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BELIEF SYSTEMS AND
ARMS CONTROL POSSIBILITIES

OR

WHY WE NEVER GET PAST
FIRST BASE IN ARMS CONTROL

by

Jane Sharp*



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ABSTRACT

This paper argues that a major impediment to arms control agreements in the past has been the mindsets of policymakers. The first part of the paper outlines different types of mindsets and the sorts of policy options they are likely to generate. Five mindsets and associated strategies for the 'totalitarian', at one extreme, to the 'pacifist' at the other, are outlined. The second half of the paper examines what implications the interaction of these different strategic perspectives have for progress in arms control.

East-West arms control diplomacy has been in the doldrums throughout the Reagan presidency, but even in the Carter years, and before that in the halcyon days of detente, the achievements were modest at best. Rarely have the agreements concluded done more than codify some aspect of the status quo. Even this usually requires an extraordinary alignment of favorable conditions not only between the main protagonists, but also among domestic and allied special interests. All too often negotiations consume and erode trust rather than build confidence, with each side employing increasingly coercive bargaining tactics that simply exacerbate the arms competition in the name of arms control.

Many factors influence the choice of bargaining strategies in arms control negotiations. These include a category of relatively immutable background factors like the polarity of the international system, the power differential and political climate between the negotiating parties, as well as the relations within the parties, and between the parties and their respective alliance partners. A second category of more mutable factors include the structural conditions under which negotiations occur: the formality of the setting, the number of issues and parties and of issues at stake, and the stress of time and outside events. This essay addresses a subset of the first category, namely the factors that influence the political climate between the parties; specifically the belief systems and mindsets of the decision-makers.

Members of the informed public reading accounts of arms control negotiations often ask why political leaders armed with the same data can draw widely differing conclusions about their significance and prescribe dramatically different solutions. One answer is that measurable facts, such as the raw figures about defense spending and deployed systems, are

not as powerful determinants of bargaining policy and negotiating positions as the different belief systems, mindsets and operational codes of the elites in the policy making community. How the facts are perceived, how the payoff structure of a negotiation looks, how an adversary's proposals are interpreted, how intentions are gauged from capabilities and rhetoric, how previous encounters are remembered and analysed, all depend on the mindset into which the information is fed.

A theory of negotiation should be able to speculate intelligently about how the bargaining strategies determined by one state's elite images and belief systems will interact with the strategies determined by the dominant mindset of the negotiating partner. Those with a Hobbesian view of international relations are likely to endorse quite different defense and foreign policies, estimate different force requirements, and adopt different arms control strategies from those with more flexible and optimistic attitudes. This article outlines the bargaining strategies likely to emerge from five different belief systems, then speculates as to how these kinds of strategies would interact with each other in a negotiating forum.

The five recognizable mindsets among the leaderships of the superpowers are: the totalitarian, the confrontational, the competitive, the cooperative and the pacifist.¹ These are drawn from analyses and observations of United States decision makers, but western analyses of Soviet defense and foreign policy making elites suggest analogous categories exist in Moscow also.² The two issue areas of most salience in formulating Soviet and American defense and arms control policies are first, national security and the risk of war, particularly nuclear war; and second, the risk of losing global status and influence to the other

superpower, at worst being taken over by the adversary's political system. Thus, at one extreme are those whose primary fear is of political change and who will run the risk of war to preserve their own system, and at the other are those whose prime fear is nuclear holocaust who will sacrifice their own political system to avert the risk of conflict that might lead to nuclear war.³ Table I summarizes each mindset as it affects the image of the adversary and the nature of international relations; draws the implications of each for broad foreign and defense policy goals and specifically for the role nuclear weapons should play in advancing these goals; suggests the most likely arms control objectives and bargaining strategies consistent with each; and finally, suggests how each will conduct its compliance diplomacy once a treaty has been concluded.

