

THE WAVY CROSS:
Australia, Turkey and the US 1945-1975

Gürol Baba


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The Australian National University**

Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of my own independent research and that all authorities and sources used are duly acknowledged.



Gürol Baba

February 2010

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Abstract

As combatants in the First World War, Australia and Turkey played an important role in shaping each others' national identity. Both nations emerged from empires; both struggled to find an independent voice on the world stage; both are now regional powers facing greater policy integration with larger powers and regional groupings; both must relate to smaller powers in their region (for example, Papua New Guinea, Cyprus). For all these historical parallels and strategic similarities, no comparison exists of the foreign policies of Australia and Turkey. This raises an intriguing question: did Australia and Turkey as regional powers follow similar foreign policies?

This thesis compares the external security policies of Turkey and Australia 1945-75 with reference to the US. It examines in detail the similarities and differences in the strategic postures of Turkey and Australia in this period and compares the results.

The US alliance is the axis of the thesis for two reasons. First, throughout the Cold War period the US was a principal factor in the formulation of these two countries' security policies. Second, the US alliance highlights the dependence of Australian and Turkish foreign policies, and the limits of their search for a more independent stance.

The comparison highlights an argument that relations between small or middle powers and a superpower are usually imbalanced, because the superpower's interests extend far beyond those of its smaller allies, whose interests the superpower is prone to misunderstand, disregard or even sacrifice if seeming to run counter to the superpower's interests.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AWM: The Australian War Memorial

CNIA: Current Notes on International Affairs

CAPD: Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates

FRUS: Foreign Relations of the United States

FO: Public Records Office Foreign Office

NAA: The National Archives of Australia

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OECD: the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PM: Prime Minister

SEA: South East Asia

TGNA: The Turkish Grand National Assembly:

TGNAP: Turkish Grand National Assembly Proceedings, *T.B.M.M. Tutanak Dergisi*

the UN: The United Nations

the US: The United States

the USSR: The Soviet Union

TPMA: Turkish Prime Ministerial Archives

TPMB: Turkish Prime Ministerial Bulletins, *Ayın Tarihi (History of the Month)*

UNCIO Documents: Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organisation

WW I: The First World War

WW II: The Second World War

Introduction: The Wavy Cross

In their respective regions, Turkey and Australia are nations small enough to seek help for their external security from a great power, and important enough to receive that help. Between 1945 and 1975 the great power was the United States (US). This is still the case, so this thesis has implications for the present; it stops at 1975 because the relevant Turkish archives are closed from that year.

Between 1945 and 1975 Turkish and Australian relations with the US, although always friendly, took diagonally opposite courses. Broadly, Turkey moved from seeking the closest possible US alliance to a more independent stance, whereas Australia moved in the reverse direction. This contrast can be imagined as a diagonal cross, with Turkey and Australia each at one end of a diagonal in 1945 and crossing in later years to occupy the reverse position by 1975. Neither diagonal is simply linear: each wobbles and even dips as US relations oscillate, making the lines wavy. The image of a wavy cross conveys the contrasting Turkish and Australian courses in their US relations in this period and since.

Why did two nations similarly placed in their regions follow such opposite courses? The thesis sketches the general pattern of the relations each had with the US in 1945-75, outlining how national security concerns combined with inclinations towards national autonomy to produce the wavy cross. It exemplifies this with four more detailed case studies of key moments during those 30 years: the formation of the United Nations (UN), the Korean War, confrontation with neighbours in the 1960s and the Vietnam War. These case studies are the core of the thesis. Against the

general background of trends and events, some local, some global, they show how each contributed to shifts in relations with the US.

Hitherto such questions have been considered only from a national perspective, mostly by tracing how one country has related to a great power over a period of time. Such studies prefer to explain relations in specifically national or regional terms. Certainly such considerations matter, but by comparing countries so far apart and so dissimilar in their political institutions and national traditions, this thesis argues for inherent factors in the situation of small and middle powers, most prominently the fluctuating tension voters and leaders feel between national security and national independence. The thesis confines itself largely to the political and diplomatic manifestations of these, for want of time and space not seriously addressing other factors which from time to time influenced them, such as trade, US cultural and economic imperialism, and common language and traditions. I am aware of these factors, but chose instead to investigate closely the relevant primary international relations sources in the archives of all three countries (see Bibliography). I believe these secure my argument, even though it might be extended to those other spheres.

As the "Contents" page indicates, I explore my argument in five parts.

Each part has two chapters: one on Australia, one on Turkey. The first part, a case study, examines the formation of the United Nations. It focuses on how Turkish and Australian foreign policies and their relations with the US influenced their attitude to the UN. Turkey was less influential than Australia in the formation of the UN. For Turkey, in order to maintain its regional security in the face of a perceived Soviet threat, securing US friendship was more important than being a member of the UN.

In particular the privileged position of the USSR within the UN Security Council weakened Turkey's belief in the organization's capacity to maintain international peace. Turkey's low expectations with regard to the UN pushed Ankara to aim for a US alliance as the only effective counter to the Soviet threat. To make clear its pro-US stance, Ankara used the San Francisco Conference to argue that Turkey's founding principles were the same as the founding ideals of the US.

Despite great power dominance, Australia was an effective and self reliant middle power during the UN's formation. As a spokesman for small states, Australia attempted to increase its influence within the UN and in the post-WWII order. At the San Francisco Conference it defied great power dominance, and unlike Turkey preferred an independent say in the Pacific to closer ties with the US. In 1945 Turkey and Australia were at the far extremes of the wavy cross.

To link to the next case study, the second part, a more general review, surveys Turkish-American and Australian-American relations in the early Cold War period (1945-1948), and gives the background to Turkey's NATO membership and to the formation of ANZUS. From 1945 to 1948 Turkey had three motivations for securing US politico-economic support: external security, economic and military development and westernization. These motivations pushed Ankara to make various diplomatic moves to attract Washington's attention. Yet Turkey secured American support for its military and economic development not as a result of diplomatic efforts, but because of regional developments in the Middle East, and the first impacts of the Cold War on American policy makers, which made Turkey a significant US base.

Between 1945 and 1948 the difference between Canberra's and Washington's security considerations in the Pacific was one of the main features of American–Australian relations. This difference is seen clearly in the disputes over the Manus Island base and the Japanese peace settlement. Canberra knew that Australia could not be a key actor in the South Pacific without a US-backed regional organization, but neither it nor Washington gave way on either dispute. This delayed the formation of a regional alliance.

The third part comprises a case study of the Korean War, NATO and ANZUS. Broadly, two major anxieties and three main reasons led Ankara to focus on NATO membership, and the diplomatic effort it required. The anxieties were: a possible decrease in American support to Turkey following a US shift towards Western Europe during the formative stages of NATO, and the probability of Turkey's exclusion from NATO because NATO focussed on Western Europe. The reasons were: first, NATO membership would draw Turkey even closer to the US; second, NATO would provide an automatic security guarantee to Turkey; and third, NATO would reduce Ankara's financial burden with regard to military spending. Once again world events - the effect of Soviet-American rivalry, and the Korean War – were the crucial catalyst in Turkey joining NATO.

In forming ANZUS, Australian-American relations were affected by three main issues: the rise of Communism in Asia, the Japanese Peace Treaty, and Australia's deep-rooted objective of securing a Pacific Pact. In 1949 Canberra and Washington had differing views on these issues. For the US the Japanese Peace Treaty and Communism were primary and the Pacific Pact secondary; for Australia it was vice versa. The Korean War, and especially China's involvement in it, changed the State Department's view, particularly on the urgency of concluding the Japanese Peace

Treaty in order to prevent the fall of Japan, a potential ally, into Communist hands. The US wanted a soft treaty to help Japan stand on its own feet against Communism. Australia wanted a tough treaty to block a resurgence of Japanese militarism. Washington, Canberra and Wellington each used what the other wanted as a bargaining chip. The Pact and a soft Japanese Peace Treaty were the prices the US and Australia, respectively, paid. Australia's quick decision to deploy its troops to the Korean War, Percy Spender's efforts, and Washington's strategy to consolidate its position in the northern Pacific by committing Australia and New Zealand via a Pacific Pact to the defence of American bases on the Japanese islands, also diminished Washington's reluctance for a Pact.

Part four reviews Turkish and Australian – US relations from 1952-1966. In this period Turkish–American relations were at their closest in the military, economic and political spheres. The link between Ankara and Washington was so strong that Ankara was reluctant to let problems jeopardize relations.

In the same period Canberra tried to maintain an American commitment to South East Asia (SEA) since its national interests conformed more with the US than with Britain. Events in SEA from 1952 slowly drew the US more and more into the region. These events were: Dien Bien Phu and the following Geneva Conference on French Indochina (1954), the formation of the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), the West New Guinea (WNG) controversy in the mid 50s, the escalation in Vietnam from 1955 to 1961, the Laos Crisis (1961), and Indonesia's Konfrontasi against Malaysia from 1963. In all these crises Australia increasingly supported American policies, thereby moving from the Commonwealth towards Washington.

Part five offers case studies on the Cyprus question and the Cuban missile crisis for Turkey, and the Vietnam War for Australia. The Cyprus Question was a "sleeping", long glossed over by the closeness between the US and Turkey. This closeness was shaken by their respective attitudes during the Cuban Missile crisis in October 1962. The crisis demonstrated that Turkey's significance for Washington in the Eastern Mediterranean was decreasing, which in turn triggered Ankara's concerns about the reliability of the American alliance.

In 60s and 70s other issues, such as Turkey's withdrawal from the Multilateral Force in 1965, the problem of opium cultivation in Turkey at the beginning of 1970s, and most significant of all, Turkey's intervention in Cyprus in 1974 and the consequent American arms embargo, widened the gap between Turkey and the US. Consequently Turkey did not support the US in Vietnam and did not send troops. Regional issues took Turkey some distance away from the US.

As the Vietnam War intensified and the US increased its commitment, and especially after the end of Konfrontasi, Australia strengthened its support for the US. During this period Australia's closeness to the US peaked. The most important evidence of this is that from 1965 to 1967 Australia sent a third of its defence capability to Vietnam, and introduced conscription for foreign service for the first time in its history. In this period the Turkish and Australian arms of the wavy cross intersected, Turkey to draw away from the US, Australia towards it.

Mainly using primary sources, all five parts trace detailed, sometimes small, stances and shifts in diplomatic or political relations, which cumulatively offer an explanation of the wavy cross. The cross still illuminates Turkish and Australian relations with the

US. In tracing their varying attitudes towards the US, and their dependence on its policies, the thesis offers an understanding of the patterns of relations between great and middle powers.

I undertook this thesis in part because of the close "Anzac" relationship between Turkey, Australia and New Zealand, felt particularly at my university at Canakkale, but also because no such comparison has previously been attempted, yet the patterns of great-middle power relations are the most numerous in international relations.

A comparative approach is a common method in political history. In this thesis it let a paradox emerge: the wavy cross. The wavy cross symbolizes how one ally chose the path of independence and the other the path of greater dependence in the course of an alliance relationship that in fact exposed both to greater dangers than they might have been exposed to had they not sought the alliance relationship in the first place.

Not many secondary accounts exist on the history of Turkey-US and Australia-US relations in the 1945-75 period, none attempt a comparison such as is offered here, and no comparative study has been made of how US allies managed their respective relationships with it. No previous writer has traced the course of Australian-US relations in terms of a transition from assertive independence to growing dependence in a relationship which was essentially one-way. The thesis aims to add untold stories to the public record and to offer new insights by a new comparison. This illuminates its central argument, essentially that relations between small or middle powers and a superpower are necessarily imbalanced and unequal because the superpower has interests extending far beyond those of its clients, whose own interests the

superpower is prone to misunderstand, view as unimportant in the wider strategic picture, disregard or even sacrifice if seeming to run counter to its own interests.

PART 1: The Formation of the United Nations

a. Turkey

United Nations (UN) membership was a significant concern for both Australia and Turkey, but for different reasons. Turkey was less influential than Australia in the formation of the UN, being more concerned with maintaining its regional security by securing US friendship than with the UN itself. As it was not a belligerent in WWII, Turkey did not have a say in war-time plans and the post-war order. This situation was exacerbated when the USSR became a potential threat after Kursk, April 1943, when Soviet victory became a genuine likelihood. Based on this perceived threat Ankara began to look for a security scheme that was first international and then regional. By 1945 the only international security scheme in prospect was the UN. Turkey's interest in the organization related primarily to the UN's international security objectives. Ultimately the privileged position of the great powers within the UN Security Council, one of them the USSR, weakened Turkey's belief in the organization's capacity to maintain international peace.

Turkey's lowered expectations with regard the UN as an international security organization led Ankara to focus more on regional security to counter the Soviet threat. The only effective counter to this threat was a US alliance. This diminished the UN's significance for Turkey. Unable to make contact with the US during the war, either to convey the Soviet threat or ask for an alliance, the UN became the most suitable platform for Turkey to approach the US.

Turkey's policies during WWII and during the formation of the UN relied mainly on the legacy of Atatürk's foreign policy.¹ In terms of security, Atatürk's principal idea was to establish good relations with Turkey's neighbours to create a zone of peace around Turkey.² It was not an isolationist policy. Atatürk also viewed the collective will of international organizations as pivotal for lasting peace, and believed that world citizens should 'be educated in such a way as to root out feelings of envy, covetousness and revenge'.³ In short Atatürk believed that international organizations could contribute to world peace.⁴ Consequently, the central tenet of Turkish foreign policy was the maintenance of regional and international stability and peace. This view underpinned Turkey's non-belligerence in WWII.⁵ Although Turkey did not enter the war, it closely followed international developments which might result in an international or regional security arrangement.

During the war Turkey's policy of non-belligerence was based on a wait and see approach with Ankara observing which bloc was ascendant in order to decide which to support. To manage this policy, Ankara bought time by arguing that Turkey was not capable of defending itself in case of an attack.⁶ In this way it aimed to preserve its closeness to both the Axis and the Allies, signing a Treaty of Mutual Assistance with France and Britain on 19 October 1939⁷ and a Non-aggression Pact with

¹ For Turkey's foreign policy (specifically its non-belligerence) during WWII see: NAA, 186768 - A989 - 1943/970/50, *War. Turkish entry into War*, W. Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000*; S. Deringil, *Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War*. For a brief review of Atatürk's foreign policy see: B. Oran (ed), *Türk Dis Politikası 1919-1980*, Vol 1, 239-370.

² The steps for the formation of a zone of stability and peace in Turkey's neighborhood were mainly via regional arrangements: the Friendship and Neutrality Agreement with the USSR (1925), the Balkan Entente (1934), the Sadaabad Pact (1938). For details see: B. Oran (ed), *Türk Dis Politikası 1919-1980*, Vol 1, 314-370.

³ E. Z. Karal, *Atatürk'ten Dusunceler*, 130-31.

⁴ Turkey became a member of the League of Nations in 1935. See: B. Oran (ed), *Türk Dis Politikası 1919-1980*, Vol 1, 312.

⁵ In terms of Turkey's non-belligerence during WWII see: NAA, 186768 - A989 - 1943/970/50, *War. Turkish entry into War*, W. Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000*; S. Deringil, *Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War*.

⁶ S. Deringil, *Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War*, 184.

⁷ For the full text of this treaty see: British and Foreign State Papers, Vol CLI, 213.

Germany on 18 June 1941.⁸ The policy had one important shortcoming: it meant that Turkey could have no say in any wartime international or regional security proposal for post-war peace. Throughout WWII, the most significant of these proposals was about the UN. The UN was an Allied proposal. Turkey did not want to antagonize the Germans by supporting it.

The first major step towards the formation of the UN was the Atlantic Charter⁹, put forward by US President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill on 14 August 1941, which established a vision for post-WWII world. The Atlantic Charter attracted the attention of the Turkish press, especially in terms of the drift of the US into the war. A Turkish commentary noted that the US was 'slowly entering the war' and the Americans would enter the war with their own 'principles for defence'.¹⁰ US belligerence was an important issue for Turkey. The US had the potential to be an important actor in European defence, which would be very significant for Turkey's security.

On the other hand there was a change in the pressures WWII put on Turkey. Turkey was relieved from the imminent threat of war by its Non-aggression Pact with Germany on 18 June 1941¹¹, but another anxiety emerged from the German invasion of the USSR on 22 June 1941. Arising from the Hitler-Molotov talks in November 1940 Turkey worried about a possible secret Russo-German bargain on the Straits in

⁸ For the full text of this pact see: *New York Times* 19 June 1941 in <http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1941/410618a.html> accessed on 14.12.2007.

⁹ The Atlantic Charter was not a treaty between the US and Britain, or a final or formal expression of peace aims. It was an affirmation "of certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they based their hopes for a better future for the world." (<http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/history>) See also: J. Stone, *The Atlantic Charter: New Worlds for Old*; D. Brinkley & D. R. Crowther, *The Atlantic Charter*; H. V. Morton, *Atlantic Meeting : an account of Mr. Churchill's voyage in H.M.S. Prince of Wales....*

¹⁰ *Ulus* 16 August 1941.

¹¹ S. Deringil, *Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War*, 120-22.

favour of the USSR.¹² After Germany attacked Russia, Turkey became anxious about a similar bargain between Russia, Britain and the US. The British Ambassador to Turkey, Sir Hugh Knatchbull Hugessen, mentioned on 25 June that '[t]here are signs that Turkey fears that we may engage ourselves too closely with Russia'.¹³ Turkey 'now began to fear that Britain would become too close to the Soviets'.¹⁴ The threat Turkey perceived shifted from Germany to the USSR.

Ankara was particularly anxious about the USSR's aspirations on the Straits.¹⁵ It worried that the USSR might convince the US and Britain about its demands on the Straits. This concern was not baseless. In 1944 a Dominions Office telegram stated that in order to improve 'Turco-Soviet Relations', the US and Britain might suggest to the Turkish Government that it 'should make a spontaneous declaration that they welcome the liberation of the Aegean as a means of opening up a new supply route to Russia through the Straits'.¹⁶ A telegram from Roosevelt to Churchill further suggested that the Straits would be a subject of Allied bargaining. Roosevelt stated, '[a]lternatively we could ask Turkey to waive the Montreux Treaty for the passage [of the Straits] ... This I expect the Russians would like. But I am not so sure about the Turks'.¹⁷ Turkey's anxiety about possible Soviet demands became concrete when the USSR declared on 19 March 1945 that it did not intend to renew the 1925 Russo-Turkish Treaty of Friendship.¹⁸ This suggested that the Straits might be a bargaining point between the great powers at the end of WWII. Since Turkey was not strong

¹² M. Gonlubol (ed), *Olaylarla Turk Dis Politikasi 1919-1995*, 149-150.

¹³ FO 371/N3197/78/38 in S. Deringil, *Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War*, 123.

¹⁴ S. Deringil, *Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War*, 123.

¹⁵ T. Ataov, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1939-1945*, 98.

¹⁶ NAA, 1351823 - A 3300 - 265K, Circular Telegram from Dominions Office to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, 22 November 1944.

¹⁷ FRUS, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 10-1, President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, 22 October 1944. On the Montreux Treaty see: R. DeLuca, *Great Power Rivalry at the Turkish Straits: the Montreux Conference and Convention of 1936*.

¹⁸ NAA, 190032 - A1066 - M45/27/5, Cablegram from Australian Legation Moscow to Department of External Affairs, 21 March 1945; *Cumhuriyet* 22-23 March 1945. For the text see: League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol. CLVII, 355. The details of this very important development will be examined in chapter 2a, on Turkish-American relations 1945-1948.

enough to be an equal partner in these negotiations, it would need the support of at least one other great power.

During the war Turkey's main concern for its external security thus became the Russian threat. Turkey knew that it could not cope with this threat on its own and that it could be countered in two ways. An international security scheme was an option but Ankara was not very hopeful about this. This is seen in a Turkish press comment early in 1942, suggesting that the declaration of a new international organization (the UN Declaration¹⁹) was not important, since most signatories were Latin American states or governments in exile, and the Declaration was Allied propaganda.²⁰ Such an attitude diverted Turkey's interest from preparatory work on the UN.

The other way for Turkey to counter the Russian threat was to secure US friendship. For this it needed an international platform to approach the US, as it was not a belligerent in WWII and did not have the opportunity to convey its threat perceptions. The UN Declaration was a possible platform for this.

The next step in the formation of the UN was the Moscow Conference in October 1943.²¹ At the end of the Conference the US, British, Soviet Union and Chinese representatives announced the Declaration of Four Nations on General Security which mentioned the establishment of 'a general international organization based on

¹⁹ The United Nations Declaration was signed by 26 allied nations in Washington on 1 January 1942. It was first signed by Roosevelt, Churchill, Maxim Litvinov of the USSR and T. V. Soong of China, and on 2 January the representatives of 22 other nations added their signatures. It pledged the signatory governments to the maximum war effort and bound them against making a separate peace. The first clause of the United Nations Declaration reads that the signatory nations had "subscribed to a common program of purposes and principles embodied in ... the Atlantic Charter."
(<http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/history>)

²⁰ Y. Nadi, *Cumhuriyet* 5 January 1942.

²¹ For details of the Tripartite Conference in Moscow, 18 October – 1 November 1943, see: FRUS, 1943, General, Vol 1, 513-781.

the principle of sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security'.²²

Another step, probably the most important one, was the Dumbarton Oaks Conference (or Washington Conversations on International Peace and Security Organization) held on 21 August 1944 in Washington, during which proposals for the UN Charter were negotiated.²³ The conference was similarly attended by representatives of the US, the Soviet Union, Britain and the Republic of China and discussions encompassed the formation of the Security Council and a right of veto²⁴ for its permanent members.

The US was the principal actor during these formative stages of the UN. Therefore if it wanted to secure US friendship, Turkey needed to support the UN. Turkey's negative attitude to the UN began to fade. In 1944 Dr. Tevfik Rustu Aras, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, noted the importance of a future UN and his hope that Turkey would be one of the first signatories of the UN Charter.²⁵ The Turkish press too was positive about the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, noting that the UN would be stronger and more effective than the old League of Nations. *Aksam* explained the

²² FRUS, 1943, General, Vol 1, 756, ANNEX 1, Declaration of Four Nations on General Security.

²³ For the text of Dumbarton Oaks proposals see: New Zealand Department of External Affairs, *The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization*. According to the proposals, four principal bodies were to constitute the organization to be known as the United Nations, namely; the General Assembly the Security Council, the International Court of Justice, the Secretariat, and an Economic and Social Council working under the authority of the General Assembly. The essence of the plan was that responsibility for preventing future war should be conferred upon the Security Council. The General Assembly could study, discuss and make recommendations in order to promote international cooperation and adjust situations likely to impair welfare. It could consider problems of cooperation in maintaining peace and security. But it could not make recommendations on any matter being considered by the Security Council, and all questions on which action was necessary had to be referred to the Security Council. (<http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/history>) See also: R. C. Hilderbrand, *Dumbarton Oaks, the Origins of the United Nations and the Search for the Post-War Security*. For the account of the talks see: K. M. Barton, "The Dumbarton Oaks Conference." Florida State University PhD, 1974.

²⁴ The concept of the veto (also known as the Great Power Veto) in the UN depended on a distinction between permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council. The permanent members, the Great Powers, gave themselves a dominant place. The veto made the UN a great power forum, rather than an assembly of equal nations.

²⁵ *Tanin* 31 July 1944.

main difference between the two: the UN would be empowered by its own armed forces. Nevertheless Turkish hopes remained limited about the effectiveness of the UN against possible armed action by a great power:

Given ... aggression by one [of] the great powers, to require a unanimous decision by the great powers for armed action against the aggressor is tantamount to requesting the aggressor to vote for an action directed against it. This means that from the very beginning it has been decided that no action will be taken against any aggression.²⁶

Turkey wanted a more solid security guarantee.

The next step in forming the UN was the Yalta Conference in February 1945,²⁷ at which it was announced that a UN Charter to be drafted in San Francisco would be based on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. Turkey would be invited to the San Francisco Conference if it declared war on the common enemy by 1 March 1945.²⁸ This was the most significant reason for Turkey's declaration of war on Germany and Japan in February 1945,²⁹ an action welcomed by Britain, the US and the Western press.³⁰

Turkey's declaration of war on Germany and Japan was a rational extension of its wait and see policy. By 1943 'the Allies were ... definitely in the ascendant'³¹ so Ankara understood that cooperation with the Allies would be significant for the post-WWII era. From then on, Turkish officials started to mention the importance of closeness to the Allies. In August 1943 the Turkish Ambassador to London, Rauf

²⁶ *Aksam* 26 September 1944 in University of Ankara, *Turkey and the United Nations*, 66-67.

²⁷ For details: FRUS, *The Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, 547-996.

²⁸ FRUS, *The Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, 943-45, The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State, 11 February 1945.

²⁹ *Cumhuriyet* 24 February 1945; *Ulus* 24 February 1945.

³⁰ *Ulus* 24, 25, 26, 28 February 1945; *Ulus* 2, 15 March 1945; *Cumhuriyet* 5 January 1945; H. C. Yalcin, *Tanin* 7 January 1945; TPMB, No 135, February 1945, 32- 7, 64-7; TPMB, No 136, March 1945, 35-42.

³¹ S. Deringil, *Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War*, 144.

Orbay, 'stressed the absolute loyalty of Turkey to the Alliance', and stated that if the Allies 'wanted anything from Turkey', they 'had only to ask' and Turkey 'would do it if it was in her power.'³²

Turkey's non-belligerence was not disastrous for the Allies and did not cause resentment. Churchill commented:

I shall mention a name which I think will cause universal satisfaction –Turkey. T[urkey] made an alliance with us before the war at a very dangerous time. But when the war broke out T[urkey] found their army was not equipped with any weapons that decide modern battles. But att. has been friendly.³³

Similarly British Admiral Howard Kelly's 1945 article in the *Sunday Times* mentioned that '[T]urkey acted like a rock. Turkey's belligerency [and] opening of the Straits would not bring any advantage to the Allies. The friendship between Britain and Turkey is not something limited to the War but rather it is a long term policy'.³⁴ Ankara's wait and see policy did not harm its relations with the Allies.

The reasons for Turkey's declaration of war on the Axis were stated by the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hasan Saka, on 23 February 1945:

Our government has given weighty consideration to this suggestion and has come to the conclusion that its acceptance is completely in accordance on the one hand with our alliance and on the other with the interests of the Republic. [The Government].... notified the British ambassador that Turkey's declaration of war on Germany and our adherence to the Declaration of the United Nations would be submitted for approval to this distinguished body.³⁵

³² NAA, 186579 - A989 - 1943/940/5/1, Cablegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs London to Prime Minister's Department, Canberra, 10 August 1943.

³³ FRUS, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 784, Hiss Notes.

³⁴ *Ulus* 15 January 1945; *Cumhuriyet* 15 March 1945.

³⁵ TPMB, No 135, February 1945, 39.

The Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) supported the wisdom of this decision.³⁶ Prime Minister Sukru Saracoglu stated:

The Turkish Republic gave its word, its hearth and its weapons to the democratic nations from the very first moment of danger and to this day it has followed this path in the decisions taken by the Assembly and by the Government. For this aim we declared war on Germany and Japan which is in conformity with ... our national interests... Our government was truly convinced that the affirmative decision [of the Assembly] will maintain great benefit to the Turkish nation.³⁷

The Turkish press claimed that the decision was the 'outcome of Turkish foreign policy which had been built up deliberately, step by step'.³⁸

Invited by American Ambassador Laurence Adolph Steinhardt to the San Francisco Conference on 6 March 1945,³⁹ Turkey's acceptance was warmly welcomed by the TGNA and the Turkish press.⁴⁰ The press emphasized its hopes for a better functioning international organization and its significance for world peace.⁴¹ *Anadolu* noted that the conference had significance 'not only in the history of WWII but in the entire history of mankind'.⁴²

Turkey had both hopes⁴³ for, and concerns about, the UN. Turkey's hopes centred on the fact that in 1945 the UN was the only solid international counter to a possible Soviet threat. Its interest in the UN was less related to the organization's ideals than

³⁶ For statements of Turkish deputies in TGNAP see: TPMB, No 135, February 1945, 38-49 also *Cumhuriyet* 4 January 1945; *Ulus* 24 February 1945.

³⁷ TPMB, No 135, February 1945, 40.

³⁸ N. Nadi, *Cumhuriyet* 24 February 1945; A. S. Esmer, *Ulus* 24 February 1945; N. Sadak, *Aksam* 24 February 1945.

³⁹ TPMB, No 136, March 1945, 250.

⁴⁰ University of Ankara, *Turkey and the United Nations*, 73.

⁴¹ N. Nadi, *Cumhuriyet* 14 May 1945; N. Sadak, *Aksam* 25 April 1945; A. S. Esmer, *Ulus* 7 March 1945, Y. Abadan, *Cumhuriyet* 10 April 1945; S. Saracoglu *Ulus* 12 May 1945.

⁴² *Anadolu* 24 April 1945.

⁴³ For details see: N. Sadak, *Aksam* 23 January 1945; M. F. Fenik, *Ulus* 6 April 1945; *Cumhuriyet* 9 April 1945; N. Nadi, *Cumhuriyet* 26 April, 11 May, 27 June 1945.

the fact it was a US proposal and offered contact with the US. In other words the UN would let Turkey show itself to the US, and the San Francisco Conference would be a good platform for Turkey to present its case for US friendship.

For the Turkish press, the UN's major shortcoming was the inability of the great powers to cooperate to counter aggression, and in particular maintain such cooperation.⁴⁴ In San Francisco Hasan Saka (Minister of Foreign Affairs and the leader of the delegation) told the Reuters correspondent on 16 May 1945:

The Turkish delegation has come here with the intention of helping the conference achieve its aims. I have little doubt that success will crown our efforts even though it takes a long time. ... I do not doubt that the San Francisco Conference, even though it is unable to make up an institution which will please everybody, will set the basis for what may eventually develop into such an institution. The system, whose foundations are being laid, will flourish in proportion with the feeling of international security and cooperation that it engenders.⁴⁵

With these hopes and concerns Turkey's delegation arrived in San Francisco in April 1945 with three main delegates: Hasan Saka, Huseyin Ragip Baydur (Ambassador to the US) and Feridun Cemal Erkin (First Assistant Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).⁴⁶ The delegation emphasized the similarities between the UN Charter and the founding principles of Turkey formulated in the National Pact (*Misak-ı Milli*).⁴⁷ The delegation was very keen to show that Turkey had, since its foundation, supported principles akin to those of the new international system. Indeed the Adviser of the Turkish delegation, Ahmet Sukru Esmer, argued that the UN principles

⁴⁴ N. Sadak, *Aksam* 2 April 1945; N. Nadi, *Cumhuriyet* 22 June 1945; H. C. Yalcin, *Tanin* 26, 30 March, 3 April 1945.

⁴⁵ TPMB, No 138, May 1945, 631-32; *Cumhuriyet* 17 May 1945.

⁴⁶ TPMA, Number 3/3335, Folder 76277, Fon Code 30..18.1.2, Place No 109.68..8, Ankara, 22 November 1945; UNCIO Documents, San Francisco, 1945, Vol 1, 35-6.

⁴⁷ The National Pact was published in February 1920. It adopted six principles including self-determination, the security of Constantinople, the opening of the Straits, and the abolition of the capitulations. For details see: University of Ankara, *Turkey and the United Nations*, 82; B. Oran (ed), *Türk Dis Politikasi 1919-1980*, Vol 1, 104-5.

of justice, equality and freedom were those the Turkish Republic had followed for the last quarter century.⁴⁸ Saka said:

The fundamental document on which is founded the whole national and foreign policy of Turkey is the National Pact, published a quarter century ago, at the time of the foundation of the New Turkey. This document is nothing but an expression of faith in the principle of a Turkish state whose limits would remain purely national, which would enjoy national freedoms and recognise the right of all people to existence, to independence, to equality, and to freedom, condemning aggression of every kind and upholding as a doctrine the pursuit of peace both within and without the national frontiers.⁴⁹

To ensure peace, the delegation emphasized the importance of collective security. It mentioned that the Turkish Republic had 'fervently and militantly defended the principle of collective security'⁵⁰, and that 'Turkey has always been one of the most ardent supporters of the idea of collective security'.⁵¹ The delegation pointed out Atatürk's well known saying: 'Peace in the fatherland, peace in the world'⁵², and reflected, '[e]very one of our compatriots knows that the foundation of our internal and external policy is peace'.⁵³ The delegation's emphasis on the similarities between the founding principles of Turkey and the main principles of the UN was Ankara's attempt to attract Washington's attention to the parallels between Turkey's and the West's ideological frameworks.

At the San Francisco talks the participants discussed different aspects of the prospective UN Charter, one of which was the obligation for member states to

⁴⁸ TPMB, No 138, May 1945, 638-640.

⁴⁹ NAA, 3497173 - M1506 - 21/11, Verbatim Minutes of the Seventh Plenary Session, 1 May 1945; Saka also told Reuters of the importance of Misak-ı Milli on 16 March 1945 see: TPMB, No 138, May 1945, 631- 33.

⁵⁰ NAA, 3497173 - M1506 - 21/11, Verbatim Minutes of the Seventh Plenary Session, 1 May 1945.

⁵¹ UNCIO Documents, San Francisco, 1945, Vol 3, 480.

⁵² N. Nadi, *Cumhuriyet* 3 September 1947; TPMB, No 221, April 1952, 163.

⁵³ *Ulus* 6 May 1945. For a more detailed evaluation of this see Saka's statement in TGNA in TPMB, No 145, December 1945, 88ff.

cooperate in solving problems in a great many fields, in 'good faith'.⁵⁴ Saka told the Conference:

the honourable chairmen of the delegations of the United Nations [have] clearly demonstrated that this assembly is moved by a noble spirit of cooperation. The Turkish delegation is happy to observe this gratifying expression of solidarity. ... as long as this admirable unity is maintained ... we have no right to doubt either the success of this conference or the beneficent effectiveness of the new Organisation.⁵⁵

But the Turkish press was forthright in emphasizing the illusory nature of harmony and cooperation between the great powers:

But this is a dream ... We are yet quite far away from this result. Even now there are undeniable conflicts of interest in Europe. ... It is childish to believe that [the Great Powers] with such different historical and geographical backgrounds will be able to establish an eternal union.⁵⁶

Tanin foresaw difficulties notably in the divergent views between the Soviets and the West:

If one looks at the situation from the West, it is true that there exists a Russian danger. ... from the Russian point of view there is a British and a Western danger. In other words, mutual confidence and security have not been well grounded yet.⁵⁷

Before the Conference Turkish official circles were aware of such difficulties, but did not pursue them in San Francisco.⁵⁸ Closer ties with the US were their central aim.

⁵⁴ See in particular the Preamble to the Charter of the UN and Articles 1 (2), 1 (3), and 2 (2).

⁵⁵ NAA, 3497173 - M1506 - 21/11, Verbatim Minutes of the Seventh Plenary Session, 1 May 1945.

⁵⁶ N. Sadak, *Aksam* 25 April 1945. For comments in the Turkish Press about possible hindrances to cooperation between the Great Powers, see: N. Nadi, *Cumhuriyet* 10, 27 June 1945; F. R. Atay, *Ulus* 2 April 1945.

⁵⁷ H. C. Yalcin, *Tanin* 25 June 1945 in University of Ankara, *Turkey and the United Nations*, 91.

⁵⁸ University of Ankara, *Turkey and the United Nations*, 73-77.

The other important issue of discussion at the Conference was the pacific settlement of disputes. Article 2, paragraph 3 of the UN Charter states: "All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered". This suited the Turkish delegation, but it saw a need to reduce the Security Council's influence on the working of the pacific settlement of issues via negotiation, mediation, conciliation, judicial settlement or any other peaceful means.⁵⁹ The delegation's statement was not very detailed and did not raise any new issues or present any new arguments.

This touched one of the more vexed discussions at San Francisco: the balance between the General Assembly and the Security Council, or the balance between small and large powers in decisions on peace and security. Discussions on this issue went hand in hand with talks on the decision making procedure in the Security Council. In theory this issue concerned Turkey closely.

Before the Conference some Turkish press commentaries addressed this issue by emphasizing the importance of democracy in the UN. Yavuz Abadan stated that the 'international security organisation first of all should have a universal character and ... function on democratic principles: To differentiate between small and large states in this respect is the plain lack of these principles'.⁶⁰ In San Francisco, the Turkish delegation stated:

the principle of the sovereign equality of all member states, the General Assembly, which is the true representative organ of the new Organization, and ought to be endowed with more extensive powers than those provided in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, and especially ought to be granted all powers to control in making decisions pertaining to the maintenance of peace and security.... [t]he Turkish

⁵⁹ UNCIO Documents, San Francisco, 1945, Vol 12, 108. See also Saka's statement in an American radio broadcast: TPMB, No 138, May 1945, 629-30.

⁶⁰ Y. Abadan, *Cumhuriyet* 18 February 1945.

delegation considers that it would be well to ensure a more real balance within the Security Council by increasing the number of minimum votes required to obtain decisions.⁶¹

In addition the Turkish delegation stated that the General Assembly was the UN's 'representative body par excellence' and '[b]y delegating its powers; it endowed 'the Security Council with far reaching prerogatives and responsibilities'. Therefore 'the Security Council should report to the General Assembly on any decision it may have taken and applied, in virtue of those powers, for the maintenance of international peace and security'.⁶²

On the General Assembly's ability to maintain peace and security the Turkish delegation suggested that:

the powers conferred upon [the General Assembly] are ... limited to questions relating to social and economic activity, whereas in essential problems concerning the maintenance of peace and security, the General Assembly does not seem to have any active part.

The principle of the sovereign equality of all states should have as a consequence the concentration ... in the hands of the General Assembly of all powers of control relative to decisions bearing upon the maintenance of peace and security. This extension of the powers of the Assembly in the sphere of control does not ... in the eyes of the Turkish Delegation signify either an encroachment upon the attributes of the Security Council or a limitation of the powers originally conferred upon that body.

Consequently, the Turkish Delegation believes that it would be useful for the Conference to subject Chapter V of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposal to further examination in the light of the consideration set forth above.⁶³

⁶¹ NAA, 3497173 - M1506 - 21/11, Verbatim Minutes of the Seventh Plenary Session, 1 May 1945.

⁶² UNCIO Documents, San Francisco, 1945, Vol 3, 485. For a detailed evaluation of Saka on the same issue see: TPMB, No 138, May 1945, 629-30.

⁶³ UNCIO Documents, San Francisco, 1945, Vol 3, 480-81.

Similarly the delegation said of permanent and non-permanent seats on the Security Council:

the number of non-permanent seats on the Council is clearly insufficient. This disproportion is further stressed by the fact that in decisions relating to action the unanimity of the votes of principal powers is indispensable. In order to respect the principle of the equality of states, which forms the basis of the Organization, and to provide a better equilibrium in the Security Council, a notable increase in the number of non-permanent seats appears to be necessary. The raising to ten of the number of non-permanent seats and the provision of a minimum of eleven votes to carry a decision appear, to the Turkish Delegation, to be useful amendments for the establishment of a more balanced representation in the Council.⁶⁴

With these statements the Turkish delegation emphasized the imbalance between the Security Council and the General Assembly. This imbalance arose mainly from the limitation of the Assembly's powers on decisions about international peace and justice. The Turkish delegation's proposal to reduce this imbalance was to increase the number of votes for final decisions on peace and security matters.⁶⁵

Turkey's concern related to the UN's ability to check great power aggression. With the Council wielding such influence on these problems, it was clear to Turkey that the Assembly had little effect on their resolution. More importantly, the USSR would be a permanent member of the Council, so would have a great influence on international security issues. Moscow could block any UN measure against any Soviet pressure on Turkey. In short it could be inferred that the UN would not satisfy Turkey's security needs.

⁶⁴ UNCIO Documents, San Francisco, 1945, Vol 3, 481-82.

⁶⁵ See also: University of Ankara, *Turkey and the United Nations*, 119.

Turkey's concerns about the influence of the USSR on international security issues were aggravated by the veto the great powers had in the Security Council.⁶⁶ Under the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, Security Council decisions would be taken by unanimous vote of the permanent members. This left open whether the Council's decisions could be blocked (vetoed) by the permanent members, but it implied that they could.⁶⁷

The Turkish press considered the veto an element of inequality in the UN⁶⁸ by which only the small states would be penalized for aggression and the great powers could act without restraint.⁶⁹ It was especially disturbing for Ankara that the USSR would have the veto. But the point here is that even though Turkey knew that permanent cooperation between the great powers was very unlikely it still did not strongly criticise the veto. It continued to support the idea of the UN along the lines favoured by the US. Feridun Cemal Erkin stated the Turkish official view of the veto:

The sponsoring governments, acting with goodwill, had shown that it was impossible for them to reach agreement on a more liberal interpretation. ... the great powers had declared that they had accepted the responsibility to use the wide powers granted them for the welfare of the whole world. ... [our] government had decided to show its confidence in the great powers by accepting the text as it stood.⁷⁰

⁶⁶ For the importance of the veto see: D. E. Lee, "The Genesis of the Veto", 33-42. For discussions on the veto power: UNCIO Documents, San Francisco, 1945, Vol 1, 288-290 and Vol 11, 117-21, 305-6, 309-10, 313-14, 317-25, 329-30, 332-37, 347-352, 360, 433-37, 438-40, 454-60, 471-76, 483, 486-96, 513-19, 530-31, 534-35 538, 552, 604-615, 630-35, 642-44, 648-52, 660-64, 683-86, 693-98, 699-709, 710-14. For the general discussion on the voting procedure in the Security Council see: NAA, 280172 - A5954 - 1821/1, Cablegram from Forde and Evatt to Chifley, 3 June 1945.

⁶⁷ FRUS, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 976, Protocol of the Proceedings of the Crimea Conference, 11 February 1945. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A, and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.

⁶⁸ N. Nadi, *Cumhuriyet* 12 April 1945.

⁶⁹ Y. Abadan, *Cumhuriyet* 28 May 1945; N. Nadi, *Cumhuriyet* 26 April 1945. For Turkish press criticisms of the veto at the San Francisco Conference see: A. Daver, *Cumhuriyet* 4 June 1945; N. Sadak, *Aksam* 4, 5 June 1945; E. Tekeli, *Ulus* 7 June 1945.

⁷⁰ UNCIO Documents, San Francisco, 1945, Vol 11, 473-74.

The US mattered more to Turkey than the UN.

The Turkish delegation offered a relatively detailed proposal for regional security as an alternative to international security being left entirely to the Security Council. During the plenary session of the San Francisco Conference, on 1 May 1945, the delegation emphasized that regional arrangements had to be considered a significant part of collective security.⁷¹ It stated that it 'earnestly' desired 'the acceptance of regional arrangements providing for automatic action as constituent elements of security, on condition that they should be conceived for the exclusive purpose of defence'. It declared that the 'Turkish Government believes that in cases of emergency the immediate action which may be initiated through the application of regional arrangements should not be deferred pending the decision of the Security Council, since, in such cases, any delay due to the procedure would be detrimental to the country being attacked'.⁷² The delegation elaborated:

In order to implement the machinery of the regional arrangements ... with the full effectiveness that is required of it and at the same time set into motion the machinery of defence provided in such agreements, without having to submit to the inevitable delays in resorting to the procedure of military sanctions, it would be necessary to introduce some such automatically functioning arrangements as constituent elements of collective security, ... [H]owever that they are used exclusively for purposes of defence and that the signatory states which might be let to make use of them be held to account by the Security Council for all the emergency measures which they might have been led to adopt as a consequence of such arrangements, ... they should also be bound to justify these as emergency measures.⁷³

This proposal was a device to circumvent the Soviet veto. The two main points proposed both suited Turkish interests: regional security schemes should be automatic, and they should be active at times of emergency. Turkey's interest in

⁷¹ NAA, 3497173 - M1506 - 21/11, Verbatim Minutes of the Seventh Plenary Session, 1 May 1945.

⁷² UNCIO Documents, San Francisco, 1945, Vol 3, 483.

⁷³ NAA, 3497173 - M1506 - 21/11, Verbatim Minutes of the Seventh Plenary Session, 1 May 1945.

regional more than international security once again illustrated Turkey's limited expectations of the UN.

The UN Charter was signed on 26 June 1945 by Saka, Baydur and Erkin making Turkey a UN founding member.⁷⁴ The Turkish press welcomed the signing. For example Necmettin Sadak noted:

The San Francisco Conference is the first great step to be taken in a peaceful world. Although the final product has many and great shortcomings and cannot be considered perfect it is a beginning and its value should not be underestimated.⁷⁵

Ahmet Sukru Esmer emphasized the great idea behind the UN, stressing the significance of the US to the success of the Allies as well as Turkey's admiration of the US.⁷⁶ The Conference was an important instrument for Turkey to present itself as a democratic country sharing the same ideals as the US.

The members of the Turkish delegation repeated their concerns to the TGNA, about the undemocratic nature of UN organs, the imbalance between the General Assembly and the Security Council and the 'distinction between the permanent and the non-permanent members'.⁷⁷

Saka explained that the Charter had fewer defects than the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, and that the efforts of participants at the San Francisco Conference were significant. The Charter, he said, had:

⁷⁴ *Ulus* 27 June 1945; *Cumhuriyet* 26 June 1945.

⁷⁵ N. Sadak, *Aksam* 25 June 1945.

⁷⁶ TPMB, No 139, June 1945, 304-5.

⁷⁷ University of Ankara, *Turkey and the United Nations*, 121.

fewer omissions and disadvantages. Both we [Turkey], and the small countries ... realize that this is not a perfect product. However, we are conscious of current political realities; we should accept that these efforts have not been wasted.

The advantages of the new system... are the following: any state which is inclined to aggressive behaviour will know that it will be faced by a combination of the most powerful nations in the world and [as a result] the aggressor [will] think twice before attacking... This system is bound up with the goodwill of the great powers, depends on the harmony among them and takes its main strength from the pledges that they have given.⁷⁸

On why the Turkish delegation accepted the Charter, he continued:

The Turkish Republic tried to establish its own security within the framework of general security. ... We have participated in all efforts to protect world peace and security; however the results may have been imperfect. We dedicated ourselves to save the world from a state in which everything was permitted, everything tolerated. This is why at the most crucial moments we asked ourselves this question: Even though this document is not free from imperfections, is not anarchy worse?⁷⁹

The Minister stated the distinction between small and great powers as a shortcoming of the Charter but did not emphasize the importance of the small powers.

The TGNA debated ratification of the UN Charter from 15 August 1945 and ratified it on 28 September.⁸⁰ In the debate some speakers paraphrased US views about the main discussion point on the dominance of the great powers in the Security Council. Saka commented:

⁷⁸ TGNAP, Vol 19, 156-57, 15 Aug 1945.

⁷⁹ TGNAP, Vol 19, 157-58, 15 Aug 1945.

⁸⁰ TGNA members in this debate were elected at the 15 February 1943 election when there was a single party in Turkey, the Republican People's Party. The government was under Sukru Saracoglu (second term). The trend for transition to a multi-party system gained strength after WWII. The first alternative political party was the National Development Party founded on 18 July 1945. The Democrat Party was established on 7 January 1946. The first multi-party election in the history of the Republic of Turkey was held on 21 July 1946. See also http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/english/about_tgna.htm accessed on 01.02.2008

The preservation of peace and security falls to the organ called the Security Council. In this organ the most significant duties and responsibilities [will be] shouldered by those states which are in the first rank in terms of armed forces and natural resources. There is no doubt that the failures of the League of Nations and developments during the Second World War have determined the introduction of this feature.⁸¹

Other speakers emphasized the similarities between the principles of the UN Charter and Turkish foreign policy, and that the Charter was superior to the League Covenant. R. R. Pasin declared that 'during peace the maintenance of international peace and security will be possible as long as we have cooperation. ... Turkey's foreign policy always depended on interdependence and mutual cooperation principles'.⁸² On the issue of international peace and security Saka mentioned the difference in structure between the League of Nations and the UN, and added that the UN clearly defined a duty to maintain peace and security.⁸³ M. Okmen stated:

The UN Agreement amalgamated the will, effort and power of the democratic nations ... In this respect and without doubt the general character of the Conference is pleasing. ... The agreement in San Francisco ... is a materialization of the ideals put forward by the Turkish nation. That's why we happily vote for this agreement.⁸⁴

M. Birsel emphasized the importance for all states of the UN principles, and hoped that these would be applied in good faith.⁸⁵ Saka emphasised the importance of goodwill and cooperation among the UN members.⁸⁶

On the usage of the veto in good faith, M. Okmen stressed that it was a promise given to all world governments, so everyone should believe in it.⁸⁷ R. Peker

⁸¹ TGNAP, Vol 19, 157, 15 Aug 1945.

⁸² TGNAP, Vol 19, 159, 15 Aug 1945.

⁸³ TGNAP, Vol 19, 157, 15 Aug 1945.

⁸⁴ TGNAP, Vol 19, 159-160, 15 Aug 1945.

⁸⁵ TGNAP, Vol 19, 166, 15 Aug 1945.

