Hong Kong to promote their cultural and anti-Communist nationalist rhetoric.¹⁵³ However, in the 12 October 1956 issue of the *Chinese Students Weekly*, a writer began to rethink the relationship between the state and the nation and argued that loving the ROC did not mean people ‘could not oppose the Nationalist government’s policy and its officials’.¹⁵⁴ Another writer held a critical view of pro-GMD nationalism and questioned the motives of those supporting the GMD.¹⁵⁵ The rhetoric as such had the flavour of the rhetoric of the Third Force Movement (第三勢力運動),¹⁵⁶ which I shall discuss later.

Hong Kong Cultural and Social Studies, 2, August 2002,
http://www.hku.hk/hkcsp/ccex/ehkc01/issue2_ar_mm_01.htm (24/8/2009).

¹⁵² Zhang Pijie 張丕介, ‘Sheishi zhishi fenzi’ 誰是知識分子 (Who are intellectuals?), *Zhongguo xuesheng zhoubao* 中國學生周報 (Chinese Students Weekly), 4, 15 August 1952, p.3; see also Issue 3, 8 August 1952, p.1.

¹⁵³ Some of these intellectuals included teachers in the New Asia College such as Zhang Pijie (張丕介), Tang Junyi (唐君毅) and Qian Mu (錢穆). See, for example, Qian Mu 錢穆, ‘Jinggao liuwang haiwai de zhongguo qingnian’ 敬告流亡海外的中國青年們 (An Announcement to Chinese Youth in Exile), *Zhongguo xuesheng zhoubao* 中國學生周報 (Chinese Students Weekly), 27 March 1953, p.2.

¹⁵⁴ Xiao Du 蕭獨 (pseud.?), ‘Zifa de qingzhu’ 自發的慶祝 (Spontaneous Celebrations), *Zhongguo xuesheng zhoubao* 中國學生周報 (Chinese Students Weekly), Issue 221, 12 October 1956, p.5.

¹⁵⁵ Qiu Zhenli 秋貞理 (pseud.), ‘Ziyou de shengli’ 自由的勝利 (The Victory of Freedom), *Zhongguo xuesheng zhoubao* 中國學生周報 (Chinese Students Weekly), Issue 221, 12 October 1956, p.5. Qiu Zhenli was in fact a pseudonym of Sima Changfeng (司馬長風), a Chinese writer associated with the Third Force Movement (第三勢力) in Hong Kong. In the 1950s Sima used the name Hu Yue (胡越). I shall discuss the case of Sima and his involvement in the Third Force later in the chapter. For more information, see Huang Zhongming 黃仲鳴, ‘Sima changfeng de yanlei’ 司馬長風的眼淚 (The Tears of Sima Changfeng), *Wenxue pinglun* 文學評論 (Literature Review), Issue 4, August 2009, pp.121-131.

¹⁵⁶ For more information on the Third Force and social democracy in Republican China, see Edmund S.K. Fung, ‘State Building, Capitalist Development, and Social Justice: Social Democracy in China’s Modern Transformation, 1921-1949’, *Modern China*, 32, 3, 2005, pp.318-352; and Edmund S.K. Fung, *In Search of Chinese Democracy: Civil Opposition in Nationalist China 1929-1949* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

The fact that 1950s nationalism based on pro-PRC and pro-ROC sentiments was not anti-colonial in nature did not mean that the Hong Kong government would not be concerned about the potentially subversive elements in such sentiments. The Hong Kong colonial government took steps to suppress the development and spread of such sentiments in the colony. One of these steps was the banning and censorship of films made in the PRC, and another was the revision of the education system. In 1948, the Hong Kong government made an amendment to the Education Ordinance, which gave the Director of Education power to ‘refuse or cancel the registration of any teacher, close any school, and control the curricula and textbooks of all schools’.¹⁵⁷ Sir Alexander Grantham, Governor of Hong Kong from 1947 to 1957, was against politics in schools.¹⁵⁸ In fact, as noted by Edward Vickers, colonial Hong Kong saw a peculiar development of the Chinese history curriculum in schools from the 1960s to the early 1980s. Students in Hong Kong grew up learning that they were Chinese and that China was the ‘nation’ for Hong Kong people; yet at the same time, as Vickers puts it, the ‘emphasis of the historical narrative in Chinese history was more depoliticised and distant from the present’.¹⁵⁹ Anthony Sweeting has argued that from the mid-1940s to the mid-1960s, Hong Kong’s education policy was characterised by ‘applied decolonisation’ and depoliticisation, as a response

¹⁵⁷ Jonathan S. Grant, ‘Cultural Formation in Postwar Hong Kong’, in *Hong Kong Reintegrating with China: Political, Cultural and Social Dimensions* ed. Lee Pui-tak (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2001), pp.159-180.

¹⁵⁸ Gregory Fairbrother, *Toward Critical Patriotism: Student Resistance to Political Education in Hong Kong and China* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003), p.7.

¹⁵⁹ Edward Vickers, *In Search of Identity: The Politics of History as a School Subject in Hong Kong 1960s-2002* (New York: Routledge, 2003), p.82.

from a ‘vulnerable and decreasingly “colonialist” government to the forces of nationalism and Communism’.¹⁶⁰

Physical Displays of China-Orientated Nationalism: The Use of Symbols

Each year at the celebrations of the founding of the PRC, and that of the ROC on 10 October, the flags of the PRC and the ROC became powerful national symbols. However, quite often the British flag could be seen alongside, for example, the PRC flag. In 1952, for instance, in the celebration of the third anniversary of the founding of the PRC by the industrial and commercial sectors, the PRC flag was hung alongside the British flag on the stage where major figures of these sectors were seated.¹⁶¹ This scene was captured in a photograph that appeared in the 1 October 1952 issue of the pro-CCP *New Evening Post* (新晚報). This photograph calls into question the nature of China-orientated nationalism in colonial Hong Kong. It shows that Chinese in the colony were careful in their display of nationalistic sentiments and that they were flexible in their loyalty.

Following the founding of the PRC in 1949, the pro-CCP press immediately reported that the majority of the Chinese in Hong Kong, especially Chinese workers, the *huagong* (華工), were eager to embrace the new PRC flag. According to an article in the CCP newspaper *Huashang Bao* (華商報), which

¹⁶⁰Anthony Sweeting, *Education in Hong Kong 1941-2001: Visions and Revisions* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004), p.159.

¹⁶¹*New Evening Post* 新晚報, 1 October 1952, p.4.

was written by the chairman of a labour union and appeared on 9 October 1949, Chinese workers were ‘euphoric’ and there was a ‘rush’ among the labour unions to ‘manufacture and raise the flag’.¹⁶² The same newspaper also claimed that the public also embraced the new flag, and that the PRC flag was ‘everywhere on the streets of Hong Kong’.¹⁶³ These reports were correct to an extent, as according to government documents the PRC flag was displayed at premises of pro-CCP organisations particularly labour unions on 1 October.¹⁶⁴

In contrast, the pro-ROC press reported on the use of the ROC flag.¹⁶⁵ The use of symbols shows that it would be difficult for the Chinese community to ignore the influence of Chinese politics in the colony and that some reacted passionately to the founding of the PRC. That this symbol carried such powerful meanings is shown by the 1956 riots, which I shall discuss later, as it was the use of the ROC flag that triggered the riots.

Celebrations of Two ‘National’ Days: Nationalistic but not Anti-colonial

While modern Chinese history shows us that nationalism in China was often fuelled by anti-foreign and anti-imperial sentiments, it would be a mistake to regard the development of China-orientated nationalism in post-war Hong Kong simply as an anti-colonial or anti-British movement. Local Chinese who

¹⁶² *Huashang Bao* 華商報, 9 October 1949, p.2. The *Huashang Bao* was re-established by the CCP in Hong Kong in April 1946.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 11 October 1949, p.2.

¹⁶⁴ ‘Photographs of Decorations in Kowloon on Chinese National Day Celebrations 1 October 1955, FO371/115203.

¹⁶⁵ *Gongshang ribao* 工商日報, 1 October 1956, p.5. See also, *Huashang Bao* 華商報, 11 October 1949, p.2.

displayed their nationalistic feelings on special occasions often did so in an orderly manner and took care not to upset the authorities. Most of these celebrations were conducted in a peaceful manner. We can see this from a document sent by the General Officer Commanding Land Forces in Hong Kong, to the Under Secretary of State in London, which reports on the celebration held on 1 October 1955 for the anniversary of the founding of the PRC. The section on the speeches made during the occasion is particularly relevant to our discussion of the nature of pro-CCP political nationalism in Hong Kong:

The general themes of the speeches made at the various meetings were the 'Five Year Plan' now in operation in China, and China's sincere intention of peaceful co-existence with all nations. The improved Sino-British relations were also commented upon by some of the speakers, who claimed that this friendship between the two nations contributed much towards the lessening of tension and promotion of World peace. *There was a complete lack of aggressiveness in the speeches and such subjects as the liberation of Taiwan, anti-American imperialism etc were only lightly touched upon at one or two of the union celebrations.*¹⁶⁶

It appeared that these national celebrations were in no way a threat to the colonial authorities and those who held these events were mild in their display of pro-CCP nationalistic sentiments.

Pro-GMD Activities and the Hong Kong Government's Response

In the 1950s, British authorities were concerned about not only Communist activities, but the Nationalists' spread of pro-GMD agenda among

¹⁶⁶ FO371/115203, General Officer P.G. Rowley (Hong Kong) to the Under Secretary of State (London), 15 October 1955. (emphasis added)

the Chinese population in Hong Kong. Although some of the pro-Nationalists' activities might not have been a real threat to internal security, the colonial government was to a certain extent paranoid about the spread of Chinese national politics and thus often took a heavy-handed approach in dealing with these activities. A letter, dated 9 December 1952, from J.B. Sidebotham of the Colonial Office to Major A.E. Tracy of the War Office, clearly illustrates this concern of the British:

The dangers to internal security in Hong Kong do not always arise from Communist activities as such, but that actions of the anti-Communist Chinese element can be fully capable of causing disturbances which, had they not been 'nipped in the bud' might well have got beyond the control of the Police and required some military assistance to bring them under control.¹⁶⁷

GMD nationalists were often blamed, by both the press and the Hong Kong government, for the disturbances, with China-orientated nationalism as the trigger. Deportation was a usual tactic employed by the government to prevent the Nationalists from instigating any sort of major disturbances. I shall use a few examples from this period to illustrate my point: the activities of the Nationalists of the Hong Kong Branch of the Chinese Anti-Communist National Salvation Youth Corps and their subsequent deportation to Taiwan in the early 1950s, and the riots in Kowloon and Tsuen Wan of 1956. On 26 March 1953 Cheng Ching Yuen, the Organisation Officer of the Hong Kong Branch of the Chinese Anti-Communist National Salvation Youth Corps, controlled by its parent body in

¹⁶⁷ J.B. Sidebotham (Colonial Office) to Major A.E. Tracy (War Office), 9 December 1952, CO 1023/101.

Taiwan, was arrested and found in possession of a plan for the celebration of Youth Day to be held on 29 March 1953. On 20 April 1953 Governor Grantham ordered, in accordance with section 18 of the Deportation of Aliens Ordinance and in the ‘interests of public order’,¹⁶⁸ the deportation of fourteen Chinese who, the Hong Kong Government believed, were members of the Youth Corps. Previously, on 4 November 1952, 32 members of the Chinese Anti-Communist Anti-Russia Youth League, later reorganised into the Chinese Anti-Communist National Salvation Youth Corps, had been deported. The plan seized in the 26 March 1953 arrest shows the nature of the political activities that pro-GMD sympathisers undertook to promote pro-Nationalist sentiments. Below is an extract from the outline of the plan seized by the Hong Kong authorities from Cheng:

March 29th marks a glorious chapter in the history of the People’s Revolution. It is a great day for all youths of our nation who are under the Party’s guidance. On the occasion of the Youth Anniversary in 1952, this committee mobilised its comrades under the most trying conditions and overseas youths were urged to hold grand and enthusiastic celebrations separately in Rennie’s Mill, Ma On Shan, Tsun [sic] Wan, and other districts with courage and intrepidity. At the same time (we) launched various cultural and recreational campaigns, carried out the ‘FOUR REFORMS’ suggested by our President, and complied wholeheartedly with (his?) very proper instructions of encouraging youths to go to the front lines, to factories or to libraries. Not a few glorious achievements have since been witnessed.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁸ Governor Grantham to Oliver Lyttelton of the Colonial Office, 2 May 1953, CO 1023/101.

¹⁶⁹ Outline of Plan for the Celebration of the 10th Youth Anniversary, attached in the letter from Governor Grantham to Oliver Lyttelton of the Colonial Office, 2 May 1953, CO 1023/101.

The plan is rich in ideological themes, and contains very specific ideas, plans and objectives for the upcoming 1953 ‘Double Tenth’ celebrations. Page 6 of the document contains a list of slogans for the celebration of the Youth Festival such as ‘all for anti-Communism, all for National Salvation’, ‘long live the Chinese Guomintang’, and ‘long live President Chiang’.¹⁷⁰

Pro-Communists *versus* Pro-Nationalists: Clashes between Two Competing Nationalisms

The display of political nationalism that emerged in the 1950s was often characterised by violent clashes between the Nationalists and Communists. On 7 July 1952, for example, four supporters of the GMD entered the premises of the Hong Kong branch of the Bank of Communications, a Communist organisation, ‘assaulted a watchman, and destroyed bank documents and records’.¹⁷¹ The flying of flags sometimes triggered these incidents, as revealed by an extract from the Weekly Intelligence Report dated 14 October 1952:

Several minor clashes occurred during the celebration of the Double Tenth, most of them as a result of attacks by pro-Nationalist element on left wing union premises. Some of these incidents may have been precipitated by left wing organisations’ decision to fly Communist flags on this occasion, nominally in commemoration of the early revolutionary martyrs, but demonstrators had in most cases been paid to stir up trouble by Nationalist agents and had been assured that provocations were organised by the ‘anti-Communist anti-Russian Youth Association’ which has direct links with Taiwan. A number of persons connected with this association have been

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁷¹ Hong Kong Bank of Communications Incident, CO 1023/101.

arrested and will probably be deported. Incidents were fortunately sporadic but might have had serious results but for prompt and effective action on the part of the police whose task was made more difficult by the presence of large holiday crowds celebrating the traditional autumn festival.¹⁷²

Once again, the Nationalists were blamed for these incidents. The Hong Kong government, as usual, was quick to respond by deporting those stirring up trouble. Apart from the official sources, we can get a glimpse of what happened during the 1952 'Double Tenth' celebrations from reports by the media:

Angry crowds shouted abuse at the Chinese Communists in the union offices of dockyard carpenters. Plantation workers and sweetmeat and biscuit workers where two red flags flew defiantly among hundreds of Chinese Nationalist flags hoisted for the 'Double Tenth' celebrations. At the office of the Electrical Workers' Union a crowd broke down the doors, overpowered Communist officials, damaged office furniture, scattered union documents in the street and tore the red flag to shreds...Thousands of people flocked into Kowloon's crowded streets on hearing the disturbances.¹⁷³

Another report from Reuters tells a similar story regarding the 1952 'Double Tenth' celebrations:

Hong Kong police tonight fired teargas into an angry crowd of 1,000 Chinese Nationalists demonstrating outside the pro-Nationalist Carpenters Union office in Kowloon, the mainland city of Hong Kong. The union flew red flags on the 'Double Tenth' anniversary of the Chinese revolution under Sun Yat Sen, celebrated by the Chinese Nationalists here.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷² Extract from Weekly Intelligence Report 14 October 1952, CO 1023/101.

¹⁷³ Windows 3 Hong Kong 1129, CO 1023/101.

¹⁷⁴ Roundup New Matter Windows 1, CO 1023/101.

A report in the *The Times* shows vividly how the flags became symbols of conflict between the Nationalists and the Communists:

Members of the Chinese community made a big display of Nationalist flags, probably on a scale unequalled since the Nationalist collapse, and some right-wing trade unionists resented the action of left-wing unions in flying Communist flags. At Shamshuipo Kuomintang and Communist banners appeared at separate flats in the same building. When Communists hoisted their flag also on the roof, the rival unionists declared that the ‘Double Tenth’ was their day and tore down the red flag. A fight developed, but police soon had the situation under control.¹⁷⁵

Chinese Politics and Union Rivalries in the 1950s

The CCP-GMD struggle also contributed to labour union rivalries in post-war years. Labour unions in the colony were split into two major camps: the pro-CCP Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions (FTU) and the pro-GMD Hong Kong and Kowloon Trades Union Council (TUC). Political differences between these two labour unions had their origins in the Civil War period when Communists and Nationalists attempted to mobilise support within Hong Kong for their cause as the war was near its end.¹⁷⁶ As the Communists established unions in companies in the major sectors of the economy, the Nationalists set up rival unions in the same companies.¹⁷⁷ These labour unions were ‘guided largely

¹⁷⁵ ‘Rival Banners in Hong Kong: Clashes between Chinese’, *Times*, 11 October 1952, CO 1023/101.

¹⁷⁶ Joe England and John Rear, *Chinese Labour under British Rule: A Critical Study of Labour Relations and Law in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1975), p.84.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

by political considerations'.¹⁷⁸ There was actually a decline in the labour movement in the 1950s due to these union rivalries.¹⁷⁹ Scholars have attributed the decline to the politics of post-Civil War Sino-British relations.¹⁸⁰ It has been noted that British recognition of the PRC in 1950 and a 'tacit understanding' of the status of Hong Kong between China and Britain was a factor contributing to the decline. Moreover, the left-wing unions were unsuccessful in achieving basic goals in the strikes of the 1940s and as a result strikers were dissatisfied and the FTU lost some of its strength.¹⁸¹ Therefore, in the 1950s, the FTU endeavoured to rebuild its strength by actively recruiting members. It has been noted that both the FTU and the TUC had the same goals and strategy in the 1950s:

One goal was political, not in the sense of pursuing power and influence in the Hong Kong polity, but rather in terms of expressing and mobilising support for the policies of the PRC and Taiwan respectively. A second goal was to expand their influence among workers...After the early 1950s, the FTU became less overtly involved in industrial actions against major employers, and began to concentrate more on building up worker support through expanding educational, cultural and welfare services to members. The TUC adopted a similar strategy.¹⁸²

Governor Grantham, concerned about the potential danger of the political nature of labour unions, made a similar observation in 1955:

¹⁷⁸ Benjamin Leung and Stephen Chiu, *A Social History of Industrial Strikes and the Labour Movement in Hong Kong, 1946-1989*, (Hong Kong: Social Sciences Research Centre, University of Hong Kong, 1991), pp.25-26.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸² Stephen Wing Kai Chiu and David A. Levin, 'Contestatory Unionism: Trade Unions in the Private Sector', *The Dynamics of Social Movement in Hong Kong*, ed. Stephen Wing Kai Chiu and Tai Lok Lui (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press), pp.91-137.

The welfare and terms of service of their members are of importance only in their bearing on the major aims of the Unions which are to secure and to hold the political allegiance of their workers. Matters are made worse by the fact that the political issues in question are not related to Hong Kong's problems but are foreign in conception and origin...A labour dispute in Hong Kong, therefore, is unlikely, except superficially, to be a dispute between labour and management. It is more likely to be, in reality, a dispute involving rival political factions with the absolute control of labour as the ultimate goal.¹⁸³

Indeed, TUC publications, for example, promoted anti-Communist sentiments and had the same political rhetoric found in pro-GMD/pro-ROC newspapers. The TUC as well as unions affiliated with it promoted rhetoric such as 'democracy', 'freedom', and 'a counterattack on the mainland'.¹⁸⁴ These labour unions were more concerned about Chinese politics and mobilising support for their political agendas than the welfare of their members. The political inclinations of the labour unions set the stage for clashes between pro-CCP and pro-GMD workers.

The FTU was the numerically dominant federation. Sixty per cent of the 171,623 union members in 1966 belonged to the FTU.¹⁸⁵ However, neither of the two union federations gained much influence among workers in the manufacturing industry. As of 1961, of the 512,000 persons in the manufacturing,

¹⁸³ 'Hong Kong: Relations with China, Governor of Hong Kong to Secretary of State for the Colonies', 21 January 1955, FO371/115063.

¹⁸⁴ Gangjiu gongtuan lianhehui 港九工團聯合會 (Hong Kong and Kowloon Trades Union Council), *Xianggang laogong chengli wuzhounianjinian tekan* 香港勞工成立五周年紀念特刊 (Hong Kong Labour Special Edition Fifth Anniversary of Establishment) (Xianggang: Gangjiu gongtuan lianhehui, 1953).

¹⁸⁵ Stephen Wing Kai Chiu and David A. Levin, 'Contestatory Unionism: Trade Unions in the Private Sector', *The Dynamics of Social Movement in Hong Kong*, ed. Stephen Wing Kai Chiu and Tai Lok Lui (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press), pp.91-137.

which made up 43 per cent of the total working population, only about 10 per cent were union members.¹⁸⁶ Nonetheless, the FTU and the TUC had a more substantial presence in other industries such as utilities (40 per cent), and transport, storage and communication (78 per cent).¹⁸⁷

Rennie's Mill: A Pro-Nationalist Refugee Camp

When the Chinese Civil War resulted in a large influx of anti-Communist and/or pro-GMD refugees into the colony, some of these refugees initially settled at Mount Davis.¹⁸⁸ Between March and June of 1950, the number of refugees in Mount Davis increased from about 1,000 to 5,900. A settlement at Rennie's Mill was set up initially 'as a stopgap measure to house the ex-Nationalist soldiers at Mount Davis and their families'¹⁸⁹ and evolved into a permanent pro-Nationalist suburban enclave over the next 40 years.¹⁹⁰

Symbols of pro-GMD sentiments were a striking feature of Rennie's Mill. The ROC flag and anthem were often used. In schools there, pro-GMD and anti-Communist sentiments were promoted by the teachers.¹⁹¹ Despite poor living conditions, the refugees' loyalty to the ROC remained strong and they sought to promote their pro-GMD sentiments in the refugee camp. However, Rennie's Mill was only a small enclave and the influence of its pro-GMD sentiments beyond its boundaries was limited. In contrast, the 1956 riots instigated by pro-GMD

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁸ For a detailed study of Rennie's Mill, see Kenneth Lan, *Rennie's Mill: The Origin and Evolution of a Special Enclave in Hong Kong* (PhD thesis, University of Hong Kong, 2006).

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p.95.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.140-141.

¹⁹¹ See, for example, Hu Chunhui 胡春惠, *Xianggang tiaojinglingying de dansheng yu xiaoshi* 香港調景嶺營的誕生與消失 (The Reminiscences of the Chinese at Rennie's Mill Camp, Hong Kong 1949-1997) (Taipei: Guoshiguan, 1997), pp.44, 72, and 274.

sympathisers had a larger impact on the Chinese community in Hong Kong, albeit in a negative way.

Pro-GMD Violent Political Nationalism: The 1956 Riots

The 1956 riots at Lee Cheng Uk and Tsuen Wan, an example of ardent political nationalism, was started by pro-GMD sympathisers. Flags as symbols of political nationalism triggered the 1956 riots, as detailed in the official report titled *Report on the Riots in Kowloon and Tsuen Wan, October 10th to 12th, 1956*. Sticking paper flags or other decorations on the walls of the buildings was not allowed in the resettlement estates. It was a decision made at a meeting of the Resettlement Policy Committee of the Urban Council held on 3 October 1956. Residents in most of the resettlement estates were warned about this, and representative bodies served as communication channels between the residents and the staff of the Resettlement Department. In Li Cheng Uk, which had only one block built, there was no representative body as such. At 9am on 10 October 1956, Mok Yiu-kwong, a junior officer of the Resettlement Department in charge of Li Cheng Uk Estate found small Nationalist flags and symbols stuck on the walls of the block. Mok and another officer removed some of the flags. One reason Mok removed the flags, according to the official report, was that he knew that his superior was going to visit Li Cheng Uk on the morning of 10 October. Mok's actions upset residents who had stuck the flags on the walls. A crowd of 300 to 400 people gathered at 11am, demanding that the flags be replaced. They did not seem hostile at the start. By 11:45am, the crowd had grown into approximately 500 people, most of whom were Nationalist sympathisers. By

1:15pm, the crowd had increased to 2,000, although most of them were simply interested spectators. Demands were made by spokesmen of the crowd 'such as that 100,000 fire crackers should be provided, to hang from top to bottom of the block, that portraits of Sun Yat Sen and Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek should be erected on the block with a large Nationalist flag, and that Mr.Mok should apologise publicly before the crowd and in Chinese newspapers'.¹⁹² Initially, officials and property of the Resettlement Department were the targets. That was the first phase of the riot. In the second phase, shops with connections to Communist sympathisers were looted by Triad gangs, some of them carrying Nationalist flags. In the third phase, more shops were looted. Triad gangs, as a form of extortion, threatened to assault people in cars, and made shopkeepers in Kowloon City 'buy' Nationalist flags.

The incident in Tsuen Wan that took place on 1 October 1956 also started with the flag. On that day, Chinese Communist flags were put up for the celebration of National Day, at factory dormitories and other buildings in Tsuen Wan, which included left-wing labour buildings. One of these dormitories was that of the Pao Hsing Cotton Mill, which employed 110 left-wing workers. A non-Communist worker living in the same dormitory pulled down one of the Communist flags on the early morning of 1 October. This incident upset the left-wing workers in the dormitory who had put up the flag. The person who pulled down the flag was later asked to replace it and offer an apology to the left-wing workers, which ended the incident. On 9 October, right-wing workers in the same cotton mill dormitory put up Nationalist flags as well as decorations that

¹⁹² CO 1030/389, *Report on the Riots in Kowloon and Tsuen Wan, October 10th to 12th, 1956.*

included, according to the official report on the riots, the slogan ‘Long live the Chinese Republic’ in ‘large characters on the windows of the dormitory’.¹⁹³ A management staff member inspected the dormitory and demanded that the slogan be removed. Although the right-wing workers complied by removing all flags and decorations, the management’s demand caused resentment among them. News of the incident spread among right-wing workers in the area where the management had forbidden the employees to celebrate their national day. It was believed that this incident was the cause of agitation among the workers. In fact, before this incident a series of meetings between right-wing workers in the Tsuen Wan area had been held to plan celebrations on the National Day. The Tsuen Wan incident eventually turned into a clash between left-wing and right-wing workers. Left-wing workers were beaten by Nationalist sympathisers, and some of them died as a result.

The two riots in Kowloon and Tsuen Wan resulted in 440 casualties in total, of which 59 were fatal and 150 suffered minor injuries. Contrary to the events in Kowloon, which were spontaneous in nature, as reported by Governor Grantham,¹⁹⁴ events in Tsuen Wan were characterised by well-planned and organised violence by right-wing workers. Grantham, in a confidential letter to J.B. Johnston of the Colonial Office, remarked that ‘the Tsuen Wan story is a bad one; for more than two hours the rioters had it all their own way’.¹⁹⁵

The 1956 riots show how the CCP-GMD struggle influenced the development of nationalist sentiments in Hong Kong, and how such sentiments

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, p.31.

¹⁹⁴ CO 1030/389, Grantham to J.B. Johnston, confidential letter of 6 December 1956.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

led to violence. The initial violence in Lee Cheng Uk was triggered by pro-GMD sympathisers' dispute with the colonial authorities in relation to the public display of the GMD flag. Similarly, the violence in Tsuen Wan was triggered by competing nationalisms as both pro-Communists and pro-Nationalists attempted to promote their agenda via the use of the national flag.

Political Nationalism as Tool of Extortion: The Triads and the 1956 Riots

A noteworthy aspect of the 1956 riots was the role of the Triads and their relationship with the GMD, as mentioned in the official report. In fact, the official report noted that some of these Triad Societies had their origins in the GMD:

One of these Triad Societies, known as '14K', originated in Canton during the Nationalist regime and gained influence in Hong Kong comparatively recently; it started as a semi-official underground organisation of a political character, its members being mostly Nationalist army personnel and minor officials. Membership has lately increased, drawn largely from poor refugees, including many youths.¹⁹⁶

Zhang Sheng (章盛), in his study of the history of Triads in Hong Kong written in Chinese, and W.P. Morgan, a former inspector with the Hong Kong Royal Police, claims that the Triads were involved in the 1956 riots. Morgan states:

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.* For more information on the relationship between the Triads and the GMD, see Zhang Sheng 章盛, *Xianggang heishehui huodong* 香港黑社會活動 (Triad Activities in Hong Kong) (Xianggang: Tiandi tushu youxian gongsi, 1979), pp.67-70.

Those riots, while not inspired by the Triad societies were certainly developed by them. Statements later recorded by policy clearly showed that society elements, sometimes on a sub-branch basis, were hastily mobilised and sent out to whip up the emotions of the crowd to cover looting activities of the society members.¹⁹⁷

Zhang also states that agents of the Nationalist secret service (軍統) masterminded the riots.¹⁹⁸ Like the official report, both Zhang and Morgan remark that some Triad groups were involved in extortion in the riots by coercing pedestrians, motorists, and shopkeepers into purchasing their paper flags of a political faction, and beating anyone who refused to buy them.¹⁹⁹ This shows that political nationalism was used as a tool by the Triads for extortion and covering up their criminal activities.

When Chinese newspapers reported the 1956 riots, their reports reflected the political divisions within the Chinese-language press. While the 1956 riots occupied the headlines in the major Chinese newspapers, and in general these did provide factual information as to what happened, identifying the culprits depended on the political stance of the newspapers. For instance, the left-wing *Wen Hui Bao* placed emphasis on the role of ‘GMD agents’ (國民黨特務) in the riots.²⁰⁰ The pro-GMD *Kung Sheung Daily News*, on the contrary, reported that

¹⁹⁷ W.P.Morgan, *Triad Societies in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Government Press, 1960), p.86. For more information on the pro-GMD Triads’ involvement in the 1956 riots, see Zhang, *Xianggang heishehui huodong*, pp.230-250.

¹⁹⁸ Zhang, *Xianggang heishehui huodong*, pp.235.

¹⁹⁹ Morgan, *Triad Societies in Hong Kong*, p.86. See also, Zhang, *Xianggang heishehui huodong*, p.242.

²⁰⁰ See *Wen Hui Bao* 文匯報, 16 October 1956, p.1; 12 October 1956, p.4; 13 October 1956, p.4; 13 October 1956, p.4. On page 5 of the 13 October 1956 issue there appears an article with a detailed analysis of the violent activities supposedly carried out by GMD agents from 1947 to 1952.

the ROC government claimed that the riots were started by Communist agents (中共人員) and emphasised the role played by the triads.²⁰¹ The pro-GMD *Sing Tao Daily* put on the front page what Jiang Jieshi said on Double Tenth.²⁰² It mentioned nothing about the relationship between the GMD and the riots, and instead simply reported that it was the triads who instigated the riots.²⁰³ In an attempt to add credibility to the report the *Sing Tao Daily* in its headlines attributed the finding as to the role of the triads to the government's investigation. Compared to the *Sing Tao Daily* and the *Wen Hui Bao*, reports in the slightly rightist *Huaqiao Ribao* (華僑日報) appeared to have taken a more objective, politically-neutral approach.²⁰⁴ Possibly due to its political stance, reports in the *Huaqiao Ribao* did not mention specifically who instigated the riots or who was responsible for the violence.

Despite the fact that the Hong Kong government eventually suppressed the riots, Grantham foresaw that the risk of a similar riot occurring was always there, as the Hong Kong government with limited resources had to deal with the influx of refugees. In the draft despatch attached to the confidential letter to Johnston, Grantham gave a clear warning:

These deplorable events serve once again to draw attention to the very real problems presented by the influx of population into the small urban areas of Hong Kong and Kowloon, which have produced conditions of unparalleled overcrowding and the attendant threat to law and order that arises therefrom...Within its limited resources of land, materials and money the

²⁰¹ *Kung Sheung Daily News* 工商日報, 12 October 1956, pp.1 and 5.

²⁰² See *Sing Tao Daily* 星島日報, 10 October 1956, p.1 and 11 October 1956, p.1.

²⁰³ *Sing Tao Daily* 星島日報, 13 October 1956, p.14.

²⁰⁴ See, for example, *Huaqiao ribao* 華僑日報, 12 October 1956; 17 October 1956.

Hong Kong Government has done and is doing all it can to ameliorate the conditions of these homeless refugees...In the meantime the risks of a similar outbreak to that which took place last month will be ever present and require increased vigilance.²⁰⁵

Grantham's premonition was correct that Hong Kong would continue to be plagued by social problems in the 1950s and 60s.

Pro-Communist Elements: The Hok Yau Chinese and Western Dance Study Club and Clandestine Communist Activities

The Hok Yau Chinese and Western Dance Study Club (學友中西舞蹈研究社) was originally formed as a reading club of the Chinese-language magazine (學生文叢) shortly before the founding of the PRC. The club later evolved into a study group for students with a focus on extra-curricular activities.²⁰⁶ In secret, the group was used as a base for the indoctrination of pro-Communist sentiments and recruitment of Hong Kong youth for the CCP.²⁰⁷ The leftists had to keep a low profile, as the Hong Kong government feared the development of pro-CCP and pro-GMD sentiments in the colony and took steps to suppress activities relating to such developments. The public, too, feared the leftists. To keep a low profile and a good public image the club followed a 'two-handed operational

²⁰⁵ CO 1030/389, Grantham to J.B. Johnston, draft despatch attached to confidential letter of 6 December 1956.

²⁰⁶ Szeto Wah (司徒華), whom I interviewed and whose background I shall discuss in detail in the chapter dealing with Hong Kong's response to June 4, was one of the founding members of the Hok Yau Club. See Situ Hua 司徒華, 'Chen Duxiu de youzi yu wo' 陳獨秀的幼子與我 (Chen Duxiu's Youngest Son and I), *Ming Pao Daily News*, 7 April 2007.

²⁰⁷ Kenneth Ore, *Song of the Azalea* (Penguin: Toronto, 2005), p.131. Kenneth Ore was one of the leaders of the Hok Yau Chinese and Western Dance Study Club. In recent years Ore and his ex-wife Liang Muxian (梁慕嫻) had been writing about the activities of the club and the underground leftists in Hong Kong in the 1950s. The club is now known simply as the Hok Yau Club (學友社) as it was renamed in 1975.

principle'. The Hok Yau Club had both public and secret leaders, although the CCP had control of the group. Ore in his memoir explains in detail how the leadership of the Club was structured and the reason for it:

Communist Youth League and Party members shared executive positions with sympathetic activists who held no Party affiliation. To outsiders, the executive committee controlled the organisation: if anyone asked, the committee always made decisions together and voted on issues – a democratic system. However, since all Shadow Core members were also on the public executive committee, true power rested within the Shadow Core.²⁰⁸

There also existed 'branches' of leftists known as 'lines' (線), defined by their nature and function within the leftist circle as well as Hong Kong society. These branches included the 'Red Line' (紅線), 'Black Line' (黑線), 'Grey Line' (灰線), and 'Pink Line' (粉紅線).²⁰⁹ In contrast to pro-GMD sympathisers, pro-CCP forces kept a low profile throughout the 1950s when promoting their political agenda. To avoid arousing the suspicion of the colonial authorities, the leftists sought to promote their agenda via subtle, less aggressive means. For instance, to increase membership and promote the Hok Yau Club, members of the club 'cultivated relationships with the press, businesses, and well-known artists in the community'.²¹⁰ Of note is the fact that in 1967, pro-CCP Communists acted completely differently and became openly active, and eventually confrontational in the 1967 riots. Through the pro-Communist

²⁰⁸ Ore, *Song of the Azalea*, p. 151. The Shadow Core is known as *hexinzu* (核心組) in Chinese.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p.188. See also Liang Muxian 梁慕嫻, *Ganggong shenmi renwu Cai peiyuan* 港共神秘人物: 蔡培遠 (Secret Figure of Hong Kong Communists Cai Peiyuan), *Kaifang zazhi* 開放雜誌 (Open Magazine), 272, September 2008, p.65.

²¹⁰ Ore, *Song of the Azalea*, p. 152.

organisations, these underground leftists promoted pro-CCP sentiments in secret. At times, there were tensions among these underground leftists. Szeto Wah, for example, was a leading figure in the club but was removed from it in 1958 because he had a different opinion on how the club should be run.²¹¹

Kenneth Ore Kee-ngai (柯其毅), who became a leader of the Hok Yau Club after Szeto Wah's departure, noted in his memoir that around 1960 the club was instructed by the Party to teach club members to be more patriotic through 'thought transformation'.²¹² The transformation process was divided into several stages. First, club members were taught not to join gangs, smoke, use drugs or go dancing. Second, they were taught to 'sympathise with the poor, to love the people, and to love China'.²¹³ Third, members were recruited into the Communist Youth League and transferred outside of the Hok Yau Club.²¹⁴ However, Ore questioned the methods some Youth League members used in teaching club members to be patriotic. Ore wrote:

Not everyone in the Youth League practised transformation methods. Some members responded to patriotic directives simply by telling their contacts to be more patriotic. They then reported to their superiors that their contacts now knew what to do – that is, to be more patriotic. Those shortcuts were not good enough for me. How could I change these students' lives, their thoughts?

²¹¹ In my interview with Szeto Wah, Szeto confirmed that he was a core member of the Club in the 1950s, but was removed from the group due to internal politics in 1958. This incident is mentioned in Ore's book and confirmed by Szeto Wah in his column in *Ming Pao Daily News* in 2005. Interview with Szeto Wah, 29 September 2007. See also Situ Hua 司徒華, *Chenghuang julu* 橙黃橘綠 (Oranges are Yellow Mandarins are Green) (Xianggang: Ciwenhua youxiangongsi, 2006), pp.29-30. See also, Ore, *Song of the Azalea*, pp.151-152.

²¹² Ore, *Song of the Azalea*, pp.164.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, pp.164-165.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*

I kept asking myself. How could I make them more patriotic instead of simply telling them to love their country?²¹⁵

What does Ore's story tell us about China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong? People involved in the promotion of political nationalistic sentiments at times questioned the methods used and became confused. Ore's story also shows how pro-CCP sentiments in the post-1949 period had their origins in the 1950s and could only be promoted in secret, due to suppression by colonial authorities. In this sense, colonialism served as a limiting factor in the promotion of political nationalism. In order to promote pro-CCP sentiments without arousing the suspicion of the colonial government, members of the Hok Yau Club chose to keep a low profile and cultivated relationships with different groups such as the press and businesses.

Cold War Politics, 'Free China' and the Third Force Movement in Hong Kong

In the 1950s in Hong Kong there existed a group of political activists, originally from China and often referred to as the Third Force (第三勢力).²¹⁶ The Third Force Movement, which promoted Western liberalism and democracy, had its origins in China in the 1940s.²¹⁷ Its aim was the 'creation of a new China, based upon the principles of democratic constitutionalism, which can be brought

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.165.

²¹⁶ For some discussions on the Third Force in Hong Kong and the US State Department's perspective on it, see Chi-kwan Mark, *Hong Kong and the Cold War* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp.189-194.

²¹⁷ For details, see Fung, *In Search of Chinese Democracy*, pp.230-262.

into consonance with the traditional spirit of Chinese culture'.²¹⁸ The nationalist rhetoric of the Third Force in Hong Kong focused on the idea of building a democratic China free from the totalitarianism of the CCP and the GMD and was characterised by its criticisms of both Communist China and Chiang Kai-shek. Some of the leading members of the Third Force Movement in Hong Kong were former GMD members. Leaders of the Third Force Movement in Hong Kong included Zhang Fakui (張發奎), a well-known GMD general, Gu Mengyu (顧孟餘), Zhang Guotao (張國燾), a former CCP member, and Zhang Junmai/Carsun Chang (張君勱). Zhang wrote the book *The Third Force in China*, which was essentially a manifesto of the Third Force Movement. Zhang founded the China Democratic Socialist Party (中國民主社會黨) in 1946 and the Chinese Liberal Democracy Fighters Association (中國自由民主戰鬥同盟) in Hong Kong in 1951, and has been referred to as a 'Confucian democrat'.²¹⁹ Like the Chinese intellectuals in Hong Kong who promoted cultural nationalism, Zhang defended

²¹⁸ Carsun Chang, *The Third Force in China* (New York: Bookman Associates, 1952), p.14. An example of Chinese writers who promoted the Third Force rhetoric was Sima Changfeng (司馬長風). Sima supported neither the CCP nor the GMD and was staunchly anti-Communist. In his writings, Sima criticised the kind of nationalism that was based on allegiance to a political party. Using the name Hu Yue (胡越), Sima Changfeng was involved in the Third Force Movement in the early 1950s and was sent to Okinawa by Gu Mengyu to train young Chinese soldiers from Hong Kong with support from the Americans. See Fang Kuanlie 方寬烈, 'Sima Changfeng de zhuanqi' 司馬長風的傳奇 (The Life of Sima Changfeng), *Wenxue pinglun* 文學評論 (Literature Review), 4, 15 August 2009, pp.169-174. For examples of Sima's writings, see Sima Changfeng 司馬長風, *Daguanji* 大觀集 (An Overview Collection) (Xianggang: Tiansheng chubanshe, 1975), pp.209-213 and pp.231-232. For a complete study of his life and work, see the edited volume *Sima Changfeng zuopin pinglunji* 司馬長風作品評論集 (A Collection of Commentary on the Work of Sima Changfeng) ed. Lin Manshu 林曼叔 (Xianggang: Xianggang wenxue pinglun chubanshe, 2009). For details on the Third Force movement, see Zhang Fakui 張發奎, *Jiang Jieshi yu wo Zhang Fakui shangjiang huiyilu* 蔣介石與我：張發奎上將回憶錄 (Chiang Kai-shek and I: The Memoirs of General Zhang Fakui) (Xianggang: Wenhuiyishu chubanshe, 2008), pp.479-510.

²¹⁹ Wang Juntao, 'Confucian Democrats in Chinese History', *Confucianism for the Modern World* ed. Daniel A. Bell and Hahn Chaibong (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp.69-89.

Chinese culture in that he believed there existed ideas regarding democracy and individual freedom, and human rights in the Chinese tradition.²²⁰ However, the Third Force Movement in Hong Kong was political in nature.

The Third Force Movement in Hong Kong grew out of the aftermath of the CCP-GMD struggle and Cold War politics and was closely associated with the US government. The Hong-Kong-based Third Force received funding from the US government,²²¹ had an anti-Communist agenda, and was actively engaged in political activities such as recruiting members for the Association, publishing journals to promote their agenda, and even military operations.²²² Thus, the Third Force Movement can be classified as the third type of political nationalism that emerged in Hong Kong in the 1950s. The Third Force worked with the anti-Communist and anti-Chiang Kai-shek Free China Movement (自由中國運動) headed by Cai Wenzhi (蔡文治).²²³ As it was illegal to engage in political activities in Hong Kong at that time, the Hong Kong Special Branch (政治部) kept a close eye on the activities of the Third Force but did not take any drastic action against leaders of the Third Force Movement.²²⁴

²²⁰ Chang, *The Third Force in China*, p.323. For more information on Zhang Junmai's thought, see Edmund S.K. Fung, 'New Confucianism and Chinese Democratisation: The Thought and Predicament of Zhang Junmai', *Twentieth Century China*, 28, 2, 2003, pp.41-71.

²²¹ Zhang, *Jiang Jieshi yu wo*, pp.488-490.

²²² *Ibid.*, pp.493-498.

²²³ *Ibid.*, p.495.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.491-492. The Hong Kong Special Branch was the government department responsible for monitoring political activities in Hong Kong. For details on the Special Branch, see Luo Ya 羅亞, *Zhengzhibu huiyilu* 政治部回憶錄 (A Memoir of the Special Branch) (Xianggang: Zhongwendaxue xianggangyataianjiusuo haiwaihuaren yanjiushe, 1996).

While not all of the Chinese intellectuals who fled to Hong Kong were part of the Third Force Movement in Hong Kong,²²⁵ their relationship with the Third Force cannot be ignored. Zhang Junmai, as one of the leading figures of the Third Force Movement, helped draft the *Declaration on Behalf of Chinese Culture Respectfully Announced to the People of the World* (為中國文化敬告世界人士宣言), published in 1958 in the *Democratic Review*.²²⁶ I shall discuss this document later in the case study of the cultural nationalists.

The Third Force perceived the ROC and the GMD as different entities. For example, in an article in *China's Voice* (中國之聲),²²⁷ a weekly magazine launched by the Third Force in 1951, the Third Force explained clearly that as far as their attitude towards the GMD regime in Taiwan was concerned, there were three 'Taiwans': the ROC Taiwan, Taiwan as an anti-Communist base, and the Taiwan under the rule of Chiang Kai-shek's dictatorship.²²⁸ Although Zhang Fakui in his memoir claimed that the Third Force did not attack Chiang Kai-shek

²²⁵ Xu Fuguan, for example, has stated that he did not participate in the Third Force movement in Hong Kong. Therefore, I do not believe that the *Democratic Review* could be classified as a Third Force publication. See Xu Fuguan 徐復觀, 'Daonian Simachangfeng xiansheng' 悼念司馬長風先生 (In Memory of Sima Changfeng), in *Sima Changfeng jinianji* 司馬長風紀念集 (Collection of Writings in Memory of Sima Changfeng) (Xianggang: Juexin chubanshe, 1980), pp.83-86.

²²⁶ Mou Zongsan 牟宗三, Xu Fuguan 徐復觀, Zhang Junmai 張君勱 and Tang Junyi 唐君毅, *Wei zhongguowenhua jinggao shijie renshi xuanyan* 為中國文化敬告世界人士宣言 (*A Manifesto on the Reappraisal of Chinese Culture: Our Joint Understanding of the Sinological Study Relating to World Cultural Outlook*), *Democratic Review* 民主評論, 9, 1, 1958, pp.2-21.

²²⁷ From 1951 to 1952 *China's Voice* was headed by Zhang Guotao. See Zhang, *Jiang Jieshi yu wo*, p.489.