Totalitarian

Stalin and Hitler exemplify totalitarian thinking, but neither Soviet nor American policymaking has been dominated by this extreme perspective since the death of Stalin in 1953. Nevertheless, elements of this mindset emerge from time to time in both capitals. Ideologues like Mikhail Suslov and Boris Ponomarev in Moscow, and currently in Washington, the more conservative Reagan Administration spokesmen like Patrick Buchanan, Caspar Weinberger and Richard Perle, legislators like Senator Jesse Helms, the more extreme members of the emigre intellectual community like Richard Pipes, and fundamentalist religious leaders like Jerry Falwell have all on occasion voiced opinions that suggest a primitive totalitarian mindset.⁴

In the United States many holding these views are themselves refugees from the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe, for whom it is obviously difficult

TABLE I

BELIEF SYSTEM			DEFENSE POLICY	
Issues	Image of opponent	Nature of International Relations	Overall Strategy	Role of nuclear weapons
<u>Types</u>				
Totalitarian	- totally negative - illegitimate power with expansionist foreign policy - monolithic internally	- extremely conflictual (Hobbesian)	- rollback to pre-1945	- war winning capability - superior first strike
Confrontational	- largely negative - grudging acceptance adversary as legitimate - foreign policy as expansionist - monolithic internally	- highly conflictual	- latent rollback; manifest containment	- damage-limiting - need superior counter-force
Competitive	- mixed - accepts adversary as legitimate power - aggressive foreign policy - divided internally	- deterrent model - tends to worst case analysis	- containment	- military denial - needs countervailing force
Cooperative	- mixed - adversary as legitimate - foreign policy as opportunistic - divided internally - suffers security dilemma	- spiral model (Jervis) - tends to best case analysis	- containment - detente in both political and military relations	- punitive denial - nuclear minimalists - sufficiency over balance as force - criterion
Pacifist	- neutral - legitimate power with defensive foreign policy - divided internally	- potentially harmonious	- accommodation - defensive - non-interventionist	- nuclear abolitionists

TABLE I (contd.)

ARMS CONTROL POLICY			COMPLIANCE DIPLOMACY	
Issue Type of Mindset	Main objectives	Likely bargaining strategies	Means of monitoring compliance	Dealing with ambiguity
Totalitarian	- little faith in traditional arms control - zero-sum approach, needs to win and have adversary lose - arms control agreement should maintain superiority	- bullying, blackmailing and coercive	- on site inspection (OSI) as minimal requirement - little faith in national technical means (NTM), e.g. satellite reconnaissance	- requires absolute compliance in every detail - quick to denounce - ambiguity as deliberate violation
Confrontational	- to curtail adversary's forces while maintaining own superiority and continued modernization	- coercive and competitive - emphasis on bargaining from strength	- more faith in NTM but concern re adversary encryption	- stringent standards of compliance - also quick to denounce ambiguity as violation
Competitive	- seeks balanced limits to control both side's pace of modernization	- mixed competitive and cooperative tactics - strict tit-for-tat strategies - emphasis on reputation for resolve and commitment	- OSI preferred - NTM considered adequate	- more willing to resolve ambiguity through diplomatic channels like the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC)
Cooperative	- seeks more stable force postures on both sides - less concern with numerical balance as criterion	- cooperative and integrative - benign tit-for-tat strategies - emphasis on problem solving	- OSI if you can get it - NTM adequate - OSI useful mainly for domestic political reasons	- prefers quiet diplomacy - acknowledges both sides push treaty limits - sees need for constant consultation
Pacifist	- little faith in traditional arms control - objective to settle rather than to win	- conciliatory and accommodating	- NTM adequate - least perturbed by asymmetries of open and closed societies	- prefers quiet diplomacy - sees adversary cheating caused by own side's hardliners and refusal to ratify agreements

to regard any Soviet leaders with objectivity. Refugees or not however, totalitarian thinkers are all ethnocentric, view the adversary in a totally negative light, regard its government as illegitimate, see its foreign policy as inherently aggressive and expansionist, and believe that its leadership is monolithic, and impossible to deal with or influence in any way other than brute force. In his study of the early cold war years Daniel Yergin saw the more extreme cold warriors in the United States dominated by the Riga Axiom, which viewed the Soviet Union as a "world revolutionary state denying the possibility of co-existence, committed to unrelenting ideological warfare, powered by a messianic drive for world mastery."⁵