⁸⁶ TPMB, No 141, Aug 1945, 12.

commented that the Turkish delegation had accepted the veto without any alternative proposal, and noted that the UN 'is weak in the maintenance of peace and security'. The vital decisions about the integrity and the sovereignty of nations would be made by the Council. In this case 'if the aggressor is one of the great powers then the act of aggression will not be punished.' If a smaller state were to be backed by a great power the situation would be the same:

I did not find [the Turkish delegation's] attitude correct in accepting [this declaration] without mentioning my abovementioned ideas about the veto issue. ... Even though we are not a great power we have a right [to mention this matter]. ... I think this was the most important issue that we should propose amendments [to]. ... We could [at least] contribute to the propositions of the smaller powers opposing the veto power and vote against this veto with them. [By doing this] we would protect a very eminent right and show that we are aware of this issue which is so important for the continuity of our state.⁸⁸

Few speakers seriously criticized the Charter's shortcomings. N. Elgun stated that its principles for the maintenance of peace and security were not ideal for small nations.⁸⁹ R. Kaplan stated that 'as long as the states are classified as small nations and big nations ... I do not think that the principle of sovereignty could be applied in favour of small nations'. He thought all states should have equal rights.⁹⁰

H. Bayur stated that the UN declaration had contradictory provisions about the equality of nations. The main point was the veto power and the classification of nations as big and small. He criticised this system by stating that under the veto system, if one of the great powers disagreed with a decision, no measure could be taken.⁹¹ TUNA criticism focused on the veto as a right to be misused by the great

⁸⁷ TGNAP, Vol 19, 160, 15 Aug 1945.

⁸⁸ TGNAP, Vol 19, 172-73, 15 Aug 1945.

⁸⁹ TGNAP, Vol 19, 160, 15 Aug 1945.

⁹⁰ TGNAP, Vol 19, 167, 15 Aug 1945.

⁹¹ TGNAP, Vol 19, 168-69, 15 Aug 1945.

powers, illustrating Turkey's reduced hopes about the UN as a support for Turkey's national security. In the end, Turkish official circles were happy for Turkey to be one of the first signatories of the Charter,⁹² saying 'it was better to have a Charter than none'⁹³, it was 'the most perfect instrument available at present'⁹⁴ and 'it was the best obtainable in the present circumstances'.⁹⁵

The Turkish press also voiced concerns about the veto power in the Security Council and the undemocratic character of its decision making.⁹⁶ It noted that 'the great powers would prevent enforcement measures from being taken against any great power that happened to be the aggressor, or against a small power with the same intentions that might lean on one of the great powers'.⁹⁷ But the press too accepted the Charter.

Turkey's membership of the UN was an important indication of Ankara's early post-WWII perceptions of the US. When Turkey began to feel a Soviet threat in WWII, it naturally started to look for a security scheme. Because of the veto, Ankara understood that the UN would be ineffective in international peace and security, at least where a great power was involved. Thus Turkey focused on regional security, and for this only the US could help. Turkey was aware of the UN's limitations but did not seriously emphasize them. Instead it used the San Francisco Conference to align with the US, arguing that Turkey's founding principles were the same as the ideals of the US. It was offering itself as a US ally. In particular Turkey's failure to put forward any proposal amending the veto indicates that Turkey did not want to offend or

⁹² For the ratification act of the UN Charter see: TPMA, Number: 3/2926 Folder: 71420 Fon Code: 30..18.1.2 Place No: 108.47..19. Ankara, 17/7/1945.

⁹³ TGNAP, Vol 19, 158, 15 Aug 1945.

⁹⁴ TGNAP, Vol 19, 167, 15 Aug 1945.

⁹⁵ TGNAP, Vol 19, 171-73, 15 Aug 1945.

⁹⁶ N. Nadi, *Cumhuriyet* 27 June 1945, N. Sadak, *Aksam* 27 June 1945.

⁹⁷ N. Sadak, *Aksam* 25 June 1945.

oppose the US. Turkey was not interested in being a leader of the small nations. The San Francisco Conference was a means for Turkey to approach the US. This was not so of Australia.

PART 1: The Formation of the United Nations

b. Australia

Australia's part in forming the UN was not only significant for Australian foreign policy but also offers a clear picture of the effectiveness of a middle power in an international platform dominated by the great powers. At the formation of the UN, Australia acted as a spokesman for the small states, attempting to increase their influence within the UN and in the post-WWII order. The formation of the UN, especially the San Francisco conference, illustrates Australian attempts to be a self-reliant actor in its region. Australia was excluded from decision making in WWII, and wanted to use the San Francisco conference to show that a middle power could be effective in implementing a new international system.

Throughout the formation of the UN, Australia was aware of its limitations as a south Pacific power, and it accepted the significance of the political presence of the US and Britain in the region. Yet often it opposed American and British views, not only to increase its own weight in the Pacific but also to promote small power influence in the new international system. This chapter argues firstly that Australia played a significant role in the formation of the UN, by often defying great power dominance and by speaking for the small powers, and secondly that unlike Turkey at the San Francisco Conference, Australia preferred an independent say in the Pacific to closer ties with the US.

In this Dr. Herbert Vere Evatt¹ and his team were key elements. From 1942 Evatt was a decisive figure in formulating Australia's WWII policies, and as Minister for External Affairs, he led the Australian delegation at San Francisco.²

Australia's eagerness to influence the character of the UN arose from its League of Nations experience and from the problems Canberra faced in its relations with the great powers throughout WWII.³ In its League experience Australia felt isolated from the European base of international politics, and it doubted a League contribution to its security. Australia did not 'see herself as a lone operator dependent on the League for her security ... for security [it] continued to [rely on] the empire or, more specifically', on Britain.⁴ However, Australia had some problems with Britain and with the other great powers in terms of Pacific security.⁵ Australia's unsuccessful request to Britain for the 'relief of Australian troops at Tobruk'⁶ to meet a possible Japanese invasion is an example of the strain between Australia and Britain during WWII. Churchill tried very hard to divert these troops to Burma, and was met with Curtin's blunt and hostile rejection. Hence Australia favoured regional initiatives for the Pacific security, where it could be more influential.⁷ In regional initiatives, Australia could hope to limit great power influence, and increase its influence in the south Pacific.

Although Australia preferred regional security initiatives, it had a limited ability to establish and maintain them. Thus before proposing regional security schemes, Evatt

¹ W. J. Hudson, *Australia and the New World Order: Evatt at San Francisco, 1945*, 1-2; A. Dalziel, *Evatt: the Enigma*.

² The Department of External Affairs was separated from the Prime Minister's Department in 1935. For details of the formation of an independent Australian diplomatic service see: A. Watt, *The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy 1938-1965*; W. J. Hudson, *Australia and the New World Order*, 13-14.

³ J. D. E. Plant, "The Origins and Development of Australia's Policy and Posture at the United Nations on International Organization, San Francisco – 1945." ANU PhD, 1966, 3-9.

⁴ W.J. Hudson, *Australia and the New World Order*, 12.

⁵ J. D. E. Plant, "The Origins and Development of Australia's Policy and Posture at the United Nations", 3-9.

⁶ J. D. E. Plant, "The Origins and Development of Australia's Policy and Posture at the United Nations", 5.

⁷ W.J. Hudson, *Australia and the New World Order*, 18; H.V. Evatt, *Foreign Policy of Australia*, 116.

attempted to increase Australia's influence in the Allied war effort. One of his efforts was to propose that Australia join the British War Cabinet (as in WWI) and the Far Eastern or Pacific War Council.⁸ He also organized a mission to visit the US and Britain, in which he discussed Australia's 'position' with Roosevelt, Churchill and their advisers.⁹ During these attempts Evatt was searching for an international platform in which he could represent Australia's case effectively.

The Allied victory in the Pacific War signalled a shift from British to US dominance in the Pacific. Australia understood this, but Evatt was not satisfied with the power the Atlantic Charter gave the US. He emphasized the Charter's lack of a universal character: 'those directly concerned with the preparation of the charter had Europe primarily in mind',¹⁰ even though the Charter would apply in the Pacific and South East Asia (SEA).¹¹ Evatt believed that any new security system should be as efficient in the 'Pacific and Asiatic regions' as in all other parts of the world,¹² although he did not nominate a regional security scheme. By stressing the inclusion of the south Pacific, Evatt also indirectly argued for the importance of Australia.

In 1942 Evatt proposed in parliament a new concept: 'freedom from want'. This stressed the importance of economic, social and political benefits for all Pacific people. Evatt thought it could be the basis of a new Pacific policy.¹³ Clearly he preferred a regional scheme in the Pacific which depended not on military power but

⁸ CAPD, (Representatives), Vol 170, 52, 25 February 1942. The Pacific War Council was an inter-governmental body established in 1942 to control the Allied war effort in the Pacific and Asia. It was formed in Washington on 1 April 1942, with a membership of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, his key advisor Harry Hopkins, and representatives from Britain, China, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands and Canada. Representatives from India and the Philippines were later added.

⁹ CAPD, (Representatives), Vol 171, 2185-86, 4 June 1942.

¹⁰ CNIA, Vol 14, No 5, 146, 15 May 1943.

¹¹ J. D. E. Plant, "The Origins and Development of Australia's Policy and Posture at the United Nations", 13.

¹² CAPD, (Representatives), Vol 172, 82, 3 September 1942.

¹³ CAPD, (Representatives), Vol 172, 82, 3 September 1942.

on south Pacific stability, economic and social progress, and improved standards of living.¹⁴

Evatt's speech in New York on 28 April 1943 gives a good picture of his view on regional security. He focused on the importance of the Pacific for the post-WWII settlement.¹⁵ He did not really favour either a single universal security initiative, or regional initiatives without universal coverage. Rather he stressed the importance of a universal security scheme with efficient regional initiatives.¹⁶ According to Evatt, regional and international security were both important and should function together. This view would later be one of the main emphases of the Australian delegation at San Francisco.

Evatt defined the region significant for Australian defence as 'the arc of islands lying to the north and north-east' of ¹⁷ Australia. He declared, 'because of [Australia's] special geographical position and ... growing responsibility and power', it 'can, and should, make a very special contribution towards the establishment and the maintenance of the peace settlement in South-East Asia and the Pacific'.¹⁸ He saw the Pacific not as a mere region isolated from Europe, but one that should be considered with it.¹⁹

Australia could not freely express its own foreign policy because of its Commonwealth links with Britain. Evatt therefore proposed two ways for formulating

¹⁴ CNIA, Vol 14, No 5, 147, 15 May 1943; For Australia's views on the administration of Pacific islands, which were seen as vital to Australia's security, see: CAPD, (Representatives), Vol 176, 573-574, 14 October 1943.

¹⁵ CNIA, Vol 14, No 5, 145-152, 15 May 1943.

¹⁶ CNIA, Vol 14, No 5, 145-152, 15 May 1943.

¹⁷ CNIA, Vol 14, No 5, 145-152, 15 May 1943.

¹⁸ CAPD, (Representatives), Vol 176, 572, 14 October 1943.

¹⁹ H. V. Evatt, *Foreign Policy of Australia*, 116.

Australian foreign policy. The first was to increase consultation within the Commonwealth, a problematic issue in 1943. The second was to continue to affirm Australia's international status.²⁰ Australia did not want to break its Commonwealth ties, but the strain in Australian-British relations led Canberra to focus on the second way. Australia should assert an independent foreign policy.

After the Atlantic Charter, the next significant step in the formation of the UN was the 1943 Moscow Conference. For Australia this conference had two main shortcomings. First, the Big Three (the US, Britain and the USSR) ignored regionalism, which was Australia's foreign policy focus. Second, consultation within the Commonwealth was inadequate during the Conference. Australia wanted the entire Commonwealth to participate rather than Britain alone.²¹ Evatt stated 'other members of the British Commonwealth' had 'certainly the fullest right to expect the final execution of the Moscow Agreements' would 'not be undertaken without prior reference to them and agreement by them'.²² The Moscow Conference was an important example of Australia's exclusion from decisions on the post-WWII order. This encouraged Canberra to search for a base for a more independent foreign policy.

Regionalism was not accepted as a general principle at the Moscow Conference, but Australia (and New Zealand) did not abandon it. After the Conference Australia and New Zealand sent a joint telegram to Britain in which they requested full responsibility for the administration of Portuguese Timor, the Solomons a part in administering the Dutch East Indies and the New Hebrides. The telegram conceded

²⁰ CAPD, (Representatives), Vol 176, 575-76, 14 October 1943.

²¹ F. L. W. Wood, *The New Zealand People at War: Political and External Affairs*, 443.

²² CNIA, Vol 14, No 9, 318, November 1943.

that 'regard must be paid to the position of the United States which already has a naval base at Tutuila'.²³

Australia was well aware of the importance of the American presence in the south Pacific. Evatt said that Australia was open to collaborating with other powers in the Pacific and he referred particularly to collaboration with the US:

[For] the future of the Pacific ... Our great ally, the United States of America, is playing, and is destined to play, a major part. ... It is certain that in the Pacific our collaboration with the [US] will be extremely close.²⁴

Australia wanted to be influential in the south Pacific but was aware of its limitations. It needed the military and, to some extent, the political presence of a great power. The strain in Australian–British relations, the British decline and the rise of American military power in the Pacific edged Australia towards the US.

The next important step for post-WWII plans was the Cairo Conference from 22-26 November 1943.²⁵ At the conference the great powers focused on the Pacific peace. Australia was neither invited nor consulted, and Canberra learnt of the Conference outcomes from the press. Evatt complained to the US Secretary of State:

We feel strongly that Australia and New Zealand are entitled to the fullest degree of preliminary consultation, especially in relation to Pacific matters. At the recent Cairo conference decisions affecting the future of certain portions of the Pacific and vitally affecting Australia and New Zealand were not only made but publicly announced without any prior reference to either Australia or New Zealand Government. Actually

²³ CNIA, Vol 14, No 9, 318, November 1943.

²⁴ CAPD, (Representatives), Vol 176, 575, 14 October 1943.

²⁵ For details of the Cairo Conference see: FRUS, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, [291]-455 ff.

the first news the Australian Government received of the Cairo decisions was through the medium of the press.²⁶

Hasluck recalled that Evatt 'was greatly agitated by the Cairo Conference', and 'felt strongly that Australia had been disregarded'.²⁷

In regional terms, Australian reaction to the Cairo Conference was institutionalized in the Australian-New Zealand Agreement signed on 21 January 1944.²⁸ Since 1942 Evatt had looked for a way to make Australia an independent and self-reliant actor in the Pacific. This agreement was a first step. It argued that the approval of Australia and New Zealand was necessary for any 'changes in sovereignty' in the Pacific.²⁹ Evatt paraphrased this by stating that all 'matters covered by the Australian-New Zealand Agreement have post-war relevance and some of the matters will form the main content of the post-war settlement in this part of the world'.³⁰

Particularly in terms of regional security, Article 13 of the Agreement drew the boundaries of Australia's and New Zealand's defence perimeters:

within the framework of [a] general system of world security, a regional zone of defence comprising the South-west and South Pacific areas shall be established and ... this zone should be based on Australia and New Zealand stretching through the islands north and northeast of Australia, to Western Samoa and the Cook Islands.³¹

²⁶ FRUS, 1944, Vol 3, 186, The Minister in Australia (Johnson) to the Secretary of State, 25 February 1944.

²⁷ P. Hasluck, "Australia and the Formation of the United Nations", 149.

²⁸ For the text of the Australian-New Zealand Agreement see:

[http://www.info.dfat.gov.au/info/historical/HistDocs.nsf/\(LookupVolNoNumber\)/7~26](http://www.info.dfat.gov.au/info/historical/HistDocs.nsf/(LookupVolNoNumber)/7~26) accessed on

16.11.2007. See also: NAA, 232335 - A2937 - 160, Pacific Conference Australia - New Zealand Agreement. For the germination of the Australian-New Zealand Treaty see: P. Hasluck, "Australia and the Formation of the United Nations", 150-154.

²⁹ W.J. Hudson, *Australia and the New World Order*, 19.

³⁰ FRUS, 1944, Vol 3, 186, The Minister in Australia (Johnson) to the Secretary of State, 25 February 1944.

³¹ CNIA, Vol 15, No 1, 4 January 1944.

The US was uneasy about this regional emphasis. US Secretary of State Cordell Hull stated that:

Any attempt to deal with regional security in the South West Pacific in advance of agreement on a general security system might well give rise to efforts on the part of the other regional groups to make their own exclusive arrangements for security. Thus, such a conference as is proposed might in the end result in a number of independent regional systems and seriously interfere with efforts to achieve a general system of world security.³²

Evatt explained that the Agreement did not plan to establish a separate security scheme, rather:

Article 13 speaks of a regional zone of defense 'within the framework of a general world plan of security'. Further, the obvious intention both of Australia and New Zealand was that any discussions of regional defense should be related at all times to plans for the General International Organization referred to in the Moscow Declaration of October 1943.³³

Hull's statement shows that in 1944 the US wanted to restrict regionalism. The US preferred an international security mechanism which would be easier for Washington to control. Australia's concern was not to establish a separate arrangement, but to integrate the Pacific effectively into an international security scheme and prevent its marginalization. In an international system, Australia wanted to be effective at least on decisions about the Pacific.

The Agreement also addressed the influence of the US in the south Pacific. Evatt mentioned that 'it has always appeared to me that in the post-war period, the United States interests will lie predominantly in those islands ... [which] lie north of the

³² FRUS, 1944, Vol 3, 177, The Secretary of State to the Minister in Australia (Johnson), 1 February 1944.

³³ FRUS, 1944, Vol 3, 186, The Minister in Australia (Johnson) to the Secretary of State, 25 February 1944.

equator'.³⁴ At the same time he accepted political cooperation with the US: 'both in the development of the Pacific region and its security, full British and United States participation will be absolutely essential'.³⁵ Australia was aware of its need for a great power but this great power should not govern the Pacific. It should rather use its presence to maintain an umbrella of peace and security in the region.³⁶

The Agreement was one of Evatt's most significant attempts to present a markedly Australian international role to the great powers. Essentially he made a decision with this agreement. In 1943 he had proposed two ways to formulate Australian foreign policy: through Commonwealth consultation or by a distinct assertion of Australia's international status. The 1944 Agreement chose the second option. Yet he would need a much bigger platform to assert Australia's independent voice.

The next step in the UN's formation was Dumbarton Oaks, which established the basis of the organization. In parliament in September 1944, as the Dumbarton Oaks talks concluded, Evatt started to crystallize a policy on a new international security organization. He stressed the importance of the small powers and the sovereign equality of states. He stated that 'the representation of the smaller powers on the executive authority should be adequate to ensure a balanced outlook on world affairs' so 'no distinct region of the globe and no important group of nations should be left unrepresented'.³⁷ These views on small power influence were later emphasized at the Wellington Conference between Australia and New Zealand in November

³⁴ CAPD, (Representatives), Vol 179, 19 July 1944, 235-236.

³⁵ CAPD, (Representatives), Vol 179, 8 September 1944, 612.

³⁶ See Articles 26 and 27 of the Agreement in

[http://www.info.dfat.gov.au/info/historical/HistDocs.nsf/\(LookupVolNoNumber\)/7~26](http://www.info.dfat.gov.au/info/historical/HistDocs.nsf/(LookupVolNoNumber)/7~26) accessed on 16.11.2007. See also: NAA, 232335 - A2937 - 160, *Pacific Conference Australia - New Zealand Agreement*.

³⁷ CAPD, (Representatives), Vol 179, 604, 8 September 1944.

1944,³⁸ although 'did not produce an antipodean alternative [to the] Dumbarton Oaks *Proposals* or a list of amendments to them'.³⁹ Evatt took little part in the Wellington proceedings.⁴⁰

Evatt responded to Dumbarton Oaks in parliament on 8 September and 30 November. He said:

- (a) The success of the World Organisation must depend on the leadership of [the] great powers.
- (b) At the same time all members of the Organisation should take an active part in the general control and direction of its affairs.
- (c) All members should enter into a clear undertaking to co-operate in carrying out by all and any means adjudged necessary, including force, the decisions of the organisation for the preservation of peace.
- (d) There must be orderly procedures by which disputes can be adjusted promptly.
- (e) A permanent system of security can be made effective and acceptable only if it has a foundation in economic justice and therefore, there should also be international co-operation in economic and social matters.⁴¹

Evatt made clear that he could not oppose great power leadership, but he did not want them to dominate the maintenance of international peace.

In February 1945 the Yalta Conference tidied up loose ends from Dumbarton Oaks. It announced that a conference would be held in San Francisco to prepare a charter

³⁸ For details of the Wellington Conference see: J. D. E. Plant, "The Origins and Development of Australia's Policy and Posture at the United Nations", 102-146; R. Kay (ed), *Documents on New Zealand External Relations*. Vol 1, *The Australian-New Zealand Agreement, 1944*. See also: NAA, 280174 - A5954 - 1821/3, *Post War Organisation ... United Nations Conference on International Organisation San Francisco April to June 1945 Report by Australian Delegates*.

³⁹ W.J. Hudson, *Australia and the New World Order*, 32.

⁴⁰ For this decision see: P. Hasluck, "Australia and the Formation of the United Nations", 157-158.

⁴¹ NAA, 188026 - A1066 - H45/775, Teleprinter Message from Hasluck, External Affairs to Dr. Evatt, Commonwealth Offices, 14 February 1945.

based on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.⁴² San Francisco would offer Evatt the platform he had been searching for since 1942 to stress Australia's distinct international status and its plans for post-WWII. Australia had not had a role at Dumbarton Oaks or Yalta, but it could be very effective at San Francisco.

On 6 March 1945 the US delegation in Canberra formally invited Australia to the San Francisco Conference.⁴³ Prime Minister Curtin had already announced that the Australian delegation would be headed by Francis Michael Forde (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for the Army) and Evatt (Attorney General and Minister for External Affairs).⁴⁴ On 28 February 1945 Curtin told the House:

The aims of the Government's post-war policy in regard to national security are an adequate defence policy, the development of the maximum co-operation in defence among members of the British Commonwealth, and the establishment of defence and security policy on an all - party basis, in order to ensure its continuity.

...

The provision of an adequate defence policy as a part of collective security is one which the San Francisco conference cannot ignore. In regard to an adequate defence policy, the strength of the Australian forces and supporting resources to be provided depend on the extent of the commitments involved in cooperation between members of the British Commonwealth and between Australia and other nations in the world and regional organizations, and the degree of reliance that can be placed on the effectiveness of such cooperation.⁴⁵

⁴² FRUS, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 943-945, The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State (Grew), 11 February 1945.

⁴³ NAA, 280174 - A5954 - 1821/3, *Post War Organisation ... United Nations Conference on International Organisation San Francisco April to June 1945 Report by Australian Delegates*.

⁴⁴ *Argus* 20 February 1945 in J. D. E. Plant, "The Origins and Development of Australia's Policy and Posture at the United Nations on International Organization, San Francisco - 1945." ANU PhD, 1966, 208. For the formation of the Australian delegation see: J. D. E. Plant, "The Origins and Development of Australia's Policy and Posture at the United Nations", 209-213, 214-18, 224-27, 230-34. For details of the Australian delegation see: NAA, 280174 -A5954 - 1821/3, *Post War Organisation ... United Nations Conference on International Organisation San Francisco April to June 1945 Report by Australian Delegates*; NAA, 1375896 - A3300 - 342D, [1945 File - White Tab] *United Nations Conference, Sf (San Francisco) : Delegation - Composition of; Accommodation and Reservations*. For biographical details of the members of the delegation members see: NAA, 232961 - A3095 - 22/1/7, *International Conference, San Francisco [United Nations]*.

⁴⁵ NAA, 188026 - A1066 - H45/775, Statement by Curtin in the House of Representatives on 28th February 1945.

He continued that 'the position of Australia in an effective system of collective security on a world basis' was 'integrally associated with the maximum cooperation of the interests of the British Commonwealth as a whole'.⁴⁶ At San Francisco Australia would act within the framework of the Commonwealth rather than following an entirely independent policy.

Commonwealth cooperation was evident at the British Commonwealth meeting in London in April 1945⁴⁷ before the Australian delegation arrived in San Francisco. At this meeting Evatt had a chance to share his views about the UN more directly with Britain. In a talk titled 'The Dominions in World Affairs' Evatt argued that each dominion should put forward its views separately:

Britain and the four Dominions will be separate, distinct, equal, and autonomous members of the Organization. ... Nobody who understands the position of the Dominions in world affairs would think that their membership would amount to multiple representation of the United Kingdom. ... The fact that the members of the British Commonwealth occasionally confer together is in no way inconsistent with their distinct international status.⁴⁸

Evatt was ensuring that Britain would not speak for the entire Commonwealth, as had often happened previously. This conformed to the principles of the 1944 Australia-

⁴⁶ NAA, 188026 - A1066 - H45/775, Statement by Curtin in the House of Representatives on 28th February 1945.

⁴⁷ For details of the British Commonwealth meeting in April 1945 see: NAA, 280174 - A5954 - 1821/3, *Post War Organisation ... United Nations Conference on International Organisation San Francisco April to June 1945 Report by Australian Delegates*.

⁴⁸ NAA, 190471 - A1066 - PI45/225, The Dominions in World Affairs, Statement made by the Rt. Hon. H. V. Evatt, Australian Attorney-General and Minister for External Affairs, at Press Conference in London, on 2nd April, 1945. See also: NAA, 280174 - A5954 - 1821/3, *Post War Organisation ... United Nations Conference on International Organisation San Francisco April to June 1945 Report by Australian Delegates*.

New Zealand Agreement. Evatt also emphasized Australia's strategic situation and its potential to contribute to world security via the new security organization.⁴⁹

Evatt also gave close attention to the details of Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. He stressed three points: the restriction of the great power veto, the encouragement of regional security initiatives as an alternative if the Security Council vetoed an action, and that amendments to the UN Charter should not be subject to veto.⁵⁰ He linked economic and social initiatives to military measures, arguing that the former could be more significant in removing the cause of war. In short Evatt crystallized the core of his policy for San Francisco: to prevent the domination of great powers over the new world order. Their main instrument for this domination would be the veto so Evatt would try to abolish or at least dilute it. As Hasluck commented, Evatt's 'intellectual powers never impressed me so vividly as they did during this period of rapid learning in London'.⁵¹

The London meeting decided that the countries of the British Commonwealth would 'stand ready to play *their full part* in [an] International Organization for the purpose of preserving international peace and security and promoting human welfare'.⁵² This was particularly important for Evatt. It let him stress his views about Australia's independent international status, and offered him the chance of speaking for the small nations at the San Francisco Conference.

⁴⁹ NAA, 190471 - A1066 - PI45/225, The Dominions in World Affairs, Statement made by the Rt. Hon. H. V. Evatt, Australian Attorney-General and Minister for External Affairs, at Press Conference in London, on 2nd April, 1945.

⁵⁰ NAA, 188023 - A1066 - H45/772/1, *World Organisation: UNCIO. April 1945. Meeting of British Commonwealth representatives: London. Papers prepared by the Australian Delegation.*

⁵¹ P. Hasluck, *Diplomatic Witness: Australian Foreign Affairs 1941-1947*, 171.

⁵² NAA, 190471 - A1066 - PI45/225, Statement issued to the press at the close of the British Commonwealth Meeting in London, 12th April, 1945. (Emphasis added)

The Australian delegation assembled in San Francisco on 23 and 24 April. Evatt's potential to be a significant figure at the Conference was first noticed by US Republican Senator Arthur Hendrick Vandenberg, a key member of the US delegation, who in his diary commented that, 'I think [Evatt] is going to be a tower of strength at' San Francisco.⁵³ Evatt's stance was made clear at his first press conference. He expressed Australia's aim to be a member of the Security Council, and his unwillingness to accept the great power veto on amending the proposed UN Charter.⁵⁴

San Francisco proved to be a 'rare occasion' on which 'an isolated and minor industrial power' had an 'impact on international society'.⁵⁵ Australia seized the opportunity and 'assumed the self appointed role of champion of the small nations'.⁵⁶

The success of Australia at the Conference depended largely on Evatt. Edward Plant commented that 'by making specific and detailed comments on Australia's proposed amendments' Evatt 'had revealed himself as an aggressive, able and energetic outsider'.⁵⁷ The arguments of the Australian delegation at San Francisco were not very different from Evatt's statements at the London meeting or back to 1943. This shows Evatt's preparedness and decisiveness, and his influence on the Australian delegation's policy.

⁵³ A. H. Vandenberg, *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg*, 171.

⁵⁴ *San Francisco Examiner* 25 April 1945 in J. D. E. Plant, "The Origins and Development of Australia's Policy and Posture at the United Nations on International Organization, San Francisco – 1945." ANU PhD, 1966, 293.

⁵⁵ W.J. Hudson, *Australia and the New World Order*, 6.

⁵⁶ H. S. Albinsky, *Australia's Search for Regional Security in Southeast Asia*, 140.

⁵⁷ J. D. E. Plant, "The Origins and Development of Australia's Policy and Posture at the United Nations", 294.

At the Conference Forde introduced Australia's general thesis. He mentioned the increasing importance of the Pacific for Europe, adding that 'nations in the Pacific cannot contract out of Europe any more than European nations can contract out of the Pacific'. He noted that the principles of the Atlantic Charter were significant for the Asia-Pacific. He stated that the 'complete and immediate application of measures for collective security is essential both to deter the would-be aggressor and to bring reassurance to the peoples of the world who look for security'.⁵⁸ In short he put Australia's two main points: the importance of the Pacific, and regional input on measures to deter aggression.

On the latter, Forde outlined Australia's potential as an active regional power. He linked this to the importance of middle powers:

It will have to be recognized that outside of the Great Powers there are certain powers who, by reason of their resources and their geographical location, will have to be relied upon especially for the maintenance of peace and security in various quarters of the world. ... Australia has consistently maintained this principle. ...

Certain Powers, not classified as great, have proved by their record in two world wars that they not only have the capacity but also the will to fight in resistance of aggressors threatening the world with tyranny. ... They are in truth Security Powers. They have a claim to special recognition in any security organization.⁵⁹

Before detailed discussion began, Evatt was elected to the Executive Committee (the Steering Committee). Evatt's selection was suggested by the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, in the Washington meeting of Big Four Foreign Ministers on 23 April. He pointed out that 'Australia had asked whether it might not be possible for it to be represented on the Executive Committee since there were no countries

⁵⁸ NAA, 190454 - A1066 - PI45/207, Statement by Forde at the Second Plenary Session of the UN Conference on International Organization, 27 April 1945.

⁵⁹ NAA, 280174 - A5954 - 1821/3, Statement by Forde at the Second Plenary Session of the UN Conference on International Organization, 27 April 1945.

representing the Southwest Pacific area', and added that he felt 'full consideration should be given to this since Australia had played a very prominent part in the war'.⁶⁰ This committee had great influence on the daily discussions of the Conference. On 28 April Forde and Evatt reported to Curtin that Executive Committee membership 'is eminently satisfactory' as Australia had 'finally secured the support, of [the] British, Americans and Russians.' Membership of this 'important body' would allow Australia 'to take [a] more effective part in the conference work and we hope the recognition we have gained will also help towards recognition at a later stage when [the] security council is selected'.⁶¹ Evatt achieved the role he was looking for. He could take part in daily discussions, and present his views on nearly every topic.

Australia proposed 38 amendments of substance to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.⁶² Of these 38, 26 were either adopted without material change, adopted in principle, or made unnecessary by other alterations.⁶³ In this sense '[p]erhaps the most important achievement of the Conference' was the work of nations like Australia in 'liberalising' the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.⁶⁴

Australian proposals were quite important on five aspects of the Dumbarton Oaks text: international peace and security, the relation between the General Assembly

⁶⁰ FRUS, 1945, Vol 1, 369, Minutes of the First Four-Power Preliminary Meeting on Questions of Organization and Admission, 23 April 1945.

⁶¹ NAA, 697614 - A3300 - 342L, Telegram for Curtin from Forde and Evatt, 28 April 1945.

⁶² See: UNCIO Documents, San Francisco, 1945, Vol 3, 543-53; for contribution on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals as the basis of discussion see: UNCIO Documents, San Francisco, 1945, Vol 1, 170; see also: NAA, 280174 - A5954 - 1821/3, For Evatt's statement at Press Conference at San Francisco on 3 May 1945 see: NAA, 188016 - A1066 - H45/771/5, *World Organisation. UNCIO. The United Nations Conference on International Organisation, San Francisco, April 1945. Press cuttings from Sydney Morning Herald*.

⁶³ For the adopted proposals of Australia see: NAA, 188016 - A1066 - H45/771/5, *World Organisation. UNCIO. The United Nations Conference on International Organisation, San Francisco, April 1945. Press cuttings from Sydney Morning Herald*; NAA, 188020 - A1066 - H45/771/9, *World Organisation. UNCIO. The United Nations Conference on International Organisation, San Francisco, April 1945. Papers prepared for distribution to members of the Australian Delegation*.

⁶⁴ NAA, 5169167 - A4764 - 6, Cablegram for Makin from Evatt, 23 June 1945.

and the Security Council, the veto, regional security, and the Economic and Social Council.

On international peace and security⁶⁵, Australia focused on speedy solutions to disputes and universally applicable measures for dispute resolution. Solutions should include not only military but also economic and social measures. Forde's statement on this was summarized in a cable from the Australian delegation:

(a) There must be speedy and orderly procedures for the peaceful handling of disputes between nations.

(b) There must a system of sanctions which can be imposed very rapidly and which will be based on the united military strength of the great powers, but shared in by all powers.

(c) A permanent system of security can be made effective and acceptable only if it has a foundation in economic and social justice and real international stability can be achieved only by promoting measures of economic advancement as well as maintaining security.⁶⁶

Australia proposed that international security measures should be universal. In other words, 'enforcement action should be accepted by all members and ... decisions of the Organization to apply enforcement measures should be equally binding on all members'.⁶⁷ For the efficiency of collective security Forde noted:

under the proposed security system the obligation to contribute will be binding on all members. Acceptance of that principle implies that we must be ready to give, but in return there must be an assurance of security; an assurance that, if we are attacked,

⁶⁵ For Australia's amendments on the mechanism of sanctions to enforce peace see: UNCIO Documents, San Francisco, 1945, Vol 12, 360-1; on collective resistance against aggression see: UNCIO Documents, San Francisco, 1945, Vol 6, 345.

⁶⁶ NAA, 5169167 - A4764 - 6, Cablegram from Australian Delegation San Francisco to Cabinet, 29 April 1945.

⁶⁷ NAA, 280174 - A5954 - 1821/3, Statement by Forde, at the Second Plenary Session of the UN Conference on International Organization, 27 April 1945.

the nations of the world will come to our assistance just as we have, in fact, gone promptly to their assistance in the past.⁶⁸

The other important Australian contribution to the discussions on international security was its emphasis on the arrangements for economic and social cooperation. Australia argued that 'peace and security must rest on economic justice and social security'. Forde declared:

welfare is an end [in] itself. Greater welfare, employment for all, and rising standards of living for the masses have been promised in ... the Atlantic Charter. ... All this has been pledged. ... The pledge should be written into the Charter of the World Organization as an objective, but that is not enough. Suitable machinery must be provided for the progressive fulfilment of the pledge.⁶⁹

Importantly Australia argued that economic and social welfare could more efficiently diminish threats to international security than military measures.

Australia's second major contribution was the distribution of power between the General Assembly and the Security Council.⁷⁰ Evatt wanted the Assembly, as the most democratic element of the UN, to have the 'widest possible powers'.⁷¹ Forde agreed. He stated that the Assembly 'should become the central organ or forum in which the conscience of the peoples of the world should have its potent expression'. He added that '[w]hile the Security Council' was 'handling a dispute in accordance

⁶⁸ UNCIO Documents, San Francisco, 1945, Vol 1, 176.

⁶⁹ NAA, 280174 - A5954 - 1821/3, Statement by Forde, at the Second Plenary Session of the UN Conference on International Organization, 27 April 1945.

⁷⁰ For Australia's views on this issue see: NAA, 280172 - A5954 - 1821/1, from Forde and Evatt to Chifley, 4 June 1945, from Evatt, 6 June 1945. For a summary of Australia's views on the powers of the General Assembly see: NAA, 280174 - A5954 - 1821/3, *Post War Organisation ... United Nations Conference on International Organisation San Francisco April to June 1945 Report by Australian Delegates ... Text of Agreements signed at San Francisco 26 June 1945*. For Australia's contribution to discussions on the functions and powers of the General Assembly see: UNCIO Documents, San Francisco, 1945, Vol 5, 265-66, 272-73, 522-27, 533; on the proposed text on the right of the General Assembly to unlimited scope of discussion see: UNCIO Documents, San Francisco, 1945, Vol 5, 533.

⁷¹ H. V. Evatt, *the United Nations*, 19.

with Chapter VIII of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, nothing should be done to diminish the authority of the Council or to hamper the prompt settlement of the dispute'.⁷²

Australia's amendment on increasing the power of the General Assembly was:

(1) The General Assembly may consider, and may make such recommendations as it thinks fit with regard to any matter affecting the international relations (including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments); provided that, while in relation to any dispute or situation the Security Council is exercising the functions assigned to it ... the General Assembly may not, unless on the request of the Security Council, make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation.

(2) When the Security Council commences to exercise its functions in relation to any dispute or situation, and also when it has ceased to do so, the Secretary-General shall immediately notify the General Assembly through its President. The President of the General Assembly may at any time require the Secretary-General to report on the position of any dispute or situation before the Security Council. If the General Assembly by a three-fourths majority is of the opinion, having considered the Secretary General's report, that the Security Council [has] ceased to exercise its functions in relation to the dispute or situation, it may proceed to make any recommendation it thinks fit with regard thereto.⁷³

Australia's objective was to 'give the General Assembly a wider jurisdiction over, and a fuller share in, the general work of the Organization and in particular to vest the Assembly with power to prevent situations and disputes from becoming "frozen" in the Security Council'.⁷⁴ Australia's amendment aimed to reduce the dominance of the Security Council over the General Assembly by giving the Assembly the capacity to limit the Council's autonomy. In essence Australia aimed to give the Assembly authority to supervise the actions of the Council. This would make the Council

⁷² UNCIO Documents, San Francisco, 1945, Vol 1, 174.

⁷³ UNCIO Documents, San Francisco, 1945, Vol 3, 544-545.

⁷⁴ NAA, 280174 - A5954 - 1821/3, The Australian Objectives, Statement issued at press conference at San Francisco on 3rd May, 1945 by the Right Honorable H. V. Evatt.

(controlled by the great powers) responsible to the Assembly (where the small and middle powers had a voice).

On this matter 16 other countries proposed amendments, so Committee II/2 (General Assembly – Political and Security Functions) decided to list the amendments as questions. Evatt formulated three questions:

(a) Should the Assembly have general power to discuss and make recommendations in respect to any matter affecting international relations?

(b) Should the power of the Assembly to recommend be restricted in cases of disputes which are actually being dealt with by the Security Council, as in the existing Dumbarton Oaks text?

(c) If the answer to (b) is 'yes', should some procedure be laid down for the purpose of giving to the Assembly full power to make a recommendation in relation to any matter as soon as the Security Council has ceased to deal with the matter? ⁷⁵

On 25 May Australia submitted an amended version of its draft of the General Assembly powers.⁷⁶ In it Australia particularly insisted that the Assembly could discuss and make recommendations on any matter of international relations. On 29 May the Committee voted 27 to 11 in favour of the Assembly's right to deal with any matter of international relations, and the vote that this power should apply only to matters concerning the maintenance of international peace and security lost 9 to 27.⁷⁷ Australia's efforts played an important role in this result, which increased the Assembly's powers.

⁷⁵ UNCIO Documents, San Francisco, 1945, Vol 9, 29.

⁷⁶ UNCIO Documents, San Francisco, 1945, Vol 9, 401-403.

⁷⁷ UNCIO Documents, San Francisco, 1945, Vol 9, 108-10.

Another issue at the Conference was the veto.⁷⁸ Australia's view was that the veto should not be used on 'conciliation, or peaceful means of settling a dispute' because these 'should be regarded not as a power of the Council but as the duty of the Council'.⁷⁹ Australia wanted to restrict the veto privilege to counter aggression only. Forde commented:

The term "veto" is not altogether a happy one. In relation to sanctions, it means only this: that if the world organization is to exercise economic and military sanctions against an aggressor, which of course involves acts of war, its leading members must act unitedly or not at all.⁸⁰

The low possibility of any unanimous action in the Security Council in the event of aggression was Australia's main concern. In order to avoid this Australia wanted to limit the influence of the great powers at least on regional conflicts. If a great power were not part of a conflict, it should not have the authority to intervene in that dispute. Evatt thought that the veto might cause a deadlock in regional security issues. He stated that with the veto a great power could prevent the UN from assisting a small power in a regional conflict, even though that great power had no interest in that conflict.⁸¹

After three days of debate, the Australian amendment (which was redrafted but substantially unchanged) was rejected by 10 votes to 20 with 15 abstentions.⁸² However Evatt's battle 'did result in an assurance from the sponsoring powers (on 7

⁷⁸ For Australian views on the veto power see: UNCIO Documents, San Francisco, 1945, Vol 6, 438-39 and Vol 7, 252 and Vol 11, 121-29, 309-10, 433-34, 438-40, 491-94, 514, 516, 611, 612-13, 650-51, 685-86. For Australia's amendment on the veto power of the Security Council see: UNCIO Documents, San Francisco, 1945, Vol 11, 492-4, 612-13, 650-51, 685-86; for contribution on the discussions of the voting in Security Council see: UNCIO Documents, San Francisco, 1945, Vol 7, 252, 424 and Vol 11, 121-29, 309-10, 433-34, 438-40, 491-94, 514, 516, 552, 611, 612-13, 650-51, 685-86.

⁷⁹ UNCIO Documents, San Francisco, 1945, Vol 11, 123.

⁸⁰ NAA, 280174 - A5954 - 1821/3, Statement by Forde, at the Second Plenary Session of the UN Conference on International Organization, 27 April 1945.

⁸¹ NAA, 188016- A1066 - H45/771/5, *World Organisation. UNCIO. The United Nations Conference on International Organisation, San Francisco, April 1945. Press cuttings from Sydney Morning Herald.*

⁸² UNCIO Documents, San Francisco, 1945, Vol 11, 494-95.

June 1945) that the veto would not be used to block discussion of a situation by the Council'.⁸³ Evatt finished his campaign on the Security Council's veto by saying:

Now that the struggle is finished and the sponsoring powers have been victorious in their unrestricted retention of the right of veto, the onus is on them. We of the smaller nations will watch very closely how it is exercised in future.⁸⁴

Evatt's attack on the veto was his biggest effort to limit the Council's influence. Significantly, it was contrary to US policy, and to the advantage of the small powers.

The fourth Australian initiative concerned regional security measures.⁸⁵ The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals encouraged these, but their effectiveness was negated by the Security Council's power to veto any regional security action. Evatt was anxious about a possible Russian or Chinese veto. In order to reduce this possibility Australia proposed that:

If the Security Council does not itself take measures, and does not authorize action to be taken under a regional arrangement or agency, for maintaining or restoring international peace, nothing in this Charter shall be deemed to abrogate the right of the parties to any arrangement which is consistent with this Charter to adopt such measures as they deem just and necessary for maintaining or restoring international peace and security in accordance with that arrangement.⁸⁶

To implement this, Australia proposed:

(A) To retain the primary control by the Security Council over Regional enforcement action;

⁸³ N. Harper & D. Sissons, *Australia and the United Nations*, 53.

⁸⁴ UNCIO Documents, San Francisco, 1945, Vol 11, 129.

⁸⁵ For Australia's contribution on regional organization see: UNCIO Documents, San Francisco, 1945, Vol 12, 668, 674.

⁸⁶ UNCIO Documents, San Francisco, 1945, Vol 3, 552.

(B) To permit remission of a dispute by the Security Council to a Regional Body for enforcement action by a majority vote of the Council including 3 only of the permanent members [to avoid paralysis which would be caused by a veto]

(C) To make it clear that if and when the Security Council decides not to take enforcement action itself and not to remit the matter to a Regional Body, then States which are parties to any arrangements consistent with the Charter shall have the right to adopt such measures as they deem fit for maintaining or restoring peace and security.⁸⁷

Australia was putting forward an alternative if a veto were used against a regional body's enforcement action. It wanted to reduce the effect of a deadlock in the Council on regional security measures.

'Once again an Australian proposal played an important part in helping to shape the amendment eventually adopted'.⁸⁸ At the end of discussions Article 51 of the UN Charter was accepted on the regional arrangements.⁸⁹ It empowered 'regional agencies ... to operate immediately to resist aggression', but maintained 'the right of the Security Council to interfere at anytime if it so desires'.⁹⁰

The fifth major Australian amendment concerned the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).⁹¹ As Forde stated, ECOSOC was 'one of the principal organs' of the UN.

⁸⁷ NAA, 5169167- A4764 – 6, Cablegram for Chifley from Forde and Evatt, 18 May 1945.

⁸⁸ NAA, 280174 - A5954 - 1821/3, *Post War Organisation ... United Nations Conference on International Organisation San Francisco April to June 1945 Report by Australian Delegates*.

⁸⁹ Article 51: Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

⁹⁰ NAA, 280174 - A5954 - 1821/3, *Post War Organisation ... United Nations Conference on International Organisation San Francisco April to June 1945 Report by Australian Delegates*; H. V. Evatt, *the United Nations*, 28-29.

⁹¹ For Australia's contribution on economic and social cooperation see: UNCIO Documents, San Francisco, 1945, Vol 8, 60-61.

Australia put forward 'proposals vesting in the Council certain powers and functions in addition to and in expansion of those set out in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals'.⁹²

According to the Australian delegation:

peace and security must rest on economic justice and social security. ... Greater welfare, employment for all and rising standards of living have been promised in ... [the] Atlantic Charter. ... [In this respect] the economic and social council should be made one of the principal organs of the world organization, with extended powers and functions and should be in permanent session.⁹³

Australia's main concern about ECOSOC was the inadequacy of its powers. The delegation stated that ECOSOC was supposed to 'take adequate action in any grave international social and economic emergency' but had 'no power of co-ordination of policies of other social and economic agencies' and was 'not directed in its activities by any binding statement of principles'. Australia was also concerned that ECOSOC was 'not even included amongst those "principal organs" ... stated in Chapter IV of the Dumbarton Oaks draft'.⁹⁴ Australia again emphasized that international security should not only depend on military measures but on economic and social welfare. Australia wanted to expand ECOSOC's powers. Its draft became Article 56, which is linked to Article 55 about the Economic and Social Council.⁹⁵

⁹² NAA, 280174 - A5954 - 1821/3, Statement by Forde, at the Second Plenary Session of the UN Conference on International Organization, 27 April 1945.

⁹³ NAA, 5169167 - A4764 - 6, Cablegram for Full Cabinet from the Australian Delegation, San Francisco, 29 April 1945

⁹⁴ NAA, 280174 - A5954 - 1821/3, *Post War Organisation ... United Nations Conference on International Organisation San Francisco April to June 1945 Report by Australian Delegates*.

⁹⁵ Article 55: With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote: a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development; b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

Article 56: All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.

After the San Francisco Conference, Forde said that the 'success of the world organisation ... would depend largely on the degree of unity which continued to exist among the great powers'. He added that 'Australia came away from the conference with its international reputation at a higher standard than we have previously achieved'. He noted that the UN Charter was not a perfect document but 'at least it was a very good practical plan for peace'.⁹⁶ Australia saw shortcomings in the final text of the conference, but its efforts aiming to make the UN more democratic, lifted its status and distanced Australia from US policy.

Evatt stated:

The achievements of the Australian Delegation ... were quite considerable. ... the Dumbarton Oaks draft was gradually transformed into a workable and greatly improved Charter.

First the Conference accepted Australia's plan to extend and broaden the powers of the Assembly. The Assembly is now guaranteed the right to deal with practically every subject within the very scope of the Charter.

The Economic Council and the Assembly will now be vested with the great responsibility of recommending the working out of a sound international policy aimed as rising standards of living and full employment.⁹⁷

Evatt reinforced this in a statement titled Small States and the Charter. It observed that the UN Charter contained 'provisions for a stronger Assembly, [and] for a more effective Economic and Social Council'. The changes in San Francisco enabled the Assembly 'to discuss and make recommendations on any question of matter within

⁹⁶ *Sydney Morning Herald* 2-3 July 1945 in NAA, 188016 - A1066 - H45/771/5.

⁹⁷ NAA, 697599 - A3300 - 342F, Statement by Right Hon. H. V. Evatt Australian Minister for External Affairs on his return from the United Nations Conference at San Francisco, undated.

the scope of the Charter'. They also transformed the ECOSOC 'into a fully-blooded one, with [the] prospect of continuous growth and effectiveness'.⁹⁸

Evatt introduced a bill to adopt the Charter in parliament on 30 August 1945.⁹⁹ Parliament discussed the bill in September 1945.¹⁰⁰ He and Forde defended their policies, and outlined the delegation's achievements, notably Australia's amendments.¹⁰¹

The opposition's main attack focused on the assumption of a special relationship between Australia and Britain. The leader of the Liberal Party opposition, R. G. Menzies, stated 'whilst a new world charter may have a value which is as yet untried, our relationship with the British Empire has a value which has been proved in circumstances of very great trial over many generations'.¹⁰² The opposition also stressed that Australia could obtain significant influence in the UN through the Security Council and this could be achieved by its relationship with Britain. Essentially the opposition was criticising Evatt's policy of asserting Australia's independence which might harm its special relationship with Britain.

Paul Hasluck conceded that 'whatever Australia did there the political responsibility for it, for credit or for criticism, belongs to Dr. Evatt. It was he who decided what policy should be taken'. He recognized that 'Australia was among the ten or fifteen

⁹⁸ *Rotarian* September 1945 in NAA, 697599 - A3300 - 342F.

⁹⁹ For Evatt's speech defending his policy see: CAPD, (Representatives), Vol 184, 5016-39, 30 August 1945.

¹⁰⁰ CAPD, Vol 184, 5016-5451 and Vol 185, 5542-61.

¹⁰¹ For Forde's speech see: CAPD, (Representatives), Vol 184, 5119-26, 5 September 1945.