²²⁸ Author unknown, 'Women dui taiwan de taidu' 我們對台灣的態度 (Our Attitude towards Taiwan), *Zhongguo zhisheng* 中國之聲 (China's Voice), 1, 6, pp.2-3.

or Taiwan,²²⁹ in fact it did as it called Chiang Kai-shek's regime a 'cancer of China' (中國的毒瘤).²³⁰

The concept of a democratic 'free China' (自由中國), as a nationalist rhetoric closely related to a critical view of the GMD, was not confined to Third Force publications. It could also be found in rightist publications in Hong Kong such as the *Chinese Students' Weekly* (中國學生周報), *Zuguo zhoukan* (祖國周刊), *Daxue shenghuo* (大學生活) and *Democratic Review* (民主評論).²³¹ The similarity in rhetoric between these publications is to be expected for the writers had the same pro-democracy agenda, and the Third Force as well as most of the rightist publications received funding from the US.²³²

Despite financial support from the US government, the Hong Kong-based Third Force Movement was short-lived primarily due to divisions among its leaders.²³³ Zhang Junmai openly condemned the Taiwan government and that did not gain the approval of GMD members such as Gu Mengyu and Zhang Fakui. In addition, Gu Mengyu suspected that the Chinese Liberal Democracy

²²⁹ Zhang, *Jiang Jieshi yu wo*, p.505.

²³⁰ Author unknown, *Women dui taiwan de taidu* '我們對台灣的態度 (Our Attitude towards Taiwan), *Zhongguo zhisheng* 中國之聲 (China's Voice), 1, 6, pp.2-3. Zhang Fakui in his memoir says that he and his group did not support Chiang Kai-shek and were dissatisfied with the Taiwan government. It has been noted that although Zhang Fakui was against Chiang Kai-shek politically, he still respected Chiang. See Zhang, *Jiang Jieshi yu wo*, pp.495 and 533. See also Wang Xingang 王心鋼, *Zhang Fakui zhuan* 張發奎傳 (A Biography of Zhang Fakui) (Zhuhai: Zhuhai chubanshe, 2005), p.307.

²³¹ See, for example, Qiu Zhenli 秋貞理 (pseud.), 'Ziyou de shengli' 自由的勝利 (The Victory of Freedom), *Chinese Students Weekly*, 221, 12 October 1956, p.5; Xiao Du 蕭獨 (pseud.?), 'Zifa de qingzhu' 自發的慶祝 (Spontaneous Celebrations) *Chinese Students Weekly*, 221, 12 October 1956, p.5.

²³² It is unclear whether the *Democratic Review* received American funding.

²³³ Zhang, *Jiang Jieshi yu wo*, pp.500-501, 505-507.

Fighters Association had been infiltrated by GMD agents.²³⁴ The Association was reorganised in 1954 and then disbanded, and the Third Force Movement ended in 1962.

In the next section, I shall discuss the kind of cultural nationalism promoted by these Chinese intellectuals in exile. The section will not be a complete study of the thought of these intellectuals. It will only be a brief examination of the cultural nationalist rhetoric they promoted in Hong Kong in the 1950s. Unlike those involved in the Third Force Movement, the Chinese intellectuals I discuss in the next section did not engage themselves actively or directly in political activities or military operations in an attempt to retake mainland China. The questions I seek to answer are: what specifically was cultural nationalism in the 1950s based on? What were the Chinese intellectuals' motives in promoting cultural nationalism in Hong Kong? Were the cultural nationalists pro-GMD? Did they criticise the GMD? Did they see the GMD state as separate from China as a nation?

Promoting Cultural Nationalism: Chinese Intellectuals in Exile in Hong Kong

Chinese intellectuals such as Qian Mu (錢穆), Tang Junyi (唐君毅), Mou Zongsan (牟宗三), and Xu Fuguan (徐復觀) fled to Hong Kong in the Civil War period and actively promoted traditional Chinese culture in the colony. Although some of these intellectuals spent time in both Taiwan and Hong Kong, their writings were often published in Hong Kong in the 1950s in Chinese-language

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, p.506.

publications such as the *Democratic Review* (民主評論) and the *Chinese Students' Weekly* (中國學生周報).²³⁵ I refer to these intellectuals as Chinese intellectuals in exile because despite the CCP's victory in the Civil War they still regarded the ROC as the legitimate political state of China, although not all of them were pro-GMD. Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan, and Xu Fuguan were disciples of Xiong Shili (熊十力), a well-known scholar of Confucianism in early twentieth-century China. It has been noted that Tang, Mou, and Xu 'carried on his teaching and opened up the second stage of Modern New Confucianism'.²³⁶ Xu Fuguan, a former GMD official, founded the *Democratic Review* in 1949. In October 1949 Qian Mu, Tang Junyi and other Chinese intellectuals in Hong Kong founded the Asia College of Arts and Commerce (亞洲文商學院), which became the New Asia College (新亞書院) one year later and then part of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Mou Zongsan taught at the Chinese University of Hong Kong from the 1960s onwards until the 1990s, but his writings had been published in Hong Kong in the 1950s.

The New Asia College was founded by Qian Mu and scholars from mainland China 'in search of academic freedom'.²³⁷ Academic staff of the College consisted of intellectuals from mainland China. Tang Junyi, for example,

²³⁵ See, for example, Qian Mu 錢穆, 'Women ruhe lai qingzhu shuangshijie' 我們如何來慶祝雙十節 (How We Celebrate Double Tenth), *Zhongguo xuesheng zhoubao* 中國學生周報 (Chinese Students Weekly), 12, 10 October 1952.

²³⁶ Xinzhong Yao, *An Introduction to Confucianism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.254.

²³⁷ New Asia College, *New Asia College Calendar* (Hong Kong: New Asia College, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1963), p.3.

served as the Head of the Department of Philosophy and Education.²³⁸ Another well-known scholar Zhang Pijie (張丕介) taught economics in the college. The New Asia College had a difficult start as it suffered from a lack of funding, but later it received funding from both Taiwan and the US.

Despite its humble beginnings, New Asia became a base for the promotion of cultural nationalism as it was founded on the ideals held by Chinese intellectuals such as Qian Mu.²³⁹ After his arrival in Hong Kong, Qian saw that there were many young people without employment and education and thus he decided to provide an opportunity for them to receive an education.²⁴⁰ From the beginning, Qian as the President of the College stressed the importance of understanding Chinese culture and the advantage of traditional Chinese education in nurturing students with an all-round knowledge.²⁴¹ He also believed that the traditional *shuyuan* (書院) education system of China where students received a general education (通識) from private tutors was the best.²⁴²

The purpose in founding the College was ‘to preserve traditional Chinese culture and to balance it with western learning that students might at once have a thorough knowledge of their cultural heritage and be prepared to cope with the modern world’.²⁴³ Chinese history and culture, particularly Confucianism,

²³⁸ New Asia College, *New Asia College* (Hong Kong: New Asia College, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1979), p.9.

²³⁹ See for example, Qian Mu 錢穆, *Xinya yiduo* 新亞遺鐸 (Remembrances of New Asia) (Beijing: Xinhua shudian, 2005), p.11.

²⁴⁰ Yin Yongqing 印永清, *Bainian jiazu Qian Mu* 百年家族: 錢穆 (A Hundred-Year Family: Qian Mu) (Taipei: Lixu wenhuashiye youxiangongsi, 2002), p.251.

²⁴¹ Qian Mu 錢穆, *Xinya yiduo* 新亞遺鐸 (Beijing, Sanlian shudian, 2005), p.11.

²⁴² *Ibid.*

²⁴³ New Asia College, *New Asia College Calendar* (Hong Kong: New Asia College, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1963), p.3.

became the central motif of cultural nationalism that was promoted by the Chinese intellectuals in exile both inside and outside the New Asia College.²⁴⁴ It has been noted that Tang Junyi, for example, ‘ranked the achievements of Chinese Confucianism as the highest’ of Chinese, Western and Indian cultural traditions.²⁴⁵ The New Asia scholars strongly believed that only through the revival of Chinese traditional culture could the Chinese nation be revived.²⁴⁶ However, cross-cultural understanding was also an important focus in the New Asia College and Hong Kong was a suitable place for promoting the type of education that the mainland intellectuals envisioned.²⁴⁷

As cultural nationalists, these Chinese intellectuals in exile saw it as their mission to preserve and promote Chinese tradition in Hong Kong.²⁴⁸ They made their agenda clear in a well-known document titled *A Declaration on Behalf of Chinese Culture Respectfully Announced to the People of the World*. In that

²⁴⁴ It is debatable whether Mou Zongsan, Tang Junyi, Xu Fuguan and Qian Mu were promoting ‘New Confucianism’ in Hong Kong because there are variations on the definition of New Confucianism and there is no definitive list of New Confucians. Moreover, New Confucianism did not exist as a school or movement in the 1950s. See John Makeham, ‘The Retrospective Creation of New Confucianism’, in *New Confucianism: A Critical Examination* ed. John Makeham (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp.25-53. It has been argued that Qian Mu as a historian had a different interpretation of Confucianism and the concept of *daotong* (道統) compared to Mou Zongsan, Tang Junyi, and Xu Fuguan as philosophers. Thus, Qian did not sign the *Declaration on Behalf of Chinese Culture Respectfully Announced to the People of the World*. For more detailed discussions, see John Makeham, *Lost Soul: ‘Confucianism in Contemporary Chinese Academic Discourse* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Asia Centre, 2008), pp.150-153; see also Yin Yongqing 印永清, *Bainian jiazu Qian Mu* 百年家族: 錢穆 (A Hundred-Year Family: Qian Mu) (Taipei: Lixu wenhuashiye youxiangongsi, 2002), p.257-258. Yu Yingshi 余英時 has argued that Qian Mu had denied he (Qian) was a New Confucian. See Makeham, *Lost Soul*, pp.149-150. In any case, the main issue in this chapter is that Chinese culture was the focus of cultural nationalism promoted by the Chinese intellectuals in Hong Kong.

²⁴⁵ Lao Sze Kwang, ‘Chinese Studies and Cultural Integration’, *The Quest for Excellence: A History of the Chinese University of Hong Kong from 1963 to 1993* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1994), pp.125-162.

²⁴⁶ Huang Zuzhi 黃祖直, *Guilinjie de xinya shuyuan* 桂林街的新亞書院 (The New Asia College in Kwai Lam Street) (Xianggang: Rongtengzhai, 2005), p.30.

²⁴⁷ See Grace Ai-ling Chou, *Confucian Cultural Education on the Chinese Periphery: Hong Kong’s New Asia College, 1949-1976* (Ph.D thesis, University of Hawaii, 2003), pp.24-29.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p.4. See also, Lam Wai-man, *Understanding the Political Culture of Hong Kong: The Paradox of Activism and Depoliticisation*, p.190.

document the authors vigorously defended Chinese culture, particularly Confucianism, and discussed the future of Chinese culture in terms of its relationship with the development of a democratic Chinese nation.²⁴⁹ The authors argue that Confucianism contains ideas relating to democracy and equality.²⁵⁰

Chinese traditional culture was not the only matter these cultural nationalists discussed in their writings, for they also pondered the state of the Chinese nation. Mou Zongsan, for example, placed emphasis on the ideological aspect of *both* the nation *and* the state as one based on Chinese tradition and culture, and one that should be ‘internalised’ as part of ‘life’, or *shengming* (生命).²⁵¹ Mou believed that a nation cannot be fully realised without a state,²⁵² and that the state represents the nation.²⁵³ Mou’s concept of the relationship between nation and state is an example of Ernest Gellner’s observation that nationalism maintains that nations and states ‘were destined for each other; that either without the other is incomplete, and constitutes a tragedy’.²⁵⁴ In the view of Mou and Xu Fuguan, the transformation of the *state* and the preservation of the Chinese nation and culture cannot be separated. It is precisely for the sake of preserving Chinese

²⁴⁹ Mou Zongsan 牟宗三, Xu Fuguan 徐復觀, Zhang Junmai 張君勱 and Tang Junyi 唐君毅, *Wei zhongguowenhua jinggao shijie renshi xuanyan* 為中國文化敬告世界人士宣言 (*A Manifesto on the Reappraisal of Chinese Culture: Our Joint Understanding of the Sinological Study Relating to World Cultural Outlook*), *Democratic Review* 民主評論, 9, 1, 1958, pp.2-21.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁵¹ Mou Zongsan 牟宗三, *Shengming de xuewen* (生命的學問 *The Study of Life*) (Taipei: Sanmin shuju gufen youxiangongsi, 2007), p.38. The original articles in this volume were written in the 1950s.

²⁵² *Ibid.*

²⁵³ *Ibid.*, p.110.

²⁵⁴ Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, p.6.

culture that the state needs to be transformed.²⁵⁵ Similarly, Tang Junyi placed emphasis on both the nation and the state. He criticised those that put too much emphasis on the nation, the party or the government, and groups that simply attacked the CCP and the GMD.²⁵⁶

The work of the Chinese scholars in Hong Kong in the 1950s is an example of John Hutchinson's theory that cultural nationalists are 'moral innovators who seek by "reviving" an ethnic historicist vision of the nation to redirect traditionalists and modernists away from conflict and instead to unite them in the task of constructing an integrated distinctive and autonomous community, capable of competing in the modern world'.²⁵⁷ The work of these Chinese intellectuals in Hong Kong is an example of how cultural nationalists seek to bring together ideas of tradition and modernity, with a vision of an autonomous community based on a nation's distinctive cultural, ethnic and historical roots.

Yet there was a political dimension to the promotion of cultural nationalism by these intellectuals. New Asia College was a product of Cold War politics as well as post-Civil War Chinese politics. The College was in part supported by US non-governmental organisations, which believed that preserving a symbol of Chinese culture such as New Asia would help combat

²⁵⁵ Xu Fuguan 徐復觀, *Xufuguan wencun* 徐復觀文存 (Collected Works of Xu Fuguan) (Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 1990), pp.68-71.

²⁵⁶ Tang Junyi 唐君毅, *Zhongguo renwen jingshen zhi fazhan* 中國人文精神之發展 (The Development of the Spirit of Chinese Culture) (Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 2000), pp.182-187. The original article was published in the *Zuguo zhoukan* 祖國周刊 in 1950.

²⁵⁷ John Hutchinson, 'Cultural Nationalism and Moral Regeneration', in *Nationalism* ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp.122-131.

Communism.²⁵⁸ Qian Mu had personal connections with Chiang Kai-shek and the New Asia College received funding from the Nationalist government in Taiwan.²⁵⁹ Most importantly, what prompted these intellectuals to revive Chinese culture was the post-1949 political situation in China, as they believed that Chinese culture was slowly being destroyed by the Communist regime there. For Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan in particular, the 1949 regime change in China was the definitive turning point in their academic career as it sparked their determination to promote Confucianism.²⁶⁰ All the Chinese intellectuals in exile were anti-Communist. Tang Junyi often criticised the CCP after he went to Hong Kong.²⁶¹ Mou's nationalist ideology consists of three ideas: combating Communism with Chinese culture (文化反共); promotion of Confucianism; and supporting the ROC. As a result, Mou did not openly criticise the GMD.²⁶²

Compared to the work of the New Asia scholars, Xu Fuguan's work in Hong Kong in the 1950s was more political, particularly in the early days of the *Democratic Review*. Xu founded the *Democratic Review* not only to call upon Chinese intellectuals to ponder their role in post-1949 'China' but to push for

²⁵⁸ For details, see Grace Ai-ling Chou, *Confucian Cultural Education on the Chinese Periphery: Hong Kong's New Asia College, 1949-1976* (Ph.D. thesis, University of Hawaii, 2003), pp.137-182.

²⁵⁹ Yin Yongqing 印永清, *Bainian jiazu Qian Mu* 百年家族-錢穆 (A Hundred-Year Family: Qian Mu) (Taipei: Lixu wenhuashiye youxiangongsi, 2002), pp.250-251.

²⁶⁰ Tang Duanzheng 唐端正, *Tang Junyi zhuanlue* 唐君毅傳略 (A Brief Biography of Tang Junyi) (Xianggang: Fazhu chubanshe, 2006), p.50. See also, Li Shan 李山, *Mou Zongsan zhuan* 牟宗三傳 (A Biography of Mou Zongsan) (Beijing: Zhongyang minzu daxue chubanshe, 2006), p.110.

²⁶¹ Tang, *Tang Junyi zhuanlue*, p.50. See also Tang Junyi 唐君毅, *Shuo zhonghuaminzu de huaguopiaoing* 說中華民族之花果飄零 (On the Scattering of the Fruits of the Chinese Nation) (Taipei: Sanmin shuju, 2006), p.91.

²⁶² Cai Renhou 蔡仁厚, *Mou Zongsan xiansheng xuesi nianpu* 牟宗三先生學思年譜 (A Chronology of Mou Zongsan's Academic Thought) (Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 1996), p.16.

changes in the GMD through open discussions.²⁶³ It has been argued that the *Democratic Review* reflected a change of thought in Xu Fuguan, as he became disillusioned with the GMD and turned his focus to Chinese culture as the way to save China.²⁶⁴ Indeed, in the final issue of the *Democratic Review*, Xu admitted that the focus of the publication moved from politics to Chinese culture. However, at the same time, Xu stated that the ‘great project of revival’ (中興大業) of China was ultimately inseparable from the GMD.²⁶⁵ He also argued that despite the fact that the publication was supported by the GMD at various times, he was being critical of the GMD out of good will.²⁶⁶ Thus, it can be said that although Xu Fuguan was critical of the GMD, he still supported the GMD and respected Chiang Kai-shek. In any case, the attitudes of the cultural nationalists in exile towards the GMD appeared to be mixed and we cannot simply label them as either anti-GMD or pro-GMD.

Pro-ROC versus Pro-GMD: The ROC Flag as Symbol of Chinese Culture

The fact that New Asia scholars were anti-Communist did not necessarily mean that they should be labelled pro-GMD. While Tang at times spoke positively about the GMD government in Taiwan,²⁶⁷ and Qian Mu had a personal

²⁶³ Jiang Lianhua 蔣連華, *Xueshu yu zhengzhi Xu Fuguan sixiang yanjiu* 學術與政治:徐復觀思想研究 (Between Academia and Politics: A Study of the Thought of Xu Fuguan) (Shanghai: Sanlian, 2006), p.35.

²⁶⁴ Jiang, *Xueshu yu zhengzhi*, p.38.

²⁶⁵ Xu Fuguan 徐復觀, ‘Benkan jieshu de hua’ 本刊結束的話 (A Word on the End of Publication of the Magazine), *Minzhu pinglun* 民主評論 (Democratic Review), 17, 9, pp.22-23.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁷ Tang Junyi 唐君毅, *Zhongguo renwen jingshen zhi fazhan* 中國人文精神之發展 (The Development of the Spirit of Chinese Culture) (Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 2000), p.177.

connection with the Chiang regime in Taiwan, Qian and Tang conceptually separated the GMD from the ROC, and politics from culture.²⁶⁸ Tang Duanzheng (唐端正), a student of Tang Junyi, has noted that although Tang Junyi recognised the Nationalist government (國民政府) as the state representing China, he never praised the GMD or celebrated Chiang Kai-shek's birthday.²⁶⁹ Indeed, Tang Junyi's writings published in the 1950s show that he perceived the ROC as the Chinese nation, the GMD as a political party, and the Nationalist government as the political state.²⁷⁰

From Qian Mu's writings, it appears that although he came into contact with politically active people such as Zhang Junmai in Hong Kong,²⁷¹ the focus of Qian's nationalist rhetoric was not on Chinese national politics or pro-GMD political sentiments, but on traditional Chinese culture. In addition, Qian at times *did* criticise the GMD. Like Xu Fuguan, Qian believed changes in the GMD were needed.²⁷² That Qian was not pro-GMD is also evidenced by the fact that he refused to establish a college in Taiwan when asked to do so. Thus, New Asia apparently wished to 'operate outside the sphere of Chiang's control'.²⁷³ As far as Qian Mu's view on the future of China was concerned, he wrote that he was

²⁶⁸ Grace Ai-ling Chou, *Confucian Cultural Education on the Chinese Periphery: Hong Kong's New Asia College, 1949-1976* (Ph.D. thesis, University of Hawaii, 2003), p.245-246.

²⁶⁹ Tang, *Tang Junyi zhuanlue*, p.85.

²⁷⁰ Tang, *Zhongguo renwen jingshen zhi fazhan*, pp.173-176. The original article was first published in the Hong Kong-based *Zuguo zhoukan* 祖國周刊 in 1955.

²⁷¹ Qian Mu 錢穆, *Bashi yi shuangqin shiyou hekan* 八十憶雙親師友合刊 (A Combined Volume on Remembering My Parents, Teachers and Friends at the Age of 80) (Taipei: Lantai chubanshe, 2000), pp.273-274.

²⁷² Qian Mu 錢穆, 'Fangongdalu shengzhong xiang guominzhengfu jin yi zhonggao' 反攻大陸聲中向國民政府進一忠告 (Advice for the Guomindang Government amidst the Rhetoric of Counter Attack on the Mainland), *Mingzhu pinglun* 民主評論, 1, 21, April 1950, pp.2-4.

²⁷³ Grace Ai-ling Chou, *Confucian Cultural Education on the Chinese Periphery: Hong Kong's New Asia College, 1949-1976* (Ph.D. thesis, University of Hawaii, 2003), pp.154-155.

positive about it because China had a ‘traditionally superior culture’,²⁷⁴ and that he hoped that Chinese people would draw lessons from Chinese history and traditional Chinese culture.²⁷⁵

Although both Qian and Xu discussed the state of China and the GMD in their writings, it appears that Qian’s promotion of cultural nationalism originated from his desire to preserve Chinese culture, while in Xu Fuguan’s case the impetus was Chinese politics, or more specifically GMD politics.²⁷⁶ This difference in motive is to be expected because Xu was a former GMD official hoping to push for changes in the GMD, while Qian was a teacher and historian before he fled China.

That New Asia scholars Qian Mu and Tang Junyi saw the ROC and the GMD as different entities is evidenced by their perception of the ROC flag. The ROC flag was used in the New Asia College not because the staff supported the GMD, but because they regarded the flag as a symbol of Chinese culture. The use of the ROC flag became a political issue when New Asia was to be incorporated into a new public university set up by the government, which was determined to make public universities politically neutral and thus demanded that

²⁷⁴ Qian Mu, *Bashi yi shuangqin shiyou hekan*, pp.273-274 and 279. See also Qian Mu 錢穆, ‘Women ruhe lai qingzhu shuangshijie’ 我們如何來慶祝雙十節 (How We Celebrate Double Tenth), *Zhongguo xuesheng zhoubao* 中國學生周報 (Chinese Students Weekly), 12, 10 October 1952.

²⁷⁵ Qian Mu, *Bashi yi shuangqin shiyou hekan*, pp.273-274 and 279.

²⁷⁶ Qian and Xu also had their differences particularly in the way they studied history as Qian focused on objectivity while Xu tended to look at history from the point of view of the present. See, Li Hanji 黎漢基, *Lun Xu Fuguan yu Yin Haiguang xiandai taiwan zhishifenzi yu yishixingtai yanjiu* 論徐復觀與殷海光- 現代台灣知識分子與意識形態研究 1949-1969 (On Xu Fuguan and Yin Haiguang: A Study of Intellectuals and Ideologies in Modern Taiwan, 1949-1969) (PhD thesis, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1998), pp.139-144.

New Asia stop flying the ROC flag. In the end, leaders of New Asia, concerned about New Asia's future, bowed to government pressure.²⁷⁷

The case of Chinese intellectuals who settled in Hong Kong after 1949 shows that China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong in the 1950s was not a purely political phenomenon. Chinese culture was the central motif in the cultural nationalist rhetoric they promoted. They believed in the idea of 'saving China with Chinese culture' (文化救國). In reaction to the political nationalism revolving around the CCP-GMD struggle, they placed emphasis on the importance of *both* the nation and the state. Further, the issue of representation of the nation emerged when questions were asked about what a national symbol represented.

The flag-flying issue in the New Asia College also illustrates the fact that clashes between nationalism and colonialism were unavoidable. In fact, this was not the only time when a state flag was used as a national symbol to represent the Chinese nation in a broader sense. In the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign, which I will examine in detail in Chapter Seven, the PRC flag was used by activists to represent the entire Chinese community.

Cultural Nationalism *versus* the Third Force Movement in Hong Kong: A Comparison

A major difference between the cultural nationalists and the Third Force in Hong Kong is that while cultural nationalists Qian Mu, Tang Junyi, Mou

²⁷⁷Grace Ai-ling Chou, *Confucian Cultural Education on the Chinese Periphery: Hong Kong's New Asia College, 1949-1976* (PhD thesis, University of Hawaii, 2003), p.249.

Zongsan and Xu Fuguan were promoting their agenda with a focus on the revival of Chinese culture outside the realm of politics and respected Chiang Kai-shek, the Third Force Movement was marked by its condemnation of Chiang Kai-shek, and by Third Force activists' involvement in political as well as military activities.

There were also similarities between the rhetoric of the cultural nationalists and that of the Third Force. Both the cultural nationalists and the Third Force defended Chinese culture. The concept of 'democratic free China' could be found in the nationalist rhetoric of both the cultural nationalists and the Third Force.²⁷⁸ Those involved in the Third Force Movement had some connection with the cultural nationalists in the New Asia College as well as with other Chinese intellectuals in exile in Hong Kong. In addition, both the cultural nationalists and the Third Force were anti-Communist.

To some extent cultural nationalism persisted in the *wen she* (文社) movement in the 1960s and 1970s, which saw a proliferation of Chinese-language literary publications, some of which carried a nationalistic tone and discussed Chinese culture and matters relating to China.²⁷⁹ For example, the magazine *Pangu* 盤古, first published in 1967, contained many discussions about

²⁷⁸ As noted by Edmund S.K. Fung, Xu Fuguan, Mou Zongsan, and Tang Junyi sought ultimate inner freedom in a spiritual and philosophical sense. Similarly, Zhang Junmai placed emphasis on individual liberty and political freedoms. Thus, the similarity between the nationalist rhetoric of the Third Force and that of the cultural nationalists is to be expected. For details, see Edmund S.K. Fung, 'The Idea of Freedom in Modern China Revisited: Plural Conceptions and Dual Responsibilities', *Modern China*, 32, 4, 2006, pp.453-482.

²⁷⁹ For a detailed study on the *wen she* movement in Hong Kong in the 1960s and 1970s, see Wu Xuanren 吳宣人, *Xianggang liuqishiniandai wensheyundong zhengli ji yanjiu* 香港六七十年代文社運動整理及研究 (A Comprehensive Study of the Wen She Movement in Hong Kong in the 1960s and 1970s) (Hong Kong: Provisional Urban Council Public Libraries, 1999). See also Li Zefen 黎則奮, *Qishi niandai xianggang qingnian jijin yundong huigu* (香港青年激進運動回顧 A Review of the Radical Hong Kong Youth Movement in the 1970s), 7 June 2008, <http://www.grass-root.org/college/modules/wfsection/article.php?articleid=695>.

China as well as a well-known article written by one of the editors as a response to Tang Junyi's discussions about overseas Chinese and the state of the Chinese nation.²⁸⁰ However, it remains unclear how much influence the kind of cultural nationalism promoted by the Chinese intellectuals in exile in the 1950s had on magazines such as *Pangu*, or Hong Kong young people in the 1960s and 1970s. One scholar has argued that some of the young people who participated in the first phase of the Campaign to Make Chinese an official language (爭取中文成爲法定語文運動/中文運動) and the 1971 Defend Diaoyu Islands campaign were inspired by the 'older form of cultural nationalism' of the 1950s.²⁸¹ It can be said that cultural nationalism took on a new form in the 1970s student movement dominated by pro-China/pro-PRC Hong Kong students, who often claimed that they were promoting the spirit of the May Fourth Movement.²⁸² However, the kind of nationalism that emerged in the 1970s had more to do with increased political activism and the rise of pro-PRC sentiments among Hong Kong youth, which I shall discuss in detail in Chapter Five.

²⁸⁰ Bao Cuoshi 包錯石, 'Haiwai zhongguoren de fenlie huigui yu fandou' 海外中國人的分裂·回歸與反獨 (Overseas Chinese: Their Divisions, Return, and Anti-Independence), *Pangu* 盤古, 10, pp.2-16. It was Lai Chak-fun 黎則奮 who has argued that the article was written as a response to Tang Junyi's discussions about overseas Chinese and the Chinese nation. See Li Zefen 黎則奮, *Qishi niandai xianggang qingnian jijin yundong huigu* (香港青年激進運動回顧 A Review of the Radical Hong Kong Youth Movement in the 1970s), 7 June 2008, <http://www.grass-root.org/college/modules/wfsection/article.php?articleid=695>.

²⁸¹ Lam, *Understanding the Political Culture of Hong Kong*, p.191.

²⁸² For details on the rise of pro-China nationalism among students in the 1970s, see Chapter Five of this thesis. Lam Wai-man calls the cultural nationalism of the 1950s the 'old version' and the nationalism that emerged in the 1970s among students the 'new version', see Lam, *Understanding the Political Culture of Hong Kong*, pp.190-193.

Conclusion: Post-1949 Chinese Politics and China-orientated Nationalism in the 1950s

After the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, Hong Kong became a new battleground for the CCP-GMD struggle. With the existence of both pro-CCP and pro-GMD forces in a small colony, clashes between the two political camps were unavoidable. This emerged in different contexts. The influx of political refugees from China directly contributed to the emergence and promotion of pro-GMD sentiments in the colony. The case of Rennie's Mill demonstrates that refugees promoted their pro-GMD sentiments in the small enclave despite economic hardships and poor living conditions. We have also observed how labour unions were divided into pro-CCP and pro-GMD camps.

Along with political nationalism based on pro-CCP and pro-ROC elements, there existed cultural nationalism based on Confucianism as well as the Third Force rhetoric that was neither pro-CCP nor pro-GMD. Chinese intellectuals in the New Asia College looked to Chinese culture, specifically Confucianism, as the answer to building a better China and saw it as their mission to use Hong Kong as a base to protect Chinese culture from destruction by the CCP. There were also Chinese intellectuals who became frustrated with both the CCP and GMD, and promoted the idea of a new democratic China, free from the political influence of the CCP and the GMD. Although these Chinese writers vigorously promoted their agenda, their influence on the Chinese community in Hong Kong was limited. The Third Force Movement was short-lived due to divisions among its leaders, a matter not uncommon in nationalist movements in

post-1949 Hong Kong. In the expressions of nationalism, there emerged different meanings for ‘China’: the ROC (中華民國) as the embodiment of the Chinese *nation* and cultural China; the GMD (國民黨) as a political party; the Nationalist government (國民政府) in Taiwan as the legitimate political state of China; and New/Communist China (新中國/中共).

In the 1950s, compared to the pro-GMD sympathisers, the pro-CCP forces kept a relatively low profile. The 1950s witnessed the pro-Nationalists’ open and active promotion of their agenda, to the dismay of the colonial government. The 1956 riots show how pro-ROC sentiments led to violence. History would repeat itself in the 1967 riots when leftists carried out their own ‘nationalist’ anti-British struggle, which, like the 1956 riots, disrupted the lives of Hong Kong citizens.

Chapter Four: The China Factor and Violent Political Nationalism: Construction and Failure of an Anti-Colonial Rhetoric in the Maoist-led 1967 Riots

In the previous chapter, it was demonstrated that the post-1949 CCP-GMD struggle influenced the rhetoric of China-orientated nationalism in colonial Hong Kong in the 1950s and was a major trigger of the 1956 riots. It also showed that how the violent political nationalism manifested in the 1956 riots failed to gain public support. To a certain extent, history repeated itself in the 1967 riots, in that both riots failed to gain public support and both were influenced by the post-1949 political contexts. However, the 1956 and the 1967 riots occurred in different contexts. While the 1956 riots saw a conflict between CCP and GMD sympathisers, the 1967 riots were led by pro-CCP workers, with the involvement of Chinese officials in Hong Kong. As a result of the Cultural Revolution in China and Hong Kong's socio-economic problems at the time, what began as a labour dispute in 1967 turned into a highly politicised anti-British series of riots. The 1967 riots are significant in my analysis of China-orientated nationalism in colonial Hong Kong because the riots are another example of violent political nationalism that the colonial government as well as the Hong Kong Chinese community had to deal with; and the riots had a negative impact on the lives of Hong Kong people. Nationalism in this case created a division between those who supported the riots and those who did not. It brought the coloniser and the non-leftist Chinese closer as both sides desired security. It also prompted discussions by some Hong Kong Chinese about what China meant

for them. The violent expressions of nationalism in the 1956 and 1967 riots contributed to the disappearance of national politics from nationalist movements.

The 1967 disturbances are a controversial topic and few scholars have examined the riots in detail.²⁸³ Due to the space limitations, this chapter is unable to provide a complete history of the riots, but instead focuses on the leftists' construction of an anti-colonial rhetoric and its failure and debates about nationalism. The chapter begins with an examination of how the social contexts and the China factor contributed to political instability in the colony and how they ultimately led to the riots. It then examines the leftists' construction of an anti-colonial rhetoric by looking at leftist newspapers, and focuses on how and why the rhetoric failed. The chapter examines their tactics and how at times they disagreed among themselves as to the use of tactics. It then examines the Hong Kong community's reaction to the riots, focusing on the debates in the non-leftist Chinese-language press. Lastly, the chapter discusses why the leftist struggle failed, the impact of that failure on the leftists, and the significance of the 1956 and 1967 riots in relation to the development of China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong.

²⁸³ See, for example, Wong Cheuk-yin, *The Communist-Inspired Riots in Hong Kong 1967: A Multi-Actors Approach* (MPhil thesis, University of Hong Kong, 2000). The most recent work that examines various aspects of the 1967 is the edited volume by Robert Bickers and Ray Yep, see Robert Bickers and Ray Yep (eds.), *May Days in Hong Kong: Riot and Emergency in 1967* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009).

Socio-Economic Contexts: The Economy, Living Conditions and Colonialism

To understand why the 1967 riots happened we must first look at the social and economic contexts in which they developed. The population in the colony was close to four million. Hong Kong was one of the most densely populated cities in the world.²⁸⁴ As of 1967, there were approximately 1.5 million people working in Hong Kong, with 576,440 in the manufacturing industries.²⁸⁵ However, the economic takeoff did not necessarily result in the improvement of the living conditions of the population. Why was there industrial growth in the colony? Why was the Hong Kong government reluctant to invest resources in improving the infrastructure and living conditions in the colony? One needs to take into account two factors: the economic policy of the Hong Kong government and that of the British government; and the decline of the British industrial economy in the post-war period. As mentioned in the last chapter, Britain was determined to keep Hong Kong as a colony in the post-war period to support its own ailing industrial economy. This meant that the economic gains Britain made from the colony would not be re-invested in the colony itself. Taking Britain's economic policy into account, one can understand how the government's practice of a tight fiscal policy was not merely an 'ideological commitment of the Financial Secretary to fiscal conservatism'.²⁸⁶ It

²⁸⁴ William Heaton, 'Maoist Revolutionary Strategy and Modern Colonialism: The Cultural Revolution in Hong Kong, *Asian Survey*, 10, 9, 1970, pp.840-847.

²⁸⁵ *Hong Kong Report 1967*, p.21.

²⁸⁶ Alex H.K. Choi, 'The Political Economy of Hong Kong's Industrial Upgrading: A Lost Opportunity', in *The Economy of Hong Kong in Non-Economic Perspectives* ed. Law Kam-ye and Lee Kim-ming (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp.179-200.

was also because it served to support Britain financially that the colonial government implemented policies that facilitated industrial growth in Hong Kong, and exploited the abundant refugee labour. These economic and political contexts explain why the colonial government up until the 1967 disturbances was reluctant to make improvements to the living conditions of the citizens in the colony.

A major problem was related to housing. Although by 1967 the government had resettled over one million people, and about a third of the total population in low cost government housing, about three quarters of million people still lived in entirely inadequate housing.²⁸⁷ In its report on the 1966 riots, the colonial government admitted that despite the costs in time and resources, housing needed improvement.²⁸⁸ The colonial administration was also faced with the problem of youth discontent, which the 1966 riots clearly reflected.

Youth Discontent and the 1966 Kowloon Disturbances: A Prelude

In 1966, disturbances broke out over fare increase by the Star Ferry Company. Due to the disturbances, the government became concerned with problems relating to youth, since the disturbances marked the beginning of political participation by Hong Kong youth born after WWII. Although the disturbances had nothing to do with nationalism or politics in China, criticisms of the colony's social and economic problems these had been raised against the

²⁸⁷ William Heaton, 'Maoist Revolutionary Strategy and Modern Colonialism: The Cultural Revolution in Hong Kong, *Asian Survey*, 10, 9, 1970, pp.840-847. See also Hong Kong Government, *Kowloon Disturbances 1966: Report of Commission of Inquiry* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Government Printer, 1967), p.4.

²⁸⁸ Hong Kong Government, *Kowloon Disturbances 1966: Report of Commission of Inquiry* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Government Printer, 1967), p.138.

Hong Kong government. Many who participated in the disturbances were between the ages of fifteen to 25.²⁸⁹ It has been noted that at the time more than 50 per cent of Hong Kong's population was below the age of 21.²⁹⁰

There had been reports of growing unemployment in the newspapers but in fact, the government claimed, there had been a large increase in employment in the early 1960s.²⁹¹ However, the government also noted that many of the demonstrators in the riots had received little or no education beyond the primary school stage, and while the government concluded that the lack of education was not the reason why the riots occurred, it believed that the participating youth's lack of education might have contributed to a general attitude of discontent.²⁹² Thirdly, there was a widespread sense of worry about Hong Kong's economic future and fears of inflation.²⁹³ Under these circumstances, it was not unusual for young people to blame the colonial government for the social problems that existed in the colony. The Hong Kong government received a report from social scientists who blamed the participation of youth in the riots on their sense of frustration at 'their limited chances in life and the apparently wide gap between their aspirations and their achievements'.²⁹⁴ Although the government was uncertain as to the validity of these observations, in its report of the 1966 riots, it noted that young people had a 'lower threshold of control over their dissatisfactions', and that the participation of youth was more likely due to their

²⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p.142.

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.* See also, William Heaton, 'Maoist Revolutionary Strategy and Modern Colonialism: The Cultural Revolution in Hong Kong, *Asian Survey*, 10, 9, 1970, pp.840-847.

²⁹¹ Hong Kong Government, *Kowloon Disturbances 1966: Report of Commission of Inquiry*, p.138.

²⁹² *Ibid.*, p.139.

²⁹³ *Ibid.*, p.135.

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.143.

‘feelings of boredom’ and ‘a desire to draw attention by demonstrating false bravado’.²⁹⁵

China Factor I: CCP-GMD Struggle and Communist Influence in the Colony

The efforts of both Communists and Nationalists to promote their agenda, a result of the CCP-GMD struggle in Chinese politics, contributed to political instability of the colony. Both Communists and Nationalists used Hong Kong as a base to their advantage for political reasons. In the previous chapter, I examined several incidents in which Nationalists attempted to promote their agenda in the colony. The Communists, too, had been doing much work on expanding their influence in the colony through the control of organisations such as the Hok Yau Club,²⁹⁶ which I discussed in the previous chapter, and through indoctrination of Communist ideas and promotion of pro-CCP sentiments in these groups. In 1967, there were 32 leftist schools in Hong Kong with over 20,000 students enrolled in them.²⁹⁷ It is clear that leftist forces in Hong Kong had been expanding their influence. The leftist schools and organisations had previously kept a very low profile in their activities due to the political environment of that period and the Hong Kong government’s fear of the spread of Communist influence in the colony. Further, the influence of the Hong Kong-Macao

²⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁶ For more discussion of the Hok Yau Club, see Chapter Three of this thesis. See also Kenneth Ore’s memoir; Kenneth Ore, *Song of the Azalea: Memoir of a Chinese Son* (Toronto: Penguin, 2005).

²⁹⁷ Zhang Jiawei 張家偉, *Xianggang liuqi baodong neiqing* 香港六七暴動內情 (Inside Story of the 1967 Riot in Hong Kong), (Xianggang: Taipingyang shiji chubanshe, 2000, p.176.

Working Committee over leftist schools was weak.²⁹⁸ It was in the context of labour movement that leftists had a more significant influence. As the 1967 riots began with labour disputes and leftist labour unions played a major role in the riots, it is necessary to examine the situation regarding leftist unions in Hong Kong

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the CCP-GMD rivalry extended to the labour movement, for there existed pro-CCP and pro-GMD trade unions whose interests were tied to Chinese politics. Trade unions in Hong Kong had two functions: one was to rally support for political purposes and the other was to provide social and economic services to their members.²⁹⁹ It has been argued that while unions were forbidden by law from financing political activity, joining a trade union was a political gesture and commitment.³⁰⁰ In the 1960s and 1970s most trade unions were affiliated with the pro-CCP FTU.³⁰¹ Although the FTU lost members after the 1967 disturbances, at the end of 1967 Communist union membership was still over 95,000.³⁰² The FTU was the labour section of the New China News Agency (新華社 NCNA) and responsible for implementing the policies of the NCNA.³⁰³ Many who were involved in the 1967 disturbances and the labour disputes leading up to the riots were members of leftist trade unions.

²⁹⁸ John P. Burns, 'The Structure of Communist Party Control in Hong Kong', *Asian Survey*, 30, 8, 1990, pp.748-765.

²⁹⁹ Joe England and John Rear, *Chinese Labour under British Rule: A Critical Study of Labour Relations and Law in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1975), p.95.

³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p.94.

³⁰¹ *Ibid.*, pp.90-91.

³⁰² *Ibid.*, p.91.

³⁰³ Wong Cheuk-yin, *The Communist-Inspired Riots in Hong Kong 1967: A Multi-Actors Approach* (MPhil thesis, University of Hong Kong, 2000), pp.30-31.

China Factor II: The Cultural Revolution in China

Scholarly work done in relation to the riots has suggested that the economic and labour contexts were not the most significant factor resulting in the disturbances.³⁰⁴ There had been labour strikes in the 1950s and early 1960s but most of them were of short duration and did not escalate into full-scale riots.³⁰⁵ Moreover, there had been a decline in the labour movement and a drop in union membership in the 1950s.³⁰⁶ In addition, the fact that there had been a period of industrial peace in the 1950s was a result of the non-militant policies of the FTU and TUC.³⁰⁷ In the 1950s the FTU was in fact less openly involved in industrial actions against major employers, and its focus in that period was building up its strength through the expansion of educational and welfare services to its members.³⁰⁸ Furthermore, economic difficulties faced by the working population such as rising inflation alone ‘were not of a magnitude that could generate and sustain widespread and prolonged confrontations with the management and their alleged protectors the colonial government’.³⁰⁹

Therefore, the answer as to why the 1967 disturbances occurred and why it became so highly politicised and turned into a full-scale riot, lies elsewhere. It will be useful to begin the investigation by first examining the PRC’s policy towards Hong Kong up until 1967. Before 1967, Hong Kong and China had

³⁰⁴ Benjamin Leung and Stephen Chiu, *A Social History of Industrial Strikes and the Labour Movement in Hong Kong, 1946-1989* (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 1991), p.42.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p.29.

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p.34.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁸ Stephen Wing Kai Chiu and David A. Levin, ‘Contestatory Unionism: Trade Unions in the Private Sector’, *The Dynamics of Social Movement in Hong Kong*, ed. Stephen Wing Kai Chiu and Tai Lok Lui (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, pp.91-137).

³⁰⁹ Benjamin Leung and Stephen Chiu, *A Social History of Industrial Strikes and the Labour Movement in Hong Kong, 1946-1989* (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 1991), p.42.

shared a harmonious relationship. The guiding principle of the PRC's policy towards Hong Kong was taking a long-term view and making full use of Hong Kong' (*chongfen dasuan changqi liyong* 充分打算, 長期利用).³¹⁰ The origins of this policy could be traced back to 1948 when the Chinese Civil War was coming to an end. The head of the NCNA at that time, Qiao Guanhua (喬冠華), told the British that the CCP had no intention of taking over Hong Kong, because of Hong Kong's economic value to China.³¹¹ By maintaining the status quo the Chinese government was using Hong Kong to its advantage politically and economically.³¹² In 1966, for example, the PRC made more than 250 million pounds in foreign exchange out of Hong Kong, and Hong Kong bought 2,769 million Hong Kong dollars of low-cost goods from China.³¹³ By 1967 the PRC had made over 600 million U.S. dollars in foreign exchange out of Hong Kong.³¹⁴ It was therefore unlikely that the PRC would want to take back Hong Kong. However, with the Cultural Revolution that began in 1966 there would be political developments in China that would affect the PRC's policy towards Hong Kong, and create an impression in the eyes of leftists in Hong Kong that there would be a change in China's policy towards Hong Kong. Under the influence of the Cultural Revolution the leftists in Hong Kong attempted to start their own cultural revolution in the colony, which entailed going against Beijing's official policy towards Hong Kong. To understand why the Hong Kong leftists and the

³¹⁰ Ma Jisen, *The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2004), pp.186.

³¹¹ Tsnag, *A Modern History of Hong Kong*, p.153.

³¹² Wong Cheuk-yin, *The Communist-Inspired Riots in Hong Kong 1967: A Multi-Actors Approach* (MPhil thesis, University of Hong Kong, 2000), p.70.

³¹³ *Ibid.*

³¹⁴ William Heaton, 'Maoist Revolutionary Strategy and Modern Colonialism: The Cultural Revolution in Hong Kong', *Asian Survey*, 10, 9, 1970, pp.840-847.

NCNA officials made such attempts it is necessary to look at the politics within the PRC, particularly within China's Foreign Ministry.

Chinese Politics and the Struggle in Hong Kong

There were two factions within the Foreign Ministry, the offices under the leadership of the rebels and those under the control of the moderates. As a result, there existed two groups responsible for coordinating the work of Chinese in Hong Kong at the same time: the Hong Kong and Macao Work Committee (港澳工作委員會 HKMWC), working under the name of the NCNA in Hong Kong and under the influence of the Cultural Revolution;³¹⁵ and the Hong Kong-Macao Office (港澳辦公室 HKMO), formed under the order of Zhou Enlai and headed by Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Luo Guibo (羅貴波).³¹⁶ As rebels in the Foreign Ministry attempted to seize power from the 'moderates', the Hong Kong and Macao Working Committee and the NCNA, HKMWC's office in Hong Kong, instructed the leftists in Hong Kong to carry out the anti-British struggle. At that time the NCNA was already under the influence of the Central

³¹⁵ Although officially the PRC did not have an embassy in Hong Kong, the NCNA was the de facto representative of the PRC in Hong Kong since the 1940s until the political handover in 1997. The Hong Kong Macao Work Committee operated in secret in Hong Kong under the name of the NCNA. For the Hong Kong government banned foreign political parties in 1949. Moreover the PRC under specific orders of Mao Zedong and other cadres wanted to keep Hong Kong for its economic value and therefore had not deliberated on Hong Kong's future for many years. As to the rationale behind keeping the NCNA but not establishing an official embassy, Jin Yaoru in his memoir explained that in principle the PRC would not recognise the political status of Hong Kong as British colony; establishing a Chinese embassy would imply that the PRC recognised British sovereignty over Hong Kong. The NCNA was operating outside the laws of Hong Kong as Chinese authorities did not register the group under Hong Kong laws. For details, see Steve Tsang, *A Modern History of Hong Kong*, pp.153-154; Jin Yaoru 金堯如, *Xiangjiang wushinian yiwang* 香江五十年憶往 (Remembering Hong Kong of the Past 50 Years) (Xianggang: Jin Yaoru jinian jijin, 2005), pp.40-41; John P. Burns, 'The Structure of Communist Party Control in Hong Kong', *Asian Survey*, 30, 8, 1990, pp.748-765.