This mindset views international relations as Hobbesian and conflictual in all its aspects. Thus, in the United States, totalitarian thinkers strive to return to the unambiguous American military superiority of the late 1940s and early 1950s and endorse a policy of rolling back Soviet political influence and military presence to its pre-world war II status; by force if necessary. Such a perspective generates requirements for manifestly superior military forces, and envisages many missions for nuclear weapons: to deter an attack on the United States or its allies, to prevail in any nuclear conflict that may arise, and to provide visible evidence of superiority in the global status game. Totalitarians want nuclear forces to cover every conceivable target under the most difficult conditions, and, at a minimum, to maintain a numerical edge over the Soviet arsenal in all categories.⁶ Totalitarians also favor the building of strategic defenses to protect United States populations and missile sites, while maintaining a massive offensive capability against the adversary.⁷

Given their view of the adversary as a basically illegitimate and expansionist power, totalitarians see no value in the pursuit of cooperative arms control regimes. If forced into arms control diplomacy by a more liberal public opinion such a leadership could be expected to see negotiations as a zero sum game, to adopt extremely bullying and coercive tactics, and then to blame the inevitable failure of the process on the intransigence of the opponent.

Not surprisingly, totalitarians take an absolutist view of treaty compliance. Colin Gray and Richard Perle are good examples of this mindset in their denunciations of alleged Soviet cheating at SALT and the chemical weapons provisions of the Geneva Protocol.⁸ This viewpoint considers national technical means of monitoring adversary behavior to be inadequate and claims that on-site inspections (OSI) are vital for arms control to be worthwhile. Ironically, this would require a fair measure of cooperation with the adversary. Totalitarians judge the adversary guilty until proved innocent and are quick to publicly denounce any suspected violations, however flimsy and ambiguous the evidence, rather than pursue quiet diplomacy.

Confrontational

Confronters are hardliners who also have a predominantly negative view of the adversary but unlike totalitarians do accept -- albeit grudgingly -- that the other side is governed by a legitimate power with whom diplomatic business can, and must, be conducted. Paul Nitze, and Secretary of State George Shultz appear to fit into this category. They still suspect the adversary of being inherently expansionist in its foreign policy aims, and tend to view the adversary's internal decision making elite as monolithic.

Confronters are less paranoid than totalitarians, however. They endorse official United States containment policy, as propounded by President Harry Truman and upheld by each succeeding administration, but often hold barely concealed "rollback" tendencies; particularly those with East bloc emigre backgrounds. They believe that the best way to peace and stability lies in deterrence through the maintenance of superior military strength and see multiple missions for nuclear forces: deterrence, war-fighting and political coercion. Though not as conservative in their force requirements as the totalitarians, confronters also tend to favor the development and deployment of strategic defenses.

Confronters are not totally resistant to arms control diplomacy but tend to see negotiations as zero-sum games to be won or lost. They favor coercive bargaining tactics and fear that any hint of conciliation will be exploited as weakness. The emphasis is on bargaining from strength and maintaining a reputation for resolve with little sensitivity to the risks of provoking the adversary.

Confronters have stringent requirements for the verifiability of treaty provisions, particularly for nuclear arms control agreements. This follows naturally from the belief that counterforce capabilities are necessary to maintain the credibility of nuclear deterrence and that numerical balance matters lest the Soviets gain a meaningful political and/or strategic capability. In the United States confronters tend to fret about the relative openness of the American weapons acquisition process compared to the relative secrecy of the Soviet process and believe this gives the Soviets an important advantage that actually encourages them to cheat. On-site inspection thus becomes necessary to overcome pervasive mistrust of the adversary. When the adversary engages in ambiguous

behavior which pushes right up to the treaty limits, the hardliner tends to favor some tit-for-tat kind of response. Quiet diplomacy is downplayed in favor of public denunciation designed -- but rarely effective -- to bring the adversary to heel.