¹⁰² For R. G. Menzies' speech on 5 September 1945 see: CAPD, (Representatives), Vol 184, 5111-19. For statements by other Liberal members see: H. E. Holt CAPD, (Representatives), Vol 184, 5174-80; J.W. Leckie CAPD, (Senate), Vol 184, 5344-51, P. C. Spender CAPD, (Representatives), Vol 184, 5132-38.

other nations who were most active at San Francisco in bringing about some modification and additions to the Dumbarton Oaks draft'.¹⁰³

Australia's success at San Francisco was not only a result of the preparedness of the Australian delegation, or of Evatt's ability and assertiveness. His stress on Australia's distinct international status grew out of his questioning of problems in Commonwealth consultation, and the failure of wartime Allies to consult Australia about decisions on the Pacific. From 1943 Evatt made clear Australia's intense and independent interest in the Pacific. He engineered the Australian – New Zealand Agreement in 1944. He played a significant part at San Francisco and won Australia a seat on the Executive Committee. With other small and middle powers Australia extended the General Assembly's powers to enable it to discuss any question within the scope of the Charter. Australia increased the influence of the smaller nations in the UN.

Unlike Turkey, during the formation of the UN Australia did not focus on gaining US friendship. Canberra acted more independently, defying the US in the UN even though it knew that the US presence would be significant in the south Pacific. Australia sought to be more dominant in its region than Turkey could be in the Middle East. In relation to the US, Ankara and Canberra were at far extremes of the wavy cross.

¹⁰³ P. Hasluck, "Australia and the Formation of the United Nations", 173, 76.

PART 2: Review of Turkish-American and Australian-American relations in the early Cold War period (1945-1948)

a. Turkey

Although Turkey was a founding member of the UN, it doubted that the UN could effectively counter a Soviet threat. Therefore Turkey tried even harder for a US alliance. At the same time, with the first signs of the Cold War, the US started to search for ways to counter the threat of Soviet expansion in the Balkans and the Middle East. This chapter illustrates Turkey's efforts to secure American political and economic support between 1945 and 1948. Turkey had three motives: its external security, its economic and military development and westernization. The chapter focuses on the first of these, and argues that Turkey secured American support for its military and economic development as a result not of diplomatic efforts, but of regional developments in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the first impacts of the Cold War on American policy makers. The importance of the Middle East in US-USSR rivalry turned Turkey into a significant US base.

From 1945 to 1947 there were two main problems in Turkish external defence: its isolation from the Allies of WWII, and the Soviet threat, which had become more explicit by 1945.¹ From 1947 to 1948, Turkey focused on maintaining its economic and military development with American aid, and on proving its loyalty to the Western Alliance.

¹ O. Sander, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri*, 8.

On the other hand from 1945 to 1948 there was an interesting link between Turkey's external defence and its economic and military development. When the Soviet threat became apparent in WWII, Turkey had to maintain a large army which put a serious burden on its budget.² After the war the perception of the same threat prevented a reduction in Turkey's defence budget estimates. Turkey therefore could not launch large-scale industrialization projects, and had to look for foreign aid. It could be Western aid, but preferably it was American aid. This link between Turkey's defence requirements and its need for economic development was also important for Washington. From 1945 the US started to search for pivot states in the Middle East. The threat perceptions of the US and Turkey were now the same: the intentions of the USSR in the Balkans and the Middle East. This fact drew the two closer - Turkey received US aid, and the Truman administration could justify it.

Soviet pressure on Turkey after WWII was a part of the USSR's policy of seeking spheres of influence in the Balkans and the Middle East. Soviet pressure on Turkey intensified on 19 March 1945, when the USSR announced its intention to renounce the Turkish-Soviet Treaty of 1925.³ The People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav M. Molotov explained to the Turkish Ambassador, Selim Sarper, that the treaty was 'out of date and required revision [and that] altered conditions rendered serious modifications necessary', but that the Soviet Government was 'prepared to conclude a new treaty with Turkey which would take into consideration changed

² O. Sander, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri*, 44.

³ FRUS, 1945, Vol 8, 1219-1220, The Ambassador in Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State, 21 March 1945. By the protocol of 7 November 1935, the treaty was renewed for 10 years, to be prolonged by tacit consent for further 2-year periods unless renounced 6 months before expiry. If the treaty were not to remain operative, it would have to be renounced by one party or the other by 7 May 1945. (FRUS, 1945, Vol 8, 1221, The Ambassador in Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State, 21 March 1945.). For the text of the treaty see: League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol CLVII, 353. For the abrogation of the treaty see also: NAA, 190032 - A1066 - M45/27/5, *Turkey. Abrogation of Soviet-Turkish Treaty of 1925*; NAA, 276009 - A5954 - 2260/1, *Middle East - Cablegrams on situation in Turkey from 18th August 1945*; NAA, 190029 - A1066 - M45/27/2, *Turkey - Regime of the Straits*. For the reaction of Turkish government to the denunciation of the Turkish - Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality see: FRUS, 1945, Vol 8, 1230, The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State, 31 March 1945.

world conditions'.⁴ The Turkish Government took this statement very seriously, judging it 'the forerunner of the inevitable request for a modification of the Montreux convention', and a 'considerable pressure'.⁵ Turkey would not accept Soviet designs for a new Straits regime.⁶ These designs were the main threat that Turkey perceived until October 1946, and the perception of a Soviet threat did not disappear in Turkish politics throughout the Cold War. It remained an important element of Turkish external defence policy to show that Turkey was under constant Soviet pressure.

In order to counter the Soviet designs on the Straits, Turkey wanted to discuss the issue on an international platform. Turkish Foreign Minister Hasan Saka stated that the 'Soviets in reality wished to have bilateral conversations with the Turks in order that the Montreux Convention might be modified'.⁷ On the other hand, Turkey 'would prefer international rather than bilateral discussions looking to a modification of the Montreux Convention'.⁸ As the US Ambassador in Ankara Laurence Adolph Steinhardt noted, in order to counter Soviet pressure, which would continue as official propaganda and the circulation of rumours, the Turks looked first for British and then for US support.⁹

⁴ FRUS, 1945, Vol 8, 1223-24, The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State, 22 March 1945.

⁵ FRUS, 1945, Vol 8, 1220-22. The Montreux Convention was a 1936 agreement that regulated the regime of the Straits and which gives Turkey control over the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. For the full text of the treaty see: <http://www.turkishpilots.org.tr/ingilizcedernek/DOCUMENTS/montro.html> accessed on 11.02.2008; see also: League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol CLXXIII, 213.

⁶ FRUS, 1945, Vol 8, 1222, The Ambassador in Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State, 21 March 1945.

⁷ FRUS, 1945, Vol 8, 1224-25, The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State, 23 March 1945.

⁸ FRUS, 1945, Vol 8, 1230, The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State, 31 March 1945.

⁹ FRUS, 1945, Vol 8, 1225-28, The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State, 26 March 1945. Steinhardt was transferred to Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1945, and replaced by Edwin C. Wilson. (FRUS, 1945, Vol 8, 1229, 1234).

Turkey replied to the USSR on 4 April 1945. Saka noted 'the value of the pact of December 17, 1925 which has rendered great service to Turkish-Soviet friendship'.¹⁰ He added that Turkey 'accepts the suggestion of the Soviet Government with regard to replacing the expiring pact with another pact more suitable to the present interests of both parties'.¹¹ Clearly Turkey did not want to escalate the situation, yet its reply did not mention the Straits regime, which would be the main problem. Two attempts were made to solve this problem: the Molotov-Sarper talks (7 and 18 June 1945), and the discussions at the Potsdam Conference (17 July - 2 August 1945).

At the 7 June talks Molotov's demands showed that the renunciation of the treaty was only a beginning. Molotov declared that before 'proceeding to the negotiation of a new Soviet-Turkish Treaty [it would] be best to solve outstanding questions between Turkey and Russia'. Molotov's points were: a) 'cessions of territory made by Russia to Turkey' under the Russo-Turkish treaty of 1921¹² 'were made under duress and required revision', b) 'the cession of bases by Turkey to Russia in the Straits', c) 'an agreement between Turkey and Russia as to the revision of [the] Montreux Convention'.¹³

Sarper replied that Turkey 'was not prepared to reopen the question' of the 1921 Treaty 'which [Turkey] considered to have been freely negotiated nor could [Turkey] even consider granting Russia bases in the Straits'. As regards the Montreux Convention Sarper 'repeated that this was not a matter which could be discussed

¹⁰ FRUS, 1945, Vol 8, 1231, The Charge d'Affaires in Turkey (Packer) to the Secretary of State, 7 April 1945; TPMB, No 137, April 1945, 63.

¹¹ FRUS, 1945, Vol 8, 1231; TPMB, No 137, April 1945, 63.

¹² The Treaty of Kars, concluded on 13 October 1921. See the text in British and Foreign State Papers, Vol CXX, 906.

¹³ FRUS, 1945, the Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam Conference), Vol 1, 1017-18, Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State, 18 June 1945.

between the two Governments alone'.¹⁴ The questions remained unsolved at the end of the first round. At the second round of talks on 18 June, Sarper told Molotov that Turkey 'could not accept as a basis for discussion the three points proposed'. Molotov indicated that the USSR was prepared 'to envisage the negotiation of a treaty of "collaboration and alliance" ' between the USSR and Turkey.¹⁵ These talks also ended without any significant result.

After the talks, the Turkish Acting Foreign Minister, Nurullah Esat Sumer, expressed his 'negative impression' of the Moscow talks to the Soviet Ambassador in Ankara, Sergey Alexandrovich Vinogradov, adding that 'any new treaty of friendship between the two countries could not be based on questions such as those put forwarded [sic] by Molotov but only on "mutual respect and esteem" '. Sumer said that Turkey 'attached value to a new treaty of friendship with Russia provided all territorial and other objectionable questions were left aside'.¹⁶ He stated that 'under these conditions, instead of [the] friendship and understanding we have been pursuing, a freeze and distance will resurge'.¹⁷ Sumer's words showed that Turkey and the USSR could not solve these issues with bilateral talks.

The failure of the Moscow talks led Turkey to search for political support from either Britain or the US. President Ismet Inonu told Sumer to ask the British and US Ambassadors in Ankara to urge their governments to react against the Russian proposals at once.¹⁸ At this point the only reaction came from Britain, based on the

¹⁴ FRUS, 1945, the Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam Conference), Vol 1, 1018, Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State, 18 June 1945.

¹⁵ FRUS, 1945, the Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam Conference), Vol 1, 1024-25, The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Acting Secretary of State, 22 June 1945.

¹⁶ FRUS, 1945, the Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam Conference), Vol 1, 1024-25, The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Acting Secretary of State, 22 June 1945.

¹⁷ K. Gurun, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri (1920-1953)*, 289.

¹⁸ K. Gurun, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri (1920-1953)*, 288.

Anglo-Turkish Treaty.¹⁹ The British Government supported the Turkish position stating that Molotov's statements were 'in direct conflict with ... Stalin's statements at Yalta'.²⁰ Britain also hoped that the US would 'agree to a joint Anglo-American approach'.²¹ Yet the State Department's reply to the British Embassy showed that the US had no intention of making firm statements to the USSR. The Department noted that no 'formal demands have been presented by the Russians to the Turks', and it hoped that 'future conversations between the Russian and Turkish authorities will be conducted in accordance with the principles of the International Security Organization, to which this Government is pledged, and will continue in a friendly atmosphere'.²²

This even-handed US approach was shown at the Potsdam Conference, where the American proposal on the Straits was '(a) to prevent the Dardanelles from becoming an area of international dispute and a potential threat to world peace and (b) to ensure the unrestricted use of the Dardanelles for peaceful commerce'.²³ The US accepted that 'no power other than Turkey shall be granted the right to have a fortification on the Dardanelles or to maintain any bases in the Dardanelles without the free consent of Turkey'.²⁴ Although the US favoured Turkish control of the Straits,

¹⁹ The Treaty of Mutual Assistance concluded by Britain, France, and Turkey, signed at Ankara on 19 October 1939. See text in British and Foreign State Papers, Vol CLI, 213.

²⁰ FRUS, 1945, the Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam Conference), Vol 1, 1020, The British Embassy's aide-memoire, 18 June 1945. The British Embassy's aide-memoire indicates that Stalin stated that he readily agreed that "appropriate assurances should be given to Turkey regarding the maintenance of her independence and integrity" and that in particular Turkey should be reassured as a preliminary to the revision of the Montreux Convention. (FRUS, 1945, the Conference of Berlin -the Potsdam Conference-, Vol 1, 1027, The Department of State to the British Embassy). See also: FRUS, 1945, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 328, Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, 22 October 1944.

²¹ FRUS, 1945, the Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam Conference), Vol 1, 1018, Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State, 18 June 1945.

²² FRUS, 1945, the Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam Conference), Vol 1, 1027-28, The Department of State to the British Embassy, 23 June 1945.

²³ FRUS, 1945, the Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam Conference), Vol 1, 1014, Revised Briefing Book Paper.

²⁴ FRUS, 1945, the Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam Conference), Vol 1, 1015, Revised Briefing Book Paper. For the US Attitude towards possible changes to the Montreux Convention see: FRUS, 1945, the Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam Conference), Vol 1, 1012, 1014-15.

for defence purposes, it thought the Soviet threat not serious enough to take a firm position against the USSR.

Ankara was anxious about the next Soviet move and US indifference to the Soviet demands on Turkey. At the end of June 1945 Ankara approached the State Department to convince it that the Soviet demands were the beginning of an expansionist policy with unforeseen limits. Sarper told US Embassy staff in Moscow:

[The] Russians are not bluffing. ... Turkey was obviously in [the] Soviet security zone now taking shape from Finland to China. [The] USSR may therefore be expected to continue efforts to bring Turkey under control. ... the Soviets may have two further objectives directly affecting Turkey. One is the desire to close the Black Sea to states not in the Soviet bloc and at the same time to have free access through the Straits to the Mediterranean. Hence [the] demand for bases. ... A second possible objective ... is expansion from [the] Caucasus in two prongs: (a) Through eastern Turkey to Alexandretta and the Medit[erranean] and (b) through Iran and Iraq to [the] Persian Gulf. Hence [the] demand for [the] return of ceded territories in eastern Turkey.²⁵

Britain was backing the Turks but Turkey knew that this would not be enough to counter the Soviets. To convince the US about the gravity of the Soviet threat, Turkey undertook several other talks with US officials. One was the Sumer - Wilson dialogue in June 1945, in which Sumer stated that even though in the Moscow talks there were 'no threats', the Turkish government had 'trustworthy' information that 'Soviet Army units ... [were] moving into Bulgaria' and that these 'movements look like threats'. Even though Sumer did not believe that the USSR would take military action against Turkey on the eve of the Potsdam Conference, he said 'Turkey could not be caught unprepared'.²⁶

²⁵ FRUS, 1945, the Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam Conference), Vol 1, 1030, The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Acting Secretary of State, 25 June 1945.

²⁶ FRUS, 1945, the Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam Conference), Vol 1, 1031, The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Acting Secretary of State, 26 June 1945.

In a conversation with Ambassador Wilson on 2 July, Prime Minister Sukru Saracoglu stated his disappointment at the US wish that 'Turkey ... carry on further conversations with [the] USSR on matters relating to [the] cession of Turkish bases and territory'. He declared that the 'only hope he saw was if [the] US and British stand firmly together and say to [the] Soviets "This cannot go on any longer" '.²⁷ Wilson then gave a brief summary of his and Turkey's anxieties about the Russian claims to the US Secretary of State. He noted that 'questions raised by Molotov' were the 'opening move in [a] campaign on [a] broad front extending far beyond Turkey'. Claims for Turkish-held territory at Kars and Ardahan had to 'be taken seriously' because they 'have high strategic value covering [the] approaches to northern Iran and eastern Anatolia'. The Soviet need for 'freedom of passage through [the] Straits' could not be 'guaranteed either by bases in Turkey or by revision of [the] Straits convention'. WWII showed 'that [the] Straits can be closed by airpower based on Crete'. Thus Soviet security claims would 'be extended to [the] Aegean', in which case the 'whole debate can be transposed from [the] Black Sea Dardanelles to [the] Mediterranean-Suez-Gibraltar'.²⁸ In short, Wilson shared the Turkish view that Russian claims were the beginning of a larger strategy of domination in the region.

Although the Soviets did not officially demand bases in the Bosphorus or the cession of territories in eastern Turkey, the Turks used the Soviet claims and Soviet military movements into Bulgaria as diplomatic leverage to persuade the US that Turkey was under serious Soviet pressure. Turkey also made clear that its geographic position could be a key element in containing Russian expansionism in the Eastern Mediterranean. This argument was the cornerstone of Turkish policy towards the US

²⁷ FRUS, 1945, the Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam Conference), Vol 1, 1034-35, The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State, 3 July 1945.

²⁸ FRUS, 1945, the Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam Conference), Vol 1, 1033-34, The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State ad interim, 2 July 1945.

for the next two decades or so. It made the US aware of Turkey's growing importance in the region.

Yet Soviet pressure on the Straits was not the most crucial factor for the US, because in 1945 it still thought that this was a problem between Britain, Turkey and the USSR. The State Department felt that the Straits question 'was a local affair, not directly affecting American interests',²⁹ so the US 'should retain a detached but watchful attitude in viewing the interplay of British and Soviet policies on the Turkish stage'. The US would 'not remain silent if any country takes steps which threaten the independence and integrity of Turkey in violation of the principles' of the UN.³⁰ Thus the US would only step into the Straits issue as a member of the Security Council, not because Turkey thought the issue significant for its defence.

The US maintained this view at the Potsdam Conference (17 July to 2 August 1945).³¹ The provisions on the Straits were addressed in a Protocol signed on 2 August 1945, in which the US, the USSR and Britain agreed that the Montreux Convention 'should be revised ... to meet present-day conditions', and that 'the matter should be the subject of direct conversations between each of the Three Governments and the Turkish Government'.³² This protocol did not mean a change in the US policy, but it did make the US a party to the question.

²⁹ S. V. Beck, "A Small Power's Place in a Big Power's World: Turkey, the United States, and the Early Cold War." Bowling Green State University PhD, 2003, 7.

³⁰ FRUS, 1945, the Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam Conference), Vol 1, 1016-17, Briefing Book Paper.

³¹ For the discussions about the Straits during the Potsdam Conference see: FRUS, 1945, the Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam Conference), Vol 2, 256-258 266-267, 301-305, 312-314, 365-367, 372-373, 391, 393, 453, 551, 606, 1420-1440, 1496-1497, 1573, 1600.

³² FRUS, 1945, Vol 8, 1236-37, The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson), 9 August 1945.

At the same time Washington did not want Soviet bases in the Straits.³³ As long as Turkey was close to the US, Turkey should control this waterway. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) reported:

Neutralization would be in American strategic interests if the Turkish Government should some day come under the influence of a power hostile to the United States - in which case we would welcome the Straits being unfortified. However, as long as Turkey is friendly to us, Turkish fortifications along the Dardanelles are in our interests.³⁴

Even so, after Potsdam Truman proposed international control over navigation in the Straits:

One of the persistent causes for wars in Europe in the last two centuries has been the selfish control of the waterways of Europe. I mean the Danube, the Black Sea Straits, the Rhine, the Kiel Canal, and all the inland waterways of Europe which border on two or more states.

The United States proposed at Berlin that there be free and unrestricted navigation of these inland waterways. We proposed that regulations for such navigation be provided by international authorities.³⁵

This put the Straits in a broad European context, which was not firm enough for Ankara, and not welcomed in Turkey. Turkey's Ambassador to Washington, Huseyin Ragip Baydur, stated that according to the American view 'there would be nothing to prevent Russia from sailing its entire Black Sea fleet into the Sea of Marmora at any time, levelling its guns at Istanbul, and presenting Turkey with demands.' He added that if the US was not 'willing to undertake very specific guarantees of support to Turkey in the event of aggression', this 'would be most detrimental to Turkish

³³ FRUS, 1945, the Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam Conference), Vol 1, 1015, Revised Briefing Book Paper.

³⁴ FRUS, 1945, the Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam Conference), Vol 2, 1426, The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn).

³⁵ FRUS, 1945, Vol 8, 1240, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen), 24 August 1945.

interests'. Baydur repeated the perceived Soviet danger to Turkey to highlight the importance of the Straits question.³⁶

Ankara's arguments did not change Washington's policy on the Straits. Yet Turkey was lucky, because other factors helped Turkey get that support. These were the American policy of supporting the British position in the Eastern Mediterranean, the effect of the American officials' reports about Soviet aims in the Middle East, and the effect of the British attempts to influence US policy.

In 1945 the US was not ready to take over the British role in the Middle East, so it supported British policy. Even though British effectiveness was waning, there was as yet no power vacuum that the US might fill. British interests in the region required preventing Russian expansion, and for this the Straits were important. As the US Chief of Staff stated, 'Turkish fortifications along the Dardanelles are ... very considerable protection to British interests in the Aegean and Mediterranean'.³⁷

On the second factor, US reports on far reaching Soviet aims in the Middle East had a considerable effect on American Middle East policy, and increased Washington's interest in the Straits. Ambassador Wilson reported:

Soviet pressure on Turkey beginning with denunciation of friendship pact last March followed by Molotov demands in June and by subsequent radio and press attacks forcing Turkey to maintain large military forces mobilized with consequent strain on already unsatisfactory economic situation is doubtless intended to "soften up" Turkey. These tactics have not succeeded so far. But any agreement among great powers giving Russia privileged position at Straits at expense of Turkish security would so

³⁶ FRUS, 1945, Vol 8, 1240, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen), 24 August 1945.

³⁷ FRUS, 1945, the Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam Conference), Vol 2, 1426, The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn), 19 July 1945.

upset conditions in Turkey as conceivably to bring about downfall of present regime with resultant situation playing into Soviet hands.³⁸

The US Charge d'Affaires in Moscow, George F. Kennan, advised that he was 'heartily in agreement' with Wilson. Kennan noted that 'Soviet aspirations' were directed toward the 'elimination of western influence in Turkey and establishment of [a] regime "friendly" to [the] Soviet Union'.³⁹

On the third factor, the Foreign Office sent several reports to the State Department noting that the question of Straits had 'great importance' and that the Foreign Office was 'very anxious' that Britain and the US 'should move in completely close step about it'.⁴⁰ The Foreign Office was significant in transmitting Turkish anxieties to the US and stressing that the situation was serious not only for the Straits but also in the whole region. On 22 November 1945 the Foreign Office told Wilson of Turkish fears that a Soviet inspired revolt in Iran would be 'followed by early action by [the] USSR in Turkey's eastern provinces to bring about their annexation [to] Soviet Armenia'⁴¹

As a result of these three factors, on 2 November 1945 the State Department proposed to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs a revision of the Montreux Convention:

(1) the Straits to be open to merchant vessels of all nations at all times; (2) the Straits to be open to the transit of the warships of Black Sea Powers at all times; (3) save for an agreed limited tonnage in time of peace, passage through the Straits to be denied to the warships of non-Black Sea powers at all times, except with the specific consent

³⁸ FRUS, 1945, Vol 8, 1249, The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State, 25 September 1945.

³⁹ FRUS, 1945, Vol 8, 1251, The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State, 27 September 1945.

⁴⁰ FRUS, 1945, Vol 8, 1257, The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State, 23 October 1945.

⁴¹ FRUS, 1945, Vol 8, 1282, The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State, 22 November 1945.

of the Black Sea Powers or except when acting under the authority of the United Nations; and (4) certain changes to modernize the Montreux Convention, such as the substitution of the United Nations for that of the League of Nations and the elimination of Japan as a signatory.⁴²

This offered a more international revision of the Montreux Convention than leaving discussions to the USSR and Turkey. Turkey was not satisfied with it. On 5 November the Turkish Secretary General, Feridun Cemal Erkin, told the British Embassy of three difficulties in the American proposal:

- (a) There was no indication how the Black Sea powers were to decide whether or not warships of non-Black Sea powers were to enter the Black Sea,
- (b) the Turks may find the whole Soviet and possibly Satellite Navies in the territorial waters of Istanbul at one and the same time,
- (6) the effect of the American proposals would be to turn the Black Sea into a Russian naval base from which the Soviet Navy could make tip [hit?] and run expeditions into the Mediterranean without danger of pursuit.⁴³

Yet when the British Ambassador replied that 'the new American proposals would be more acceptable ... than earlier ideas of demilitarization and internationalization', Erkin 'agreed'.⁴⁴

These anxieties show that Ankara did not want a revision to the Montreux regime, but was after a solid guarantee against a possible Soviet move to the Straits. On the other hand the Turkish tactic of using British support to oppose the American proposal did not work.

⁴² FRUS, 1945, Vol 8, 1266, The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson), 30 October 1945. See also: H. S. Truman, *The Memoirs of Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope 1946-1953*, Vol 2, 101-102; US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol XIII, 766, 11 November 1945.

⁴³ FRUS, 1945, Vol 8, 1273, Extract of a telegram received by the Foreign Office from his Majesty's representative at Angora, 5 November 1945.

⁴⁴ FRUS, 1945, Vol 8, 1273, Extract of a telegram received by the Foreign Office from his Majesty's representative at Angora, 5 November 1945.

Turkey concluded that there was no point in pushing further for firmer American support for the Montreux Convention, and accepted the American proposals on 12 November. Erkin told Wilson that 'he had been authorized by Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to inform ... [the US] officially that Turkish Gov[ernmen]t is glad to have received this proposal and appreciates warmly evident concern of United States Gov[ernmen]t in drafting proposal to safeguard sovereignty and independence of Turkey.' Turkey found it 'essential' that the US participate in any conference to revise the Montreux Convention.⁴⁵ Turkey officially accepted the American proposal on 6 December. Saracoglu stated that Turkey 'favorably regard[ed] in principle the American viewpoint' and it was 'being accepted as the basis of discussion'.⁴⁶

In December 1945 the Turkish-Soviet war of nerves escalated. The Soviet 'press and radio' began publicizing an article 'written by Georgian professors' S. R. Djanashia and N. Berdzenishvili which claimed the 'Turkish Black Sea coast' for the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic.⁴⁷ In discussing this article, the US acting Secretary of State, Dean G. Acheson, said that 'the general questions involved extend beyond Turkish territory into the sphere of world peace and security, in which this Government has the deepest interest.'⁴⁸ His words showed increasing US concern about the Turco-Soviet issue.

The Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference (16-26 December 1945) illustrated US anxiety about the Soviets. At the conference the US Secretary of State, James F.

⁴⁵ FRUS, 1945, Vol 8, 1275, The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State, 12 November 1945.

⁴⁶ FRUS, 1945, Vol 8, 1282-83, The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State, 6 December 1945. For the statement of Saracoglu see: TPMB, No 145, December 1945, 15; H. N. Howard, *Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy*, 237-238.

⁴⁷ FRUS, 1945, Vol 8, 1285.

⁴⁸ FRUS, 1945, Vol 8, 1288, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Jones), 29 December 1945.

Byrnes', main aim was 'to get the Soviet troops out of Iran'⁴⁹ but the British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin brought the question of Turkey to the agenda. Bevin stated his concerns about Soviet policy:

Soviet policy was disturbing. It looked as if the Russians were attempting to undermine the British position in the Middle East. This could be seen in their attitude towards Greece, Turkey and Persia, all three points where the U.S.S.R. rubbed with the British Empire. The Soviet Government [was] maintaining large numbers of troops in Bulgaria and in Hungary, and there were also national armies in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.⁵⁰

He added that Britain 'could not be indifferent to a Russian threat to Turkey and would stand by her'. It 'could not agree to the Soviet request for a base in the Straits and for the return of Kars and Ardahan'.⁵¹ The conference ended, leaving the Middle East as a 'big unsolved problem'.⁵² It increased Washington's anxieties about the Straits.

In late 1945 Britain and the US also felt menaced by the situations in Iran and Greece. These, the Straits and waning British influence caused the US to consider the region more seriously.⁵³

State Department officers and Congress were also influential on the change in US Middle East policy. One of these officers was Loy Henderson.⁵⁴ He did not believe in the UN as a security organization, and he stressed the seriousness of Soviet aims in

⁴⁹ B. R. Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East*, 284.

⁵⁰ FRUS, 1945, Vol 2, 629, Record of Conversation, Prepared by the United Kingdom Delegation at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, 17 December 1945.

⁵¹ FRUS, 1945, Vol 2, 630, Record of Conversation, Prepared by the United Kingdom Delegation at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, 17 December 1945.

⁵² H. Matthews, *New York Times* 30 December 1945 in B. R. Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East*, 291.

⁵³ B. R. Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East*, 299, 342-50, 383-99.

⁵⁴ Loy Henderson, the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, was known as a tough-minded officer about the USSR in the State Department. See: B. R. Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East*, 237-244.

the Middle East. His memorandum, 'The Present Situation in the Near East – A Danger to World Peace', argued that the core of Soviet policy was to reach the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf through Turkey and Iran, which could jeopardize the UN. To prevent USSR expansion the US should 'intend to enforce its policies with the use of force or the threat of force' or with 'the employment of ... economic power'.⁵⁵

The second element in Washington for a change in US Middle East policy was Congress. Congress began to focus on the Middle East after the inconclusive Moscow Conference. Congressmen began to ask 'why was nothing settled about Russia's activities in Iran and its demands on Turkey?'.⁵⁶

In short by January 1946 British and Turkish efforts, and changes of thinking in Washington triggered a change in US Middle Eastern policy.⁵⁷ Truman wrote to Brynes on 5 January 1946:

There isn't a doubt in my mind that Russia intends an invasion of Turkey and the seizure of the Black Sea Straits to the Mediterranean. Unless Russia is faced with an iron fist and strong language another war is in the making. Only one language do they understand –how many divisions have you?⁵⁸

Washington was now ready to be firm towards the USSR, and to be more closely involved in Middle Eastern affairs.

⁵⁵ FRUS, 1946, Vol 7, 1-6, Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson), undated.

⁵⁶ A. Knock, *New York Times* 30 December 1945 in B. R. Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East*, 294.

⁵⁷ The factors mentioned up to here were the main reasons for this change. Examining all other reasons exceeds the scope of this review chapter.

⁵⁸ H. S. Truman, *The Memoirs of Harry S. Truman, Year of Decisions*, 1945, Vol 1, 492.

This trend was confirmed by Kennan's telegram from Moscow to the Secretary of State on 22 February 1946, also known as the "long telegram".⁵⁹ It is considered one of the landmarks of the Cold War.⁶⁰ It addressed five subjects:

(1) Basic features of post-war Soviet outlook. (2) Background of this outlook. 3) Its projection in practical policy on [an] official level. (4) Its projection on [an] unofficial level. (5) Practical deductions from [the] standpoint of US policy.⁶¹

On Turkey Kennan reported:

Wherever it is considered timely and promising, efforts will be made to advance official limits of Soviet power. For the moment, these efforts are restricted to certain neighboring points conceived of here as being of immediate strategic necessity, such as northern Iran, Turkey.

Where individual governments stand in path of Soviet purposes pressure will be brought for their removal from office. This can happen where governments directly oppose Soviet foreign policy aims (Turkey, Iran).⁶²

At the beginning of 1946 two other significant developments helped the Turkish government secure American support. These were Byrnes' speech to the Overseas Press Club in New York on 28 February, and Churchill's "iron curtain" speech at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri on 5 March. Byrnes' speech was an important reflection of a firmer American attitude towards the Soviets. He tried to mobilize public support for a new and a more determined policy of resistance to aggression by

⁵⁹ This telegram was published with the title 'The Sources of Soviet Conduct', in *Foreign Affairs* 1947 with the author name Mr X. See also: B. Rubin, *The Great Powers in the Middle East, 1941-1947 : the road to the Cold War*, 203-205; <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm> accessed on 23.07.2008

⁶⁰ <http://agonist.org/node/13725/print> accessed on 23.07.2008

⁶¹ FRUS, 1946, Vol 6, 696, The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State, 22 February 1946. For the full text see: FRUS, 1946, Vol 6, 696-709, The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State, 22 February 1946.

⁶² FRUS, 1946, Vol 6, 701-702, 705, The Charge d'Affaires in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State, 22 February 1946.

any aggressor within the framework of the UN.⁶³ Churchill's speech noted a serious world-wide threat of Soviet expansionism:

From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. ...Turkey and Persia are both profoundly alarmed and disturbed at the claims which are being made upon them and at the pressure being exerted by the Moscow Government.I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war. What they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines. ... Our difficulties and dangers ... will not be removed by mere waiting to see what happens; nor will they be removed by a policy of appeasement.⁶⁴

The most important reflection of the change in US Middle East policy after these events was the US battleship *Missouri's* Istanbul visit. With *Missouri* Byrnes sent a task force to the Mediterranean to reassure Greece and Turkey. *Missouri* carried the remains of the Turkish Ambassador to the US, Mehmet Munir Ertegun, who died on 11 November 1944.⁶⁵ *Missouri's* visit was an important example of 'the use of armed forces as a political instrument'.⁶⁶

On 12 April, Wilson reported Turkish reactions to *Missouri's* visit, which were quite significant. He told the Secretary of State that Turkish 'demonstrations of friendliness ... towards US Naval officers and men' were 'remarkable'. These demonstrations indicated Turkey's 'hope[s]' for the visit. Turkey considered the visit showed that the US had 'established [an] independent policy in [the] Near and Middle East based on defense of its own interests in this region'. Turkey understood that these interests

⁶³ J. F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, 254-56; For the full text see: US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol XIV, 355-58, 10 March 1946.

⁶⁴ http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1946/s460305a_e.htm accessed on 15.03. 2008; see also: F. J. Harbutt, *The Iron Curtain*, 183-208; F. J. Harbutt, "American Challenge, Soviet Response: The Beginning of the Cold War, February-May, 1946", 631-32

⁶⁵ W. Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries: the Inner History of the Cold War*, 141. *Missouri* was the most powerful battleship in the US Navy. The State Department issued a press release on 6 March announcing *Missouri's* visit to Istanbul see: US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol XIV, 447, 17 March 1946. See also: FRUS, 1946, Vol 7, 822, The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State, 12 April 1946; D. Alvarez, "The Missouri Visit to Turkey: An Alternative Perspective on Cold War Diplomacy", 233-35; Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East*, 335-336.

⁶⁶ S. Foerster & E. N. Wright (ed.), *American Defense Policy*, 321-23.

would 'oppose any effort by [the] USSR to destroy Turk[ish] independence and integrity'. Wilson added that the visit had an 'influence ... which extends far beyond [the] immediate theater in which it occurs'.⁶⁷ His report showed Ankara's expectations from Washington.

Truman's Army Day speech on 6 April 1946 was also welcomed in Ankara. It promised social and economic support for the Middle and Near East, which was 'an area of great economic and strategic importance' and stated that American military power would stand behind the UN.⁶⁸ Truman's speech was another sign of the change in US Middle East policy. Kuniholm's comment is interesting here. He linked developments in Iran, Greece and Turkey. Together and separately, they were related to each other and to their region. These three countries were 'a bulwark' to protect American interests in the region, 'the focal point of which was Middle East oil',⁶⁹ and to prevent the expansion of Soviet influence into the oil producing areas.

Turkish desire for US support was realized with these developments. At this time there was no official agreement between the US and Turkey on defence, but the events of April were a clear prelude to a Turkish-American alliance. This was a considerable relief for Turkey. However this relief was diminished with a new Soviet note on 7 August 1946.

In the note, the Soviets stated that the Montreux regime did not 'meet the interests of the safety of the Black Sea Powers' and did not 'insure conditions under which the use of these Straits for purposes inimical to the Black Sea Powers would be

⁶⁷ FRUS, 1946, Vol 7, 822-23. For the effect of the Missouri's visit on Turkish public opinion see: TPMB, No 149, April 1946, 64-74.

⁶⁸ US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol XIV, 622-24, 17 March 1946.

⁶⁹ Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East*, 374.

prevented'.⁷⁰ The note suggested that a 'new regime' should be established by which:

1. The Straits should be always open to the passage of merchant ships of all countries. 2. The Straits should always be open to the passage of warships of the Black Sea powers. 3. Passage through the Straits for warships not belonging to the Black Sea powers shall not be permitted except in cases specially provided for. 4. The establishment of a regime of the Straits, as the sole sea passage, leading from the Black Sea and to the Black Sea, should come under the competence of Turkey and other Black Sea powers. 5. Turkey and the Soviet Union, as the powers most interested and capable of guaranteeing freedom to commercial navigation and security in the Straits, shall organize joint means of defense of the Straits for the prevention of the utilization of the Straits by other countries for aims hostile to the Black Sea powers.⁷¹

The first three principles did not contradict the American note of 2 November 1945 but the last two would isolate the non-Black Sea powers from a new regime and establish a defence system run by Turkey and the USSR. Especially after the developments in the review few months, this was unacceptable to both Turkey and the US. Truman found the last principle of the note 'ominous'. He considered it 'an open bid to control Turkey' and 'to allow Russia to set up bases in the Dardanelles ... would ... result in Greece and the whole Near and Middle East falling under Soviet control'.⁷²

On 12 August Wilson noted that Turkey did not want to reply to the Soviets before learning the American view.⁷³ On 15 August the US State, War and Navy Departments 'at [the] highest levels, after [a] series of meetings, agreed upon a

⁷⁰ FRUS, 1946, Vol 7, 827, The Soviet Charge (Orekhov) to the Acting Secretary of State, 7 August, 1946.

⁷¹ FRUS, 1946, Vol 7, 829, The Soviet Charge (Orekhov) to the Acting Secretary of State, 7 August, 1946. See also: TPMB, No 153, August 1946, 72-74.

⁷² H. S. Truman, *The Memoirs of Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope 1946-1953*, Vol 2, 102.

⁷³ FRUS, 1946, Vol 7, 836-37, The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State, 12 August 1946.

memorandum' about the Soviet note, which was approved by the President. This memo highlighted the change in US policy towards USSR pressure on Turkey. It declared that 'the primary objective of the Soviet Union is to obtain control of Turkey' by 'introducing into Turkey armed forces with the ostensible purpose of enforcing the joint control of the Straits'. Soviet control over Turkey would lead 'to control over Greece and over the whole Near and Middle East', and this would 'cut off' these areas 'from the Western world'. These areas were 'strategically important from the point of view of resources, including oil, and from the point of view of communications'. Without American support Turkey might not be able to resist this. 'The only thing' which would 'deter the Russians' would 'be the conviction that the United States' was 'prepared, if necessary, to meet aggression with force of arms'. The USSR should 'understand that the United States' would 'firmly and with determination support Turkey' against 'Soviet measures threatening the independence, sovereignty or territorial interests of Turkey'.⁷⁴

This Soviet note thus further strengthened Turkish–American relations, and heightened the Cold War. The US implied that it was ready for an alliance with Turkey. It repeated this in its reply to the Soviet note on 19 August, which stated the American intention to be a party in the establishment of a new Straits regime, since this was not 'a matter of concern ... only to the Black Sea powers'. The note stressed that 'Turkey should continue to be primarily responsible for the defense of the Straits' and 'should the Straits become the object of attack or threat of attack by an aggressor ... [this] would clearly be a matter for action on the part of the Security Council'. It also highlighted that 'the note of the Soviet Government contains no reference to the United Nations', but that 'the Straits should be brought into [an]

⁷⁴ FRUS, 1946, Vol 7, 840-42, The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris, 15 August 1946.

appropriate relationship with the United Nations'.⁷⁵ On 21 August, Britain gave a similar note to the USSR which was against the 'points 4 and 5 of the Soviet note'.⁷⁶

Turkey had the US and the British replies before it sent its note to the Soviets on 22 August. The Turkish note was understandably firm. It stated that US views were important for any changes to the Montreux regime. It referred to the American note of 2 November 1945, put forward a view similar to the 19 August American note about principles 4 and 5, stated that they were unacceptable, and warned that 'Turkey' might 'take all measures necessary [to] [e]nsure [the] security of [the] country against every danger which may come from abroad'. Like the US note, the Turkish note emphasized the importance of the UN to the establishment of a new regime of the Straits.⁷⁷ The Turkish Cabinet went further, deciding that 'Turkey's interests would be best served if no conference to revise [the] convention' was held.⁷⁸

August 1946 was decisive for American official circles in crystallizing their policy on Turkey. On 23 August a US JCS Memorandum noted that the USSR could not 'provide for the effective defense' of the Straits without having a 'military dominance of the area for several hundred miles in all directions', which meant that 'Soviet military penetration' would extend 'through the Aegean'. This would 'soon result in reducing Turkey to a satellite Soviet State'.⁷⁹ The memo continued:

Strategically Turkey is the most important military factor in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. She is one of the few national entities and the only nation now possessing, according to best available information, a firm resolution to oppose the

⁷⁵ FRUS, 1946, Vol 7, 847-48, The Acting Secretary of State to the Soviet Charge (Orekhov) Washington, 19 August 1946; TPMB, No 153, August 1946, 74-75.

⁷⁶ FRUS, 1946, Vol 7, 849-51; TPMB, No 153, August 1946, 76.

⁷⁷ FRUS, 1946, Vol 7, 852-55, The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State, 22 August; TPMA, Folder: E4 Fon Code: 30..1.0.0 Place No: 60.368..8.

⁷⁸ FRUS, 1946, Vol 7, 855, The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State, 23 August 1946.

⁷⁹ FRUS, 1946, Vol 7, 857-58, Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of War (Patterson) and the Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal), 23 August 1946.

apparent Soviet policy of expansion in the area. While lacking an effective navy and air force, Turkey possesses a rugged and considerable ground army which, particularly if properly equipped and supported, is capable of offering material resistance, even to the Soviets, if the nation is attacked.⁸⁰

The expansionist policy of the USSR had 'the most serious impact on the vital interests of' the US. The memo proposed to improve Turkey's military situation by offering it US military and non-military material, and the assistance of US technicians and officers.⁸¹ This reflects another change in the US policy: US officials began to discuss the military development of Turkey.

These changes diminished Turkey's anxieties about the Soviets' next move. Hasan Saka told Wilson that any Soviet attack on Turkey was 'unlikely' because the Soviets were 'unready for war at present and undesirous [to] run risk [of] general conflict.'⁸² The Soviets did not withdraw their claims to the Straits, but Turkey thought the Soviet threat less serious than before the emergence of American support.

The USSR delivered a new note on 24 September 1946.⁸³ It reiterated the previous note, but it 'seemed softer'. It was 'less insistent [on] point 4 but insist[ent] [on] point 5', a joint defence of the Straits. The Turkish government did not consider [a] reply [an] especially urgent matter'. It again waited for British and American views.⁸⁴

⁸⁰ FRUS, 1946, Vol 7, 857-58, Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of War (Patterson) and the Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal), 23 August 1946.

⁸¹ FRUS, 1946, Vol 7, 857-58, Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of War (Patterson) and the Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal), 23 August 1946.

⁸² FRUS, 1946, Vol 7, 859-60, The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State, 9 September 1946.

⁸³ FRUS, 1946, Vol 7, 860-66, The Charge in Turkey (Bursley) to the Secretary of State, 26 September 1946; TPMB, No 154, September 1946, 46-51.

⁸⁴ FRUS, 1946, Vol 7, 860, 868-69.

The US replied on 9 October 1946. It reiterated its August note, especially on the two critical points, 4 and 5.⁸⁵ On the same day the Foreign Office replied that it was ready to attend a Straits Conference with the US, the USSR, France and the signatories of the Montreux Convention.⁸⁶ Turkey replied on 18 October, repeating its previous note, stressing that it opposed point 4, and that point 5 'which recommends a mixed system of Turco-Soviet defense in the Straits' was 'incompatible with the rights of sovereignty and the security of Turkey'.⁸⁷

With Turkey's note debate over the Straits formally ended. No conference was organized to change the Montreux regime. The USSR 'suffered a diplomatic setback',⁸⁸ but Turkey made significant gains. It became a part of American interests in the Middle and the Near East, and its significance increased steadily during this period.

On 21 October 1946, a US memo highlighted the crystallization of its support for Turkey:

Strategically, Turkey is the most important factor in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. By its geographical position, Turkey constitutes the stopper in the neck of the bottle through which Soviet political and military influence could most effectively flow into the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. A Russian-dominated Turkey would open the floodgates for a Soviet advance into Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan, Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula, all of which are at present still relatively free from Russian activities and direct Russian pressure because of their relative remoteness from the sphere of Soviet dominance. It would also dangerously, perhaps fatally, expose Greece and Iran, two countries whose governments are already having the greatest difficulty in standing up to the Soviet Union and its agents. None of the nations mentioned has a government or social order so stable

⁸⁵ FRUS, 1946, Vol 7, 874-75, The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, (Smith), 8 October 1946.

⁸⁶ FRUS, 1946, Vol 7, 876-78. See also: H. N. Howard, *Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy*, 251.

⁸⁷ FRUS, 1946, Vol 7, 879-93. See also: H. N. Howard, *Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy*, 253-54; B. R. Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East*, 372; TPMB, No 155, October 1946, 58-70.

⁸⁸ H. N. Howard, *Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy*, 258.

and united as Turkey, and none could be expected to stand against Soviet pressure after Turkey had gone down.⁸⁹

The memo continued that Turkey was 'so obviously a key point' that if it fell to Soviet pressure it would influence other nations 'to come to terms with the Soviets and abandon support of the United States'. Yet Turkey alone could not resist the Soviets because it lacked the 'the economic and industrial resources' and 'its economic structure' was 'shaken by the war'. The war of nerves with the Soviets also forced Ankara to maintain 'a large military force' which was 'a dangerous drain on the nation's economic strength'. Turkey was 'unable to produce for itself the modern weapons and equipment required for defense under present-day conditions'. Thus the US should give economic assistance to Turkey. Britain should continue to provide military aid to Turkey but, the memo continued, if 'a case should arise where Britain' was 'not in a position to furnish the necessary' military aid, the US would be prepared to substitute.⁹⁰ In short the memo not only emphasized Turkey's significance but also accepted the issues that Ankara had been complaining of since 1945.

Turkey was much encouraged by this. President Inonu's speech in the TGNA in November 1946 appreciated the strengthening relations between Turkey and the US. Inonu's speech got a very positive reaction from the parliament.⁹¹ A new phase began in Turkish-American relations marked by US economic aid. In the coming years, economic needs and security requirements would go hand in hand.

⁸⁹ FRUS, 1946, Vol 7, 894-97, Memorandum on Turkey Prepared in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, 21 October 1946.

⁹⁰ FRUS, 1946, Vol 7, 895-96, Memorandum on Turkey Prepared in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, 21 October 1946.

⁹¹ TPMB, No 156, November 1946, 12-15.

After WWII, the Turkish economy faced two serious problems. One was a reduction in revenues following a drop in the price of export commodities. The other was the cost of Turkey's large army. A lack of finance and of modern technology prevented Turkey from dealing with these problems or undertaking large-scale economic development projects. Thus it looked for foreign aid.⁹² It got aid from Britain but as well turned to the US.

Before 1946, Turkey and the US had concluded several economic agreements. These were the treaty of commerce and navigation on 1 October 1929⁹³, a trade agreement effecting tariff changes on 1 April 1939⁹⁴ and the American lend-lease aid to Turkey formalized by an agreement on 23 February 1945⁹⁵. In October 1945 Turkey asked the US for a credit of \$500 million for industrialization projects. Given that the huge US defence budget was a burden on Washington,⁹⁶ Turkey first got a credit of \$10 million to purchase US surplus material in the Middle East (on 27 February 1946),⁹⁷ and then \$25 million from Eximbank (on 3 July 1946).⁹⁸ On 7 May 1946 another aid agreement gave Turkey \$4,5 million.⁹⁹

However the US gave Turkey no direct military aid in 1946. On 8 November Acheson told Wilson that the State Department considered that 'it would be preferable for Turkey to continue to obtain such supplies from Great Britain', which was a 'treaty

⁹² M. Gonlubol (ed), *Olaylarla Turk Dis Politikasi*, 212. See also: H. Bagci, *Turk Dis Politikasında 1950'li Yillar*, 6-7; H. Ulman & O. Sander, "Turk Dis Politikasi'na Yon Veren Etkenler: 1923-1968 II", 18-19. For the table of the Turkish economic situation after WWII see: A. O. Krueger, *Trade and Employment in Developing Countries*, Vol 2, 24, 28.

⁹³ FRUS, 1929, Vol 3, 838-40, Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and Turkey, Signed at Angora, 1 October 1929. For details see: FRUS, 1929, Vol 3, 803-845.

⁹⁴ League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol CCII, 129. See also:

http://untreaty.un.org/unts/1_60000/3/24/00005198.pdf accessed on 18.03.2008

⁹⁵ FRUS, 1945, Vol 8, 1293-1309.

⁹⁶ FRUS, 1945, Vol 8, 1309-11.

⁹⁷ FRUS, 1946, Vol 7, 901, The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State, 16 February 1946. See also: TPMA, Folder: 46232 Fon Code: 30..10.0.0 Place No: 52.345..23. Ankara, 28/6/1946.

⁹⁸ FRUS, 1946, Vol 7, 903-904, 907, 909, 911.

⁹⁹ FRUS, 1946, Vol 7, 906, Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State, 4 May 1946; US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol XIV, 868, 19 May 1946. Turkey became the first country to receive substantial quantities of supplies as lend-lease aid.

ally' of Turkey and so would be less provocative to the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁰ Britain decided that it could not continue to help Greece and Turkey but on 21 February 1947 stated that both had strategic value and 'should not be allowed to fall under Soviet influence'. Britain asked the US to take up the burden of supplying military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey, adding that Turkey's need for foreign aid was particularly for re-equipping its army and for financing any 'extensive programme of industrial development'. For these two 'Turkey would have to look' either to the US 'or to one of its lending agencies, such as the Import-Export Bank, or to the International Bank or the International Monetary Fund'.¹⁰¹

Turkey was 'seriously disturbed' by the British statement. Saka told the US Military Attaché, 'Turkey must turn to [the] US for assistance it had previously sought from Britain regarding military equipment'.¹⁰² The cessation of British aid gave Turkey an opportunity and justification to press harder for American economic and military aid.

