

Tan deserves great credit for this brave lifetime project to bring the massacres in Dao County to light. Without his book, only a small number of experts outside the location would know about this traumatic set of events. His book shows that the government at the provincial and district levels made great efforts to document the massacre and its specificities, but for internal use only. We do not know whether the central government in Beijing played any role. To address this issue would make the topic even more sensitive in China today.

There is no doubt that Tan's book is based on hard documentary evidence and countless interviews. However, from an academic point of view, it is problematic that Tan did not make a decision between the two options of writing a document-based nonfiction book or "report literature" (*baogao wenxue*). In some parts of the book, he provides quotes from original documents and petition letters. In other parts, he recounts long dialogues from meetings during the Cultural Revolution in the form of direct quotes combined with detailed descriptions of feelings, atmosphere, and the inner thoughts of actors at a given moment. These kinds of literary features make the book more readable for a broader audience, but they weaken the book's evidential basis. Hopefully one day Tan will hand over his documents to the United Nations, because the massacre in Dao County seems to fit into the category of crimes against humanity.

Felix Wemheuer
University of Cologne

China's Security State: Philosophy, Evolution, and Politics, by Xuezhi Guo.
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 496 pp. £73.99 (cloth),
 £23.99 (paper), US\$32.00 (eBook).

"Few institutions have received as much weight but as little weighty analysis as China's security and intelligence agencies and their role in elite politics" (2). So begins Xuezhi Guo's substantial study on the evolution and functions of China's security and intelligence organizations both before and after the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. Guo is certainly correct about the weight of the topic. These organizations "are responsible for protecting party leadership, countering domestic dissent, blocking coups or mass insurrections, preventing external threats to the regime, and conducting foreign operations" (3).

Yet even though the security and intelligence agencies are of critical importance to the survival of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime, they have remained largely enigmatic, and solid treatment of their history has been rare. This book is

therefore a welcome addition to the literature—and overdue. It gains further significance given that the security system has witnessed accelerating expansion since President Xi Jinping came to power in late 2012. Xi and his lieutenants have been perfecting the art of surveillance and social control, with new innovations to an already vast and sophisticated security apparatus. This is especially notable in Xinjiang, where a high-tech surveillance system has been installed to track suspicious activities among the Uighurs.

The book is organized around the key security and intelligence organizations in PRC history. The Ministry of Public Security, the armed police, and the intelligence agencies each receive two chapters of coverage because of their importance, while the Central Guard Bureau, the Central Guard Regiment, the garrison commands, and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) each get a single-chapter treatment.

In addition to a detailed history of the various agencies, a notable strength of the book is its analysis of how they are entangled with CCP elite politics. The degree of leaders' effective control over the agencies is positively correlated with the consolidation of their political power, both for paramount leaders such as Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, as well as for lesser rulers such as Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.

Take the Central General Office (CGO). Not itself a security organ, the CGO has nevertheless wielded enormous influence, in competition with other high-level Party organs such as the Politburo, the CCP Central Secretariat, and the State Council, on how the various security agencies can be used. Mao depended on control over the CGO to gain support for the Cultural Revolution. In October 1969 he gave the CGO command over the Central Guard Bureau, an elite security force providing protection to the top leadership, and installed Wang Dongxing, his loyal bodyguard, as commander of its Guard Department. In the post-Mao power struggle, Deng Xiaoping weakened the CGO's grip on security forces by giving command over the Central Guard Bureau to the PLA General Staff Department, his own fiefdom, thus consolidating his control over internal security.

When Jiang Zemin came to power after 1989, he rearmed the CGO as an instrument of elite politics. He installed his lieutenant Zeng Qinghong in the CGO, and Zeng, by cultivating ties with the security and intelligence apparatuses, contributed much to Jiang's consolidation of power. Following Jiang, Hu Jintao continued to rely on the CGO by making Ling Jihua, a longtime follower, its head. But Hu never achieved significant control over the security organizations, owing to the continuing shadow of Jiang, the growing institutionalization of these organizations, and Hu's weak personal ties with the security chiefs. The book does not discuss the Xi Jinping era, but notably, in his first five-year term in office Xi, much like Jiang and Hu, installed his own confidant Li Zhanshu as director of the CGO. But more than Jiang and Hu, and in a manner reminiscent of Mao and Deng, Xi has tightened his ties with the military and security organizations in a frenzy to impose paramount personal control.

Where does the book leave us? It has provided an excellent history of China's security apparatuses from the founding of the CCP in 1921 to the end of the Hu Jintao era in 2012. A journal article by the author to provide an update on the Xi era would be an excellent idea. The Hu period, as noted earlier, saw an increasing institutionalization of Chinese politics and a corresponding weakening of his personal control over the security forces. A successor of his mold might have tolerated continued institutionalization, eventually entrenching a balance-of-power system in elite politics and potentially fermenting a sort of intraparty democracy called for by some liberal Party members. But Xi is anything but.

Xi's "imperial presidency," as Elizabeth Economy puts it, has instead escalated the expansion of China's security state. With gusto, Xi has promulgated the notion of "overall state security," securitizing everything from regime survival to international security. The decision to establish a new National Security Commission in November 2013 was the most notable sign of this securitization—and with it, Xi's intention to control an expanded and streamlined security apparatus. China's security state, to which Mao gave birth, continues to thrive under Xi.

Feng Zhang
Australian National University

Where the Party Rules: The Rank and File of China's Communist State,
 by Daniel Koss. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. 408 pp.
 US\$99.99 (cloth).

Where the Party Rules is an admirably ambitious endeavor to investigate the role of political parties in authoritarian regimes. To this end, Daniel Koss explores the sources of the Chinese Communist Party's strength and its impacts on state capacity and regime resilience. Instead of focusing on contemporary Party affairs, Koss's account covers almost the entire past century. Although this is not the first book that focuses solely on the Party, the major departures in *Where the Party Rules* are its emphasis on the Party's grassroots organizations and the historical origins of Party strength.

The book pins down one of the most important factors in the Chinese regime's resilience—the Communist Party. How, then, do authoritarian parties contribute to authoritarian durability and what are the sources of their effectiveness? Koss first offers an overarching theoretical framework of authoritarian parties and distinguishes these from previous scholarship, which has tended to view authoritarian parties either as the moderators of elite conflict or purely patronage machines. Koss rightly points out that previous scholarship of Party politics based on democra-