Competitive

This is the mainstream mindset that has dominated both superpowers' arms control diplomacy in the post World War II period. Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense in the Carter Administration is a good example. Like the hardliners, the competitive mindset has mixed views of the adversary, accepting its government as legitimate but still suspecting its aims as inherently aggressive if not necessarily greedy for more territory. The most important difference between the mainstream competitive view and both the totalitarian and the hardline perspectives is an awareness in the former that the adversary's elites are as likely to be divided internally as one's own, and are thus open to influence. This view nevertheless still sees international relations as basically competitive and tends to make worst case assumptions about ambiguous behavior. International relations are perceived according to the deterrence model, namely, that in order to deter aggression by the adversary a state must demonstrate both resolve and capability to prevail in any conflict that might arise.⁹

The competitive mindset sees the need for balanced nuclear forces with the adversary, but is less confident than the confrontational and totalitarian thinkers that nuclear superiority contributes to stability. It sees the need for counterforce as part of an effective deterrent force and tends to believe in limited nuclear options and escalation control once war breaks out. Such a force posture, while rationalized as defensive,

nevertheless often looks offensive to potential adversaries and does little to dampen down the arms competition. Competitors are sensitive to the provocative and destabilizing aspects of strategic defenses that purport to protect populations from the adversary's nuclear weapons, while maintaining highly offensive strategic forces against that adversary. Nevertheless they tend to favor limited hard point defenses to protect their own retaliatory forces. Some would like to amend the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty to permit land based ballistic missile defenses on a broader scale than currently permitted.

In arms control the emphasis on numerically balanced agreements and strictly verifiable provisions constrains diplomatic possibilities. Before the 50% cuts endorsed, in principle, by the 1985 summit, there was little willingness to go beyond a stabilization of the status quo, to offer radical reductions, or to initiate weapons moratoria -- except in the case of manifestly obsolete or impractical weapons systems.

Mainstream competitors are less rigid about verification requirements than confronters and tend to define violations as those actions that give a manifest strategic advantage to the adversary. In the United States this group is concerned that the Soviet radar being built at Krasnayorsk (which all groups agree will probably be a technical violation of the ABM treaty if and when it becomes operational) might give the Soviets an advantage if both sides were to break out of the ABM treaty. In general this group believes national technical means more adequate than do the confronters but nevertheless advocates on-site inspections to provide extra insurance. This group is more favorable to the concept of quiet diplomacy to resolve compliance ambiguities, as exemplified by the Carter and Ford Administrations' approach to the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) through the 1970s.

Cooperative

This belief system is characterized by sensitivity to the problems and requirements of the adversary as exemplified by policymakers like Averill Harriman, George Kennan and Marshall Shulman. It tends to view an opponent's enmity as a transient rather than a permanent phenomenon, that can be transformed into a relationship of detente given the right kind of diplomacy. It is in tune with Daniel Yergin's Yalta Axiom which saw the Soviet Union as a traditional great power trying to achieve its objectives in the context of the existing international system rather than trying to overthrow it. In common with the spiral model of Robert Jervis -- and in marked contrast to the confrontational and competitive mindset -- cooperative actors are aware that the actions of one's own state can affect the behavior of others and should be moderated accordingly. Thus, excessive military forces are eschewed as being dangerously provocative to political adversaries. Cooperators see strategic defenses in general and the Reagan Administration's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in particular, as likely to generate more offensive forces on the adversary's side and to undermine international stability.

In foreign policy, those with a cooperative mindset still endorse containment of the other superpower's reach and influence but do so in the context of developing harmonious relations and relaxing tensions. In defense planning they see sufficiency as a more appropriate criterion than parity or superiority and see nuclear weapons as useful to perform one mission only -- to deter a nuclear attack. They believe this deterrent mission requires only a minimal retaliatory force for which the primary criterion is invulnerability not balance with the adversary. Many believe

that nuclear weapons have no utility as instruments of war fighting and should not even be considered as military weapons, being unable either to gain or hold territory, nor to defend military positions or civilian populations.

Cooperative actors are the most optimistic about arms control, see negotiations as variable sum games, and emphasize problem solving for both sides rather than one-sided gains. They are the most likely to initiate integrative bargaining and to respond to the other side's moves with benign tit-for-tat tactics. While sensitive to the political need for agreements that are equitable and verifiable, they do not make a fetish of nuclear balance in every force category or of treaty compliance in every last detail.