The US then began to institutionalize its aid policy to Greece and Turkey. On 24 February 1947 the US agreed to accept 'the responsibility which the British Government was proposing'.¹⁰³ On 1 March 1947 the State Department told the British Embassy:

The Government of the United States has given urgent attention to the aide-memoire dealing with Greece and Turkey ... left by the British Ambassador at the Department of State on February 24, 1947. The Executive Branch of the Government of the United States is of the opinion that the political and territorial integrity of Greece and Turkey must be maintained and has therefore decided to make every effort to extend

¹⁰⁰ FRUS, 1946, Vol 7, 916, The Under Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson), 8 November 1946.

¹⁰¹ FRUS, 1947, Vol 5, 32-37, The British Embassy to the Department of State.

¹⁰² FRUS, 1947, Vol 5, 88-89, The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State, 4 March 1947.

¹⁰³ FRUS, 1947, Vol 5, 45-47, 49-55, 60-62.

the aid necessary for that end and for developing a sound economy in those countries.¹⁰⁴

This stance was institutionalized in Truman's statement on 12 March 1947, known as the Truman Doctrine. Truman emphasized Greece's difficult position and declared that the US must help it. He also mentioned that Turkey's position was not as serious as Greece's but it still needed help for 'the maintenance of its national integrity' which was 'essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East'. He went on:

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way. I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes. ... Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far-reaching to the West as well as to the East. We must take immediate and resolute action. I therefore ask the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey in the amount of \$400,000,000 for the period ending June 30, 1948.¹⁰⁵

It is apparent that the trigger for Truman's statement was the Greek Civil War, not the situation in Turkey.¹⁰⁶ There was a little reference to Turkey's position. Turkey was strategically important but at the time of Truman's statement, the Soviet pressure on Turkey was relieved and Ankara was encouraged by Washington's assurances about defending Turkey.

Turkey had one remaining problem: to get considerable American aid to cover its defence expenses. This was also evident to the US JCS. It stated that the USSR would not attack Turkey but the war of nerves would continue. This would be

¹⁰⁴ FRUS, 1947, Vol 5, 72, The Department of State to the British Embassy, 1 March 1947.

¹⁰⁵ US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol XVI, 534-37, 23 March 1947; D. Acheson, *Present At the Creation, My Years in the State Department*, 222.

¹⁰⁶ See also: O. Sander, *Türk - Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-1964*, 15.

dangerous for Turkey 'unless [it was] given positive assurances including concrete assistance', because of its key position to block Soviet expansion into the Middle East. It put forward two objectives: 'to stiffen the Turkish will and ability to ... continue a firm national posture against Soviet pressure', and 'to improve the Turkish military potential'. To realize these aims it proposed to give 'economic and direct military assistance, even if furnished in small quantities' which would indicate 'a will on the part of the western democracies to support Turkey in case of an emergency'.¹⁰⁷

The Truman Doctrine and the JCS proposal were formalized by the Greek-Turkish Aid Act, approved in the Senate (by 67 to 23) on 22 April, in the House of Representatives (by 287 to 107) on 9 May,¹⁰⁸ and by the President on 22 May 1947.¹⁰⁹ The Act provided up to \$300 million dollars to Greece and up to \$100 million in loans to Turkey.¹¹⁰ This had a 'most encouraging effect' in Turkey. 'It has been wholeheartedly welcomed by Turk[ish] Government and people'.¹¹¹

On 12 July 1947 the agreement which would regulate American aid to Turkey was signed. It laid the basis for future agreements between Turkey and the US. Its crucial fourth article declared that Turkey 'will not transfer, without the consent of the Government of the United States, title to or possession of any such article or information nor permit, without such consent, the use of any such article or the use or disclosure of any such information by or to anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of the Government of Turkey or for any purpose other than that for which the article

¹⁰⁷ FRUS, 1947, Vol 5, 111-12, Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of War (Patterson) and the Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal), 13 March 1947. For the statement of Henry S. Villard, Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, mentioned the importance of Turkey see: US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol XVI, 999, 18 May 1947.

¹⁰⁸ FRUS, 1947, Vol 5, 164, Memorandum by the Acting Legislative Counsel (Sandifer) to the Secretary of State, 9 May 1947.

¹⁰⁹ FRUS, 1947, Vol 5, 175. For the analysis of the legislation by the State Department see: FRUS, 1947, Vol 5, 126-28.

¹¹⁰ Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol XVI, 1070-73, 1 June 1947. For the act and its regulations see: US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol XVI, 1070-73, 1 June 1947.

¹¹¹ FRUS, 1947, Vol 5, 194, The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State, 6 June 1947.

or information is furnished'.¹¹² US military equipment and information transferred to Turkey would be under US consent.

In order to persuade the public and official circles, Saka emphasized that the agreement did not harm the independence or sovereignty of Turkey,¹¹³ but established the conditions and procedures of American aid. Many in Turkey overestimated the extent of the agreement,¹¹⁴ but it was significant for Turkey's general political aims. Since 1945 Turkey had tried to be a part of the western alliance led by the US, not the UN. With this agreement Turkey achieved that aim.

Part of US aid was the European Recovery Programme, proclaimed by the Secretary of State George C. Marshall, on 5 June 1947, have known as the Marshall Plan. Marshall stated:

It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist. ... Any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full cooperation, I am sure, on the part of the United States Government. Any government which manoeuvres to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties, or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in

¹¹² For the text http://turkey.usembassy.gov/uploads/images/-ro_yRRfTpmFcys7zSnCeA/11be1163.pdf accessed on 08.02.2008. See also: TPMB, No 164, July 1947, 16-21.

¹¹³ TPMB, No 166, September 1947, 19-21. For Turkish reactions to the agreement see: TPMB, No 166, September 1947, 27-30.

¹¹⁴ Some press records even mentioned that with this agreement Turkey had secured full US support and that Turkey had already accessed the western defence system. Moreover, some claimed that Turkey had secured automatic American defence in any sort of aggression. TPMB, No 164, July 1947, 39-42. See also: O. Sander, *Türk - Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-1964*, 29. The importance of the July agreement was also emphasized by the President İsmet İnönü. For İnönü's speech see: TPMB, No 168, November 1947, 33-37.

order to profit there from politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States.¹¹⁵

The Marshall Plan's initial aim was to offer a tentative scheme to give American economic aid to Europe. Turkey was not included. Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak criticized Turkey's exclusion and stressed Turkey's economic needs to cover defence expenses. Turkey told the US that it needed \$615 million based on 1 July 1947 prices. The US replied that Turkey was not a belligerent in WWII so its economy was not devastated. The plan was for recovery in war-torn Europe.¹¹⁶

Yet Walter Wilds, the Acting Coordinator for Aid to Greece and Turkey, thought Turkey should be a recipient under the Marshall Plan. He stressed that current American aid was not enough to modernize the Turkish armed forces and that the USSR continued to be a threat. The American Survey Mission's reports also confirmed this. Wilds added that the defence burden was the biggest handicap for 'economic productivity', so additional financial aid was necessary both to encourage the Turks against the Soviets and to 'maintain the strength of the Turkish fighting forces'. He continued:

in developing plans for the European Recovery Program it has been assumed that Turkey would be a contributor rather than a recipient of aid. This has been based upon the assumption that the Turkish economy would not be burdened by heavy military expenditures In the absence of relief from this military burden the Turkish economy would not be in a position to contribute to the European Recovery Program;

¹¹⁵ US Department of State, Bulletin, Vol XVI, 1159-60, 15 June 1947. For details of the Marshall Plan see: R. M. Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism*, 151-187; A. W. Dulles, *The Marshall Plan*; S. Jackson, "Prologue to the Marshall Plan: The Origins of the American Commitment for a European Recovery Program". For the reactions of the Turkish press see: TPMB, No 170, January 1948, 211-15. For the application of the Marshall Plan in Turkey see: TPMA, Folder: M Fon Code: 30..1.0.0 Place No: 125.801..5., Ankara, 4/1/1952.

¹¹⁶ TPMB, No 171, February 1948, 23-33.

on the contrary Turkey would in all probability require extensive aid under that program.¹¹⁷

Wilds' report led to Turkey's inclusion in the Marshall Plan. This was legalized by an agreement signed on 4 July 1948,¹¹⁸ which also formed a general framework for other economic agreements between Turkey and the US.

In order to increase American aid, Turkey emphasized the importance of mutual strategic planning. In December 1948 President Inonu stressed 'his disappointment at the level of military aid' and strongly requested 'a correlation of American and Turkish strategic planning'.¹¹⁹ Washington accepted that Turkey had become more important than Greece. The US National Security Council accepted that the US had 'greater long-range strategic interests in the military establishments of Turkey than in those of Greece'.¹²⁰ This encouraged Turkey to intensify its attempts to ally with the US, institutionalize economic-military aid, and provide an automatic security guarantee. That system would prove to be NATO, which was initiated by the Brussels Treaty on 17 March 1948 and established on 4 April 1949.¹²¹ The next aim of Turkey was to become a member of NATO.

¹¹⁷ FRUS, 1948, Vol 4, 34-36, Memorandum by the Acting Coordinator for Aid to Greece and Turkey (Wilds) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett), 23 January 1948.

¹¹⁸ For the full text:

<http://turkey.usembassy.gov/uploads/images/wvKSFrTPBr97ulkwAYao4g/11be1166.pdf> accessed on 08.02.2008. For Turkey's inclusion to the Marshall Plan see: TPMA, Folder: 400-1118 Fon Code: 30..10.0.0 Place No: 219.476..18., Ankara, 26/6/1948. For the amount and the procedures of aid from the Marshall Plan see: TPMA, Folder: M Fon Code: 30..1.0.0 Place No: 125.801..5., Ankara, 4/1/1952; TPMA, Folder: E12 Fon Code: 30..1.0.0 Place No: 80.507..5., Ankara, 0/0/1950. See also: FRUS, 1948, Vol 4, 34-36, 208-209, 221. In 1948 Turkey also attempted to present itself to the US for a better understanding between two nations: TPMA, Folder: F11 Fon Code: 30..1.0.0 Place No: 101.628..9., Ankara, 9/12/1948.

¹¹⁹ FRUS, 1948, Vol 4, 217.

¹²⁰ FRUS, 1949, Vol 6, 40.

¹²¹ For the text see: <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b480317a.htm> accessed on 21 March 2008.

The last factor in Turkish-American relations in this era was the westernization policies of Turkey. From the foundation of the Republic, westernization was one of the main aspects of Turkish domestic policy, and it had important foreign policy consequences. It was both a reason and a means to justify American political and economic support. Turkey's westernization attempts intended to show that Turkey was a democratic country and a part of the West in its socio-political and economic structure.¹²² In the post-WWII era the Turkish leaders saw the West as the 'guarantee' of 'security, development and acculturation'.¹²³ After WWII the West became mainly the US. In 1946 Prime Minister Recep Peker told Wilson that 'despite obstacles such as political inexperience and difficulties from [the] opposition, [Turkey continues] to make definite progress on [a] sound, stable basis towards democracy'.

He said there will be no turning back on this road as there was in 1930. He remarked [that] Turkey's political life can no longer be built around one dominating personality like Ataturk and Inonu, but henceforth must develop towards fuller participation [of the] people. ... [he] attached great importance to increasing friendship, understanding with US.¹²⁴

Communism, which in theory could maintain an ideological link with the USSR and might detach Turkey from the US, never had a solid base in Turkey. 'Even during the halcyon years of Turkish-Soviet relations, Communist or Socialist parties and movements remained strictly banned in Turkey'. After WWII, Turkish 'Russophobia ... combined with anti-communism'.¹²⁵ Turkey's westernization attempts and anti communism formed an ideological base for the US to support Turkey.

¹²² O. Sander, *Türkiye'nin Dis Politikası*, 77. See also: W. L. Wright, "Truths about Turkey".

¹²³ F. A. Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, 115.

¹²⁴ FRUS, 1946, Vol 7, 844-45, The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State, 17 August 1946.

¹²⁵ F. A. Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, 67. For a general framework of Communism in Turkey see: G. S. Harris, *The Origins of Communism in Turkey*.

The Soviet threat thus brought the US and Turkey together, and secured US military and economic aid for Turkey. Australian – American relations in this period were strikingly different.

PART 2: Review of Turkish-American and Australian-American relations in the early Cold War period (1945-1948)

b. Australia

The main feature of American–Australian relations from 1945 to 1948 was the difference between their security considerations. This is illustrated by two case studies: the Manus Island base, and the Japanese peace settlement.

After its part in forming the UN, Australia continued its policy of attempting to be a key actor in the South Pacific. It knew that it could not do this alone, so it sought support on four elements: the UN, the Commonwealth, a possible US alliance, and a regional defence scheme. The first two were secured, but were insufficient to assure Australia's leadership in the South Pacific. Only a formal US alliance and a US backed regional organization could do this. Yet the Manus Island and Japanese peace settlement issues made it difficult for Australia to get US support, while Australia was reluctant to give way on either issue.

The general framework of Australia's post-WWII policy was put forward by Prime Minister John Curtin in the House of Representatives on 23 March 1945. Curtin stated the importance of ensuring 'closer liaison on Defence matters on the official level with the corresponding United Kingdom machinery', and that the 1944 Anzac Pact provided 'co-operation between the Dominions in all defence matters of mutual interest'.¹ As well he stated the significance of collective security and the indivisibility of world peace. He said that the maintenance of peace 'primarily rests on the Big

¹ NAA, 638519 - A5954 - 1600/2, Statement by the Prime Minister, 23 March 1945.

Powers' but that 'the small nations' also had 'their part to play'. He continued that because of its geographical position, Australia needed a defence scheme contingent on the maintenance of the security of the islands to its north. Australia's capability was not enough to secure this region without help:

the security of Australia and New Zealand is best achieved by a system of defence based on the island screen to the North of these Dominions. ... The crux of the situation is the capacity of Australia and New Zealand to provide for the defence of the screen and, at the same time, for the local defence of their territories. In actual fact it is impracticable for Australia and New Zealand to defend the area unaided.²

Cooperation was necessary 'with foreign powers', such as the Netherlands, Portugal, the US and France. From Australia's 'war experience' American co-operation was of 'paramount importance'.³ In short Curtin stated that Australia was aware of its limited capabilities for its defence, and to secure a defence perimeter it needed a protector, preferably the US.

In 1945 Washington was seeking a solution to the problem of its Pacific bases. US Under Secretary of State, Joseph C. Grew, wrote on 18 April 1945 that 'the Army, Navy, and the Department had been working for many months endeavouring to find a satisfactory solution to the question of trusteeships, maintaining our strategic bases in the Pacific and at the same time not being charged with annexation and expansionist policies'. The former Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson stated that 'it was unthinkable at this time' to 'give up our bases and protection in the Pacific'.⁴

² NAA, 638519 - A5954 - 1600/2, Statement by the Prime Minister, 23 March 1945.

³ NAA, 638519 - A5954 - 1600/2, Statement by the Prime Minister, 23 March 1945.

⁴ FRUS, 1945, General: the United Nations, Vol 1, 350, Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Under Secretary of State (Grew), 18 April 1945. For American defence policy from 1945 to 1949 see: S. Foerster & E. N. Wright (ed), *American Defense Policy*.

Grew summed up the conditions in the Far East with a policy paper on 22 June 1945.

He saw Australia and New Zealand as:

small, young, vigorous parliamentary democracies, intensely proud of their separate membership in the international community and in the British Commonwealth. ... Both will assert their right to be consulted about every major Pacific problem. ... Both will pursue similar foreign policies based on (1) strong support of the world organization, (2) an endeavor to develop a joint system of regional security appropriately linked to the world system, (3) further development of defense industries, (4) closer co-operation with the United States, and (5) continued but somewhat less intimate co-operation with the United Kingdom.

Australia considers herself the Dominion most hurt by the economic consequences of both phases of the war. ... Under the assertive leadership of Dr H.V. Evatt, Australia is determined to play as large a part as she can in the Pacific settlement and is to a large degree carrying New Zealand along with her. ... [B]oth governments asserted, among other things, a right to full participation in all armistice and post-war arrangements in the Pacific, demanded that no territorial changes be made without their concurrence, favored the establishment, within a general system of world security, of a regional zone of defense "stretching through the arc of islands north and northeast of Australia to Western Samoa and the Cook Islands", and proposed the formation of a regional commission to deal with the welfare of native peoples in the South Seas.⁵

According to Grew, US Pacific policy should be 'guided by a desire to deal with [Australia and New Zealand] as two separate nations—members of the British Commonwealth—with each of which the United States has the closest ties of friendship and common interest in the Pacific'. In its 'policy toward territorial problems in the South Pacific', the US should 'prevent the somewhat expansionist tendencies which have their roots mainly in Australia rather than in New Zealand from unduly complicating the relations of the United States with the United Kingdom, France, and

⁵ FRUS, 1945, Vol 6, 574-76, Policy Paper Prepared in the Department of State (An Estimate of Conditions in Asia and the Pacific at the Close of the War in the Far East and the Objectives and Policies of the United States), 22 June 1945.

the Netherlands'.⁶ Grew's paper shows that the US was aware of Australian foreign policy aims. In this context the Manus Base and the Japanese peace issues were debated.

Manus is one of the Admiralty Islands some 150 miles south of the equator and some 200 miles from New Guinea. On its north coast lies 'Seeadler Harbour, a magnificent natural anchorage capable of accommodating 1,000 ships; it has been likened to Scapa Flow in the Atlantic'.⁷ Manus was significant for both Australian and American Pacific defence strategies, but their policies on using the island conflicted.

The American view was put forward in August 1945 in a comprehensive report of the Sub-Committee on Pacific Bases of the Committee on Naval Affairs. According to the report, for American security and 'the security of the Western Hemisphere, and ... the peace of the Pacific, the United States should have at least dominating control over the former Japanese mandated islands of the Marshalls, the Carolines, and the Marianas - commonly known as "Micronesia" -and over the outlying Japanese islands of the Izus, Bonins, and Ryukyu.'⁸ The report went on:

With respect to Manus, Noumea, Espiritu Santo, Guadalcanal, and other sites of American bases on islands mandated to or claimed by other nations, full title to those bases should be given to the United States because -

⁶ FRUS, 1945, Vol 6, 574-76, Policy Paper Prepared in the Department of State (An Estimate of Conditions in Asia and the Pacific at the Close of the War in the Far East and the Objectives and Policies of the United States), 22 June 1945.

⁷ J.J. Dedman, "Encounter over Manus", 135. Early in 1942, Manus was occupied by the Japanese and in February 1944 was recaptured by US forces guided by Australians. The US transformed the area into an important naval base, at a cost, according to the Naval Affairs Committee Report, of \$71 million, of which materials accounted for \$9 million. For the strategic location, strategic facilities, anchorage protection, air protection, surface protection and sovereignty aspects see: NAA, 240083 - A5954 - 1818/1, *Bases in the Pacific. United States Report by Sub-committee on Pacific Bases of Committee on Naval Affairs of House of Representatives*. For Manus' geographical and security features see also: NAA, 169815 - A816 - 7/301/56, *Naval Base at Manus*.

⁸ NAA, 240083 - A5954 - 1818/1, A Report by the Sub-Committee on Pacific Bases of the Committee on Naval Affairs House of Representatives Seventy-Ninth Congress First Session.

(a) These other nations are not capable of defending such islands; they do not possess the manpower and materials that the United States does for the holding and maintaining of these bases; and

(b) As these bases are links in our chain of security, and no chain is stronger than its weakest link, we cannot permit any link to be in the hands of those who will not or cannot defend it.⁹

Two objectives should therefore be met. 'The primary mission' was 'to occupy, maintain, and defend such bases in the Pacific area ... to insure' American 'superiority on the sea, on the land, and in the air in order to protect the United States and its possessions against any probable enemy'. The secondary mission was 'to occupy the minimum of bases in the Pacific area, prepared to execute such necessary measures as required to prevent aggression in the Pacific'.¹⁰ The US would not 'retain all bases', but would select those 'which are not only strategically desirable but those islands also of greatest economic value'.¹¹ It was not clear which bases were both vital and economically feasible.

Thus the American demand for Manus was for full title. Terms of reciprocity with Australia were not mentioned. According to the US strategy, the Pacific was divided into the north and the south. Both regions should be protected in order to 'maintain' a 'centre line of defence', across the mid-Pacific from Hawaii to the Philippines. The northern flank should be composed of defensive fortifications in the Aleutians and the Kuriles; the southern flank of defensive fortifications in the Admiralties, New Hebrides, New Caledonia, and Samoa.¹² The problematic flank was the southern one

⁹ NAA, 240083 - A5954 - 1818/1, A Report by the Sub-Committee on Pacific Bases of the Committee on Naval Affairs House of Representatives Seventy-Ninth Congress First Session.

¹⁰ NAA, 240083 - A5954 - 1818/1, A Report by the Sub-Committee on Pacific Bases of the Committee on Naval Affairs House of Representatives Seventy-Ninth Congress First Session.

¹¹ NAA, 240083 - A5954 - 1818/1, A Report by the Sub-Committee on Pacific Bases of the Committee on Naval Affairs House of Representatives Seventy-Ninth Congress First Session.

¹² NAA, 240083 - A5954 - 1818/1, A Report by the Sub-Committee on Pacific Bases of the Committee on Naval Affairs House of Representatives Seventy-Ninth Congress First Session.

because it was 'a mixture of islands either held outright by, or under the mandate of, the British, the French, the Australians, the New Zealanders, the Dutch, the Portuguese, and the Chileans'. The US could not 'permit enemy forces to occupy Australia or New Zealand, for to do so would make our centre line vulnerable from attack from the south'.¹³

On the other hand, southern Pacific bases 'offer advantages of land manoeuvres that most of the islands north of the Equator do not'. Manus especially did 'not involve complex problems of natives', so it 'would be a purely military and naval base'.¹⁴ Manus possessed 'the greatest advantages as main fleet bases'.¹⁵ It was a 'strategic outpost' which provided 'a southern flank defence' of the American 'centre line', and gave 'protection and security for Australia and New Zealand'.¹⁶

The report offered several reasons to justify American retention of Pacific bases. These were the 'loss of American lives in taking these bases', the 'vast sums of American money in establishing and equipping' them, the importance of the US in maintaining 'peace in the Pacific' and the 'apparent preference of the natives of these islands for the United States Government'. American policy for the post-war Pacific depended on the assumption that the US 'restored peace to the Pacific almost single-handedly' so it should be 'charged with the responsibility of maintaining that

¹³ NAA, 240083 - A5954 - 1818/1, A Report by the Sub-Committee on Pacific Bases of the Committee on Naval Affairs House of Representatives Seventy-Ninth Congress First Session.

¹⁴ NAA, 240083 - A5954 - 1818/1, A Report by the Sub-Committee on Pacific Bases of the Committee on Naval Affairs House of Representatives Seventy-Ninth Congress First Session.

¹⁵ NAA, 240083 - A5954 - 1818/1, A Report by the Sub-Committee on Pacific Bases of the Committee on Naval Affairs House of Representatives Seventy-Ninth Congress First Session.

¹⁶ NAA, 240083 - A5954 - 1818/1, A Report by the Sub-Committee on Pacific Bases of the Committee on Naval Affairs House of Representatives Seventy-Ninth Congress First Session.

peace' and had to be 'given the authority and the means by which to maintain the peace' by having 'authority over strategic islands in the Pacific.'¹⁷

These claims were the major point of tension between Australia and the US. Until December 1949 elections, Australia's Pacific strategy followed the principles set down in the 1944 Australia-New Zealand Pact (the Anzac Pact). Both nations wanted to have a say in the Pacific. Australia was conscious of its limitations and wanted Britain and/or the US in the region, but the US claim for a single-handed American influence in the Pacific was jarring. The Australian Minister for Defence, John J. Dedman stated that the US report 'became the basis for allegations by certain politicians and some sections of the press in Australia that the U.S. Government had sought "full title" to Manus'.¹⁸

In November 1945, the US approached Britain to secure 'long-term military base rights in territories mainly in the Pacific' administered by Britain. The US also 'indicated [its] intention of approaching Australia and New Zealand for similar rights in each of their mandated territories'. Britain 'made it clear that outright cession of bases would not be considered', 'made no commitments' on the American proposals, and 'insisted on consultation with [the] Dominions'. Australia and New Zealand also 'insisted on their right to a full and direct part in any discussions' on the American demands.¹⁹

The report of the Australian Chiefs of Staff Committee on the US proposals for bases, on 19 November 1945, gives a clear picture of Australian views on the

¹⁷ NAA, 240083 - A5954 - 1818/1, A Report by the Sub-Committee on Pacific Bases of the Committee on Naval Affairs House of Representatives Seventy-Ninth Congress First Session.

¹⁸ J. J. Dedman, "Encounter over Manus", 139.

¹⁹ NAA, 237944 - A11546 - 6, Note on Discussion of Questions Relating to Pacific Bases and Regional Security in the South and South West Pacific.

American claims. The Committee admitted that the 'advantage' of associating with the US 'to the maximum extent' was of 'great military importance'. It welcomed 'the American proposal for long-term military base rights' but only on islands which were 'to remain under Commonwealth control'.²⁰

Instead Australia favoured reciprocity. On 24 December 1945 the Australian Defence Committee stated that '[a] natural corollary to the joint use of bases is the existence of a joint plan in which the role of the bases is clearly defined, and it is of vital concern to the British Commonwealth that such a plan should be drawn up'.²¹ On 27 December, in Cablegram 285, Canberra stated specifically that 'there would be long term advantages in having strong joint British Commonwealth – United States bases in the Pacific', but 'the establishment of such bases must be related to an overall plan in which their role should be clearly defined'.²² In short, at the end of 1945 Australia would have accepted an arrangement on Manus if two main provisions had been satisfied: reciprocity in using the facilities, and the formulation of terms as part of an overall security scheme in the Pacific.

Canberra attempted to make clear to the British that these two provisions should be satisfied for any Pacific bases arrangement. On 13 January 1946 External Affairs told the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs in London that 'under no circumstances should British sovereignty or control of Pacific Islands be surrendered or altered without unanimous consent of Australia and New Zealand ... This does not preclude arrangements for joint use of use of bases on condition of strict reciprocity'. Australia

²⁰ NAA, 662471 - A5954 -1818/3, Chiefs of Staff Committee United States Proposals for Bases, 19 November 1945.

²¹ NAA, 662471 - A5954 -1818/3, Out-of-Session Minute by the Defence Committee, 24 December 1945.

²² NAA, 656002- A5954 -1662/4, Minute by Defence Committee, 2 April 1946.

wanted to be 'represented at all stages of talks' with the US 'in respect to Pacific'.²³ On 15 February Chifley directed the departments of Defence and External Affairs that the future status and use of bases 'should be considered simultaneously [with] future defence arrangements in the Pacific Zone affecting the joint interest of the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, including the principle of reciprocity and joint use of bases'.²⁴ On 18 February Chifley mentioned America's November claims, and told the High Commissioner in London that 'future use of the bases' should be part of 'an overall plan in which their role would be defined, and in which the right to joint use and reciprocity would be provided for'. Chifley noted that a Prime Ministers' Conference²⁵ was being convened in London primarily to consider matters pertaining to the Pacific, of which the question of bases is a vital aspect, and that Australia was 'of the opinion that no discussion in Washington should precede' this conference.²⁶ Before bilateral talks with the US started, Australia made its position very clear to the British.

In February 1946, before the Australian-American talks on the Manus base, the Australian Chiefs of Staff highlighted the importance of US support for Australia's defence in an Appreciation on the Strategic Position of Australia. The appreciation stated that if the UN broke down, 'the security of every nation of the British Commonwealth' would 'depend on the effectiveness of a plan of Empire Defence and on co-operation' with the US. US cooperation would strengthen the Empire's position 'immeasurably'. No coordinated Empire defence plan was important unless US 'assistance' could 'be guaranteed from the outset'. If the 'immediate and full co-

²³ NAA, 662471 - A5954 -1818/3, Cablegram from External Affairs to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs in London, 13 January 1946. See also NAA, 656002- A5954 -1662/4, Cablegram 22, 12 January 1946, in Minute by Defence Committee, 2 April 1946.

²⁴ NAA, 656002- A5954 -1662/4, Directive for the Guidance of the Defence Department and of the Department of External Affairs on Related Aspects, 15 February 1946.

²⁵ A meeting of the prime ministers of the UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa took place in London in April and May 1946.

²⁶ NAA, 662471 - A5954 -1818/3, Cablegram from Chifley to the Australian Resident Minister in London, 18 February 1946.

operation' of the US could not be guaranteed 'from the outset in an emergency', 'the importance of the line of bases' was 'greatly enhanced'. In relation to Manus, the Chiefs of Staff stated that there would be no 'military reason' for the US to require 'base facilities in the Admiralties or in any other Australian external territory for operations against any small power except Australia'.²⁷ Furthermore,

Australia could not shoulder the expense of the maintenance of the main rear operational base at Manus without serious detriment to the provision of mobile fighting forces. It is essential therefore, that the U.S.A. be afforded facilities there on the understanding that we have the clear right to their joint use at all times, in peace and war, whether or not the U.S.A is a belligerent. America's lag in entering two world wars appears to be a constant factor which should be taken into account in this regard. ... The U.S.A is the predominant power in the Pacific and her immediate assistance to the British Empire in the event of war with Russia as a naval power, is of paramount importance.²⁸

Australia wanted a regional security pact involving the US. In the House of Representatives on 13 March, Evatt stated 'the importance' of regional 'security arrangements in the Pacific', including a US-backed regional pact:

Australian security is very largely dependent on our closest co-operation with the British Commonwealth and the United States of America. Any hindrance to the maximum degree of co-operation with either is contrary to the interests of all these countries. ... It should be added that regional arrangements for defence are not only permitted but encouraged by the Charter so long as the Objectives are in accordance with the principles of the United Nations.²⁹

On 20 March, the US Department of State presented a memorandum to the Australian delegation in Washington, suggesting informal conversations concerning the US claim for a long-term base in the Admiralty Islands, to be shared jointly with

²⁷ NAA, 656002- A5954 -1662/4, an Appreciation by the Chiefs of Staff on the Strategical Position of Australia, February 1946.

²⁸ NAA, 656002- A5954 -1662/4, an Appreciation by the Chiefs of Staff on the Strategical Position of Australia, February 1946.

²⁹ NAA, 662471 - A5954 -1818/3, Extract from Statement to the House of Representatives on Foreign Affairs by H. V. Evatt, Minister for External Affairs, 13 March 1946.

Australia. Two documents were attached to the memorandum. The first was a preliminary draft of a proposed agreement on bases between the US and Australia. The second was a draft of clauses for inclusion in any Trusteeship Agreement for New Guinea.³⁰ Manus, at the time of the memorandum, was part of New Guinea.

Under the US proposal, the US, 'jointly with Australia' would possess 'rights... 'to occupy, maintain, improve, operate and control the naval base presently established on Manus', 'to install, maintain, operate and control at locations within the Admiralty Islands to be mutually agreed upon, facilities for defense', 'to operate military craft, including aircraft, vessels, and vehicles into, through, over, and away from the Admiralty Islands without restriction except as mutually agreed upon', and 'to utilize the port, transportation and communication facilities in the Admiralty Islands required in the exercise of the rights accorded, and to install and improve' them. The US would possess rights 'to import, station, store in or remove from the Admiralty Islands, personnel, material and supplies', 'to have exclusive jurisdiction over United States military personnel present in the Admiralty Islands in the exercise of the rights accorded', and 'if in its judgment conditions at the time make such action necessary, to assume control upon due notification to the Australian authorities, of any or all of the military installations and facilities in the Admiralty Islands, [with] such control to continue for such time as the United States considers necessary'. The US would undertake 'to pay the expense of the maintenance of such installations and facilities during such period of temporary control'.³¹

³⁰ NAA, 237944 - A11546 - 6, Note on Discussion of Questions Relating to Pacific Bases and Regional Security in the South and South West Pacific. For the facilities on Manus at the time of discussions between the Australia and the US see: NAA, 662470 - A5954 - 1818/2, *Regional Security in the Pacific, Including the Use of Bases by the United States. (From Meeting of Prime Ministers' in London, April 1946)*. For US-Australian discussions on Manus see: NAA, 662471 - A5954 -1818/3, *The Defence Aspect of Bases in the Pacific (File No 1) (Up to Meeting of Prime Minister's, London April/May 1946)*. See also: NAA, 656002- A5954 -1662/4, *British Commonwealth Conference 1946. Defence and Security. Appendices*.

³¹ NAA, 656002- A5954 -1662/4, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Base Agreement between Australia and the United States.

Canberra did not reply officially to the American proposals. In April 1946 Evatt told John Russell Minter, American Charge D'Affaires in Australia, that 'he had nothing very concrete to say at this time' about the American proposals, and added that 'he would rather wait till after London'³² before he said anything. He hoped then to meet the US Secretary of State, James Francis Byrnes, in Paris, and there have 'informal talks'.³³ An Australian Defence Committee minute on the American draft commented:

- (a) the question of bases in the Pacific must be related to an overall plan for the security of the British Commonwealth as a whole and not as a regional matter affecting the Pacific;
- (b) certain bases ... may be necessary for the security of the interests of the British Commonwealth and United States in the Pacific as part of an overall plan, and arrangements should be made accordingly between the countries concerned.³⁴

On 8 April Cabinet accepted as a general basis for Australian approval on the use of bases in the Pacific:

The use of bases must be related to an overall plan. The importance of American participation in the maintenance of security in the southwest Pacific and the granting of facilities in accordance with the principles outlined in the memorandum. ... the principle of reciprocity is fundamental in the granting of facilities.³⁵

At the meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London in April-May 1946, Australia admitted the importance of association with the US for 'the maintenance of security in the Southwest Pacific' and mentioned that it did not oppose granting the

³² The meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London, held in April-May 1946.

³³ FRUS, 1946, Vol 5, 27, The Charge d'Affaires in Australia (Minter) to the Secretary of State, 13 April 1946.

³⁴ NAA, 540798 - A816 - 7/301/55, Report by the Joint Planning Committee, 18 December 1947.

³⁵ NAA, 237944 - A11546 - 6, Regional Security in the Pacific, including the use of Bases by the United States, Memorandum by the Prime Minister of Australia, The General Basis of Approach Approved by the Australian Government, 8 April 1946.

US facilities in its bases. However Australia found some provisions in the American draft unacceptable:

(i) Australia is not to be able to establish any military installation without the approval of the United States (Clause 1 of the Agreement)

(ii) The United States may at any time, and for as long as she desires, assume control of any or all of the military installations and facilities in the Islands. (Annex "A" to the Agreement)

(iii) The facilities shall not be made available to another Government without the consent of the United States. (Annex "A" to the Agreement)

(iv) The United States is to enjoy all rights she desires, but may at any time relinquish her responsibilities.³⁶

As Dedman noted, the proposed base agreement did not take Australian defence requirements into consideration.³⁷ The US could choose to take full control of the base, and Australia could not let another party use base facilities without US consent. Australia's rights would be subject to American consent.

The London meeting also discussed a regional security pact. This seemed unlikely at that stage. Australia reported that although the Joint Staff mission had had 'a series of conversations' with US authorities to 'clarify the details of the American requests', and 'to find out ... whether the American proposals' formed 'part of any specific plan of defence', it 'doubt[ed] whether any such plan exist[ed]'.³⁸

³⁶ NAA, 240015 - A5954 - 1662/1, British Commonwealth Conference 1946 Defence and Security Outline for Prime Minister's Use, Part IV-Regional Security in the Pacific, including the Use of Bases by the United States.

³⁷ J. J. Dedman, "Encounter over Manus", 144.

³⁸ NAA, 237944 - A11546 - 6, Meeting of Prime Ministers. United States' Request for Bases. Report by the Chiefs of Staff, 16 April 1946.

London's primary aim was to commit the US to the Pacific 'with or without' an overall regional security scheme,³⁹ but for Canberra both that scheme and US participation in it were paramount objectives. Both Britain and Australia opposed exclusive US authority over the Pacific bases. In April 1946, Australia's general approach was accepted at the London meeting. The British, Australian and New Zealand governments agreed:

- (1) to favour the establishment of a regional arrangement or regional arrangements for the maintenance by the parties thereto of international peace and security in the South Pacific and South-West Pacific areas;
- (2) to invite the participation in such arrangements of the United States;
- (3) to consider as a part of any such arrangements, the future administration and use of Pacific bases, including the defence bases established in whole or in part by the United States during the war in territory in the Pacific area administered wholly or in part by the Governments of the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand.⁴⁰

The US did not accept this position. On 20 April the US Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Captain Robert L. Dennison, reported to the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs in the State Department, John Hickerson, that 'Australia and possibly New Zealand' were attempting 'to use base negotiations as an excuse for conversations regarding a regional security arrangement for the Southwest Pacific into which the United States' would be 'drawn'. He added that since the State Department was not involved in 'the larger question of reciprocal use of bases', the 'present negotiations' had 'no relation whatsoever to a mutual defense arrangement or a regional security pact'. He recommended that the State Department 'should divorce discussions for base rights completely from any regional security

³⁹ A. P. Walter, "Australia's Relations with the United States: 1941-1949." University of Michigan PhD, 1954, 119. See also H. S. Albinsky, "Australia's search for regional security in South East Asia." University of Minnesota PhD, 1959, 207.

⁴⁰ NAA, 237944 - A11546 - 6, Note on Discussion of Questions Relating to Pacific Bases and Regional Security in the South and South West Pacific. See also: FRUS, 1946, Vol 5, 37, First Secretary of the British Embassy in Washington (Maclean) to the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson), 2 May 1946.

arrangements' to which it was 'asked to become a party', and added that a 'discussion of any regional defense plan in the Southwest Pacific which includes the United States is inopportune'.⁴¹

Similarly the US State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee memorandum on regional defence arrangements for the Southwest Pacific declared that the 'UN Charter was not intended to promote artificial development of regional arrangements for security purposes' and current 'consideration of over-all regional arrangement for S[outh] W[est] Pacific, with or without US participation, would be premature and inadvisable'. The memorandum thought that the 'Australian proposal might encourage [the] USSR to advocate other regional arrangements not to [the] advantage of [the] UN'. The memorandum suggested that Evatt should be told that American defence plans for the South West Pacific could be changed if there were 'an existing or imminent threat to the peace', but at present 'no such threat' was 'envisaged' in the South West Pacific.⁴² Other US statements thought Evatt's proposal inconvenient. On 1 May 1946, a memorandum from Brigadier General George A. Lincoln, Military Adviser to the United States Delegation, Council of Foreign Ministers, to Byrnes, the Secretary of State, mentioned that '[a]s a final military point, Dr. Evatt's split-up of the Pacific for defense purposes is strategically unsound and contrary to the accepted military concept of the Joint Chiefs of Staff'.⁴³

On 2 May 1946 Byrnes explained to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Ernest Bevin, that the US 'wanted some rights at Manus' but it 'had no intention of keeping any more than a few personnel in these various locations and that [it] saw no

⁴¹ FRUS, 1946, Vol 5, 30-31, Captain Robert L. Dennison, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Politico-Military Affairs, to the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson), 20 April 1946.

⁴² FRUS, 1946, Vol 5, 34, Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Harriman), 27 April 1946.

⁴³ FRUS, 1946, Vol 5, 35.

military threat in the South Pacific in the near future'.⁴⁴ He also mentioned that the US 'was not interested in establishing any system of regional defense in the south-west Pacific', as its 'own defense interests lay further north'.⁴⁵ These statements made it clear that the US had no interest in a Pacific Pact on Canberra's terms.

After the Commonwealth meeting, Evatt visited the US to discuss the Pacific bases with Truman and Byrnes. On 12 June Byrnes told Evatt that 'it would be difficult to justify to Congress, the assumption of any defence obligation in a new area. ... Evatt had replied that it would be more difficult to justify a concession by Australia'.⁴⁶ On 21 June Evatt talked with Truman and Acheson, which according to Evatt was 'long and satisfactory'. He said that 'American obligations need not perhaps be evidenced by formal undertakings but by an informal statement of policy and, best of all, by making it clear that the defence of Australia and New Zealand and their territories was involved and not merely the defence of particular bases, such as Manus'.⁴⁷ Truman replied that 'a strict treaty would be difficult on the grounds that American obligations would be extended to an area far outside their present hemispherical sphere of influence'.⁴⁸

Canberra now understood that the South Pacific situation was not threatening enough for the US to conclude a formal defence treaty with Australia and New

⁴⁴ FRUS, 1946, Vol 5, 36, Brigadier General George A. Lincoln, Military Adviser to the United States Delegation, Council of Foreign Ministers, Paris, to Lieutenant General John E. Hull, Assistant Chief of Staff, War Department General Staff, 2 May 1946. For a more detailed examination of the link between US threat perceptions on the South West Pacific and its demands on Manus see: FRUS, 1946, Vol 5, 39, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Freeman H. Matthews), 2 May 1946. For a detailed evaluation of Australia's claims at the Commonwealth Conference from the US by the Department of State see in FRUS, 1946, Vol 5, 41-42, Memorandum by Dean Acheson, the Acting Secretary of State, to President Truman, 7 May 1946.

⁴⁵ NAA, 237944 - A11546 - 6, Note on Discussion of Questions Relating to Pacific Bases and Regional Security in the South and South West Pacific. See also NAA, 662470 - A5954 - 1818/2, Cablegram from Evatt to Chifley, 10 May 1946.

⁴⁶ NAA, 237944 - A11546 - 6, Cabinet Agendum 104/13, Regional Security in the Pacific. Including the Use of Bases by the United States, 26 July 1946.

⁴⁷ NAA, 662470 - A5954 - 1818/2, Cablegram from Evatt to Chifley, 22 June 1946.

⁴⁸ NAA, 237944 - A11546 - 6, Cabinet Agendum 104/13, Regional Security in the Pacific. Including the Use of Bases by the United States, 26 July 1946.

Zealand. However Australia did not give up the idea of securing an American defence guarantee. On 28 June 1946 Chifley telegraphed Evatt that while it would be difficult to conclude a 'strict treaty in regard to security in Pacific ... it is suggested that an informal statement of policy would need to be supplemented at least by staff conversations and preparation of a plan'. Chifley replied that this was 'fundamental to a sound defence policy and a basis for defence preparations'.⁴⁹ Evatt recommended this to US officials as 'a visible manifestation of long-term Defence association for mutual benefit, without any suggestion whatever of interferences with Australian sovereignty'.⁵⁰ However the US was 'disinclined to consider ... the assumption of specific defence obligations concerning the South-west Pacific and favoured alternative plan, which could properly be regarded as a regional arrangement and which might lead to an informal agreement'.⁵¹

On 19 July Evatt reported one positive development during these talks: Byrnes favoured 'an acceptance of the principle that there should be reciprocal use of facilities'. The Americans were 'prepared to afford Australian facilities at some place, or places to be determined which are under United States control'.⁵² However the State Department still opposed a regional pact as 'unnecessary' at that time, and 'an exceedingly bad example which might be followed elsewhere in the world' to the 'disadvantage' of the US and the UN.⁵³ Nevertheless the Australian Defence Committee maintained that 'an informal agreement of the scope envisaged in the

⁴⁹ NAA, 237944 - A11546 - 6, Cabinet Agendum 104/13, Regional Security in the Pacific. Including the Use of Bases by the United States, 26 July 1946.

⁵⁰ NAA, 237944 - A11546 - 6, Cabinet Agendum 104/13, Regional Security in the Pacific. Including the Use of Bases by the United States, 26 July 1946.

⁵¹ NAA, 237944 - A11546 - 6, Cabinet Agendum 104/13, Regional Security in the Pacific. Including the Use of Bases by the United States, 26 July 1946.

⁵² NAA, 237944 - A11546 - 6, Cabinet Agendum 104/13, Regional Security in the Pacific. Including the Use of Bases by the United States, 26 July 1946.

⁵³ FRUS, 1946, Vol 5, 47, The Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (John Hickerson) to the Under Secretary of State (Dean Acheson), 11 July 1946.

cablegrams under review can be related to the needs of Empire strategy in the Pacific', and 'it is to our advantage to secure such an agreement'.⁵⁴

Chifley repeated the Defence Committee's views to Cabinet on 26 July. He said that Australia and New Zealand's contribution to the defence of the British Commonwealth 'could be best made' in the Pacific. 'It would be possible to devise a common scheme of defence for this area after discussion, in the first instance, between the Governments of the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, and thereafter with the United States Government'. If this scheme were secured, 'it would be appropriate that its operation should be controlled through the defence organisation in Australia'.⁵⁵ Neither the US nor Australia would amend its views on Manus or on a common defence scheme.

Late in 1946 Truman announced that the 1947 budget would cut naval expenditure drastically. This would make it very difficult to maintain a base in Manus.⁵⁶ Still Evatt tried to persuade the US to stay. When parliament opened in November 1946, the government repeated that it would welcome "joint use of bases in the Pacific on the principle of reciprocity". Evatt said that Australia wanted an:

arrangement which would provide, among other things, for ... the reciprocal use of bases in that area. Under such an arrangement ... it would be possible for the American Navy to use facilities at Manus Island, but not control them. In the same way, our Navy and Air Force would be able to use facilities that are controlled directly

⁵⁴ NAA, 237944 - A11546 - 6, Cabinet Agendum 104/13, Regional Security in the Pacific. Including the Use of Bases by the United States, 26 July 1946.

⁵⁵ NAA, 237944 - A11546 - 6, Cabinet Agendum 104/13, Regional Security in the Pacific. Including the Use of Bases by the United States, 26 July 1946. See also: NAA, 662470 - A5954 - 1818/2, Chifley's statement in *Sydney Morning Herald* on 6 September 1946.

⁵⁶ J.J. Dedman, "Encounter over Manus", 149. Truman's 1947 budget reduced the military allocation by \$2 billion out of a total federal budget of \$ 41 billion. (T. Karvounarakis, "In Defense of 'Free Peoples': The Truman Doctrine and its Impact on Greece During the Civil War Years, 1947-1949", 6-7.) See also: H. S. Truman, *The Memoirs of Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope 1946-1953*, Vol. 2, 35-40; A. P. Walter, "Australia's Relations with the United States: 1941-1949." University of Michigan PhD, 1954, 136; N. Harper, *A Great and Powerful Friend a Study of Australian American Relations between 1900 and 1975*, 153.

by the United States of America, the matter of finance and proper places to be selected to be determined after the principle has been agreed upon.⁵⁷

On 12 December the US Ambassador, Robert Butler, told Evatt that the US would only enter into negotiations on Manus based on the 'preliminary draft presented to the Government in March 1946'. There was also 'a proviso that the United States government should not be "financially obligated" at Manus'.⁵⁸ On 17 December Dedman warned Evatt that 'it has become apparent that the interest of the United States in Manus is waning and that there is a tendency to withdraw personnel and moveable material from that Island'.⁵⁹

Evatt had imagined that Australia's position in the Pacific was strong enough to bargain with the US about terms.⁶⁰ On 10 February 1947 John Hickerson gave State Department a clear picture of American loss of interest in Manus. He stated:

he had recently been at pains to reassure Canberra that the United States Navy had no intention of going back on its decision to pull out of Manus. The decision was a firm one, and the physical evacuation would take place in a matter of months. The truth was that the Navy was now no longer very much interested in Manus as a strategical factor. They had originally been interested primarily because of the amount of equipment poured into Manus, and the likelihood of Congressional criticism if nothing were done to keep a foothold there. They had now determined, however, to dismantle and remove all they could. ... If Australia still wanted to sign an agreement on the use of Manus, the United States would be willing to go along. It would not press for one, however, and [it] thought that on the whole it would be better if there were no formal agreement. It might only serve to stir up the Russians unnecessarily.⁶¹

⁵⁷ CAPD, (Representatives), Vol 189, 100, 8 November 1946.

⁵⁸ NAA, 237944 - A11546 - 6, Note on Discussion of Questions Relating to Pacific Bases and Regional Security in the South and South West Pacific.

⁵⁹ NAA, 540797 - A816 - 7/301/54, Cablegram from Dedman to Evatt, 17 December 1946.

⁶⁰ T. R Reese, *Australia, New Zealand, and The United States, A Survey of International Relations 1941-1968*, 53.

⁶¹ NAA, 1352795 - A3300 - 567, Record of Informal Conversation with John Hickerson, (State Department), 10 February 1947.

That was that.

Despite the Manus and Pacific Pact issues, Australia-US relations remained close. Australia and the US reached agreement on the use of service facilities at two air force bases in Australia; Eagle Farm and Amberley.⁶² Yet this level of cooperation was less than Canberra hoped. The Americans were not prepared to enter into comprehensive defence schemes with Australia.

In Canberra in June 1947 the Commander in Chief of the US Pacific Fleet Admiral, Louis E. Denfeld, made Washington's views clear on the level of cooperation with Canberra. Denfeld told Australian authorities that 'neither Government wanted anything to do with agreements on a high level', but 'he was very much in favour of staff discussions on a Service level'. Of Manus he said, 'no agreements were necessary' and that the US would soon withdraw and 'hoped to be out by the end of July'. This was 'forced' on the Navy because of 'shortage of manpower and cutting down of the Naval Vote'.⁶³ Denfeld made it clear that Washington did not want a comprehensive defence arrangement in the south Pacific.