³¹⁶ Ma Jisen, *The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2004), p.157.

Revolutionary Group (中央文革組),³¹⁷ and decided that a large scale struggle must be carried out. Moderates such as Liao Chengzhi (廖承志) and Luo Guibo had doubts about carrying out a large scale struggle in Hong Kong. However, in the political climate of the Cultural Revolution at that time, they were reluctant to say anything.³¹⁸

Premier Zhou Enlai himself, though not directly or openly supporting the struggle, had a direct involvement in the policy-making processes in relation to the struggle in the colony. Although the rebels attempted to seize power from the moderates in the Foreign Ministry, Zhou and his subordinates did not really lose control of everything. For in the end the Gang of Four and the rebels failed in their attempt to seize power in the Foreign Ministry after the burning of the office of the British Charge d'Affaires in Beijing, which was severely criticised by both Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai.³¹⁹ Eventually Zhou and the moderates, through the HKMO, with the approval of Mao Zedong, put an end to the struggle.³²⁰

There have been different opinions in literature dealing with the Cultural Revolution, on whether Zhou Enlai lost control of the Foreign Ministry during the Cultural Revolution and whether the Hong Kong disturbances were a result of Zhou's loss of control. Officially, the Chinese government put the blame on the

³¹⁷ Jin Yaoru, *Xiangjiang wushinian yiwang*, p.141. Jin was a member of the CCP and sent to Hong Kong to work in 1948. He worked for the leftist newspaper *Wen Hui Bao* (文匯報). Jin spent over 40 years working in Hong Kong. He migrated to the United States and settled in Los Angeles after the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident. He left the CCP in the same year.

³¹⁸ Ma, *The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China*, p.163. See also Steve Tsang, *A Modern History of Hong Kong*, p.179-180.

³¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.188-189.

³²⁰ Ma Jisen, *The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China*, p.163. See also Steve Tsang, *A Modern History of Hong Kong*, p.188.

Gang of Four and their attempt to change China's policy towards Hong Kong.³²¹ It has been suggested that the Foreign Ministry was going through a process of 'disintegration' and radicalisation and that had there not been the radicalisation the Hong Kong riots probably would not have occurred.³²² Jin Yaoru, who worked for the *Wen Hui Pao* during the 1967 disturbances, has stated that the Central Revolution Group under the leadership of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing had a direct hand in the work of the Foreign Ministry relating to affairs of Hong Kong and Macao. Jin has also stated that the State Council's Foreign Affairs Staff Office (國務院外事辦公室) under the leadership of Zhou Enlai was in practice removed by the Gang of Four.³²³ However, recent literature presents a different story. Ma Jisen, for example, in her recent work argues that although the Central Revolution Group, through its propaganda had a significant influence on the anti-British struggle in Hong Kong, it was not directly involved in the decision-making process in relation to the struggle. Ma also argues that the Foreign Ministry was very much intact and still under the leadership of Zhou Enlai.

Before the radicalisation and the radicals' attempt to seize power, work relating to Hong Kong and Macao were under the leadership of Liao Chengzhi who was the leader of the Hong Kong and Macao group of the State Council's Foreign Affairs Staff Office (the office was headed by Foreign Minister Chen Yi)

³²¹ Ma Jisen 馬繼森 and Ran Longbo 冉隆勃, *Zhou Enlai yu xianggang liuqi baodon neimu* 周恩來與香港六七暴動內幕 (Inside Story of Zhou Enlai and the Hong Kong 1967 Disturbances) (Xianggang: Ming chuang chu ban she you xian gong si, 2001), p.3.

³²² Thomas Robinson, 'China Confronts the Soviet Union: Warfare and Diplomacy on China's Inner Asian Frontiers', in *The Cambridge History of China* ed. Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp.218-301.

³²³ Jin, *Xiangjiang wushinian yiwang*, p.131.

and First Deputy Head of the office.³²⁴ However, some of its conservative officials were now facing the prospect of being criticised by the rebels or had already become targets of criticism. These included Foreign Minister Chen Yi (陳毅) and Liao Chengzhi. For the sake of self-preservation, conservative officials such as Liao Chengzhi and Luo Guibo dealing with Hong Kong and Macao affairs were afraid to speak up against the extremist direction the HKMWC was taking.³²⁵ Even Zhou Enlai himself gave tacit approval to the work of the Red Guards and openly supported the seizure of power by the rebels, although this move by Zhou in practice protected the Foreign Ministry from being thrown into disarray.³²⁶ It cannot be denied that there was a strong impression of a change in policy regarding Hong Kong, particularly in the eyes of those in the leftist circle and Chinese officials working in the colony. For these reasons, it is not at all surprising that the NCNA/HKMWC in Hong Kong took steps to carry out and prolong the anti-British struggle.

Although the radicals of the Central Revolution Group might not have had a direct hand in changing the PRC's policy towards Hong Kong at this time, there did appear to be a change of policy in May 1967 when Vice Foreign Minister Luo Guibo issued a statement protesting the way in which the Hong Kong government dealt with the labour disputes at the San Po Kong Plastic Flower Works.³²⁷ Scholars have given some explanations as to the factors that

³²⁴ For more information on the structure of CCP's control in Hong Kong, see John P. Burns, 'The Structure of Communist Party Control in Hong Kong', *Asian Survey*, 30, 8, 1990, pp.748-765.

³²⁵ Ma and Ran, *Zhou Enlai yu xianggang liuqi baodon neimu*, p.14.

³²⁶ *Ibid.*, p.7.

³²⁷ Wong Cheuk-yin, *The Communist-Inspired Riots in Hong Kong 1967: A Multi-Actors Approach* (MPhil thesis, University of Hong Kong, 2000), p.70.

contributed to this change in policy. Firstly, the ideology and political atmosphere of the Cultural Revolution would not tolerate the existence of colonial and capitalistic Hong Kong. Secondly, despite Hong Kong's economic value to the PRC, under the influence of the Cultural Revolution Chinese Communists would make national pride their priority over all else.³²⁸ The Sino-Soviet border conflict in the 1960s illustrated that to some extent.³²⁹ Under the extreme political climate, officials in China and Chinese government personnel in Hong Kong could not afford to appear any less revolutionary than what was required by the Cultural Revolution, in order to avoid personal political troubles. Naturally, in 1967 the staff in the NCNA were under much pressure to create an image for themselves that they were 'revolutionary'. Adding insult to injury, there appeared to be a lack of communication between Beijing and the NCNA regarding the anti-British struggle in Hong Kong. Although rebels in Beijing initially created the impression that the struggle must continue, staff in the NCNA appeared to be confused by the political developments in China.

Although the power struggle within the Foreign Ministry ended in August 1967, the NCNA /HKMWC in Hong Kong were not ordered to end the struggle until late 1967. Between August and the end of 1967, it was up to the leftists in Hong Kong to continue with the struggle. For Zhou Enlai did not become involved in the Hong Kong struggle for a while even after the Sha Tau Kok incident, a border incident that saw a clash between Hong Kong police and

³²⁸ William Heaton, 'Maoist Revolutionary Strategy and Modern Colonialism: The Cultural Revolution in Hong Kong, *Asian Survey*, 10, 9, 1970, pp.840-847.

³²⁹ Thomas Robinson, 'China Confronts the Soviet Union: Warfare and Diplomacy on China's Inner Asian Frontiers', in *The Cambridge History of China* ed. Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp.218-301.

Chinese troops as the two sides exchanged fire.³³⁰ It is unclear whether the heads of the NCNA were aware of the end of the internal Foreign Ministry power struggle following Mao's criticism of the rebels' actions. By August Mao realised the Foreign Ministry rebels were a threat, and took steps to crack down on the rebels.³³¹ Many cadres working in Hong Kong were unaware of the end of the power struggle.³³² The evidence suggests that there was confusion within the Hong Kong NCNA because of the NCNA officials' lack of knowledge of the political developments within the Chinese government. This confusion further contributed to the leftists' attempt to prolong a failing struggle. In short, it was both the confusion and sense of self-preservation, a result of the Cultural Revolution, among Chinese cadres responsible for PRC's work in Hong Kong, which ultimately resulted in the extreme left approach taken by Hong Kong leftists in the 1967 riots. While the politicisation and escalation of the anti-British struggle in Hong Kong was a result of the influence of the Cultural Revolution, it was the labour disputes in the colony that triggered the riots.

Labour Disputes in Early 1967

The immediate trigger to the 1967 riots was the labour dispute at the Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works in San Po Kong in Kowloon in April 1967. However, it should be noted that from February to May 1967 there were other labour disputes as well. There were reports of fighting among workers and

³³⁰ For details, see Ma Jisen, *The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China*, pp.185-186.

³³¹ For example, Wang Li (王力), a leading rebel who caused major changes in the Foreign Ministry in 1967, was arrested on 26 August 1967 and suspended from his job. See Ma Jisen, *The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China*, pp.219-220.

³³² Jin, *Xiangjiang wushinian yiwang*, p.168.

beating of workers by the senior staff.³³³ The leftist media seized every opportunity to politicise these labour disputes by putting the blame on the colonial government as well as GMD agents. On 29 April a labour dispute broke out at the Hung Hom works of the Green Island Cement Company (青洲英坭公司) when it was alleged that Chinese workers were beaten by two Australian engineers.³³⁴ The workers protested and made a six-point demand to the management. The management quickly closed down the factory suspending the works and preventing about 200 workers from getting into work.³³⁵ As the workers protested outside the factory, eight people wearing Mao badges and holding *Quotations of Chairman Mao* (毛主席語錄), also known as the ‘Little Red Book’, and recited the quotations.³³⁶ Leftists’ involvement and their use of Chinese Communist symbols marked the beginning of the politicisation of labour disputes.

The Labour Dispute at the Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works as Immediate Trigger

Although the labour dispute at the Green Island Cement Company attracted more public attention, it was the labour dispute at the San Po Kong Artificial Flower Works in Kowloon that served as the immediate trigger to the 1967 disturbances, due to violent intervention by Hong Kong police.³³⁷ Two serious clashes between the police and the workers involved in the dispute

³³³ *Ibid.*, p.23.

³³⁴ *Ibid.*, p.24.

³³⁵ *Ibid.*, p.24. See also John Cooper, *Colony in Conflict: The Hong Kong Disturbances, May 1967-January 1968* (Hong Kong: Swindon, 1970), p.3.

³³⁶ Zhang, *Xianggang liuqi baodong neiqing*, p.24.

³³⁷ *Ibid.*, p.33

occurred on 6 May and 11 May. On 6 May, for the first time the dispute turned into a riot resulting in confrontation between the police and workers,³³⁸ as about 100 workers involved in the labour strike attempted to stop the moving of goods from the factory and police were called in to help.³³⁹ Some people involved were beaten by the police and eighteen were arrested. The second, more violent confrontation took place on 11 May when leftist students and workers visited the workers of the flower works to offer their support. About 620 riot police arrived at the scene at 3pm,³⁴⁰ and started beating the leftist students and workers. In total 53 tear gas bombs and 70 wooden bullets were fired by the police and 127 people were arrested.³⁴¹ Following the events at San Po Kong of 11 May, riots broke out in other parts of Kowloon.³⁴² Why was there continued politicisation and escalation of the riots in the months following the initial riots? To answer that question we need to examine in detail Beijing's response, which served as a source of encouragement for the local leftists.

Politicisation and Escalation of the Anti-British Struggle

Along with the Cultural Revolution in China, the colonial government's handling of the labour disputes as well as Beijing's response encouraged the leftists to escalate the struggle. Following the clashes between police and workers at San Po Kong in May 1967 struggle committees were formed. After the Foreign Ministry of China released statements expressing support for the

³³⁸ Tsang, *A Modern History of Hong Kong*, p.183.

³³⁹ Zhou Yi 周奕, *Xianggang zuopai douzhengshi* 香港左派鬥爭史 (A History of Leftist Struggles in Hong Kong) (Xianggang: Liwen chubanshe, Third edition, 2002), pp.225-226.

³⁴⁰ Zhang, *Xianggang liuqi baodong neiqing*, p.37.

³⁴¹ Zhou, *Xianggang zuopai douzhengshi*, p.229.

³⁴² *Ibid.*

struggle in Hong Kong, the number of struggle committees surged. On 15 May the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued its first statement expressing support for the ‘Hong Kong compatriots’ and condemning the use of violence by the Hong Kong government in the events at San Po Kong.³⁴³ Material published in the *People’s Daily*, too, served as an inspiration to the leftists in Hong Kong as they believed it was proof that the Chinese government was officially supporting the anti-British struggle. On 3 June the *People’s Daily*, which was under the influence of the rebels, published an editorial titled ‘Resolutely Repel British Provocations’ (堅決反擊英帝國主義的挑釁),³⁴⁴ which called upon the populace of Hong Kong to take action against the Hong Kong government. On 5 July the *People’s Daily* once again called for an escalation of the Hong Kong struggle.³⁴⁵ The small victory of the leftists in the Macao riots also served as an inspiration to Hong Kong leftists. The arrests of the staff of three leftist newspapers in August provoked the leftists even further. The arrests eventually led to the Chinese government’s issuing an ultimatum to the British government demanding that the Hong Kong government lift the ban on the three newspapers and release the 19

³⁴³ Hong Kong Kowloon All Circles Hong Kong Compatriots Anti-British Struggle Committee, *Wuyue fengbao* 五月風暴 (The Storm in May) (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Kowloon All Circles Hong Kong Compatriots Anti-British Struggle Committee, 1967), pp.155-158. For an English translation of the statement see Wong Cheuk-yin, *The Communist-Inspired Riots in Hong Kong 1967: A Multi-Actors Approach* (MPhil thesis, University of Hong Kong, 2000), pp.227-230.

³⁴⁴ Translation of the title is taken from Ma, *The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China*, p.184. Full text of the editorial in Chinese can be found in Gangjiu gejie tongbao fandui gangying pohai douzheng weiyuanhui 港九各界同胞反對迫害鬥爭委員會 (Hong Kong Kowloon All Circles Compatriots Anti-British Persecution Committee) (ed.), *Xianggang fengbao* 香港風暴 (The Storm in Hong Kong) (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Kowloon All Circles Compatriots Anti-British Persecution Committee, 1967), pp.159-162. According to Ma Jisen, the editorial had been revised by Zhou Enlai himself, and Zhou admitted that he had not gone far enough in his revisions. See Ma, *The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China*, p.184.

³⁴⁵ *People’s Daily*, *Fangshou fadong qunzhong jinyibu zhuangda fanyingkangbaodouzheng duiwu* 放手發動群眾,進一步壯大反英抗暴鬥爭隊伍 (Freely Mobilise the Masses, Take One Step further to Strengthen the Anti-British Anti-Persecution Struggle Team) (Xianggang: Sanlian shudian, 1967). The original editorial appeared in the *People’s Daily* on 5 July 1967.

detained reporters within 48 hours.³⁴⁶ Rallies were held in China to support the Hong Kong struggle.

All these events showed that the factors contributing to the escalation of the struggle included Chinese politics and Beijing's response to the events in Hong Kong, and the Hong Kong government's actions. More importantly, Beijing's actions created an impression, in the eyes of the local leftists and particularly the Hong Kong branch of NCNA, that the PRC was supporting them. Leftists in Hong Kong were not the only ones who started the promotion of an anti-colonial rhetoric. Beijing played an equally important role in the construction of an anti-colonial rhetoric and by doing so, it encouraged local leftists to escalate the struggle. Chinese officials particularly top cadres of the NCNA, who dealt with Hong Kong affairs were so encouraged by Beijing's actions that they even believed that eventually the PRC would officially intervene in the Hong Kong struggle. However, these Chinese officials miscalculated, as they failed to keep in mind the PRC's official long-standing policy towards Hong Kong, and that is to maintain the status quo.³⁴⁷ From the time Beijing made an official response to the events in Hong Kong, leftists in Hong Kong followed Beijing's political tone very closely in their construction of an anti-colonial rhetoric, only to realise in the end that neither Beijing nor the public would support their anti-British struggle.

³⁴⁶ Ma, *The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China*, p.186.

³⁴⁷ The Hok Yau Club, which I discussed in the previous chapter, was one of the few leftist organizations that kept a low profile during the 1967 riots. See Niu Mang 牛嘜, 'Cong fanyingbaodong dao hongding shangren' 從反英暴動到紅頂商人' (From Anti-British Riots to Red Businessman), *Open Magazine*, 122, February 1997, pp.51-54.

Construction of Maoist Anti-Colonial Rhetoric

The NCNA was pulling the strings as it controlled the major leftist newspapers in the colony such as the *Ta Kung Pao* (大公報) and *Wen Hui Pao* (文匯報). Throughout the disturbances, the two leftist newspapers constantly published articles on the anti-British struggle and the Cultural Revolution in China. Quotations from Mao's works were often printed in prominent spaces in leftist newspapers published during the disturbances. During the indiscriminate bombing in Hong Kong, the two newspapers published reports on the bombing, claiming how British police officers were shaken by the bombing or were killed by the bombs.³⁴⁸ The leftists called colonial officials 'white-skinned pigs' (白皮豬) and Chinese police officers 'yellow-skinned dogs' (黃皮狗).³⁴⁹ Leftist newspapers also published small newsletters to promote their anti-British struggle.³⁵⁰ Some of the 'letters of support' from readers that were published in the leftist newspapers were not genuine as they were in fact written by the editors themselves.³⁵¹

Some observations can be made concerning the leftists' construction of rhetoric. Firstly, the leftists used the print media extensively to promote their agenda and for their construction of political nationalism with an anti-colonial rhetoric. Secondly, from what was published in the leftist media one can clearly see that the leftists almost completely ignored the inconveniences the indiscriminate bombing caused to the lives of the citizens in the colony. The

³⁴⁸ See, for example, *Wen Hui Pao*, 6 November 1967, p.1; *Wen Hui Pao*, 16 July 1967, p.1.

³⁴⁹ Zhang, *Xianggang liuqi baodong neiqing*, p.250.

³⁵⁰ See, for example, *Ta Kung Pao*, 26 September 1967, p.5.

³⁵¹ Zhang, *Xianggang liuqi baodong neiqing*, p.250.

construction of rhetoric had nothing to do with an attempt to address labour grievances or labour disputes. It was unlikely that Hong Kong citizens would be able to relate personally to the anti-colonial rhetoric or the leftist nationalist rhetoric when it was obvious that all the leftists were trying to do was to stir up trouble in the colony. One needs to keep in mind that many who fled mainland China during the Civil War period did so to avoid the political turmoil. Moreover, given that information about the situation in China was not readily available to the public, most Hong Kong citizens probably would have no idea what was happening in China as far as the Cultural Revolution was concerned.

The leftists' lack of realistic objectives and use of a rhetoric that had little to do with addressing labour grievances meant that the struggle was destined to fail. Indeed, from the beginning the leftists achieved very limited success with the strikes. A joint strike was launched on 10 June to disrupt local administration and food supplies to the colony. An announcement was made in the leftist newspapers that in response to the call to strike by four left-wing government workers' unions, workers in government departments would go on strike as protest against government persecution.³⁵² However, almost all government workers reported for duty. Food strikes launched to disrupt food supplies to Hong Kong did not make much of an impact either, for although food supplies from mainland China was disrupted, not many responded to the call to strike and there were local supplies of food.³⁵³ In the latter half of the year, the leftists

³⁵² Benjamin Leung and Stephen Chiu, *A Social History of Industrial Strikes and the Labour Movement in Hong Kong, 1946-1989* (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 1991), p.46.

³⁵³ *Ibid.*, p.47.

launched yet another food-related campaign in an attempt to discredit the colonial government, following their failure with the food strikes.

Launch of the ‘Love the Motherland, Buy National Goods’ Campaign

In the latter half of 1967, there was a shortage of food caused by the local strikes initiated by leftists,³⁵⁴ a reduction of food imports from mainland China due to the Cultural Revolution,³⁵⁵ and bad weather in the summer of 1967.³⁵⁶ Leftists called upon the hawkers and merchants selling food products to go on strike, but the call received little response and had very little effect.³⁵⁷ Perhaps sensing that their anti-British struggle was failing and desperate to gain public support, local leftists’ propaganda blamed the colonial government for the shortage of food, claiming it resulted from the colonial government’s closure of the border. In October, the leftists launched a campaign to promote Chinese food products and to create an impression that China had an ample supply of food and was on the side of Hong Kong compatriots and would keep supplying them with food.³⁵⁸ The slogan of the campaign was ‘love the motherland, buy national goods’ (愛祖國，用國貨).³⁵⁹ The campaign was officially launched on 29 October and ended on 10 November, and major leftist newspapers *Wen Hui Pao*

³⁵⁴ *South China Morning Post*, 29 June 1967.

³⁵⁵ Letter from Commerce and Industry Department, HKRS70-2-439. See also *Sing Tao Daily News*, 23 August 1967, HKRS70-2-439. The Hong Kong and Kowloon Fishermen’s Struggle Committee, for example, called for a three-day strike.

³⁵⁶ *South China Morning Post*, 23 August 1967, HKRS70-2-439.

³⁵⁷ Jin, *Xiangjiang wushinian yiwang*, p.184. See also *China Mail*, 6 October 1967, HKRS70-2-439.

³⁵⁸ *Wen Hui Pao*, 31 November 1967, p.4.

³⁵⁹ *Wen Hui Pao*, 27 October 1967, p.1.

and *Ta Kung Pao* were mobilised to promote the food campaign.³⁶⁰ In contrast, *Ming Pao Daily News* criticised the food campaign and called for an end to the violent struggle.³⁶¹ If the leftists were to show that they cared about the well-being of Hong Kong citizens, why did they not simply end the indiscriminate bombing and strikes so that order could be restored and people's lives could return to normal? The launch of the 'buy national goods' campaign was marked by inauspicious timing, and represented a lack of strategy on the part of the leftists.

Months before the launch of the October/November 'buy national goods' campaign the power struggle within the Chinese Foreign Ministry had ended. The campaign appeared nothing more than a final attempt by the leftists to prolong the struggle. Leftists once again attempted to construct a campaign with a nationalistic tone. Unlike the previous food strikes, the 'buy national goods' campaign did not carry an anti-colonial rhetoric. It is possible that the leftists had learned that actions that carried an overtly anti-colonial tone, and caused disruption to the lives of citizens would only antagonise the public. Therefore, the leftists emphasised the nationalist rhetoric in the 'buy national goods' campaign towards the end of the year, when it became apparent that their struggle was failing as it lost public support. As far as nationalist campaigns are concerned, this change of tactics by the leftists in 1967 illustrates how activists in nationalist campaigns had to change tactics if the situation called for it. A nationalist campaign cannot succeed without the support of the masses. A

³⁶⁰ See, for example, *Ta Kung Pao*, 29 October 1967, p.9.

³⁶¹ *Ming Pao Daily News*, 2 November 1967, p.5.

change in tactics may be needed, particularly if the campaign has failed to gain public support.

The ‘buy national goods’ campaign by the leftists was a failed attempt to rally public support simply by using a nationalistic rhetoric. The leftists failed to consider the fact that leftist labour strikes and bombing had already caused inconveniences to many citizens in the colony. Food supply in the colony seemed to have stabilised by the end of the year. The launch of the ‘buy national goods’ represented a lack of direction within the local leftist circle as to how the anti-British struggle should be continued in wake of a series of failures in rallying public support. The indiscriminate bombing had already tarnished the leftists’ reputation and the food strikes only appeared to be causing inconveniences to the citizens of Hong Kong. Launching another campaign with an empty nationalist tone certainly would not help in improving the leftists’ public image. Launching strikes and campaigns with a nationalist motif was not the only action the leftists took in the riots to promote their agenda. The leftists also constructed heroes by publishing stories of individuals who were arrested in their newspapers and labelled them as ‘patriots’.

Stories of Tsang Tak-sing and Individual Leftists as Propaganda Material: Construction of Heroes

The case of Tsang Tak-sing (曾德成),³⁶² who was hailed by leftist media as a hero after his arrest, is particularly interesting. Tsang was an eighteen-year-old Form 6 student at St. Paul’s College who was arrested by the police for

³⁶² Tsang Tak-sing is now serving in the HKSAR government as Secretary for Home Affairs.

distributing leaflets criticising the colonial education system. After the labour disputes in May Tsang sympathised with the leftists and began distributing the leaflets outside his school during the summer holiday. On 28 September, when Tsang was a Form 7 student, he and several students distributed the same leaflets in the classrooms. Police were called in by the school. Tsang was the only person arrested. He was beaten by the police and eventually sentenced to two years' imprisonment.³⁶³ After the incident, Tsang was hailed by the leftist media as a hero, particularly because he was not a member of the leftist circle and was studying in an English secondary school perceived to be a nursery for the local elites under colonial rule. Although Tsang's father was working for the pro-CCP Hong Kong Chinese General Chamber of Commerce (香港中華總商會), his family was not a 'traditionally leftist' family. Tsang's story was published simultaneously in the 27 October editions of *Wen Hui Pao* and *Ta Kung Pao*. The leftist media reported that Tsang had been 'poisoned by enslavement education' (飽受奴化教育毒害),³⁶⁴ that Tsang displayed courage on the frontline of the struggle and that he was 'armed with Mao Zedong Thought'.³⁶⁵ The leftist media also emphasised how he sacrificed himself and his future as a patriot.³⁶⁶ However, a later study asserted that Tsang had distributed the leaflets out of sympathy for the leftists following the use of violence by the police in the labour disputes, not because of 'Mao Zedong Thought'.³⁶⁷

³⁶³ For details of Tsang's story, see Zhang, *Xianggang liuqi baodong neiqing*, pp.150-162.

³⁶⁴ *Wen Hui Pao*, 27 October 1967, p.5.

³⁶⁵ *Wen Hui Pao*, 27 October 1967, p.5.

³⁶⁶ *Ta Kung Pao*, 27 October 1967, p.6.

³⁶⁷ Zhang, *Xianggang liuqi baodong neiqing*, p.152.

Tsang's story is one example of how leftist media would seize every opportunity to promote their agenda, even when what was said in their reports was far from the truth. Political nationalism in this case was about constructing heroes as models for citizens to follow. Tsang was not the only one constructed by leftist media as a hero; the stories of those working for leftist newspapers who were arrested by the Hong Kong government were used as propaganda material as well. By publishing Tsang's story, the leftists probably hoped to show that even someone educated in a colonial education system would 'rise up' against the colonial government. However, given the violence committed by the leftists in the form of indiscriminate bombing, the construction of heroes through newspaper reports would have little effect in helping leftists gain public support for their anti-British campaign. These stories of arrested leftists, and of those who sympathised with the leftists, would only serve to remind citizens of Hong Kong that taking any action to support or show sympathy for the leftists would be dangerous. Another major flaw with these personal stories was that they ignored what the majority of the Chinese population was thinking at that time. The majority of Hong Kong citizens supported the government, as they put their faith in the colonial administration in restoring order. Having failed to gain public support by trying to promote a Maoist anti-colonial rhetoric through propaganda and strikes, local leftists resorted to the use of terror bombing, which was the major factor contributing to the failure of their struggle.

Use of Violence and Bomb Tactics: Struggle out of Control and Divisions within Leftist Circles

As part of the escalation of the anti-British struggle, local Communists devised the tactic of indiscriminate bombing. Bomb attacks began around July 1967,³⁶⁸ occurred almost daily, and lasted several months until the end of December.³⁶⁹ The first bomb attack occurred on 8 July as demonstrators attacked a police station in Kwun Tong.³⁷⁰ The Chinese government did not sanction the use of bombs. It was a tactic devised by local leftists alone.³⁷¹ Even the British government believed that the disturbances ‘were almost certainly not premeditated by the Chinese government’.³⁷² Despite the fact that the bombing caused injuries and great inconvenience to innocent Hong Kong citizens, leftist newspapers promoted the use of bombs in the struggle. However, some of the leftists raised doubts about the bomb tactic. The principal of the leftist Hon Wah Middle School (漢華中學) Huang Jianli (黃建立), for instance, had doubts about the bomb tactic.³⁷³ Huang was a core member of the struggle committee of the education sector. According to Huang’s account, leftists in the education sector did not support the use of violence and only carried out non-violent protests.³⁷⁴

As other examples, Jin Yaoru of *Wen Hui Pao* and Liao Yiyuan (廖一原), a

³⁶⁸ According to Jin Yaoru’s memoir, the first bombs were made in as early as June. See Jin, *Xiangjiang wushinian yiwang*, p.151.

³⁶⁹ Deng Kaisong 鄧開頌 and Lu Xiaomin 陸曉敏, *Yuegang guanxishi* 粵港關係史 (A History of Guangdong-Hong Kong Relations) (Xianggang: Qilin shuye you xian gong si, 1997), p.309. See also Government Information Services Department, *Events in Hong Kong 1967: An Official Report* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1968).

³⁷⁰ Stephen Waldron, *Fire on the Rim: A Study in Contradictions in left-wing political mobilisation in Hong Kong 1967* (Ph.D. thesis, Syracuse University, 1976), p.15.

³⁷¹ Ma Jisen, *The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China*, p.186.

³⁷² Hopson to Brown, China: Chinese Policies towards Hong Kong, 12 June 1967, FCO21/204.

³⁷³ Zhang, *Xianggang liuqi baodong neiqing*, p.178.

³⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p.176.

committee member of the All Circles Struggle Committee (各界鬥委會), similarly did not support the use of bombs.³⁷⁵ In any case, these less radical leftists did not express their doubts about the bombing, as they did not wish to upset their fellow leftists at a time when the nationalist fever within the leftist circle was at its peak.³⁷⁶

The fact that some leftists had doubts about the use of bombs in the 1967 riots shows that as far as nationalist movements in Hong Kong were concerned, differences in opinion were unavoidable. In the case of the 1967 riots, certainly the use of violence would not gain approval from some of the less militant leftists. Even in cases of peaceful expressions of China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, activists would differ as far as the use of tactics was concerned. It is impossible to get activists to agree on tactics unanimously. When it comes to the use of violence, any activist with common sense would have doubts about it. Under the extreme political circumstances in both China and Hong Kong at the time the riots occurred, however, it was difficult for the less radical leftists to oppose the use of violence or any other extreme measures. In this sense, the nationalist fever displayed in the 1967 riots became a form of censorship for local leftists as well as Chinese cadres working in Hong Kong. Further, it could be said that it was both action *and* inaction of the leftists that contributed in part to the occurrence of the riots. Conversely, Hong Kong citizens were willing to speak up by supporting the government. The

³⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p.217. See also, Jin, *Xiangjiang wushinian yiwang*, pp.152-153.

³⁷⁶ Zhang, *Xianggang liuqi baodong neiqing*, pp.178, 218.

use of violence meant that leftists in 1967 would lose public support for their anti-British campaign as it was widely condemned by the local community.

Community Reaction to the Riots

Major non-leftist newspapers all condemned the leftist-instigated violence, particularly the killing of two siblings in North Point on 20 August by a bomb,³⁷⁷ and that of well-known radio broadcaster Lam Bun (林彬) in the same month.³⁷⁸

On the killing of the two siblings, the *South China Morning Post* commented:

No single incident since the disturbances began has created such universal horror and disgust as the murder of two little Chinese children in Ching Wah Street on Sunday. The planting of other bombs near children's playgrounds indicates a definite intention to kill or wound the youngest members of the community – those who are as innocent of political entanglement as they are vulnerable through childish curiosity. That such a campaign should have been knowingly embarked on speaks volumes for the animal savagery of the agitators, whether they are those who construct the bombs or the (probably) paid thugs who distribute them.³⁷⁹

The killing of Lam Bun attracted just as much publicity. Lam Bun was a well-known radio host at Hong Kong Commercial Radio, who had been criticising the leftists on a daily basis on his show during the disturbances. The killing of Lam attracted much criticism from the non-left media such as *Ming Pao*.³⁸⁰ The incident certainly boosted leftists' reputation but in a very negative

³⁷⁷ *South China Morning Post*, 21 August 1967, p.1.

³⁷⁸ *South China Morning Post*, 25 August 1967, p.1. See also *Ming Pao Daily News*, 24 August 1967, p.2.

³⁷⁹ *South China Morning Post*, 21 August 1967, p.10.

³⁸⁰ See the editorial of *Ming Pao Daily News*, 25 August 1967, p.1.

way. It only shows that no one in the community, whether it be a child on the street or a well-known media personality, was safe from the violent display of political nationalism. The indiscriminate bombing was one of the main reasons the leftists lost public support. Contrary to the leftists' expectations, the public supported the colonial government's actions. Numerous individuals and groups such as companies and community groups sent letters of support to the government and expressed support for the government through advertisements in the newspapers.³⁸¹ It was one of the major tactical mistakes the leftists made in their attempt to force the colonial government to give in to their demands. As Stephen Waldron has argued:

These bomb incidents, which caused increasing anxiety among ever-larger numbers of residents from all walks of life, constituted one of the weakest elements in the struggle campaign, since they did not mobilise and consolidate anti-government sentiment; instead they had the opposite effect of causing large numbers of persons to turn in desperation away from the leftist cause and to the government, which they came to view as a better guarantor of safety and welfare.³⁸²

1967 Disturbances Sparking Debates of Nationalism

As the leftists' violent anti-British struggle escalated, it sparked discussions about nationalism in the media and among university students. For example, in the summer of 1967 there were discussions about the disturbances in

³⁸¹ The large volume of declarations of support sent from individuals, workers' guilds, companies, factories, clansmen associations, and kaifong associations, to the Hong Kong Government can be found in the archive; see HKRS70-1-313G.

³⁸² Stephen Waldron, *Fire on the Rim: A Study in Contradictions in left-wing political mobilisation in Hong Kong 1967* (PhD thesis, Syracuse University, 1976), p.156.

the Hong Kong University Student Union's official publication *Undergrad*.³⁸³ Of note is how many of the students writing in the magazine criticised not only the extremist actions by the leftists, but the CCP as well. In their criticisms of the leftists students also asked questions about the meaning of patriotism and more specifically whether the CCP actually represented the Chinese nation.³⁸⁴ In these articles, the student implicitly perceived a separation between the state and the nation.

Outside the university setting, Chinese newspapers were divided in their interpretation of nationalism. On the one hand were the leftist newspapers, under the influence of the Cultural Revolution, embarking on their incessant propaganda campaign for the struggle. On the other hand, writers in non-leftist newspapers such as *Ming Pao Daily News* put forward their own interpretation of nationalism as they condemned the leftists' actions.³⁸⁵ The founder of *Ming Pao Daily News*, Louis Cha (查良鏞), and his staff openly criticised the leftists in the newspaper's editorial, particularly after the local leftists' attempted to sabotage the newspaper by secretly replacing a photograph with a statement allegedly issued by the bogus 'Ming Pao Workers' Struggle Committee' before the 23 June edition of the newspaper went into print.³⁸⁶ Louis Cha was not the only writer in

³⁸³ *Undergrad*, 13 July 1967. There were also rumours that a struggle committee was formed at the University of Hong Kong, although the editor of the *Undergrad* was quick to deny the existence of such a struggle committee.

³⁸⁴ *Undergrad*, 13 June 1967, p.2; 13 July 1967, pp.1-2.

³⁸⁵ See, for example, *Ming Pao Daily News*, 24 August 1967, p.2.

³⁸⁶ Zhang Guiyang 張圭陽, *Jinyong yu mingbao zhuanqi* 金庸與明報傳奇 (The Legend of Jinyong and Ming Pao Daily News) (Taipei: Yunchen wenhua shiye gufen youxiangongsi, 2005), p.183.

Ming Pao Daily News who criticised the leftists, numerous articles in the newspaper written by others also denounced the leftists' actions.³⁸⁷

The debate in the media shows that nationalism is always open to debate and interpretations. Violent expressions of political nationalism in particular were prone to criticism. In their discussions of the meaning of patriotism, tertiary students in particular offered their own interpretation. The discussions might have been very different had the leftists dropped the anti-colonial rhetoric and protested via peaceful means, without attempting to transplant the Cultural Revolution to the colony. Amidst the discussions and criticism of the leftists' use of violent tactics, there emerged a perceived separation between the nation and the state. Although the issue of political allegiance had no doubt surfaced after the Civil War as Chinese in Hong Kong celebrated two 'national' days, the violence of the 1967 riots once more prompted those who discussed the meaning of being a patriot rethink about the question of whether the Chinese Communist state represented all of Chinese people.

Rhetoric without Substance: Failure of a Highly Politicised Campaign

There are several reasons the leftists' anti-British struggle ended in failure. Firstly, the leftists' campaign to discredit the colonial government started to lose support as the struggle became increasingly politicised, which meant that the struggle began to ignore the real problems facing the workers. Therefore, the struggle gradually alienated itself from the workers as well as the people of

³⁸⁷ See, for example, *Ming Pao Daily News*, 24 August 1967, p.2.

Hong Kong. Had the Leftists' focused on the original labour grievances in their rhetoric it might have been possible for them to retain support. Ultimately, the leftists' use of violent tactics in the form of indiscriminate bombing resulted in the complete loss of public support and sympathy.³⁸⁸

As mentioned previously, Chinese internal politics was a major factor that contributed to the end of the struggle. Although the power struggle within the Foreign Ministry of the PRC ended in August 1967, it was not until the spring of 1968 that the NCNA in Hong Kong received instructions from Premier Zhou Enlai to put an end to the struggle and to negotiate with the colonial government.³⁸⁹ Late in 1967 Zhou also held meetings with members of the Hong Kong-Macao Office and the Hong Kong and Macao Working Committee and, with the approval of Mao Zedong and Lin Biao (林彪), ordered them to put an end to the strikes and bombing. With the leaders of the struggle held in Beijing for two months, the Hong Kong struggle ended. It was obvious that the struggle was already failing in the latter half of 1967, and the instructions from Beijing officially put an end to the struggle.³⁹⁰

The 'nationalist' anti-British struggle was marked by inauspicious timing as it occurred at a time when it was obvious, taking into account the political and social circumstances at the time, that neither Beijing nor citizens of Hong Kong would support an armed display of political nationalism. Further, the anti-British struggle lacked direction and realistic objectives. The leftists in Hong Kong

³⁸⁸ Benjamin Leung and Stephen Chiu, *A Social History of Industrial Strikes and the Labour Movement in Hong Kong, 1946-1989* (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 1991), p.49.

³⁸⁹ Jin, *Xiangjiang wushinian yiwang*, pp.190.191.

³⁹⁰ Ma, *The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China*, p.189.

committed a major flaw in terms of the use of tactics, and showed a lapse of judgment on their part as they hoped that Beijing would intervene. Not surprisingly, the struggle died slowly and silently.

Through the 1967 riots, the leftists learned that violent political nationalism would never be successful. Though maintaining that the anti-British struggle was the right thing to do, the leftists admitted that the extremist tactic was a mistake. Following the disturbances the deputy director of the NCNA Qi Feng (祁峰) on one occasion said that ‘1967 was a mistake’.³⁹¹ The 1967 riots were damaging to not only to the leftist circle as a whole, but to individual leftists as well.

Negative Impact of the 1967 Disturbances on the Leftist Circle

On a macro-level, the FTU lost a significant number of members and labour activists.³⁹² It has been estimated that the FTU lost over a thousand members,³⁹³ and according to one report, hundreds of left-wing workers left their unions to form or join right-wing unions.³⁹⁴ Due to the 1967 riots the leftists the public came to have a very negative opinion of anyone who belonged to the leftist circle. This made it difficult for leftists to be accepted by employers or the society at large. In October, it was reported that close to 1,000 left-wing workers

³⁹¹ Zhang, *Xianggang liuqi baodong neiqing*, p.135. According to Cheung Kar-wai’s (Zhang Jiawei) work the original article reporting Qi Feng’s comment appeared in the *Ming Pao Daily News*. However, I was unable to find the original article in the archive. It appears that the article was removed from the microfilm copies of the newspaper.

³⁹² Liang Baolong 梁寶龍, ‘Xianggang gonghui lianhehui jianjie’ 香港工會聯合會簡介 (A Brief Introduction to the Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions), *Xianggang yu zhongguo gongyun zongheng* 香港與中國工運縱橫(Dimensions of the Chinese and Hong Kong Labour Movement) ed. Chen Mingqiu 陳明錄 (Xianggang: Xianggang jidujiao gongye weiyuanhui), pp.127-131.

³⁹³ Joe England and John Rear, *Chinese Labour under British Rule*, p.91.

³⁹⁴ *Hong Kong Standard*, 25 April 1968, HKRS70-1-312.

were unemployed and did not receive living allowance payment.³⁹⁵ It was reported that unemployed left-wing workers were told by Communist leaders to find work,³⁹⁶ and when left-wing strikers failed in seeking reinstatement, the leftist media once again put the blame on the colonial government and called the workers' attempt to find work a 'return-to-work struggle' (復工鬥爭).³⁹⁷

Left-wing workers were not the only ones who suffered due to their participation in the anti-British struggle. Others in the leftist circles, who quit their jobs or took steps to join the left-wing workers, were also affected. As noted by Kenneth Ore who worked at the left-wing Hok Yau Club:

Between 1967 and 1969, the high point of the Cultural Revolution, many of our Hok Yau contacts had left high-paying jobs and prestigious schools to show solidarity with their working-class comrades. In the aftermath of the riot years, however, these activists found themselves in serious debt and under pressure from their families. They could not return to their jobs or schools...The extreme-leftist faction of the Party sharply disapproved of anyone attempting to rebuild their lives after the May Riot.³⁹⁸

The plight of the workers shows that those who sacrificed themselves for the promotion of political nationalism ended up causing themselves great difficulty socially and financially. Violent expressions of political nationalism would only create a negative image of oneself in the eyes of the public. The 1967 riots was a painful lesson for the leftists as a group and as individuals. Leftist organisations and individuals suffered economic losses. Their public image was

³⁹⁵ *China Mail*, 28 October 1967, HKRS70-1-301.

³⁹⁶ *The Star*, 10 June 1969, HKRS70-1-312.

³⁹⁷ *Wen Hui Pao*, 22 May 1968, HKRS70-1-312.

³⁹⁸ Ore, *Song of the Azalea*, p.242.

severely tarnished by the riots. For years to come the public would harbour a sense of fear for anything leftist. In contrast to the leftist workers, it seemed that pro-GMD sympathisers had learned their lesson from the 1956 riots. During the 1967 riots, pro-GMD sympathisers kept a very low profile, but took the opportunity to improve their image yet at the same time promoted their agenda peacefully.

Pro-GMD Forces during the 1967 Riots

Pro-Nationalist people in the colony carried out their Double Tenth celebrations as usual in Wan Chai and Rennie's Mill.³⁹⁹ Radical leftists attempted to disrupt the celebrations, by planting hoax bombs in places where the Nationalists planned to gather.⁴⁰⁰ In Wan Chai members of the TUC and representatives of 110 affiliated right-wing unions met. The chairman of the TUC stated there that the 'freedom-loving peoples had just won the "first round of battle".'⁴⁰¹ During the disturbances, Nationalist workers were asked to counter what the leftist workers did. According to a transport worker who was a GMD member and had been the chairman of the Hong Kong Motor Transport Workers General Unions (汽車總工會), during the disturbances the GMD's Hong Kong branch and pro-GMD workers were given specific instructions by the GMD to make sure all the workers went to work.⁴⁰² A loyal workers' fund, the initial amount of which came from public donations and was given to the pro-GMD

³⁹⁹ Cooper, *Colony in Conflict*, p.233.

⁴⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰¹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰² Hong Kong Oral History Archive, accession number 074.

TUC, was established as a reward for workers who remained at their posts during the riots.

It is possible that pro-GMD sympathisers had already learned from the 1956 riots that violent political nationalism would only end in failure. They did not choose to confront the leftists directly as they did in the 1956 riots. Instead, pro-GMD sympathisers chose to celebrate Double Tenth peacefully, and, perhaps as a silent protest against the leftists' actions, followed GMD's orders to go to work. The actions of GMD sympathisers as such show that political nationalism need not be promoted through violence against the other faction, despite the intense hostility between pro-CCP sympathisers and pro-GMD sympathisers expressed in the past. It would appear that during the 1967 riots GMD sympathisers seized the opportunity to improve their image by taking actions much more acceptable to the public, compared to the violence and strikes started by the leftists, which only caused inconveniences to the public.

Conclusion: Significance of the 1956 and 1967 Riots

The 1967 riots are significant in my analysis of China-orientated nationalism in post-1949 Hong Kong because the kind of violent political nationalism expressed in the riots became a serious problem for both the colonial government as well as the people of Hong Kong.⁴⁰³ Although the immediate trigger of the 1967 disturbances was labour disputes, this chapter has noted that a power struggle in China's Foreign Ministry during the Cultural Revolution

⁴⁰³ For details of the politics behind the Hong Kong colonial government's handling of the 1967 riots, see Ray Yep, 'The 1967 Riots in Hong Kong: The Domestic and Diplomatic Fronts of the Governor', in *May Days in Hong Kong: Riot and Emergency in 1967* ed. Robert Bickers and Ray Yep (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009), pp.21-36.

contributed to the politicisation of the riots in Hong Kong and prolonged the leftists' anti-colonial campaign. It has been pointed out that the 1967 disturbances show the 'susceptibility of the labour movement, and indeed of the Hong Kong Chinese community, to the influence of political events in Mainland China'.⁴⁰⁴ Of course, Hong Kong's social and economic conditions also contributed to the discontent among the working class, which local leftists exploited to carry out the struggle. Writers of Hong Kong history have often focused on how the 1967 disturbances were a watershed in the history of Hong Kong as they led to the development of a Hong Kong identity,⁴⁰⁵ government policy changes that improved industrial relations, increased public spending by the colonial government,⁴⁰⁶ and increased public support for the colonial government.⁴⁰⁷ What was the significance of the 1956 riots and 1967 disturbances in relation to the history of China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong? Both disturbances were characterised by expressions of pro-CCP/pro-GMD political nationalism through violence. Both were related to Chinese politics, a legacy of the CCP-GMD struggle. Colonialism served as a trigger and, particularly in the case of the 1967 riots, a source of escalation of the disturbances. In both disturbances, the public became the victim and the colonial government took firm action against the troublemakers.