Cooperators believe that national technical means are adequate for the monitoring of each side's treaty compliance, noting that despite the relatively closed nature of Soviet society, the western intelligence community is rarely surprised by Soviet weapons development; having correctly predicted all new systems before they became operational. They believe that monitoring Soviet capability is enhanced by arms control agreements, the compliance provisions of which allow legal challenges of ambiguous behavior. Cooperators believe in quiet diplomacy to resolve compliance problems and tend to blame both sides for pushing too close to treaty limits after SALT I.¹⁰ While disappointed by Soviet failure to adequately explain technical violations like the Krasnayorsk radar, cooperators do not judge the radar to be detrimental to western security.

Pacifist

Few pacifists can be found among the decisionmaking elites of either superpower. Pacifists see the risk of war as much higher than the risks of political take-over. Their view of the adversary is more benign than that of the other four mindsets outlined above, is more willing to credit the other side with legitimate foreign and defense policy objectives, and is more sensitive to the opponents' internal divisions. Pacifists emphasize common rather than conflicting interests between states and are prepared to invest heavily in measures to improve relations with their political adversaries.

Allies worried about security guarantees tend to be disturbed by pacifist tendencies in the decision making hierarchies of their alliance leaders because pacifists tend to be accomodative in their foreign policy, minimalist in their military force requirements, and abolitionist with respect to nuclearforces, denying the need for even a minimal deterrent force.

Pacifists tend to favor radical disarmament measures and to be impatient with traditional arms control diplomacy, seeing the pursuit of formal treaties and agreements as more likely to drive the competition in armaments than to dampen it down. If engaged in negotiations pacifists would tend to adopt accomodative and conciliatory bargaining tactics without fear of exploitation; their objective being more to settle than to win. They would be more likely than others to engage in unilateral concessions, particularly on nuclear matters.

Pacifists are the most relaxed about verification requirements and consider the risks of cheating by an adversary small when compared to the benefits of mutual restraint and the risks of further unlimited

accumulation of nuclear weapons by both sides. They are the most willing to give an adversary the benefit of the doubt in case of ambiguous behavior and the least perturbed by asymmetries in openness. They tend to blame hardliners in their own government for recalcitrance in the adversary. Not surprisingly they deplore public denunciations of cheating and favor quiet diplomacy to resolve compliance ambiguities.

The middle three categories of belief systems outlined above: confronters, competitors and cooperators, differ on many particulars but share a consensus on two general issues: the need to maintain strong military forces with a significant nuclear component, and the need to pursue arms control arrangements with the adversary. The two extreme points of view do not share this consensus.

Pacifists see little purpose for most military forces and none at all for nuclear weapons, and totalitarians see no purpose in cooperative arms control diplomacy. As Levine noted in his 1963 study these two extremes share a simplicity in their approach and sometimes make strikingly similar policy recommendations despite their radically different political philosophies. Thus, anti-communist extremists and pacifists can both endorse the abolition of nuclear weapons and the building of a strategic defensive shield; neither of which are considered feasible by more sophisticated analysts. Similarly, in the debate over NATO's decision to deploy new American missiles in western Europe in the early 1980s, the extreme left in western Europe and the isolationist right in the United States both advocated that the United States dissociate itself from Europe and let Europeans provide for their own defense; the American right believing Europe not worth the trouble and expense, the European left believing American "support" too dangerous.

The potential for negotiated arms control -- both in terms of reaching agreement on common goals and of concluding treaties that effectively limit armaments -- can be assessed by examining how different bargaining strategies interact with each other. Twenty-five interactions are theoretically possible between the five bargaining strategies that each of two negotiating parties might adopt based on the preceding analysis of belief systems. Table II demonstrates that only a few of these are likely to produce stable and effective arms control agreements. In some, the mindsets of the negotiating parties will preclude any recognition of common interests; in others, any agreements concluded are likely to be mere codifications of the status quo; and between conciliatory anti-war pacifists negotiations will be unnecessary. The following section briefly summarizes the likely outcomes from these hypothetical interactions, beginning with those involving negotiating parties with a totalitarian mindset.