The Australian representatives told Denfeld that they favoured 'steps to consider the practicability of arrangements of a regional character under the United Nations Charter: that in any event some machinery for defence consultation and liaison be established in a purely informal and consultative manner, possibly on the lines of a

⁶² For details of this agreement see: NAA, 194272 - A1068 - A47/2/8/8, Press release of American and Australian Joint Statement, 10 March 1947.

⁶³ NAA, 645998 - A5954 - 1445/6, Interview with Admiral Louis Denfeld, U.S.N. Commander-in-Chief, Pacific and Pacific Fleet, 10 June 1947. For the full text of Denfeld's speech see: in NAA, 237944 - A11546 - 6, BASE AT MANUS (Note left by Admiral Denfeld, June 1947).

Pacific mutual defence committee'. They added that 'regional arrangements might go a long way toward preventing' any emergency in the region.⁶⁴

Canberra now understood that it was not the time to push for a regional security pact but it did not give up the idea. On 22 December 1947 the Department of External Affairs was still 'reluctant to abandon entirely the idea [of] a regional security arrangement ... in co-operation' with the US. There was 'at present little immediate prospect of achieving any such regional scheme as that we envisaged in view of lessening importance attached apparently by the United States to regional defence arrangements in the South Pacific, chiefly as a result of their establishment in the former Japanese Mandates'.⁶⁵

Debate on Manus ended in mid-1948. The US and Australia reached an agreement involving the remaining American equipment in Manus and the rest of Papua New Guinea. Arrangements were made for the formal transfer of the base from the US to Australia in late June or early July 1948.⁶⁶ Manus then became 'Australia's advance naval and air operational base'.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ NAA, 237944 - A11546 - 6, Note on Discussion of Questions Relating to Pacific Bases and Regional Security in the South and South West Pacific, undated.

⁶⁵ NAA, 540798 - A816 - 7/301/55, Cablegram from the Department of External Affairs to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations in London, New Zealand Prime Minister and the Australian Embassy in Washington, 22 December 1947. A statement about the continuing significance of Manus was made on 25 March 1948 in an Australian Defence Committee Minute: 'In accordance with its assessment of the strategic importance of Manus, the establishment there of an advanced Naval base and an advanced Air base is one of the essentials in the general strategy for the protection of the northern approaches to Australia', see: NAA, 540797 - A816 - 7/301/54, Minute by Defence Committee No 54/1948, 25 March 1948.

⁶⁶ *The Herald* 4 June 1948 in A. P. Walter, "Australia's Relations with the United States: 1941-1949." University of Michigan PhD, 1954, 145.

⁶⁷ A. P. Walter, "Australia's Relations with the United States: 1941-1949." University of Michigan PhD, 1954, 145. For statements about the importance of Manus and cooperation with the US in 1949 see: NAA, 540798 - A816 - 7/301/55, Bases File No 2 [US - Pacific Bases].

The Manus discussions were a clear manifestation of the difference between Australian and American defence policies on the Pacific. Yet it was not the only point of tension between the two in the 1945-49 era. Australia and the US did not agree on the central problem of the Cold War, the USSR threat. For the US, Communism was the main danger for the western alliance, and to counter this threat it wanted pivot states. From 1945 to 1949, Japan was a more useful pivot than Australia or New Zealand. For Australia the principal threat was the revival of Japanese economic and military aggression. The USSR and Communism were not seriously considered a danger until 1949, with the Communist takeover in China.⁶⁸ Thus another important case indicating Australian and US differences in security perceptions was the Japanese Peace Agreement.⁶⁹

For Washington Japan could be a strategic pivot in the northern Pacific, so it was essential to American defence considerations. The US would not impose a harsh peace on Japan, as it might make a weak and resentful state, possibly vulnerable to Communism. On the other hand, Australia wanted to limit Japanese economic and military power as much as possible, was against a soft peace with Japan, and wanted a say in the peace process.

One main reason why Australia and New Zealand wanted a firm peace treaty with Japan stemmed from their experiences in WWII. Their profound distrust of Japan continued in the post-war period. 'The ferocity of the fighting ... and the brutality of

⁶⁸ For a detailed analysis of Australia's view on the USSR see: A. Curthoys & J. Merritt (ed), *Australia's First Cold War 1945-1953*, Vol 1, 49-128.

⁶⁹ Some of the basic documents about the Japanese peace settlement are: United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan 24 October 1945, Terms of Reference of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission 30 October 1945, United States Proposal for 25-year Treaty of Disarmament and Demilitarization of Japan 18 June 1946, Trusteeship Agreement for the former Japanese Mandated Islands 2 April 1947, F.E.C. Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan 19 June 1947, Provisional Rules of Procedure for the General Assembly of the United Nations. For the full texts see: NAA, 655556 - A5954 - 1642/2, Japanese Peace Settlement Documents. August 1947.

Japanese treatment of prisoners of war produced a [strong] bitterness, [while] the extensive early success of Japanese aggression, particularly the capture of Singapore, caused an anxious awareness of vulnerability in Australia and New Zealand and a determination to make adequate provision for future security'.⁷⁰ 'Darwin had been bombed and Japanese midget submarines had entered Sydney Harbour'.⁷¹ After the war Australia (and New Zealand) 'wanted to destroy Japan's military potential and impose severe restrictions that would prevent the resurgence of militaristic elements'.⁷²

Australia wanted to participate fully in the peace process, but it emerged that it might be excluded from decision making, even where its interests were affected. First, there was the announcement of the terms for Japanese surrender in the Potsdam Declaration on 26 July 1945.⁷³ Second, there was Truman's appointment of MacArthur as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in August 1945.⁷⁴ Both these crucial decisions were made without consulting Australia.

Australian policy on Japan was stated in the Australian delegation's note to the Department of State on 13 August 1945. Australia put forward four main points: the participation of Australia in discussions and decisions on the peace settlement, the

⁷⁰ T. R Reese, *Australia, New Zealand, and The United States, A Survey of International Relations 1941-1968*, 85-86. See also B. K. Gordon, *New Zealand Becomes a Pacific Power*, 237-38.

⁷¹ N. Harper, *A Great and Powerful Friend a Study of Australian American Relations between 1900 and 1975*, 184.

⁷² T. R Reese, *Australia, New Zealand, and The United States, A Survey of International Relations 1941-1968*, 85-86. See also: B. K. Gordon, *New Zealand Becomes a Pacific Power*, 237-38.

⁷³ For the full text of the Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender, see: US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol XIII, 137-38. See also: NAA, 655556 - A5954 - 1642/2, Japanese Peace Settlement Documents. August 1947.

⁷⁴ FRUS, 1945, Vol 6, 648, President Truman to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, 13 August 1945. See also: NAA, 655556 - A5954 - 1642/2, Japanese Peace Settlement Documents. August 1947.

status of the Japanese emperor, economic, social and political conditions in Japan, and changes to Japan's political organization.⁷⁵

On the first point, the Australian note emphasized Australia's war effort in the Pacific War and its geographical significance in the Pacific. Australia 'should participate fully at all stages in Allied consultations and decisions on the future of Japan'. It should also 'take a direct part, preferably by way of personal, round-table consultation, in the formulation of Allied policies, the drafting of Armistice terms and signature of Armistice conditions, the definition of methods of control and the establishment and working of control machinery'. Australia proposed that the Japanese Emperor '[a]s Head of the State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces ... should be held responsible for Japan's acts of aggression and war crimes'. The 'roots of Japanese militarism are embedded in the totalitarian social, political and economic system built over past 70 years', and to eliminate Japanese militarism and 'its constant threat to Pacific security' necessitated 'radical changes' in this 'social, political and economic pattern'. Finally, Australia stated the importance of encouraging the '[p]opular influence on government in Japan' which meant 'to replace the Militarists, Zaibatsu and Bureaucracy by a system of Government responsible to popular needs'.⁷⁶

The Australian terms were much firmer than the American terms, but in any case the note reached the Department of State after Truman's directive to General MacArthur laying down the principles of the Japanese surrender.⁷⁷ His directive did not provide for Australia to be represented at the surrender ceremony, and did not mention that

⁷⁵ FRUS, 1945, Vol 6, 650-54, The Australian Legation to the Department of State.

⁷⁶ FRUS, 1945, Vol 6, 650-54, The Australian Legation to the Department of State.

⁷⁷ For the full text of Truman's directive see: FRUS, 1945, Vol 6, 647-48, President Truman to General of the Army Douglas Mac Arthur. Directive to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. For the Japanese instrument of surrender see: FRUS, 1945, Vol 6, 649. Assistant Secretary of State James C. Dunn mentioned on 14 August that he received the Australian note on 13 August 1945 at 3 pm but did 'not see anything to be done about it'. (FRUS, 1945, Vol 6, 650.)

the Japanese emperor should be regarded as a war criminal.⁷⁸ Canberra's policy was not very different from its stance on Manus. Australia wanted the great powers to accept that Australia had an interest in the Pacific.

Australia quickly succeeded in gaining a place at Japan's official surrender. In mid-August Evatt told Minter that 'Australia should participate in the simultaneous official surrender announcement'.⁷⁹ On 20 August 1945, Britain supported Australia's position and added that 'Australia should be represented on the Control Council' of Japan.⁸⁰ The day before, Minter informed Evatt that the US had accepted Australian participation 'in the formal act of surrender of Japan' and also 'the presence of a representative of the Australian Armed Forces on the occasion of the surrender'. Minter advised Evatt that 'General Sir Thomas Blarney has been appointed as the representative of the Australian Armed Forces'.⁸¹ Washington had conceded a point of no strategic importance.

Australian claims for a firm Japanese treaty were resisted. Evatt put forward his views on full Australian participation in the Japanese peace agreement in a press statement on 1 November 1945. He noted that Australia's effort in the Pacific War 'should carry with it the undoubted right of full and timely consultation on the basis

⁷⁸ MacArthur also stated that it would be a tactical mistake to treat the emperor as a war criminal. It would require the stationing of a million allied troops in Japan and an indefinite military occupation. His trial, conviction, and execution would strengthen the emperor cult worship. For this argument see N. Harper, *A Great and Powerful Friend a Study of Australian American Relations between 1900 and 1975*, 184.

⁷⁹ FRUS, 1945, Vol 6, 656, The Charge in Australia (Minter) to the Secretary of State, 14 August, 1945.

⁸⁰ FRUS, 1945, Vol 6, 678, The British Embassy to the Department of State, 20 August 1945.

⁸¹ FRUS, 1945, Vol 6, 685-86, The Charge in Australia (Minter) to the Secretary of State, 22 August 1945. The instrument of surrender was signed aboard U.S.S. *Missouri*, Tokyo Bay, 2 September, 1945; for text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 493, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1733; see also: US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol XIII, 364, 9 September 1945; FRUS, 1945, Vol 6, 700.

[of] comradeship in all that concerns the carrying out of the Japanese armistice and the making of the peace. ... This is Australia's claim and we shall never abandon it.⁸²

At the Moscow Conference in December 1945, the structure of the decision making mechanism for the Japanese peace settlement was modified. It was decided to 'set up a Far Eastern Commission (FEC) in Washington to replace the Far Eastern Advisory Commission' (FEAC). FEC would 'have responsibility for the formulation of broad policies with regard to the future of Japan and was to be composed of those Allied nations which had contributed to the defeat of Japan and more particularly of those with vital interests in the Pacific'. In addition to FEC, 'an Allied Council for Japan was set up as a small advisory body composed of representatives' of the US, the USSR, China and the British Commonwealth. The Allied Council was 'designed to advise the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in implementing and interpreting the policy decisions' of FEC.⁸³ Thus at the end of 1945 four agencies were working on the Japanese peace settlement: the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), FEC, the Allied Council for Japan and the US as the main coordinator of these bodies.⁸⁴

⁸² NAA, 190060 - A1066 - P45/10/33/2, Cablegram from the Australian Legation in Washington to the Department of External Affairs, 2 November 1945.

⁸³ NAA, 194232 - A1068 - A47/2/3/18, United States Policy in the Far East. For the Communique on the Moscow Conference of the Three Foreign Ministers on 27 December 1945 which established these new decision making structures see: US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol XIII, 1027-1032, 30 December 1945. See also for the formation of the FEC and the Allied Council: NAA, 190060 - A1066 - P45/10/33/2, Japan : Allied Control - Far Eastern Advisory Commission 1st Session; FRUS, 1945, the Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam Conference), Vol 1-2 and US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol XIII, 545, 7 October 1945; No 329, 561, 14 October 1945; No 340, 1027-1032, 30 December 1945. For the policy decisions of the FEC see: NAA, 655558 - A5954 - 1642/4, Japanese Peace Settlement. Far Eastern Commission Policy Decisions. For the formation of FEAC see: the US proposal to Britain on 21 August 1945 in FRUS, 1945, Vol 6, 683-85, The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant), 21 August 1945. See also: G. H. Blakeslee, *The Far Eastern Commission : A Study in International Cooperation, 1945 to 1952*.

⁸⁴ N. Harper, *A Great and Powerful Friend a Study of Australian American Relations between 1900 and 1975*, 167.

Australia had a place at FEAC, FEC and at the Allied Council.⁸⁵ This temporarily alleviated Evatt's anxiety about Australia's exclusion from the core process, but he was not happy with FEC as it had only advisory status.⁸⁶ On 11 November 1945 Evatt told the Australian Ambassador to the US, Norman John Oswald Makin, that FEC members should have a veto which would 'withdraw from the United States primary responsibility on matters concerning the occupations of Japan'.⁸⁷ Evatt wanted to decrease US role in the decision making mechanism of the Japanese peace.

The US was reluctant to accept Evatt's veto view and to share the authority and responsibility of occupation with other parties. MacArthur thought of FEC only as 'little more than a debating society'.⁸⁸

The year 1946 started with two important developments for the Australian position on the Japanese peace settlement. Firstly, it was decided that Australia would represent the Commonwealth in the Allied Council in Tokyo, and W. MacMahon Ball was appointed to this position.⁸⁹ That was a significant turning point in intra-Commonwealth relations. It shows that the Commonwealth accepted Australia's attempts to play a more distinctive role in Pacific affairs. Secondly, following this, the US accepted Australian participation in the British Commonwealth Occupation Force.⁹⁰

⁸⁵ N. Harper, *A Great and Powerful Friend a Study of Australian American Relations between 1900 and 1975*, 158; NAA, 190060 - A1066 - P45/10/33/2, Telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Canberra, 15 December 1945.

⁸⁶ CNIA, Vol 17, No 10, 596, 13 March 1946.

⁸⁷ NAA, 190060 - A1066 - P45/10/33/2, Cablegram from Evatt for Makin, 11 November 1945.

⁸⁸ D. MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 293.

⁸⁹ NAA, 209886 - A2908 - A98, External Telegram from Canberra to Resident Minister in London (Mr. Beasley), 28 January 1946. For details on MacMahon Ball see: NAA, 209886 - A2908 - A98, Mr MacMahon Ball; P. Ryan, *William Macmahon Ball, a memoir*.

⁹⁰ FRUS, 1946, Vol 8, 120, The Acting Secretary of State to Australian Minister Frederic William Eggleston, 22 January 1946. Diplomatic discussions between MacArthur, the State Department, and

These two developments increased Australia's role in the Japanese peace treaty process, but US and Australian defence considerations on the Pacific still diverged significantly. On 20 March 1946 the Australian Chiefs of Staff Committee stated that the USSR was 'a major threat to Empire interests in Europe, the Middle East, and India,' which would 'always be present'. Such a threat would 'extend to the South Pacific', if Russia could develop 'sea power'.⁹¹ On the other hand in February 1946 the Chiefs of Staff considered Japan 'a naturally aggressive nation' and 'a potential aggressor in the Pacific'.⁹² Unlike the US, in 1946 Australia's main concern was to contain the Japanese, not the Soviets.

As a result, in 1947 Canberra continued to push for firmer conditions on Japan, and Washington continued to ignore them.⁹³ On 26 February 1947 Evatt stated that 'Japan must never again be permitted to develop the means of waging aggressive war'.⁹⁴ Yet an American seven man committee sent to Japan by the US War Department recommended softer treaty provisions to MacArthur, as had been previously recommended to Truman.⁹⁵

Evatt led to the decision that the Commonwealth forces should be limited to 36,000 rather than the Australian target of 43,600. The Commonwealth occupation forces of 36,000 compared with the American forces of approximately 400,000 gave Australia and the Commonwealth token representation in Japan. US feeling was that the British Empire occupation force was "neither needed nor wanted". See: N. Harper, *A Great and Powerful Friend a Study of Australian American Relations between 1900 and 1975*, 159.

⁹¹ NAA, 656002- A5954 -1662/4, Minute by Chiefs of Staff Committee, 20 March 1946. See also DAFP, Vol 9, January-June 1946, 195-201, Chiefs of Staff Committee Minute II/1946, 20 March 1946.

⁹² NAA, 656002- A5954 -1662/4, An Appreciation by the Chiefs Of Staff on the Strategical Position of Australia, February 1946.

⁹³ NAA, 194272 - A1068 - A47/2/8/8, *Bilateral Relations. United States - Australian relations general*.

⁹⁴ NAA, 170283 - A816 - 19/304/481 ATTACHMENT 3, Draft Proposals on the Peace Settlement with Japan. See also Evatt's statement on 6 June 1947 which mentioned the importance of controlling Japan to curb its potential menace NAA, 170283 - A816 - 19/304/481 ATTACHMENT 3, Draft Proposals on the Peace Settlement with Japan.

⁹⁵ *Sydney Morning Herald* 20 February 1946 in NAA, 194232 - A1068 - A47/2/3/18.

Clear evidence of America's soft policy on Japan was the Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan issued by FEC on 19 June 1947. The document had some firm provisions such as ensuring 'that Japan will not become a menace to the peace and security of the world', and that Japan should maintain complete disarmament and demilitarization, and 'bring about the earliest possible establishment of a democratic and peaceful government', but it also permitted Japan 'to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy' and to participate in 'world trade relations'.⁹⁶ The US did not want to restrict the rebuilding of Japanese economic power. This was prompted by events in China. The Chairman of the State Department Policy Planning Board, George F. Kennan, recalled the importance of a friendly Japan and the elimination of a possible Communist takeover in Japan.⁹⁷

It would thus be very hard for Canberra to convince Washington of the importance of containing the Japanese menace. As MacArthur put it, 'the democratisation of Japan and the establishment of a strong American military position in the north-eastern Pacific would be sufficient to meet' a potential Chinese threat in the Pacific.⁹⁸

On the points of disagreement between the US and Australia, *The Washington Post* commented on 7 July 1947 that the main trouble in American-Australian relations was 'Australian resentment about the secondary position to which it has been relegated in post-war Far Eastern affairs. Evatt has never hidden his displeasure that MacArthur "runs" Japan as a purely American show'. American officials feared that Evatt would seek to form a British Commonwealth bloc to oppose the dominant American position in Japan and at the future Japanese peace conference. The

⁹⁶ NAA, 655556 - A5954 - 1642/2, F.E.C Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, 19 June 1947. See also US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol XVII, 216-221, 3 August 1947.

⁹⁷ G. F. Kennan, *Memoirs 1925-1950*, 382-96.

⁹⁸ *Melbourne Herald* 16 June 1947 in NAA, 194272 - A1068 - A47/2/8/8.

comment noted four points of conflict. Phosphate: the US had overruled Australia's protest about MacArthur's decision to let the Japanese work a phosphate-rock deposit on Angaur Island in the Palau group. Civil Aviation: Australia wanted Japan to be deprived of all rights to manufacture or operate civil aircraft during the period of Allied control, and wanted the right to establish her own airlines in Japan. The United States had a more liberal view on Japanese civil aviation. Japan's Fleet: Australia bitterly protested being excluded from participating in the decision on the disposition of the fleet. Japanese reparations: Evatt contended that the FEC, in which each of the Big Four had a veto, was not the proper organ to decide this. He wanted it left to the peace conference where he would wage a strenuous battle to oppose a veto for any country. As another point of disagreement *The Sydney Morning Herald* noted on 10 July 1947 Australian concerns of 'Japanese vessels roaming the waters around Australia' for whaling. The Australian objection to this 'was completely ignored'.⁹⁹

In 1947 Australia still saw the main threat in the Pacific as a Japanese military revival,¹⁰⁰ so Evatt did not abandon his policy. On 24 July he went to Japan to express Australian views on the Japanese peace agreement to MacArthur in person. On 30 July 1947 Evatt stated that '[t]here should be no delay in going ahead with the Japanese Peace Conference', that the principle of veto should be excluded from the voting procedure, that the peace settlement should be completed in 1948, and that the peace treaty should be 'just and firm'.¹⁰¹ MacArthur accepted Evatt's point on completing the peace treaty as speedily as possible because he realized the problems of a prolonged military occupation after a successful war.¹⁰² On 12 August 1947 Evatt said that his discussions in Japan were 'full and frank' and that he was

⁹⁹ NAA, 194272 - A1068 - A47/2/8/8, Bilateral Relations. United States - Australian relations general.

¹⁰⁰ For details see NAA, 170281 - A816 - 19/304/481 ATTACHMENT 1, Australian Defence Committee Report on "Strategic Aspects of the Peace Settlement with Japan", 24 June 1947.

¹⁰¹ NAA, 237679 - A4144 - 640/1947, Notes of Statement by Minister for External Affairs, 30 July 1947.

¹⁰² N. Harper, *A Great and Powerful Friend a Study of Australian American Relations between 1900 and 1975*, 187.

'satisfied that the way is clear to the making of a peace settlement'.¹⁰³ One consequence of Evatt's visit was the resignation of MacMahon Ball and appointment of Patrick Shaw in his place.¹⁰⁴

At this time the escalation of the Communist threat in China intensified American efforts to conclude the Japanese peace treaty. For this, Washington proposed a conference on 19 August to prepare a draft treaty.¹⁰⁵ It was never convened. The Commonwealth held its own conference in Canberra. American officials remained concerned that, at the Canberra conference, Evatt would seek to form a British Commonwealth bloc to oppose the dominant American position in Japan and at the future Japanese peace conference.¹⁰⁶

The Canberra conference, from 26 August to 12 September 1947, was attended by the five Commonwealth members of the Far Eastern Commission, Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand and Britain, together with Burma, Pakistan and South Africa. It did not totally oppose the occupation policies of MacArthur, but emphasized Commonwealth anxiety about the Japanese menace.¹⁰⁷ The final communiqué intensified American fears that a Commonwealth bloc might be formed against the US, although Hubert A. Graves, Counsellor of the British Embassy in Washington, told Hugh Borton, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern

¹⁰³ NAA, 237679 - A4144 - 640/1947, Statement by the Australian Minister for External Affairs, (Evatt), 12 August 1947.

¹⁰⁴ During his visit to Japan, Evatt praised the efforts of Macmahon Ball in the Allied Council for Japan. However in his meetings with MacArthur on 28 and 30 July, Evatt appeared to go out of his way to dissociate himself from Ball, by excluding him from diplomatic functions, and by denouncing Ball's performance in the Council. Ball considered his position untenable, and tendered his resignation to Chifley on 18 August 1947. The resignation came as a great relief to both the Americans and the British in Tokyo, as they had viewed him as obstructing US policy in Japan. For the details of his resignation see: C. M. de Matos, "Diplomacy Interrupted?: Macmahon Ball, Evatt and Labor's Policies in Occupied Japan." See also from Ball to Chifley, Report Extracts, 30 August 1947 in [http://www.info.dfat.gov.au/info/historical/HistDocs.nsf/\(LookupVolNoNumber\)/12~497](http://www.info.dfat.gov.au/info/historical/HistDocs.nsf/(LookupVolNoNumber)/12~497) accessed on 23.07.2008

¹⁰⁵ US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol XVII, 182, 27 July 1947.

¹⁰⁶ *The Washington Post* 7 July 1947 in NAA, 194272 - A1068 - A47/2/8/8.

¹⁰⁷ For details see: NAA, 170284 - A816 - 19/304/481 ATTACHMENT 4, Canberra Conference August 1947.

Affairs, that the participants of the Conference did not 'wish to give the impression of a forming a Commanwealth [sic] bloc'.¹⁰⁸

In 1948 the US moved to become the sole authority in the Japanese peace settlement. In his memoirs Kennan wrote that 'the economic rehabilitation of Japan and the restoration of her ability to contribute constructively to the stability and prosperity of the Far Eastern region' was a prerequisite for the US. As there had been 'no international agreement on the policies and methods to be applied in this unforeseen situation', the US, as the 'commander in Japan had to exercise an independent judgement'. Kennan added that it was not necessary to consult the FEC.¹⁰⁹

In February 1948 Kennan went to Japan to discuss with MacArthur US security requirements in the Pacific, including the desirability of an early treaty with Japan 'with or without the Soviet Union; and [s]teps which can be taken now to speed up Japanese economic recovery'.¹¹⁰ His report on 25 March 1948 showed that the US was trying to create, at least economically, a non-vulnerable Japan. Kennan stated that the Japanese treaty would be 'as nonpunitive as possible', and the number of the tactical forces in Japan would be reduced to 'a minimum' in order to reduce 'their cost to the Japanese economy, and the psychological impact of their presence on the Japanese population'. He added that '[e]conomic recovery should be made the prime objective of United States policy in Japan for the coming period'.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸ FRUS, 1947, Vol 6, 525-526, Memorandum of Conversation, by Hugh Borton, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth), 6 October 1947.

¹⁰⁹ G. F. Kennan, *Memoirs 1925-1950*, 406-407.

¹¹⁰ FRUS, 1948, Vol 6, 667, Frank G. Wisner, Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Saltzman), to the United States Representative on the Far Eastern Commission (McCoy), 27 February 1948.

¹¹¹ FRUS, 1948, Vol 6, 691-96, Report by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan), 25 March 1948.

Kennan put these views to MacArthur on 5 March 1948.¹¹² MacArthur agreed, adding that the FEC 'constituted an impediment to any reasonable revision' of American policy and that he 'had always been opposed to the FEC and the Allied Council'. The centre of American defence, he said, was no longer the neighbourhood of the Philippines, but had 'shifted to the north'.¹¹³ Interest in the south Pacific had all but vanished. On his return Kennan recommended that the US should not press for a peace treaty in 1948, but should be ready to enter into negotiations when the differences between the members of FEC were resolved.¹¹⁴

As US influence grew, that of FEC and the Allied Council waned. These were Australia's two prospective channels of influence on the Japanese peace settlement. By 1949 both had ceased to play any important role in the discussions. The Council's input from the Supreme Commander decreased and its agenda became meaningless, until finally there was no agenda to discuss and no minutes to adopt.¹¹⁵ The requirement for unanimity by the four great powers undermined the FEC's ability to make policy decisions. 'As relations between the US and the USSR deteriorated, policy decisions became fewer and fewer and without policy decisions the Commission was impotent'.¹¹⁶ Australia's hopes of influencing the Japanese peace agreement disappeared. Yet Australia still perceived Japan as a threat at the end of 1948 because of the relaxation of American occupation policy on Japanese industries.¹¹⁷

¹¹² FRUS, 1948, Vol 6, 699-700, Conversation between General of the Army MacArthur and George F. Kennan, 5 March 1948.

¹¹³ FRUS, 1948, Vol 6, 700. For details of MacArthur's new Pacific strategy see: *Melbourne Herald* 2 March 1949 in NAA, 240083 - A5954 - 1818/1.

¹¹⁴ FRUS, 1948, Vol 6, 727, Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Saltzman), to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth), 9 April 1948.

¹¹⁵ N. Harper, *A Great and Powerful Friend a Study of Australian American Relations between 1900 and 1975*, 181.

¹¹⁶ A. P. Walter, "Australia's Relations with the United States: 1941-1949." University of Michigan PhD, 1954, 180.

¹¹⁷ See also: N. Harper, *A Great and Powerful Friend a Study of Australian American Relations between 1900 and 1975*, 165, 190.

Washington believed that Australia's main aim was still a Pacific Pact invoking the US. On 18 November 1949 the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, W. Walton Butterworth, claimed that the formation of such a Pact would bring several difficulties for the US. Firstly it would be directed against a possible USSR threat in the south Pacific which could not be countered by the US. Secondly, the US could not 'give extensive additional military commitments without seriously diluting the effectiveness of those already given'. Thirdly, the idea of a Pacific Pact modelled on NATO was not acceptable to 'India, Burma and Indonesia and probably some other states', which might make a 'US security guarantee' divisive rather than cohesive. Finally, the US had concerns about the fact that the Pacific states involved would not be 'able to build and maintain an effective union'.¹¹⁸

The tension between the US and Australia was not a result of an ideological conflict between the two, but of the discord between their defence considerations in the Pacific. Neither would give way, but Australia was not critical of Washington which it did not see as an equal in dealing with the Pacific.

The Australian Labor government's independent stance reflected its attempts to restrain the big powers in the formation of the UN. Federal elections on 10 December 1949 saw Labor lose office however, and the new conservative government under Menzies started to draw Australia closer to the US. Soon after, the Korean War broke out, and the importance of the south Pacific increased for the State Department.

¹¹⁸ FRUS, 1949, Vol 7, Part 2, 901-902, Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State, 18 November 1949.

With the Menzies government Australia's quest for an independent foreign policy faded. It was replaced by a desire to institutionalize friendly relations with the US. In short both Australia and Turkey entered the pre-Korean War period with aspirations for a solid American alliance.

PART 3: The Korean War, NATO and ANZUS

a. Turkey

The growth of American interest in the defence of Western Europe during the formative stages of NATO¹ fuelled Turkey's anxieties, never far from the surface in any case. There were two main concerns: the possibility of a decrease in American support to Turkey following a shift in American thought to Western Europe, and the probability of Turkey's exclusion from NATO since its focus was also on Western Europe.

Apart from eliminating these anxieties, in 1948 three main reasons led Ankara to consider NATO membership as its ultimate foreign policy aim. First, NATO was a US backed organization, like the UN, so membership would draw Turkey even closer to the US. Second, NATO, unlike the UN, would provide an automatic security guarantee to Turkey, including against the USSR. Third, if Turkey became a member, NATO would reduce Ankara's financial burden on military spending.² Regarding the first reason, NATO would be a stronger platform for Turkey to carry out its relations with the US and Western Europe.³ Regarding the second, automatic

¹ For details about the formation of NATO see: D. Cook, *Forging the Alliance NATO 1945-1950*, 24-251; N. Henderson, *The birth of NATO*, 1-115; A. Beaufre, *NATO and Europe*, 19-33; L. S. Kaplan, *NATO and the United States : the Enduring Alliance*, 1-33; P. Duignan, *NATO: its past, present, and future*, 1-19; M. Atay, "İkinci Dünya Savası Sonrası Dünya Siyasal Ortamında Türkiye'nin İttifak Arayışları ve NATO'ya Giriş Süreci." İstanbul Üniversitesi PhD, 1995, 44-56. See also: M. Tamkoc, "Turkey's Quest for Security through Defensive Alliances", 1-39; E. Athanassopoulou, *Turkey – Anglo - American Security Interests 1945-1952, The First Enlargement of NATO*, 85-134.

² There were domestic political factors for Turkey's seeking NATO membership. These exceed the scope of this chapter.

³ N. Uslu, *Türk Amerikan İlişkileri*, 98. See also: I. Ariogul, "American Turkish Relations 1945-1960: The Roots of a Long-Term Alliance." Bilkent University MA, 2003, 30.

American support⁴ would make it unnecessary for Turkey to use a crisis to secure it, as Ankara did in 1946 during the Soviet demands on the Straits. NATO membership would have both military significance and a 'political and deterrent value'.⁵ Regarding the third, NATO membership would reduce Turkey's defence expenditure and its anxieties about a decrease in the American aid.⁶ Above all, Turkey's membership of NATO would deter the USSR, and make it unnecessary for Ankara to keep such a big army.⁷

Since NATO membership was so crucial for Turkey, from 1947, Turkish leaders intensified their diplomatic efforts to draw American attention to the Eastern Mediterranean and to Turkey's potential, significance and loyalty to the US. These efforts were not successful. Ankara had to wait for a significant change in Washington's strategic thinking on the Middle East. Two main developments produced this change: the Korean War and Turkey's quick decision to deploy troops there; and London and Washington's compromise on their Middle East strategies. To support this argument the chapter focuses on: (a) Turkey's diplomatic efforts, (b) changes in American strategic thinking and (c) diplomatic exchanges between Washington and London on the Middle East.

⁴ J. M. V. Lippe, "Forgotten brigade of the forgotten war: Turkey's participation in the Korean War", 95. See also: A. Sever, *Soguk Savas Kusatmasinda Turkiye, Bati ve Orta Dogu 1945 – 1958*, 60. See also: N. Uslu, *Turk Amerikan Iliskileri*, 98-99.

⁵ E. Athanassopoulou, *Turkey – Anglo - American Security Interests 1945-1952, The First Enlargement of NATO*, 173. See also: FRUS, 1950, Vol 5, 1298, the Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State, 22 August 1950.

⁶ FRUS, 1949, Vol 6, 1648, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State (Acheson), 12 April 1949.

⁷ For a similar evaluation see: K. Gurun, *Dis Iliskiler ve Turk Politikasi*, 261-62 in M. Atay, "Ikinci Dunya Savasi Sonrasi Dunya Siyasal Ortaminda Turkiye'nin Ittifak Arayislari ve NATO'ya Giris Sureci." Istanbul Universitesi PhD, 1995, 137. For the comments of the Turkish Minister of Finance on the positive effects of the NATO membership on Turkey's budget see: TPMA, Folder A42, Fon Code 30..1.0.0, Place No 35.216..26, Ankara, NATO hakkında, Meclis Baskani ve bazi bakanlarin gorusleri. See also: M. H. Ozelik, "Turk Basininin Turkiye'nin Nato'ya Giris Sureci (1948-1952)." Marmara University MA, 2003, 44; H. Ulman, "NATO ve Turkiye", 149. See also: T. Merih, *Soguk Savas ve Turkiye (1945-1960)*, 136; A. Sever, *Soguk Savas Kusatmasinda Turkiye, Bati ve Orta Dogu 1945 – 1958*, 59; N. Uslu, *Turk Amerikan Iliskileri*, 98-99.

Turkey's diplomatic efforts concerning NATO started in late 1947 when Washington began to encourage the formation of a Western European grouping as an antecedent of NATO.⁸ After the conclusion of the Brussels Treaty,⁹ Ankara intensified these efforts¹⁰ to be a part of this new Western grouping. Ankara approached Washington with the old argument but a new demand. Ankara's argument was the Soviet threat to Turkey. Yet this time Ankara did not request an increase in American aid: rather it asked for an institutionalized American security guarantee like the one Washington was considering for Western Europe.

The Turkish Ambassador to Washington, Huseyin Ragip Baydur, conveyed this to the US Secretary of State George C. Marshall on 11 May 1948.¹¹ Baydur asked for 'similar guarantees' to those given to the countries of Western Europe. He stated that the lack of these guarantees might cause a new Soviet threat to Turkey, shake the unity of the Turkish people against Soviet pressure, and strengthen the minorities in Turkey who advocated 'the submission by Turkey to Soviet demands and the voluntary entry of Turkey into the Soviet sphere of influence'. Marshall replied that Turkey 'should not overlook the fact' that in 1947 the US 'had been carrying out a policy of giving Turkey and Greece certain military equipment', a policy which the US 'had not thus far adopted with regard to any Western European country'.¹²

⁸ For details see: FRUS, 1948, Vol 3, 1ff.

⁹ The Brussels Treaty was signed on 17 March 1948 between Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Britain, against a Communist threat in Western Europe. They pledged to set up a joint defensive system as well as strengthen their economic and cultural ties. Article IV of the Treaty stated that should any of the Parties be the object of an 'armed attack in Europe', the others would afford the attacked Party 'all the military and other aid and assistance in their power'. The duration of the Treaty was fifty years. It was the forerunner of NATO. See:

<http://www.nato.int/archives/1st5years/chapters/1.htm> accessed on 04.11.2008. See also: Pamphlet Presented by the Minister of Defence to Parliament, Collective defence under the Brussels and North Atlantic treaties, His Majesty's stationary office, London, February 1950.

¹⁰ Turkey's diplomatic efforts for NATO membership depended on the proposals of the Brussels Pact states and the US and Canada about the formation of a new security organization within the framework of the UN. These proposals considered establishing possible links with Turkey, Norway, Denmark, Portugal, Italy, Spain, Greece and Iran. See: Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1948, 589.

¹¹ FRUS, 1948, Vol 4, 83-85, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State, 11 May 1948.

¹² FRUS, 1948, Vol 4, 83-84, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State, 11 May 1948.

Nonetheless Baydur made the same demands to Robert A. Lovett, the Under Secretary of State, in late May.¹³ Baydur asked 'about the question of guarantees or assurances which might be given by the' US 'to certain European countries'. Lovett replied that 'the extension of such guarantees was, of course, contrary to the whole tradition' of the US. 'Under no circumstances could this Government agree in advance to an arrangement whereby it would be committed automatically to come to the direct assistance of another country'. Baydur repeated that the only way 'that the USSR would refrain from any action which would precipitate a war' was an American security guarantee to the countries under Soviet pressure. Lovett's point was that the 'most disastrous thing for the whole world' would be for the US 'to exhaust itself financially in such a way that' it 'could neither build up' its 'own military power nor assist in defending other countries'.¹⁴ On 21 July, Lovett repeated to Baydur that the American aid given to Greece and Turkey exceeded 'anything thus far requested by signatories [of the] Brussels pact, and [that] any change which might tend to jeopardize existing satisfactory arrangements with Turks would be unfortunate'.¹⁵

Inonu repeated Turkey's case to the American Secretary of the Air Force, W. Stuart Symington, on 16 August 1948, stressing three aspects: the continuing Russian threat against Turkey; Turkey's 'desire not to bear the brunt of any such conflict alone, although their decision has already been made to do so if necessary': and 'Turkey's wish for an increased sympathy from, and understanding with', the US.¹⁶

Turkey's repetition of its demands reflected a misunderstanding by Turkish policy makers. In 1948 Ankara expected a change in American policy to Turkey; in fact this

¹³ FRUS, 1948, Vol 3, 129-131, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett), 25 May 1948.

¹⁴ FRUS, 1948, Vol 3, 129-30, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett), 25 May 1948.

¹⁵ FRUS, 1948, Vol 4, 115.

¹⁶ FRUS, 1948, Vol 4, 134-35.

had not significantly changed since Truman's message to Congress on 12 March 1947.¹⁷ Truman had favoured 'limited military assistance to Turkey' which would 'contribute toward modernization of the Turkish armed forces and [an] increase in Turkish morale to resist Communist pressure'. This aid was 'only on a year-to-year basis', there was 'no policy or appropriation to sustain any policy for long-range or any other type of support'.¹⁸

Turkey's misjudgement is seen in the continuing bilateral conversations between Washington and Ankara in 1948. In September 1948 Feridun Cemal Erkin, Turkish Ambassador to Washington, told Marshall that 'Turkey's foreign policy' was 'firmly based on friendship, cooperation and solidarity' with the US. He expressed 'the great desire' of Turkey 'to adhere to the western union or some other regional arrangement'. He 'had raised this question with Mr. Lovett and had been told that the present time was not opportune',¹⁹ but he proposed 'a possible alternative regional arrangement, one including Turkey and Greece having the support' of Britain and the US. Marshall rejected this proposal.²⁰

Turkey's misjudgement is also seen in a memo from Joseph C. Satterthwaite, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, to Lovett about Washington's future policy toward Turkey in 1948. The memo stated that it was 'imperative' for Washington to find 'some formula ... under which all nations directly threatened by the Soviet Union and friendly to the Western powers' might 'be given public assurances [about] their defense'. Yet this did not 'necessarily require a close

¹⁷ FRUS, 1947, Vol 5, 110.

¹⁸ FRUS, 1948, Vol 4, 144, Memorandum by the Coordinator for Aid to Greece and Turkey (McGhee) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett), 30 August 1948.

¹⁹ FRUS, 1948, Vol 4, 148, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State, 9 September 1948.

²⁰ FRUS, 1948, Vol 4, 149, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State, 9 September 1948.

mutual assistance pact of the type apparently contemplated for the North Atlantic region, nor ... necessarily involve the provision of substantial amounts of military equipment to all the countries concerned'.²¹

In this framework, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) put forward a proposal for Turkey's defence. JCS stated that since Turkey was 'strategically more important than Greece since ... it dominates major air, land, and sea routes from the USSR to the Cairo-Suez area and to the Middle East oil fields', JCS proposed to develop the 'combat effectiveness' of the Turkish armed forces 'to the extent that any overt Soviet aggression' could 'be delayed long enough to permit the commitment of' US 'and allied forces in Turkey in order to deny certain portions of Turkey to the USSR'.²² At the end of 1948 Turkey was important to the US, but not important enough to join NATO, which was a Western European alliance.

Turkey did not give up. In November, Turkey presented the British and US Ambassadors with a memorandum which expressed its formal request to join any future Atlantic Pact'.²³ In this memo Turkey stated that it should participate in NATO as it had been 'firmly' opposing the Soviet 'expansion in [the] Middle East and Mediterranean basin'. Turkey's 'non-participation in such organism would disillusion Turkish people and might well encourage aggressive aims'. Turkey implied that it was an integral part of the security of the Mediterranean by stating that ' "one cannot cut [the] Mediterranean in two" ' .²⁴

²¹ FRUS, 1948, Vol 4, 174-76, Memorandum by the Director of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Satterthwaite) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett), 26 October 1948.

²² FRUS, 1948, Vol 4, 191-92, Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (James V. Forrestal), 24 November 1948.

²³ E. Athanassopoulou, *Turkey – Anglo - American Security Interests 1945-1952, The First Enlargement of NATO*, 114; FRUS, 1948, Vol 3, 294-95, the Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State, 26 November 1948. See also: F. C. Erkin, *Disislerinde 34 Yil*, Vol. 2, 57.

²⁴ FRUS, 1948, Vol 3, 294, the Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State, 26 November 1948.

NATO was not a Mediterranean Pact. The American response to this was negative. On 15 December 1948 Lovett stated that American participation in the Brussels Treaty would be based on 'policy stated in [the] Vandenberg Resolution'²⁵ of 11 June 1948.²⁶ He continued that Washington had decided that Brussels Pact countries 'obviously constitute [a] compact regional group' and that it was 'very doubtful however that Turkey, which is neither in Western Europe nor on the Atlantic, could be considered to form geographically part of this regional group'.²⁷ Lovett, advised that Washington 'would prefer that Turkey not press at this time for inclusion [in the] North Atlantic group'. The US had its 'hands full working out problems of North Atlantic grouping' and simply could 'not attempt [to] consider other regional groupings' until that was 'more clearly developed'. American 'interest in North Atlantic security in no way implies any lessening of interest in Turkish security'.²⁸

In any case, Turkey's claim based on a Soviet threat was weakening. Soviet pressure on Turkey ended in 1946. Both Ankara and Washington knew that, and in March 1949 Erkin's statement showed it. He stated that the 'exclusion [of] Turkey from North Atlantic Pact seriously weakens [the] Turk[ish] position vis-a-vis [the]

²⁵ Passed by the US Senate on 11 June 1948. This resolution provided for US association with "regional groups affecting our national security and based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid". For the full text see: FRUS, 1948, Vol 3, 135-136, Senate Resolution 239 (Vandenberg Resolution), 11 June 1948.

²⁶ FRUS, 1948, Vol 4, 213-15, the Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey, 15 December 1948. See also: FRUS, 1948, Vol 3, 321-323, Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Satterthwaite) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett), 14 December 1948.

²⁷ During the Washington Security Talks on 24 December 1948, it was stated that 'Italy could logically be asked to join the Pact on grounds [of] geographical contiguity, whereas the same argument did not apply [to] the cases of Greece and Turkey, for example'. See: FRUS, 1948 Vol 3, 340, Report of the International Working Group to the Ambassadors' Committee, 24 December 1948. The same meeting 'agreed that while Greece and Turkey could not participate in the North Atlantic Pact, some further steps would have to be taken to assure the governments of these countries and perhaps Iran that their security had not been lost sight of and was a matter of concern'. See: FRUS, 1948 Vol 3, 342, Report of the International Working Group to the Ambassadors' Committee, 24 December 1948.

²⁸ FRUS, 1948, Vol 4, 214, The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey, 15 December 1948.

USSR and opens way for [the] Soviets to produce split in Turk[ish] public opinion'.²⁹ There was very little possibility that the Soviets might threaten Turkish territorial integrity or might 'repeat a coup on the Czech model'. Although the liberalisation of the Turkish regime after 1945 had allowed the appearance of left-wing parties and political groups, convinced leftists were few in number. There are no accurate figures of the number of communists in Turkey for that period, but the estimates vary between 1,000 and 3,000. In addition, the Turkish state was always alert to control any activity deemed hostile. Soon after the establishment of the Communist Party in Turkey in 1946, its activities had been banned.³⁰

Some NATO members, such as Luxembourg and Holland,³¹ also did not want to extend the borders of the Alliance to the Eastern Mediterranean. They believed that Turkey's inclusion would 'weaken the ideal of a "Christian, democratic community of free states" ' and would extend the commitments of the Alliance 'beyond the field' of its 'actual interest', while an increase in member numbers would 'cut down the share of American armaments which each member is due to receive'.³²

Last but not least was the British view on the Middle East and Turkey. In 1949 London and Washington had not achieved a mutually satisfactory solution on their positions in the Middle East. In British strategic thinking Turkey was a more useful asset for the defence of the Middle East than as a NATO member.³³ According to

²⁹ FRUS, 1949, Vol 4, 234, The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey, 16 March 1949. A similar argument by the Turkish Foreign Minister Necmeddin Sadak to Secretary of State Acheson, see: FRUS, 1949, Vol 6, 1648, Memorandum of Conversation by the Secretary of State (Acheson), 12 April 1949.

³⁰ E. Athanassopoulou, *Turkey – Anglo - American Security Interests 1945-1952, The First Enlargement of NATO*, 91. The Czech coup was the Communist take over in Czechoslovakia in February 1948. For details see: H. Ripka, *Czechoslovakia enslaved: The story of the Communist Coup d' etat*; M. A Kaplan, *The Communist Coup in Czechoslovakia*,

³¹ FRUS, 1949, Vol 4, 118, Memorandum of Conversation by the Secretary of State (Acheson), 17 February 1949.

³² H. F Armstrong, "Eisenhower's Right Flank", 660.

³³ For a similar evaluation see: F. C. Erkin, *Disislerinde 34 Yil*, Vol. 2, 68. For details of British plans for the Middle East command structure and Turkey's prospective role see: B. K. Yesilbursa, "Turkey's

this thinking Turkey would take part with Greece, Egypt and Britain in the defence of the Middle East. Turkey's growing military potential and its geostrategic position would help Britain to assist Iran or the Arab states in case of a Soviet attack.³⁴ From 1949 to 1952 London tried to convince Washington of the possibility of using Turkey for the defence of the Middle East. But the British plans were not acceptable to Ankara. Turkey did not want to be part of British plans without American support.³⁵

NATO came into being on 4 April 1949 in Washington, with its most important theme: "collective defence".³⁶ This crucial provision of the North Atlantic Treaty was spelled out in Article 5. It provided for collective defence, an automatic security guarantee among NATO members.³⁷ This article clearly stated Turkey's demands of an automatic security guarantee and made NATO membership its 'unconditional objective'.³⁸

Once again Turkey did not give up. The Turkish Foreign Minister Necmeddin Sadak met Acheson on 12 April 1949. Sadak expressed Ankara's disappointment at Turkey's exclusion from the alliance. He claimed that this meant that the US 'had altered its position regarding Turkey and that it no longer maintained the powerful interest in the maintenance of Turkey's independence and integrity', and this would create a good atmosphere for Moscow 'to make the most of this situation'. This made

Participation in the Middle East Command and its Admission to NATO, 1950- 52"; C. Goktepe, "The 'forgotten alliance'? Anglo-Turkish relations and CENTO, 1959-65"; M. Persson, *Great Britain, the United States, and the Security of the Middle East: The Formation of the Baghdad Pact*.

³⁴ O. Sander, *Türk - Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-64*, 75.

³⁵ A. Sever, *Soguk Savas Kusatmasinda Turkiye, Bati ve Orta Dogu 1945 - 1958*, 75.

³⁶ <http://www.nato.int/archives/1st5years/chapters/1.htm> accessed on 06.11.2008. For documentation on the negotiation on the North Atlantic Treaty see: FRUS, 1949, Vol 4, 1 ff. This includes the discussions and exchanges during February, March, and April regarding the possible inclusion of Turkey in the alliance.

³⁷ For the founding treaty of NATO and Article 5 see: <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/treaty.htm> accessed 06.11.2008

³⁸ P. I. Vamvakas, "States in Transition and Defensive Alliances: Greece and Turkey in NATO." Boston University PhD, 2001, 170.

Ankara 'particularly worried'.³⁹ It also gave 'rise to fears of the Turks being "sold down the river" by the British'.⁴⁰

On 6 May 1949 Sadak met Bevin to ask the British position on Turkey's membership. Bevin replied that the 'US and [Britain] had gone as far as they could at [the] moment in safeguarding [the] interests of Turkey'. He added that Turkey would be 'better off under [the] Truman Doctrine with substantial flow supplies [rather] than under [a] pact where Turkey would have to await Congressional approval before obtaining equipment'. Bevin gave 'no promise' to Sadak about a re-examination of Turkey's position for NATO membership.⁴¹

Washington was less blunt, but just as firm. On several occasions US officials stated that the American interest in Turkey's security and independence was not diminished.⁴² On 26 April 1949 Truman gave a similar verbal assurance to Inonu.⁴³ Truman even stated that NATO aimed to 'enhance Turkey's security as well'.⁴⁴ Ankara was not satisfied with these verbal assurances. Ankara's major concern was, '[w]ould the US fight if the USSR attacked Turkey'?⁴⁵ When Sadak asked Acheson this question, Acheson could only say 'this was a decision that was largely in the hands of the President and ... it was very difficult' for him 'to give a direct answer to this type of inquiry'.⁴⁶

³⁹ FRUS, 1949, Vol 6, 1647-53, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State, 12 April 1949.