⁴⁰⁴ Benjamin Leung and Stephen Chiu, *A Social History of Industrial Strikes and the Labour Movement in Hong Kong, 1946-1989* (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 1991), p.42.

⁴⁰⁵ Lee Ming Kwan, 'Hong Kong Identity – Past and Present', in *Hong Kong Economy and Society: Challenges in the New Era* ed. Wong Siu-lun and Toyojiro Maruya (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 1998), pp.153-175.

⁴⁰⁶ Yuan Bangjian 元邦建, *Xianggang shilue* 香港史略 (A Concise History of Hong Kong) (Hong Kong: Zhongliu chubanshe youxiangongsi, 1997), pp.243-245.

⁴⁰⁷ Ian Scott, *Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989), p.104.

However, there are several key differences between the two periods of riots. In the 1956 riots, the main actors were pro-Nationalist sympathisers. In the 1967 disturbances, the main actors were the leftists. The circumstances and triggers that sparked the riots were also very different. The 1956 riots began with a small incident when pro-GMD sympathisers were told by authorities to remove GMD flags from buildings, followed by a violent conflict between pro-CCP and pro-GMD sympathisers. The 1967 disturbances were triggered by an industrial dispute at a factory and were quickly transformed into a political struggle against the colonial authorities, but did not involve any direct clashes with the GMD camp. The disturbances instead took the guise of an anti-colonial struggle.

Although the 1967 Communist-inspired anti-colonial campaign was a failure, its significance in terms of the history of nationalism in Hong Kong cannot be ignored. Firstly, the failure of the 1967 riots marked the end of violent political nationalism in the history of colonial Hong Kong. The 1956 and 1967 riots saw the last open, violent expressions of China-orientated nationalism based on pro-GMD and pro-CCP sentiments. After the 1967 riots, there was no more violent conflict between CCP and GMD sympathisers. Neither the CCP nor the GMD sympathisers again employed violent militant tactics to promote their agendas.

The CCP-GMD struggle as a legacy of Chinese national politics completely disappeared from the rhetoric of nationalism in mass movements in later years. The reason this is the case is that through the 1956 and 1967 riots, the pro-CCP and pro-GMD forces learned that violent expression of political

nationalism would only antagonise the public. The public image of both the pro-Communists and pro-Nationalists was damaged by the two riots. The pro-Nationalists showed that they had learned their lesson, for they kept a low profile during the 1967 riots.⁴⁰⁸ The leftists, too, learned that the 1967 riots were a mistake. As far as the disappearance of national politics in political movements is concerned, Lee Ming-kwan argues:

The pro-Communists, on the heel of the pro-Nationalists, had lost their battles and sympathisers in their bid to challenge the authority of the colonial administration. As a result, national politics had also lost its battlefield and protagonists. The stage was set for the Government of Hong Kong and its people to enact their own drama.⁴⁰⁹

Further, anti-colonialism as a theme was no longer explicitly used in subsequent mass movements relating to the expression of nationalism. Nor was such a theme able to stir up as much trouble as in the 1967 disturbances. For these reasons, the 1967 disturbances were a watershed not only in Hong Kong history, but in the development and evolution of China-orientated nationalism in the colony.

The two sets of riots demonstrate that violent public displays of political nationalism did not gain public support. Nevertheless, the 1967 riots, along with the 1966 riots, raised Hong Kong youths' political awareness, and awareness of

⁴⁰⁸ Clandestine sabotage activities of GMD agents against the Communists were still carried out in Hong Kong in the 1960s. See 'Guomintang Activities in Hong Kong', CO1030/1605, 1963.

⁴⁰⁹ Lee Ming Kwan, 'Hong Kong Identity – Past and Present', in *Hong Kong Economy and Society: Challenges in the New Era* ed. Wong Siu-lun and Toyojiro Maruya (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 1998), pp.153-175.

the injustices of colonialism. It could be said that the two riots indirectly led to the student and social movements that would emerge in the next decade. It has been argued that ‘through these bloodstained experiences, society was growing more articulate’.⁴¹⁰ Eventually, Hong Kong youth *did* become articulate in the 1970s. The small group of university students who sympathised with the leftists during the 1967 disturbances evolved into the pro-China faction in the student movement of the early 1970s.⁴¹¹ I shall discuss in the next chapter how Hong Kong youths played an important role in the nationalist *Baodiao* campaign in 1971 as well as the promotion of China-orientated nationalism in universities around the mid-1970s.

⁴¹⁰ Lam Wai-man, *Understanding the Political Culture of Hong Kong: The Paradox of Activism and Depoliticisation* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), p.124.

⁴¹¹ Zhang, *Xianggang liuqi baodong neiqing*, p.77.

Chapter Five: Hong Kong Youth and the Politics of Nationalism in the 1970s: *Baodiao*, New Left, China Complex

This chapter begins the third part of this thesis, in which I examine three case studies of popular nationalism in Hong Kong: the 1971 *Baodiao* campaign and the surge of nationalist sentiments among Hong Kong youth in the 1970s, Hong Kong's response to the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, and the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign.

In Chapters Three and Four, I discussed how the expression of China-orientated nationalism was based on allegiances to the PRC and the ROC. The 1956 and 1967 riots saw the outbreak of a series of disturbances by pro-CCP and pro-GMD sympathisers in the colony. The Hong Kong government's crackdown on Communist activities during the 1967 riots dealt a serious blow to the left-wing forces (左派) in Hong Kong. As the influence of the traditional left-wing faded, a new breed of activists took the lead in political activities over the next decade. The 1970s saw the emergence of student and youth activists, different from the traditional leftists and pro-GMD activists, as a new yet significant force in the promotion of China-orientated nationalism. The kind of nationalism expressed from the 1970s onwards had little relationship with the politics of the CCP-GMD struggle. I refer to this kind of nationalism as *popular nationalism*.

Two waves of the Defend Diaoyu Islands Movement (*Baodiao yundong* 保釣運動) occurred in the 1970s, the first in 1971-72 and the other in 1978. The

1970s also saw the surge of nationalistic sentiments among university students and, after 1971, the dominance of pro-China student activists in universities. In this chapter, I continue to focus on the significance of local politics in the expression of nationalism, and the politics of nationalism. The chapter first examines the ‘defend Diaoyutai’, *Baodiao* (保釣), phenomenon of 1971 to demonstrate how the expression of China-orientated nationalism was influenced by local politics due to differences in political ideology of the participating groups. There were differences in opinion between not only the pro-China group and radicals known as the New Left,⁴¹² but within each of these two groups as well. Although the *Baodiao* campaign appeared to be a nationalist campaign, the New Leftists intended to use it to encourage the public to think about colonialism. To some extent, the New Left succeeded in its goals because the government was criticised for its handling of the 7 July demonstration, and after the 1971 campaign young people participated in movements aimed at addressing social

⁴¹² I have borrowed the term ‘New Left’ from a 1972 report written by the Special Branch of the Hong Kong Government on radical youth in the early 1970s. In that report, the term ‘New Left’ was used to describe ‘groups of young people in Hong Kong who were discontented with the established order and who actively organised protest in an attempt to bring about changes’. The *70s Bi-weekly*, a left-wing group not related to the CCP, was considered by the Hong Kong Government as a New Left group. In Chinese, the term ‘New Left’ is *xinzuopai* 新左派 and has been used by former Social Faction member Lai Chak-fun (黎則奮) to describe young activists in the 1970s who were influenced by Marxism. In Hong Kong politics, the term *zuopai* 左派, or ‘leftist’, is generally used to refer to people or groups that have connections with the CCP. Writer Chan Koon-chung (陳冠中) has used the term *zuoyi qingnian* 左翼青年 (left-wing youth) to refer to the young activists in the *70s Bi-weekly* as well as those in the Social Faction in universities. To avoid confusion, I have used the term ‘New Left’ in this thesis, as used by the Hong Kong Government in its report, to distinguish the radical young activists who were active in political movements in the 1970s from the traditional leftists who were related to the CCP. It should be noted, however, that members of the *70s Bi-weekly* and those of the Revolutionary Marxist League never called themselves the New Left. See Hong Kong Special Branch, ‘The New Left and Hong Kong’, HKRS934-3-30; Li Zefen 黎則奮, *Qishi niandai xianggang qingnian jijin yundong huigu* 香港青年激進運動回顧 (A Review of the Radical Hong Kong Youth Movement in the 1970s), 7 June 2008, <http://www.grass-root.org/college/modules/wfsection/article.php?articleid=695>; and Chen Guanzhong 陳冠中, *Shihou bentu wenhuazhi* 事後：本土文化誌 (In Hindsight: A Chronicle of Local Culture) (Xianggang: Niujin daxue chubanshe, 2007), p.38.

injustice in the colony. The significance of China-orientated nationalism in the 1970s is that, first, it was used as a tactic for political purposes by groups of politically active young people. Second, it created divisions among them before and after the *Baodiao* campaign. Third, nationalism provided Hong Kong young people a means to reflect on their Chinese identity and express their concern for China as well as Hong Kong.

The first section of this chapter consists of a brief analysis of the context of the 1970s. Subsequent sections examine the development of the *Baodiao* campaign of the 1970s; the different factions involved in promoting China-orientated nationalism; and the emergence of young people and students as leaders of the campaign. I argue that in the 1971 *Baodiao* campaign, China-orientated nationalism was a mere rhetorical expression of the New Left, the true political agenda of which was anti-colonialism and anti-capitalism, and that was influenced by local politics and the group's own political ideologies. Therefore, the 1971 *Baodiao* campaign reflected the complexity of not only China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong, but the *politics* of it. In the final section, I examine the rise and decline of pro-China sentiments among university students in the 1970s.

Hong Kong in the 1970s: Young People and Student Activism

From the 1950s to the 1970s, Hong Kong experienced significant social and economic changes. As far as the economy was concerned, the national

income and government expenditure increased twelve times in those 20 years.⁴¹³ The city's physical environment underwent significant changes as high-rise buildings were built and infrastructure such as roads and highways expanded. Hong Kong's population at the end of 1972 was 4,103,500.⁴¹⁴ About 55 per cent of the urban population was born in Hong Kong. The fact that Hong Kong had a young population, with nearly half under the age of nineteen, put much stress on the education system, but Hong Kong's education services expanded steadily, and by 1971, 1,284,000 students were enrolled in 2,895 schools, colleges and adult education centres.⁴¹⁵ In higher education, in 1969-1970 the government introduced a scheme of student financing that provided grants and loans to students at the University of Hong Kong (HKU) and the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK). There were approximately 3,000 undergraduate places at the HKU and the total undergraduate enrolment at the CUHK was about 2,500. Although the number of tertiary students remained small, it is clear that Hong Kong in the 1970s had a young population and that more young people were being educated. This is not to say that there was no student movement before the 1970s. It has been argued that the first wave of the Hong Kong student movement appeared in the early 1960s as those born in Hong Kong after WWII came of age.⁴¹⁶ It has also been argued that the first generation of young people born in the colony did not possess the 'refugee mentality' of their parents and

⁴¹³ *Hong Kong 1973, Report for the Year 1972* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Government Press 1973), p.2.

⁴¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.183.

⁴¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.53.

⁴¹⁶ Tsoi Yiu-cheong, 'The Hong Kong Student Movement's 'China Complex'', in *Hong Kong Social Movements: Forces from the Margins* ed. Sophia Woodman (Hong Kong: July 1 Link and Hong Kong Women Christian Council, 1997), pp.86-92. For some elaboration on the student movement, see page 149 of this chapter.

were therefore ‘willing to think seriously about injustices in their society’ and to ‘think about their roots’.⁴¹⁷ In short, the social context of Hong Kong and the historical background in relation to Hong Kong youth contributed to the appearance of the Hong Kong student movement in the 1960s and 1970s. The social contexts as such help us understand why young people in Hong Kong became the protagonists in the expression of nationalism, and why such expressions were essentially a product of not only the China factor but the ‘Hong Kong factor’ as well.

The 1970s also saw the rise of local popular culture based on the Cantonese language. Yet this local popular culture was also mixed with elements of Western popular culture. The local Hong Kong Chinese became more conscious of their Hong Kong identity as increased wealth enabled them to travel overseas and to China, giving them a perspective to reflect on their own identity, and as Hong Kong was faced with the problem of illegal immigrants from mainland China who had difficulty in terms of assimilation into the Hong Kong way of life.⁴¹⁸ At the same time, and partly as a consequence, an obsession with understanding China, sometimes referred to as the ‘China complex’, emerged among young people and fuelled the student-led nationalist movements in the 1970s.

⁴¹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁸ Tsang, *A Modern History of Hong Kong*, p.193.

University Students and the ‘China complex’: Reflecting on Nationalism and Colonialism

Although the political awareness of Hong Kong youth was growing as they reflected on their Hong Kong identity, the 1971 *Baodiao* campaign sparked some of the Hong Kong youth’s interest in learning about China. Internally, as a result of the 1971 *Baodiao* campaign there was a split among university students as some placed China first while others were more concerned about Hong Kong society.⁴¹⁹ Conversely, the Cultural Revolution served as an external factor contributing to a surge of nationalist sentiments among university students. However, university students’ understanding of what was happening in China was quite limited. In fact, some of the interviewees said that young people, who grew up in the post-war years, were ‘confused’⁴²⁰ and did not really understand what was happening in China.⁴²¹ Various essays in the student magazines reveal that students were still attempting to learn about China. In fact, discussions of China-orientated nationalism among university students did not begin with the *Baodiao* phenomenon. In as early as the late 1960s, university students had already pondered the idea of China-orientated nationalism. The Campaign to Make Chinese an Official Language (爭取中文成爲法定語文運動/中文運動) of the late 1960s and early 1970s carried a nationalistic tone, although it was a Hong Kong-orientated movement and had little to do with nationalism.⁴²² It is clear

⁴¹⁹ Wu Zhongxian 吳仲賢, *Dazhi weijing* 大志未竟: 吳仲賢文集 (Our Work is not Finished: A Collection of Ng Chung-yin’s Writings) (Hong Kong: Wu Ye lirong, 1997), p.269.

⁴²⁰ Interview with Chui Pak-tai, 15 October 2007.

⁴²¹ Interview with Szeto Wah, 29 October 2007.

⁴²² Interview with Szeto Wah, 29 October 2007. In my interview with Szeto Wah, he said that the Campaign to Make Chinese an Official Language was only about ‘Chinese people using Chinese’

that through their essays, university students reflected on Chinese identity as well as issues related to China. Two other features can also be noted concerning these discussions about China. First, on many occasions, rather than providing an informed discussion about China, students often asked a series of questions about China.⁴²³ Second, in their discussions of China-orientated nationalism, university students inevitably reflected on Hong Kong identity and, to some extent, colonialism as well. Some lamented that although ‘China’ was often the subject of discussion, most of the Hong Kong people neglected the injustices and problems of colonialism in the colony. One author wrote in an article in the University of Hong Kong student publication *Undergrad*:

I don't believe that anyone who refuses to fight the injustice and inequality right before their eyes, anyone who refuses to sacrifice [sic] for his own community will someday sacrifice and fight for the 700 million Chinese in China...After all, an average youth in Hong Kong has never touched, smelled, seen and experienced China...China is but an empty shadow. Hong Kong is concrete.⁴²⁴

New Leftists Ng Chung-yin and Mok Chiu-yu, too, pondered the problem of nationalism vis-à-vis colonialism. The involvement of the anti-colonial, anti-capitalist New Left was particularly significant for our understanding of the context of the 1970s youth/student movement, which I shall discuss later. In any

and that it was not a nationalist movement. Lau Chin-shek 劉千石, who was a worker at that time, said that he participated in the campaign as he felt that workers were being exploited because Chinese was not an official language. See Sally Blyth and Ian Wotherspoon, *Hong Kong Remembers* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.72. For discussions about the campaign, see, for example, Wu Guowei 吳國偉, ‘Zhongwen fading yundong de lailong qumai 中文法定運動的來龍去脈’ (The Origins and Development of the Campaign to Make Chinese an Official Language), *Qishi niandai* 七十年代 (The Seventies), 10, 1970, pp.4-6.

⁴²³ See, for example, Ru 如 (pseud.), ‘Yiqie yaocong liaojie zhongguo kaishi’ (一切要從了解中國開始 Everything should start with understanding China), *Undergrad*, 16 October 1972, p.6.

⁴²⁴ *Undergrad*, 1 November 1969, p.6.

case, what students and young people possessed in the late 1960s and early 1970s might be called a ‘China complex’,⁴²⁵ because they were still learning about China and there was no indication that they were clearly supporting the CCP at the time. It should be kept in mind that the pro-China ‘China faction’, which the majority of politically active students in universities belonged to and that dominated the student movement later in the 1970s, did not exist before or in 1971. The 1971 *Baodiao* campaign was an opportunity for them to reflect on Chinese identity and colonialism, and to express their ‘China complex’. Following the 1971 campaign, there was a surge of nationalistic sentiments among university students. I shall examine the post-1971 contexts later in this chapter, but first I shall discuss the background to the 1971 *Baodiao* campaign.

Youth/Student Participation in 1970s Social Movements: The Background

Young people, particularly college students, played a major role in the movements in the late 1960s and early 1970s.⁴²⁶ Two points should be noted when studying the role university students played in the social movements of the early 1970s. Firstly, it would be erroneous to simply refer politically active

⁴²⁵ I have borrowed the term ‘China complex’ from Tsoi Yiu-cheong’s article. See Tsoi Yiu-cheong, ‘The Hong Kong Student Movement’s ‘China Complex’’, in *Hong Kong Social Movements: Forces from the Margins* ed. Sophia Woodman (Hong Kong: July 1 Link and Hong Kong Women Christian Council, 1997), pp.86-92.

⁴²⁶ Pik Wan Wong, ‘The Pro-Chinese Democracy Movement in Hong Kong’, in *The Dynamics of Social Movement in Hong Kong* ed. Stephen Wing Kai Chiu and Tai Lok Lui (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2000), pp.55-90. For more information on the different factions in the student movement, see Chen Guanzhong 陳冠中, *Shihou bentu wenhuazhi* 事後：本土文化誌 (In Hindsight: A Chronicle of Local Culture) (Xianggang: Niujin daxue chubanshe, 2007), pp.24-26; Xianggang zhuanhang xuesheng lianhui 香港專上學生聯會 (Hong Kong Federation of Students) (ed.), Hong Kong Federation of Students, *Xianggang xuesheng yundong huigu* 香港學生運動回顧 (A Review of the Student Movement in Hong Kong) (Xianggang: Guangjiaojing chubanshe, 1983), pp.97-100.

university students of the 1970s as ‘left-wing’. Nor would it be appropriate, as the 1970s New Left leader Mok Chiu-yu has argued, to call the social movements of the early 1970s a ‘student movement’, for many who participated in the social movements in the early 1970s were not students.⁴²⁷ The *Baodiao* demonstrations of 1971, for example, involved both students and non-students. Secondly, because the New Left was involved in the social movements, it is not surprising that the 1971 *Baodiao* campaign carried with it an anti-colonial and anti-capitalist flavour.

The New Leftists in Hong Kong

Who were the New Left and why did they become involved in the 1971 *Baodiao* campaign? I shall examine in detail the background of two of its core members: Ng Chung-yin (吳仲賢) and Mok Chiu-yu (莫昭如). Ng Chung-yin emerged as an activist in the late 1960s in the Chu Hai/Zhu Hai College (珠海書院) student strike, and took part in the Campaign to Make Chinese an Official Language. Ng was involved in the 1971 *Baodiao* campaign and the 1973 Anti-Corruption Campaign (反貪污運動) as well.⁴²⁸ He also participated in a few other social movements such as the anti-inflation rally in 1974.⁴²⁹ Although there were two forces, namely the pro-China activists (not the same as the ‘China faction’ in the universities) and the *70s Bi-weekly* that led the 1971 *Baodiao* campaign in Hong Kong, Ng Chung-yin, according to a report in the *South China*

⁴²⁷ Xianggang zhuan Shang xuesheng lian hui, *Xianggang xuesheng yundong huigu*, p.64.

⁴²⁸ Until the establishment of the ICAC, corruption, particularly in the police force, had long been a serious problem in colonial Hong Kong. For details, see H.J.Lethbridge, *Hard Graft in Hong Kong: Scandal, Corruption and the ICAC* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1985)

⁴²⁹ *South China Morning Post*, 15 September 1974, p.1.

Morning Post published in September 1974, ‘played a key role in instigating the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands demonstrations, and gained the ‘reputation’ of being the first demonstrator arrested by police’.⁴³⁰ In fact, the Hong Kong government became quite concerned about the emergence of the New Left and compiled a detailed report on it.⁴³¹

Why and how did the New Leftists become involved in the nationalist *Baodiao* campaign? To answer these questions one must examine the history of the *70s Bi-weekly*, a group formed by New Leftists and was one of the leading activist groups in the 1971 *Baodiao* campaign.

The 70s Bi-weekly: Hong Kong Anarchists and Marxists

The *70s Bi-weekly* (七十年代雙週刊/七零) was founded on 1 January 1971.⁴³² Mok Chiu-yu and Ng Chung-yin were among the founders of the magazine. Following the Chu Hai College student strike Mok and Ng believed that they needed an independent publication of their own. In the beginning, there were four editors and the publication relied on donations. The office of the *70s Bi-weekly* was in Wan Chai. Although all the members were editors, Mok was responsible for the finances of the publication. Mok contributed a thousand Hong

⁴³⁰ Kenneth Ko, ‘HK Marxists and the European Connection’, *South China Morning Post*, 22 September 1974, p.1. However, Ng Chung-yin did not participate in the 7 July demonstration or any of the *Baodiao* demonstrations later, as he had already departed for France before then. According to Mok Chiu-yu, as a result of his trip to France Ng was criticised as a ‘deserter’. Interview with Mok Chiu-yu, 10 October 2007. The exact date of Ng’s departure for France is unclear, although Ng mentions in his essay that he was preparing for the trip in June. See Ng Chung-yin, ‘Baye de zhaji’ 八月的札記 (The August Journal) in Wu, *Dazhi weijing*, pp.161-167.

⁴³¹ Hong Kong Special Branch, ‘The New Left and Hong Kong’, HKRS934-3-30. In the Special Branch paper a section was devoted to the *70s Bi-weekly*, and Ng and Mok were mentioned.

⁴³² Mok Chiu-yu, one of the founders of the *70s Bi-weekly*, prefers to call the magazine *qiling* (七零) so as to distinguish it from the *Qishi niandai* 七十年代 (The Seventies) monthly magazine. Interview with Mok Chiu-yu, 10 October 2007.

Kong dollars, almost half of his salary from his daytime job, to the magazine.⁴³³ At its peak, the publication sold 10,000 copies. Mok said that 10,000 was not a small number considering the magazine was an individual publication for youths.⁴³⁴ A report in the *South China Sunday Post Herald (SCSPH)* on the 10 April *Baodiao* demonstration confirms that the magazine was indeed read by university students and had some influence on them. The *SCSPH* report states:

Some demonstrators said they were university students and decided to take part in the demonstration after being ‘inspired by articles in the 70s Bi-weekly.’⁴³⁵

The political inclination of many of the *70s Bi-weekly* editors was internationalism (國際主義),⁴³⁶ humanitarianism (人道主義), and liberalism (自由主義). Mok Chiu-yu was an Anarchists (無政府主義者). Ng Chung-yin might have started out as a Marxist or Anarchist, but it is certain that he later became a Trotskyist.⁴³⁷ To understand the mentality of the *70s Bi-weekly* editors it might be useful to examine briefly the definitions and theories of Anarchism. Ng in one of his essays recommends the work of Alexander Berkman entitled *The ABC of Anarchism*, first published in 1929, as entry-level reading for understanding the basic concepts of Anarchism.⁴³⁸ Written in a conversational style, Berkman’s work provides an overview of the key ideas of Anarchism in a

⁴³³ Interview with Mok Chiu-yu, 10 October 2007.

⁴³⁴ Interview with Mok Chiu-yu, 10 October 2007.

⁴³⁵ *South China Sunday Post Herald*, 21 February 1971.

⁴³⁶ Interview with Mok Chiu-yu, 10 October 2007.

⁴³⁷ Lin Wushan 林武山 and Li Zefen 黎則奮 ‘Tancheng kaifang de geminglixiang zhuyizhe fangwen qishi niandai bianjibu’ 坦誠，開放的革命理想主義者：訪問 70 年代編輯部 (Candid and Open Revolutionary Idealists An Interview with the Editorial Board of the 70s Bi-weekly), *Undergrad*, 1 December 1973, pp.8-9.

⁴³⁸ Wu, *Dazhi weijing*, pp.161-167. The article was first published in the *70s Bi-weekly* in September 1971.

manner very accessible to the general reader. Since Ng and Mok have claimed that they were engaged in an anti-colonial and anti-capitalist movement, and on many occasions confronted the colonial authorities, it would be worthwhile to analyse what the Anarchists say, on the theoretical level, about government. Alexander Berkman wrote in his book:

It is capitalism and government which stand for disorder and violence. Anarchism is the very reverse of it; it means order without government and peace without violence.⁴³⁹

Berkman further argues that the government forces people to do certain things and prohibits them from doing others, and that the government and the capitalist class would do everything to retain their power.⁴⁴⁰ Berkman also discusses the continuous struggle between capital and labour, and argues that the revolution would abolish not only the government but the ‘entire system of wage slavery’ as well.⁴⁴¹ It is not surprising, then, that the self-proclaimed Anarchists in Hong Kong would take every opportunity to confront the colonial authorities. As I shall demonstrate later, the *Baodiao* movement provided the New Left with an opportunity to confront the colonial government and to promote their anti-colonial agenda. For Mok Chiu-yu, the fact that the police on many occasions attempted to crack down *Baodiao* demonstrations was a violation of human rights. Mok went ahead to hold the 4 May demonstration even though he knew that he would be arrested.⁴⁴²

⁴³⁹ Alexander Berkman, *The ABC of Anarchism* (New York: Dover, 1972), p.173.

⁴⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p.186.

⁴⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p.222.

⁴⁴² *The Star*, 4 May 1971, HKRS 70-2-324.

The Trotskyist Revolutionary Marxist League, known in Chinese as the *Geming makesi zhuyi tongmeng* (革命馬克思主義同盟), or *Gemameng* (革馬盟) for short, was another New Left group that emerged in the 1970s. Ng Chung-yin was one of the founders of the League, following his departure from the *70s Bi-weekly*. The official magazine of the League was the *Zhan Xun* (戰訊), published weekly. *Zhan Xun* was quite similar to the *70s Bi-weekly* in tone and content. The League was concerned about issues such as class struggle, democracy, imperialism and colonialism. Like the *70s Bi-weekly*, the League took an interest in the *Baodiao* movement, this time the Second *Baodiao* campaign of 1978. Although the League's target in the 1978 campaign was US and Japanese imperialism, it employed the rhetoric of China-orientated nationalism. Expressions such as 'Chinese people united' and 'protecting territorial integrity of China' can be found in the articles published in the 1978 issues of the *Zhan Xun*.⁴⁴³ At the same time, the League clearly explained its opinion on the *Baodiao* campaign, which was quite different from what the pro-China faction proclaimed in the first wave of the movement in 1971-72. The League claimed that the *Baodiao* movement could contribute to the 'anti-imperialist consciousness' of the people and make them rethink the problems of colonialism.⁴⁴⁴

Another Trotskyist group was the *Shiyue pinglun* (十月評論), a magazine that was in fact the Hong Kong branch of the Fourth International (第四國際), an international Trotskyist group. Both the *Gemameng* and the *Shiyue pinglun* had

⁴⁴³ *Zhan Xun* 戰訊, 7 May 1978, 2, 29, p.1.

⁴⁴⁴ *Zhan Xun* 戰訊, 14 May 1978, 2, 30, p.1.

links to the Fourth International. These special relationships would become more apparent later as an incident occurred in 1978 that involved Ng Chung-yin being removed from the League due to pressure from the Fourth International. These Hong Kong Trotskyites, and other young leftists who were non-Marxist and non-Anarchist, and did not belong to the traditional pro-Beijing camp, were also known as the ‘New Left’ (新左派). It is clear, therefore, that the New Left was not pro-China, and thus the group’s ideology was not based on the pro-PRC nationalist rhetoric.

The New Left and the *Baodiao* Movement: Nationalism as Tactic

Why would the Trotskyites and other ‘new left-wing’ radicals, who often espoused the rhetoric of anti-colonialism, be interested in the *Baodiao* movement with its Chinese nationalist overtones? As far as these radicals were concerned, there existed a symbiotic relationship between anti-colonialism and China-orientated nationalism. Ng Chung-yin himself has stated that when the *Baodiao* campaign broke out in 1971 he believed that China-orientated nationalism could be used as a means to mobilise the public for an anti-colonial movement.⁴⁴⁵ In other words, for these young radicals, nationalism functioned as a tool to draw the attention of the masses for the sake of their anti-colonialist campaign. Mok Chiu-yu has argued that the result of the *Baodiao* campaign was that it became an anti-colonial campaign as the authorities attempted to suppress it.⁴⁴⁶ Mok’s claim is true to an extent, as I shall demonstrate later in my discussion of the 7 July demonstration. For these New Leftists, nationalism was only a tool to draw the

⁴⁴⁵ Wu, *Dazhi weijing*, p.267.

⁴⁴⁶ Interview with Mok Chiu-yu, 10 October 2007.

public's attention to the problems of colonialism. Unlike the pro-China activists who worked with them, the New Left did not intend to run the *Baodiao* movement as a purely pro-China irredentist movement.

Divisions and Differences among *Baodiao* Activists

Difference in opinion existed not only within the New Left. There were tensions between pro-China activists and between pro-China and New Left activists as well. This can be seen when examining in detail the agenda and activities of the major players in the *Baodiao* movement. The 1971 *Baodiao* campaign in Hong Kong was inspired by the *Baodiao* campaign in the US, which took place earlier.⁴⁴⁷ While both the pro-Beijing and New Left camps protested against Japan's claims to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, they held very different political beliefs about irredentist nationalism. The pro-China Hong Kong Protect Diaoyutai Action Committee (香港保衛釣魚台行動委員會), formed in February 1971, believed that the islands should be 'returned to the Chinese people, not just Taiwan or China.'⁴⁴⁸ The 'pro-Beijing' activists were at the centre of the group Protect Diaoyutai Action Committee, which organised the 1971 *Baodiao* campaign. These 'pro-China' activists included Chou Lo-yat/Zhou Luyi (周魯逸) and Bao Cuoshi (包錯石). Conversely, radicals such as Ng and Mok joined the *Baodiao* campaign as part of their campaign to promote their anti-colonial (反殖)

⁴⁴⁷ Wu, *Dazhi weijing*, pp.813-816. See also Tsoi Yiu-cheong, 'The Hong Kong Student Movement's 'China Complex'', in *Hong Kong Social Movements: Forces from the Margins* ed. Sophia Woodman (Hong Kong: July 1 Link and Hong Kong Women Christian Council, 1997), pp.86-92.

⁴⁴⁸ *China Mail*, 1 February 1971, HKRS 70-2-324.

and anti-imperialist (反帝) agenda.⁴⁴⁹ From Mok's point of view, being anti-imperialist in the *Baodiao* movement was no different from being anti-war (反戰) and supporting revolutions in Third World countries.⁴⁵⁰ Mok stated that while studying in Australia from 1965 to 1968 he was influenced by the student movement and anti-war protests in Australia.⁴⁵¹ Even before going to Australia, Mok had already thought about the problem of colonialism.⁴⁵² Mok said that when he was in school in Hong Kong teachers talked about nationalism, yet he was thinking why they did not ask questions about colonialism in Hong Kong.⁴⁵³

According to Ng Chung-yin's account, the *Baodiao* campaign in Hong Kong began in February 1971.⁴⁵⁴ Ng also states that the campaign was not launched by university students and that at the time members of the *70s Bi-weekly* launched the *Baodiao* campaign in the early 1970s, there were different opinions within the group itself as to what the focus of the campaign should be. Mok Chiu-yu was in fact more concerned about Internationalism (國際主義) and perceived nationalism as reactionary (反動的).⁴⁵⁵ In my interview with him, Mok confirmed his position as such. Mok stated in the interview that he approached the whole *Baodiao* phenomenon from an anti-colonial, anti-imperialist (反帝國主義), and anti-US position. He argued that the later stages of the *Baodiao* campaign showed how the pro-China faction was being 'blindly

⁴⁴⁹ Interview with Mok Chiu-yu, 10 October 2007.

⁴⁵⁰ Interview with Mok Chiu-yu, 10 October 2007.

⁴⁵¹ Xianggang zhuan shang xuesheng lian hui, *Xianggang xuesheng yundong huigu*, pp.64-66; Interview with Mok Chiu-yu, 10 October 2007.

⁴⁵² Interview with Mok Chiu-yu, 10 October 2007.

⁴⁵³ Interview with Mok Chiu-yu, 10 October 2007.

⁴⁵⁴ Wu, *Dazhi weijing*, pp.813-816.

⁴⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

patriotic’ (盲目地愛國). As an Internationalist, Mok perceived the idea of nationalism as ‘very outmoded’ (落伍的) and ‘reactionary’.⁴⁵⁶ Mok was an Anarchist and the irony about the 1971 *Baodiao* campaign is that although the theme of it was China-orientated nationalism, some of the activists who participated some did not actually believe in China-orientated Nationalism. Mok argues that the fact that the colonial authorities took steps to suppress the *Baodiao* campaign further contributed to their anti-colonial agenda and turned the nationalist campaign into an anti-colonial campaign.⁴⁵⁷

Mok was not the only one who criticised the pro-Beijing position of the pro-China activists. Even some of the activists that belonged to the pro-China group leading the *Baodiao* campaign disliked the fact that the group was becoming too pro-China and left the group. Chui Pak-tai, a former member of the pro-Beijing *Baodiao Hui*, said that pro-Beijing activists in the *Baodiao Hui* such as Chou Lo-yat organised the campaign as a pro-PRC nationalistic movement.⁴⁵⁸ Chui’s background explains to some extent why he participated in the *Baodiao* movement. Chui’s father was a GMD soldier. Chui said that his nationalistic sentiments in his early years were influenced by his father’s background and thus he was pro-GMD when he was young. However, later he was influenced by leftist ideas, for Chui at one point joined a left-wing labour union. As a joke, his friends called him a ‘small caterpillar’, or *xiao maochong* in Chinese. *Mao* was a punning reference to Maoism and Mao Zedong.⁴⁵⁹ Unlike

⁴⁵⁶ Interview with Mok Chiu-yu, 10 October 2007.

⁴⁵⁷ Interview with Mok Chiu-yu, 10 October 2007.

⁴⁵⁸ Interview with Chui Pak-tai, 15 October 2007.

⁴⁵⁹ Interview with Chui Pak-tai, 15 October 2007.

many others who participated in the July 7 demonstration, Chui was not a student when he took part. Chui recalled that during the 7 July demonstration the demonstrators confronted the police while holding hands. He participated in other demonstrations as well. For instance, he was involved in a protest that took place in front of a Japanese department store. Chui and his friends joined the pro-Beijing *Baodiao Hui* (保釣會) from the very beginning. However, Chui's friends such as Liu Jian-wei (劉建威), also known as Liu Shuang-yang (劉霜陽), disliked the fact that the *Baodiao Hui* was becoming increasingly pro-Beijing. Eventually, approximately ten members, including Chui and his friends, left the group. Some of them later joined the United Front Senkakus Committee (聯合陣線), of which the *70s Bi-weekly* was a core member.⁴⁶⁰

Although the pro-China group and the New Left were able to work together and factionalism was not openly apparent during the 1971 *Baodiao* campaign,⁴⁶¹ there were tensions between the two groups. That the pro-China group and the New Leftists did not always share an amicable relationship is evidenced by Ng Chung-yin's criticism that the pro-China faction was attacking as well as using the *70s Bi-weekly* group to further its own agenda.⁴⁶²

⁴⁶⁰ Interview with Chui Pak-tai, 15 October 2007. It does not appear that Chui left the *Baodiao Hui* because he disliked the pro-Beijing nature of the *Baodiao Hui*. Chui said that he left the *Baodiao Hui* simply because he was following his friends who left. Ng Chung-yin too discussed the departure of some of the *Baodiao Hui* members in one of his essays, but he argued that Liu Jian-wei and others left because they were against the excessively strict organisation of the *Baodiao Hui*. See Ng, *Dazhiwei jing*, pp.267-268.

⁴⁶¹ Wu Zhongxian 吳仲賢, 'Baodiao shidai de xuesheng' 保釣時代的學生 (Students in the *Baodiao* Era), *CU Student*, 14 June 1978, p.29.

⁴⁶² Wu, *Dazhi weijing*, pp.161-167. This article was first published in the *70s Bi-weekly* in September 1971.

The 1971 campaign as further undermined by several splits that took place in late 1971 and 1972. In November 1971, it was reported that supporters of the United Front Senkakus Committee ‘were drifting away’ and that Mok Chiu-yu admitted that some organisers did not attend meetings.⁴⁶³ Although Mok claimed that the reason supporters did not attend meetings was that they were tied up with studies and work, I believe it was the political differences among *Baodiao* activists that caused the loss of supporters. There is certainly some truth in the report published in *The Star* on 1 November 1971, which stated:

It is believed the protestors who have come under fire from the police are regarded as the ‘trouble making’ fringe by Committee leaders. They are thought to be more interested in causing violence and taking part in extreme activities rather than seriously furthering the Senkakus cause. Many claim the trouble-makers are not really members of student movements but simply louts who are either unemployed or labourers.⁴⁶⁴

In May 1972, another split occurred when the Federation of Catholic Students and the College Students’ Association quit as organisers of a planned protest rally. Although the president of the Hong Kong Federation of Students (HKFS, 香港專上學生聯會), one of the organisers of the rally, declined to reveal the reason for the split,⁴⁶⁵ I believe it was due to political differences among the student activists and probably the loss of interests in the *Baodiao* campaign among students in general.

⁴⁶³ *The Star*, 1 November 1977, HKRS 582-1-3.

⁴⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶⁵ *Hong Kong Standard*, 12 May 1972, HKRS 582-1-3.

Internally, activist groups involved in the *Baodiao* campaign suffered from loose organisation. It was not only the student activist groups that suffered from this.⁴⁶⁶ The *70s Bi-weekly* group was loosely organised, mainly due to the Anarchist nature of the group. Mok Chiu-yu commented that it was difficult to identify precisely who the members were.⁴⁶⁷ Activities of the group involved primarily discussion and interaction among its members. More importantly, the *70s Bi-weekly*'s was in principle against restrictions resulting from tight organisation.⁴⁶⁸ Another feature of the *70s Bi-weekly* was its emphasis on the need for action.⁴⁶⁹ The group's emphasis on action is clearly illustrated by its participation in many of the *Baodiao* demonstrations in 1971. As a result of the differences in opinion, some of the members of the *70s Bi-weekly* eventually left the group to pursue their own interests and careers.⁴⁷⁰

In nationalist movements, or any social movement, it is unavoidable that activists would have different opinions as to the ideology behind the movement and specific tactics. Nationalism is open to interpretation and there is no guarantee that those who participated in nationalist movements did so simply because of nationalism. In the case of the 1971 movement, these differences in opinion were obvious. While these groups with different agendas managed to

⁴⁶⁶ Alvin Y. So and Ludmilla Kwitko, 'The Transformation of Urban Movements in Hong Kong, 1970-90', in *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 24, 4, 1992, pp.32-43.

⁴⁶⁷ Hong Kong Federation of Students, *Xianggang xuesheng yundong huigu* (香港學生運動回顧 A Review of Student Movement in Hong Kong), p.65.

⁴⁶⁸ Lin Wushan 林武山 and Li Zefen 黎則奮, 'Tancheng kaifang de geminglixiang zhuyizhe fangwen qishi niandai bianjibu' 坦誠，開放的革命理想主義者：訪問 70 年代編輯部 (Candid and Open Revolutionary Idealists An Interview with the Editorial Board of the 70s Bi-weekly), *Undergrad*, 1 December 1973, pp.8-9.

⁴⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷⁰ *Xianggang zhuanshang xuesheng lianhui*, *Xianggang xuesheng yundong huigu*, p.65. See also, 'Tancheng kaifang de geminglixiang zhuyizhe fangwen qishi niandai bianjibu' 坦誠，開放的革命理想主義者：訪問 70 年代編輯部 (Candid and Open Revolutionary Idealists An Interview with the Editorial Board of the 70s Bi-weekly), *Undergrad*, 1 December 1973, pp.8-9.

work together, the fact that these groups joined the movement for different reasons contributed to the tensions between them. Instead of focusing all their energy on organising the movement, at times *Baodiao* activists had to deal with differences in terms of both ideology and tactics.

Significance of the New Leftists in the 1971 *Baodiao* Campaign

The *70s Bi-weekly* group was instrumental in organising a series of *Baodiao* demonstrations in 1971 including those that took place on 20 February (二·二〇示威), 10 April (四·一〇示威), 4 May (五·四示威), 16 May (五·一六示威) and 13 June (六·一三示威).⁴⁷¹ Archival evidence reveals that editors of the *70s Bi-weekly* often participated in the *Baodiao* demonstrations including the ones held on 13 August and 7 July. On both occasions, among those arrested at least one of them was a *70s Bi-weekly* editor.

On Saturday 10 April 1971, approximately 30 to 40 people, many of whom were tertiary students participated in a demonstration in front of the Japanese Cultural Centre at the Junction of D'Aguiar Street and Queen's Road Central. The demonstration was organised neither by the HKFS nor the *70s Bi-weekly*. The Deputy President of the HKFS, Kwan Pun-fong, said at the time that the HKFS had not sponsored the demonstration.⁴⁷² According to Ng Chung-yin, the demonstration was organised by a committee, which consisted of an editor of the *70s Bi-weekly*, students from various schools and colleges such as Chu Hai College, King's College, and the New Asia College of the CUHK, and two

⁴⁷¹ Wu, *Dazhi weijing*, pp.249-271

⁴⁷² *South China Morning Post*, 12 April 1971. This article was found in the Chinese Press Review compiled by the Government Information Services, 15 April 1971, HKRS 70-2-324.

working young people.⁴⁷³ According to the Chinese-language press before the demonstration started about 200 police officers were already stationed at the scene. From the point of view of the authorities, the demonstration was illegal, and in fact the police had denied a request by Mok Chiu-yu to hold a demonstration on 10 April. However, Mok was not a member of the group that organised the 10 April demonstration.⁴⁷⁴ The incident was widely reported by the press. In addition, an article in the Chinese University student magazine, written by Chen Dong (陳東), a participant in the demonstration, gives a first-hand account of what happened during the event. According to Chen, who was marching at the front, as the demonstrators were approaching the Japanese Cultural Centre the police intervened.⁴⁷⁵ Twenty-one people, nineteen males and two females, with two as young as sixteen, were arrested by the police and charged with unlawful assembly. Among the 21 arrested were students from the HKU and CUHK, an editor of the *Ming Pao Weekly* magazine, a shipyard mechanic, a ballroom waiter, a clerk, a female artist, and Ng Chung-yin of the *70s Bi-weekly*.⁴⁷⁶

May Fourth is a national holiday in China, celebrating a famous 1919 student demonstration against Japanese imperialism. However, in Hong Kong in 1971 the participants included both students and non-students such as workers. On 4 May, a small demonstration was held in the Queen's Pier area by a group of

⁴⁷³ Wu, *Dazhi weijing*, pp.802-812.

⁴⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷⁵ Chen Dong 陳東, 'Fenghou haixiao yi guyuan' (風吼海嘯憶故園), *Zhongda xueshengbao* (中大學生報 Official magazine of the Chinese University Student Union), special issue, 17 April 1971, p.2.

⁴⁷⁶ *South China Morning Post*, 14 April 1971, Chinese Press Review, 15 April 1971, HKRS 70-2-324.

twelve young people. Some of the demonstrators were carrying banners. The group arrived at 2:30 pm ‘to protest Japanese claims to the Senkaku Islands’.⁴⁷⁷ After repeated warnings to disperse were ignored by the demonstrators they were arrested by the police and charged with unlawful assembly, for the ‘demonstration was held without the necessary police permit being obtained’.⁴⁷⁸ The police report dated 4 May 1971 reveals that, among the twelve people arrested, while all were under the age of 30, only one person was a student, and the others were workers.⁴⁷⁹ Of the twelve arrested, three were editors of the *70s Bi-weekly*. They were Chan Ching-wai (陳清偉), Mok Chiu-yu (莫昭如), and Sze Shun-tun (施純頓).

The above incidents show that the *70s Bi-weekly* was in the forefront of the *Baodiao* campaign as they attempted to promote its anti-colonial, anti-capitalist agenda through the campaign. The incidents also show how local young adults were an increasingly important factor in the nationalist movements in Hong Kong. However, the incidents examined above were only a prelude, for there would be a much larger, violent confrontation between police and the young protesters on 7 July.

The 7 July demonstration was a turning point in that it marked a change in the nature of the *Baodiao* campaign. The events at the 7 July demonstration further contributed to the anti-colonial rhetoric of the New Left because Hong

⁴⁷⁷ *Police Report No.14*, 4 May 1971, HKRS 70-2-324.

⁴⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷⁹ *Ibid.* The name ‘Mok Chiu-yu’ appears in the police report twice, one classified as a ‘student’, ‘aged 21’, and the other ‘editor of the *70s Bi-weekly*’, ‘aged 24’. According to a report in *Huaqiao Ribao* 華僑日報, they were two different people, for their names have different Chinese characters, one being ‘莫昭如’, and the other ‘莫潮如’. See *Huaqiao Ribao*, 5 May 1971.

Kong Police used violence in an attempt to end the demonstration, and that it marked the transition from nationalism to anti-colonialism.

On 7 July 1971, which marked the 34th anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident (盧溝橋事變) that sparked the Second Sino-Japanese War, a *Baodiao* demonstration was held in Victoria Park in Causeway Bay at about 7pm. There are two documentary sources on the course of events: the official police report and reports in the newspapers. The demonstration was in the headlines in almost all the major newspapers the next day.