Interaction #1, that between a pair of totalitarian parties, is unlikely to take the form of an arms control negotiation since totalitarians are indifferent to the welfare of others and insensitive to the benefits of cooperative diplomacy. In game theory terms the payoff structure will never look worthwhile. A weak totalitarian may nevertheless be unable to avoid coming to terms with a more powerful totalitarian opponent, as Stalin was forced to negotiate with Hitler in the late 1930s. When totalitarians are engaged with each other, however, either diplomatically or in a conflict situation, the prognosis is for a mutually destructive outcome as both sides tend to adopt bullying and coercive tactics, both are out to win, and neither is likely to reduce the other's demands.

TABLE II

INTERACTIONS BETWEEN DIFFERENT BARGAINING STRATEGIES: LIKELY OUTCOMES

A \ B	Totalitarian	Confrontational	Competitive	Cooperative	Pacifist
	1	2	3	4	5
Totalitarian	mutually destructive	A's totalitarian stance moves B towards totalitarian position	potential for B to move A into accepting B's existence, i.e. from totalitarian to confrontational	A tends to take advantage of B's cooperative gestures	B likely to cave in
Confrontational	B's totalitarian stance moves A towards totalitarian position	positive outcome requires each to accept legitimacy of the other	B unwilling to give A the benefit of the doubt. Worst case analysis of A's actions by B	B has potential to move A to more cooperative position	A takes advantage of B
Competitive	potential for A to move B from totalitarian to confrontational position	A unwilling to give B benefit of the doubt. Worst case analysis of B's actions by A	Dangerous and mutually reinforcing interaction likely. Stalemate at best	Positive outcome more likely if B is stronger than A	As A increases demands, B will move to competitive stance
Cooperative	B tends to take advantage of A's cooperative gestures	A has potential to move B to more cooperative position	Positive outcome more likely if A stronger than B	mutually beneficial resolution of conflicts likely in all interactions between cooperative and conciliatory bargainers	
Pacifist	A likely to cave in	B tends to take advantage of A's cooperative gestures	As B increases demands A becomes more competitive		

Interactions between totalitarians and more flexible mindsets present more potential for mutual influence but the changes may not always be in the direction intended, particularly if one side misreads the mindset and the bargaining tactics of the other. In numbers 2 and 6, interactions between totalitarians and confronters, the confronter might have its belief systems and prejudices reinforced, and its positions even further hardened, by the bullying and coercive tactics of a totalitarian negotiating partner. Latent acceptance of the legitimacy of the other's negotiating objectives could also be lost, for example, as appears to have happened in the Anglo-Argentinian negotiations on the sovereignty of the Falklands Islands.¹² The Argentine military government's attempted fait accompli, in taking over the islands by force, eliminated a considerable British tolerance for earlier Argentinian claims for eventual sovereignty over the Falklands, strengthened the hardliners in Britain, and generated overwhelming public support for British military countermeasures. In arms control negotiations the blatant accumulation of new weapons systems as coercive bargaining chips by one side has a similar blackmailing effect, toughening the negotiating positions of the other. As the United States bargains coercively it reinforces those in the Kremlin arguing against the feasibility of peaceful coexistence and strengthens those with a more orthodox Marxist-Leninist viewpoint of the final triumph of communism. Similarly, when the Soviets are intransigent -- as when they walked out of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) talks in November 1983 -- those arguing against the virtue of a cooperative arms control are strengthened in the United States.

When a competitive bargainer negotiates with a totalitarian -- as in interactions numbers 3 and 11 -- the totalitarian may be moved into a position more accepting of the legitimacy of the adversary; particularly if

the competitive bargainer is the more powerful. An example is the manner in which Israel was able to bring Egypt round to an acceptance of the state of Israel and a willingness to negotiate a settlement in the Sinai.¹³

Cooperative bargainers interacting with totalitarians -- numbers 4 and 16 -- run the risk of exploitation by the bullying tactics of the latter. A firm cooperator employing a tit-for-tat strategy that rewards concession and punishes coercion will soon have to revert to a hardline if there is no conciliatory behavior from the adversary. Efforts to play a benign game, that does not respond to every defection with a corresponding one, will be perceived by the totalitarian as weakness and thus a measure of the success of his firmness, not as a concession requiring reciprocal behavior.