⁴⁰ E. Athanassopoulou, *Turkey – Anglo - American Security Interests 1945-1952, The First Enlargement of NATO*, 92.

⁴¹ FRUS, 1949, Vol 6, 1670-71, the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State, 11 May 1949.

⁴² FRUS, 1949, Vol 6, 1652, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State, 12 April 1949.

⁴³ FRUS, 1949, Vol 6, 1656-57, President Truman to the President of Turkey (Inonu), 26 April 1949.

⁴⁴ FRUS, 1949, Vol 6, 1657, President Truman to the President of Turkey (Inonu), 26 April 1949. See also Truman's speech on 4 April 1949 at the signing Atlantic Pact mentioning Turkey, Greece and Iran: US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol XX, 481-82, 17 April 1949.

⁴⁵ FRUS, 1949, Vol 6, 1653, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State, 12 April 1949.

⁴⁶ FRUS, 1949, Vol 6, 1653, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State, 12 April 1949.

US policy toward Turkey was reaffirmed by the Department of State on 5 May 1949.⁴⁷ It stated that 'in order to strengthen' American policy with respect to Turkey the following broad lines should be taken into consideration:

(1) resistance, by action in the UN or by other appropriate means, to all diplomatic offensives of the Soviet Union directed against the territorial integrity of Turkey or toward any change in the status of the Straits which would adversely affect Turkey's position; (2) continuation of military assistance to Turkey, under legislative provisions; (3) consideration of Turkey's desire to join the Atlantic Pact, or of creating some other defensive regional arrangement including Turkey; (4) active support of Turkey in obtaining necessary economic assistance, primarily from international and private sources but including ECA credits consonant with the general policies and purposes of ERP; (5) intensive assistance under "Point Four" of the President's Inaugural speech; and (6) keeping the American public informed concerning the current situation in Turkey and its implications with respect to our national security, so that US public opinion will be receptive to further positive action in support of Turkey, should such action be necessary and desirable.⁴⁸

In 1949 Washington was aware of the significance of Turkey's potential but it was still not ready to extend the principal defence perimeter to the Eastern Mediterranean.

After mid-1949, Ankara initiated new diplomatic tactics to join NATO. The first was to find alternative defence schemes which might link Turkey to the US. Turkey put forward two proposals: a Mediterranean Defence Pact, and the inclusion of the US in the 1939 Treaty of Mutual Assistance. The second was to bluff by announcing that Turkey might remain neutral during a Soviet-western conflict. The third was to propose a common plan of defence and assistance between the Turkish and the American General Staffs. The fourth was to look for a vital international development to change Washington's views on Turkey's accession to NATO.

⁴⁷ FRUS, 1949, Vol 6, 1660-70, Department of State Policy Statement, 5 May 1949. See also: FRUS, 1949, Vol 6, 269-79, Report by the National Security Council to the President (NSC 42/1), U.S. Objectives with Respect to Greece and Turkey to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security, 22 March 1949.

⁴⁸ FRUS, 1949, Vol 6, 1670, Department of State Policy Statement, 5 May 1949.

Regarding the first, Ankara believed that a Mediterranean Defence Pact would not only highlight the importance of the Eastern Mediterranean and Turkey's potential for its defence, but would also link the region to NATO.⁴⁹ A Pact would buy time for Turkey, involving the US in a 'Mediterranean regional defensive arrangement until such time as Turkey could attain full acceptance by NATO'.⁵⁰ NATO membership remained its primary objective; this Mediterranean initiative was secondary. Ankara communicated several times with European and American officials to get support for this Pact. Sadak actively explored 'the possibilities of establishing a Mediterranean pact, similar in principle to the North Atlantic alliance'. During February 1949, he went to London, Paris and Brussels, but his conversations with Bevin, Schuman and Spaak⁵¹ were 'largely inconclusive'.⁵² In February and April Erkin met Acheson and Truman to ask for American support for a Mediterranean Pact, but got none.⁵³

Turkey repeated its proposal for a Mediterranean Pact several times. This was partly to reduce domestic criticism. The Republican People's Party (RPP) government was attacked by the Democrat Party (DP) opposition at the beginning of 1949 on the grounds that it 'had been unable to secure Turkey's entrance' into NATO. Achieving 'Turkey's participation' in NATO 'had become an issue in the competition for popular

⁴⁹ TPMB, No 186, May 1949, 31, Minister of Foreign Affairs Sadak's statement at the TGNA, 16 March 1949. See also: TPMB, No 183, February 1949, 139-40, Sadak's statement to France Presse; TPMB, No 184, March 1949, 13, Sadak's statement.

⁵⁰ G. S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance, Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective*, 1945-1971, 37.

⁵¹ British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Ernest Bevin, French Minister for Foreign Affairs Robert Schuman, and Belgian Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs Paul-Henri Spaak.

⁵² FRUS, 1949, Vol 6, 1662-63, Department of State Policy Statement, 5 May 1949.

⁵³ FRUS, 1949, Vol 4, 117-120, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State (Acheson), 17 February 1949; FRUS, 1949, Vol 6, 1650, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State, 12 April 1949; No record has been found of the substance of discussion between the President and the Foreign Minister. FRUS, 1949, Vol 6, 1646. See also: TPMB, No 185, April 1949, 111-13; Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry. S. Truman, 1949, 214; F. C. Erkin, *Disislerinde 34 Yil*, Vol. 2, 49-51, G. S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance, Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective*, 1945-1971, 37.

support between' the RPP and the DP.⁵⁴ The RPP's Mediterranean Pact highlighted another critical situation in Turkish domestic politics. Inonu and his staff claimed to see Turkey's rejection by NATO 'as a sign that the European states rejected Turkey as a member of the European community'. They claimed that this increased Turkey's concerns 'that in the future' Turkey 'might be faced with political as well as cultural isolation from the west'.⁵⁵

To diminish such concerns, Turkey was invited to the Council of Europe in August 1949.⁵⁶ Again Turkey misinterpreted this. Ankara imagined that its membership of the Council of Europe could be a base for its application to NATO. Sadak commented:

The center of gravity of our foreign policy is the Western world. Our alliance with Britain and France and developing relations with the US had already directed our foreign policy to the West, even more. Our membership of the European Council is an essential consequence of this long lasting and continuous policy of ours.⁵⁷

Yet neither economically nor militarily was this membership a substitute for NATO.⁵⁸

Ankara also tried to affiliate the US with the 1939 Turkish-British-French Agreement. Washington rejected this too,⁵⁹ because of the 'tremendous financial burden and [the] grave political liability ... to undertake directly the defence responsibilities of the

⁵⁴ E. Athanassopoulou, *Turkey – Anglo - American Security Interests 1945-1952, The First Enlargement of NATO*, 136-37.

⁵⁵ E. Athanassopoulou, *Turkey – Anglo - American Security Interests 1945-1952, The First Enlargement of NATO*, 145. See also: H. Bagci, *Türk Dis Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar*, 16.

⁵⁶ For Turkey's membership to Council of Europe see: TPMB, No 189, August 1949, 73-74, Sadak's Statement to Anadolu Agency. See also:

<http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/AyinTarihi/1949/agustos1949.htm> accessed on 13.11.2008

⁵⁷ M. Gonlubol (ed), *Olaylarla Türk Dis Politikasi*, 243. See also: C. Akalin, *Soguk Savas ABD ve Turkiye Olaylar Belgeler 1945-1952*, 250.

⁵⁸ G. S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance, Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971*, 38.

⁵⁹ FRUS, 1949, Vol 6, 1680, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and African Affairs (McGhee), 15 September 1949. See also: FRUS, 1949, Vol 6, 1682-83, Memorandum of Conversation by the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (John D. Jernegan), 13 October 1949; FRUS, 1949, Vol 4, 359-60, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Dean Rusk), 5 December 1949.

British in certain areas of the Near' East.⁶⁰ The US did not have 'the resources to undertake these additional responsibilities while continuing its foreign aid programs in Western Europe'.⁶¹ Western Europe was still Washington's top defence priority at the end of 1949.

In 1949 Turkey announced that it might remain neutral during a Soviet-Western conflict.⁶² The Foreign Office commented that this was 'designed either to blackmail' the British and Americans into 'some formal guarantee by the threat of Turkish neutrality or to encourage our under-writing of a possible Mediterranean Pact' ... 'the chances of Turkish neutrality in a war in which the United States and Britain would be engaged against the Soviet Union could not even be thought of'.⁶³ The bluff did not work.

Turkey's last tactic was to propose a common plan of defence and assistance between the Turkish and American General Staffs. Sadak explained this in his visit to Washington in December 1949. Washington replied that 'joint war planning could only be undertaken if there were a prior political agreement' ... 'Joint planning without such an agreement would imply a commitment which the executive branch' of the American government 'could not properly give'. Washington remarked that 'the most practical step that can be taken at the present time' was 'the revision of Turkish

⁶⁰ FRUS, 1949, Vol 4, 831, Memorandum by William H. Bray of the Office of the Coordinator for Foreign Military Assistance Programs to the Coordinator (Berkner), 3 September 1949. For the differences and similarities between Anglo-American security interests at the end of 1949 see: FRUS, 1949, Vol 6, 61-64, Statement by the United States and the United Kingdom Groups, 14 November 1949.

⁶¹ FRUS, 1949, Vol 4, 832, Memorandum by William H. Bray of the Office of the Coordinator for Foreign Military Assistance Programs to the Coordinator (Berkner), 3 September 1949. See also: the Recapitulation of Conclusions of the Conference of American Chiefs of Mission in the Near East, 26-29 November, 1949 at Istanbul: FRUS, 1949, Vol 6, 176-77.

⁶² M. P. Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey and NATO, 1945-1952", 820.

⁶³ E. Athanassopoulou, *Turkey – Anglo - American Security Interests 1945-1952, The First Enlargement of NATO*, 135.

strategic war plans' which would 'be of great value should circumstances make possible at a later date the joint planning' Sadak proposed.⁶⁴

Ankara's failure in 1948-50 to engage the US more closely stemmed not only from its misreading of American perceptions of the Middle East, but also because the US 'had no coordinated policy applicable to the Middle East as a whole' at that time, while British Middle East policy 'had reached a state of bankruptcy'. British Middle East objectives depended on American military and economic support,⁶⁵ but the US had an estimated budget deficit of '\$5 billion, which would mean a national debt by 1952 of \$268.3 billion'.⁶⁶ Neither Washington nor London had enough economic and strategic capability to control the region. At this time Ankara's repeated pleas for closer US ties were futile.

Yet Ankara continued its efforts to attract Washington's attention. It concluded a friendship agreement with Italy at the end of March 1950⁶⁷ which refreshed the idea of a Mediterranean Pact.⁶⁸ Interestingly, Turkey's 'renewed request' for the pact 'came at a time when London had started seriously considering' the formation of a similar arrangement which would 'entice Egypt into military cooperation with Britain'. The British Middle Eastern scheme was not the same as Turkey's. It wanted to use Turkey as a link between Britain and Egypt. For London, Egypt would be a better

⁶⁴ FRUS, 1950, Vol 5, 1238-40, the Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth), 20 March 1950.

⁶⁵ H. L. Hoskins, "Some Aspects of the Security Problem in the Middle East", 189-90.

⁶⁶ David McCullough, *Truman*, 759.

⁶⁷ <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/AyinTarihi/1950/mart1950.htm> accessed on 23.11.2008

⁶⁸ See: <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/AyinTarihi/1950/mart1950.htm> accessed on 24.11.2008; <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/AyinTarihi/1950/nisan1950.htm> accessed on 24.11.2008; M. Gönülbul (ed), *Olaylarla Türk Dis Politikası*, 227.

base for a Middle East security scheme. Both Ankara and London knew that their plans could not succeed without US and Arab states' support.⁶⁹

The US rejected both London's and Ankara's plans. When the British asked for Washington's support for a Middle Eastern Pact at the end of April 1950, Washington's reply clearly stated this.⁷⁰ Raymond A. Hare stated that the American 'commitments in Europe' were of 'such a nature and scope that' Washington could not bear any more commitments. He also rejected Turkey's proposals for connecting the 1939 Agreement with NATO and the coordination of Turkish-American General Staffs talks.⁷¹

While Turkish (and British) attempts failed to win American support for any Mediterranean based defence initiative, on 19 April 'Moscow gave Ankara fresh ground to complain over Soviet tactics, and hence to renew its diplomatic pressure on the Americans'. *The Red Fleet*, official organ of the Soviet Navy, 'declared that the 1936 Montreux Convention had ceased to correspond with the interests of the Black Sea Powers'. 'Turkey was attacked as having sold its independence to the Americans'. The article 'reviewed the history of the "Russian struggle" for an outlet to the Black Sea which, it commented, in the year 600 was known as the "Russian Sea"'.⁷² Ambassador Erkin stated that this Soviet action 'compelled him again to bring the Mediterranean Pact issue into consideration with the request' that Washington should

⁶⁹ E. Athanassopoulou, *Turkey – Anglo - American Security Interests 1945-1952, The First Enlargement of NATO*, 156-59.

⁷⁰ FRUS, 1950, Vol 3, 884, the United States Delegation at the Tripartite Preparatory Meetings to the Secretary of State, 27 April 1950. See also FRUS, 1950, Vol 3, 975, the United States Delegation at the Tripartite Preparatory Meetings to the Secretary of State, 2 May 1950.

⁷¹ FRUS, 1950, Vol 3, 976. For the general outline of US policy on the Near East see: FRUS, 1950, Vol 5, 163-66, Report to the President by the National Security Council, 17 May 1950.

⁷² *The Times* 20 April 1950 in E. Athanassopoulou, *Turkey – Anglo - American Security Interests 1945-1952, The First Enlargement of NATO*, 154-55. For the article see also: <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/AyinTarihi/1950/nisan1950.htm> accessed on 27.11.2008

give it 'urgent consideration'.⁷³ Washington did not consider the article as a threat. The Russian remarks in *The Red Fleet* were 'limited to one article' and 'no direct demands' had been made to Turkey, nor was there 'a barrage of Russian Press and radio comments on the subject since the publication of the article'.⁷⁴ On 19 August 1946 Acheson merely noted that 'Turkey should remain primarily responsible for the defence of the Straits'.⁷⁵ Ankara could not attract Washington's attention with any Eastern Mediterranean initiative. The RPP government returned to pushing directly for NATO membership.

Just before the May 1950 elections, on 11 May, the RPP government applied for NATO membership. It attempted to justify its application by stating that the tension between the Arab states and Israel complicated the formation of a Mediterranean Pact.⁷⁶ The only way to maintain the defence of the eastern Mediterranean was an extension of the NATO umbrella to this region. Turkey's attempt was again not successful.⁷⁷

On 14 May 1950 the DP won a sweeping electoral victory over the RPP.⁷⁸ Adnan Menderes became Prime Minister and Celal Bayar President.⁷⁹ In foreign policy the DP did not significantly differ from the RPP. Both were keen on establishing close

⁷³ FRUS, 1950, Vol 5, 1252, Memorandum of Conversation by the Under Secretary of State (Webb), 27 April 1950.

⁷⁴ FRUS, 1950, Vol 3, 80, Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Under Secretary of State, 1 May 1950.

⁷⁵ US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol XXII, 687, 1 May 1950.

⁷⁶ G. Kirk, *Survey of International Affairs: The Middle East 1945-50* in O. Sander, *Türk - Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-64*, 70-71.

⁷⁷ B. Oran (ed), *Türk Dis Politikası 1919-1980*, Vol 1, 545.

⁷⁸ For details of the election see: <http://www.secimsonucu.com/DetaySon.asp?HID=78> accessed on 25.11.2008. See also: <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/AyinTarihi/1950/mayis1950.htm> accessed on 25.11.2008; F. Ahmad, *Turkish Experiment in Democracy*, 31. For a brief outlook for the dynamics of the change in the government see: F. Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 102-110; Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Foreign policy in Transition 1950-1974*, 54, 84; Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 312-19; Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, 169-242.

⁷⁹ For a brief outlook of the formation of the new government see: R. S. Burcak, *On Yilin Anilari (1950-1960)*, 50-53. For details about the DP's history and ideology see: Cem Eroglu, *Demokrat Parti: Tarihi ve Ideolojisi*; F. Ahmad, *Turkish Experiment in Democracy*, 390.

relations with the US.⁸⁰ In this the RPP left the DP a strong legacy. The DP leaders did not miss this opportunity. Menderes' statements during his electoral campaign stressed the importance of the American alliance. He stated that 'the biggest desire' of the DP was to 'strengthen the political and the economic relations with our great friend, the US, within [an] atmosphere of sincerity and understanding'.⁸¹

Washington welcomed the election result. James E. Webb, the Acting Secretary of State, noted that it represented 'the culmination of democratic development in Turkey'⁸², and that the DP government would 'cooperate with' the US 'and the other western democracies as fully as its predecessor as the two parties are united on foreign policy'.⁸³ Truman told Bayar that he was 'looking forward with confidence to the continuance of the very friendly and close relations' between the US and Turkey.⁸⁴

In May 1950 Fuat Koprulu, Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated that the new government supported a Mediterranean Pact⁸⁵, and in June the government officially stated this to Washington. Washington's reply was again negative.⁸⁶ It did not change its mind about a regional security pact.

⁸⁰ See: M. Atay, "İkinci Dünya Savası Sonrası Dünya Siyasal Ortamında Türkiye'nin Ittifak Arayışları ve NATO'ya Giriş Süreci." İstanbul Üniversitesi PhD, 1995, 130.

⁸¹ TPMB, No 198, May 1950, 60-61. See also: *Zafer* 9 May 1950.

⁸² FRUS, 1950, Vol 5, 1262, Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the President, 22 May 1950.

⁸³ FRUS, 1950, Vol 5, 1263, Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the President, 22 May 1950.

⁸⁴ FRUS, 1950, Vol 5, 1264, President Truman to the President of the Turkish Republic (Bayar), 24 May 1950; *Zafer* 27 May 1950. See also: Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1950, Vol 12, 669-72. For the foreign press reactions to the elections see: *Zafer* 17 May 1950. For the positive reactions of the American senators see: *Zafer* 31 May 1950.

⁸⁵ *Zafer* 31 May 1950.

⁸⁶ FRUS, 1950, Vol 5, 1264-1266, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Hare), 2 June 1950.

It did not take much time for the DP to realize that Washington had no interest in a Mediterranean initiative. As did the RPP in its last days, the DP focussed directly on NATO membership. The DP was luckier than the RPP. With the outbreak of the Korean War⁸⁷, on 25 June, US policy changes began.

On 27 June Truman authorized the use of US naval and air forces in support of South Korea against invasion from the Communist north.⁸⁸ On the same day the UN Security Council asked members to provide assistance to South Korea.⁸⁹ The TGNA discussed a UN telegram on the Korean situation on 30 June. Koprulu declared that defending UN principles was an indispensable component of Turkish foreign policy. He stated that Turkey had a very close and sincere friendship with the US, which had mobilized its forces in order to enforce the UN decision to maintain the international peace, and that every peace-loving country should welcome Washington's decision to support South Korea. The Turkish Foreign Ministry replied to the UN telegram that the 'Turkish Republic would fulfil the commitments to the Security Council's decision with utmost sincerity'.⁹⁰

⁸⁷ The Korean Crisis had started with the invasion of the North Korean forces to South Korea. The Western Bloc considered this invasion as an indirect Soviet intervention. The crisis rapidly turned into the first biggest regional conflict of the Cold War. See: P. Lowe, *The Origins of the Korean War*, 172-91, T.C. Genel Kurmay Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı, *Kore Harbinde Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin Muharebeleri*, 18-29, 48; Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War, Vol 2 The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-1950*, 379-625; Korea Institute of Military History, *The Korean War*, 1-258.

⁸⁸ Classified Teletype Conference, dated 27 June 1950, between the Pentagon and General Douglas MacArthur http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/week1/kw_22_1.htm accessed on 28.11.2008 See also: US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol XXIII, 43-44, 10 July 1950.

⁸⁹ The UN decision at:

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/064/95/IMG/NR006495.pdf?OpenElement> accessed on 28.11.2008

⁹⁰ TGNAP, Vol 1, 310-13, 30 June 1950; TPMB, No 199, June 1950, 122-23; *Zafer* 1 July 1950.

Koprulu's words on 30 June echoed those of American officials.⁹¹ The debate in the TGNA was really just an announcement of the DP's support for the American course. On 28 June Koprulu had already told Ambassador Wadsworth:

[Turkey] concur[s] in what [the US] has done. That which was done at UN was the only proper thing to do. We will support it in any way we can.⁹²

Koprulu's words and the discussions at the Assembly show that Turkey would send troops to Korea because the US would be there. The decision to send Turkish troops to Korea was made in a cabinet meeting on 18 July⁹³, and announced on 25 July. The government decided to send a 4,500-man brigade to Korea,⁹⁴ the first time Turkish troops were sent overseas.⁹⁵ Menderes explained his government's decision:

It is only by way of a decision similar to ours, to be arrived at by other freedom loving nations, that acts of aggression can be prevented and world peace can be safeguarded. A sincere attachment to the ideals of the United Nations requires a belief in this basic principle.⁹⁶

Turkey became one of the first countries after the US to deploy forces to Korea.⁹⁷ Turkey showed its loyalty to the US. Ankara even took the risk that its decision would

⁹¹ For the American officials statements on the Korean situation see:

<http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/korea/korea.htm> accessed on 28.11.2008. See also: Statement by President Harry S. Truman, announcing his order to send U.S. air and naval forces to help defend South Korea and explaining the rationale for his decision 27 June 1950,

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/week1/kw_27_1.htm accessed on 28.11.2008

⁹² FRUS, 1950, Vol 5, 1276, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (McBride), 28 June 1950.

⁹³ President Bayar, Prime Minister Menderes, Vice Prime Minister Samet Agaoglu, Foreign Minister Koprulu, Chief of General Staff Nuri Yamut and other military and political seniors were present at the meeting. *Zafer* 19 July 1950.

⁹⁴ *Zafer* 26 July 1950; *Ulus* 26 July 1950. See also:

<http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/AyinTarihi/1950/temmuz1950.htm> accessed on 1.12.2008

⁹⁵ R. S. Burcak, *On Yilin Anilari (1950-1960)*, 61.

⁹⁶ <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/AyinTarihi/1950/temmuz1950.htm> accessed on 1.12.2008

⁹⁷ TPMB, No 200, July 1950, 108.

antagonize the Soviets and might cause 'renewed military pressure'⁹⁸ from the USSR.

Yet how the decision was made was questionable. According to article 26 of the 1924 Turkish Constitution, the TGNA should declare war, although the article made no clear provision regarding the deployment of troops abroad.⁹⁹ The opposition reacted to this and on 1 December asked for a parliamentary inquiry for the DP's decision.¹⁰⁰ During the parliamentary debate on this enquiry, the government referred to the UN Charter and international law, arguing that these two concepts made it legal to deploy troops overseas. It argued that deploying troops overseas was not a war declaration, so did not come under the Assembly's sole authority. The opposition emphasized article 26.¹⁰¹ The TGNA voted that the government's decision was not illegal or unconstitutional.¹⁰²

The way that the decision was taken highlights the political motivation of the DP government. The government gave its decision as quickly as possible because it did not want to lose the opportunity to show its loyalty to the US. As Major General Yusuf A. Egeli stated in an informal memorandum to General Nuri Yamut, Chief of Staff, '[i]t will be [the] greatest crime in Turkish history' if Turkey failed to take the advantage of 'this opportunity'.¹⁰³ Ankara saw the War as a very important opportunity to get closer

⁹⁸ M. Stearns, *Entangled Allies, US Policy toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus*, 75. 'At the US Embassy in Ankara the military threat to Turkey was thought to be so grave after the outbreak of the Korean War that an evacuation plan for US [was] prepared, and a handful of officials were designated to remain behind in the event of a Soviet occupation of Ankara'. See: M. Stearns, *Entangled Allies, US Policy toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus*, 170.

⁹⁹ For the article 26 of the 1924 Constitution see: E. M. Earle, "The New Constitution of Turkey", 91.

¹⁰⁰ TGNAP, Vol 3, 5-6, 1 December 1950.

¹⁰¹ For the debate in the parliament on the interpellation see: TGNAP, Vol 3, 136-195, 11 December 1950.

¹⁰² TGNAP, Vol 3, 199, 11 December 1950.

¹⁰³ FRUS, 1950, Vol 5, 1282, the Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State, 24 July 1950.

to the West, which 'would lead to economic growth and greater diplomatic and military power'.¹⁰⁴

Turkey's decision was to send troops to help the UN.¹⁰⁵ It did not refer to helping the Americans. But it was apparent that the decision was to 'prove' that Turkey was a 'worthy partner' of the US.¹⁰⁶ Menderes tried to justify the legality of the decision within the framework of the UN and the western ideals; for Ankara the West was not the UN, it was the US. Turkish–American diplomatic exchanges, during Ankara's decision making, illustrate this.

During the decision making process, Turkish officials several times stated the closeness of Turkish and American interests and the importance of supporting the US. Ankara took the chance to highlight its loyalty and ability to back the US course, and to show that it was an ally which should not be dismissed. On 20 July Koprulu told Wadsworth that Turkey should 'continue' its 'orientation to Western democracies. Our interests lie with yours.'¹⁰⁷ Two days later Koprulu told Wadsworth that Turkey wished 'particularly' that its reply conform 'with US policy and public opinion'. US officials replied that Turkey 'could best manifest its support of UN policies by prompt dispatch of fully equipped regimental combat team.' On 24 July in a meeting between Senator Harry P. Cain, who visited Turkey from 23 July to 26 July to observe the military aid program, McBride, Wadsworth and Turkish Defence Minister, Chief of Staff and Commanding General of Turkish ground forces and Koprulu, Koprulu

¹⁰⁴ J. M V. Lippe, "Forgotten Brigade of the Forgotten War: Turkey's Participation in the Korean War", 93.

¹⁰⁵ H. Tek, "The Decision-Making Process of Turkey Deploying Turkish Troops to Korea." Bilkent University MA, 2005, 27; M. Atay, "İkinci Dünya Savası Sonrası Dünya Siyasal Ortamında Türkiye'nin İttifak Arayışları ve NATO'ya Giriş Süreci." İstanbul Üniversitesi PhD, 1995, 149.

¹⁰⁶ S. V. Beck, "A Small Power's Place in a Big Power's World: Turkey, the United States, and the Early Cold War." Bowling Green State University PhD, 2003, 174.

¹⁰⁷ FRUS, 1950, Vol 5, 1280, the Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State, 22 July 1950.

stated that '[p]ersonally I am wholeheartedly in favor sending ground forces promptly and will present your suggestion to Cabinet at [the] earliest opportunity, if possible tomorrow'.¹⁰⁸

Other factors were also behind this decision. One was the US Senator Cain. Some factions in the Turkish opposition claimed that Turkey's decision to send troops was 'dictated' by Cain.¹⁰⁹ In Turkey on 25 July Cain said:

As an American senator and a citizen I am hoping that the Turkish government will send a Turkish military unit to Korea. ... The Korean War is not only an American war but it is the war that every member of the UN should participate in. ... If the other members of the organization do not participate in the Korean War, the organization will be dissolved and each state has to take care of itself. ... If Turkey becomes the first country to help [the situation in Korea], Turkey's international reputation will be vastly increased. ... Turkey controls the Straits and Suez Canal. ... if Turkey becomes a full member of the Atlantic Alliance, we can protect ourselves much better. ... If we want to protect the whole [Mediterranean], Turkey should access the Atlantic Alliance.¹¹⁰

This statement led the Turkish Government to believe that 'its offer [to] assist in Korea might result Turkey's inclusion [in the] Atlantic Pact'.¹¹¹ Turkey decided to send troops not only to show that it was staunch ally, but also to secure American support for Turkey's NATO membership. Selim Sarper, the head of the Turkish delegation at the UN, said that Turkey should send troops to Korea on condition that the US support Turkey's NATO membership.¹¹²

¹⁰⁸ FRUS, 1950, Vol 5, 1281-82, the Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State, 24 July 1950.

¹⁰⁹ G. S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance, Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971*, 40.

¹¹⁰ *Zafer* 26 July 1950. See also General McBride's encouraging statement on the military strength of Turkish armed forces: *Zafer* 23 July 1950.

¹¹¹ FRUS, 1950, Vol 5, 1286, the Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State, 31 July 1950. See also: E. Athanassopoulou, *Turkey – Anglo - American Security Interests 1945-1952, The First Enlargement of NATO*, 181.

¹¹² F. C. Erkin, *Disislerinde 34 Yil*, Vol. 2, 154. Three Turkish Ambassadors, Semih Gunver, Zeki Kuneralp and Mahmut Dikerdem, accepted that Turkey's decision to send troops to Korea was because

Ankara applied to join NATO on 1 August.¹¹³ In September the North Atlantic Council rejected it, but offered Turkey association with NATO military agencies in Mediterranean defence planning.¹¹⁴ Turkey accepted this offer unhappily.¹¹⁵ In order to prevent a political crisis, President Bayar argued that the application was not a complete failure - that the NATO Council's decision showed that European allies accepted the importance of Turkey for Eastern Mediterranean security.¹¹⁶

The DP now adopted two strategies. First, Ankara attempted to reduce British opposition to Turkey's NATO membership.¹¹⁷ London replied that it 'did not favour the expansion of the Atlantic Pact to include Turkey'.¹¹⁸ Second, Ankara returned, for a while and half-heartedly, to the old idea of a Mediterranean Pact.¹¹⁹ Neither move was successful. Turkey had to wait for the gradual effect of the Korean War on Washington's strategic thinking.

of its desire to be a NATO member. See: A. Sever, *Soguk Savas Kusatmasinda Turkiye, Bati ve Orta Dogu 1945 – 1958*, 65. See also: O. Sander, *Turk - Amerikan Iliskileri 1947-64*, 74.

¹¹³ *Zafer* 3 August 1950; *Ulus* 3 August 1950. See also Koprulu's statement about the Korean War and Turkish foreign policy to International News Service TPMB, No 201, August 1950, 24-27. For Turkey's request in 1950 for membership in the NATO see: FRUS, 1950, Vol 3, 1 ff, 1108 ff; FRUS, 1950, Vol 5, 1224 ff.

¹¹⁴ <http://www.nato.int/archives/1st5years/appendices/1.htm> accessed on 06.09.2008; FRUS, 1950, Vol 3, 333-335, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State, 19 September 1950. For the Note Verbale of 19 September 1950, from Acheson acting on behalf on the North Atlantic Treaty Council, to the Turkish Ambassador in the US, on Turkey's association with NATO military planning see: US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol XXIII, 632, 16 October 1950.

¹¹⁵ FRUS, 1950, Vol 3, 334, Memorandum of Conversation by the Secretary of State, 19 September 1950. For the Note Verbale of 2 October 1950 from Erkin replying to Acheson's note on Turkey's association with the military planning work of NATO and stating Turkey's confirmation of the NATO proposal see: US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol XXIII, 633, 16 October 1950.

¹¹⁶ TPMB, No 204, November 1950, 34.

¹¹⁷ London did not change its plans to use Turkey in a separate Middle Eastern defence organization rather than NATO. However, the US had already accepted Turkey's participation in Mediterranean defence plans within NATO. Britain had to accept this proposal. For details see: A. Sever, *Soguk Savas Kusatmasinda Turkiye, Bati ve Orta Dogu 1945 – 1958*, 68-69. For Bevin's opposition to Turkey's NATO membership see: FRUS, 1950, Vol 3, 1218-1220, United States Delegation Minutes, Third Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, New York, 13 September 1950.

¹¹⁸ E. Athanassopoulou, *Turkey – Anglo - American Security Interests 1945-1952, The First Enlargement of NATO*, 169.

¹¹⁹ E. Athanassopoulou, *Turkey – Anglo - American Security Interests 1945-1952, The First Enlargement of NATO*, 165-166. See also: TPMB, No. 204, November 1950, 33-35.

The Korean War increased the significance of the Middle East for Washington. Truman presumed that the USSR 'might move against the Persian Gulf states', starting from Iran.¹²⁰ The War also 'created a situation under which there must be an urgent and frank re-appraisal of the global position of' US 'military potential'.¹²¹ As a part of this re-appraisal the US National Security Council reported that Turkey was important for the control of both the Turkish Straits and the eastern Mediterranean. The report defined these two regions as part of 'a traditional and deep-seated Russian objective', and deduced that 'a direct USSR attack on Turkey would involve serious risk of precipitating [a] global war'.¹²²

The Korean War was an important trigger for Washington to reconsider the international situation following new Communist threats, such as the Communist victory in China in 1949¹²³, China – Soviet Alignment in 1950¹²⁴, the situation in Yugoslavia¹²⁵ and the USSR's successful nuclear tests.¹²⁶ This reconsideration was summarized in NSC-68.¹²⁷ NSC-68's core emphasis was that when American 'military strength is related to the world situation and balanced against the likely

¹²⁰ R. J. Donovan, *Tumultuous Years: the Presidency of Harry S Truman, 1949-1953*, 204-205. For the increasing importance of the Middle East for the US with the Korean War see also: FRUS, 1950, Vol 3, 1686-89, Approved Summary of Conclusions and Agreements Reached at a Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the US and United Kingdom, 23 October 1950.

¹²¹ FRUS, 1950, Vol 1, 353, Memorandum by the Secretary of the Army (Frank C. Pace), the Secretary of the Navy (Francis P. Matthews), and the Secretary of the Air Force (Thomas K. Finletter) to the Secretary of Defense (Louis A. Johnson), 1 August 1950.

¹²² FRUS, 1950, Vol 1, 380, the Report by the National Security Council about the Position and Actions of the US with respect to possible further Soviet moves in the light of the Korean Situation, 25 August 1950.

¹²³ For details see: E. Athanassopoulou, *Turkey – Anglo - American Security Interests 1945-1952, The First Enlargement of NATO*, 149; FRUS, 1950, Vol 6, Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson), 20 January 1950; R. J. Donovan, *Tumultuous Years: the Presidency of Harry S Truman, 1949-1953*, 75-88.

¹²⁴ On 14 February 1950 a 30 year Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance was concluded between Moscow and Beijing. See: <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t18011.htm> accessed on 22.11.2008.

¹²⁵ The US favored the protection of Yugoslavia from a Soviet attack. For details see: B. Heuser, *Western containment policies in the cold war : the Yugoslav case, 1948-53*, 1-125.

¹²⁶ H. J. Morgenthau, "Russian Technology and American Policy" 129-135.

¹²⁷ National Security Council Report 68 was a classified report issued on 14 April 1950 which would shape the US government's actions for the next 20 years. NSC-68 also enabled a significant increase in the US defence budget. FRUS, 1950, Vol 1, 126-492; S. N. Drew (ed.), *NSC-68: Forging the Strategy of Containment with Analyses by Paul H. Nitze; E. R. May, American Cold War Strategy : Interpreting NSC 68; R. J. Donovan, Tumultuous Years: the Presidency of Harry S Truman, 1949-1953*, 158-161, 241-247.

exigencies of such a situation, it is clear that ... [it] is becoming dangerously inadequate'.¹²⁸ There is no clear evidence that the Korean War was the spur to Truman's approval of NSC-68 on 30 September 1950,¹²⁹ but several scholars accepted that it was very important to Truman's decision.¹³⁰

NSC-68 led to a 'substantial increase' in American military aid funds,¹³¹ and to Turkey's election as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, on 7 October 1950, with US support.¹³² These reflected Washington's increased interest in Turkey, but were far from satisfying Ankara's desire to join NATO. Turkey had to wait for a London-Washington bargain on the Middle East.

In the second half of 1950 it became clear that British defence capabilities in the Middle East were inadequate without US support. On 27 December George C. McGhee, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, advised the Secretary of State of British inability to control the Middle East. He stated that the defence of the Middle East is ' "vital" to the defence of the US' ' and Britain, 'which had the primary responsibility for the defence of the Middle East' did not have sufficient 'manpower and resources' to defend the region.¹³³

¹²⁸ FRUS, 1950, Vol 1, 261.

¹²⁹ S. Nelson Drew (ed.), *NSC-68: Forging the Strategy of Containment with Analyses by Paul H. Nitze*, 111.

¹³⁰ For details see: J. L. Gaddis *Strategies of containment : a critical appraisal of postwar American national security policy during the cold war* s.106-109, B. Heuser, *Western containment policies in the cold war : the Yugoslav case, 1948-53*, 131-34; David T. Fautua, "The "Long Pull" Army: NSC 68, the Korean War, and the Creation of the Cold War U.S. Army", 93-120; J. Donovan, *Tumultuous Years: the Presidency of Harry S Truman, 1949-1953*, 241-47.

¹³¹ FRUS, 1950, Vol 5, 1317-1320, Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, 19 September 1950.

¹³² FRUS, 1950, Vol 5, 1325. For documentation regarding this election see FRUS, 1950, Vol 2, 87ff.

¹³³ FRUS, 1951, Vol 5, 4, Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State, 27 December 1950. For similar evaluations see: FRUS, 1951, Vol 5, 24-27, Paper Drafted in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, undated; FRUS, 1951, Vol 5, 27-42, State Department Draft Minutes of Discussions at the State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, 30 January 1951, 6 February 1951.

Washington felt obliged to step into the Middle East, and this led Washington to re-define Turkey's position by focusing on its potential for Middle Eastern defence. On 31 January 1951 General Dwight Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of NATO forces, told Truman:

Europe appears ... to be shaped like a long bottleneck. The wide part of the bottle is Russia, the neck is Western Europe, stretching down to the end of the bottle, Spain. ... We must apply great air and sea power on both sides and we must rely on land forces in the center. I want to build a great combination of sea and air strength in the North Sea. ... I'd do the same sort of thing in the Mediterranean, I'd put a great fleet of air and sea power in the Mediterranean and I'd give arms to Turkey.¹³⁴

This signalled changes in Washington's Middle Eastern strategy¹³⁵ including Turkey's joining NATO. The US officials now 'fully' agreed that Turkey should be their 'major reliance in the Middle East'.¹³⁶

In February 1951 more official reports in Washington pointed out to importance of Turkey for the defence of the Middle East. On 5 February Henry S. Villard from the Policy Planning Staff stated:

Since we have found that the "Security of Turkey is vital to the security of the U.S." it would seem logical to give effect to this decision by some sort of formal commitment. Furthermore, we have staked so much on our program of military aid for Turkey and our prestige has been so much involved in the process that it would be unthinkable if we should fail to act in case of Soviet aggression against Turkey. ... Actually, to obtain the maximum cooperation from the Turks in bolstering the defense of the Mediterranean today, it seems essential to offer Turkey some form of written guarantee.¹³⁷

¹³⁴ FRUS, 1951, Vol 3, Part 1, 454, Notes on a Meeting at the White House, 31 January 1951.

¹³⁵ The change in the Washington's strategic thinking was broadly the increasing importance of the Eastern Mediterranean (Turkey and Greece) for the defence of Europe. See: FRUS, 1951, Vol 5, 25, 29-42; FRUS, 1951, Vol 5, 446-51, Memorandum by the Minister in Greece to the Ambassador in Greece, 20 January 1951.

¹³⁶ FRUS, 1951, Vol 5, 29, State Department Draft Minutes of Discussions at the State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, 30 January 1951.

¹³⁷ FRUS, 1951, Vol 5, 1117-18, Memorandum by Henry S. Villard to the Director of the Policy

On 12 February, in a meeting between Bayar, Koprulu, McGhee, and William M. Rountree, the Director of GTI, McGhee expressed the importance of Turkey's security to the US and the Middle East. He added that Turkey's participation in the Korean War had won 'the admiration of the whole free world'. He made it clear that 'the present basic objective of' NATO, 'the land defense of Western Europe', was 'separate from the problem of [the] land defense of Turkey'. Bayar said that Turkey was 'not satisfied with its present position in the partnership' with the US. Turkey would like to receive a guarantee. McGhee 'then promised' that he would talk to Truman about Bayar's 'deep concern over this problem'. He added that 'he would do everything possible to accelerate consideration in Washington of a security commitment'.¹³⁸

The Conference of Middle Eastern Chiefs of Mission in Istanbul on 14-21 February was the next step towards Turkey's NATO membership. At the Conference nearly all the American diplomatic representatives from Middle East countries, together with significant figures from the State Department, were present. The Conference agreed that Turkey was very important for the defence of the Middle East and 'a special, formalized security commitment to Turkey' was necessary. It also noted that if a security commitment offer were not made soon, Turkey would 'veer towards a policy of neutralism', and 'until a commitment' was 'extended to Turkey' there could be 'no assurance that Turkey' would 'declare war unless it ... [was] attacked'. If a security commitment were offered to Turkey, 'it must at the same time be offered to Greece'. These agreed conclusions opened Turkey's and Greece's entry into NATO.¹³⁹

Planning Staff (Nitze), 5 February 1951.

¹³⁸ FRUS, 1951, Vol 3, Part 1, 466-73, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Rountree), 12 February, 1951.

¹³⁹ FRUS, 1951, Vol 5, 51-55, Agreed Conclusions and Recommendations of the Conference of Middle Eastern Chiefs of Mission, 14-21 February 1951.

A US National Intelligence Estimate expressed similar views on 26 February. It noted Washington's concern that if Turkey were 'unable to obtain assurances' of American support, and if Washington adopted 'a policy of hemispheric isolation', Turkey might 'automatically ... abandon its pro-US alignment'. In other words 'if Turkey were isolated from the West in this way', Ankara 'would attempt to maintain a policy of neutrality'. The Estimate also underlined Turkey's contribution to the Korean War ¹⁴⁰

At the beginning of March, the State Department made several statements on Turkey's strategic importance. One was that Turkey could be a key actor in the control of the Middle East oil.¹⁴¹ Another was the importance of Turkish military capability 'to neutralize the Soviet submarine threat in the Mediterranean, to tie up large numbers of Soviet troops, and to launch air attacks on vital Soviet petroleum resources'.¹⁴² By the end of March it became clear the State Department was considering Turkey's NATO membership closely.¹⁴³ In April McGhee, as one of the most significant State Department figures for Turkey's NATO membership¹⁴⁴, defined Turkey 'as a link between the Near East on the one hand and the Mediterranean and European defense areas on the other', and stated that Turkey's and Greece's

¹⁴⁰ FRUS, 1951, Vol 5, 1119-26, National Intelligence Estimate, 26 February 1951.

¹⁴¹ <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/AyinTarihi/1951/mart1951.htm> accessed on 07.12.2008

¹⁴² P. Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey and NATO, 1945-1952", 824. Soviet control of the Middle East and its oil would enormously enhance Soviet power and increase the Soviet military threat against Western Europe. See: G. McGhee, *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection*, 82.

¹⁴³ FRUS, 1951, Vol 3 Part 1, 501-505, The Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall), 24 March, 1951; FRUS, 1951, Vol 3, Part 1, 505-506, The Secretary of State (Acheson) to Certain Diplomatic Offices, 31 March 1951.

¹⁴⁴ For details of the importance of McGhee for Turkey's NATO membership see: H. Bagci, *Demokrat Parti Donemi Dis Politikasi*, 33-39

admission to NATO is 'desirable'¹⁴⁵. Throughout April the Turkish press and public were 'preoccupied' with the 'urgent need' to link Turkey to NATO.¹⁴⁶

In May 1951, the US government issued NSC 109. It was official US support for Turkey's admission to NATO.¹⁴⁷ Washington had decided that the disadvantages of the British view of a Mediterranean security scheme outweighed its advantages, and that Turkey's and Greece's admission to NATO was more advantageous.¹⁴⁸

Some nations opposed this American decision. The Scandinavian members of NATO argued that NATO's extension to the Eastern Mediterranean might pull them into war because of a conflict in the Mediterranean where they had no interest. They also stated that NATO was an alliance of Atlantic civilization. The biggest reaction came from London, since Turkey's admission to NATO would make it difficult to link Turkey to the defence of the Middle East according to British Middle East strategy.¹⁴⁹

Washington did not want to bypass London's reservations on Turkey's admission to NATO. Throughout 1951 civil and military officials in London and Washington discussed whether Turkey and Greece should become NATO members; whether 'a separate command arrangement be established to cover the defence needs of these countries or should their armed forces and strategic interests be fully accommodated within the existing NATO structure?'¹⁵⁰ American, British, Turkish and French officials

¹⁴⁵ FRUS, 1951, Vol 5, 106, Memorandum of Informal United States-United Kingdom Discussions, in Connection With the Visit to London of the Honorable George C. McGhee, 2 April 1951.

¹⁴⁶ FRUS, 1951, Vol 3, Part 1, 515, the Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State, 24 April 1951.

¹⁴⁷ FRUS, 1951, Vol 5, 1148-1162, Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security Council, undated.

¹⁴⁸ FRUS, 1951, Vol 3, Part 1, 521-22, the [US] Embassy in the United Kingdom to the British Foreign Office, 15 May 1951.

¹⁴⁹ M. Gönülbul (ed), *Olaylarla Türk Dis Politikası*, 230-31.

¹⁵⁰ FRUS, 1951, Vol 5, 143, the Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices, 22 May 1951.

discussed the formation of a Middle East Command which might later be expanded to include Egypt and other countries in the Near East.¹⁵¹ Turkey did not reject its participation in NATO within a Middle East Command structure, but first wanted to join NATO, then discuss the Command structure.¹⁵² Turkey's readiness to participate to the Middle East Command structure softened London and eliminated its objection to Turkey's membership.¹⁵³

Turkey and Greece were invited to join NATO at the North Atlantic Council Conference in Ottawa on 20 September 1951.¹⁵⁴ Truman conveyed this decision to Bayar, and stated his hope that Turkey would be a founding member of Middle East Command.¹⁵⁵ Bayar accepted this¹⁵⁶, but really Ankara wanted to be part of Supreme Allied Command Europe.¹⁵⁷ Under American pressure the Turks agreed to start talks to join the Middle East Command¹⁵⁸, but Koprulu argued that Turkey wanted to take its place 'within an existing Command Organization of NATO' since NATO 'already existed' and the 'Middle East Command was only a project'.¹⁵⁹

On 15 October, Egypt's refusal to join Middle East Command strengthened Ankara's argument for being under Supreme Allied Commander Europe. Without Cairo's

¹⁵¹ See: FRUS, 1951, Vol 3, 460 ff; FRUS, 1951, Vol 5, 144ff. For the Middle East Command structure see also: D. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 562-65. See also: "Declaration by the Governments of the U.S.A, the United Kingdom, France and Turkey on their Intention to Establish A Middle East Command, November 10, 1951" in Documents on International Affairs, 1951, 427-29.

¹⁵² FRUS, 1951, Vol 5, 173-74, Paper Prepared in the British Embassy, 1 September 1951.

¹⁵³ *Manchester Guardian* 17 July 1951 in NAA, 1322069, A1838, 78/2/14, NATO - Policies - Turkey.

¹⁵⁴ US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol XXV, 523-524, 1 October 1951.

¹⁵⁵ US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol XXV, 571, 8 October 1951. See also: FRUS, 1951, Vol 3, 576-77.

¹⁵⁶ US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol XXV, 650, 22 October 1951. See also: FRUS, 1951, Vol 3, Part 1, 578-80, The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State Ankara, 24 September 1951.

¹⁵⁷ See also: E. Athanassopoulou, *Turkey - Anglo - American Security Interests 1945-1952, The First Enlargement of NATO*, 218.

¹⁵⁸ FRUS, 1951, Vol 5, 199-200, The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Department of State, 29 September 1951. For the talks see: FRUS, 1951, Vol 5, 212-226, Record of the Conference of United States, United Kingdom, and French Representatives with Turkish Prime Minister and Staff at Ankara on October 13 and 14, 1951.

¹⁵⁹ FRUS, 1951, Vol 5, 218, Record of the Conference of United States, United Kingdom, and French Representatives with Turkish Prime Minister and Staff at Ankara on October 13 and 14, 1951.

support Middle East Command was stillborn.¹⁶⁰ Washington accepted that it should not 'interfere or delay [the] admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO.'¹⁶¹

On 22 October 1951 the protocol inviting Greece and Turkey to join NATO was signed.¹⁶² Turkey became a NATO member on 18 February 1952 and formally joined the alliance at the Lisbon meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 20-25 February 1952. Turkey became a part of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe through Commander-in-Chief, Southern Europe. The naval forces of Greece and Turkey remained under their national chiefs of staff, operating in close co-ordination with all other naval forces in the Mediterranean.¹⁶³ With this development 'an era ended for Turkey and a new one began'.¹⁶⁴

The decline of British Middle East capacity led Washington to support Turkey's NATO membership.

The effect of the Korean War on Washington's strategic considerations should not be forgotten. The Korean War led Washington to focus on the concept of regional defence in different parts of the world. One of these regions was the Middle East. Washington could not leave its rich energy resources to Soviet expansion. This increased Turkey's significance in the region, due to its geostrategic location.