The police report, compiled on the same day the demonstration took place, provides the most comprehensive account of what happened in Victoria Park.⁴⁸⁰ According to the report, a crowd started to gather in the park at approximately 5pm and an hour later, there were about 300 people, most of whom were spectators and members of the press. Tension started to build up after 6pm. At 6:40pm, the report states, ‘two youths with furled banners walked across a football pitch in the park and approached to within 100 yards of parked police vehicles’. The two youths were surrounded by the crowd and the police repeatedly gave warnings in Chinese to the crowd to disperse. The police arrested six people after these warnings were ignored. By 7pm the crowd had swelled to 3,000, most of whom were spectators. A crowd sitting on the ground displayed ‘four banners and a portrait of Sun Yat-sen’.⁴⁸¹ There are several explanations as to why there was a portrait of Sun Yat-sen displayed in the demonstration. I shall come back to them later.

⁴⁸⁰ Police Report No.19, 7 July 1971, HKRS-70-2-324.

⁴⁸¹ *Ibid.*

Warnings by the police to disperse were ignored by the crowd. Arrests were made and in the process, some of the police officers were assaulted. When the crowd again ignored warnings to disperse 'baton charges were made'.⁴⁸² The police began a sweep through Victoria Park shortly thereafter. In the chaos, two motorcycles, one a police motorcycle, were set on fire. Six people were taken to hospital for treatment of injuries, all of whom were discharged late in the evening.

Reports in the newspapers tell a similar story, with only minor differences to the police report. The pro-China *Wen Hui Bao* reported that in the morning some youths and students had visited the Japanese Consulate in the Central District to hand in a petition, and that the sit-in demonstration in Victoria Park was attended by approximately a thousand young people, most of whom were students.⁴⁸³ Demonstrators held banners and distributed flyers with anti-Japanese slogans. The *South China Morning Post* reported that the number of demonstrators increased to about 2,000, and that the crowd eventually swelled to 3,000 'as they were joined by watching students and rowdy spectators'.⁴⁸⁴ Before the demonstration started there were already police within and outside Victoria Park from early afternoon, with units stationed outside the Daimaru and Chancellor departmental stores. As soon as the demonstration began, the police intervened. Riot police were called in. According to the *Sing Tao Daily News* 星島日報 the disturbances spread to nearby areas as the crowd set fires at two spots near the park.⁴⁸⁵ In the aftermath of the disturbances, the *Sing Tao Daily*

⁴⁸² *Ibid.*

⁴⁸³ *Wen Hui Bao* 文匯報, 8 July 1971, p.4.

⁴⁸⁴ *South China Morning Post*, 8 July 1971, p.1.

⁴⁸⁵ *Sing Tao Daily*, 8 July 1971, p.23.

reported that 21 people were arrested, and six injured, five of whom were students.

As far as the Hong Kong Government was concerned, the 7 July demonstration was illegal. The application to hold the demonstration was provisionally approved by the Police, but it was later rejected by the Urban Council.⁴⁸⁶ At that time, the authorities had set out strict guidelines and rules regarding holding meetings or processions in a public place. Persons wishing to hold such meetings were required to make an application to the police beforehand. Having refused to give the organisers permission, the authorities took a tough approach towards the demonstration, which eventually turned into a violent confrontation between participants and the police.

At the 7 July demonstration the colonial government, for whom internal security was the top priority, took steps to suppress a supposedly nationalist movement. The government used the same approach to deal with the young demonstrators as they did with the leftists in 1967. However, unlike the leftists in 1967, the young *Baodiao* demonstrators did not use violence to promote their cause, while the government used violent means in an attempt to suppress a non-violent demonstration.⁴⁸⁷ For that reason, the Hong Kong government's actions soon came under criticisms.

⁴⁸⁶ Government Information Service, *Press Review*, No.128, 8 July 1971, p.1, HKRS-70-2-324.

⁴⁸⁷ For details, see *South China Morning Post*, 8 July 1971, p.1.

Nationalism versus Colonialism: Hong Kong Government Criticised

The events of 7 July in effect acted as a catalyst to the gradual transformation of the *Baodiao* campaign into an anti-colonial movement by the New Left. The New Left could now use the 7 July demonstration as evidence in their argument that the colonial government was being an oppressor. What is interesting is that the government decided to put an end to the demonstration using violence, despite the fact that it had probably been aware that the 7 July demonstration was widely reported by the Chinese press before it took place. For the Government Information Service (GIS) kept a close watch on reports in the Chinese press. For example, in relation to press coverage *before* the demonstration, the GIS made several comments in a press review it compiled:

Local newspapers have been very interested in reporting the progress of the '7/7' Senkaku Island demonstration. Before the demonstration, a number of newspapers already published their opinions on the 'man-made' complicated application procedure and their advice to the demonstrators and authorities...⁴⁸⁸

As soon as the disturbances were over, the Hong Kong government came under attack by not only students but also the public for its handling of the incident. The Chairman of the Urban Council defended the Council's decision not to allow students to use Victoria Park for a demonstration. The HKFS criticised the police for its 'excessive use of violence'.⁴⁸⁹ In fact, the 7 July

⁴⁸⁸ Government Information Service, *Press Review*, No.128, 8 July 1971, p.1, HKRS-70-2-324.

⁴⁸⁹ *Sing Tao Daily*, 9 July 1971, p.23.

demonstration would not be the last instance in which the students ignored the authorities' rejection of their application and went ahead to hold demonstrations not approved by the authorities. In the following year, on 13 May, students held another demonstration in the Central District without prior approval from the authorities.

The 7 July demonstration drew the attention of not just local students and residents. Overseas student organisations, too, raised their criticisms against the Hong Kong government. The Chinese Student Associations and Protect Diaoyutai Action Committee of different US colleges signed and sent a protest letter, dated 12 July 1971, to the Hong Kong government. In the letter, the groups made several demands:

- (1) Open apologies from the Hong Kong government to the public.
- (2) Drop all charges and release all who were illegally arrested.
- (3) Compensate those who were injured by the police.
- (4) Respect human rights, cancel the illegal assembly law and guarantee no further suppression of any future patriotic movement.

The Hong Kong government will be held responsible for all the serious consequences if it continues to neglect the public opinions.⁴⁹⁰

Following the three demonstrations that saw government intervention, the *70s Bi-weekly* and the United Front (聯合陣線) began to focus their energy on turning the *Baodiao* campaign into one with an anti-colonial agenda 'as a way

⁴⁹⁰ Chinese Student Associations and Protect Diaoyutai Action Committees to Hong Kong government, 12 July 1971, HKRS 163 9/717.

forward.⁴⁹¹ This time the colonial administration, in their attempt to suppress the demonstrations in the same way they did in the 1967 riots, ended up creating a negative image for itself in the eyes of the public. One lesson we can learn from this incident is that peaceful demonstrations would be a more acceptable and effective means to promote nationalism and, for the New Left, anti-colonialism. After 1971, Hong Kong young people participated in social movements aimed at addressing these injustices such as the Anti-Corruption Campaign in 1973, which saw the participation of the New Left, as did the Anti-Inflation Movement in 1974.

The significance of the 7 July demonstration as the beginning of the transformation of the *Baodiao* campaign from a nationalist campaign into an anti-colonial one is not the only point worth noting. The 7 July demonstration also illustrates the importance of symbols in nationalist movements, for Sun Yat-sen's portrait was displayed during the demonstration.

Symbolism in the *Baodiao* Campaign: Pro-Nationalist Sentiments and Use of Sun Yat-sen's Portrait

Symbols, whether they are state flags or portraits, were often used in nationalist movements in Hong Kong. Two questions can be asked: why was there a portrait of Sun displayed? Why did the demonstrators not use the flag of the PRC? One possible explanation is that there were pro-GMD demonstrators in the crowd. An article in the *70s Bi-weekly* published in October 1971 reveals that there were pro-Nationalists among those involved in the *Baodiao*

⁴⁹¹ Wu, *Dazhi weijing*, p.267.

campaign.⁴⁹² Another reason, as Chui Pak-tai, who was at the scene of the 7 July demonstration, said in my interview with him, was that no one doubted the importance and reputation of Sun in Chinese history.⁴⁹³ Therefore, the use of Sun's portrait should not come as a surprise. The use of Sun's portrait shows that that nationalist movements often sought the participation of people with different political agendas from the organisers. Further, the portrait of Sun Yat-sen was a neutral nationalist symbol acceptable to both pro-CCP and pro-GMD sympathisers participating in the *Baodiao* campaign.

Significance and Influence of the 1971 *Baodiao* Campaign

The 1971 *Baodiao* campaign was in part a product of the anti-colonial movement started by students and the 'New Leftist' radicals, and of pro-PRC nationalism of the pro-China activists. Although the 'New Leftist' young radicals took part in the *Baodiao* campaign as part of their anti-colonial campaign, it was the rhetoric of China-orientated nationalism, rather than that of anti-colonialism, that gained public support.

Compared to the traditional leftists in 1967, the New Left was very clever in terms of its use of tactics. Although both the traditional leftists and the New Left had anti-colonial agendas, the New Left did not make use of violence to

⁴⁹² See Xiang Qing 向青 (pseud.?), 'Baodiao yundong wang hechuqu' 保釣運動往何處去? (Where is the *Baodiao* Movement Headed?), *Qishi niandai shuangzhoukan* 七十年代雙週刊 (The 70s Bi-weekly), Vol. 24, October 1971, pp.10-13. The name of the author is presumably a pseudonym, as the name has not appeared in any government documents that I have examined. Mok Chiu-yu said in the interview that the author was only a contributor, and that he was not Ng Chung-yin. Interview with Mok Chiu-yu, 10 October 2007.

⁴⁹³ Interview with Chui Pak-tai, 15 October 2007.

promote its agenda.⁴⁹⁴ The New Leftists simply focused on nationalism knowing that any attempt by the government to crack down on the *Baodiao* campaign would spark criticisms. The events at the 7 July demonstration meant that the New Leftists' plan to use nationalism as a tactic to promote its anti-colonial agenda was for the most part successful.

As far as Hong Kong's social history was concerned, the 1971 *Baodiao* campaign and the student movement of the 1970s could be regarded as precursors of the social movements of the 1970s aimed at addressing social problems in Hong Kong,⁴⁹⁵ and the democracy movements of the 1980s. Some of the activists who participated in the movements in the 1970s would later become the leaders of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements in China (香港市民支援愛國民主運動聯合會) in the late 1980s. Lastly, a major significance of the 1971 *Baodiao* campaign was that it marked a surge of nationalist sentiments among Hong Kong youth. While there is no evidence which suggests that the 1971 campaign directly led to the rise of the China Faction in universities in the mid-1970s, the movement certainly set the stage for the rise of China-orientated nationalism in universities in later years. Ng Chung-yin commented that the major impact of the 1971 *Baodiao* campaign was that it resulted in students' rethinking the affairs of China

⁴⁹⁴ It has been argued that the student movement of the 1970s was different from the 1967 riots, for it was peaceful, orderly and had a 'good cause'. See Alvin Y. So and Ludmilla Kwitko, 'The Transformation of Urban Movements in Hong Kong, 1970-90', in *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 24, 4, 1992, pp.32-43.

⁴⁹⁵ Pik Wan Wong, 'The Pro-Chinese Democracy Movement in Hong Kong', in *The Dynamics of Social Movement in Hong Kong* ed. Stephen Wing Kai Chiu and Tai Lok Lui (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2000), pp.55-90. For more details on the 1973 Anti-Corruption Campaign, which saw the participation of the New Left, see Lam Wai-man, *Understanding the Political Culture of Hong Kong: The Paradox of Activism and Depoliticisation* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), pp.156-163.

and Hong Kong from two perspectives: identification with China (認同) and anti-colonialism (反殖).⁴⁹⁶ Indeed, the 1971 campaign prompted future pro-China students such as David Chan Yuk-cheung (陳毓祥) to ponder the future of the *Baodiao* movement.⁴⁹⁷ Chan in his writings states that as a student at the University of Hong Kong he had some discussion with other students and they believed that the next step of the *Baodiao* movement should be seeking an understanding of China (認識中國) and promoting a unification movement (統一運動).⁴⁹⁸

Nationalism in Student Movement: Rise and Dominance of the China Faction

Following the 1971 *Baodiao* campaign, politically active students and activists outside the universities were divided into three factions based on their ideology. Most of the politically active university students belonged to the *Guocui pai* (國粹派), or China Faction, which identified with the CCP.⁴⁹⁹ The

⁴⁹⁶ Wu, *Dazhi weijing*, p.269.

⁴⁹⁷ Chen Yuxiang 陳毓祥, *Zuori jinri Chen Yuxiang 昨日今日陳毓祥* (The Past and Present Chan Yuk-cheung) (Xianggang: Guangjiaojing chubanshe youxiangongsi, 1989), pp.25-30. The original article was written and published in April 1972 in the official HKFS publication *Xuelianbao*, when David Chan was a first-year student at the University of Hong Kong.

⁴⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.30.

⁴⁹⁹ Various sources confirm that the pro-China faction was the mainstream among university students. See Chen, *Shihou bentu wenhuazhi*, p.24; Alvin Y. So., 'The Transformation of Urban Movements in Hong Kong, 1970-90', in *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 24, 4, 1992, pp.32-43; and Tsoi Yiu Cheong, 'The Hong Kong Student Movement's 'China Complex'', in *Hong Kong Social Movements: Forces from the Margins* ed. Sophia Woodman (Hong Kong: July 1 Link and Hong Kong Women Christian Council, 1997), pp.86-92. Tsoi Yiu Cheong was a member of the Hong Kong Federation of Students in the early 1990s. The tone of the documents published in the annual reports of the HKFS also indicate that the China Faction was the dominant group in student activism. The term 'China Faction' was in fact coined by Tsang Shu-ki (曾澍基) of the Social Faction in 1973. See Zeng Shuji 曾澍基, *Guocui pai shehui pai yuankao* "國粹派"、"社會派"源考 (Tracing the Origins of the China Faction and Social Faction),

China Faction dominated the student movement in the 1970s up until 1976. While there might have been pro-Beijing students before 1971, the *Guocui pai* did not come into existence in universities until after the 1971 *Baodiao* campaign. The pro-Beijing group in the 1971 campaign could be considered a predecessor of the China Faction that dominated the student movement in the 1970s, for the China Faction, too, was pro-Beijing. It has been said that the China Faction was turning a blind eye to the dark side of the Cultural Revolution.⁵⁰⁰ Another group of students, more concerned about ‘redressing the injustices of colonial rule’,⁵⁰¹ was known as the *Shehuipai* (社會派), or Social Faction. The Social Faction was a minority among left-wing students,⁵⁰² and criticised the China Faction for blindly identifying with the CCP.⁵⁰³ The last group consisted of radicals, most of whom later became Trotskyites (托洛斯基份子) and were simply known as the *Tuopai* (托派).⁵⁰⁴ Some of these radicals were originally in the *70s Bi-weekly*, which continued to exist after the 1971 *Baodiao* campaign. Of course, the New Leftist *70s Bi-weekly* differentiated itself from the ‘China group’ or the traditional left-wing that supported the CCP.⁵⁰⁵ These three groups continued to be active in the student/youth movement of the 1970s.

<http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~sktsang/1973.doc>, (14 December 2008). See also Chen, *Shihou bentu wenhuazhi*, p.24.

⁵⁰⁰ Chen, *Shihou bentu wenhuazhi*, p.25. In fact, Chen makes some very negative comments about the China Faction by calling them ‘absurd’.

⁵⁰¹ Tsoi Yiu Cheong, ‘The Hong Kong Student Movement’s ‘China Complex’’, in *Hong Kong Social Movements: Forces from the Margins* ed. Sophia Woodman (Hong Kong: July 1 Link and Hong Kong Women Christian Council, 1997), pp.86-92.

⁵⁰² Chen, *Shihou bentu wenhuazhi*, p.24.

⁵⁰³ Special Report, ‘Xianggang xiaoyuan de huohong niandai’ 香港校園的火紅年代 (The Crimson Years in Hong Kong Universities), *Yazhou zhoukan*, 10, 20, 1996, p.38.

⁵⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰⁵ Wu, *Dazhi weijing*, pp.813-816.

The 1970s saw the emergence of political and social activists including Szeto Wah, Leung Kwok-hung, Ng Chung-yin, and Mok Chiu-yu, all of whom also responded passionately to the democracy movement in China in the late 1980s. The stories of these activists show, in particular, that the struggle for democracy in Hong Kong and Hong Kong's support for the democracy movement in China of the next 20 years and beyond had their roots in the 1970s, a time when the Hong Kong identity was starting to take shape, and young people began to ponder nationalism and the problems of colonialism.

Factionalism and the China Faction's Domination at Universities

That students in the 1970s placed China first and Hong Kong second meant that they were more interested in China.⁵⁰⁶ There are several reasons the student movement was dominated by the China Faction in the 1970s. First, from the 1950s to the early 1970s generations of Chinese students studied Chinese history and culture in schools. The history curriculum in effect encouraged them to identify culturally with China.⁵⁰⁷ Second, Chinese-language publications with information on China such as the *Ming Pao Monthly* (明報月刊) and *Qishi Niandai* (七十年代) were readily available.⁵⁰⁸ The official CCP publication *Hong Qi* (紅旗) was also available in the University of Hong Kong library.⁵⁰⁹ Third, despite the New Leftists' involvement in the 1971 movement their

⁵⁰⁶ Alvin Y. So., 'The Transformation of Urban Movements in Hong Kong, 1970-90', in *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 24, 4, 1992, pp.32-43.

⁵⁰⁷ Flora L.F. Kan, *Hong Kong's Chinese History Curriculum from 1945: Politics and Identity* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2007), p.77.

⁵⁰⁸ *Qishi Niandai* (七十年代) and the *70s Bi-weekly* (七十年代雙週刊/七零) were different publications.

⁵⁰⁹ *Hong Qi* was often used by left-wing trade unions in Hong Kong as study material. See 'The Communist Controlled Schools', Hong Kong Special Branch Report Summary, Communism in Schools in Hong Kong 1960-1962, CO1030/1107.

influence on university students in the 1970s was limited. Although *70s Bi-weekly* worked with university students at some point in the 1971 *Baodiao* campaign, the *70s Bi-weekly* was not a student activist group. Most of the members were not students and leading members such as Mok Chiu-yu and Ng Chung-yin were working adults. Fourth, the 1970s saw the rise of China as a political state gaining international status as evidenced by the PRC's entry into the United Nations (UN) in 1971 and US President Richard Nixon's visit to China in 1972.⁵¹⁰ Moreover, the 1971 *Baodiao* campaign was in the eyes of the public a nationalist movement despite the fact that the New Left was attempting to give it an anti-colonial tone. The 1971 *Baodiao* campaign saw the display of nationalistic sentiments by Hong Kong youth and I believe it might have sparked their interest in learning about China and thus set the stage for the rise of the China Faction in subsequent years. David Chan Yuk-cheung, for example, was involved in the 1971 campaign as a secondary school student and he would later become one of the most important leaders of the China Faction⁵¹¹ and participate in the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign in which he died. Lastly, the Cultural Revolution in China and the related propaganda up until 1976 was a strong external factor providing university students with nationalist as well as political inspirations.⁵¹²

There are other theories regarding the causes of the rise of the China Faction in the 1970s. Former Social Faction member Lai Chak-fun, for example,

⁵¹⁰ Ru 如, 'Yiqie yaocong liaojie zhongguo kaishi' 一切要從了解中國開始 (Everything must Begin with Understanding China), *Undergrad* 學苑, 16 October 1972, p.6. See also, Blyth and Wotherspoon, *Hong Kong Remembers*, p.99.

⁵¹¹ Li Jingjun 李靜君, 'You xueyun lingxiu dao guangboren Chen yuxiang shinianruiyi' 由學運領袖到廣播人 (From Leader of the Student Movement to Broadcaster: Chan Yuk-cheung Remains the Same for Ten Years), *Wide Angle* 廣角鏡, 16 September 1985, pp.52-55.

⁵¹² Special Report, 'Xianggang xiaoyuan de huohong niandai' 香港校園的火紅年代 (The Crimson Years in Hong Kong Universities), *Yazhou zhoukan*, 10, 20, 1996, p.38.

argued that Li Yi (李怡), chief editor of *Qishi Niandai* (七十年代), provided guidance to students in their quest to learn about China. Lai also argued that the leftist newspaper *Ta Kung Pao* (大公報) had contact with university students.⁵¹³ Chan Koon-chung (陳冠中), who studied at the University of Hong Kong in the 1970s, argued that until the late 1970s *Qishi Niandai* served as a propaganda apparatus for the CCP.⁵¹⁴ From 1981 onwards, however, due to a change in its political stance, *Qishi Niandai* was no longer part of the leftist camp.⁵¹⁵

Until the late 1970s, the China Faction in universities was quite critical of the Trotskyists, and often criticised them severely in their writings in student publications. For example, the pro-China student activists criticised the Trotskyists for ‘jeopardising the interests of Chinese and Hong Kong comrades’ and ‘interfering in the student movement’.⁵¹⁶ With the emergence of the China Faction at universities, factionalism became much more apparent in the student movement than in the 1971 *Baodiao* campaign.

An example that reflects the strong interest among university students in understanding China was the China Week (中國周) exhibitions. Student unions of different universities in Hong Kong organised the first China Week exhibition

⁵¹³ Li Zefen 黎則奮, *Qishi niandai xianggang qingnian jijin yundong huigu* 香港青年激進運動回顧 (A Review of the Radical Hong Kong Youth Movement in the 1970s), 7 June 2008, <http://www.grass-root.org/college/modules/wfsection/article.php?articleid=695>.

⁵¹⁴ Chen, *Shihou bentu wenhuazhi*, pp.34-37.

⁵¹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵¹⁶ See, for example, Editorial 社論, ‘Renshizuguo yundong shibukedang’ 認識祖國運動勢不可擋 (The Understanding the Motherland Movement is Unstoppable), *Xuelian bao* 學聯報, 10, June 1975, p.2 and pp.3-5. See also, author unknown, ‘Tuopai ruhe chashou xuesheng yundong’ 托派如何插手學生運動 (How the Trotskyists Interfered in the Student Movement), *Xueyun chunqiu* 學運春秋 (The Student Movement Years) ed. Yuandong shiwu pinglunshu 遠東事務評論社 (Xianggang: Yuandong shiwu pinglunshu, 1982), pp.93-97. The original article was written by a committee member of the Hong Kong University Student Union (HKUSU) and published in the HKUSU newsletter in January 1975.

in 1973.⁵¹⁷ More exhibitions were held in the following years. David Chan, for example, represented the HKFS, one of the organisers of the China Week exhibitions. The aim of the China Week exhibitions was to help the public understand mainland China. In fact, the slogan ‘*renzhong guanshe*’ (認中關社), which means ‘identification with China, pay attention to (Hong Kong) society’, was the popular slogan among students and those interested in China’s affairs. The pro-China students also claimed that they were promoting the ‘spirit of the May Fourth Movement’ (發揚五四精神).⁵¹⁸ The HKFS in the 1970s adopted the slogan: ‘keep the world in mind, understand our motherland, be concerned with society, fight for the rights of our fellow students’ (放眼世界, 認識祖國, 關心社會, 爭取同學權益).⁵¹⁹ Hong Kong university students began visiting China during this time. The visits to China undoubtedly contributed to their pro-China sentiments.

Pro-China sentiments and supporters of the China Faction existed outside universities as well. Joseph Lian Yizheng (練乙錚),⁵²⁰ for example, was one of those from outside universities who supported the pro-China *Guocuipai*. Like Chui Pak-tai, Joseph Lian inherited his sense of nationalism from his father who was a GMD official.⁵²¹ Lian participated in the *Renzhong guanshe* movement,

⁵¹⁷ Alvin Y. So., ‘The Transformation of Urban Movements in Hong Kong, 1970-90’, in *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 24, 4, 1992, pp.32-43. See also, Pik Wan Wong, ‘The Pro-Chinese Democracy Movement in Hong Kong’, *The Dynamics of Social Movement in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2000, pp.55-90.

⁵¹⁸ See, for example, Chan, *Zuori jinri Chen Yuxiang*, pp.52-55. The essay in this edited volume was originally a speech given at a meeting held by the HKFS on 5 May 1974 to commemorate the 55th anniversary of the May Fourth Movement.

⁵¹⁹ Chan Yuk Cheung to M.R. Templeton, 26 June 1975, HKRS 147-7-100. Chan was then the President of the HKFS and Templeton Principal of the Northcote college of Education.

⁵²⁰ Joseph Lian is now working as the lead writer for the Hong Kong Economic Journal (信報).

⁵²¹ Interview with Joseph Lian, 15 December 2008.

although he was not a student at the time. He was teaching at a secondary school and helped organise the 1975 education exhibition to criticise the colonial government's 'enslavement education' (奴化教育). The exhibition was a China Faction initiative.⁵²² As far as factional differences were concerned, the situation outside universities appeared to be different from that inside universities. Joseph Lian, in my interview with him, said that there did not appear to be strong hostility between China Faction and other groups outside universities.⁵²³

Analysis: Rise of the Student-Led China Faction after 1971

Baodiao Campaign

For the pro-China university students, who grew up and were educated in Hong Kong, being pro-China was not about fighting the Hong Kong colonial government;⁵²⁴ it was about rediscovering their Chinese identity by first learning about China. However, these pro-China students ignored the problems of Cultural Revolution. Until the truths about the Cultural Revolution began to surface in the late 1970s, pro-China students only spoke of the positive aspects of China under the rule of the CCP. Those under the influence of a nationalist fever could not, or did not wish to see the dark side of it. In this sense, the China Faction was similar to the leftists in the 1967 riots.

⁵²² Lian Yizheng 練乙錚, *Xicao weifeng 細草微風* (Small Grass in a Breeze) (Xianggang: Tiandi tushu, 2007), p.192. Lian was a member of the Central Policy Unit of the Hong Kong government from 1998 to 2003.

⁵²³ Interview with Joseph Lian, 15 December 2008.

⁵²⁴ Although the China Faction participated in the Anti-Inflation Campaign in 1974, it largely refrained from taking actions against the colonial government. See Benjamin K.P. Leung, 'The Student Movement in Hong Kong: Transition to a Democratising Society', in *The Dynamics of Social Movement in Hong Kong* ed. Stephen Wing Kai Chiu and Tai Lok Lui (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2000), pp.209-225.

Decline of Pro-China Forces Inside and Outside Universities

The dominance of the China Faction did not last. Various sources confirm that following the fall of the Gang of Four in China in 1976, the China Faction in universities began to lose its influence.⁵²⁵ Pro-China forces outside universities, too, went into decline. Those possessing pro-China sentiments began to re-think the Cultural Revolution and some left the pro-China camp.⁵²⁶ The fall of the Gang of Four destroyed the ideals of many who belonged to the China Faction, and as a result, they lost interest in politics.⁵²⁷ Joseph Lian, in my interview with him, related that it took some of the pro-China people as long as ten years to ‘wake up’ to face the truths about the Cultural Revolution.⁵²⁸

Student publications reveal that there was a change of tone within the HKFS after the fall of the Gang of Four in 1976. Before 1976, the HKFS only spoke positively about the PRC,⁵²⁹ as though the status of the CCP as the ruling party was unquestionable. After 1976, the HKFS began to ponder the question of

⁵²⁵ Lian, *Xicao weifeng*, p.192. See also Cai Ziqiang 蔡子強 et. al, *Tongtushugui qiantu tanpan yilai de xuegangxue yun* 同途殊歸：前途談判以來的香港學運 (From Identity to Indifference: Hong Kong Student Movement since 1991 [sic]) (Xianggang: Xianggang renwen kexue chubanshe, 1998), p.367.

⁵²⁶ Li yi (李怡), for example, was an editor of the *Qishi niandai* and was a pro-China person. Li eventually left the *Qishi niandai* following the fall of the Gang of Four. See Chen, *Shihou bentu wenhuazhi*, p.36. See also, Li Zefen 黎則奮, *Qishi niandai xianggang qingnian jijin yundong huigu* 香港青年激進運動回顧 (A Review of the Radical Hong Kong Youth Movement in the 1970s), 7 June 2008, <http://www.grass-root.org/college/modules/wfsection/article.php?articleid=695>. See also, Special Report, ‘Xianggang xiaoyuan de huohong niandai’ 香港校園的火紅年代 (The Crimson Years in Hong Kong Universities), *Yazhou zhouban*, 10, 20, 1996, p.38.

⁵²⁷ Special Report, ‘Xianggang xiaoyuan de huohong niandai’ 香港校園的火紅年代 (The Crimson Years in Hong Kong Universities), *Yazhou zhouban*, 10, 20, 1996, p.38.

⁵²⁸ Interview with Joseph Lian, 15 December 2008.

⁵²⁹ Xianggang zhuanshang xuesheng lianhui 香港專上學生聯會 (Hong Kong Federation of Students), *Di shiqi jie zhou nian dahui wenji* 第十七屆周年大會文集 (Selected Documents of the 17th Annual Conference of the Hong Kong Federation of Students) (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Federation of Students), 1975, pp.32-33.

identifying with a political state.⁵³⁰ As in the 1967 riots, the China factor contributed both to starting *and* to ending nationalist fever among university students in Hong Kong in the 1970s.⁵³¹

Conclusion: Hong Kong Youth and the Politics of China-orientated Nationalism in the 1970s

This chapter demonstrates that despite their lack of interest in nationalism, the New Left activists played a leading role in the 1971 *Baodiao* campaign. They participated in what appeared to be a nationalist movement in order to promote their anti-colonial agenda. The study of the 1971 campaign tells us that those who were involved in a nationalist movement often had different motives. From the pro-China activists' point of view, it was simply an irredentist movement based on pro-China sentiments. The New Left, on the other hand, aimed to use nationalism as a tactic to bring people's attention to the injustices of colonialism. The 7 July demonstration was a turning point as the events at Victoria Park contributed to the New Left's anti-colonial agenda. The New Left was quite clever in simply focusing on the nationalist rhetoric so that when the colonial authorities attempted to suppress the *Baodiao* campaign with violence, the colonial government would be blamed. In that respect, the New Left was successful in using the supposedly nationalist movement to further their anti-colonial cause.

⁵³⁰ Xianggang zhuan Shang xuesheng lianhui 香港專上學生聯會 (Hong Kong Federation of Students), *Di ershi jie ahou nian dahui wenji* 第二十屆周年大會文集 (Selected Documents of the 20th Annual Conference of the Hong Kong Federation of Students) (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Federation of Students), 1978, p.21.

⁵³¹ Alvin Y. So and Ludmilla Kwitko, 'The Transformation of Urban Movements in Hong Kong, 1970-90', *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 24, 4, 1992, pp.32-43.

The 1971 *Baodiao* campaign, along with the Campaign to Make Chinese the Official Language and the rise of the China Faction after 1971, marked a surge of nationalist sentiments among Hong Kong youth. As in the 1966 riots, the 1971 *Baodiao* campaign saw the participation of Hong Kong youth as the protagonists in these events. Although it was apparent that political divisions existed among Hong Kong youth, it can be argued that the 1971 *Baodiao* campaign accelerated the factional divisions between university students in the 1970s, with the emergence of the China Faction and Social Faction in universities. While the China Faction promoted its nationalist rhetoric based on pro-China sentiments, the Social Faction focused on the injustices and problems of colonialism in Hong Kong. The student activists belonging to the China Faction ignored the dark side of the Cultural Revolution and vigorously defended their political position by ignoring and criticising those who had different political ideas.

The 1971 *Baodiao* campaign and the story of the China Faction illustrate the temporal nature of China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong since the early 1970s. In the case of the student-led China Faction of the 1970s, the end of the Cultural Revolution marked the end of the China fever in universities, and thus the dominance of the China Faction in student activism. Overall, once the activists who organised these nationalist movements shifted their focus away from nationalism, as a result of differences in political agenda, there were no more actors, or actions that were able to give meaning to the nationalist rhetoric.

The New Leftists of the *70s Bi-weekly* who participated in the 1971 *Baodiao* campaign were never interested in nationalism. The main agenda of these New Leftists were anti-colonialism and anti-capitalism. Following the 1971 *Baodiao* campaign, as admitted by members of the *70s Bi-weekly*, the group experienced a ‘couple of internal divisions’.⁵³² With pro-China activists becoming disillusioned with the nationalist rhetoric inspired by the Cultural Revolution, and the New Leftists’ lack of interest in nationalism, the disappearance of major nationalist movements in the late 1970s was to be expected. Of course, young people’s focus on social problems might also explain the gradual decline of China-orientated nationalism towards the late 1970s. Compared to the 1971 campaign, the second *Baodiao* campaign of 1978 did not have much impact, nor did it gain much attention.

The 1971 *Baodiao* campaign, the participation of the New Left in it, and the short-lived ascendance of the China Faction and disillusionment of its members after 1976 all meant that the ‘Hong Kong factor’ became more significant in Hong Kong after 1967. The continued significance of the ‘Hong Kong factor’ in later years is reflected in the fact that the promotion of nationalism in the student movement laid ‘the groundwork for the impetus towards unification during the early eighties’.⁵³³ Moreover, the *Baodiao*, student and social movements in the 1970s saw the emergence of many activists who

⁵³² Lin Wushan 林武山 and Li Zefen 黎則奮, ‘Tancheng kaifang de geminglixiang zhuyizhe fangwen qishi niandai bianjibu’ 坦誠，開放的革命理想主義者：訪問 70 年代編輯部 (Candid and Open Revolutionary Idealists An Interview with the Editorial Board of the 70s Bi-weekly), *Undergrad*, 1 December 1973, pp.8-9.

⁵³³ Alvin Y. So and Ludmilla Kwitko, ‘The Transformation of Urban Movements in Hong Kong, 1970-90’, in *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 24, 4, 1992, pp.32-43.

later led the democracy movement in the 1980s.⁵³⁴ Ng Chung-yin and Lau San-ching (劉山青) of the Revolutionary Marxist League, for instance, became early supporters of the democracy movement in China in the late 1970s and early 1980s.⁵³⁵

In the next two chapters, I will demonstrate that the ‘Hong Kong factor’ became even more important in the expression of China-orientated nationalism in later years. Both the Hong Kong people’s response to the Tiananmen Square massacre and the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign were directly related to the Hong Kong people’s concern over the future of Hong Kong. The two events illustrate how the ‘China factor’ and the ‘Hong Kong factor’ became intertwined in the expression of nationalism.

⁵³⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵³⁵ For details of Ng and Lau’s involvement in the Chinese democracy movement, see Wu, *Dazhi weijing*, pp.899-921; and Liu Shanqing 劉山青, *Wuhui de licheng* 無悔的歷程 (A Journey with No Regrets) (Xianggang: Ming Bao chubanshe, 1992).

Chapter Six: Tiananmen 1989: Nationalism, Democracy and the 1997 Question

Hong Kong felt like a morgue after Tiananmen, yet it was very much alive. We lived through a moment in time when heart, mind and soul came together for the community. The sense of resolve and camaraderie was transforming for those who experienced it.⁵³⁶

- Christine Loh, *Being Here: Shaping a Preferred Future*

In the previous chapters, we have seen how the China factor and local politics had a significant impact on the nature and expression of China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong. This chapter continues to follow that theme by examining how the local political situation shaped Hong Kong people's response to the massacre in Beijing on 4 June 1989. Writing about the June Fourth incident means stepping into very divisive territory. This is particularly the case when one writes about Hong Kong people's responses. However, it is clear that June Fourth has become a 'scar' not only in the memory of the Hong Kong people, but also of the Chinese people as a whole. This chapter argues, first, that the Hong Kong people's response to the 1989 Chinese democracy movement was a result of both their feelings about China and their concern over the 1997 Question. Democracy became the central theme in the rhetoric of their China-orientated nationalism. Nationalism created solidarity among a large sector of the Hong Kong Chinese community. It prompted the people of Hong Kong to think about what China meant for them. Some Hong Kong-based political groups

⁵³⁶ Christine Loh, *Being Here: Shaping a Preferred Future* (Hong Kong: SCMP books, 2006), p.207.

used nationalism to mobilise the masses and to promote their pro-democracy agenda.

To understand the link between the nationalistic rhetoric about China and Hong Kong's struggle for democracy, one must understand the context in which the movement in Hong Kong after June Fourth emerged. Moreover, it is necessary to understand *who* was responding to June Fourth. I examine two forces in particular: the Democrats and university students. This is to support my argument that the development of China-orientated nationalism was triggered by both the China factor and Hong Kong politics. In particular, I will examine the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China (香港市民支援愛國民主運動聯合會), the role played by its chairman Szeto Wah (司徒華), and the April Fifth Action group (四五行動).

The historical, cultural, and political contexts of colonial Hong Kong made the events in 1989 in Hong Kong all the more complex, for three reasons. First, well before June Fourth there had been a steady development of a Hong Kong identity.⁵³⁷ A new breed of Hong Kong Chinese, with their own distinct identity and lifestyle, had emerged from the 1970s onwards.⁵³⁸ Second, up until 1989, the impact of China-orientated nationalism as a phenomenon in Hong

⁵³⁷ Wang Jiaying 王家英 et. al., 'Dui zhongguo de chongxin xiangxiang' 對中國的「重新想像」：回歸後身分認同的延續與變化 ('Reimagining' China: Continuity and Change of Identity after the Handover) in 香港社會政治的延續與變遷 (Society and Politics in Hong Kong: Continuity and Change) ed. Liu Zhaojia 劉兆佳 et. al. (Xianggang: Xianggang zhongwendaxue xianggang yatai yanjiusuo, 2004), pp.213-241.

⁵³⁸ David Faure, 'Reflections on Being Chinese in Hong Kong', in *Hong Kong's Transitions, 1842-1997* ed. Judith M. Brown and Rosemary Foot (London: MacMillan, 1997), pp.103-120. Lau Siu-kai argues that a sense of community emerged among the younger Hong Kong generation in the 1960s, albeit it was still weak. See Lau Siu-kai, 'Hong Kong's 'Ungovernability' in the Twilight of Colonial Rule', in *The Chinese and Their Future: Beijing, Taipei, and Hong Kong* ed. Zhiling Lin and Thomas W. Robinson (Washington D.C.: AEI Press, 1994), pp.287-314.

Kong society was very small, for only a small minority of the Chinese community was involved in its expression. In contrast, June Fourth had a much larger impact on Hong Kong society. Not only did it spark nationalistic sentiments among the Hong Kong Chinese community, but it also forced the majority of Hong Kong Chinese to reconsider their Hong Kong identity vis-à-vis their sense of being Chinese. This impacted directly upon their view of the 1997 return to Chinese sovereignty, which was directly related to Hong Kong's future. As will be shown later in this chapter, although the Hong Kong people had a great deal of sympathy for the students in Beijing during the democracy movement, they also realised that Hong Kong was different from mainland China.

Third, the 1980s saw a politically troubled Hong Kong. A debate about democratic government had been in train and gaining momentum since the early 1980s. The struggle for democracy in Hong Kong saw the emergence of various groups of democracy activists, some of whom would eventually become leaders in mobilising local support for the democracy movement in China. In short, three factors contributed to Hong Kong's passionate response to the Chinese democracy movement: the local democracy debate; the 1997 Question; and China-orientated nationalism.

The Political Context in the 1980s

Although economic growth had slowed in the 1980s, the period had witnessed rapid and significant political developments. Before 1989, two historically monumental events had taken place: the Sino-British negotiations and the debate about democracy within Hong Kong.

The Sino-British negotiations, renowned for the fact that Hong Kong people were never consulted at any stage of the process, were held between 1982 and 1984. In December 1984, the Chinese and British governments signed the Joint Declaration. This was the result of two years of negotiation and its consequences determined the future of Hong Kong after 1997. Following the signing of the Joint Declaration the colony became embroiled in a debate about democracy, as the Hong Kong government took steps in an attempt to introduce a democratic system before 1997.⁵³⁹

It was also during this time that a number of pro-democracy political pressure groups began to emerge. It has been argued that the emergence of these political groups in was the result of the decolonisation process, which gave rise to a new political environment.⁵⁴⁰ In July 1984, the Hong Kong government issued a consultative green paper on political reform. Three years later, an official review was carried out on the 1984 political reform plans. The 1984 political reform proposal and the subsequent review sparked off a debate on democratisation by local political leaders as well as Hong Kong people. The Gao Shan Theatre meetings (高山大會) of the early 1980s marked a new phase of the campaign for democracy led by these political pressure groups. Specifically through these meetings the groups campaigned for direct elections to the Legislative Council in 1988.

⁵³⁹ Tsang, *A Modern History of Hong Kong*, pp.231-232.

⁵⁴⁰ Tai Lok Lui and Stephen Wing Kai Chiu, 'Introduction – Changing Political Opportunities and the Shaping of Collective Action: Social Movements in Hong Kong', in *The Dynamics of Social Movement in Hong Kong*, ed. Stephen Wing Kai Chiu and Tai Lok Lui (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2000), pp.1-19.

In the years between 1985 and 1990, when the Basic Law was being drafted, there were constant battles and negotiations between pro-democracy and pro-China groups, and within the Basic Law Drafting Committee (BLDC). The campaign for democracy in Hong Kong also saw the emergence of the Joint Committee on Promotion of Democratic Government (民主促進聯合會/民促會). After 4 June 1989, the Joint Committee on Promotion of Democratic Government became the primary leader of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China whose main agenda was to support the Chinese democracy movement. It is not surprising that the movement in Hong Kong to support the democracy movement in China merged with Hong Kong's own struggle for democracy as both struggles were emphasised by local pro-democracy activists.

Hong Kong's Response to the Chinese Democracy Movement

The 1989 Chinese democracy movement awakened a sense of being Chinese among the Hong Kong population. It has been argued that the Chinese democracy movement 'unleashed the suppressed sense of Chinese national identity and the patriotic sentiments of many Hong Kong Chinese'.⁵⁴¹ It contributed to their imagination of China being the 'fatherland', and that they were Chinese even though politically they were colonial subjects. Terms such as 'patriotic' (愛國), 'Chinese people' (中國人民), and 'Hong Kong compatriots' (香港同胞) were often used by activist groups in Hong Kong supporting the

⁵⁴¹ Pik Wan Wong, 'The Pro-Chinese Democracy Movement in Hong Kong', in *The Dynamics of Social Movement in Hong Kong* ed. Stephen Wing Kai Chiu and Tai Lok Lui (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2000), pp.55-90.

Chinese democracy movement in their discussion about the Hong Kong movement.⁵⁴² The dominant motif was that supporting the democracy movement was an expression of patriotism. Even the normally pro-PRC government circles in Hong Kong supported the movement. The FTU, a well-known pro-PRC organisation with approximately 170,000 members, made it clear that it would support the Chinese student movement, and referred to the democracy movement as a ‘patriotic democracy movement’ (愛國民主運動).⁵⁴³ FTU chairman Cheng Yiu-tong (鄭耀棠) commented at that time that the FTU had long been a ‘patriotic’ organisation, whether it be supporting the Chinese government’s policies or criticising the government for its mistakes.⁵⁴⁴ Cheng also emphasised that the FTU was based in Hong Kong and had no connections with trade unions on the mainland, and that it encouraged its members to participate in the protest rallies. Indeed, Cheng led the FTU to participate in the mass rally on 21 May.⁵⁴⁵ When blood was spilled in Beijing, in short, Hong Kong people of all stripes and factions became upset and furious. Protest marches were held, and funds were raised to support the Beijing students. The Democrats, too, made it clear that their support for pro-democracy movement in China was a patriotic activity, as they named their new umbrella organisation the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China (香港市民支援愛國民主運動聯合

⁵⁴² *Bajiu zhongguoxueyun qijian xianggangdiqu xuanchuan danzhang huibian* 八九中國學運期間香港地區宣傳單張匯編 (A Collection of Propaganda leaflets from Hong Kong in the 1989 Chinese Student Movement) (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Special Collection, University of Hong Kong, 1989).

⁵⁴³ *Ming Pao*, 30 May 1989, p.2.

⁵⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴⁵ *South China Morning Post*, 22 May 1989, p.1.

會, the Alliance). Many of the protests were organised by the Hong Kong Alliance.

The Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China

It becomes important to focus on the groups of people who led the campaign of mobilising Hong Kong people to support the democracy movement in China: the Democrats and the Alliance in Support of Democratic Movement in China, which was formed on 21 May.⁵⁴⁶ The Alliance was formed amidst the demonstrations that took place in Hong Kong in the weeks before June Fourth, in response to the student movements in mainland China. The group's main goals were to provide material and financial support to the 'patriotic democracy movement' (支援愛國民主運動) and to 'overthrow the clique in power led by Deng Xiaoping, Li Peng and Yang Shangkun' (推翻當權者鄧、李、楊集團).⁵⁴⁷ As of November 1990, the Alliance had approximately 200 member groups, local political, student, religious, and community organisations.⁵⁴⁸ Before the establishment of the Alliance, there was no unified organisation to mobilise

⁵⁴⁶ The original name for the Alliance in Chinese was *Quangang shimin zhiyuan aiguo minzhu yundong lianhehui* 全港市民支援愛國民主運動聯合會. It was suggested that it would be changed slightly, from 'quangang shimin' 全港市民 to 'xianggang shimin' 香港市民 on 1 June 1989, presumably to make it clear that the group was from Hong Kong.

⁵⁴⁷ Xianggang shimin zhiyuan aiguo minzhu yundong lianhe hui 香港市民支援愛國民主運動聯合會 (Hong Kong Alliance in Support of the Patriotic Democratic Movements of China), *Diyijie changwu weiyuanhui gongzuo baogao* 第一屆常務委員會全年工作報告 (Annual Work Report of the First Standing Committee) (Xianggang: Xianggang shimin zhiyuan aiguo minzhu yundong lianhe hui, 1990), p.2.

⁵⁴⁸ Suzanne Pepper, *Keeping Democracy at Bay: Hong Kong and the Challenge of Chinese Political Reform* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), p.217.

For a complete list of member organisations see Pik Wan Wong, 'The Pro-Chinese Democracy Movement in Hong Kong', in *The Dynamics of Social Movement in Hong Kong*, ed. Stephen Wing Kai Chiu and Tai Lok Lui (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2000), pp.55-90.

support for the Chinese student democracy movement. In an interview with Szeto Wah, he told me that he had asked the student union federation, the HKFS, to organise a large-scale protest march but the group declined. The Joint Committee on Promotion of Democratic Government, a loosely organised group, then took it upon itself to organise the march.