Interactions between totalitarians and conciliatory bargainers of the anti-war pacifist stripe -- numbers 5 and 21 -- are likely to produce unequal and ultimately unstable agreements as the latter gives in to all the former's demands. Hitler's taking over of the Sudetenland, post-war settlements in which the victor demands unconditional surrender of the vanquished, and manifestly inequitable treaties, all fall into this category; usually with unfortunate long term consequences.

In sum, totalitarians are unlikely to enter into serious arms control negotiations and, if engaged, are unlikely to generate the kind of climate conducive to stable agreements. Fortunately the councils of government in Washington and Moscow since World War II have been largely made up of those with mindsets and belief systems in the three middle categories outlined here. Nevertheless, while these policymakers are not resistant to cooperative arms control efforts, not all forums involving various combinations of these moderate negotiations will produce effective agreements.

Negotiation between two confrontational bargainers, number 7, is more likely to occur than number 1, between two totalitarians. It requires each side to accept the legitimacy of the other and to recognize a common interest that threatens neither. Even then, the range of possible limits to which each side can agree is likely to be very narrow, since hardliners believe in peace through strength rather than peace through cooperation. Agreements are certainly possible but are likely to impose limits that have no effect on either side's arsenals. One case in point is the Limited Test Ban concluded in 1963 which bans nuclear testing in the atmosphere but permits testing underground and thus does nothing to slow the weapons development programs of either superpower. Another is the Non Proliferation Treaty signed in 1968, and ratified by the two superpowers in 1970, which imposes limits on the non-nuclear weapons powers only.

Interactions between confronters and competitors -- numbers 8 and 12 -- are somewhat more conducive to productive arms control bargaining than between two confronters but negotiations are still constrained by a tendency on the part of the confronter to make worst case analyses of the actions and rhetoric of the competitor. Both sides find it difficult to recognize areas of common interest and neither has the necessary confidence in themselves, or trust in the other, to make innovative proposals. Competitive bargainers who believe in deterrence by balanced nuclear capabilities are extremely fearful of being exploited by hardliners, and reluctant to make any move which could suggest giving the other side an advantage. Jerome Frank, writing of East-West disarmament negotiations in the 1950s and 1960s, observed that the risk that the other side might gain an advantage by cheating on an agreement was a far more potent determinant of both side's negotiating behavior than the far greater risk of a nuclear

exchange that might destroy humanity.¹⁴ And the pervasive mistrust of the cold war years has been noted by many former officials. Louis J. Halle, who served on the State Department Policy Planning staff in the 1950s, admits that the United States was even more suspicious of reasonable Soviet proposals, believing them far more sinister and dangerous than proposals that were manifestly unacceptable. As Halle put it:

Our instinct is to cast about for grounds on which to discredit the proposal instead of seizing it and making the most of it. Being distrustful of the Greeks bearing gifts, we are afraid of being tricked.¹⁵

In the 1980s, a similar cold war distrust dominated American attitudes towards Soviet arms control proposals. A good example is the automatic rejection of Mikhail Gorbachev's test moratorium in the summer of 1985; not only by Reagan Administration spokesmen, but also by most of the media.¹⁶

Interactions between two competitive bargainers -- number 13 -- should theoretically be less risky than between two hardliners, but the prospects for innovative arms control are nevertheless slim. Competitive bargainers are overly concerned about numerical balance even as they claim to eschew offensive forces and strategies. Bilateral Soviet-American negotiations on strategic arms (SALT, START) since the late 1960s demonstrate the kind of progress that can be expected from this kind of interaction. It is possible to maintain sufficient sense of the common interest to keep the dialogue alive, but not to limit effectively weapons programs. Some status quo agreements have been concluded but, since 1972, even these modest limits have proved impossible to ratify in the United States.