¹⁶⁰ US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol XXV, 702-03, 29 October 1951. See also: FRUS, 1951, Vol 5, 226-227, The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt, 16 October 1951; P. L. Hahn, *The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956 : strategy and diplomacy in the early Cold War*, 131-39. For the importance of Egypt in the Middle East Command see: FRUS, 1951, Vol 5, 185-87, Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President, 12 September 1951; FRUS, 1952-54, Vol 9, Part 1, 195-99, National Intelligence Special Estimate, 17 March 1952.

¹⁶¹ FRUS, 1952-54, Vol 9, Part 1, 169, Negotiating Paper Prepared in the Department of State, 4 January 1952.

¹⁶² <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/bt-a1.htm> accessed on 08.12.2008 for documentation regarding the inclusion of Greece and Turkey see: FRUS, 1951, Vol 3, 460ff; 616ff.

¹⁶³ <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c520225a.htm> accessed on 08.12.2008. See also: FRUS, 1952-54, Vol 9, 178-84. For the discussion at the TUNA on Turkey's accession to NATO and the act for Turkey's NATO membership see: TGNAP, Vol 13, 313-346, 18 February 1952.

¹⁶⁴ G. C. McGhee, "Turkey Joins the West", 617.

The Korean War was important for Turkey. It was not the only factor, but it was a vital catalyst in Turkey's membership of NATO.¹⁶⁵ In Washington's eyes Turkish troops in Korea changed Turkey's position. The Korean War and subsequent NATO membership brought new dimensions to Turkish-American relations. They led to a strategic partnership and cooperation between Ankara and Washington in the Middle East throughout 1950s and 60s.

Australia's reasons for sending troops to the Korean War and for urging the formation of the ANZUS Pact were quite different.

¹⁶⁵ For a similar view see: F. Turkmen, "Turkey and the Korean War" in H. Tek, "The Decision-Making Process of Turkey Deploying Turkish Troops to Korea." Bilkent University MA, 2005, 33; J. M. V. Lippe, "Forgotten Brigade of the Forgotten War: Turkey's Participation in the Korean War" 98.

PART 3: The Korean War, NATO and ANZUS

b. Australia

In the last two years of the Chifley and the first two years of the Menzies governments Australia had three main foreign policy issues: the rise of Communism in Asia, the Japanese Peace Treaty, and the deep-rooted objective of achieving a Pacific Pact. This chapter considers Australian-American relations from 1949 to 1952, and how these three issues led to the ANZUS Pact.¹

In 1949 Canberra's and Washington's views on these three issues were quite different. Communism was the main threat for the US. Especially after the Communist victory in China in 1949, Washington intensified its efforts to contain Communism in Asia. For Australia, Communism was a secondary threat.² Washington and Canberra also had different perceptions on Japan and the Japanese Peace Treaty. The US considered Japan a potential ally to maintain the American defence perimeter in the Pacific, so the State Department sought a soft peace treaty.³ For Australia, Japan was the primary potential threat and its military revival a more serious fear, so Australia sought a tough peace treaty.⁴ Washington was not

¹ On the formation of ANZUS see: D. McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact*; B. Stillman, "Pacific Pact: the Birth of ANZUS 1949-1951." Monash University, PhD, 1991; N. Harper, *A Great and Powerful Friend a Study of Australian American Relations between 1900 and 1975*; C. Bell, *Dependent ally: a study in Australian Foreign Policy*; R. N. Rosecrance, *Australian Diplomacy and Japan, 1945-1951*; R. O'Neill, *Australia in the Korean War*, Vol 1; Glen St. J. Barclay, *Friends in High Places, Australian-American Diplomatic Relations since 1945*; P. Spender, *Exercises in Diplomacy: the ANZUS Treaty and the Colombo Plan*; A. Watt, *Australian Diplomat*; J. G. Starke, *The Anzus Treaty Alliance*; T. R. Reese, *Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, a Survey of International Relations 1941-1968*; D. Mclean, "Anzus origins: a reassessment".

² D. Mclean, "Anzus origins: a reassessment", 76.

³ D. McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact*, 238-239; D. Mclean, "Anzus origins: a reassessment", 67.

⁴ D. Mclean, "Anzus origins: a reassessment", 76.

completely closed to a Pacific Pact but was generally reluctant to consider it.⁵ For Canberra the Pact was the most desirable defence scheme in the Pacific.⁶ In short for the US the Japanese Peace Treaty and Communism were primary and the Pacific Pact a secondary aspect; for Australia it was vice versa. As with Turkey, the near region mattered more to Australia than to the US.

Like with Turkey, an international crisis altered this, and indirectly reduced Washington's dislike of a Pacific Pact. The Korean War, and especially China's involvement in it, changed the State Department's view, particularly on the urgency of concluding the Japanese Peace Treaty. The Department decided that the Treaty had to be concluded as soon as possible in order to prevent the fall of Japan, a precious potential ally, into Communist hands.⁷ The Treaty had also to help Japan stand on its own feet against Communism. Thus it could not be as tough as Australia wanted. To get the support of Canberra and Wellington for a soft Japanese Treaty, Washington used the Pacific Pact as a bargaining counter.⁸ A Pacific Pact and a soft Japanese Peace Treaty were the prices the US and Australia, respectively, had to pay.⁹

Other factors diminished Washington's reluctance for a Pact. One was Australia's quick decision to deploy its troops to the Korean War. It was an important move which Washington could not disregard. Another was Australia's efforts first through Evatt, then after 1949 through Percy Spender, the new Minister for External Affairs, in keeping the idea of the Pacific Pact alive in Washington. This led Washington to see the Pacific Pact as the main bargaining chip in order to win the support of

⁵ D. W. Mabon, "Elusive Agreements: The Pacific Pact Proposals", 173; D. McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact*, 247-48.

⁶ D. McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact*, 247-48.

⁷ H. Umetsu, "The Birth of ANZUS: America's attempt to create a defense linkage between Northeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific", 174.

⁸ D. W. Mabon, "Elusive Agreements: The Pacific Pact Proposals", 165-66, 173-74.

⁹ D. McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact*, 287.

Canberra (and Wellington) for a soft Japanese Peace Treaty. Before the Korean War, Spender was more influential than Prime Minister Menzies in pushing the Pacific Pact idea against American reluctance.¹⁰ A third, more minor, factor was Washington's strategic thinking to consolidate its position in the northern Pacific by committing Australia and New Zealand, via a Pacific Pact, to the defence of American bases and forces stationed on the Japanese islands.¹¹ This chapter argues that ANZUS was a result of the convergence of these factors.

A Pacific Pact was a very long term goal of Australia, going back to the early days of the Australian federation.¹² The idea was refreshed by Prime Minister Stanley Melbourne Bruce in 1923.¹³ Bruce proposed a conference on maintaining peace in the Pacific between the US, Japan, Canada and other Pacific nations. Again in 1936, Robert Gordon Menzies raised the possibility of a regional pact which would provide collective defence.¹⁴

In 1948 Australian officials repeated their serious desire for a Pacific Pact. On 8 April Evatt stated Australia's desire for a Pacific security scheme in Parliament.¹⁵ At the Commonwealth Prime Minister's conference in October, Australia emphasized the importance of a regional pact in the Pacific.¹⁶ On 12 November Evatt told the US Secretary of Defence James V. Forrestal, that there was a need for "some

¹⁰ For Spender's special role during the formation of ANZUS see: S. Penrose, "Percy Spender and the Origins of ANZUS: An Australian Initiative". See also: D. W. Mabon, "Elusive Agreements: The Pacific Pact Proposals", 163-64, 174-75; D. McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact*, 282.

¹¹ H. Umetsu, "The Birth of ANZUS: America's attempt to create a defense linkage between Northeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific", 172-73.

¹² For a summary of Australia's views about a Pacific Pact until 1948 see: G. B. Stillman, "Pacific Pact: the birth of ANZUS 1949-1951" Monash University PhD, 1991, 1-9; Neville K. Meaney 'A proposition of the highest international importance': Alfred Deakin's pacific agreement proposal and its significance for Australian-imperial relations, 200-13.

¹³ CAPD, (Representatives), Vol 105, 2768, 15 August 1923.

¹⁴ CAPD, (Representatives), Vol 151, 622-23, 29 September 1936.

¹⁵ CAPD, (Representatives), Vol 196, 749, 8 April 1948.

¹⁶ For details see: NAA, 435757, A1838, TS899/6, British Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference - October 1948.

instrument for dealing with the problems of South-east Asia as a whole"'. Evatt said that India under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru would be 'a bulwark against Communism'¹⁷, suggesting that for the Australian Labor government the spread of Communism was only a secondary threat.

In 1948 a Pacific Pact was not a vital issue in Washington. It was thinking primarily about the future of Japan. On 25 March the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, George Kennan, recommended that the US should aim to make the Japanese Peace Treaty 'as nonpunitive as possible', that Japan's 'economic recovery should be made the prime objective of' the US.¹⁸

This difference in priorities did not diminish Canberra's enthusiasm for a Pacific Pact. Canberra believed that the unstable situation in the Pacific might lead the US to consider a self-defence organization in the region.¹⁹ In 1949 Australian policy makers continued to consider the organizational structure of a prospective Pacific security initiative. On 14 March, Defence Minister John J. Dedman announced that 'the pact would be similar to the Atlantic defence pact' and it would be open to 'both sides of the Pacific'.²⁰ Australia put forward different approaches for a Pacific Pact in order to attract Washington's attention.

Washington was not persuaded. In reply to Dedman, Lewis W. Douglas, the US Ambassador to Britain, told Maberly E. Dening of the Foreign Office, why the formation of an organization like NATO, as Dedman suggested, would be very

¹⁷ W. Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, 487.

¹⁸ FRUS, 1948, Vol 6, 691, 694.

¹⁹ See: B. Stillman, "Pacific Pact: the Birth of ANZUS 1949-1951." Monash University, PhD, 1991, 10; T. R. Reese, *Australia, New Zealand and the United States*, 112-113.

²⁰ DNZER, the ANZUS Pact and the Treaty of Peace with Japan, Vol 3, 480, the Minister of External Affairs to the High Commissioner for New Zealand, Canberra, 15 March 1949.

difficult in the Pacific. He said that the countries in the Pacific other than the US, the British Dominions and the Philippines did not have 'common interests' as did NATO members. Again, apart from these four, the countries in the Pacific could not maintain 'effective self-help and mutual aid', and through supporting a Pacific Pact idea, the US could have been accused of 'underwriting the British, French and Dutch colonial policies' in the Pacific which it never wanted to do.²¹ The North Atlantic and the South Pacific had different regional considerations, so could not be covered by similar alliance mechanisms.

Britain too was reluctant about a Pacific Pact. 'Dening said that the proposed Pact in fact "boiled down" to a desire by Australia' that the US 'should underwrite its security, and added that it was "only human" for Australia to desire this'. He also 'said that the whole thing seems to be a "pipe dream" of Australian politicians and newspapermen'.²² Douglas and Dening's statements illustrate the difference between Canberra and Washington-London.

Yet Australia was not alone in wanting a Pacific Pact. The Philippines and Korea too sought a pact. On 20 March 1949 Philippines' President Elpidio Quirino asked the US 'not to neglect the needs of Asia' because 'Asia ... "is a virgin region with unmeasured resources and people who are eager to take advantage of the blessings offered by democracy" '. He stated that a Pacific Pact was 'advisable' and might bring 'many advantages'.²³ On 8 April 1949 John M. Chang, Ambassador of the Republic

²¹ FRUS, 1949, Vol 7, Part 2, 1133-34, the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State, 29 March 1949.

²² FRUS, 1949, Vol 7, Part 2, 1134, the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State, 29 March 1949.

²³ FRUS, 1949, Vol 7, Part 2, 1124, the Charge d'Affaires in the Philippines (Lockett) to the Secretary of State, 21 March 1949.

of Korea, stated his government's interest in the conclusion 'of a Pacific counter-part to the Atlantic Pact'.²⁴ Both nations put forward proposals to the Americans.

The US did not accept them. Thomas H. Lockett, the American Charge d'Affaires in the Philippines, saw Quirino's words as the Philippines' 'anxious search ... for some measure of definite security against possible outside aggression'. Filipinos 'were anxious to have American support and assistance whether it comes in the form of a Pacific Pact or whether it comes in the form of direct government-to-government assistance'.²⁵ W. Walton Butterworth, Director of the Office for Far Eastern Affairs of State Department told Chang that circumstances in the Pacific were 'not even closely duplicated' in Europe and the Atlantic community. He 'emphasized that conditions' in the Pacific did not 'at the present time lend themselves to the type of approach embodied in the Atlantic Pact'.²⁶

Washington's opinion of South East Asia (SEA), both as a region and within the general framework of the Cold War in 1949, underlay its reluctance for a Pact. Washington did not think of SEA as bits and pieces, but 'as an integral part of that great crescent formed by the Indian Peninsula, Australia and Japan'. US policy was 'to contain and steadily reduce Kremlin influence in the region'.²⁷ Thus the object of containing Communism, the key American policy in the Cold War, drew the boundaries of Washington's policy. The Japanese Peace treaty and the Pacific Pact

²⁴ FRUS, 1949, Vol 7, Part 2, 1141-42, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office for Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth), 8 April 1949. For Korea's positive views on a Pacific Pact see: FRUS, 1949, Vol 7, Part 2, 1144-45, The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State, 20 May 1949.

²⁵ FRUS, 1949, Vol 7, Part 2, 1124-25, the Charge d'Affaires in the Philippines (Lockett) to the Secretary of State, 21 March 1949.

²⁶ FRUS, 1949, Vol 7, Part 2, 1141-42, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office for Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth), 8 April 1949. For Korea's positive views on a Pacific Pact see: FRUS, 1949, Vol 7, Part 2, 1144-45, The US Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State, 20 May 1949.

²⁷ FRUS, 1949, Vol 7, Part 2, 1128-33, Policy Planning Staff Paper on United States Policy Toward Southeast Asia, 29 March 1949.

were only the means to achieve this objective. What shaped the difference between Canberra and Washington was that the latter focused more on the upper part of this crescent, Japan, and the former on the lower part.

On 7 July 1949 the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department put forward a draft paper on the suggested course of action in SEA. It focused on the importance of the Japanese Peace Treaty and the possibility of a Defence Pact in the Pacific, suggesting that 'within three or four months' there should be a 'move toward a peace settlement with' Japan. It noted that if the 'Congressional leaders and the National Security Council' supported 'a security arrangement', the State Department 'should sound out the Philippines and Australia on the desirability of a Three Power Defense Treaty, along the general lines of the Atlantic Pact, composed initially of the US, the Philippines and Australia'. This pact should 'eventually ... embrace these three countries plus Canada, Japan and possibly New Zealand'.²⁸

SEA nations continued to pursue a Pact. On 11-12 July 1949 Quirino and Nationalist China's leader Chiang Kai Shek met at Baguio to discuss it.²⁹ They decided to take the initiative for the formation of a pact and to invite 'all the other freedom loving nations in the [P]acific to join'.³⁰ They proposed that the prospective Pacific Pact should extend 'Marshall Plan aid ... to the participating Asian states'.³¹ The Baguio meeting showed that the Asian model for a Pacific Pact differed from Australia's. Their model was a system which would mainly ensure continuous American aid. Australia's model was more security oriented.

²⁸ FRUS, 1949, Vol 7, Part 2, 1147-51, Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan), 8 July 1949.

²⁹ NAA, 11129481, A1838, 250/7/10B, *New Delhi Radio* 13 July 1949.

³⁰ NAA, 271815, A1838, 370/1/12, Australian High Commissioner Wellington to Minister and Department of External Affairs, 25 July 1949.

³¹ FRUS, 1949, Vol 7, Part 2, 1155, the Charge d'Affaires in the Philippines (Lockett) to the Secretary of State, 12 July 1949.

Washington was aware of this difference between the Asian and Australian proposals, but this did not change its reluctance to endorse either. In its memorandum on 15 July 1949, the Office of Far Eastern Affairs stated that both Korea and Chiang were attempting to put pressure on Washington via a Pact to extend American aid. The memo noted that the attitudes of Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines to the Pact depended on concern for 'their security in any global conflict', while for Korea and Chiang it was the '[c]oncern for immediate military assistance'. The memo stressed that the US 'would welcome the development of an effective association of non-Communist countries' in SEA 'which might develop into an active anti-Communist front', but the US did not think that the 'Chiang-Quirino-Rhee basis for a Pacific Union' could 'be the beginning of an effective structure'.³² Washington also thought that American participation in such an initiative 'at this early stage ... could give fuel for propaganda of "American imperialism" ' among the small powers.³³ None of the pressures of Australia or the Asian countries had any effect on the US in 1949.

Britain decided to mediate. In September 1949, American and British officials met in Washington to discuss ways for defending 'Southeast Asia against Communism'.³⁴ They discussed the Pact and the Japanese Peace Treaty. M. E. Denning, the Director of Far Eastern Affairs Office of the Foreign Office, stated that Britain was considering the 'desirability' of a Pacific Pact which 'was necessary to the successful resistance [of] Communism in Asia'. Yet Britain concurred that 'neither a political nor a military

³² FRUS, 1949, Vol 7, Part 2, 1160-64, Memorandum by the Policy Information Officer of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Fisher) to the Director of the Office (Butterworth), 15 July 1949.

³³ DNZER, the ANZUS Pact and the Treaty of Peace with Japan, Vol 3, 502, The New Zealand Ambassador, Washington, to The Minister of External Affairs, 15 August 1949. See also: FRUS, 1949, Vol 7, Part 2, 1191-92, Memorandum by Max W. Bishop, of the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk), 24 August 1949.

³⁴ See: Australian Ambassador to the US Norman J. O. Makin's report in NAA, 238898, A5460, 217/6 PART 1, D.D. No. 28/49, 26 September 1949.

regionalism' was 'possible' at that time.³⁵ On the Japanese Peace Treaty, the US considered that the main difficulty could come from Australia but that it had to be overcome.³⁶

At the end of 1949 the State Department began to consider the Pact as a negotiating counter for winning Canberra's support for the conclusion of a soft Japanese Peace Treaty. On 18 November 1949 Butterworth considered 'the possibility that Australia' might 'try to obtain a US security guarantee in return for concurring generally [with] the substance' of American proposals for a Japanese peace settlement. He noted that Australia would seek this security guarantee against 'Japan's economic recovery or the improvement of Japan's international status', and stated that this sort of guarantee 'would almost certainly be unacceptable to India, Burma and Indonesia and probably some other states'. The American security guarantee along the lines Australia wanted would 'be divisive rather than cohesive'. If the US agreed to enter a Pacific defence scheme composed of 'Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand with a few possible additions', this implied that these were the states the US would 'intend to defend and that the rest' were 'being abandoned'. For these reasons Butterworth suggested that the State Department 'should not accede to any request from Australia at this time to provide a security guarantee'.³⁷ A Pacific Pact might be a bargaining counter, but it still was not desirable in Washington.

³⁵ FRUS, 1949, Vol 7, Part 2, 1198, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth), 12 September 1949.

³⁶ FRUS, 1949, Vol 7, Part 2, 858, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State, 13 September 1949.

³⁷ FRUS, 1949, Vol 7, Part 2, 901-902, Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State, 18 November 1949.

London assured Washington that it wanted to press 'vigorously forward with the Japanese Peace Treaty'.³⁸ Bevin said 'the problem was to get the Commonwealth to underwrite and agree on a treaty for Japan, acceptable' to Washington. He added that he was thinking of a Commonwealth foreign ministers' meeting in January 1950, to 'get the Commonwealth together to write the basic provisions of the treaty which would be satisfactory' to the US.³⁹ He asked the US what its strategic interests were in a Japanese peace treaty.

It was not easy for the State Department to reply, because of its discord with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) about the timing of the Treaty.⁴⁰ The JCS argued that before establishing 'Japan's democracy and western orientation', it would be 'premature' to conclude a Treaty;⁴¹ whereas the State Department considered that an early treaty would 'contribute ... to the development within' Japan 'of indigenous resistance to Communism and of spontaneous orientation toward the west, while at the same time' it would maintain American 'essential military requirements with respect to Japan'.⁴² The State Department was not able to give Bevin 'satisfactory answers'.⁴³

At the same time the National Security Council in its NSC 48/2 report on 30 December 1949, argued that Washington 'should make known its sympathy with the efforts of the Asian leaders to form regional associations of non-Communist states', although the US was 'invited to assist such associations' it 'must not take such an

³⁸ FRUS, 1949, Vol 7, Part 2, 1205, Report by Charles W. Yost, Special Assistant to the Ambassador at Large (Jessup), 16 September 1949.

³⁹ FRUS, 1949, Vol 7, Part 2, 859, Memorandum of Conversation by the Secretary of State, 13 September 1949.

⁴⁰ For JCS on the Treaty at the end of 1949 see: FRUS, 1949, Vol 7, Part 2, 922-23, Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson), 22 December 1949.

⁴¹ FRUS, 1949, Vol 7, Part 2, 776, Report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9 June 1949.

⁴² FRUS, 1949, Vol 7, Part 2, 873, Department of State Comments on NSC 49 (15 June 1949), 30 September 1949.

⁴³ FRUS, 1949, Vol 7, Part 2, 901-902, Informal Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Franks), 24 December 1949.

active part in the early stages' because it would 'be subject to the charge of using the Asiatic nations to further' US 'ambitions'.⁴⁴

Washington's confusion let Canberra push its own regional agenda. In December 1949 the Labor Government lost office. Menzies became Prime Minister and Spender Minister for External Affairs. This did not bring a significant change in policy on a Pacific Pact and the fear of a Japanese revival. The only difference was that the new government had fewer reservations about linking itself to Washington,⁴⁵ although the 23-year conservative rule was significant in the long-term in shaping Australia's arm of the wavy cross. James Plimsoll, a member of the Australian Delegation to the UN, stated that the new Australian government would like to cooperate with the US 'as far as possible' on 'Japanese matters' but added that 'such cooperation could be made easier if some sort of definite defence arrangements could be concluded regarding the Pacific' between the US and Australia. He said that Australia's fear regarding Japan was that Japan's 'economic and industrial potential' would be built up 'to a high degree, after which it might be taken over by the USSR and used against the other nations in Asia'. He expressed a point vital to Canberra's strategic thinking: 'if Australia had assurances of joint action' with the US 'in case of trouble in the Pacific, there would not be nearly as much opposition' to US 'plans for a piecemeal treaty with Japan'.⁴⁶ Plimsoll's statement signalled Canberra's readiness to pay the price of accepting a Japanese Peace Treaty in accordance with US interests in order to get a Pacific Pact.

⁴⁴ FRUS, 1949, Vol 7, Part 2, 1215-20, Report to the President by NSC, 30 December 1949.

⁴⁵ T. R. Reese, *Australia, New Zealand and the United States*, 115.

⁴⁶ FRUS, 1949, Vol 7, Part 2, 933, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of North-east Asian Affairs (Allison), 27 December 1949.

This was encouraged by British mediation efforts at a Commonwealth foreign ministers' conference between 9 and 14 January 1950 in Colombo.⁴⁷ Its main theme was the importance of the economic capability of the newly established Asian states, but, there was some discussion of the Pact.⁴⁸

At the beginning of the Conference Spender focused on capital, technical and material assistance to Asia. He said that he did not support a Pacific Pact idea 'at this stage'.⁴⁹ Canberra initially believed that any plan should be discussed with the US rather than the Asian countries.

This view changed during the conference. There was a private meeting between Bevin and Spender and Frederick W. Doidge, New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs, on 13 January 1950. Bevin tried to convince Australia and New Zealand to adopt a conciliatory solution to the Pacific Pact and the Japanese Peace Treaty. He stated that Britain was in need of Australia's and New Zealand's support in the Middle East. Spender replied that Australia's support to Britain in the Middle East would depend on the extent of the American guarantee in the Pacific. He added that Washington was reluctant to give such a guarantee. Bevin replied that this was because of 'the fear about security leaks and because [the] State Department had been "put out" by Evatt's complaints about Anglo-American discussions over Japan'. He was confident of the American wish for close cooperation with Australia and suggested that Spender visit the US 'as soon as possible'.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ For details see: NAA, 169958, A816, 11/301/720, *Colombo Conference - Colombo Plan. British Commonwealth Consultative Committee for Asia and South East Asia*.

⁴⁸ NAA, 169958, A816, 11/301/720, Commonwealth Meeting on Foreign Affairs, Minutes of the First Meeting held in the Senate Building Colombo, 9 January 1950.

⁴⁹ NAA, 169958, A816, 11/301/720, Commonwealth Meeting on Foreign Affairs, Minutes of the Second Meeting held in the Senate Building Colombo, 9 January 1950.

⁵⁰ PRO DO 35/2773, Record of meeting between Bevin, Spender and Doidge, 13 January 1950, in D. McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact*, 257-58.

Spender then changed his position slightly at the Conference, saying that 'Australia had a special interest on strategical grounds in the Atlantic Pact and he thought that it would be necessary, unless the Russian menace abated, to have regard more and more to the possibility of a similar regional pact for the Pacific area'.⁵¹ Spender had stressed the importance of a Pacific Pact in a Commonwealth forum, and afterwards he accelerated efforts to convince the Americans about a Pacific Pact. By frequently stressing its importance for the defence of SEA, and the necessity of it, he became a significant actor in this matter.

At the same time the State Department accelerated its efforts to deal with the escalating communist threat in Asia, especially after the conclusion of the 30 Year Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance treaty between China and the USSR, nearly a month after the conference. This development made the State Department 'increasingly alarmed at the situation in South-East Asia'. It felt 'that "someone must do something quickly"'.⁵²

On 20 February 1950 Spender stated that the USSR 'had had a great victory in China'. As a result China 'would certainly be a Communist ... state in the future, co-operating closely with Russia'. 'In these circumstances', he continued, 'having regard to the increasing penetration of Communism throughout the South-East Asian area ... some sort of regional security must be evolved in this area'. This 'would be only a meaningless gesture' without the US. Australia, New Zealand, Britain and other Commonwealth countries 'might well form the initial basis of a Pacific Pact'. Later

⁵¹ NAA, 169958, A816, 11/301/720, Commonwealth Meeting on Foreign Affairs, Minutes of the Ninth Meeting held in the Senate Building Colombo, 13 January 1950.

⁵² DNZER, the ANZUS Pact and the Treaty of Peace with Japan, Vol 3, 514, the New Zealand Ambassador, Washington to the Minister of External Affairs, 22 February 1950.

'other countries might then' be invited to join 'particularly' the US.⁵³ This was a change in Australia's emphasis on a Pacific Pact. China had become Communist, and Spender now stressed the significance of the Communist threat in Asia, previously of little importance to Australia, and linked a Pacific Pact to this threat. In short Spender moved a little closer to Washington. Presumably he expected a positive reaction from the State Department.

On 24 February Spender asked to see the American Ambassador in Australia, Peterson Bryant Jarman, to get Washington's reaction to his reformulated views. Jarman informed the State Department of them, and asked for instructions in responding to them.⁵⁴ It replied that it considered 'the development of regional coalition [in] SEA more important to its future plans' than it had 'in the past'. However '[w]hat ultimate relation US would have to such organization would naturally be impossible to forecast'.⁵⁵ Amid such vagueness, Spender's reformulated views were not discouraged, but attracted little attention. Australia needed a serious crisis in SEA or clearer American views on the Japanese Peace Treaty.

After a series of meetings, in March 1950 the State Department clarified its stance on the Treaty, and thus on the Pact.⁵⁶ Its memorandum on 9 March was particularly important in linking the Treaty to the Pact. It stated that 'as a matter of urgency' the US should 'conduct diplomatic discussions with other friendly governments for the purpose of obtaining their concurrence in going forward with the conclusion of a

⁵³ DNZER, the ANZUS Pact and the Treaty of Peace with Japan, Vol 3, 515-16, the Official Secretary, Office of the High Commissioner for New Zealand, Canberra, to the Secretary of External Affairs, 22 February 1950. See also: NAA, 238898, A5460, 217/6 PART 1, External Affairs to Australian Embassy in Washington, 24 February 1950.

⁵⁴ FRUS, 1950, Vol 6, 26, the Ambassador in Australia (Jarman) to the Secretary of State, 24 February 1950.

⁵⁵ FRUS, 1950, Vol 6, 26-27, the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Australia, 25 February 1950.

⁵⁶ FRUS, 1950, Vol 6, 1138-49, Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary (Howard) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth), 9 March 1950.

Japanese peace treaty and a Pacific collective security arrangement'. It suggested that Pact 'membership would include, initially,' the US, 'Canada, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand and Japan'. It rejected the membership of Britain, France and the Netherlands because this 'would require in turn the inclusion of Hong Kong, the Malayan States, Indochina and Indonesia with a consequent unacceptable extension of the security commitment of the participating nations and with the consequent introduction of an unfortunate imperialistic aspect into the arrangement; ... British prestige in the Pacific should be adequately assured through the security system of the British Commonwealth of nations'. The Pact's underlying principle would be 'collective self-defense', so it would 'facilitate the signature by other members of a non-punitive peace treaty with Japan and help to assure them against a resurgence of Japanese aggression'. It would also 're[i]nforce measures for the strengthening of Indochina and other non-communist South East Asian countries and provide a backstop that would assist in their protection against Soviet-Communist expansion'. Because the USSR and Communist China might not attend a conference on the Japanese Peace Treaty, under a Pacific Pact 'a large number of countries' would attend and sign, giving it 'a solid international backing ... in spite of the refusal of the USSR and Communist China to participate'.⁵⁷

This memo showed that for the State Department the Peace Treaty was still the dominant issue, but that the Pact could be a useful tool in achieving it. Yet, the Department still decided to focus more on the 'political and economic problems generally dealt with in a peace treaty' than to 'work out a satisfactory solution of the security problem'.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ FRUS, 1950, Vol 6, 1140-49, Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary (Howard) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth), 9 March 1950.

⁵⁸ FRUS, 1950, Vol 6, 1158, Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary (Howard) to the Minister in France (Bohlen) 31 March 1950.

On the day of the memo, Spender reiterated in Parliament his view on the necessity of US membership of the Pact. He said that the Pact should be ‘“a defensive military arrangement”’ of which the nucleus might be formed by Australia, Britain and the other Commonwealth countries. American participation was vital otherwise the Pact would be ‘meaningless’.⁵⁹ This was quite close to those of the State Department’s memo, and the Americans welcomed Spender’s words. On 15 March 1950 Dean Acheson, the US Secretary of State, said that the US was ‘much interested in a statement on Australian foreign policy made to the Australian House of Representatives by Mr. Spender ... on March 9’. The US ‘welcome[d] the statement’.⁶⁰ Spender’s comments also attracted positive media attention in Washington.⁶¹ At the beginning of 1950, Washington and Canberra were moving towards an understanding.⁶² Since Britain would be excluded from the Pact, these two would be the main partners in its formation.

On 6 April 1950, the Department of State announced the appointment of John Foster Dulles as Consultant to the Secretary of State. Dulles would deal with the peace treaties on a global scale but with particular reference to Japan.⁶³ After his appointment Dulles examined the idea of the Pacific Pact and commented that ‘such

⁵⁹ FRUS, 1950, Vol 6, 45, the Ambassador in Australia (Jarman) to the Secretary of State, 10 March 1950; *Sydney Morning Herald* 10 March 1950 in NAA, 11129481, A1838, 250/7/10B. At the beginning of March Carl Berendsen, New Zealand Ambassador to Washington, also put forward a proposal of a Pacific Pact. For details see: D. McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact*, 261-64, I. McGibbon (ed), *Undiplomatic dialogue: letters between Carl Berendsen and Alister McIntosh*, 1943-52, 205. See also: DNZER, the ANZUS Pact and the Treaty of Peace with Japan, Vol 3, 522-36, The New Zealand Ambassador, Washington, to the Minister of External Affairs, 14 March 1950.

⁶⁰ US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol XXII, 467-72, 27 March 1950. See also: NAA, 238898, A5460, 217/6 PART 1, from the Australian Embassy, Washington to the Department of External Affairs, 18 March 1950.

⁶¹ NAA, 246863, A1838, 250/7/10 PART 1, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Washington to the Department of External Affairs, 13 March 1950.

⁶² NAA, 238898, A5460, 217/6 PART 1, Memorandum from Australian Embassy in Washington to the Department of External Affairs, 17 April 1950.

⁶³ FRUS, 1950, Vol 6, 1160.

pacts' would lead the US 'to draw lines which included some countries and excluded others', thus it was not favorable.⁶⁴

The State Department's view was conveyed to Spender on 19 April 1950.⁶⁵ It stated that the 'fundamental objectives of US policy toward Australia' were firstly to obtain Australia's support for US policies 'in the development of a democratic order in Japan', secondly 'to discourage Australia from taking positions which hinder' the US 'in achieving these objectives, particularly in the case of the Japanese occupation'.⁶⁶ Australia was becoming more significant in Washington's strategic considerations.

A link between the Treaty and the Pact was made in a State Department memorandum on 14 April, which suggested 'a multilateral security arrangement participated in by the powers which initially negotiated the peace treaty and Japan'. These powers 'would perhaps include' the US, Britain, 'France, possibly the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines'.⁶⁷ This shows the Department still juggling with membership. How exclusive the Pact would be was the main remaining obstacle.

The State Department next moved to persuade the JCS to accept its new position. State and Defence Department officials met on 24 April 1950.⁶⁸ Acheson argued that the Peace Treaty should be 'non-punitive in nature' and 'at the same time a security arrangement should be entered into with the FEC [Far Eastern Commission]

⁶⁴ FRUS, 1950, Vol 6, 1162, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Assistant to the Secretary (Howard), 7 April 1950.

⁶⁵ FRUS, 1950, Vol 6, 81, The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Australia, 19 April 1950.

⁶⁶ FRUS, 1950, Vol 6, 190, Department of State Policy Statement, 21 April 1950.

⁶⁷ FRUS, 1950, Vol 6, 1173.

⁶⁸ FRUS, 1950, Vol 6, 1175-82, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Assistant to the Secretary (Howard), 24 April 1950.

countries'.⁶⁹ He stated that Britain and the 'Pacific members of the Commonwealth are all anxious for a peace treaty' and the latter 'would welcome the continued presence of U.S. forces in Japan and if some such security arrangement were not made they would insist upon a very punitive peace treaty'.⁷⁰ He was not successful in changing JCS' thinking. Depending on the 'developments and the uncertainties in the changing situation in the Far East' the JCS still thought that 'a peace treaty was premature'.⁷¹

On 25 June North Korea attacked the South. The Korean War became the main accelerator for both the Pact and the Treaty. It gave Canberra the chance to advance its claims on the importance of a Pacific Pact. Spender did not miss this opportunity. On 26 June he highlighted the urgency of a Pacific Pact because of the seriousness of events on the Korean Peninsula.⁷² Canberra also strengthened its claim for a Pact by entering the war on the side of Washington. This followed the British Cabinet's decision to send assistance to Korea.⁷³

Canberra's decision had two main phases. The first was responding to the UN plea to assist South Korea; the second was responding to a specific US appeal for ground troops.⁷⁴ On 27 June, the US asked for a 'clear indication from' Australia about its prospective support for South Korea.⁷⁵ Australia was reluctant to commit itself totally

⁶⁹ FRUS, 1950, Vol 6, 1176, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Assistant to the Secretary (Howard), 24 April 1950.

⁷⁰ FRUS, 1950, Vol 6, 1180, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Assistant to the Secretary (Howard), 24 April 1950.

⁷¹ FRUS, 1950, Vol 6, 1177, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Assistant to the Secretary (Howard), 24 April 1950.

⁷² AWMA, 505283, AWM89, B1/44, Statement by the Minister for External Affairs (Spender), 26 June 1950.

⁷³ PRO CAB 128/17, CM 50, 39th Conclusions, 27 June 1950.

⁷⁴ For details see: R. O'Neill, *Australia in the Korean War*, Vol 1, 45-77; AWMA, 505283, AWM89, B1/44.

⁷⁵ AWMA, 505283, AWM89, B1/44, Cablegram from the Australian Delegation to the United Nations Assembly, New York to the Department of External Affairs, 26 June 1950 [received 27 June 1950].

to the conflict before knowing British and American plans.⁷⁶ Truman's decision to provide naval and air support to South Korea⁷⁷ and British Prime Minister Clement Richard Attlee's decision to place the Royal Naval forces 'in Japanese waters at the disposal' of the US to support South Korea⁷⁸ narrowed Australia's options.⁷⁹ On 30 June the Menzies government decided to commit a Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) fighter squadron stationed in Japan to South Korea.⁸⁰

The second phase of Australia's commitment to the War was the deployment of ground troops. The first sign of a demand for Australian ground troops came in mid-July. On 13 July John Allison, Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs in the State Department, briefly alluded to the possibility of Australian ground forces in Korea.⁸¹ The next day UN Secretary, General Trygve Lie, sent a telegram to all UN members supporting the UN action in Korea and calling for an increase in their force contributions.⁸²

The most effective figure in Australia's ground force deployment to Korea was Spender. On 17 July he conveyed his anxieties to Menzies about Australia's lack of response to Lie's telegram: 'From Australia's long-term point of view any additional aid [Australia] can give to the US..., small though it may be, will repay [Australia] in the future one hundred fold'. He added that if Australia refrained from 'giving any

⁷⁶ AWMA, 505283, AWM89, B1/44, Cablegram from the Department of External Affairs to the Australian High Commission, London, 27 June 1950; AWMA, 505283, AWM89, B1/44, Cablegram from the Department of External Affairs to the Australian Embassy, Washington, 27 June 1950; R. O'Neill, *Australia in the Korean War*, Vol 1, 49.

⁷⁷ NAA, 140902, A1838, 3123/5 PART 1, Official Text of President Truman's Statement as Read out at 2.30 a.m. over the Voice of America, 28 June 1950.

⁷⁸ NAA, 140902, A1838, 3123/5 PART 1, Cablegram from the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, London, to the Department of External Affairs, 28 June 1950.

⁷⁹ R. O'Neill, *Australia in the Korean War*, Vol 1, 50.

⁸⁰ NAA, 140902, A1838, 3123/5 PART 1, Press Release 93/1950, Korea, Statement by the Prime Minister, 30 June 1950.

⁸¹ NAA, 395539, A816, 19/323/14, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Washington to the Department of External Affairs, 13 July 1950.

⁸² NAA, 395539, A816, 19/323/14, Cablegram from the Australian Mission to the UN, New York to the Department of External Affairs, 14 July 1950.

further aid [it] may lose an opportunity of cementing friendship with the US which may not easily present itself again'.⁸³ Australia's reaction thus paralleled Turkey's, and for parallel reasons. The lines of the wavy cross were about the meet.

On 21 July Spender wrote to Menzies that an Australian decision to send naval and air forces should be 'an independent decision, conveyed independently' to the US rather than via Britain. Such a move would help Australia make 'a strong impression on official and unofficial American opinion'.⁸⁴ Spender 'warned that there had been criticism of British policy' in the US and the 'warmth of the Australian-American relations, which had increased since the outbreak of the Korean conflict, could be diminished if Australia was too closely identified with Britain in Washington'.⁸⁵ He wanted to show both Australia's independent loyalty to the American course in a serious crisis in SEA and the value of a Pacific Pact with US membership.

On 24 July Spender stated Australia's readiness to increase its assistance to South Korea, after Menzies' talks with British and American authorities. This, he said, 'would be far more likely to fit into the general pattern of the global responsibilities and the defensive needs of democratic nations as a whole'.⁸⁶

Spender's statement attracted US military attention. Following a deterioration in the allied position in South Korea, UN commander, Douglas MacArthur requested an Australian battalion. His request reached Canberra on 26 July.⁸⁷ That day James Marjoribanks, Official Secretary of the British High Commission in Canberra,

⁸³ R. O'Neill, *Australia in the Korean War*, Vol 1, 65.

⁸⁴ AWMA, 505305, AWM89, B1/47, Cablegram for the Prime Minister from Spender, 21 July 1950.

⁸⁵ R. O'Neill, *Australia in the Korean War*, Vol 1, 68.

⁸⁶ AWMA, 505305, AWM89, B1/47, Statement by the Minister for External Affairs (Spender), 24 July 1950.

⁸⁷ R. O'Neill, *Australia in the Korean War*, Vol 1, 73.

informed Alan Watt, Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, that London would announce its decision to send troops to Korea at 8 pm Eastern Australian time. Watt conveyed this to Spender. Spender did not want to let London announce a decision so vital to American benevolence before Canberra. Since Menzies was away, Spender rushed to Arthur Fadden, the deputy Prime Minister, to persuade him that Australia should announce its decision before London, and that it would be too late if they waited to consult Menzies. Fadden agreed. At 7 pm, ahead of the British, the Australian Broadcasting Commission made the announcement.⁸⁸ As Spender expected, 'the response of Australia and New Zealand to American calls for assistance in Korea generated undoubted goodwill in the United States, which was a helpful background factor in the discussions about a security guarantee'.⁸⁹

This view was shared by Norman Makin, the Australian Ambassador in Washington. He stated that the State Department had shown 'genuine gratification' at Australia's quick response to Korea, and reported that Livingston L. Satterthwaite, the US Deputy Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, understood that the Korean War gave a new impulse to the State Department to consider Spender's Pact initiative.⁹⁰ On 19 July Truman's statement to Congress strengthened this impulse. Truman commented on Australia's and New Zealand's support in Korea and added that 'we must assist free nations associated with us in common defence to augment their military strength', by increasing 'the strength of the

⁸⁸ NAA, 140940, A1838, 3123/7/3/1 PART 1, Cablegram from the Department of External Affairs, 27 July 1950. See also: R. O'Neill, *Australia in the Korean War*, Vol 1, 75-76, D. McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact*, 277; A. Watt, *Australian Diplomat*, 173-76; P. Spender, *Politics and a Man*, 280-85. Neither Spender nor Watt knew that they were beaten by Wellington. New Zealand Prime Minister Sidney Holland announced his decision to send troops to Korea, at 5.30 pm Canberra time. See: D. McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact*, 271.

⁸⁹ D. McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact*, 269.

⁹⁰ NAA, 246863, A1838, 250/7/10 PART 1, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Washington to the Department of External Affairs, 29 June 1950.

other free nations [whose] security is vital' to the US.⁹¹ Truman's statement confirmed Spender's expectations about Washington's appreciation of Australia's support.

Some obstacles to the Pact remained in Washington. First, although Washington appreciated Australia's increased commitment in Korea, it did not change US priorities. The Treaty remained more important than the Pact. In August and early September 1950, the State Department and the JCS considered drafts of the Treaty.⁹² On 7 September the Secretaries of State and Defence agreed on a draft of the Treaty and submitted it to Truman.⁹³ This submission was significant because it highlighted the security aspects of the Treaty, on which the JCS and the State Department had formerly had difficulty in agreeing. As the next step, the Department of State was to 'undertake confidential preliminary discussion[s] through the diplomatic channel with friendly powers on the Far Eastern Commission'.⁹⁴ On 14 September Truman authorized the State Department 'to initiate informal discussions as to future procedure' of the treaty with the members of the FEC.⁹⁵

Another obstacle was discord within the State Department on the very idea of a Pacific Pact. One critic was Dean Rusk. He considered that the Pact would exclude some Asian countries, thus turning the pact into a ' "white" association'. He 'doubted the practicability or value of such a project'.⁹⁶

⁹¹ NAA, 246863, A1838, 250/7/10 PART 1, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Washington to the Department of External Affairs, 21 July 1950.

⁹² FRUS, 1950, Vol 6, 1267-93.

⁹³ FRUS, 1950, Vol 6, 1293-96, the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defence (Johnson), 7 September 1950. For the draft treaty see: FRUS, 1950, Vol 6, 1297-1303, Draft of a Peace Treaty with Japan, 11 September 1950.

⁹⁴ FRUS, 1950, Vol 6, 1295, the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defence (Johnson), 7 September 1950.

⁹⁵ US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol XXIII, 513, 25 September 1950.

⁹⁶ NAA, 246863, A1838, 250/7/10 PART 1, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Washington to the Department of External Affairs, 3 August 1950.

In Canberra too there was no consensus on the viability or urgency of the Pact. Spender and Menzies had differing views. Menzies was not a strong supporter of the Pact. One of the most obvious indications of this was his talking points during his Washington visit from 27 July to 7 August. At a meeting with Truman on 28 July, he talked mainly about the 'importance of development in the basic industries and housing and in irrigation projects'.⁹⁷ That night Menzies did discuss the Treaty with Dulles, the Secretary of State. Menzies 'did not believe that the treaty should impose economic and military restrictions upon the Japanese except possibly restricting their right to build a navy with offensive capabilities'. Dulles 'was glad to hear this', as it coincided 'very largely' with US views.⁹⁸ Menzies met Dulles again on 31 July, mentioned Australia's 'wholehearted' help to Korea, Australia's migration program, and the funds necessary for development projects.⁹⁹ On 3 August Menzies wrote to Fadden that the Americans were not really considering a Pacific Pact because of the instability of the Asian countries. He added that Australia did not need a Pact with the US because the Americans were 'already overwhelmingly friendly' to Australia.¹⁰⁰ Menzies was ready to fall in with US views.

Nonetheless, Spender continued to highlight the urgency of the Pact. He went to Washington on 13-14 September before going to New York as head of the Australian delegation to the Fifth UN General Assembly.¹⁰¹ He met Truman on 13 September and talked about Australia's problem in ' "not having a say" in most of the important

⁹⁷ FRUS, 1950, Vol 6, 204-205, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State, 28 July 1950.

⁹⁸ FRUS, 1950, Vol 6, 1261-62, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Consultant to the Secretary (Dulles), 29 July 1950. On 14 August Menzies talked to William J. Sebald, Acting U.S. Political Adviser in Japan, in Tokyo. Sebald reported that Menzies was 'definitely convinced [the Japanese Peace] treaty should be negotiated without further delay, not only because Japan in [its] present anomalous position [was] unable to contribute its share toward stability and peace in Asia, but because of long-range necessity making Japan [a] firm ally of West'. See: FRUS, 1950, Vol 6, 1262.

⁹⁹ FRUS, 1950, Vol 6, 205-206, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State, 31 July 1950.

¹⁰⁰ R. O'Neill, *Australia in the Korean War*, Vol 1, 87. Menzies also told the British that the Pacific Pact was 'Percy Spender's baby'. PRO DO 35/2775, Garner to Liesching, 19 September 1950 in D. McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact*, 282. See also: NAA, 238898, A5460, 217/6 PART 1, Memorandum from the Australian Embassy in Washington to the Department of External Affairs, 4 August 1950.

¹⁰¹ FRUS, 1950, Vol 6, 212. For his account of visit see: P. Spender, *Exercises in Diplomacy: the ANZUS Treaty and the Colombo Plan*, 37-42.

international decisions'. Rather these decisions 'were being made ... by the Atlantic Pact Powers and the European powers under the leadership of "Big Three" '. He raised the question of the Pacific Pact. Truman expressed sympathy with Australia's stance and suggested that Spender take up the details with Acheson.¹⁰² On the same day Spender gave a press conference in which he again emphasized the necessity of a Pacific Pact. He repeated that 'any pact' without the US ' "would be" ' meaningless.¹⁰³

On 14 September Spender talked to Congressional leaders about the Pact. He repeated Australia's desire for a Pact 'similar in terms to' NATO which would enable 'Australia and New Zealand and other interested countries to act more freely and effectively in the event of the outbreak of a global war'. He suggested that the Pacific Pact might be composed of 'Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Canada, Great Britain, the United States, Mexico, and appropriate South and Central American states bordering upon the Pacific.'¹⁰⁴ This hoped to mitigate Rusk's concerns about the Pact's exclusiveness.

On 18 September Spender met Acheson in New York and reiterated Australia's concerns about global decision making and the Pacific Pact. Acheson focused mainly on the importance of the Japanese Peace Treaty. He declared that 'the best place to

¹⁰² FRUS, 1950, Vol 6, 212-13, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of Protocol (Simmons), 13 September 1950. See also: *New York Herald Tribune*, 14 September 1950 in NAA, 238898, A5460, 217/6 PART 1.

¹⁰³ NAA, 238898, A5460, 217/6 PART 1, *The Baltimore Sun* 14 September 1950; NAA, 238898, A5460, 217/6 PART 1, External Affairs to Australian Embassy in Washington, 14 September 1950; NAA, 139965, A1838, 88/1/4, Extract from ABC News, 14 September 1950; NAA, 11129481, A1838, 250/7/10B, *Canberra Times* 15 September 1950.

¹⁰⁴ FRUS, 1950, Vol 6, 214-17, Memorandum of Conversation, by Horace H. Smith, Senate Liaison Officer, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, 14 September 1950. For the effect of Spender's visit on the State Department see: FRUS, 1950, Vol 6, 218-22, Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Secretary of State, 15 September 1950.

discuss these matters was in the treaty negotiations'.¹⁰⁵ The State Department had not budged. On 22 September Spender talked to Dulles and other US officials, who noted a difference between Menzies and Spender on 'a "liberal" ' Peace Treaty. Spender 'expressed the intent of his Government to hold out for a Pacific Pact as the price for a liberal treaty with Japan'.¹⁰⁶ He was not totally against a soft peace treaty with Japan if he could secure the Pacific Pact. He wanted 'an "unequivocal" reaction from the' US.¹⁰⁷

On 9 October the State Department offered a solution to the membership problem of the Pact - a trilateral agreement between Australia, New Zealand and the US, with the acronym ANZUS. The idea was conveyed to both Phillip Jessup, US Ambassador-at-Large and to Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs.¹⁰⁸

Rusk found the proposal appealing. He reiterated the American view that the State Department was open-minded with regards the Pact and conceded that 'the choice of members would at the outset introduce problems which might vitiate [the American] position in the Far East, considerably weaken[ing] the effect of the pact'. However a trilateral agreement with Australia and New Zealand would tighten their relationships with the US, and this would 'be of increasing importance to [the US] during the coming year', in view of 'the peculiarly difficult problems of the post-hostilities security and reconstruction of Korea and the negotiation of a Japanese peace treaty'. He

¹⁰⁵ FRUS, 1950, Vol 6, 222-23, Memorandum of Conversation by the Secretary of State, 18 September 1950.