When the democracy movement in China first erupted, some of the Hong Kong Democrats in the Joint Committee on Promotion of Democracy Government had not wished to become involved in the campaign to support the Chinese democracy movement,⁵⁴⁹ but instead still wanted to focus on local affairs. The Committee members soon changed their attitude. Initially, one of the Committee's members announced that he would leave the Committee if it did not wish to become involved, and many supported his call. According to Cheung Man-kwong's account, it was after listening to Li Peng's speech announcing the Beijing curfew that the Committee members as a whole were determined to become involved in supporting the democracy movement in China. Indeed, Cheung commented in May 1989 that the Democrats normally kept their hands off the affairs of China.⁵⁵⁰ The earliest activity of the Committee was on 17 May. On 20 May, the Committee held a rally in Victoria Park attended by 40,000 people.⁵⁵¹

On 21 May 1989, the Committee put together the largest protest rally in the history of Hong Kong. An 8-hour march saw a fifteen-kilometre procession

⁵⁴⁹ Cai, *Tongtu shugui*, p.362. See also, *South China Morning Post*, 28 May 1989, p.2.

⁵⁵⁰ *South China Morning Post*, 28 May 1989, p.2.

⁵⁵¹ Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China, *Gangzhilian tongxun* 港支聯通訊 (Newsletter of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China), 27 August 1989, p.1.

marching from Central to North Point and ended with a mass rally with close to a million people at the Happy Valley racecourse. Protesters wore headbands and held banners as they marched from Central starting from 2:15pm. It was during the rally, which took place eight hours later, that the Alliance was inaugurated.

The reason for the Alliance's formation that day, Szeto has emphasised, is that the Democrats and their Committee were not the only one supporting the Chinese democracy movement. He commented to me:

We were not the only ones...all the people of Hong Kong were supporting [the Chinese democracy movement], if that was not the case there would not have been the million-people protest march...people whose names appeared in the [pro-democracy] political advertisements in the newspapers such as Leung Chen-ying, Tam Yiu-chung, Cheng Yiu-tong were all supporting.⁵⁵² Who was the first one to yell 'down with Deng, Li, Yang'? It was Tam Yiu-chung. Cheng Kai-nam was in the first central committee of the Alliance...it was not just us, all the Hong Kong people were supporting it.⁵⁵³

For the last 20 years, Szeto Wah has been the Chairman of the Alliance. Why and how did he become a democracy activist who often spoke out against the CCP, and a central figure of the Alliance?

Szeto Wah: Chairman of the Alliance

Although Szeto Wah is well known as a central figure of the Alliance for his anti-Communist sentiments and for his call for regime change in China, Szeto

⁵⁵² Leung Chen-ying 梁振英 was a member of the Basic Law Consultative Committee (BLCC).

⁵⁵³ Interview with Szeto Wah, 29 September 2007.

Wah was in fact a leftist in his early years. Szeto Wah's father was a dockyard worker who came to Hong Kong in the early 1910s at the age of twelve and participated in the Hong Kong Seamen's Strike of 1922 and the Canton-Hong Kong Strike-Boycott of 1925.⁵⁵⁴ However, Szeto stated that it was not his father who influenced his strong feelings for China. His father was not actually a patriot. Szeto claimed that it was his own experience during WWII that had a strong influence on his opinions and feelings for China. He fled to Guangdong during the war and witnessed the hardship endured by the peasants and the corruption of the government. The war experience contributed to Szeto's desire for a China that is 'strong and prosperous'. As a fifteen-year-old teenager, Szeto paid much attention to news about China. He was optimistic for the PRC when it was founded in 1949. Even before the founding of the PRC, he had joined a leftist group, the Hok Yau Chinese and Western Dance Study Club (學友中西舞蹈研究社), now known as the Hok Yau Club (學友社), which was formed in January 1949.⁵⁵⁵ However, in 1958 Szeto was labelled a rightist by the group and removed from it. He admitted that at that time there were 'many things' about mainland China that he did not understand.

In 1973, he led a successful strike by teachers in protest against salary cuts, for which he is well known, and formed the Hong Kong Professional Teachers' Union (HKPTU), which currently has approximately 80,000 members. The Xinhua News Agency had asked Szeto not to organise the strike, on the grounds that it would have an adverse effect on the stability of the colony. Szeto

⁵⁵⁴ For details, see Chan Lau, *China, Britain and Hong Kong 1895-1945*, pp.169-219.

⁵⁵⁵ Interview with Szeto Wah, 29 September 2007.

Wah disregarded this appeal. When Deng Xiaoping gained power in 1979 and announced plans for reform, once again Szeto was optimistic for the PRC. However, seeing that there was no political reform, coupled with his experience in the BLDC and events in 1989, resulted in Szeto becoming completely disillusioned with the PRC. I shall discuss his involvement in the BLDC in relation to Martin Lee's story later.

As far as his personal feelings are concerned, Szeto Wah had never expected that the Chinese government would use 'tanks and machine guns to kill its people'.⁵⁵⁶ When asked about his first reaction on hearing about the crackdown of 4 June 1989, Szeto stated during my interview with him:

Why would a government which called itself a people's government and a military which called itself the people's army massacre its own people? It was beyond my imagination...Through June Fourth I now fully understood the true nature of the Chinese Communist Party.

Martin Lee and Other Pro-Democracy Activists in the Alliance

Like Szeto Wah, Martin Lee has been an important figure in the Hong Kong political scene since the 1980s.⁵⁵⁷ Martin Lee's father was a GMD officer who settled in Hong Kong after the civil war. Lee studied at the University of Hong Kong in the 1950s and graduated in 1960. He first became known in Hong Kong politics in the mid-1980s when he concurrently served as a Legislative

⁵⁵⁶ Interview with Szeto Wah, 29 September 2007.

⁵⁵⁷ In late 2008, I attempted to arrange an interview with Martin Lee but was unsuccessful.

Council member from the legal constituency and as a drafter in the BLDC alongside Szeto Wah.

It is unclear how much influence Martin Lee's father had on his views on China and whether Lee had an emotional attachment to China like Szeto Wah. Martin Lee participated in the pro-Chinese democracy movement in 1989 due to his political agenda and frustration with the BLDC. Ever since Lee was elected to the Legislative Council in 1985, his primary concern was fighting for greater democracy for future Hong Kong. Lee was in fact handpicked by the Chinese government to serve in the BLDC. The speeches Lee made while he was a BLDC drafter indicate that he was determined to make the idea of 'one country, two systems' a success and that he was concerned about Hong Kong's future more than anything else.⁵⁵⁸

The relationship between Martin Lee and Szeto Wah on the one side, and other BLDC drafters on the other, was not amicable. Beijing's desire to have a tight rein over the design of Hong Kong's future political system upset Lee and Szeto and their opinion that the Basic Law should give Hong Kong a full democracy was largely ignored by other members of the BLDC. Despite their objections the final version of the political blueprint set out in the first draft of the Basic Law, which in the view of Lee and Szeto Wah was too conservative, was passed in 1988. Lee and Szeto then teamed up to continue fighting for greater

⁵⁵⁸ Li Zhuming 李柱銘, *Li Zhuming minzhu yanlun ji* 李柱銘民主言論集 (A Collection of Lee Chu-ming's Speeches on Democracy) (Xianggang: Tianyuan shuwu, 1989).

democracy late 1988.⁵⁵⁹ Thus, Lee and Szeto's status as leaders in Hong Kong's response to June Fourth should not come as a surprise.

Following the outbreak of the Chinese democracy movement Lee served as the vice-chairman of the Alliance and was responsible for contacting foreign governments and Chinese overseas in support of the Chinese democracy movement.⁵⁶⁰ Other Alliance committee members included Lee Wing-tat (李永達), Cheung Man-kwong (張文光) and Albert Ho Chun-yan (何俊仁). They had grown up in the 1970s, experienced the student movement, and were involved in the Hong Kong democracy movement starting around the mid-1980s.⁵⁶¹

The April Fifth Action Group

Another important group that organised protest rallies during the spring of 1989 in support of the Chinese democracy movement was the April Fifth Action group (四五行動). It was founded by Leung Kwok-hung and other local activists. Leung, better known in Hong Kong as 'Long Hair' (長毛), was also an important member of the Alliance. His nickname is derived from his hairstyle, which he has kept since 1989, as an expression of protest against the Chinese government's verdict to label the democracy movement as counter-revolutionary.⁵⁶² The April Fifth Action group was named after the first Tiananmen incident of 5 April 1976.

⁵⁵⁹ For details of the work of the BLDC and Martin Lee's involvement in it, see Mark Roberti, *The Fall of Hong Kong: China's Triumph and Britain's Betrayal* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Revised edition, 1996), pp.152-236.

⁵⁶⁰ Xianggang shimin zhiyuan aiguo minzhu yundong lianhe hui 香港市民支援愛國民主運動聯合會 (Hong Kong Alliance in Support of the Patriotic Democratic Movements of China), *Diyijie changwu weiyuanhui gongzuo baogao 第一屆常務委員會全年工作報告 (Annual Work Report of the First Standing Committee)* (Xianggang: Xianggang shimin zhiyuan aiguo minzhu yundong lianhe hui, 1990), pp.2 and 5.

⁵⁶¹ I shall discuss the background of Albert Ho in detail in Chapter Seven.

⁵⁶² Pepper, *Keeping Democracy at Bay*, p.282.

In the beginning, the group actually had no name. Leung claimed to me in an interview that he was one of those who gave the group its name.⁵⁶³

In my interview with him, Leung claimed that the April Fifth Action group's activities predated those of the Alliance, and that the group had been active as early as January 1989.⁵⁶⁴ While there is no evidence that Leung and his group were organising activities in January 1989, a report in the *South China Morning Post* confirmed that the rally held by the April Fifth Action group on 22 April was the first local response to the Chinese democracy movement.⁵⁶⁵ As mentioned in the previous chapter, members of the Revolutionary Marxist League Ng Chung-yin and Lau San-ching had been in contact with democracy activists in China in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Since the early 1980s, the League became increasingly concerned about the Chinese democracy movement as well as the future of Hong Kong. In the League's official publication *Zhan Xun* (戰訊), it argued that the issue of democracy reforms in China should be combined with that of Hong Kong's return to China.⁵⁶⁶ Thus, Leung, who was also a member of the League, was probably correct in saying that his group was already doing similar work in early 1989.

When the Chinese democracy movement erupted in Beijing a few months later, the April Fifth Action group argued that only when China had democracy could Hong Kong have a democratic future (中國有民主，香港才有民主的前

⁵⁶³ Interview with Leung Kwok-hung, 20 November 2007.

⁵⁶⁴ Interview with Leung Kwok-hung, 20 November 2007.

⁵⁶⁵ *South China Morning Post*, 28 May 1989.

⁵⁶⁶ *Geming makesizhuyizhe tongmeng* 革命馬克思主義者同盟 (Revolutionary Marxist League), 'Jiang guonei de minzhu gaige he shouhui xianggang zhuquan jiehe qilai' 將國內的民主改革和收回香港主權結合起來! (Linking Democratic Reforms in China with the Return of Hong Kong's Sovereignty), *Zhan Xun* 戰訊, 18 September 1983, p.3.

途).⁵⁶⁷ Leung Kwok-hung argued that the April Fifth Action group was the first to organise rallies in response to the Tiananmen protests, and criticised the Democrats for their tardy response to the democracy movement.⁵⁶⁸ Even after the founding of the Alliance, both the April Fifth Action group and the Alliance were organising their own protest rallies. Just before the bloody crackdown of 4 June the April Fifth Action group was organising a round-the-island protest rally (環島遊行). In criticising the Democrats for their tardy response to the Chinese democracy movement, Leung told me:

As far as the 1989 democracy movement goes, the April Fifth Action group was the first one to respond to it...what you call the Democrats today were not even there at that time. We responded as early as 1 January the same year. The reason was that we had the same ideas as the people on the mainland. Regarding timing of the Three Anniversaries of that year -- the 200th anniversary of the French Revolution, the 40th anniversary of the founding of the PRC, and the 70th anniversary of the May Fourth Movement -- we all knew something big was going to happen. The April Fifth Action group was formed at that time to push for greater democracy in Hong Kong and to support the democracy movement in China.⁵⁶⁹

⁵⁶⁷ Siwu xingdong 四五行動 (April Fifth Action Group), 'Quanmin dongyuan fensui zhenya' 全民動員，粉碎鎮壓 (Mobilising the Masses and Crushing the Crackdown), Hong Kong Special Collections, University of Hong Kong, *Bajiu zhongguoxueyun qijian xianggangdiqu xuanchuan danzhang huibian* 八九中國學運期間香港地區宣傳單張匯編 (A Collection of Propaganda leaflets from Hong Kong in the 1989 Chinese Student Movement) (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Special Collection, University of Hong Kong, 1989).

⁵⁶⁸ Interview with Leung Kwok-hung, 20 November 2007.

⁵⁶⁹ Interview with Leung Kwok-hung, 20 November 2007.

What is interesting is that in May 1989 Ng Chung-yin, representative of the Hong Kong Journalists' Committee in Support of Beijing Student Movement and head of the Alliance's information group, made the same criticism as Leung's:

The slow response of the liberals in this issue reflects that they are politically insensitive. They are supposed to provide political leadership for the people, but it turned out they were behind the people.⁵⁷⁰

Given Leung and Ng's background as Trotskyist activists of the Revolutionary Marxist League, their participation in Hong Kong's response to June Fourth was to be expected. However, we also need to consider carefully what Leung said about the reason the April Fifth Action Group was founded, and what the group said at the time. I believe that both Leung and the democrats responded passionately to June Fourth for the same reason: to show their concern over the democracy movement in *both* China *and* Hong Kong. It was apparent that in the view of Leung, the Democrats, and Hong Kong citizens, the democracy movement in China and that in Hong Kong became inseparable. In fact, the April Fifth group was a founding member of the Alliance, and Leung has been an executive committee member of the Alliance since the 1990s. He simultaneously serves in Hong Kong's Legislative Council as a thorn in the side of the Hong Kong government.

⁵⁷⁰ *South China Morning Post*, 28 May 1989, p.2.

Activities and Fund-raising in Hong Kong Supporting the Student Movement in Beijing

From its founding on 21 May, the Alliance continued to be extremely active. On 25 May, the Alliance announced that it would set up a central fund, the purpose of which, according to Alliance member Lee Wing-tat, was to support both the Beijing students and the work done in Hong Kong to support the movement in China.⁵⁷¹ It was announced that the initial amount of donations received reached one million Hong Kong dollars.⁵⁷² Representative of the Alliance Lee Cheuk-yan (李卓人), who took the million-dollar donation to Beijing, was arrested on 5 June by Chinese authorities and the donation was seized.⁵⁷³ Three days later, after signing a confession, Lee was allowed to leave.⁵⁷⁴

The Alliance was not the only organisation arranging for funds to be brought to Beijing. The students of the HKFS also set up funds. On the same day as the Alliance announced their plan for a central fund, the HKFS sent a group of students to bring \$900,000 to Beijing to support the students there. In fact, as early as 1 May, the HKFS had set up its own central fund, which it

⁵⁷¹ *Ming Pao*, 26 May 1989, p.2.

⁵⁷² *Ibid.*

⁵⁷³ In a recent session of the Legislative Council, Lee Cheuk-yan revealed that on 5 June in a Beijing hotel he gave Chinese students \$200,000 for the purpose of fleeing. Before 5 June, donations from the Alliance were given to Hong Kong students in Tiananmen Square. See *Hong Kong Hansard: Official Record of Proceedings*, 27 May 2009, p.161.

⁵⁷⁴ *South China Morning Post*, 9 June 1989, p.1.

claimed up until late May had amounted to \$6 million. The HKFS also supplied Beijing students with loudspeakers.⁵⁷⁵

University students had been vocal about their views of China and their sense of China-orientated nationalism, particularly in the 1980s. Several events had provided opportunities for university students to express their opinions about China, and highlighted their sense of nationalism: the Japanese textbook controversy in 1982, Margaret Thatcher's visit to China in the same year, and the Sino-British negotiations. Major players in the student-led nationalistic movements included student unions at Chinese University of Hong Kong and the University of Hong Kong.

The university students' responses both to the democracy movement at Tiananmen and to the subsequent brutal crackdown of it were vivid and strong. Issues of the University of Hong Kong student magazine *Undergrad* published at this time were filled with passionate, at times poetic, discussions of June Fourth. In earlier weeks, a number of university students from Hong Kong went to Beijing and witnessed the turbulent events leading up to June Fourth.⁵⁷⁶

⁵⁷⁵ *Ming Pao*, 26 May 1989, p.2.

⁵⁷⁶ For first-hand accounts of Hong Kong people who went to Beijing during that time see, for example, Feng Yulian 馮玉蓮 et. al., *Sijiao yu huixiang* 嘶叫與回響 (Outcry and Response) (Xianggang: Kunlin, 1989); Chen Baoxun 陳寶珣, 'Li zhuoren bei kou 李卓人被扣 (The Arrest of Lee Cheuk-yan), in *Renmin buhui wangji* 人民不會忘記 (The People will not Forget) ed. Sixty-four Hong Kong Journalists (Xianggang: Xianggang jizhe xiehui, 1989), pp.173-178; and Chen Baoxun 陳寶珣 et. al., 'Women liuzhe yiyang de xue xianggang de zhihuan' 我們流一樣的血 – 香港的支援 (The Same Blood Flows in Us – Support from Hong Kong), in *Renmin buhui wangji* 人民不會忘記 (The People will not Forget) ed. Sixty-four Hong Kong Journalists (Xianggang: Xianggang jizhe xiehui, 1989), pp.279-286. It is ironic that, as far as the title of the last article is concerned, on the one hand, Hong Kong people claimed that they regarded mainland Chinese as their comrades (in Chinese *tongbao* 同胞, which means people from the same 'nation'), but on the other hand, as it has been argued and for which there is plenty of evidence to suggest, in everyday lives in colonial Hong Kong mainland Chinese were often discriminated against by Hong Kong people.

However, going to Beijing made them realise that they were very different from their mainland comrades. It was difficult for Hong Kong students to come to terms with how to identify and position themselves in what was essentially a ‘Chinese’ student movement taking place in mainland China. A university student who went to Beijing at that time wrote in *Undergrad* that compared to students in China,

Hong Kong university students and teachers enjoy considerable material wealth, and do not need to worry about future job opportunities. For Hong Kong students, joining the mainland Chinese student movement carries a sense of strangeness. For myself, I do not wish to identify myself as a Hong Kong student in a mainland student movement...I am willing to do my best to fulfill my dream of reviving and strengthening the Chinese nation, and develop democracy.⁵⁷⁷

Interestingly, members and staff of traditional pro-China/pro-Communist groups also participated in supporting the Tiananmen protests, and Communist staff members even joined the giant 21 May rally. According to a report in the *South China Morning Post* dated 22 May, at the massive protest rally of 21 May in which close to a million people participated, Cheng Yiu-tong (鄭耀棠), chairman of the pro-Communist trade union federation, the FTU, said that ‘Beijing students sacrifice their bodies to contribute to the future and the democratic development of the country. We should learn from them and cherish and protect their patriotism’.⁵⁷⁸

⁵⁷⁷ *Undergrad*, 89-90, 2, p.18.

⁵⁷⁸ *South China Morning Post*, 22 May 1989, p.1.

In the evening of 3 June, after hearing the news of the bloody crackdown in Beijing, the Alliance called for a sit-in protest rally. The rally would be known as the Black Mass Sit-in (黑色大靜坐), held the next day, with approximately 200,000 participating in the event. Both Szeto Wah and Martin Lee, as organisers of the rally, spoke to the crowd. Wearing a black headband, Martin Lee urged other BLDC drafters to suspend their work. Szeto Wah, after delivering an emotional speech, collapsed due to heat exhaustion.⁵⁷⁹

The Immediate Aftermath of the 4 June Massacre

Hong Kong's populace was shocked by the killings, and took to the streets in massive marches and rallies, to voice their anger over the bloody crackdown by the Chinese government on the democracy movement. Even the official Communist groups in Hong Kong, including the NCNA,⁵⁸⁰ the pro-PRC newspapers *Ta Kung Pao* (大公報), the *New Evening Post* (新晚報), and the FTU. Xu Jiatun (許家屯), chief of the NCNA in Hong Kong at that time, wrote in his memoirs that many within the agency were upset by the events in Beijing, and that he let his staff, whether they be staff within the Agency or staff of the left-wing newspapers, participate in the rallies in the names of their respective organisations.⁵⁸¹ There were discussions within the Agency as to whether to

⁵⁷⁹ *South China Morning Post*, 5 June 1989, p.7.

⁵⁸⁰ As mentioned in Chapter Four, the New China News Agency (NCNA) was the de facto representative of the PRC in Hong Kong.

⁵⁸¹ Xu Jiatun 許家屯, *Xu Jiatun xianggang huiyilu* 許家屯香港回憶錄 (*Memoirs of Xu Jiatun*) (Xianggang: Lianhebao, 1994), pp.367-369. In the months after Tiananmen there were tensions among the NCNA personnel, including the staff of *Wen Hui Pao* and *Ta Kung Pao* as Beijing instructed them to 'reflect on' (反思) their involvement in the pro-Chinese democracy movement in Hong Kong. About one month after June 4 Li Zisong (李子誦), chief of *Wen Hui Pao*, was

allow staff to respond in support of the democracy movement. Of course, the Agency decided that although the staff would be allowed to support the movement, yelling slogans such as ‘down with Deng (Deng Xiaoping), Li (Li Peng), and Yang (Yang Shangkun)’⁵⁸² would not be appropriate.⁵⁸³

The activists of the Alliance, in contrast, took decisive actions that were strongly anti-regime. This included Operation Yellow Bird (黃雀行動), an underground operation to smuggle Chinese pro-democracy leaders out of China after June Fourth. Eighteen years later, neither Leung Kwok-hung nor Szeto Wah, whom I interviewed in 2007, were yet willing to say much about it:

I always say we would do things that we should do and could do. At the same time I always say to my fellow Alliance members, to quote Confucius, ‘if one remains unknown and is not bothered, is one not a gentleman?’⁵⁸⁴ It means that even if others do not know what you could do you will not be upset...So when people asked me about the Operation I would not answer.

Leung, the leader of the April Fifth Group and a committee member of the Alliance, commented that ‘if people did not say anything then it means that it did happen; they cannot talk about it because people’s lives are still at risk’.⁵⁸⁵

Former actor and comedian Johnny Shum Kin-fun (岑建勳) did disclose some of the details of the operation in a BBC interview.⁵⁸⁶ According to Shum, the

removed from his post. For details on what was happening inside the NCNA in the months after June 4, see Xu, *Xu Jiatun xianggang huiyilu*, pp.385-394.

⁵⁸² ‘打倒鄧、李、楊.’

⁵⁸³ Xu, *Xu Jiatun Xianggang huiyilu*, pp.367-369.

⁵⁸⁴ *Ren buzhi er buyun buyi junzi hu* 人不知而不慍 不亦君子乎？

⁵⁸⁵ Interview with Leung Kwok-hung, 20 November 2007.

⁵⁸⁶ A report of the interview was published in *The Washington Post* on 2 June 1991.

operation was led by the pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong who formed the Alliance. It was also said that the Hong Kong pro-democracy sympathisers turned to smugglers to carry it out,⁵⁸⁷ and that the operation was funded by a Hong Kong entrepreneur.⁵⁸⁸

The events in Beijing took the media as well as the people of Hong Kong by storm, largely because of concern over the future of Hong Kong in light of the events in Beijing. Events leading up to, and the final bloody crackdown that took place on 4 June invoked a sense of fear and despair among the Hong Kong population, now very concerned about 1997.⁵⁸⁹ The killings in Beijing forced them to rethink their political relationship, present and future, with mainland China. Sifting through the various responses, written and verbal, that appeared in the newspapers in the days following the shootings one can clearly see Hong Kong people's loss of confidence in the future. Let us consider this response from a Westerner living in Hong Kong at that time:

With one incident I have been convinced that there is, after all, no future in Hong Kong. My Chinese friends have tried to persuade me of this in the past. I didn't believe them, but they were absolutely right.⁵⁹⁰

Similarly, but in a more sarcastic tone, and referring specifically to the drafting of the Basic Law that would govern Hong Kong after the hand-over of sovereignty in 1997, another *South China Morning Post* reader wrote:

⁵⁸⁷ Gavin Hewitt, 'The Great Escape from China', *The Washington Post*, 2 June 1991, p.1.

⁵⁸⁸ For details of Operation Yellow Bird, see Zheng Yi 鄭義, *Guogong xiangjiang diezhan* 國共香江諜戰 (The Battles between CCP and GMD Agents in Hong Kong) (Xianggang: Xianggang wenhuayishu chubanshe, 2009), pp.64-87.

⁵⁸⁹ According to a survey done by Survey Research Hongkong (SRH) for the *South China Morning Post* after the events of June 4, economic confidence dropped by 12 points in one month. See *South China Morning Post*, 4 July 1989, p.1.

⁵⁹⁰ *South China Morning Post*, 6 June 1989, p.28.

To all those who are still willing to continue their roles in the drafting of the Basic Law, I am sure when this document is complete, they will feel an enormous sense of achievement in being involved in something that is worth less than its equivalent weight in toilet paper.⁵⁹¹

Some of the members responsible for drafting the Basic Law *did* suspend their work on it as a form of protest. These members included the FTU chairman Cheng Yiu-tong, newspaper tycoon Louis Cha (Jin Yong), Reverend Peter Kwong Kong-kit (鄭廣傑), and Professor Yeung Yue-man (楊汝萬). Martin Lee and Szeto Wah immediately decided that, although they were members of the BLDC, for the time being they would not be involved in the drafting process, although they did not resign officially.⁵⁹² Lee and Szeto were eventually removed from the drafting committee by China's National People's Congress.⁵⁹³

It would not be appropriate to say there was a mass exodus, but Hong Kong people *did* try to secure their future and to find a way out by emigrating, as noted by Cheng:

Given the present fears, demands for the right of abode [in Europe] for the 3.25 million holders of British Dependent Territory Citizen (BDTC) passports have stepped up, while attempts have also been made to seek some form of international guarantee for Hong Kong people's rights and freedoms beyond 1997. In their panic, Hong Kong people also renewed

⁵⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹² *Ming Pao*, 5 June 1989, p.2.

⁵⁹³ Joseph Y.S. Cheng, 'Prospects for Democracy in Hong Kong after the Beijing Massacre', *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, 23, 1990, pp.161-185. In an article published in *Ming Pao Daily News* in 1999 Szeto Wah has confirmed that he was removed from the BLDC. Situ Hua 司徒華, *Xiongzong haiyue 胸中海嶽* (Sea in Heart) (Xianggang: Ciwenhuatang, 1999), p.79. Some reports suggest that Szeto Wah and Martin Lee resigned but that cannot be verified.

such proposals as purchasing South Pacific Islands passports, placing Hong Kong under United Nations Trusteeship, independence, etc.⁵⁹⁴

A survey conducted for the *South China Morning Post* revealed:

49 per cent of 479 respondents felt that independence was a viable option for Hong Kong...Of these 31 per cent would prefer that Hong Kong be a self-governing member of the Commonwealth while 18 per cent want independence.⁵⁹⁵

It is debatable as to whether surveys like this truly reflected the views of the millions of Hong Kong people at that time. Nonetheless, as Szeto Wah, Chairman of the Hong Kong Alliance, commented, there was fear among the Hong Kong population. Szeto commented in an interview with me:

⁵⁹⁴ Joseph Y.S. Cheng, 'Prospects for Democracy in Hong Kong after the Beijing Massacre', *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, 23, 1990, pp.161-185. It was University of Hong Kong law lecturer Nihal Jayawickrama who suggested the United Nations should step in and settle Hong Kong's fate. See Nihal Jayawickrama, 'Can UN settle our fate?', *South China Morning Post*, 8 June 1989, p.15. Allen Lee in his memoirs also makes note of Hong Kong people's attempts to secure their future overseas, and that prominent lawyer T.S. Lo himself in fact was involved in the business (what he called 'emergency door companies') of helping people in search of a safe haven overseas. See Li Pengfei 李鵬飛, *Fengyu sanshinian 風雨三十年—李鵬飛回憶錄* (Vicissitude of 30 Years: Memoirs of Allen Lee) (Xianggang: Cup Publishing, 2004), p.145. When British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe visited Hong Kong in early July, twelve representatives from the Hong Kong People Saving Hong Kong Campaign, the Federation of Civil Service Unions, Hong Kong Observers and a group of expatriates, asked that a meeting be arranged with Sir Geoffrey. The purpose of this meeting was to ask the British government to give Hong Kong people the right of abode in Britain. Here is an excerpt from a report in the *South China Morning Post*: "[A] number of pressure groups and trade unions petitioned Sir Geoffrey yesterday for an escape route, greater democracy and human rights for Hong Kong people and solutions to the decade-long Vietnamese boat people problem. A four-metre-long white banner carrying more than 300,000 signatures collected in Central in support of the right of abode campaign was also presented to the Foreign Secretary. It was organised by a 130-member concern group whose spokesman, Mr. Chow Hing-chuen, urged the British government to establish an independent and autonomous state in Hong Kong instead of giving the territory back to China. "We would rather be administered by the United Nations or the Taiwanese government instead of being under the control of an unpopular regime", he said. *South China Morning Post*, 4 July 1989, p.3

⁵⁹⁵ *South China Morning Post*, 26 June 1989, p.1.

Hong Kong people did not have much of a sense of belonging. But after the Joint Declaration was signed they knew Hong Kong would be returned to China in 1997. I remember that during a march two slogans gave me the deepest impression: ‘today’s Beijing is tomorrow’s Hong Kong’...Everyone was afraid.⁵⁹⁶

The business sector, too, was restless.⁵⁹⁷ Top companies in Hong Kong joined forces to campaign for the right of abode in the United Kingdom for the people of Hong Kong.⁵⁹⁸ Founding members of this group included Swires, Jardines, Hong Kong Telecom, Inchcape, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, Hutchinson Whampoa, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, DHL, Cluff Oil, and Legislative Councillors Stephen Cheong Kam-chuen (張鑑泉) and Ron Arculi (夏佳理).⁵⁹⁹ Interestingly, it was reported that the group would ‘not be campaigning for an increase in the pace of democracy in Hong Kong or for the adoption of a Bill of Human Rights’ for which other groups had been fighting.⁶⁰⁰ It is obvious that they did not want to upset the Chinese government for the sake of their business interests in mainland China. This shows that there were always interests at stake.

What happened in 1989 in the business sector was therefore similar to how in the 1920s and 1930s the Chinese bourgeoisie, faced with crises

⁵⁹⁶ Interview with Szeto Wah, 29 September 2007.

⁵⁹⁷ *South China Morning Post*, 4 July 1989, p.2. It is also interesting to see that the Retail Management Association in fact issued a statement in the newspaper, which says ‘in morning, the retail industry will pause for 30 minutes between 2pm and 3pm on Wednesday June 7. In addition, retails workers may express their personal sorrow by displaying black ribbons which will be supplied by RMA member companies.’ See *South China Morning Post*, 7 June 1989.

⁵⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

threatening their economic interests, sought ways to protect their interests.⁶⁰¹ The actions of the Chinese businesspeople in Hong Kong illustrate how, just as throughout Hong Kong's history, the interests of Hong Kong Chinese businesses were tied to British colonialism as well as China, and these businesspeople would support policies to protect their economic interests. In any case, for both the Chinese businesspeople and ordinary Hong Kong citizens in 1989, the future of China seemed linked to that of Hong Kong.

Convergence between Concern over Hong Kong's Future and Nationalism

Although June Fourth invoked strong sentiments about the people of China among Hong Kong's residents, at the same time the events in Beijing confirmed in the minds of Hong Kong people the image of the PRC as a brutal regime. These feelings and responses reflected not only Hong Kong people's anxiety over their future, but their sense of identity and value judgments as well. China-orientated nationalism was represented by Hong Kong people's sympathy for students on the mainland, as far as the struggle for democracy was concerned. Edward Vickers has observed:

The crushing of the mainland pro-democracy movement, with which millions of Hongkongers had come to sympathise, shattered overnight the mood of cautious optimism concerning the retrocession that had prevailed

⁶⁰¹ John M. Carroll, 'Colonialism, Nationalism, and Bourgeois Identity in Colonial Hong Kong', *Journal of Oriental Studies*, 39, 2, 2005, pp.146-164. See also Cai, *Xianggangren zhi xianggangshi*, pp.142-146; and Huei-ying Kuo, 'Chinese Bourgeois Nationalism in Hong Kong and Singapore in the 1930s', *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 36, 3, 2006, pp.385-405.

prior to this, and brought home to local people the fragility of the promises of autonomy for Hong Kong made by Beijing.⁶⁰²

Juxtaposing the aforementioned historical contexts with statements in the newspapers issued by various groups in response to June Fourth,⁶⁰³ I believe that Hong Kong's response to June Fourth marked a convergence between Hong Kong's people's concern for China's future and that for Hong Kong's future. June Fourth forced the people of Hong Kong to come to terms with their Hong Kong identity as defined by their colonial experience, Hong Kong's return to Chinese rule in the future, and their concept of China as a nation. For the people of Hong Kong, the future of the colony was just as significant as the student movement in Beijing, with democracy being the underlying issue. In short, the evidence shows how Hong Kong people attempted to renegotiate the meanings of Chinese and Hong Kong identities, and to rethink Hong Kong's future political relations with China.

With the events in 1989, a supposition took root that '1997 would be the end for Hong Kong'. It was not only Hong Kong people who contributed to this myth, but also commentators from both within and outside Hong Kong.⁶⁰⁴

In the aftermath of the 4 June massacre in Beijing, a student with the pseudonym of Zhongqiu ('Mid-autumn') discussed the conflict between being nationalistic and choosing to emigrate:

⁶⁰² Vickers, *In Search of an Identity*, p.34.

⁶⁰³ In these public statements terms such as 'comrades' and 'fellow Chinese' (*tongbao*) were often used to refer to those who died in the bloody crackdown. See, for example, *Ming Pao*, 7 June 1989, p.26; *Ming Pao*, 8 June 1989; and *Wen Hui Bao*, 5 June 1989, p.6.

⁶⁰⁴ See, for instance, Ito Kiyoshi 伊藤潔, *Honkon kuraihisu* 香港クライシス! (Hong Kong Crisis) (Tokyo: Jikku shuppanyoku, 1991); and Lin Leping 林樂平, 'Jiuqi buzou you ruhe' 九七不走又如何(What to do if staying after 1997), *Next Magazine*, No.1, 23 March 1990, pp.4-9.

Of course, I am not making assumptions as to how to be nationalistic. In a free society, every person has the right to choose which country they want to live in, but if we are to claim to be nationalistic, the bottom line is to be a Chinese.⁶⁰⁵

Non-ethnically Chinese intellectuals living in Hong Kong, too, became worried about the China factor and how this would play out. Hong Kong University law lecturer Nihal Jayawickrama wrote in the *South China Morning Post*:

Over a century and a half [Hong Kong people] have created, within clearly defined historical boundaries, a nation...Should the people of the future Hongkong SAR express their solidarity with a liberal reformist movement on the mainland, as they did in the spring of 1989, they are unlikely to be spared the wrath of the People's Liberation Army commandeered into action in defense of the other system.⁶⁰⁶

The response as such should not come as a surprise if we take into account the fact that well before June Fourth some of the Hong Kong-based intellectuals had been discussing the status of Hong Kong and her future. It has been argued that these intellectuals had formed very specific views. Quoting an article:

1. In any case, Hong Kong should be a bridge between China and the outside world.

⁶⁰⁵ Zhong Qiu 中秋 (pseud.), 'Loving the Motherland, Not Loving Democracy; Loving Democracy, Not Loving the Motherland; Loving Democracy, Loving the Motherland' (Woai zuguo wobuaimizhu woai minzhu wobuai zuguo woai minzhu woai zuguo 我愛祖國，我不愛民主；我愛民主，我不愛祖國；我愛民主，我愛祖國), *Undergrad*, No. 3, 1989-1990, p.20-21. It is interesting that the title seems to suggest that the student was putting forward, or reflecting on, three options regarding Hong Kong people's political agenda.

⁶⁰⁶ *South China Morning Post*, 8 June 1989, p.15.

2. Although the people of Hong Kong would very much like to maintain the status quo, objectively speaking changes would be inevitable.
3. The future of Hong Kong concerned every Chinese living in Hong Kong. The Chinese government should listen to their views.⁶⁰⁷

Judging from all the sources it can be argued that Hong Kong people's passionate response to June Fourth represented both their colonial identity and China-orientated nationalism.⁶⁰⁸ In their response to June Fourth, Hong Kong people expressed their concerns over Hong Kong's future as well as China's; and redefined themselves as colonial subjects who had to make decisions as to whether they were also China-orientated nationalists. However, it was obvious that in the minds of Hong Kong people Hong Kong came first, and China second. June Fourth was one of those occasions where politicians and the public became united as they all shared concerns about the future of Hong Kong. Ironically, the more Hong Kong people tried to frame their agenda in the name of 'nationalism', the more their own confusion as to who they were was exposed. Historian Steve Tsang recognises this 'identity crisis':

[The] lack of clarity in their minds had important implications. On the one hand, as Hong Kong citizens, they wanted to preserve their *own way of life* under the 'one country, two systems' formula...On the other hand,

⁶⁰⁷ Adapted from Chen Jingxiang 陳景祥, 'Xianggang xuesheng yundong' 香港學生運動 (The Student Movement in Hong Kong), in *Xianggangshi yanjiu lunzhu xuanji* 香港史研究論著選輯 (Selected Writings on Hong Kong History) ed. Cheng Meibo 程美寶 and Zhao Yule 趙雨樂 (Xianggang: Xianggang gongkai daxue chubanshe, 1999).

⁶⁰⁸ Edward Vickers has commented on the impact of June 4 in terms of contributing to a 'Hong Kong identity' in his book. See Vickers, *In Search of an Identity*, pp.34-35.

feeling that they were Chinese too, they believed they had a right to have
a say in vital matters affecting the future of the nation...⁶⁰⁹

Exactly how ‘patriotic’ the pro-democracy activists and activist groups were remains debatable. They and the people of Hong Kong opposed the use of force by the PRC in the suppression of the student movement, and thus many criticised the PRC in a highly anti-Communist tone. Below is a passage from a Hong Kong pamphlet of that period:

Someone will ask: is victory possible? Our answer is: it is possible! As long as the people are committed, not afraid of sacrifice, and continue to struggle...Chinese workers in particular have a special responsibility...they can go on strike on the one hand, arm themselves with whatever is available in the factories, and organise self-defense forces, and continue the struggle.⁶¹⁰

Looking at documents and speeches by the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China during the months and years that followed, one often find phrases such as ‘the second year after June Fourth’ or ‘the first October 1 after June Fourth’. ‘June Fourth’ became a chronological symbol and important rhetorical phrase in the pro-democracy group’s writings. For the democracy activists, it was not only a date but also a

⁶⁰⁹ Steve Tsang, *A Modern History of Hong Kong* (Hong Kong, 2006), p.247. (Emphasis added)

⁶¹⁰ Author unknown, ‘Fankang daodi, xuezhai xuechang’ 反抗到底，血債血償 (Fighting to the end, paying the blood debt with blood), *Xinmiao Bi-Monthly* (新苗雙月刊) 25 May 1989, p.4, in *Bajiu zhongguo xueyun qijian xianggang diqu xuanchuan danzhang huibian* 八九中國學運期間香港地區宣傳單張匯編 (Collection of Pamphlets Distributed in the Hong Kong Area during the 1989 Chinese Student Movement), (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Special Collections, University of Hong Kong, 1989). The full passage in Chinese is as follows: ‘有人會問: 勝利還可能嗎? 我們答: 還是有可能的! 只要人民下定決心, 不怕犧牲, 反抗到底, 仍然有可能爭取一部分軍人倒戈。陣前倒戈的起義在中國歷史上是常見的! 中國工人階級更負有特別責任。他們可以一方面罷工, 使全北京工交企業癱瘓, 另一方面利用工廠中一切器械武裝人民, 組織自衛隊, 繼續奮鬥。’

symbol signifying political meanings as well as personal feelings.⁶¹¹ The annual June Fourth protests in Hong Kong became a means of expressing this. Notably, too, the pro-democracy activists, the Hong Kong Chinese as a whole during the early 1990s, and their colonial master were now on the same side, in being concerned about the future of Hong Kong.⁶¹²

The Alliance has long regarded itself as being on the frontline of the political struggle for democracy, freedom and human rights in Hong Kong. How does this relate to China-orientated nationalism? The annual reports released by the standing committee of the Alliance over the years are replete with such rhetorical themes as ‘the Chinese people’ and ‘nationalism’ or ‘patriotism’. For them the underlying theme of nationalism has been democracy. It was through the Alliance and its members that the rhetoric of nationalism and democracy became linked.

Many of the original founders of the Alliance later became members of the Democratic Party (DPHK), founded on 4 October 1994. Why were these Democrats (民主派), such as Szeto Wah, Martin Lee, Ho Chun-yan, and Cheung Man-kwong, interested in the democracy movement in China? Was their support linked to the political situation in Hong Kong? While there is no evidence that

⁶¹¹ For details, see the collection of papers released and edited by the Alliance: Xianggang shimin zhiyuan aiguo minzhuyundong lianhehui 香港市民支援愛國民主運動聯合會 (Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China) (ed.), *Li shi xuanyan* 歷史宣言 (The Historical Manifesto) (Xianggang: Xianggang shimin zhiyuan aiguo minzhuyundong lianhehui, 1998).

⁶¹² According to Allen Lee, Governor Sir David Wilson was ‘outraged’ by what happened on June 4. See Li, *Fengyu sanshinian*, p.114. Indeed, Sir David Wilson issued two separate statements on June 4 which, according to a report in the *South China Morning Post*, ‘went from expressing deep sadness and shock to horror and anger’. See *South China Morning Post*, 5 June 1989, p.8.

suggests that it was directly related to their fight for democracy in Hong Kong, if one analyses the political agenda and background of these Democrats it is not surprising. Cheung Man-kwong has stated that in the early years of the Democratic Party's activities, although the Democrats in Hong Kong did not wish to become involved in the affairs in China, they did hope that by achieving democracy in Hong Kong they would be able to push for democracy in China.⁶¹³

Conclusion: The Politics of Response to the Chinese Pro-Democracy Movement

Taking into account the political context of Hong Kong before 1989, the populace's passionate response to June Fourth was to be expected. June Fourth changed the way they viewed China. Although at least some of them high hopes for the CCP before June Fourth, the events in 1989 resulted in their loss of confidence in the CCP. Second, there emerged once again the notion that the nation was different from the state.

It is also worth noting that Hong Kong's response to June Fourth challenged the myth of the Hong Kong people's being politically apathetic. By political participation, I am not referring to specific legal political procedures such as elections as a yardstick to measure the degree of a people's participation in politics.⁶¹⁴ Instead, I refer to the making of political statements and expressing legitimate concerns for their future, in mass gatherings and protests, by the

⁶¹³ Cai Ziqiang 蔡子強 et. al., *Tongtushugui qiantu tanpan yilai de xianggang xueyun* 同途殊歸：前途談判以來的香港學運 (From Identity to Indifference: Hong Kong Student Movement since 1991 [sic]) (Xianggang: Xianggang renwen kexue chubanshe, 1998), p.361.

⁶¹⁴ This has been discussed in Michael E. Degolyer and Janet Lee Scott, 'The Myth of Political Apathy in Hong Kong', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 547, September 1996, pp.68-78.

people of Hong Kong in the days, weeks and even years following Tiananmen. In this sense, June Fourth resulted in greater participation in politics by the people of Hong Kong, as well as a shift in terms of political attitudes.⁶¹⁵

June Fourth has become a 'scar' in the history of Hong Kong. Two factors contributed to Hong Kong's response to it: China-orientated nationalism and the 1997 Question. June Fourth heightened both the Hong Kong people's sense of their own identity, their feelings for China, and awareness of the 1997 Question. Hong Kong's response to June Fourth reflected both a China-orientated nationalism and the Hong Kong people's anxiety over their own future. Hong Kong's response also marked a convergence of the local democracy movement and the rhetoric of China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong. It signified an evolution in the debate about nationalism in the colony as democracy became a central theme. Interestingly, the 1989 Chinese democracy movement brought together people from both sides of the political spectrum. Both the Democrats and the pro-China groups were upset by the events in Beijing. As far as the issue of identity is concerned, it was not only the people of Hong Kong who contributed to the discourse about their own identity. The British public, too, believed that Hong Kong people deserved a 'reprieve'. A poll taken in the days after June Fourth for the *Daily Telegraph* revealed that 48 per cent of the British did not want see Hong Kong returned to China.⁶¹⁶

⁶¹⁵ Tai-lok Lui and Stephen W.K. Chiu, 'Social Movements and Public Discourse on Politics', in *Hong Kong's History: State and Society under Colonial Rule* ed. Tak-Wing Ngo (London: Routledge, 1999), pp.101-118.

⁶¹⁶ *South China Morning Post*, 8 June 1989, p.6.

As far as the local political scene was concerned, while there is no doubt that June Fourth brought together the Democrats, conservatives, and pro-China groups, it also exposed the rift between them. Solidarity between different political groups would not last long. Soon after July 1989, the Hong Kong support movement went into decline. With each passing year after 1989, the number of people participating in the rallies decreased.⁶¹⁷ This is because the Democrats' campaign for greater democracy in China as well as Hong Kong, which had begun in the early 1980s and was vindicated by the events of 1989 as fears for the future of the colony grew, was not acceptable in the eyes of Beijing. Beijing soon embarked on a campaign to discredit the Democrats, through the *People's Daily*.⁶¹⁸ Following Beijing's criticisms against the Democrats, pro-China organisations such as Cheng Kai-nam's (程介南) Hong Kong Federation of Education Workers (香港教育工作者聯會) withdrew from the Alliance, and conservatives even recommended dissolving it to avoid upsetting Beijing any further.⁶¹⁹ Further, for certain political and community groups, there were other more important issues. As a result, the unified campaign born out of an awakened sense of nationalism and concern for Hong Kong's future went into decline due to political differences, just as the *Baodiao* movement of the early 1970s was undermined by conflicts between the groups leading the campaign. This shows the temporal nature of China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong.

⁶¹⁷ For details, see Pik Wan Wong, 'The Pro-Chinese Democracy Movement in Hong Kong', in *The Dynamics of Social Movement in Hong Kong* ed. Stephen Wing Kai Chiu and Tai Lok Lui (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2000), pp.55-90.

⁶¹⁸ Pepper, *Keeping Democracy at Bay*, pp.217-218.

⁶¹⁹ *Ibid.* See also, Roberti, *The Fall of Hong Kong*, p.270.