The interactions with the most potential for achieving equitable agreements are between cooperative bargainers and almost any kind of

adversary except the lunatic fringe totalitarians and the most hardline confrontational bargainers. As noted earlier, the main characteristic of cooperative bargainers is their sensitivity to the security needs of others and of the interdependence of one nation's actions on another. Unlike totalitarians, confronters and competitors, cooperative bargainers do care about the welfare of their negotiating partners and look for solutions that serve both sides' needs.¹⁷

Cooperators negotiating with either hardliners or competitors -- numbers 9, 17, 14 and 18 -- can move the adversary into more cooperative bargaining positions by a benign tit-for-tat strategy that always rewards concessions with concessions and generally, but not always, punishes coercion with coercion. Firm cooperators have the right mix of cooperation and strength that permits the bargainer to give its opponent the benefit of doubt when interpreting ambiguous moves, but will not cave in to an adversary's bullying behavior. As noted above, however, the cooperative side of this strategy can backfire when tried against extremely hardline adversaries (interactions 4, 9, 16, and 17) who misperceive cooperation as weakness and are thereby reinforced in the appropriateness and effectiveness of their coercive behavior.

Conciliators facing conciliators

Conciliators are unlikely to face conciliators in an arms control negotiation since disputes between them are likely to be settled tacitly. But any combination of conciliatory with cooperative bargaining tactics will reinforce the integrative aspects of each, as in interactions numbers 19, 20, 24 and 25. Arms control agreements that mop up loose ends after the otherwise tidy resolution of conflict are products of this kind of

cooperative interaction. Two cases in point are the Anglo-American/Rush-Bagot Treaty of 1817 that demilitarized the Great Lakes after the War of 1812 had been settled at the Treaty of Ghent in 1814; and the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty that set limits on capital ships after World War I. Attempts to refine the 1922 agreement, in the late 1920s and 1930s, however, degenerated into competitive bargaining and concern over numerical balances.¹⁸

Purely conciliatory tactics work with friendly states to expedite the codification of common interests, but rarely work with an adversary more hostile than a firm cooperator; unless the interaction toughens up the conciliator. Bargainers lacking the interest or the capability to be firm in the face of the bullying and coercive tactics do not fare well with totalitarians, confronters and competitors, who tend to pocket rather than reciprocate concessions, as in interactions numbers 5, 21, 10, 22, 15, and 23. That said, many opportunities for innovative arms control do appear to have been lost because potentially cooperative gestures were withheld by parties who misread negotiating partners, with cooperative tendencies, as competitive or confrontational bargainers on whom concessions would be wasted.

Conclusion

Several lessons flow from these hypothetical bargaining interactions. First, that the voting public, frustrated by the slow pace of arms control, should understand how the belief systems of their elected officials will limit the choice of national arms control bargaining strategies. It is thus quite unrealistic to elect leaders with either totalitarian,

confrontational or highly competitive mindsets and then expect them to negotiate dramatic arms reductions treaties. Status quo agreements are the most that can be expected under these circumstances. These are non-trivial achievements especially when both sides have destabilizing new systems on their drawing boards and in their weapons pipelines. But no-one should be fooled into anticipating dramatic reductions or budget savings by arms control negotiations. Reductions usually occur as unilateral initiatives by confident leaders with strong cooperative instincts.

A second lesson for governments contemplating a set of negotiations is the need to invest more effort into assessing the nature of the adversary, since strategies that are effective with one party may be counterproductive with others.

Totalitarian and confrontational strategies, characterized by coercive bullying and blackmailing, are obviously destructive to relations between negotiating parties and unlikely ever to produce useful stable agreements.

Competitive bargaining strategies may be the only ones appropriate to standing up to totalitarians and confronters. Competition breeds competition, however, and such interactions are unlikely to produce effective arms control and may forfeit opportunities to soften the position of a latent cooperator.

Cooperative approaches are optimum for dealing with all but the extremists, as these tactics allow most adversaries to shift one notch along the spectrum in a non-threatening environment. A firm tit-for-tat approach that punishes all defections is more likely to be effective in avoiding exploitation by confronters but a more benign approach that gives ambiguous moves the benefit of the doubt, could be more effective with

competitors and other firm cooperators.

Purely conciliatory strategies are adequate for dealing with friendly partners, but are likely to be exploited by hardliners and might even encourage bullying.

NOTES

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