After the events of 1989, many changed their attitudes towards the CCP. As far as the rhetoric of nationalism was concerned, the events led to Hong Kong people's viewing the state as different from the nation. Szeto Wah and the pro-democracy activists were not the only ones. Students, too, changed their views towards the CCP and came to differentiate state from nation. Interviews with student leaders of the 1980s, published in Ivan Choi Chi-keung's *From Identity to Indifference* reveal this.⁶²⁰ After the 1989 pro-democracy movement, the HKFS refused to recognise the CCP as the current regime.⁶²¹

Regardless, Hong Kong's future was already set in stone as it was to be handed over to China in 1997. In the final chapter, I will examine how some Hong Kong people, on the eve of the 1997 handover, attempted to rediscover their Chinese identity and voice their concern about the future of Hong Kong by constructing an anti-imperialist rhetoric and participating in the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign, which had a strong irredentist nationalist theme.

⁶²⁰ Cai et. al., *Tongtushugui qiantu tanpan yilai de xuegangxue yun*, pp.243-244.

⁶²¹ *Ibid.*, pp.116-117.

Chapter Seven: Irredentist Nationalism as Construction: The Politics of the 1996 Defend Diaoyu Islands (*Baodiao*) Campaign⁶²²

In Chapter Five, I examined the 1971 *Baodiao* campaign and the significance of local politics in influencing the nature and course of the campaign. The subject of this chapter is the 1996 campaign, the larger of the two campaigns. The 1996 campaign was the fourth wave of the *Baodiao* movement.⁶²³ Historically, the movement had its origins in the 1971 campaign and thus the 1996 campaign should be viewed not as a separate campaign but an extension of the previous ones. The chapter begins with a brief examination of the background to the 1996 campaign and then discusses the events that occurred between September and November 1996. The remaining sections of the chapter analyse the specifics of the major events in relation to the following themes: symbolism in the use of the PRC flag by Hong Kong activists; divisions among the activists; media responses to the *Baodiao* campaign; and the various debates in the media. In the last section, I examine the construction of the anti-imperialist nationalist rhetoric by the leading Hong Kong activists.

⁶²² I contacted the offices of Albert Ho Chun-yan and Tsang Kin-sing more than five times over a two-year period. Ho did not respond to my requests for an interview. I talked to Tsang over the phone in 2007 but he was unavailable at that time. In the end I was unable to arrange an interview with Tsang as he did not respond to my later requests. Both Ho and Tsang were leaders in the 1996 Defend Diaoyu Islands movement.

⁶²³ The 1996 movement is often referred to as the Third *Baodiao* Movement (第三次保釣運動), but in fact it was the fourth movement. The first three took place in 1971, 1978, and 1990. The 1978 campaign, which was started by university students and much smaller in scale compared to the other ones, is often neglected.

Although the 1996 campaign appeared to be a nationalist movement, it was to a large extent sparked by Hong Kong's social and political contexts. The *Baodiao* phenomenon provided Hong Kong people an opportunity to rethink their Chinese identity at a time when British colonial rule was ending and Hong Kong would soon be returned to China. The 1996 campaign also exposed the limitations of China-orientated nationalism on both local and macro-levels. Some of these limitations were represented by conflicts between Hong Kong and Taiwanese activists who had different political agendas, and disagreements among Hong Kong activists during their first trip to the Diaoyu Islands. Further, the anti-imperialist and anti-Japanese rhetoric was nothing more than an empty slogan constructed by leading activists who had different reasons to participate in the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign. Like Hong Kong's response to the 4 June killings in Beijing in 1989, the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign was a display of Hong Kong people's concern over Hong Kong's future under the guise of nationalism. The real target was probably Beijing, not Japan or Japanese militarism. Some Hong Kong-based political groups used the *Baodiao* phenomenon to promote their pro-democracy agenda. I shall briefly discuss in the next section the developments concerning the sovereignty issue that triggered the 1996 campaign.

Background to the *Baodiao* Movement: The Problem of Sovereignty since the 1970s

Although the sovereignty issue regarding the tiny uninhabited Diaoyutai islands was an unresolved issue in Sino-Japanese relations after WWII,⁶²⁴ up until the 1970s the PRC government remained largely silent, and the ROC government in Taiwan and the Japanese government were the parties openly in dispute. However, since the early 1970s, the islands had been under the spotlight at the PRC-Japanese negotiation table.⁶²⁵ Actions by the US government complicated the sovereignty issue further. The US included the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the Reversion Treaty which took effect on 15 May 1972 and under which the islands, along with Okinawa, were returned to Japan. As a result, the US recognized that legally the islands should come under the control of the Japanese government, although the US government stated that the dispute over the islands should be dealt with by Japan and China.⁶²⁶ When Sino-Japanese relations were normalised in 1972, both governments made the decision to put aside the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands issue for settlement later.⁶²⁷ In 1978, the PRC and Japanese governments signed the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty,

⁶²⁴ For details on the historical background to claims of sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, see Unryu Suganuma, *Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations* (Honolulu: Association for Asian Studies and University of Hawaii Press, 2000), pp.117-123, and Giovanni Segni, 'The Diaoyu Tai Dispute Implications Regarding Chinese National Identity and Cross-Strait Relations', *Asian Profile*, 26, 1, 1998, pp.1-8. For studies of the *Baodiao* movement and sovereignty issue in the Chinese language, see Lin Tianfu 林田富, *Diaoyutailieyu zhuquan zhengyi* 釣魚臺列嶼主權爭議 (The Dispute over Sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands) (Taipei: Wunantushuchuban youxiangongsi, 2002); Zheng Hailin 鄭海麟, *Diaoyudaolieyu zhi lishi yu falv yanjiu* 釣魚島之歷史與法理研究 (A Study of the History and Legal Issues Relating to the Diaoyu Islands) (Beijing: Zhonghuashuju, 2007).

⁶²⁵ For more information, see Daniel Tretiak, 'The Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1978: The Senkaku Incident Prelude', *Asian Survey*, 18, 12, 1978, pp.1235-1249.

⁶²⁶ Suganuma, *Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations*, pp.131-132.

⁶²⁷ *Ibid.*

and both countries once again decided to shelve the issue, to be settled by ‘future generations’.⁶²⁸ The problem of sovereignty over the islands was never resolved officially. Since the early 1970s, the treaty actions by the US and Japanese governments, and by right-wing super-patriots in Japan helped give rise to several waves of the *Baodiao* phenomenon among Chinese communities in the US, Canada, and Hong Kong.

The 1990 *Baodiao* Campaign in Hong Kong

The first *Baodiao* campaign in Hong Kong of 1971, as noted in Chapter Five, was a response to the movement started by Chinese students in the US. After 1971, two waves of the *Baodiao* movement erupted in Hong Kong in the 1990s. In September 1990, the Diaoyu Islands came under the spotlight again when the Maritime Safety Agency of Japan announced its recognition of the lighthouse built by a Japanese non-governmental body, as a ‘lawful navigation mark’.⁶²⁹ This announcement triggered another wave of the *Baodiao* phenomenon in Hong Kong. Community groups and university students were the major forces leading the 1990 *Baodiao* campaign. The HKFS in particular was extremely critical of the Chinese government’s response to the sovereignty issue. In an article containing five statements the HKFS criticised the Chinese government for remaining silent, and ‘American imperialists’ for handing the islands over to ‘Japanese imperialists’.⁶³⁰ The HKFS also accused the Chinese

⁶²⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶²⁹ *Ming Pao Daily News*, 20 October 1990.

⁶³⁰ *Xuelianbao* 學聯報, 22/11/1990, p.3.

government of ‘bringing shame to national dignity’ in seeking a ‘20 million-dollar loan’ from Japan.⁶³¹

On 28 October 1990, more than 10,000 people gathered at Victoria Park to participate in a protest march to the Japanese consulate.⁶³² The march was organised by the HKPTU, of which Szeto Wah, well known for his participation in the 4 June 1989 protests in Hong Kong, was one of the leaders. However, the HKFS, after meeting with the organiser, decided not to participate due to ‘differences in opinion’.⁶³³ Two things are of note with regards to the 28 October protest march. First, about a hundred participants were holding the ROC flag and portrait of Sun Yat-sen; the flags were handed out by a right-wing pro-ROC organisation.⁶³⁴ Secondly, about 20 secondary school students participated in the protest, so it was not only tertiary students who were involved. Former chief of the *Wen Hui Bao* Li Zisong (李子誦), who was removed from his post after June Fourth, spoke at the gathering at Victoria Park.⁶³⁵ A small incident occurred when the chief of the *Baixing Bi-monthly* magazine (百姓半月刊) Lu Keng (陸鏗) spoke. He said that he had contacted those who were close to Deng Xiaoping and talked about Deng’s opinion on the issues regarding the Diaoyu Islands. Lu’s comments angered those who held the ROC flag, who stood up and accused Lu of being a ‘traitor’ (賣國賊)⁶³⁶ because they thought Lu was speaking on

⁶³¹ *Ibid.*

⁶³² According to the Defend Diaoyu Islands Action Committee’s own figures, 12,000 people participated in the 28 October march. See the Committee’s website at <http://www.diaoyuislands.org/fw1/1.html>

⁶³³ *Ming Pao Daily News*, 29 October 1990, p.2.

⁶³⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶³⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶³⁶ *Ibid.*

behalf of Deng Xiaoping.⁶³⁷ Others who spoke at the gathering included Cheung Man-kwong and Szeto Wah. The small incident at Victoria Park illustrates how the *Baodiao* campaign was plagued by politics, whether it be Chinese politics or local politics. Even in 1996, the legacy of the CCP-ROC struggle still had some influence on the expression of China-orientated nationalism.

Continuity: Actors in the Two *Baodiao* Campaigns in Hong Kong in 1971 and 1996

Some of the 1996 activists, such as David Chan Yuk-cheung (陳毓祥) and some members of the Democracy Party,⁶³⁸ who participated in the 1996 campaign had already been involved in the 1970s campaign and in the protest against Japan in 1982 regarding the textbook controversy. David Chan in particular served as a significant symbol for the 1996 campaign. He had been involved in the first campaign in 1971 as a high school student,⁶³⁹ and his presence provided both continuity and a source of inspiration for other activists, both old and new to the campaign. Although the leading activists' involvement provided continuity, their involvement alone does not explain why the 1996 campaign broke out. Moreover, why did the 1996 campaign attract more attention and responses compared to the previous campaigns? To answer these questions we need to examine the wider social and political contexts and the *Baodiao* leaders' background.

⁶³⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶³⁸ These included legislators Cheung Man-kwong (張文光) and Szeto Wah (司徒華). David Chan had been involved in the 1971 movement as a student. For details and a brief biography of Chan, see *Sing Tao Daily News*, 27 September 1996, p.A20.

⁶³⁹ *Sing Tao Daily News*, 27 September 1996, p.A20.

The 1997 Psyche: The Social and Political Factors

The 1996 *Baodiao* campaign must be analysed against the social and political contexts of Hong Kong on the eve of the 1997 handover. While there is no concrete proof to show that every Hong Kong citizen who participated in the 1996 campaign did so because of a need to show loyalty on the eve of 1997, there is some evidence that the psychological pressure in relation to 1997 might have prompted some Hong Kong people to participate in the *Baodiao* phenomenon. First, according to one survey conducted in July 1996, there was a noticeable increase in the number of people who identified themselves as ‘Chinese’, from nineteen per cent in 1993 to 30 per cent in April 1996.⁶⁴⁰ However, in another survey, over 50 per cent of Hong Kong youth identified themselves as ‘Hong Kong people’.⁶⁴¹ These surveys show that although the Hong Kong identity remained strong, the handover did have a psychological impact on Hong Kong people’s attitude towards China. Therefore, the large-scale participation in the 1996 campaign could be *in part* explained by the 1997 psyche and the sudden surge of nationalistic feelings.

Secondly, Hong Kong had been in a struggle regarding greater democracy since the late 1980s and, as discussed in the previous chapter, the massive response to June Fourth was the product of the Chinese democracy movement as well as Hong Kong’s own struggle for democracy. The late 1990s saw much

⁶⁴⁰ Maureen Pao, ‘Identity Crisis’, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 161, 28, 1998, pp.62-64.

⁶⁴¹ Qi Xin 齊辛, ‘Xianggang minzuzhuyi qingxu de yongqi’ 香港民族主義情緒的湧起 (The Upsurge of Nationalistic Sentiments in Hong Kong), *Jiushi niandai* 九十年代 (The Nineties), October 1996, pp.60-61. Qi Xin (齊辛) is a pen name of Li Yi (李怡), a well-known Hong Kong commentator on China affairs. Li Yi founded *Qishi niandai* 七十年代 (The Seventies), which became *Bashi niandai* 八十年代 (The Eighties) and *Jiushi niandai* 九十年代 (The Nineties).

greater participation by Hong Kong people in local politics. In March 1995, elections for the Urban Council and the Regional Council were held and 560,000 electors turned out to vote. In September, the Legislative Council elections were held and it was the first time in Hong Kong history the Council was wholly elected. The geographical elections had a record turnout of 920,000 and the functional constituency elections had a record turnout of 460,000.⁶⁴²

Therefore, while some of the participants in the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign might have been driven by a sense of nationalism in opposing Japan's claims to the islands, it is possible that the 1996 campaign provided some with an emotional outlet for their concern over the future of Hong Kong on the eve of 1997.⁶⁴³ Of course, the lack of action on the part of the Chinese government could be another contributing factor.⁶⁴⁴ However, can we use the same arguments to explain the leaders' intentions and participation in the 1996 campaign? I shall examine the motives of the leading activists separately, for some of them were political activists and/or had a very different background compared to the masses, and thus I believe they had specific reasons to participate in the campaign.

For leading *Baodiao* activist David Chan Yuk-cheung, the reasons for participating in the campaign appear to have been personal. Chan was in the 7

⁶⁴² Hong Kong Government, *Hong Kong Annual Report 1996* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1996), p.5.

⁶⁴³ Commentators argued that the large scale participation was the result of the surge of nationalistic sentiments on the eve of 1997. See Qi Xin 齊辛, 'Xianggang minzuzhuyi qingxu de yongqi' (香港民族主義情緒的湧起 The Upsurge of Nationalistic Sentiments in Hong Kong), *The Nineties*, October 1996, pp.60-61; Arai Hifumi, 'Angry at China? Slam Japan', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 3 October 1996, p.21.

⁶⁴⁴ Wang Xingqing 王杏慶, 'Taigang renmin baodiao rechao de jiedu' 台港人民保釣熱潮的解讀 (An Interpretation of the Waves of the *Baodiao* Movement of Taiwanese and Hong Kong people), *Yazhou zhoukan* 亞洲周刊 (Asia Week), 10, 41, 1996, p.24.

July demonstration during the 1971 *Baodiao* campaign and was a prominent figure of the China Faction during his studies at the University of Hong Kong in the 1970s.⁶⁴⁵ Chan originally held a negative view of the Cultural Revolution in China, but a trip to Yan'an sparked his nationalistic sentiments as he was inspired by Mao's teachings.⁶⁴⁶ Chan graduated from the University of Hong Kong in 1975, worked for Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK) for over ten years and hosted public affairs shows on television. After the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, Chan was so shocked by the events of 4 June that he became a monk for a week.⁶⁴⁷ In an essay written in 1990, Chan admitted that June Fourth shattered his 'China dream' and that he decided to remake his 'Hong Kong dream' and 'China dream'.⁶⁴⁸ In 1991, Chan was a candidate in the Legislative Council elections where he adopted the slogan 'staying in Hong Kong and building Hong Kong' (留港建港). Chan lost in the Legislative Council elections in 1991 and again in 1995, and in the 1995 Urban Council elections.⁶⁴⁹ It was reported that Chan lost the elections because a group of people, including the political activist entertainer Johnny Shum, exposed his background as a member of the China Faction in a newspaper advertisement.⁶⁵⁰ In my opinion, the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign provided Chan an opportunity to renew and promote not only his nationalistic ideals, but his political aspirations for Hong Kong's future.

⁶⁴⁵ In fact, Chan was holding a portrait of Sun Yat-sen in the 7 July demonstration at Victoria Park. He was hit by police in the head during the demonstration. See *Apple Daily*, 27 September 1996, p.A5.

⁶⁴⁶ Special Report, 'Xianggang xiaoyuan huohong de niandai' 香港校園火紅的年代 (The Red Hot Years of Hong Kong Universities), *Yazhou zhoukan*, 10, 20, 26 May 1996, p.38.

⁶⁴⁷ *Sing Tao Daily News*, 27 September 1996, p.A20

⁶⁴⁸ Chen Yuxiang 陳毓祥, *Chen Yuxiang xuanwenji lizhipian* 陳毓祥選文集勵志篇 (Selected Works of Chan Yuk-cheung: Aiming High) (Xianggang: Yuxiang wenhua fuwushe, 1998), pp.1-4.

⁶⁴⁹ *Apple Daily*, 27 September 1996, p.A5.

⁶⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

Ho Chun-yan (Albert Ho) was another leader in the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign, but his background was different from that of David Chan. Although Ho was active in student politics when he was a student at the University of Hong Kong in the early 1970s, he was not in the China Faction. In fact, he was not on good terms with the China Faction, and he attempted to challenge the China Faction's domination over the student movement.⁶⁵¹ Ho graduated in 1974, but even after his graduation, he was criticised, in 1976, by pro-China students as a troublemaker who had attempted to cause divisions in the student movement in 1973.⁶⁵² Ho believed he was criticised because of his critical views on the Cultural Revolution. In 1996, Ho was a legislator of the Democratic Party and had been involved in the Hong Kong democracy movement in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It is apparent that Ho participated in the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign not because he was pro-China, but rather for Hong Kong-orientated political reasons. The reported arrest of Chinese *Baodiao* activist Tong Zeng (童增) in mid-September might also have provoked the Democrats in Hong Kong, including Tsang Kin-sing (曾建成), who had been a democracy activist since Hong Kong's response to June Fourth in 1989 and perceived the arrest as a sign that the Chinese government was suppressing the *Baodiao* campaign.⁶⁵³ Why did the Democratic Party and democracy activists participate in the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign? To answer this question it might be useful to examine the political context before and after the 1996 campaign.

⁶⁵¹ The student movement and student politics in general were dominated by the pro-China faction in the early 1970s. For details, see Chapter Three of this thesis.

⁶⁵² *Ming Pao Daily News*, 8 February 2004, p.D4.

⁶⁵³ *Apple Daily*, 18 September 1996, p.A2. Tsang was a member of the Democratic Party until 2000 and served in both the Urban Council and the Legislative Council.

Political Factors: The Democrats in 1996

Relations between the Democrats and Beijing became severely strained after the 1989 pro-democracy movement. It was suggested that the Democrats were involved in the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign as an attempt to repair their relations with Beijing. There is no solid proof for that theory. In fact, the Democrats had been very outspoken about their political stance since the 1980s particularly following their response to June Fourth in 1989. In any case, with the benefit of hindsight, there is no doubt that the months in which the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign occurred were also a politically turbulent period in Hong Kong politics. There was a race involving over 5,800 people trying to get into the 400-member Selection Committee,⁶⁵⁴ the official body with the power to elect the first chief executive and shape ‘the major arms of the first SAR government’.⁶⁵⁵ The Selection Committee and the candidates in the chief executive election made headlines in the press at the same time as the *Baodiao* fever did. Moreover, shortly after the decline of the *Baodiao* phenomenon, the new post-1997 Legislative Council was announced and no one from the Democratic Party was included.⁶⁵⁶ On 2 October, Hong Kong’s last Governor Chris Patten made his final policy address, which caused a stir in the media, for in it Patten made the accusation that ‘some people’ in Hong Kong could be giving away Hong Kong’s autonomy ‘bit by bit’.⁶⁵⁷ The Democrats were known

⁶⁵⁴ *South China Morning Post*, 15 September 1996, p.2.

⁶⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 14 September 1996, p.17.

⁶⁵⁶ Tsang, *A Modern History of Hong Kong*, p.266.

⁶⁵⁷ Legislative Council, *Hong Kong Hansard: Official Record of Proceedings*, 2 October 1996, p.59. For examples of newspaper reports on Patten’s comment, see *Hong Kong Standard*, 3 October 1996, p.1; *Sing Tao Daily News*, 3 October 1996, p.A16, A19; *Ming Pao Daily News*, 3 October 1996, p.A2.

for their opposition to the Provisional Legislative Council.⁶⁵⁸ Taking all the political factors and Albert Ho's personal background into account, it would not be unreasonable to argue that the democrats probably used the *Baodiao* campaign as part of their political campaign to voice their frustration at Beijing's control over the future of Hong Kong. Notably, though, they did so by means of expressing patriotic sentiments over the *Baodiao* issue at a time when Beijing was relatively silent on the issue. Thus, when confronted with the criticism that the Democrats participated in the *Baodiao* campaign to show their loyalty to the central Chinese government at an auspicious time before the handover, Cheung Man-kwong of the Democratic Party, for example, argued that when it came to matters regarding Chinese patriotism, political interests were not part their consideration.⁶⁵⁹ Both Cheung and Albert Ho constructed the *Baodiao* campaign as an 'anti-imperialist' campaign.⁶⁶⁰ I shall examine Ho's rhetoric in more detail in the final section of the chapter.

Immediate Trigger: Japan's Claim to the Islands in 1996

While the psychological pressure on Hong Kong people on the eve of 1997 and the Democrats' political agenda were the main causes of the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign, one should also take into consideration the more immediate external trigger: Japan's claim to the islands in 1996. In 1996, several Japanese government officials, including Foreign Minister Ikeda Yukihiro, claimed that the Diaoyu Islands belonged to Japan. Ikeda on several occasions, including

⁶⁵⁸ For example, see *Sing Tao Daily News*, 3 October 1996, p.A16.

⁶⁵⁹ *Yazhou Zhoukan* 亞洲周刊, 14-20 October 1996, p.34.

⁶⁶⁰ See, for example, Zhang Wenguang 張文光, 'Baodiao shi xianggang gongtong de shengyin' 保釣是香港共同的聲音 (The *Baodiao* movement is the unified voice of Hong Kong), *Yazhou Zhoukan* 亞洲周刊 (Asia Week), 7 October – 13 October 1996, p.18.

during his visit to Hong Kong, asserted Japanese sovereignty over the islands.⁶⁶¹ The Consul-General of Japan in Hong Kong stated that the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue was merely a minor incident, and, like Ikeda, asserted Japanese sovereignty over the islands.⁶⁶² Adding insult to injury, members of the Japan Youth Federation, an extreme nationalist group, constructed a lighthouse and a war memorial on one of the islands.⁶⁶³ These events sparked off major repercussions in Hong Kong. On 16 September 1996, 13,000 people including representatives from Taiwan and Macau participated in a protest march. During the march, Jin Jieshou from Taipei waved the ROC flag while some waved the PRC flag. The protest called for a boycott of Japanese goods and participants yelled slogans such as ‘down with Japanese militarism’.⁶⁶⁴ However, not all responded to the call for a boycott of Japanese goods.⁶⁶⁵

On 18 September 1996, which marked the sixty-seventh anniversary of the Shenyang Incident (瀋陽事變/九一八事變), the Hong Kong Democratic Party held a protest at the Cultural Centre in Kowloon. Five hundred thousand students from 600 schools mourned in a moment of silence to commemorate the

⁶⁶¹ Giovanni Segni, ‘The Diaoyu Tai Dispute Implications Regarding Chinese National Identity and Cross-Strait Relations’, *Asian Profile*, 26, 1, 1998, pp.1-8. See also, Ming K. Chan, ‘Global Implications of Hong Kong’s Retrocession to Chinese Sovereignty’, in *Hong Kong’s Reunion with China: The Global Dimensions* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), p.41; and the website of the Hong Kong Defend Diaoyutai Action Committee at www.diaoyuislands.org/fw1/1.html (25 May 2009).

⁶⁶² Ming K. Chan, ‘Global Implications of Hong Kong’s Retrocession to Chinese Sovereignty’, in *Hong Kong’s Reunion with China: The Global Dimensions* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), p.41. See also *Yazhou zhoukan*, 7 October – 13 October 1996, p.35.

⁶⁶³ Author unknown, ‘You say Senkaku, I say Diaoyu’, *The Economist*, 7 September 1996, pp.28-30. The Japan Youth Federation was not an insignificant group. For it had some 3,000 members, and some 750 large vans painted with patriotic slogans that drive through cities blaring nationalistic messages through loudspeakers’. For details, see Sebastian Moffett, ‘The Right and Its Wrongs’, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 21 November 1996, pp.28-30.

⁶⁶⁴ *Sing Tao Daily News*, 16 September 1996, p.A2.

⁶⁶⁵ *Sing Tao Daily News*, 19 September 1996, p.A16. See also, *South China Morning Post*, 19 September 1996, p.3.

anniversary. The Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB) organised a signature campaign, which saw the collection of about 760,000 signatures, which were given to the Consulate-General of Japan in Hong Kong. The Hok Yau Club submitted 50,000 signatures.⁶⁶⁶ While nationalistic sentiments were surging in the colony, the most daring of the activists, in order to escalate the protest, made plans to sail to the islands.

First Trip to the Diaoyu Islands: *Kien Hwa 2's Baodiao* Activists Divided

On 26 September 1996, seventeen activists led by David Chan Yuk-Cheung embarked for the Diaoyu Islands. The trip was organised hastily as the planning took only a month or so before the group's departure. Wong's memoir provides many details of the first trip, particularly interactions between the activists.⁶⁶⁷ Officially, tanker captain Ngai Lup-chee and David Chan were the 'commanders-in-chief'.⁶⁶⁸ The rest of the team were divided into three groups, with five members in each, all led by Chui Yuk-chun (徐玉親), a full-time fireman and part-time lifeguard, who was handpicked by Ngai to be leader of the team. Other members such as Wong, Kwok Chung-man, and Fung Ho-shum had experience on the sea. Conversely, David Chan had almost no nautical experience. It is not surprising that there would be conflicts between the

⁶⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶⁷ Another useful source which provides details of divisions among the activists is an article written by Wang Ruizhi (王睿智). For details, see Wang Ruizhi 王睿智, *Diaoyutai haiyu shengsijie* 釣魚臺海域生死劫 (Life and Death in the Diaoyu Islands), *Yazhou zhoukan* 亞洲周刊 (Asia Week), 7 October – 13 October 1996, pp.29-32.

⁶⁶⁸ Huang Weiming 黃偉明, *Juezhhan diaoyutai: yi ge baodiao weishi de zishu* 決戰釣魚台：一個保釣衛士的自述 (A Personal Statement of a Protector of the Diaoyu Islands) (Xianggang: Nianyishiji gainian youxiangongsi, 1997), p.12.

members when it came to execution of plans. In fact, when the activists decided to have people jump into the water they could not agree on the method to tie them together.⁶⁶⁹ There were also other times when there were arguments between the activists.⁶⁷⁰

It was reported that five members including Chan threw themselves off the 32-year-old vessel *Kien Hwa 2* (建華二號) as a gesture symbolising Chinese sovereignty over the islands. According to the memoir by Wong Wai-ming (黃偉明), a *Baodiao* activist on board *Kien Hwa 2*, three of the five who jumped climbed back up onto the deck, while Chan and another person were still struggling in the water. Three were tied together by ropes.⁶⁷¹ Chan was the last to be rescued, but was pronounced dead from drowning by a Japanese doctor three hours after the accident.⁶⁷²

Who should be blamed for the accident? The question was discussed in the media following the group's return to Hong Kong.⁶⁷³ Wong Wai-ming never blamed anyone in particular, although he *did* question the captain's decision to let the activists jump into the water. Wong remarked that the captain was under much pressure from the activists, who certainly did not want to return to Hong Kong without doing something significant.⁶⁷⁴ The fact that the captain gave his

⁶⁶⁹ Huang, *Juezhhan diaoyutai*, p.32.

⁶⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p.9.

⁶⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p.32.

⁶⁷² *Ibid.*, p.30.

⁶⁷³ See, for example, Author unknown, 'Woyao wen weilizhi wuge wenti' 我要問魏立志五個問題 (I want to ask Ngai Lap-chee Five Questions), *Apple Daily*, 2 October 1996, p.F8. The author claimed that Ngai was responsible for David Chan's death and that Chan was a victim of the incident.

⁶⁷⁴ Huang, *Juezhhan diaoyutai*, p.115.

permission too quickly was confirmed by a newspaper report as well.⁶⁷⁵ Other activists who were on the boat never blamed Ngai Lap-chee. In fact, they clearly showed their support for Ngai on their return to Hong Kong.⁶⁷⁶ Even experts commented that although Ngai was the captain, the activists were not officially under his command like professional sailors, and that their activities were of a political nature, something Ngai could not have had complete control over. According to Wong's account, Ngai himself urged the activists to jump into the water as he thought it was their only chance to do so.⁶⁷⁷ According to a magazine report, Ngai admitted that he allowed the activists to jump into the water because he saw that they were disappointed when the original plan to land on the island was cancelled.⁶⁷⁸ The tragedy illustrates how in a nationalistic movement emotions could run high to the point where they overrode rational thinking, and how a nationalist fever could affect the activists.

The death of David Chan reinforced the *Baodiao* sentiments of Hong Kong people.⁶⁷⁹ In Hong Kong approximately 30,000 gathered in Victoria Park to mourn Chan's death, hailed him as a martyr, and stressed unity in the *Baodiao* campaign.⁶⁸⁰ Chan was hailed by the Hong Kong media such as the *Ming Pao Daily News* as a martyr for the cause. One commentator in *Apple Daily* hailed

⁶⁷⁵ *Sing Tao Daily News*, 28 September 1996, p.A16.

⁶⁷⁶ *Sing Tao Daily News*, 28 September 1996, p.A2.

⁶⁷⁷ Huang, *Juezhuan diaoyutai*, p.115.

⁶⁷⁸ *Yizhou kan* 壹周刊 (Next Magazine), 4 October 1996, p.54.

⁶⁷⁹ Zhang Wenguang 張文光, 'Baodiao shi xianggang gongtong de shengyin' 保釣是香港共同的聲音 (The *Baodiao* Movement is the Unified Voice of Hong Kong), *Yazhou zhoukan* 亞洲周刊 (Asia Week), 7 October – 13 October 1996, p.18.

⁶⁸⁰ *Ming Pao Daily News*, 30 September 1996, A1. Some reports estimated that as many as 50,000 participated in the gathering. See, for example, <http://www.diaoyuislands.org/fwl/1.html>.

Chan as a ‘true patriot’ and criticised Hong Kong politicians as ‘fake patriots’.⁶⁸¹ Cheung Man-kwong (張文光), a member of the Legislative Council (Legco) and of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China (香港市民支援愛國民主運動聯合會), stated that the death of Chen united all political groups and *Baodiao* activists in Hong Kong.⁶⁸²

Li Yi, who had been critical of the surge of nationalistic sentiments from the beginning, stated that the two governments should make clear their positions on the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute otherwise more ‘would sacrifice themselves for the sake of protecting Chinese territory’.⁶⁸³ Like the case of Tsang Tak-sing in the 1967 riots, the death of David Chan in 1996 shows how martyrs of nationalism were constructed by the media, and stories of these martyrs sparked more discussions about patriotism. At the same time, Chan’s death brought Chan’s family and fellow *Baodiao* activists pain. Johnny Shum, a *Baodiao* activist in 1971 and a well-known democracy activist in 1989, was devastated by Chan’s death.⁶⁸⁴

October 1996: Second Trip to the Diaoyu Islands

The second trip to the Diaoyu Islands was a joint operation of Hong Kong and Taiwan activists. They were led by Hong Kong activist Albert Ho Chun-yan (何俊仁) of the Democratic Party, and Taiwanese activist Jin Jieshou (金介壽).

⁶⁸¹ Ling Feng 凌鋒, ‘Chen Yuxiang xisheng he zhenjiaaiguo’ 陳毓祥犧牲和真假愛國 (David Chan Yuk-cheung’s Sacrifice and Real versus Fake Patriotism), *Apple Daily*, 28 September 1996, p.F2.

⁶⁸² Zhang Wenguang 張文光, ‘Baodiao shi xianggang gongtong de shengyin’ (保釣是香港共同的聲音), *Yazhou zhouban* 亞洲周刊 (Asia Week), 7 October – 13 October 1996, p.18.

⁶⁸³ *Apple Daily*, 28 September 1996, p.F8.

⁶⁸⁴ *Sing Tao Daily News*, 27 September 1996, p.B16, p.A19.

The fact that both Albert Ho and Tsang Kin-sing were members of the Democratic Party did not mean that all members of the Democratic Party supported Tsang's plan to sail to the Diaoyu Islands. It was reported that initially his plan was criticised by the majority of Democratic Party members. Under the influence of the media as well as the surge of nationalistic sentiments among the masses, the Democratic Party eventually decided to lead the *Baodiao* campaign.⁶⁸⁵

On the night of 6 October, activists embarked on a joint expedition to the Diaoyu Islands on 39 fishing boats carrying about 200 activists as well as journalists, from the Taiwanese port Jilong/Keelung (基隆). Of the 200 activists, about 90 were from Hong Kong and the rest were from Taiwan. Officially, the objective of the trip was the 'display of sovereignty', but Ho, the leader of Hong Kong activists, did not rule out the possibility of landing on the islands and dismantling the lighthouse built by the Japan Youth Federation.⁶⁸⁶ On 7 October, at approximately 3am, as the activists were about 20 miles from the Diaoyu Islands, Japanese coast guards appeared attempting to intercept the fishing boats.⁶⁸⁷ Two activists, Chan Yu-lam (陳裕南), a taxi driver from Hong Kong,⁶⁸⁸ and Taiwanese representative Jin Jiesshou of the pro-unification New Party successfully evaded the Japanese coast guards and landed on one of the islands at 6:14am. Chan planted the PRC flag while Jin planted the ROC flag.⁶⁸⁹ Chan Yu-

⁶⁸⁵ *Ming Pao Daily News*, 16 December 1998.

⁶⁸⁶ *Ming Pao Daily News*, 5 October 1996, p.A2.

⁶⁸⁷ *Ming Pao Daily News*, 8 October 1996, p.A2.

⁶⁸⁸ *Ibid.* See also *Next Magazine*, 344, 11 October 1996, pp.43-55.

⁶⁸⁹ Giovanni Segni, 'The Diaoyu Tai Dispute Implications Regarding Chinese National Identity and Cross-straits Relations', *Asian Profile*, 26, 1, 1998, pp.1-8. See also *Next Magazine*, 344, 11 October 1996, pp.43-55; and *Ming Pao Daily News*, 8 October 1996, p.A2.

lam, who happened to be standing next to Tsang Kin-sing, second-in-charge of the operation, when Tsang was giving orders to the group in Keelong the night before the operation, was asked by Tsang to participate in the landing.⁶⁹⁰ Chan and Tsang were good friends and were on the same boat as Jin Jieshou during the operation.⁶⁹¹ Chan planted not only the PRC flag but also a yellow flag containing hundreds of Hong Kong people's signatures proclaiming 'Chinese territory Diaoyu Islands'.⁶⁹²

Politics of the 1996 *Baodiao* Campaign on a Macro-level: Hong Kong *versus* Taiwan

On the surface when the PRC and ROC flags were planted side by side it looked as if Hong Kong and Taiwan activists worked together in the campaign to defend the Diaoyu Islands, but there was an occasion where Taiwanese activists clashed with Hong Kong activists due to the former's political agenda. In fact, the planting of two flags only served to signify how problematic and limited China-orientated nationalism was in the *Baodiao* movement in the context of cross-strait relations between greater China and Taiwan. Several observations can be made regarding the complex nature of the politics of the movement. First, some of the Taiwanese activists were fighting for Taiwan's fishing rights and believed the islands belonged to Taiwan. It has been argued that for the Taiwanese, *Baodiao* was about the ROC's claim to the islands and, as part of this,

⁶⁹⁰ *Ming Bao zhoukan* 明報周刊 (Ming Pao Weekly), 1455, 29 September 1996, pp.94-97.

⁶⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹² *South China Morning Post*, 8 October 1996, p.11. See also, *Ming Bao zhoukan* 明報周刊 (Ming Pao Weekly), 1457, 13 October 1996, pp.94-97.

Taiwanese fishing rights.⁶⁹³ This is not at all surprising considering it has been stated that the islands are surrounded by rich fish stocks and undersea oil resources.⁶⁹⁴ The pro-independence Taiwanese activists in fact had a negative opinion of the Hong Kong *Baodiao* campaign and even held a hostile attitude towards Hong Kong people during the campaign,⁶⁹⁵ believing that the islands belonged to the ROC.⁶⁹⁶ In fact, there was an incident in which pro-independence Taiwanese activists shouted at Hong Kong activists outside their hotel.

An analogy has been drawn between the case of the PRC and that of the ROC in terms of official attitudes and interests: that both mainland China and Taiwan had their own political and economic considerations and were therefore reluctant to take rash political actions regarding the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute.⁶⁹⁷ In this sense, the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue became not just an outlet of Chinese nationalistic sentiments, but also a battleground taken up by dissidents in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan who could use the issue to portray themselves as the defenders of Chinese or Taiwanese sovereignty and economic interests.

⁶⁹³ Lai Xiuru 賴秀如, 'Diaoyutai taiwan zhibao yuquan' 釣魚臺：臺灣只保漁權？(Diaoyu Islands: Is Taiwan only Protecting Her Fishing Rights?), *Jiushi niandai* 九十年代 (Asia Week), October 1996, pp.56-59.

⁶⁹⁴ Saganuma, *Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations*, pp.131-132; Chang, *Return of the Dragon*, p.212.

⁶⁹⁵ *Yizhoukan* 壹周刊 (Next Magazine), 11 October 1996, pp.43-55.

⁶⁹⁶ Lin Tianfu 林田富, *Zailun diaoyutai lieyu zhuquan zhengyi* 再論釣魚臺列嶼主權爭議 (Revisiting the Diaoyu Islands Sovereignty Dispute) (Taipei: Wunan chubanshe, 2002).

⁶⁹⁷ Shi Hua 施華, 'Liangan baodiao weihe xianbuqi rechao' 兩岸保釣為何掀不起熱潮 (Why the *Baodiao* Movement Cannot Spark a Fever), *Jiushi niandai* 九十年代 (The Nineties), October 1996, pp.62-63.

Divisions among Local Politicians in Hong Kong

In Hong Kong, not all politicians participated in the *Baodiao* campaign. Some of them simply had no interest in the campaign at all. Tsang Yok-sing (曾鈺成) of the pro-Beijing Democratic Alliance for Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB), for instance, believed that the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute should be settled through diplomatic means, and urged that people in Hong Kong stay calm in the ‘fight against Japanese militarism’.⁶⁹⁸ Christine Loh Kung-hui (陸恭蕙) did not participate in *Baodiao*, and, like Tsang, believed that the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue should be settled by the Chinese and Japanese governments.⁶⁹⁹

The *Baodiao* phenomenon also reflected divisions among Hong Kong people, especially among the democratic camp. Some of the local politicians of the democratic forces, such as Emily Lau Wai-hing (劉慧卿) of The Frontier (前綫) Party, stated that her party gave priority *not* to Chinese patriotism but to local issues such as democratisation in Hong Kong and the welfare of Hong Kong people.⁷⁰⁰ Emily Lau in fact regarded herself as a ‘British citizen of Chinese descent’.⁷⁰¹ However, Lee Cheuk-yan, from the same party as Lau, did participate in the *Baodiao* campaign.⁷⁰² On the other side of the democratic camp, politicians such as Cheung Man-kwong (張文光), Szeto Wah (司徒華), and Albert Ho Chun-yan (何俊仁), who were core members of the Action Committee

⁶⁹⁸ Zheng Yucheng 曾鈺成, ‘Baochi lengjing changqi dasuan’ 保持冷靜，長期打算 (Remaining Calm and Long-term Planning), *Ming Pao Daily News*, 27 September 1996, A12.

⁶⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰⁰ *Yazhou Zhoukan* 亞洲周刊 (Asia Week), 14-20 October 1996, p.34.

⁷⁰¹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰² *Ibid.*

for Defending the Diaoyu Islands (保釣行動委員會), had actively supported the 1989 Chinese student democratic movement, the protests against Japanese altering of textbooks in 1982, and the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign.⁷⁰³ In short, the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign reveals the subtle differences among the democratic forces in terms of individuals' beliefs and actions when it comes to China-related issues and nationalist movements.

Divisions among Tertiary Student Groups

Although tertiary students *did* participate in the *Baodiao* campaign, it was reported that they were divided in their opinions on the campaign. In fact, some students decided not to join the large-scale protest march of 15 September and instead held their own protest. The reason behind this move, according to the spokesperson of the group, was to show that students had a 'separate identity', and that they were not involved in politics.⁷⁰⁴ However, a small number of representatives from the HKFS *did* participate in the 15 September protest march. On another occasion, students from the Chinese University of Hong Kong even complained how everyone was only concerned about the Diaoyutai islands but forgot about the issue regarding the HKSAR Chief Executive Selection Committee.⁷⁰⁵ A committee member of the HKFS remarked that students within the HKFS were divided into three groups as far as their opinions were concerned. There were those who did not wish to say anything about the sovereignty issue surrounding the Diaoyu Islands, although they would support activities with a

⁷⁰³ *Yazhou Zhoukan* 亞洲周刊 (Asia Week), 14-20 October 1996, p.34.

⁷⁰⁴ *Sing Tao Daily News*, 16 September 1996, p.A15.

⁷⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

focus on the rhetoric of anti-imperialism (Japan's claim to the Diaoyu Islands). Another group of students believed that the Diaoyu Islands belonged to China, and that group had a strong sense of nationalism. The third group was completely against the *Baodiao* campaign because these students believed it was more important to protest against the Selection Committee and that the *Baodiao* phenomenon took the focus away from the more pressing issues regarding the future of Hong Kong.⁷⁰⁶

Apathy: Limited Response from the Chinese Government

The Beijing government's concerns were two-fold. For the PRC government the issue of sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands was about maintaining a balance between its own political legitimacy by appealing to popular nationalistic sentiments, and economic development by ensuring access to the international economy, particularly after the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident.⁷⁰⁷ However, the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign was too important to ignore.⁷⁰⁸ It was reported that the official view of the CCP was that it sympathised with the grass-root movement but also wanted to ensure that it would not get out of control.⁷⁰⁹ Official responses from the PRC were vague and at times appeared to be contradictory. The cautious approach employed by Chinese authorities is clearly reflected by their responses in both mainland China and Hong Kong.

⁷⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰⁷ For a detailed discussion on this subject see Erica Strecker Downs and Phillip C. Saunders, 'Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Islands', *International Security*, 1999, 23, 4, pp.114-146. See also Michael Yahuda, *The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995* (London: Routledge, 1996), p.218.

⁷⁰⁸ *Ming Pao Daily News*, 12 October 1996.

⁷⁰⁹ *Ibid.* See also, *Ming Pao Daily News*, 8 October 1996, p.A5.

The Chinese government attempted to distance itself from and suppress the *Baodiao* campaign within China. For instance, it was reported in September 1996 that authorities asked Chinese *Baodiao* activists to leave Beijing for fear that their activities would have a negative impact on Sino-Japanese relations.⁷¹⁰ Conversely, in Hong Kong, the campaign was both a political and grass-root campaign as politicians along with citizens from all walks of life participated. For example, Leung Chi-hung (梁智鴻), chairman of the House Committee of the Hong Kong Legislative Council, sent a letter on behalf of the Legislative Council to the Japanese Prime Minister's office to protest Japan's claim to the Diaoyu Islands.⁷¹¹

Sympathy and Apathy: Responses from Chinese Officials in Hong Kong

Responses from Chinese officials in Hong Kong illustrate the complexity of the Chinese government's attitude towards the *Baodiao* campaign. On more than one occasion, Chinese officials dealing with Hong Kong spoke positively about the *Baodiao* campaign and about Chan's work and character. Zhou Nan (周南), the head of the Xinhua News Agency in Hong Kong and the highest level Chinese official in Hong Kong, on hearing that Chan had drowned openly urged that others whose lives were at risk be helped by any boat nearby, 'regardless of

⁷¹⁰ News Summaries of the Hong Kong Alliance of in Support of the Patriotic Democratic Movements of China 支聯會新聞摘要 <http://www.alliance.org.hk/info/news/9609/news.htm> (8 May 2009). See also *Apple Daily*, 18 September 1996, p.A2.

⁷¹¹ See, for example, letter from Leung Chi-hung to Prime Minister of the Japanese government and Vice Premier of the People's Republic of China, 21 September 1996, CB2/H/3 Pt.I and CB2/H/3 Pt.II.

which country it was',⁷¹² and praised Chan for being a patriot.⁷¹³ Zhang Junsheng of the Xinhua Agency also praised Chan for his work as a patriot. The flag that was used to cover Chan's coffin at his funeral was donated by the Xinhua Agency. Statements by Chinese officials in Hong Kong should not be construed as meaning the Chinese government fully supported the grass-roots *Baodiao* campaign. The focus of Chinese officials' comments was on Chan's life and character rather than on the *Baodiao* campaign, although Zhang *did* speak positively about the campaign as a 'patriotic campaign'.⁷¹⁴

On 13 September 1996, it was reported that the Xinhua Agency in Hong Kong refused to accept a letter from the Action Committee for Defending the Diaoyu Islands (保釣行動委員會) protesting against the Chinese government's crackdown on the *Baodiao* campaign in mainland China.⁷¹⁵ It is clear that the Chinese government's official attitude was to strike a balance between *Baodiao* patriotism and political stability particularly in terms of China's foreign policy.⁷¹⁶ It is important to recognise that the PRC government was put in a difficult position by the *Baodiao* campaign. The nationalistic sentiments of *Baodiao* could be advantageous for the PRC. Conversely, the PRC feared that *Baodiao* might turn into a democratic, anti-government movement like the Tiananmen protests..⁷¹⁷ The Chinese government was often criticised by Hong Kong media

⁷¹² *Ming Pao Daily News*, 27 September 1996, p.A4.

⁷¹³ *Ibid.*

⁷¹⁴ *Sing Tao Daily News*, 28 September 1996, p.A16.

⁷¹⁵ <http://www.alliance.org.hk/info/news/9609/news.htm> 支聯會新聞摘要 (8 May 2009)

⁷¹⁶ *Ming Pao Daily News*, 12 October 1996.

⁷¹⁷ See Takanori Higurashi 日暮高則, 'Senkaku mondai de chuuka nashonarizumu kouyou' 尖閣問題で中華ナショナリズム高揚? (The Rise of Chinese Nationalism in the Senkaku Islands Issue?), *Asahi Shimbun* 朝日新聞, 22 September 1996; and Takeoka Ryo 竹岡亮, 'Senkaku shotou hannichi demo ni miru honkonjin no aikokushin to usanusasa' 尖閣諸島反日「デモ」に

and commentators for its relative silence,⁷¹⁸ despite the PRC's reiterations that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were Chinese territory.⁷¹⁹ Of course, the PRC's relative silence was neither unfounded nor unsound, for Japan was China's major economic partner.⁷²⁰

What is striking about the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign is that groups in Hong Kong, Taiwan and the overseas Chinese community were all major voices against Japan.⁷²¹ The response from China, on both the official and popular levels, was not as strong as that from the periphery. The official Chinese newspaper *Guangming Ribao* (光明日報), for example, did not mention anything regarding the *Baodiao* campaign or any issues about the status of the islands when the campaign was at its peak.⁷²² The relative silence among the mainland media was in line with the cautious approach taken by the Beijing government. In view of the reluctance of the PRC to deal with the issue, it is not difficult to understand why it came under attack particularly from Hong Kong-based journalists.

見る香港人の愛国心とうさん臭さ (The Smell of Hong Kong People's Patriotism as Seen in the Anti-Japanese Senkaku Islands Demonstration), *Shokun* 諸君, 28, 12, 1996, pp.121-123.

⁷¹⁸ See, for example, *Ming Pao* 明報, 2 October 1996, p.D10; Yu Jiwen 余集文, 'Diaoyutai fengyun zhoubian de jinyin' 釣魚臺風雲驟變的近因 (The Immediate Trigger of the Diaoyutai Issue), *Jiushi niandai* 九十年代 (The Nineties), October 1996, pp.47-49; and 'Chinese Foreign Ministry News Briefings', *Beijing Review*, 23-29 September 1996, p.11; 'Chinese Foreign Ministry News Briefings', *Beijing Review*, 30 September-6 October 1996, p.12; Guan Wenliang 關文亮, 'Beijing chuli diaoyutai shijian zhihui buzhu' 北京處理釣魚臺事件智慧不足 (Beijing's Lack of Wisdom in Handling the Diaoyutai Issue), *Ming Pao Daily News*, 29 October 1996, p.A5.

⁷¹⁹ 'Chinese Foreign Ministry News Briefings', *Beijing Review*, 23-29 September 1996, p.11; 'Chinese Foreign Ministry News Briefings', *Beijing Review*, 30 September-6 October 1996, p.12.

⁷²⁰ For details see Micheline Beaudry-Somcynsky and Chris M. Cook, *Japan's System of Official Development Assistance Profiles in Partnership No.1* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1999), pp.151-152.

⁷²¹ Liang Hu Xueji 梁胡雪姬, 'Baodiao yundong de yaoyi huiguang' 保釣運動的妖異迴光 (The Strange Return of the *Baodiao* Movement), *Jiushi niandai* 九十年代 (The Nineties), October 1996, pp.22-23.

⁷²² Close examination of the microfilm version of *Guangming Ribao* 光明日報 that was published in the fourth quarter of 1996, reveals that no reports or references were made to the *Baodiao* movement or the issue of sovereignty regarding the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. No article or commentary whatsoever on the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue could be found. This was also noted by commentators, see, for example, *Ming Pao Daily News*, 2 October 1996.

Commentators argued that although the PRC government verbally placed emphasis on territorial integrity, it was not prepared to take actions regarding the Diaoyu/Senkaku incident.⁷²³ They also argued that the PRC and ROC governments' relative silence upset Hong Kong Chinese and the 1996 protests were in fact targeted at the two governments.⁷²⁴ Therefore, instead of viewing the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign as simply a 'nationalist' campaign, we can argue that it was also a campaign to criticise the Chinese government for its reluctance to take action against Japan's claim to the Diaoyu Islands.

Media Responses to the 1996 *Baodiao* Campaign

Throughout the *Baodiao* campaign, the Chinese-language media in Hong Kong acted as a significant agent in the dissemination of nationalistic sentiments. The English language reports contrasted sharply with Chinese language newspapers, which often contained passionate responses to the campaign, particularly in the editorial and letters-to-the-editor sections. Terms such as 'aggression' and 'threat' were used by the Chinese-language media to describe Japan's actions.⁷²⁵ . Japan's role as the aggressor in WWII was constantly reiterated and emphasised in magazines and newspapers.

⁷²³Liang Hu Xueji 梁胡雪姬, 'Baodiao yundong de yaoyi huiguang' 保釣運動的妖異迴光 (The Strange Return of the *Baodiao* Movement), *Jiushi niandai* 九十年代 (The Nineties), October 1996, pp.22-23; Lin Heng 林恆, 'Yiyang baodiao minjian guanfang butong diao' 一樣保釣, 民間官方不同調 (The Same *Baodiao* Movement, Officials and the Masses have a Different Tone), *Jiushi niandai* 九十年代 (The Nineties), October 1996, p.59.

⁷²⁴ Fang Su 方蘇, 'Qizhi zhi zheng yu teshou zhi zheng' 旗幟之爭與特首之爭 (Flag Contest and Chief Executive Contest), *Jiushi niandai* 九十年代 (The Nineties), October 1996, pp.43-45.

⁷²⁵ See, for example, *Ming Pao Daily News*, 2 October 1996, D10; and Yu Jiwen 余集文, 'Diaoyutai zhengyi huadangnian' 釣魚臺爭議話當年 (On the Past Diaoyu Islands Dispute), *Jiushi niandai* 九十年代 (The Nineties), October 1996, pp.50-52.

Hong Kong Chief Secretary Anson Chan Fang On-sang (陳方安生), during her visit to Australia, when asked about the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue, used the Japanese term ‘Senkaku’ instead of the Chinese term ‘Diaoyu’. After her return to Hong Kong Anson Chan was soon confronted by the media regarding her use of the Japanese name for the islands. Anson Chan stressed that she used the Japanese term simply because it was a non-Chinese reporter who asked her the question, that she believed it would be clearer to use the English translation ‘Senkaku’, and that it was not her intention to convey any sort of subtle political innuendo by using the Japanese term.⁷²⁶

War in the Media: Popular Nationalism as Censorship

During the campaign, the Hong Kong media were criticised for overreacting. Hong Kong-based Japanese journalist Arai Hifumi (新井ひふみ, 新井一三), for example, criticised the Hong Kong media for inciting nationalistic sentiments. In the Hong Kong newspaper *Apple Daily* (蘋果日報) Arai argued that the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue was blown out of proportion, that the issue should be left to the Chinese and Japanese governments to resolve, that the *Baodiao* phenomenon in Hong Kong was caused by Hong Kong’s pre-1997 political and psychological tensions and was utilised by some to expose the inability of the PRC, and that Japanese people became the victims of Hong Kong

⁷²⁶ *Ming Pao Daily News*, 30 September 1996, A4. See also *Yazhou zhoukan* 亞洲周刊 (Asia Week), 7 October – 13 October 1996, p.12.

people's 'blowing off steam'.⁷²⁷ Arai also noted in the 3 October issue of *Far Eastern Economic Review*:

The Chinese government has been promoting nationalism in the territory as the handover approaches. Hong Kong people have increasingly been under political pressure to keep in line with Beijing.

It is no secret the citizens of Hong Kong are disillusioned by the Chinese government, feeling that the promise of 'Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong' has become nothing more than an empty slogan. Their frustration was suppressed until a handful of Japanese extremists provided them with an emotional outlet...

The current fury over the Diaoyu Islands has more to do with Hong Kong people's frustration towards Beijing than anything else. Japan is an easy target, not only because of its record of aggression but also because of its insensitivity towards Asian neighbours ... I personally hope the two governments will resolve the dispute peacefully. However, that might not be what nationalistic Hong Kong wishes to see. They want to have a say, if only to blow off steam.⁷²⁸

Taking into account Hong Kong's political circumstances in 1996, which I explained at the beginning of the chapter, we can see that there is some element of truth to Arai's comments. However, I do not believe that Hong Kong people were trying to show their loyalty to Beijing through the *Baodiao* campaign, for they were very outspoken against Beijing's handling of the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. Further, Hong Kong people made it clear in their response to

⁷²⁷ *Apple Daily*, 22 September 1996, p.E6. See also, *Yazhou zhoukan* 亞洲周刊 (Asia Week), 7 October – 13 October 1996, p.12.

⁷²⁸ Arai Hifumi, 'Angry at China? Slam Japan', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 3 October 1996, p.21.

June Fourth that they were concerned about the future of Hong Kong more than anything and this did not necessarily mean that they were trying to show their loyalty to Beijing through the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign.

Nevertheless, I agree with Arai's view that the true concern of Hong Kong people in the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign was Hong Kong's future, not Chinese sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands; and that the real target was Beijing, not Japan. Both the Diaoyutai issue and Hong Kong's return to China were related to the issue of territorial sovereignty. It was natural for Hong Kong people to link them together not because of their desire to respond to China's call for patriotism, but because of their concern over the future of Hong Kong. In short, the 1996 *Baodiao* phenomenon represented Hong Kong people's own interpretation of what it meant to be a patriot, which was fuelled by their concern over the colony's future and to some extent Hong Kong's struggle for democracy. In fact, a commentator argued if Hong Kong people were willing to defend some islands that were unrelated to them, then obviously they would be determined to defend Hong Kong's future. Therefore, the *Baodiao* campaign represented Hong Kong people's expression of their determination to defend not only the Diaoyu Islands but also, more importantly, Hong Kong.⁷²⁹ Moreover, I believe that those participating in the *Baodiao* campaign, particularly the Democrats, probably wanted to voice their frustration not only at Beijing's inability to deal with the Diaoyutai issue but more importantly her tight rein over the development of democracy in Hong Kong. Japan and 'Japanese militarism' were merely a

⁷²⁹ Jin Zhong 金鐘, 'Minzu zhuyi zai fangxing' 民族主義再反省 (Rethinking Nationalism), *Open Magazine* 開放雜誌, 118, October 1996, p.6.

convenient scapegoat and tool for expressing that frustration. However, such critical views were not welcomed when the *Baodiao* fever was at its peak. Arai immediately came under attack from readers of *Apple Daily* as well as Hong Kong people from various backgrounds.⁷³⁰ In her column in *Apple Daily*, for example, Arai said that she received a letter from a reader accusing her for being ‘shameless’.⁷³¹ She was under so much pressure that she stopped writing in *Apple Daily* starting from early October.

Similar to Arai, Li Yi (李怡), founder of *Qishi niandai* (七十年代), was critical of the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign from the beginning and contended that it was linked to the 1997 psyche of Hong Kong people.⁷³² Li was severely criticised by Hong Kong commentators for distorting the truth about *Baodiao*, including the aims of the campaign and the intentions of the activists; and for ignoring the fact that the 1996 campaign had its origins in the 1970s student movement.⁷³³ The fact that Arai Hifumi and Li Yi were criticised illustrates the sensitivity prevalent among Hong Kong media and society during the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign. One’s freedom to voice his/her own opinions were constrained when nationalistic emotions ran high, regardless of whether such opinions were reasonable or not. This is ironic, for Hong Kong has been widely known to embrace and promote freedom of speech and expression, as opposed to the mainland China where censorship and central control were strictly reinforced.

⁷³⁰ *Yazhou zhoukan* 亞洲周刊 (Asia Week), 7 October – 13 October 1996, p.12.

⁷³¹ *Apple Daily*, 20 September 1996, p.A2.

⁷³² Qi Xin 齊辛, ‘Xianggang minzuzhuyi qingxu de yongqi’ 香港民族主義情緒的湧起 (The Upsurge of Nationalistic Sentiments in Hong Kong), *Jiushi niandai* 九十年代 (The Nineties), October 1996, pp.60-61. See also, Li Yi 李怡, ‘Minzu qingxu’ 民族情緒 (Nationalistic sentiments), *Apple Daily*, 2, October 1996, p.F8.

⁷³³ Zhang Wenyuan 張文遠, ‘Qixin de guailun’ 齊辛的怪論 (Qi Xin’s Strange Theory), *Ming Pao Daily News*, 10 October 1996.

Arai felt frustrated and argued that even though Hong Kong was not yet handed back to China, already Hong Kong people wanted to have her silenced.⁷³⁴

Constructing a Rhetoric of China-Orientated Nationalism: Leading Activists' Perspectives

The Chinese-language press was not the only agent in the construction of the *Baodiao* nationalist rhetoric. Leading *Baodiao* activists such as Albert Ho and Leung Kwok-hung developed a clear, detailed nationalist rhetoric based on the idea of 'anti-imperialism',⁷³⁵ a term that fit the fact that the *Baodiao* campaign was not simply about reasserting Chinese sovereignty over the islands. The leading activists simply argued that the whole *Baodiao* phenomenon represented a battle against the revival of Japanese militarism. Albert Ho, in a foreword to a book on the *Baodiao* movement published in Taiwan in 1997, claimed:

The *Baodiao* movement is not a narrow-minded nationalist movement, because we are not supporting China in regaining the Diaoyu Islands for the sake of expanding its borders. Japan knew that the Diaoyu Islands were not part of their territory, but exploited the special circumstances in the postwar environment to continue her ambition to expand her territory and aggression. For this reason, we promote the *Baodiao* movement for the sake of dealing a blow to Japan's ambition of aggression; and for the sake of making Japan come to terms with history and learn from the lesson;

⁷³⁴ *Yazhou zhoukan* 亞洲周刊 (Asia Week), 7 October – 13 October 1996, pp.34-35.

⁷³⁵ *Sing Tao Daily News*, 16 September 1996, A2.

and to apologise and pay compensation to the nations and peoples who had been victims of her invasion.⁷³⁶

Ho's rhetoric was problematic for several reasons. First, Japan was not rearming nor did she send troops to claim the islands in 1996. The Japanese right-wing group Japan Youth Federation (日本青年社) that built the lighthouse on the Diaoyu Islands did not represent the Japanese government, nor was the group part of the Japanese military forces.⁷³⁷ Second, despite Ho's claim that the *Baodiao* campaign was not an anti-Japanese movement, it did become one because there was a boycott of Japanese goods and some Japanese residents in Hong Kong, including Arai Hifumi, were threatened.⁷³⁸ Further, given Ho's background as a Democrat, the fact that the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign coincided with the election of HKSAR's first Chief Executive, and the fact that shortly after the campaign all the Democrats were forced to step down because of Beijing's 'no-through-train' policy, it is quite possible that Ho and other Democrats participated in the campaign in an attempt to win the support of the public for the Democratic Party. The Democrats probably used the *Baodiao* campaign as a tool to voice their frustration not only towards Beijing's inability to deal with the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue but more importantly Beijing's tight rein on the development of democracy in Hong Kong on the eve of 1997.

Like Albert Ho, Leung Kwok-hung *imagined* the *Baodiao* campaign as a fight against Japanese imperialism. In my interview with him in 2007 Leung still

⁷³⁶ Jin Jieshou 金介壽 and Wu Xingjian 吳行健, *Riben gunchu diaoyutai* 日本滾出釣魚臺 (Get out of the Diaoyu Islands, Japan), (Taipei: Rizhen chubanshe youxiangongsi, 1997), pp.17-19.

⁷³⁷ Sebastian Moffett, 'The Right and Its Wrongs', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 21 November 1996. See also, Chang, *Return of the Dragon*, p.212.

⁷³⁸ See, for example, Li Yi 李怡, 'Chouri qingxu' 仇日情緒 (Anti-Japanese Sentiments), *Apple Daily*, 21 September 1996, p.F8.

claimed that the whole idea about the *Baodiao* movement was anti-imperialism (保釣運動實質在於反帝).⁷³⁹ We can trace Leung's rhetoric back to the late 1970s when the small Trotskyist group Revolutionary Marxist League, of which Leung was then a member, used the same anti-imperialist rhetoric in its publication *Zhan Xun* to promote the 1978 *Baodiao* campaign.⁷⁴⁰ Leung related in the interview:

It is just a protest against Japan's occupation of the Diaoyu Islands...You can say there is no need to protest, but if you do not protest against [Japan's] occupation [of the islands] how can you be against imperialism? You can fight imperialism verbally, but in practice when all Chinese feel that this [Japan's claim to the islands] is an act of aggression, then we say this is an imperialist aggression and we are fighting it.⁷⁴¹

From the League's perspective, the Diaoyu Islands issue involved a collaborative relationship between Japanese imperialism and US imperialism, as it was the US that handed the Diaoyu Islands over to Japan.⁷⁴² Taking into account the League's rhetoric in the 1978 campaign and the New Leftists' involvement in the 1971 campaign, I believe Leung's participation in the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign was not necessarily because he was a patriot, but because of his background as a leftist whose main agendas were anti-capitalism and anti-colonialism. Further, if

⁷³⁹ Interview with Leung Kwok-hung, 20 November 2007.

⁷⁴⁰ *Zhan Xun* 戰訊, 7 May 1978, Vol. 2, Issue 29, p.1. See also, Yun Chong 雲冲 (pseud.?), 'Shisi baowei diaoyutai fandui ridi qinlue' 誓死保衛釣魚台!反對日帝侵略! (Defending the Diaoyu Islands till Death, Opposing the Aggression of Japanese Imperialism), *Chidao yuekan* 赤道月刊, May 1978, pp.20-21. Both *Zhan Xun* and *Chidao Yuekan* were published by the Revolutionary Marxist League.

⁷⁴¹ Interview with Leung Kwok-hung, 20 November 2007.

⁷⁴² *Zhan Xun* 戰訊, 14 May 1978, Vol 2, Issue 30, p.1.

we take into account Leung's response to June Fourth in 1989, it is possible that Leung's real target was Beijing, and that Leung's real concern was the future of Hong Kong.

What do Albert Ho and Leung Kwok-hung's rhetoric tell us about the China-orientated nationalism that they preached? The nationalist rhetoric based on the concept of anti-imperialism was a deliberate construction by these leading *Baodiao* activists to represent their own political perspectives. However, the *Baodiao* campaign grew out of Hong Kong's political circumstances in 1996. Arai Hifumi was correct in saying that anti-imperialism became a convenient banner for ordinary *Baodiao* participants in the movement, when their real concern was the future of Hong Kong. However, the construction of the anti-imperialist rhetoric by leading *Baodiao* activists was not the only striking feature of the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign. The use of the PRC flag was also an important part of that construction.

Symbolism: Use of the CCP Flag by Hong Kong Activists as a Symbol of Sovereignty

As noted, during the 1996 campaign Hong Kong activists used the PRC flag as a symbol of Chinese sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, while activists from Taiwan used the ROC flag. One question that might be asked is: why did Hong Kong activists use the PRC flag when those who participated in the campaign, particularly those from the Democratic Party and Leung Kwok-hung, had been critical of the CCP, particularly after the 1989 Tiananmen massacre? Leung had long been involved in political movements since the 1970s

and is well known for his anti-CCP stance. His leftist pro-democracy April Fifth Action group was formed in 1989 and called for more democracy and ‘an end to the dictatorship of the CCP’.⁷⁴³ Leung had been involved in the 1971 *Baodiao* campaign when he was a 15-year-old student. In 1996, Leung said that the flag represented not the CCP but the ‘spirit of 1.2 billion Chinese people’.⁷⁴⁴ For Leung, it did not matter whether the flag was the ROC flag or the PRC flag; a Chinese flag that represented non-recognition of Japanese sovereignty was all that mattered. Leung explained in my interview with him in 2007:

‘If you were in a dispute with Japan, and you did not have another flag, then that flag [the CCP flag] represented Chinese sovereignty, whether it be the Chinese Community Party or the Guomintang...unless we do not even talk about the state...Whether you planted the PRC or the ROC flag, at that point in time it represented a non-recognition of Japanese sovereignty over the islands. But if this PRC flag were to be used for oppression of the Chinese people then I would not recognise it as the national flag.’⁷⁴⁵

Chan Yu-lam in fact helped Jin Jieshou plant the ROC flag after planting the CCP flag. Therefore, it is clear that these activists were not concerned about the political agenda or the differences represented by the flags. The use of the flag in the campaign shows that state flags could be used in nationalist campaigns by any activist who might not support the state represented by the flags. In other words, there is no objective meaning to a state flag. What the state flag represented was tied to the subjective interpretation or imagination of the activist who used it.

⁷⁴³ For details, see the previous chapter on the 1989 pro-democracy movement in this thesis.

⁷⁴⁴ *Yazhou zhoukan* 亞洲周刊 (Asia Week), 10, 14 October - 20 October 1996, p.28.

⁷⁴⁵ Interview with Leung Kwok-hung, 20 November, 2007.

Decline and End of the 1996 *Baodiao* Campaign

In Wong Wai-ming's memoir, written after the end of the 1996 campaign and shortly before the handover, he argued that activists' forced entry into the Japanese embassy on 9 October resulted in the decline of the campaign. Wong argued that the incident created a negative image of the activists as well as of the campaign in the minds of the people of Hong Kong, and thus the incident 'tainted the campaign'. Leung Kwok-hung, one of the 24 people who stormed into the Japanese consulate, refuted Wong's argument. Leung believed that the *Baodiao* campaign quickly ended following the incident due to the lack of further action at that time, not because of his group's actions at the consulate. However, Leung also commented in an interview:

'When you organise this kind of movement, it is often illegal. What Mr. Wong said is meaningless because in 1997 we sailed to the islands again...What resulted in the decline of the movement was not because of that incident in the embassy; it was because the Chinese government repeatedly intervened, put pressure [on the people] and divided [us]... 'The Chinese government always told the people not to organise the *Baodiao* movement, to sit down and talk and not to sail to the islands. Later when we worked with Mainland activists the Chinese authorities took our boat'⁷⁴⁶

As to why the group forced its way into the embassy, Leung said they wanted to make Japanese authorities 'experience what it was like to have its territory invaded'.⁷⁴⁷ Wong also discussed this reasoning in his book, but argued against it. In Wong's view, the laws must be observed, especially when Hong

⁷⁴⁶ Interview with Leung Kwok-hung, 25 November 2008.

⁷⁴⁷ Interview with Leung Kwok-hung, 25 November 2008.

Kong prides itself in the rule of law, and forced entry into an embassy is an irrational act.⁷⁴⁸

In my opinion, the real cause of the end of the *Baodiao* campaign involved Hong Kong politics. After mid-October, there were no more reports on the campaign in the media, which turned its attention to the election of the first chief executive of the HKSAR, while activists such as Tsang Kin-sing and the Democrats turned their attention to the support of Chinese democracy activist Wang Dan.⁷⁴⁹ The 1996 *Baodiao* campaign illustrates that nationalistic movements in Hong Kong usually had a very short lifespan due to two factors: Hong Kong politics and the political agenda of the actors. The 1996 *Baodiao* campaign lasted only four months and when leading activists turned their attention to other things the campaign quickly ended.

Comparison between the 1971 and 1996 campaigns

There are both similarities and differences between these *Baodiao* campaigns. One similarity is that both the 1971 campaign and the 1996 campaign were a product of Hong Kong politics. Another similarity is that relations between the activists were not always amiable. It was unavoidable for *Baodiao* activists to disagree among themselves for various reasons. In 1971, Ng Chung-yin and Mok Chiu-yu had different ideas about China-orientated nationalism, although both dismissed nationalism as an ‘outmoded’ concept. Activists in 1971 were divided into two factions: a pro-China faction and an Anarchist/Trotskyist faction. In 1996, despite differences in their political

⁷⁴⁸ Huang Juezhan *Diaoyutai*, p.104.

⁷⁴⁹ *South China Morning Post*, 18 October 1996, p.10.

agendas, groups from both the pro-democracy and pro-China camps participated in the campaign, including politicians who belonged to different political parties. However, *Baodiao* activists on the *Kien Hwa 2* argued among themselves when it came to executing plans, as illustrated by the first trip to the Diaoyu Islands.

Unlike the 1971 campaign, which at one point became a movement against colonialism due to the government's crackdown on the movement, the 1996 campaign never became an anti-colonial government campaign. In both the 1971 and 1978 campaigns young people and students were the major forces, but the 1996 campaign, although led by the activists who had been politically active as students in the 1970s, included Hong Kong citizens from all walks of life, whether new to the *Baodiao* movement or '*Baodiao* veterans' (*laobaodiao* 老保釣).

Conclusion: Politics and the Construction of Irredentist Nationalism in the 1996 Campaign

The *Baodiao* campaign of 1996 followed the same pattern as other nationalist movements that had occurred in Hong Kong. Although it appeared that the immediate, external trigger of the campaign was Japan's claim to the Diaoyu Islands, social and political factors were the true underlying causes of the 1996 *Baodiao* phenomenon. Like Hong Kong's response to June Fourth in 1989, the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign was largely a product of Hong Kong politics. Hence, I argue that the *Baodiao* campaign was both a nationalist *and* political campaign. The campaign gave Hong Kong people the opportunity to rediscover and reconstruct their Chinese identity on the eve of the 1997 handover, and to

criticise Beijing for its reluctance to take action against Japan. For Hong Kong politicians, it was an opportunity to promote themselves and to gain support from Hong Kong citizens.

It is clear that the participants had differing motives. Political pressures in relation to 1997 prompted some ordinary residents to participate. For the Democrats, the *Baodiao* campaign was part of their political campaign to promote their agenda. For David Chan, the *Baodiao* campaign provided an opportunity to promote his political career and to express his pro-China sentiments and his intention to 'stay and build Hong Kong'. The 1996 campaign reflects not only the 'identity crisis' that Hong Kong people had to face on the eve of 1997 but the complex political dynamics in the colony, particularly regarding the idea of democracy and how it could function as a motif in the nationalist rhetoric of the Democrats.

Like all the other nationalist movements in Hong Kong that came before it, the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign was short-lived. Politics, on both the local and macro levels, again came into play in the 1996 campaign. Although it appeared that those involved in the campaign were united, some divisions could be seen among local politicians and student groups. On a macro level, the 1996 campaign exposed the weakness of China-orientated nationalism in the context of cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan, as pro-independence *Baodiao* activists from Taiwan had their own agenda and their hostility towards the Hong Kong activists could be clearly seen when the latter stayed in Taiwan during the second trip.

Notably, from the perspective of some of the leading activists, the CCP flag that was planted by Hong Kong activist Chan Yu-nam in the second trip represented the Chinese *nation*, not necessarily the actual political *state*. In this sense, what the flag represented was never set in stone. The subjective interpretations of those participating in the *Baodiao* campaign determined what the flag represented, not objective interpretations.

In the history of nationalism in colonial Hong Kong, both the 1989 pro-democracy movement and the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign signified a new development. While the rhetoric of nationalism remained tied to the political situation in greater China as well as Hong Kong, the rhetoric was no longer about the CCP-GMD struggle. Local politics became increasingly significant as a dominant factor. The rhetoric of nationalism starting in 1989 became linked particularly to the Democrats' political agenda.. In fact, the democrats made their mark in their support of 1989 Chinese pro-democracy movement.

In the previous chapter, I argued that Hong Kong people's nationalist response to June Fourth represented a convergence between Hong Kong's support of the Chinese democracy movement and Hong Kong's own struggle for democracy. Similarly, I believe that the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign represented the construction and use of irredentist nationalism and anti-imperialism by certain Hong Kong people as a tactic to show their interests in both China and Hong Kong, political interests driven by the 1997 psyche. Hence, I also argue that in both the 1989 and 1996 nationalist movements the China-orientated nationalism

was used by Hong Kong people as a way to express their determination to defend their political interests and concern over Hong Kong's future.

The *Baodiao* movement certainly did not end with the 1996 phase, even though it has not received as much media or public support as in 1996. Nonetheless, the movement has persisted during the years since Hong Kong's reversion to China in 1997. With the gift of hindsight, taking into account the fact that since the handover relations between pro-democracy activists and Beijing were still strained, it is debatable that the campaign was ever a 'show of loyalty to Beijing'.

Chapter Eight: Conclusion

Something called 'China' unquestionably exists, but, more importantly, there is a multitude of expressions to denote different aspects of China and Chineseness.⁷⁵⁰

- Allen Chun

For thirty years, I have been weaving my 'Hong Kong dream', 'China dream'.... The sound of gun shots of June Fourth had shaken my 'heart of China' and destroyed my 'China dream'. But after much thought, I believe that staying in and building Hong Kong was the way to save Hong Kong and so I became involved in the 'Hong Kong people building Hong Kong' movement to once again weave my 'Hong Kong dream' and 'China dream'.⁷⁵¹

- David Chan Yuk-cheung

China-orientated nationalism was a significant issue the Hong Kong colonial government, politicians, and some in the Chinese community had to grapple with from 1949 to 1997. Nationalism was an important part of Hong Kong's political life in several ways: first, it prompted Hong Kong Chinese to think about what China meant for them. Second, it provided Hong Kong Chinese an opportunity to express their concern over China as well as Hong Kong. Third, nationalism was used as a tactic by Hong Kong-based political groups to promote their agenda and mobilise the masses. Fourth, China-orientated nationalism had the dual effect of dividing and uniting some sectors of the Hong Kong Chinese community. Fifth, when nationalism jeopardised the lives of Hong Kong citizens

⁷⁵⁰ Allen Chun, 'Fuck Chineseness: On the Ambiguities of Ethnicity as Culture as Identity', *boundary 2*, Vol. 23, No. 2, 1996, pp.111-138.

⁷⁵¹ Chan Yuk-cheung, *Chen Yuxiang xuanwenji lizhipian 陳毓祥選文集勵 (Selected Works of Chan Yuk-cheung: Aiming High)* (Xianggang: Yuxiang wenhua fuwushe, 1998), p.1.

and threatened the colony's security, the colonial government was forced to take action against it. In that process nationalism brought the coloniser and the colonised closer as both sides desired security. Sixth, nationalism was an issue generations of Hong Kong Chinese were exposed to whether they were politically active or not.

This thesis has highlighted the fact that Hong Kong is a society of immigrants where people had both a Chinese identity and a colonial identity. China-centred nationalism contributed to political factionalism in Hong Kong political history. Hong Kong Chinese, despite being colonial subjects under British rule, were willing to speak up for their concerns using nationalism. Thus, Hong Kong people were clearly not politically apathetic. Lastly, this thesis has highlighted the fact that political activism in Hong Kong on some occasions saw clashes between colonialism and some sectors of the Chinese community.

This thesis is the first comprehensive study, in the field of Hong Kong colonial history that examines a series of episodes regarding China-orientated nationalism and links them together in a broader perspective, showing the continuities and changes in the meaning and politics of nationalism in the long period between 1949 and 1997. It originated from a desire to understand why and how that nationalism was expressed. This thesis demonstrates that the Chinese nation was *imagined* and *acted out* by a small minority of the Hong Kong Chinese community. The historical, social, and political contexts of China and Hong Kong contributed to its construction and reshaping throughout the latter half of the twentieth century. In this period, the focus of that nationalism

was increasingly on what was happening in Hong Kong rather than China, although the China factor remained a significant trigger of nationalist movements in the colony.

Triggers and Patterns of Nationalism

Post-1949 nationalist movements in Hong Kong were often short-lived for two reasons. First, expressions of nationalism were tied to the volatile political situations both in modern Chinese history and in Hong Kong's modern history. Once triggered, nationalist sentiments swept across the colony as a minority within the Chinese community mobilised themselves quickly to express such sentiments openly. At the same time, however, changes in the China factor and in the Hong Kong factor on several occasions directly resulted in the decline and end of nationalist movements, as illustrated by the 1967 riots, the case of the student-led China Faction in the 1970s, and the 1996 *Baodiao* campaigns.

Second, because the people involved in these movements were not immune from the influence of Chinese and Hong Kong politics, their political focus at times changed quickly. Moreover, activists leading the nationalist movements often had different opinions and political agendas, which created tensions among activists and undermined nationalist movements. This is illustrated by the Third Force Movement in the 1950s, Hong Kong's response to June Fourth, and the 1971 and 1996 *Baodiao* campaigns. That the nationalist movements and the actors involved in them were not immune from political influences also meant that China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong was open

to interpretation. Actors constructed their own nationalist rhetoric and formulated their own strategy in expressing nationalism.

Multiple Interpretations of Patriotism: Nationalism as a Tactic

Before WWII, Hong Kong's Chinese elites were nationalistic yet they collaborated with the colonial government. During the war against Japan, Hong Kong became a battleground in wartime political propaganda. The Wang Jingwei faction promoted its collaborationist cause while mainland Chinese intellectuals who fled to Hong Kong supported the war effort. In the 1930s, Chinese merchants promoted their products as 'national goods' to protect their economic interests.

In the 1950s, 'China' carried different meanings for different sections of the Chinese community concerned about Chinese politics. Those who were pro-CCP believed that the 'New China' was represented by the CCP, as opposed to those who identified with the GMD in Taiwan. The Hong Kong-based Third Force activists believed that the ROC represented the 'true China' and criticised both the CCP and the GMD and engaged themselves in political activities, while some Chinese intellectuals in exile promoted their nationalist rhetoric through a revival of traditional Chinese culture. Starting from the 1980s, democracy became the central motif in the debate and construction of the rhetoric of China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong. The fact that nationalism was open to interpretation and constructed by activists meant that motives and agendas were not always clear. The cases of Hong Kong's response to June 4 in 1989 and the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign show that while on the surface the focus of the two

nationalist movements was China, for Hong Kong people the real concern was for the future of Hong Kong. These two cases also accentuate Hong Kong people's conceptual separation of the nation from the state. Nationalist rhetoric was at times also used as a tactic to protect or promote the interests of those involved. The New Left in the 1971 *Baodiao* campaign used the movement to promote their anti-colonial and anti-capitalist agenda. June Fourth in 1989 and the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign provided the Democrats an opportunity to promote themselves.

As a result of the different interpretations of the Chinese nation, three types of nationalism emerged in post-1949 Hong Kong: cultural nationalism, political nationalism, and popular nationalism.

Symbols of Nationalism

This thesis has demonstrated the importance of symbols in the expression of nationalism in Hong Kong. The Tramway boycott of 1912, the 1956 riots, 1967 riots, and the 1971 and 1996 *Baodiao* campaign show how symbols of nationalism, whether they be Chinese coins, Mao badges, or state flags, served as triggers and representations of rhetoric in nationalist movements. In the Tramway boycott and the 1956 riots, Chinese coins and the ROC flag served as a trigger as these symbols had been, in the view of the participants, insulted and desecrated by colonial authorities. In this sense colonialism, too, contributed to the outbreak of these events. In the 1967 riots, symbols of the Cultural Revolution such as Mao badges and the Little Red Book represented the leftist nationalist rhetoric in their anti-British struggle.

The case study of the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign demonstrated how the meaning of a state flag was not set in stone. Despite Hong Kong people's distrust of the PRC before and after 1989, the PRC flag was used in the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign to represent China. Of course, using the flag was in no way an implication that Hong Kong people politically approved of the PRC. The case of 1996 showed that there was no objective meaning to the PRC flag. There was only a subjective meaning attached to it by whoever used it at a particular time in history. A state flag could be a symbol representing the nation instead of the state and its meaning evolved with Chinese history and Hong Kong history.

Phase I: Evolution of China-Orientated Nationalism in Hong Kong: 1949-1967

In the post-war years up until 1967, China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong was, as an aftermath of the Chinese civil war, tied to the CCP-GMD struggle. This was a contributing factor in Hong Kong's political instability, manifested in the 1956 and 1967 riots. The violent expression of nationalism in both riots was condemned by both the colonial government and the public. Yet some in the Chinese community who were neither pro-CCP nor pro-GMD were more concerned about Chinese politics than Hong Kong politics. This too contributed to the debate about nationalism in the 1950s.

It remains unclear how much influence the different types of nationalism that were played out in the 1950s had on later developments. Cultural nationalism of the 1950s might have had some influence on Hong Kong youth in the 1960s and 1970s, through the Chinese-language magazines containing

discussions about China. Perhaps the major influence the 1950s had on later developments was that the 1956 riots contributed to the disappearance of violence in nationalist movements from the 1970s onwards. Activists in later years probably knew the use of violence would not gain public support.

In the decades before the 1967 riots, the China factor was a significant element in triggering expressions of nationalism in the colony. However, after the 1967 riots, Chinese national politics, although remaining a contributing factor, became less significant in the debate, with the exception of the rise of the China Faction in universities in the 1970s. Both pro-GMD and pro-CCP sympathisers lost public support for their actions in the 1956 riots and 1967 riots. In the years after the 1967 riots local politics started to have a more significant bearing on the expression of China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong. The four phases of the *Baodiao* movement, and the campaign to support the Chinese democracy movement in the 1980s, although triggered by events relating to China, were largely locally inspired. China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong evolved over time in terms of both rhetoric and participation. The focus of that nationalism became increasingly on what was happening in Hong Kong rather than China. This evolution accentuates the fact that Hong Kong people became more concerned about Hong Kong than China.

Phase II: Hong Kong Youth and Nationalist Movements in the 1970s

In the post-1967 period, extreme pro-CCP and pro-GMD political sentiments disappeared from large-scale nationalist movements as they had lost

public support. The 1971 and 1978 phases of the *Baodiao* movement were led by a new generation of young Hong Kong Chinese, some of whom were politically active and concerned about the injustices of colonialism and interested in the affairs of China. The young *Baodiao* activists in the 1970s were not concerned about the CCP-GMD struggle. Social movements in the 1970s were marked by a connection between local social and political issues, and affairs in China. The first *Baodiao* campaign of 1971, the subject of Chapter Five, reflected the division between the activists who had a desire to take action against social injustices in the colony and those who were pro-China. The *70s Bi-weekly*, comprised of mostly Anarchists and Trotskyists, was not on good terms with the pro-China activists, although the two groups managed to work together to lead the 1971 *Baodiao* campaign.

As demonstrated in Chapter Five, the *70s Bi-weekly* attempted to turn the 1971 *Baodiao* campaign into an anti-colonial campaign by using China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong to draw young Hong Kong people's attention to the injustices of colonialism. As a result, the *Baodiao* campaign also carried an anti-colonial flavour. The *70s Bi-weekly* succeeded to some extent in its goal, as the Hong Kong government's attempt to suppress the *Baodiao* campaign using violence attracted criticism from the public. However, anti-colonialism never became a major motif in subsequent nationalist movements as pro-CCP sentiments gained the support of students in universities around the mid-1970s.

The period between the mid and late 1970s saw the emergence and dominance of the pro-CCP China Faction in the student movement. However, the dominance of the China Faction soon ended following Mao's death and the fall of the Gang of Four in the late 1970s. After the 1970s, the pro-CCP and pro-GMD political rhetoric almost completely disappeared from open, large-scale nationalist movements.

Phase III: Popular Nationalism in the 1980s and 1990s

From the 1980s onwards, as the Hong Kong youth who were active in the student movement came of age and played a leading role in political movements, Hong Kong's political situation became more important in the expression of nationalism than the China factor, as the colony evolved into a political community whose people were more willing to speak up for their interests and were rethinking their Chinese identity on the eve of 1997. Hong Kong's response to 4 June 1989 and the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign were both fuelled by the 1997 psyche, and occurred at politically turbulent times in the history of Hong Kong.

China-Orientated Nationalism in a Supposedly Depoliticised Colony

The haphazard rise of China-orientated nationalism in colonial Hong Kong between 1949 and 1997 was because Hong Kong was not immune from the influence of Chinese history and politics. Part of the populace arrived from China after 1949. Their personal experiences served as a source of their nationalistic sentiments. The small minority of Chinese in Hong Kong involved

in nationalist movements and promoting nationalist rhetoric had an emotional attachment to China, albeit having different interpretations of China and patriotism. These people included Chinese who had fled to Hong Kong after 1949, the anti-Communist Chinese intellectuals in the 1950s, the pro-China students in the 1970s, and my interviewees. For some of my interviewees their emotional attachment to China was a result of family influence.

The Hong Kong-based Chinese-language press, too, played a major role in contributing to the promotion of nationalism, as it served as an important source of information about China and a platform for discussions about nationalism. Both rightist and leftist publications were easily accessible. Chapter Three demonstrated how the Chinese-language publications constructed different types of nationalist rhetoric, and as argued in Chapter Five, Hong Kong youth learned about China from the Chinese-language publications, which to some extent contributed to their nationalistic sentiments. Chapters Four and Seven showed how the Chinese-language press promoted nationalism by portraying actors involved in nationalist movements as heroes.

As Hong Kong people became actively involved in local political affairs, China-orientated nationalism and their concern over the political future of Hong Kong became intertwined. The Hong Kong factor became so significant in the expressions of nationalism in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s that the colonial authorities' attempts at depoliticisation did not hamper the construction of Chinese nationalist rhetoric at all.

China-Orientated Nationalism and Colonialism

For the Hong Kong government, internal security was the top priority. For many years, the government endeavoured to suppress the influence of Chinese politics in the colony as well as any expression of nationalistic sentiments, which in its view would threaten the colony's security. In the education system, as noted in Chapters Two, Three and Five, the colonial government made a consistent effort to keep the influence of Chinese politics to a minimum. Yet the colonial education system taught generations of Chinese students to identify *culturally* with China.

The colonial government's attempt to suppress China-orientated nationalism at times served as the immediate trigger of an outbreak of violent nationalist movements in the colony. The analysis of the 1956 and 1967 riots showed how actions of the colonial government provoked a politically conscious minority of the Chinese community to become involved in violent expressions of political nationalism. Although the colonial government's suppression of the 1967 riots gained a great deal of public support, its use of violence in handling the peaceful 7 July *Baodiao* demonstration in 1971 attracted much criticism. On a more positive note, colonialism contributed to the development of nationalism as the Hong Kong government allowed press freedom, albeit for the sake of balancing political forces in the colony. Thus, colonialism served as both a limiting and a contributing factor to the development of China-orientated nationalism.

One striking feature of post-1949 nationalist movements in Hong Kong is that, with the exception of the 1967 riots and the New Left in the 1970s, the colonial government was not the target and those involved were not attempting to discredit or overthrow it. Hong Kong's proximity to China and political neutrality provided an ideal environment for various Hong Kong-based groups to promote their strategically constructed nationalist rhetoric. The colonial government allowed the promotion of different types of nationalism as long as it would not destabilise the colony. Interestingly, as demonstrated in Chapters Six and Seven, in the 1980s and 1990s the real target of nationalist movements was the PRC government, *not* the Hong Kong colonial government.

Negative Impacts of China-Orientated Nationalism in Hong Kong

The analysis of the 1967 riots and the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign showed that a nationalist fever could cloud an individual's judgement. The leftists in the 1967 riots, under the influence of the political fever of the Cultural Revolution, ignored the PRC's long-standing principle of maintaining the Party's status quo in Hong Kong and rashly launched an anti-British struggle in the name of patriotism. The violent expression of political nationalism in the 1967 riots disrupted Hong Kong people's lives and resulted in the deaths of innocent Hong Kong citizens. Some of the leftists, too, suffered physically and economically due to their participation in the riots. In the 1996 *Baodiao* campaign, David Chan died not because of 'Japanese militarism', but because of nationalism.

Post-1997 Development of China-Orientated Nationalism in Hong Kong

Expressions of China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong did not end with the 1997 handover. The *Baodiao* movement continued for at least ten years following the handover. Hong Kong's struggle for greater democracy was manifested in a huge 1 July 2003 protest march involving 500,000 people, and the arrest of the Hong Kong journalist working for the *Strait Times* Ching Cheong (程翔) by Chinese authorities in 2005⁷⁵² sparked much discussion about patriotism.⁷⁵³ What is patriotism? What does it mean to be a patriot? Such questions were often asked in the discussions about democracy in Hong Kong and after Ching Cheong's arrest. As in the pre-1997 period, multiple interpretations of patriotism emerged.

While there have been a few studies of China-orientated nationalism in post-1997 Hong Kong, this thesis could shed light on its development in the future. I believe that China-orientated nationalism in Hong Kong will continue to

⁷⁵² Like David Chan Yuk-cheung, Ching Cheong was a member of the China Faction during his time as a university student. Ching graduated from the University of Hong Kong (HKU) in 1973. Unlike most other HKU graduates who either joined the civil service or sought high-pay jobs, Ching became a reporter for the leftist newspaper *Wen Hui Pao* in 1974. It was well-known that employees in leftist organisations had a much lower income than those in non-leftist companies. Ching worked in Beijing between 1982 and 1989. In 1989, together with the chief editor Li Zisong, Ching Cheong left the *Wen Hui Pao* following the Tiananmen Square Incident, as a form of protest against Beijing's handling of the Chinese democracy movement. In 1996, Ching became a reporter for the Singaporean *Strait Times*. Ching was arrested in Guangzhou on 22 April 2005 and charged with espionage. Ching was praised by his friends as a 'true patriot'.

⁷⁵³ See Situ Hua 司徒華, *Shenme shi aiguo shenme shi minzhu* 什麼是愛國，什麼是民主 (What is Patriotism, What is Democracy), in *Yanyu pingsheng* 煙雨平生 (Life with Misty Rain) (Xianggang: Ciwenhua tang chubanshe, 2008), pp.194-197; Ming Bao bianjibu 明報編輯部, *Aiguo Lunzheng* 愛國論爭 (Debates about Patriotism) (Xianggang: Ming Bao chubanshe youxiangongsi, 2004); and Cheng Xiang 程翔, *Manman aiguo lu Cheng Xiang Wenji* 慢慢愛國路：程翔文集 (The Long Road to Patriotism: A Collection of Ching Cheong's Writings) (Xianggang: Cheng Xiang jijinhui, 2005).

be used as a tool and as rhetoric in political movements in Hong Kong. I also believe that its content and political utility will continue to evolve alongside changes in Chinese and Hong Kong politics, and that democracy will remain a central motif in the rhetoric of nationalism.

While there is no doubt that events in China will continue to contribute to the construction of nationalist rhetoric in Hong Kong, the China factor will be a much less significant factor compared to the Hong Kong factor. As both Hong Kong and Macau have been returned to China, the kind of irredentist nationalism constructed in the *Baodiao* movement is unlikely to emerge again as a major rhetoric in Hong Kong.

In the construction of nationalist rhetoric in future nationalist movements in Hong Kong, it is very likely that the Chinese democracy movement will continue to be linked to Hong Kong's own struggle for greater democracy. The fact that Hong Kong people are now much more involved in local politics than ever before means that the Hong Kong factor will continue to be the major driving force behind nationalist movements in Hong Kong.

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