¹⁰⁶ FRUS, 1950, Vol 6, 1308. For details of the Spender-Dulles meeting see: P. Spender, *Exercises in Diplomacy: the ANZUS Treaty and the Colombo Plan*, 44-48.

¹⁰⁷ FRUS, 1950, Vol 6, 1321.

¹⁰⁸ D. McIntyre, *Background to the Anzus Pact*, 286.

thought such an agreement might satisfy Canberra's needs.¹⁰⁹ Thus the idea of ANZUS was first raised in the State Department although it did not propose it officially.

The next US move was to clarify Canberra's views on the Pact. Acheson asked the American representative at the UN to talk informally with Spender to 'ascertain more specifically what he has in mind'. He repeated that Washington was 'open-minded' on the subject, but had some reservations in becoming the proposer of it, and in the selection of its members, which might lead a 'misunderstanding' of 'US motives' among Asian states.¹¹⁰

On 12 October, Spender told US officials that the Pact should have 'a provision substantially similar to Article five' of NATO. He suggested that the members should be Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, the US, Britain and Canada. Indonesia 'should be asked but would probably ... refuse'. The Pact's operating area would extend 'through Indonesia, Malaya, Thailand', which would make it easier for Australia to send troops to this region if war came. The Pact was necessary to satisfy public opinion on the assurance of American assistance, even if there were 'no danger of Australia being attacked and no probability that they would ever be attacked without a simultaneous attack' on the US. US officials understood from Spender that the US 'ideas for a "soft" peace with Japan would be very difficult to sell without the counter balance of a pact',¹¹¹ but suggested that a visit of 'a high level Australian military mission' to Washington 'which had direct access to top echelons

¹⁰⁹ FRUS, 1950, Vol 6, 147-48, Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Matthews), 9 October 1950.

¹¹⁰ FRUS, 1950, Vol 6, 148-49, the Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin), 12 October 1950.

¹¹¹ FRUS, 1950, Vol 6, 149-52, Memorandum of Conversation, by Ward P. Allen, Adviser, United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, 12 October 1950.

and participated in formulating decisions' which involved Canberra's 'major interests' would be sufficient.¹¹² Clearly Washington still had not accepted Canberra's stance.

Spender reported to Canberra that he conveyed to both Dulles and Rusk that any American proposal on the Japanese Peace Treaty with 'no limitation upon' Japan's 'rearmament ... was completely unacceptable' to Australia. At the same time he tried nearly every option to build up a perception in Washington that the Pacific Pact should be concluded as soon as possible. He made his views closer to Washington's, offered different membership structures, and even declared that Australia would not support the Treaty without the Pact.¹¹³

While Washington was considering the prospective side effects of the Pacific Pact, in November China intervened in the Korean War. This seriously increased the State Department's anxieties and significantly accelerated the Japanese Peace Treaty and the Pacific Pact.¹¹⁴ As with Turkey the Korean War came to Australia's aid.

In a memorandum to the Secretary of State on 8 December 1950, Dulles suggested that there 'should be a prompt effort definitely to commit Japan, spiritually and politically, to the cause of the free world'. Furthermore, rather than continuing with the intra-departmental conflicts on the Treaty, the 'only practical procedure is to send to Japan a mission, which, bearing in mind U.S. capabilities and objectives ... would ascertain what, if any, arrangement were feasible'. He also suggested that it 'may be necessary to have a Pacific Pact, initially of Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the

¹¹² FRUS, 1950, Vol 6, 225, Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Secretary of State, 27 October 1950.

¹¹³ NAA, 238898, A5460, 217/6 PART 1, Spender to Watt, 2 November 1950. See also: NAA, 3001613, A6768, EATS 77 PART 1, Spender to Watt, 2 November 1950.

¹¹⁴ For details see: R. O'Neill, *Australia in the Korean War*, Vol 1, 143-159.

Philippines, the United States, and perhaps Indonesia'.¹¹⁵ He seemed to admit that the Pact would be a necessary leverage for the Treaty.

Other State Department officials repeated this. John K. Emmerson, the Regional Planning Adviser in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, stated that recent 'developments in Korea have increased the urgency of developing Japan's resistance to Communism and Japan's ability to assume a responsible and secure position in the non-Communist Pacific community'. In order to achieve this, 'the cooperation of other off-shore Pacific nations is highly important'. He proposed a Pacific Declaration, which he assumed would be particularly important in obtaining 'the agreement of Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and possibly Canada and Indonesia' to a treaty.¹¹⁶

On 3 January 1951, the State Department attempted to clarify the boundaries of the Pacific Pact with the Pacific Ocean Pact Declaration, also known as the island chain proposal. According to the JCS, the Pact 'should be strictly confined to the island nations of the Pacific (Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, the United States, and possibly Indonesia)'. Neither Britain nor most Asian nations would be members. The JCS stated its desire for Australia's membership because of its 'belief that if Australia were re-assured as to its defense in the Pacific area it would be in a position to give more assistance to the general cause in the Middle East',¹¹⁷ where Britain needed help. This would mollify prospective British reactions to its exclusion from the proposed pact.

¹¹⁵ FRUS, 1950, Vol 6, 1359-60, Memorandum by the Consultant to the Secretary (Dulles) to the Secretary of State, 8 December 1950.

¹¹⁶ For details see: FRUS, 1950, Vol 6, 1360-63, Memorandum by the Regional Planning Adviser in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Emmerson), 12 December 12, 1950.

¹¹⁷ FRUS, 1951, Vol 6, Part 1, 132-34, Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Consultant (Allison) to the Ambassador at Large (Jessup), 4 January 1951.

The island chain proposal was Washington's attempt to convince Australia of American security support, thereby securing Canberra's support for the Japanese Peace Treaty. It was to give what it thought 'sufficient reassurance to Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines' so that they would 'consent to a peace with Japan which' would 'not contain limitations upon rearmament'. 'In view of the interdependence of the Pact and the proposed Japanese peace', the US 'should not become committed to the Pact' unless it was 'assured that the other Parties' would 'agree to the kind of a Japanese peace that the United States feels' was necessary'.¹¹⁸ The State Department had finally clarified its views about the link between the Treaty and the Pact and Australia's role in this link.

Yet comparing Spender's stance with Washington's island chain proposal shows that Australia and the US still had not achieved solid common ground. To achieve this and to accelerate the Peace Treaty, on 10 January 1951 Truman designated Dulles as 'Special Representative of the President with the personal rank of Ambassador, and instructed him as to general policy with regard to a Japanese peace treaty and to potential defence arrangements in the Pacific area'. Dulles' main mission would be to secure the treaty and if necessary to conclude 'a mutual assistance arrangement' among the nations listed in the Pact proposal.¹¹⁹ Truman wanted to speed up the Peace Treaty. If the price to be paid was the Pact, Washington would pay it.

This was nearly two months after Spender's visit to the US, and he still had no clear reply to his proposals. He asked Makin to 'make a formal approach to [the] State

¹¹⁸ FRUS, 1951, Vol 6, Part 1, 134-37, Memorandum by John Foster Dulles, the Consultant to the Secretary, to the Ambassador at Large (Jessup), 4 January 1951.

¹¹⁹ FRUS, 1951, Vol 6, Part 1, 137-38. For Truman's letter see: FRUS, 1951, Vol 6, 788-89.

Department' on the regional pact and Australia's role in global decision making.¹²⁰ Makin met Satterthwaite and reported that the 'main stream of events was carrying' the US 'in the direction' that Australia 'desired'.¹²¹ Nevertheless it would take a little more time for Washington to align with Australia.

Before the State Department conveyed its official reply to Spender, two important observations were made in Washington. George W. Perkins, the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, voiced a suspicion that even if the Australians secured a Pacific Pact they might not give the necessary backing to a Japanese Peace Treaty on American terms. The State Department needed to be sure of Canberra's position. Perkins therefore suggested that the State Department get the approval of the Defence Department for Spender's proposal to send a high level Australian military mission to Washington. It would then be possible to use the State Department's 'willingness to accept the mission as a bargaining lever in the discussions with Australia on the Japanese Peace settlement'.¹²² The second observation was by the JCS. It found the idea of the visit of an Australian military mission 'negligible' and not advantageous.¹²³ Thus the State Department's official reply to Spender was only the announcement of Dulles' visit to Canberra after his Tokyo meetings, to talk about the Japanese Peace Treaty and the Pacific Pact.¹²⁴ John M. Allison, director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department, invited New Zealand to Canberra for

¹²⁰ NAA, 271757, A1838, TS250/7/10, from Spender to the Australian Embassy in Washington, 9 January 1951.

¹²¹ FRUS, 1951, Vol 6, Part 1, 138, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and North European Affairs (Satterthwaite), 11 January 1951; NAA, 271757, A1838, TS250/7/10, Australian Embassy in Washington to the Department of External Affairs, 11 January 1951.

¹²² FRUS, 1951, Vol 6, Part 1, 140-41, Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to John Foster Dulles, Consultant to the Secretary, 15 January 1951. For the Defence Strategy of the US on Asia at the beginning of 1951 see: NAA, 140019, A1838, 250/7/1B, *United States of America - External - General - Political*.

¹²³ FRUS, 1951, Vol 6, Part 1, 140-41, Marshall to Acheson, 16 January 1951.

¹²⁴ NAA, 424476, A5460, 217/6 PART 2, Australian Embassy in Washington to Department of External Affairs, 17 January 1951.

the Dulles visit.¹²⁵ The visit would attempt to help the US understand Canberra's and Wellington's views, then achieve a solution for the link between the Pact and the Treaty.

Before arriving in Canberra, Dulles had to appease the British, who were not happy with their exclusion from the island chain proposal. On 2 February 1951, he met Sir Alvary Gascoigne, the Foreign Office representative on the British Liaison Mission at MacArthur's headquarters, to explain why Britain should not join the Pact. Gascoigne outlined the advantages and disadvantages of the island chain proposal and added that the Foreign Office was 'strongly opposed to idea of a Pacific which would exclude' Britain. Dulles replied that the 'island chain of [the] Aleutians, Japan, Ryukyus, Philippines, Indonesia ... Australia, and New Zealand' were 'so interconnected that an attack on one link would jeopardize entire chain'. No British 'territory formed [a] link in this particular chain'. However, the US 'recognized' that Britain 'had [a] Commonwealth concern in security of Australia and New Zealand and on this account, and if disposed to contribute sea and air power to [the] defense of [the] chain', Britain 'might be an appropriate charter member of any consultative group'.¹²⁶ Britain's main concern about its exclusion from the Pacific Pact negotiations and the draft scheme was that Australia and New Zealand, because of the Pact, might find themselves heavily bonded with the developments in SEA and be unable to meet Australia's and New Zealand's commitments in the Middle East.¹²⁷

Washington was not the only party anxious about the British reaction to its exclusion from the Pact. In Canberra there was an '[u]nspoken fear' about the 'possible

¹²⁵ DNZER, the ANZUS Pact and the Treaty of Peace with Japan, Vol 3, 438-41, the New Zealand Ambassador in Washington to the Minister of External Affairs, 19 January 1951.

¹²⁶ FRUS, 1951, Vol 6, Part 1, 143-44, the United States Political Adviser to SCAP (Sebald) to the Secretary of State, 2 February 1951. See also: FRUS, 1951, Vol 6, Part 1, 145, The United States Political Adviser to SOAP (Sebald) to the Secretary of State, 2 February 1951.

¹²⁷ For details see: D. McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact*, 303.

complications arising from any move' by Britain that 'might limit freedom of exchanges and, possibly, militate against conclusions satisfactory to Australia and New Zealand'.¹²⁸ Australia's concerns were basically Spender's. Menzies did not have the same desire for a formal pact. On 6 February 1951 he wrote to Spender and advised that Australia 'should not push' the US 'too hard for formal obligation'.¹²⁹

A week before the talks, Edward J. Williams, the British High Commissioner in Canberra, wrote to Fadden about the British reservations about the Pacific Pact negotiations.¹³⁰ But in Cabinet on 12 February the First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff, Lord Fraser, stated that in 'the global strategy' which was discussed by the British and US Chiefs of Staffs, 'the Far East' was a US 'commitment and the Middle East a Commonwealth commitment'. Moreover 'Australia and New Zealand had been reluctant to commit themselves fully to co-operation in the Middle East until they had more definite information about' US 'intentions in the Pacific'. '[T]he best way', of 'allaying their anxieties would be for the United States to guarantee their security in a major war, possibly through a tripartite pact'.¹³¹ Britain was prepared to accept its exclusion from ANZUS since it would allow Australia and New Zealand to increase their commitments to the British course in the Middle East.

Australian and New Zealand representatives met on 12 February to discuss the details of the American proposal, and agreed on the following points. Firstly, they accepted that the rearmament of Japan was 'inevitable' but it was also 'essential that Australia and New Zealand obtain an adequate guarantee of security against any

¹²⁸ DNZER, the ANZUS Pact and the Treaty of Peace with Japan, Vol 3, 572, the High Commissioner for New Zealand in Canberra to the Minister of External Affairs, 5 February 1951.

¹²⁹ NAA, 271757, A1838, TS250/7/10, Menzies to Spender, 6 February 1951.

¹³⁰ NAA, 842148, A1838, TS686/1 PART 1, E. J. Williams to A. W. Fadden, 8 February 1951. See also: DNZER, the ANZUS Pact and the Treaty of Peace with Japan, Vol 3, 578-81, the Commissioner for the United Kingdom to the Minister of External Affairs, 8 February 1951.

¹³¹ PRO CAB 128/19, CM 51, 13th Conclusions, 12 February 1951.

possible Japanese aggression in the future'. Secondly, 'the only power capable of providing such a guarantee' was the US. Thirdly, 'the best form ... such a guarantee might take would be a tripartite arrangement between' Australia, New Zealand and the US. Finally, Australia and New Zealand should work jointly for an arrangement of this nature in their talks with Dulles.¹³²

Dulles' visit to Canberra from 15 to 18 February at last led to the formation of ANZUS. During these talks between Dulles, Spender and Doidge, the draft of the tripartite treaty was decided.¹³³ A draft security treaty for the Pacific between the US, Australia and New Zealand was also put on paper.¹³⁴ This draft was the basis of ANZUS. However as Dulles wrote to Doidge, there was 'an interdependence between the contemplated Japanese peace treaty ... and the contemplated security treaty in the sense that neither of us would be obligated to accept one without the other'.¹³⁵ Australian and New Zealand accepted this.

On 18 February a joint communiqué was issued.¹³⁶ It stated that the talks represented 'consultation at its best' on the Japanese Peace Treaty and the Pacific Pact, that the 'resurgence of the old Japanese militarism would be a disaster', and

¹³² DNZER, the ANZUS Pact and the Treaty of Peace with Japan, Vol 3, 590-91, Note on Discussions between the New Zealand and Australian Ministers of External Affairs, 13 February 1951. See also Spender's comment on the forthcoming exploratory talks with Dulles: NAA, 3001613, A6768, EATS 77 PART 1, 15 February 1951.

¹³³ See also: D. McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact*, 303; H. Umetsu, "The Birth of ANZUS: America's attempt to create a defense linkage between Northeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific", 171, 182.

¹³⁴ For the text see: FRUS, 1951, Vol 6, Part 1, 172-75; NAA, 842148, A1838, TS686/1 PART 1, the Department of External Affairs to the Australian Embassy in Washington, 21 February 1951.

¹³⁵ FRUS, 1951, Vol 6, Part 1, 175, John Foster Dulles, the Consultant to the Secretary, to the Minister for External Affairs of New Zealand (Doidge), 18 February 1951. See also for Doidge's earlier view on the same subject: *The Daily Telegraph* 12 February 1951 in NAA, 11129481, A1838, 250/7/10B

¹³⁶ For the communiqué see: NAA, 3001613, A6768, EATS 77 PART 1, Joint Communiqué by the Representative of the US, Australia and New Zealand at the Canberra Conference on the Japanese Peace Treaty and Security in the Pacific, 18 February 1951. For the record of the talks see: P. Spender, *Exercises in Diplomacy*, 112-61; FRUS, 1951, Vol 6, Part 1, 155-175; DNZER, the ANZUS Pact and the Treaty of Peace with Japan, Vol 3, 593-613, Noted on the Australian-New Zealand-United States Talks in Canberra, 15-17 February 1951; 625-650, Report on the Australian-New Zealand Consultations with Dulles at Canberra, 7 March 1951; NAA, 3001619, A6768, EATS 77 ANNEX A, Spender to Forde, 22 February 1951; NAA, 3001619, A6768, EATS 77 ANNEX A, Spender to Harrison, 22 February 1951.

that it 'was essential not to leave a power vacuum in Japan which could be filled by unfriendly forces'. On the Pacific Pact Australia and New Zealand had stressed 'the necessity for such a security arrangement' and this view 'received the sympathetic consideration of the representative' of the US.¹³⁷

Comment by the British Chiefs of Staff, on 26 February, confirmed that London would not block a tripartite treaty. The comment noted that the tripartite arrangement would 'facilitate' Australia's and New Zealand's contribution to the Middle East, rather than diverting them from that region.¹³⁸ Clement R. Attlee, British Prime Minister, accepted Britain's exclusion, and told Cabinet that the Pact 'would meet' Australia's and New Zealand's desires 'for guarantees in the Pacific', and would be to Britain's 'advantage as making them more willing to meet their commitments for the defence of the Middle East'.¹³⁹ On 12 March, Gordon Walker, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, stated in Cabinet that 'no attempt should be made ... to dissuade' Australia and New Zealand 'from concluding this tripartite treaty' with the US. 'If such an attempt were made', he continued, 'it would fail'; Australia 'would go forward with the treaty ... and would persuade' New Zealand. As a result the British Cabinet accepted and adopted that 'it was not practicable ... to offer opposition to the conclusion of this treaty'.¹⁴⁰ Walker sent this decision personally to Menzies on 14 March.¹⁴¹ Canberra appreciated 'the assurance' given by Britain.¹⁴²

¹³⁷ DNZER, the ANZUS Pact and the Treaty of Peace with Japan, Vol 3, 614-15, the High Commissioner for New Zealand in Canberra to the Minister of External Affairs, 18 February 1951.

¹³⁸ PRO DEFE 4/40, COS (51), 37th Meeting, Item 5, 26 February 1951 in D. McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact*, 327.

¹³⁹ PRO CAB 128/19, CM 51, 16th Conclusions, 1 March 1951.

¹⁴⁰ PRO CAB 128/19, CM 51, 19th Conclusions, 12 March 1951. For Britain's acceptance of the trilateral Pacific Pact see also: NAA, 3001619, A6768, EATS 77 ANNEX A, *Pacific Pact [ANZUS Treaty] 15/2/1951 to 13/4/1951*.

¹⁴¹ NAA, 3001616, A6768, EATS 77 PART 3, Text of Personal Message from Gordon-Walker to Mr. Menzies, 14 March 1951.

¹⁴² NAA, 3001621, A6768, EATS 77 ANNEX B, the Department of External Affairs to the Government of New Zealand, 21 March 1951.

The discord in Washington on different aspects of ANZUS was smoothed over in April. In mid-April Dulles managed to convince the JCS on ANZUS.¹⁴³ The JCS agreed to the formation of ANZUS but 'opposed the inclusion in the pact of any reference to military plans, planning, or organizations therefor.'¹⁴⁴ On 18 April Truman published a statement on the positive developments in Washington about the formation of ANZUS.¹⁴⁵ Australia was quite satisfied with this statement.¹⁴⁶

Via ANZUS, Dulles now attempted to integrate Australia and New Zealand into US efforts for the defence of Japan.¹⁴⁷ In a State Department – JCS meeting¹⁴⁸ Dulles stated that there should be two arrangements for the defence of the Pacific. One '[a] bilateral pact with Japan permitting the continuation of U.S. forces there', the other 'either ... a quadripartite pact with the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand or ... a bilateral pact with the Philippines and a tripartite pact with Australia and New Zealand'. He stated 'that the total effect of these pacts would be same in substance as the single pact' which means '[i]f any of the five were attacked, the others would be under an obligation to react'.¹⁴⁹ He repeated that 'under the separate pacts all nations concerned equally would be pledged to help defend Japan if it were attacked

¹⁴³ For details of the opposition from the JCS see: D. McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact*, 336-38.

¹⁴⁴ FRUS, 1951, Vol 6, Part 1, 201-202, the Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Secretary of State, 13 April 1951.

¹⁴⁵ DNZER, the ANZUS Pact and the Treaty of Peace with Japan, Vol 3, 701, the New Zealand Ambassador in Washington to the Minister of External Affairs, 18 April 1951; *Sydney Morning Herald* 20 April 1951 in NAA, 11129481, A1838, 250/7/10B; NAA, 246863, A1838, 250/7/10 PART 1, D.D. No. 26/51, 14 May 1951. See also: NAA, 1192281, A9564, 221/4/2 PART 1, Press Statement by John Foster Dulles, 19 April 1951.

¹⁴⁶ NAA, 842148, A1838, TS686/1 PART 1, Statement by the Minister For External Affairs Pacific Security Arrangements, 19 April 1951; NAA, 842148, A1838, TS686/1 PART 1, Spender to Makin, 23 April 1951. See also: *The Age* 20 April 1951 in NAA, 11129481, A1838, 250/7/10B.

¹⁴⁷ For a similar view see: H. Umetsu, "The Birth of ANZUS: America's attempt to create a defense linkage between Northeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific", 193.

¹⁴⁸ FRUS, 1951, Vol 6, Part 1, 192-201, Memorandum on Substance of Discussions at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, 11 April 1951.

¹⁴⁹ FRUS, 1951, Vol 6, Part 1, 195, Memorandum on Substance of Discussions at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, 11 April 1951.

unless [the US] failed' to help Japan.¹⁵⁰ The US saw in ANZUS a bonus in linking the southern and the northern points of the Pacific crescent.

On 10 July the terms of both the Japanese Peace Treaty and ANZUS were cleared in Washington.¹⁵¹ On 12 July, the ANZUS terms were released to the Press.¹⁵² On 1 September 1951 ANZUS was concluded in San Francisco. Truman ratified the treaty on 15 April 1952, and it came into force on 29 April 1952, after the 'ratifications by all three Governments that day', at the same time as the Japanese Peace Treaty.¹⁵³

ANZUS institutionalized the American-Australian alliance and proved that Britain was no longer Australia's "big protector". Even though Britain was excluded, London accepted that ANZUS would be an important security scheme.¹⁵⁴

The Pacific Pact, Canberra's long term ideal, was achieved following changes in Washington's strategic thinking after mid 1949, because of the Korean War and Spender's persistent diplomacy. Particularly after the Communist victory in China, Australia intensified its efforts for the Pact amid increasing anxieties in Washington about the spread of Communism in Asia. Yet Canberra had to wait for the outbreak

¹⁵⁰ FRUS, 1951, Vol 6, Part 1, 198, Memorandum on Substance of Discussions at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, 11 April 1951.

¹⁵¹ DNZER, the ANZUS Pact and the Treaty of Peace with Japan, Vol 3, 737-39, the New Zealand Ambassador in Washington to the Minister of External Affairs, 10 July 1951.

¹⁵² For the text see: US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol XXV, 148-49, 23 July 1951. See also: NAA, 842149, A1838, TS686/1 PART 2; NAA, 842150, A1838, TS686/1 PART 3; NAA, 655549, A5954, 1340/12; NAA, 246863, A1838, 250/7/10 PART 1, Australian Consul General in New York to the Department of External Affairs, 13 July 1951.

¹⁵³ NAA, 842149, A1838, TS686/1 PART 2, the Department of External Affairs to the Australian Embassy in Washington, 29 April 1952; FRUS, 1951, Vol 6, Part 1, 250-51. For the statements made at the signing ceremony by Acheson, Berendsen and Spender see: US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol XXV, 495, 24 September 1951. See also: DNZER, the ANZUS Pact and the Treaty of Peace with Japan, Vol 3, 764-72, the New Zealand Ambassador in Washington to the Minister of External Affairs, 25 September 1951. For the text of the Japanese Peace Treaty see: NAA, 655546, A5954, 1340/11, *Texts of: (a) Treaty of Peace with Japan. (b) Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan. (c) Mutual Defence Treaty between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America.*

¹⁵⁴ D. W. Mabon, "Elusive Agreements: The Pacific Pact Proposals", 168-70.

of the Korean War for a real change in Washington's thinking on the importance of a Pacific Pact. With China's entry into the war the State Department started to focus on the urgency of the Japanese Peace Treaty. With a soft treaty Washington could prevent the loss of Japan to the Communists. To achieve this, the State Department was obliged to accept a Pacific Pact. This led the State Department to oppose the JCS' reservations on the Pact and the Treaty. Within all these interactions Spender was the key actor in all these interactions, keeping the idea fresh in the minds of the Americans and Australians. In the end, ANZUS satisfied Australia, New Zealand, and the US, and was even acceptable to the excluded Britain.

In this period the US had a clear and sound understanding of its broad security interests, but this left almost a policy vacuum, certainly a vague and wavering stance, on regional aspects. Both Turkey and Australia laboured hard to counter this. With the Korean War, world events moved in the direction each had feared, but helped each in their aspirations for strengthening their ties to the US. But the wavy lines were soon to intersect. Regional factors would push Turkey and Australia in different directions. This is crucial in understanding how and why Turkey and Australia assessed the US role in their respective regions differently.

PART 4: Review of Turkish-American and Australian-American relations from 1952-1966

a. Turkey (1952-1959)

After Turkey joined NATO, Turkish–American relations experienced their closest phase. This closeness was not only in military but also economic and political. There was an increase in American aid to Turkey, bilateral agreements organizing American military and economic aid and providing certain economic openings to American investments, the establishment of American bases, Turkish support for the US in the international arena, and Turkey's eagerness to support American policies in the Middle East and the Balkans.

Several factors kept this closeness alive. Regional developments after the mid 50s, such as the Suez Crisis 1956, the Syrian issue in 1957, the conflict in Jordan in 1957, USSR's Sputnik success in 1957, the Iraqi revolution in 1958, and the crisis in Lebanon in 1958 increased Turkey's importance for Washington, and in them all Turkey followed the American course unquestioningly. The link between the two was so strong that Ankara was reluctant to let problems jeopardize relations.

The daily expression of Turkish-US closeness was the expansion of American economic and military aid programs under the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine. NATO became the main source of American aid and the US became

identified with NATO. ¹ In 1955 Foreign Minister Koprulu stated the value of NATO for Turkey: it was 'our national policy'.²

Yet more US aid led Turkey to want even more. Washington did not like this, but until the mid 50s tried to satisfy it. In March 1952 the NATO Supreme Commander, General Dwight Eisenhower, visited Ankara to reach an accord on the transfer of modern military equipment to Turkey.³ The transfer aimed to share the burden of Turkey's defence budget.⁴ The US considered that strong Turkish armed forces might be necessary to hold the Soviets in the event of an unexpected Soviet attack.⁵ For Washington, unlike Ankara, the close alliance was not the main motive for increases in American aid. The dynamics of the Cold War and Turkey's strategic position as a critical buffer against any Soviet attack was the key motivating factor. The difference in Ankara's and Washington's views became a problem after the mid 50s.

After Eisenhower's visit President Bayar attempted to increase American aid. He visited Washington on 17 March 1954,⁶ after which Washington announced that an extra amount of \$ 30 million would be given to Turkey in the 1954 financial year.⁷ In June 1954 Prime Minister Menderes visited Washington to discuss a '4 year military and economic program for Turkey',⁸ and again a joint communiqué on 5 June

¹ F. A. Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, 125.

² M. Gonlubol (ed), *Olaylarla Turk Dis Politikasi*, 311.

³ TPMB, No 220, March 1952, 105.

⁴ R. Robinson, "Introduction to Turkey", 17-18 in American University Field Staff Reports, Southwest Asia Series, Vol 1, 1952.

⁵ J.S. Raleigh, "The West and the Defence of the Middle East", 180.

⁶ For details of this visit see: TPMB, Special Issue: Reisicumhur Celal Bayar'in Amerika'yi ziyareti munasebetiyle, 1954, 109-95.

⁷ R. D. Robinson, "Developments Respecting Turkey", 45 in American University Field Staff Reports, Vol 1, July 1953-October 1954.

⁸ FRUS, 1952-54, Vol 8, 943. For details of Menderes' visit see: FRUS, 1952-54, Vol 8, 944-50.

expressed America's intention to increase economic and military aid.⁹ Dulles stated that the US was aware that Turkey's 'defense posture' placed 'heavy strain upon its resources' and made 'substantial assistance' from the US necessary. The US was prepared to increase the 'approved military assistance program "by an amount to meet one fourth of unfunded US screened requirements [to the] Turkish armed forces to achieve NATO goals"'.¹⁰ In other words, until the mid 50s the US was responsive to Turkey's demands for increasing American aid. From 1948 to mid 1955 direct economic aid to Turkey totalled around \$ 396 million. In addition, \$ 195 million was given as indirect aid and \$ 9 million as technical aid. From 1948-1956, the total amount of aid was \$ 601 million.¹¹

Bilateral agreements regulated the provision of American military and economic aid, and provided certain economic facilities to American investments. Basically they promoted US activities in Turkey.¹² By February 1970 there were 91 agreements.¹³ The most significant were: an agreement relating to assurances by the Government of Turkey with respect to guarantees to investors pursuant to article III of the economic cooperation agreement on 15 November 1951¹⁴, an exchange of notes constituting an agreement relating to mutual security on 7 January 1952¹⁵, Turkey's adherence to the Agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their forces on 10 March 1954¹⁶, an agreement on implementing the Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty

⁹ The joint communiqué is also known as Menderes-Stassen Communiqué. For the text see: US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol XXX, 912-13, 14 June 1954; TPMB, No 247, June 1954, 26-27.

¹⁰ FRUS, 1952-54, Vol 8, 949, the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey, 5 June 1954.

¹¹ William Reader Bullard, *The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey*, 523.

¹² See also: G. S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance, Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971*, 49.

¹³ Seventeenth Press Conference of Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel, Ankara, 7 February 1970 in O. Sander, *Türk - Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-64*, 103.

¹⁴ For the text see: <http://turkey.usembassy.gov/3t3720/> accessed on 24.03.2009

¹⁵ For the text see: http://untreaty.un.org/unts/1_60000/5/7/00008338.pdf accessed on 24.03.2009

¹⁶ See: <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/b510619a.htm> accessed on 24.03.2009. See also: Omer İlhan Akipek, "NATO Kuvvetleri Sözleşmesine göre Vazife Kavramı ve Türkiye'deki Tatbikati", 9-26. Ankara Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi vol 24, No 1-4, 1967. in <http://auhf.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/auhfd-arsiv/AUHF-1967-24-01-04/AUHF-1967-24-01-04-Akipek.pdf> accessed on 24.03.2009

regarding the status of their forces on 23 June 1954¹⁷, an agreement relating to relief from Turkish taxation on expenditures made by or on behalf of the US for common defense on 23 June 1954¹⁸, an exchange of notes constituting an agreement relating to a defense facilities assistance program on 25 April 1955¹⁹, an agreement for co-operation concerning civil uses of atomic energy on 10 June 1955,²⁰ and another on ownership and use of local currency repayments made by Turkey to the Development Loan Fund on 6 September 1958²¹. The number of the treaties and their scope show that the US-Turkish alliance penetrated to many aspects of Turkey's politico-economic and military life.

The third element of Turkish-American relations in this period was the establishment of American bases and facilities in Turkey. These bases can be classified under four headings: air bases, strategic missile bases, radar and communication facilities and living quarters. For them Turkey assigned 32 million square meters of land to the US.²² This is a good illustration of Ankara's eagerness to maintain the American presence in Turkey.

The fourth element of Turkish-American relations in this period was a change in Turkish foreign policy, which led Turkey to follow the American course even more closely. Ankara judged international events with Washington's perspective, followed an American oriented policy, and became a Middle East spokesman for the US.²³ There were three significant examples of this. The first was Ankara's attitude at the

¹⁷ For the text see: http://untreaty.un.org/unts/1_60000/6/38/00011852.pdf accessed on 24.03.2009

¹⁸ For the text see: <http://turkey.usembassy.gov/5t1258/> accessed on 24.03.2009

¹⁹ For the text see: http://untreaty.un.org/unts/1_60000/7/36/00013753.pdf accessed on 24.03.2009

²⁰ For the text see: http://untreaty.un.org/unts/1_60000/7/4/00012194.pdf accessed on 24.03.2009

²¹ For the text see: <http://turkey.usembassy.gov/9t1251/> accessed on 24.03.2009

²² M. Gönülbul, "NATO and Turkey an Overall Appraisal", 24-25.

²³ For a similar view see: O. Sander, *Türk - Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-64*, 121.

Bandung Conference on 18-24 April 1955.²⁴ Turkish policy makers had decided not to attend the conference but the US persuaded them to go.²⁵ During the Conference Turkey followed a solid pro-Western attitude.²⁶ The second was Turkey's stance against Algerian independence. In 1955 Turkey voted against the Asia-African states' request that "The question of Algeria" be included in the agenda of the 10th session of the General Assembly.²⁷ The third was when in 1957 and 1958 Turkey abstained from voting for Algerian self determination.²⁸ Ankara's loyalty to the American alliance made Turkey very dependent on US strategic thinking.

The fifth element was Ankara's eagerness to support US policy for establishing regional pacts in Turkey's neighbouring areas, notably the Balkan Pact and the Baghdad Pact. After Turkey and Greece became NATO members the main gap in NATO's eastern flank became Yugoslavia. Washington wanted to encourage a regional arrangement to link Yugoslavia indirectly to NATO.²⁹ Turkey and Greece followed Washington's strategy. The Balkan Pact was agreed on 28 February 1953. It was an Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation between Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia,³⁰ which obliged the signatories to consult on matters of common interest and to discuss military matters.³¹ It became an alliance on 9 August 1954, under the

²⁴ The first large-scale Asian-African or Afro-Asian Conference. It was a meeting of Asian and African states, most of which were newly independent, which took place between 18-24 April 1955 in Bandung, Indonesia. The conference's stated aims were to promote Afro-Asian economic and cultural cooperation and to oppose colonialism or neocolonialism by the US, the USSR, or any other "imperialistic" nation. For details see: G. J. Pauker, *The Bandung Conference*.

²⁵ *The New York Times* 8 March 1955 in O. Sander, *Türk - Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-64*, 122

²⁶ O. Sander, *Türk - Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-64*, 122. For details see: M. Gönülboğ (ed), *Olaylarla Türk Dis Politikası*, 273-76.

²⁷ Yearbook of the United Nations 1955, 65-69 in http://unyearbook.un.org/1955YUN/1955_P1_SEC1_CH6.pdf accessed on 25.03.2009

²⁸ Yearbook of the United Nations 1957, 68-72 in http://unyearbook.un.org/1957YUN/1957_P1_SEC1_CH6.pdf accessed on 25.03.2009; Yearbook of the United Nations 1958, 79-82 in http://unyearbook.un.org/1958YUN/1958_P1_SEC1_CH7.pdf accessed on 25.03.2009

²⁹ For a similar view see: D.J.K., "Greece, Turkey and NATO", 168.

³⁰ W. Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, 124.

³¹ For details of the talks see: TPMB, No 231, February 1953, 278-85. For the text of the agreement see: TPMB, No 231, February 1953, 286-88.

title Balkan Defence Pact.³² The Pact was never effective, since in 1955 the USSR made peace with Yugoslavia, and because the Cyprus question pushed Turkey and Greece apart.³³

The second regional initiative, again with US encouragement, was the Baghdad Pact.³⁴ Washington's strategic aims in the Middle East were briefly summarised in a National Intelligence Estimate on 15 January 1953, which stressed the importance of 'the extensive oil resources and strategic location of the area'. It concluded that '[d]enial of these assets to the West would constitute a serious setback to it in the struggle with the Soviet Bloc'. It stated that the USSR would 'continue to encourage disorder and anti-Westernism and to exploit the substantial opportunities for creating friction among states of the area, between them and the West'. This would increase the possibility for the expansion of 'Communist influence' in the region. Another conclusion was that the 'Middle Eastern states', except Iran, did 'not feel immediately threatened by the USSR and they fear that acceptance of Western support would lead to Western domination'. The US was seen as 'responsible for maintaining the state of Israel, and by US association with the former colonial powers - the UK and France'. The estimate thought that the regional states would 'rely increasingly on their armed forces to retain power', but would 'have to find a solution to the problem of establishing relations with the Western Powers' which would 'be acceptable to nationalist aspirations at home', but which would 'permit them to obtain Western

³² For details see: TPMB, No 249, August 1954, 89-92; <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/AyinTarihi/1954/agustos1954.htm> accessed on 25.03.2009. For the text of the agreement see: TPMB, No 249, August 1954, 87-88. See also: M. Pundeff, "The Balkan Entente Treaties", 635-640; B. Oran (ed), *Türk Dis Politikasi 1919-1980*, Vol 1, 588-592; O. Sander, *Balkan Gelişmeleri ve Türkiye (1945-1965)*, 99-127.

³³ See also: W. Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, 124; O. Sander, *Balkan Gelişmeleri ve Türkiye (1945-1965)*, 125.

³⁴ For details see: B. K. Yesilbursa, *The Baghdad Pact, Anglo-American defence policies in the Middle East, 1950-1959*; M. Persson, *Great Britain, the United States and the Security of the Middle East: the Formation of the Baghdad Pact*; R. L. Jasse, "The Baghdad Pact: Cold War or Colonialism?"; A. Sanjian, "The Formulation of the Baghdad Pact".

military and economic aid and advice'.³⁵ In short, the US worried about the expansion of the Soviet influence in the region, whereas most regional states did not.

Washington needed a suitable multilateral regional arrangement to block possible Communist expansion, preferably emanating from the region rather than directly by the US. Turkey's role in the formulation of the Baghdad Pact was the result.³⁶

Dulles visited the Near and Middle East from 9 to 29 May 1953.³⁷ The visit was mainly to learn regional views on a regional association. On 1 June 1953, Dulles reported that people 'of the Near East and South Asia' were 'deeply concerned about political independence for themselves and others' and were 'suspicious of the colonial powers', including the US because of its NATO 'alliance with France and Britain'. He also stated that wise 'mutual security programs would bring Washington a 'better understanding and cooperation', but that 'the Arab peoples' were 'more fearful of Zionism than of communism' and distrusted the American support of Israel. He thought that a regional defence organization should be initiated with 'the northern tier of nations'³⁸ which were aware of the Soviet threat. 'But no such system' could 'be imposed from without'. 'It should be designed and grow from within out of a sense of common destiny and common danger'. The US could 'usefully help strengthen the

³⁵ FRUS, 1952-54, Vol 9, Part 1, 334-43, National Intelligence Estimate, Conditions and Trends in the Middle East Affecting US Security, 15 January 1953.

³⁶ For a similar view see: J.S. Raleigh, "Middle East Politics: The Past Ten Years", 5 (Middle East Affairs, Vol X, No 1, January 1959) in O. Sander, *Türk - Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-64*, 128.

³⁷ For details of this visit see: FRUS, 1952-54, Vol 9, Part 1, 1-167, the visit of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Mutual Security Administrator Harold Stassen to the Near and Middle East, 9-29 May 1953.

³⁸ It was a geo-strategic concept referring to the countries on the southern periphery of the USSR. More specifically it was the region comprising Iran and Turkey in the Middle East and Afghanistan and Pakistan in central Asia. Its location on the border of the USSR made it an area of high interest for US defence planners and their allies during the Cold War. For details see: G. Haddad, *Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East: the Northern Tier*, Z. Khalilzad, "The Superpowers and the Northern Tier"; R. K. Ramazani, *The Northern Tier: Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey*.

interrelated defense of those countries' ³⁹ Dulles' visit highlighted the fact that any direct US initiative in the Middle East without the necessary support of the regional actors would be unsuccessful.

Dulles' visit and his suggestions smoothed the way to establishing the Baghdad Pact.⁴⁰ Turkey would initiate it. There were several reasons for this. Firstly, Turkey was both a NATO member and had long-lasting relations with the Arab states. Secondly, Prime Minister Menderes was very keen to initiate American oriented regional projects.⁴¹ Moreover 'Turkey has a different dimension' towards the Soviet threat than the Arab states. The USSR 'was an actual threat to Turkey' not only 'because of its territorial demands like Kars and Ardahan' but also because of 'its demands for the Soviet participation in the defence of the Straits Bosp[h]orus and the Dardanelles' and 'for the renewal of 1925 Soviet-Turkish Friendship and Neutrality Treaty', whereas Ankara had told Moscow on different occasions that any 'improvement in bilateral relations could only result from the development of general relations between NATO countries and Moscow'.⁴² During Dulles' visit in May 1953 the Turkish government emphasized its strong stand against the Soviet threat and stated that Turkey should be the 'back bone' of any security arrangements for Middle East defence.⁴³ This accorded with the 'active east policy' of the Menderes government.⁴⁴ These points showed that Turkey was best placed to initiate the Baghdad Pact.

³⁹ US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol XXVIII, 831-35, 15 June 1953. See also: FRUS, 1952-54, Vol 9, Part 1, 406-07, the Secretary of State to Certain diplomatic missions, 30 July 1953.

⁴⁰ For a similar view see: A. Sanjian, "The Formulation of the Baghdad Pact", 226-27.

⁴¹ See also: R. D. Robinson, "Turkey Strives for Greater Security at Home and Abroad" 1-2 in American University Field Staff Reports, Vol 3, No 8, 1954.

⁴² A. Sanjian, "The Formulation of the Baghdad Pact", 227-28.

⁴³ FRUS, 1952-54, Vol 9, Part 1, 139-40, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of Embassy in Turkey (Rountree), 26 May 1953.

⁴⁴ H. Bagci, *Türk Dis Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar*, 41.

The Baghdad Pact was established through three main steps. The first was the Turkish – Pakistani Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation for Security on 2 April 1954.⁴⁵ The second was the Pact of Mutual Cooperation between Iraq and Turkey on 24 February 1955.⁴⁶ The third was the accession of Britain, Pakistan and Iran to this Pact to form the Baghdad Pact.⁴⁷

Washington was not directly involved with establishing the Pact, but acted behind the scenes. Despite the demand of the five members of the pact to see the US as a member, Washington refused. A day after Britain joined the pact, 'The U.S. ...quietly notified Britain that it prefers to wait for a 'cooling-off' period in Middle East affairs before joining the new Turkish-Iraqi-British Defence Alliance'.⁴⁸ Washington also claimed that 'if it joined it would be obliged to give a security guarantee to Israel and its membership would antagonise Egypt and Saudi Arabia who might be pushed ... to be in closer contact with the Soviet Union'.⁴⁹ American non-adherence to the Pact shows that in 1955, the main American policy for the Middle East was not intervening directly into regional issues. This policy could have helped the US to understand the dynamics of the Middle East without facing any serious reaction from the states of this region.

The Baghdad Pact, like the Balkan Pact, was not a successful initiative, especially for Turkey. The westernized posture of Turkey led the Arab states to think that it was an extension of western colonialism. This caused a deterioration in Turkey's relations

⁴⁵ For the text see: TPMB, No 245, April 1954, 35-37.

⁴⁶ For details see: TPMB, No 255, February 1955, 165-85. For the text see: TPMB, No 255, February 1955, 185-87.

⁴⁷ O. Sander, *Türk - Amerikan İlişkileri* 1947-64, 131.

⁴⁸ NAA, 273717, A5954, 1409/1, Age 5 April 1955.

⁴⁹ NAA, 273717, A5954, 1409/1, Guidance Savingram No.5, 7 March 1956.

with the Arab states, especially with the members of the Arab League. Turkey's policy also further worsened its relations with the USSR.⁵⁰

Although Turkish-American relations in the 1950s were very close, there was some discord. Perhaps most significant was that the US began refusing Turkey's constant demands for a serious increase in American economic aid. Especially from 1954, a decrease in agricultural production and an increase in imports, in inflation and in the agricultural subsidies raised Turkey's foreign trade and budget deficit. Turkey attempted to deal with this deficit via external debt, mainly from the US.⁵¹ Menderes requested \$ 300 million from the US in June 1954. Washington officials demurred.⁵² Turkey requested the same amount of money from Washington until 1957. Every time Washington put forward new conditions and did not provide that amount.⁵³ The reason for US reluctance to pay was that it did not want to pay Turkey's foreign debts, but only to share Turkey's economic burden in keeping huge armed forces. Quite unreasonably, this caused a short-term disillusionment in Ankara.

Ankara's disillusionment did not last. In 1958 the US decided to give \$ 234 million to Turkey,⁵⁴ because of Turkey's increased value in the Middle Eastern conflicts from 1956 to 1958,⁵⁵ and because of the USSR's Sputnik success and Turkey's new

⁵⁰ M. Gönülbul (ed), *Olaylarla Türk Dis Politikası*, 269-71.

⁵¹ For the main economic indicators of Turkey from 1945 to 1960 see: A. O. Krueger, *Trade and Employment in Developing Countries*, 30; B. Oran (ed), *Türk Dis Politikası 1919-1980*, Vol 1, 487. For details of the economic stagnation of Turkey in this era see: B. Oran (ed), *Türk Dis Politikası 1919-1980*, Vol 1, 487-91.

⁵² FRUS, 1952-54, Vol 8, 953, Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, 14 October, 1954.

⁵³ O. Sander, *Türk - Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-64*, 137.

⁵⁴ FRUS, 1958-60, Vol 10, Part 2, 772, Operations Coordinating Board Report, 19 November 1958.

⁵⁵ These events are not examined in this study.

economic stabilization programme.⁵⁶ Washington's decision to pay shows the importance of Turkey as a regional actor of the Cold War.

Ankara's enthusiasm to sustain a close alliance with Washington led Turkey to support Washington during all the Middle Eastern conflicts from 1956 to 1958. One was the Suez Crisis.⁵⁷ The crisis was followed by the Eisenhower Doctrine. The Doctrine was President Eisenhower's message to the US Congress on 5 January 1957. It required Congress to yield its traditional war-making power to the president, and stated that the US would use armed forces upon request in response to imminent or actual aggression against the US. Countries opposing Communism would be given aid in various forms. With this doctrine the US took over Britain's role in the Middle East.⁵⁸

On 22 March 1957 Turkey and the US released a joint communiqué in which Turkey expressed its full support of the Eisenhower Doctrine. The communiqué stated that both countries were 'determined to cooperate ... in protective measures' against the Communist threat.⁵⁹ Turkey followed this pro-American policy throughout the later Middle East crises; Syria in 1957, Jordan in 1957, the Iraqi revolution in 1958 and the Lebanese crisis in 1958.⁶⁰

⁵⁶ O. Sander, *Türk - Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-64*, 139. For Turkey's economic stabilization programme see: US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol XXXIX, 534-35, 6 October 1958.

⁵⁷ The Suez Crisis, also referred to as the Tripartite Aggression, was a military attack on Egypt by Britain, France, and Israel beginning on 29 October 1956. The attack followed Egypt's decision of 26 July 1956 to nationalize the Suez Canal after the withdrawal of an offer by Britain and the United States to fund the building of the Aswan Dam. For details see: H. J. Dooley, *The Suez crisis, 1956: a case study in contemporary history*.

⁵⁸ For details of the development of the Doctrine see: FRUS, 1955-57, Vol 12, 1-675. For the text see: Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957, 6-16, Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the Middle East, 5 January 1957.

⁵⁹ US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol XXXVI, 726-276, 6 May 1957.

⁶⁰ For details of Turkey's role in these events see: O. Sander, *Türk - Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-64*, 155-61, 165-70; M. Gönülbul (ed), *Olaylarla Türk Dis Politikası*, 290-305; B. Oran (ed), *Türk Dis Politikası 1919-1980*, Vol 1, 629-35.

Throughout these crises the US also supported Turkey. One example was the escalation of the Syrian crisis at the beginning of October 1957. On 7 October 1957 Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, talked of '“the danger of a new war” ' in the Middle East. On 9 October he stated that in that war Turkey would be under a serious threat.⁶¹ On 10 October the State Department announced its full support of Turkey.⁶² On 16 October 1957 Dulles stated that the USSR might attack Turkey, and if so 'it would not mean a purely defensive operation' by the US.⁶³ In these statements Washington emphasized the reciprocity of Turkish-American relations, especially in terms of Turkey's defence. Washington made clear that Turkey was under the American security umbrella.

Another event which increased Turkey's value for Washington was the USSR's Sputnik success.⁶⁴ On 4 October 1957 the USSR launched the Sputnik 1 satellite, which meant that Moscow achieved the capability of launching an intercontinental ballistic missile.⁶⁵ With Sputnik the USSR got one step ahead of the US in Cold War rivalry. Dulles' response was local defence, by which the US would give its peripheral allies the capacity for limited atomic war.⁶⁶ The US could thus bridge the missile gap 'with intermediate-range ballistic missiles which are of no value unless they can be brought close to Soviet territory, either by sea - perhaps in nuclear submarines or

⁶¹ R. P. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs 1957*, 326-327.

⁶² Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1957, 239-240.

⁶³ US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol XXXVII, 708-14, 4 November 1957.

⁶⁴ On 4 October 1957 the USSR launched the Sputnik 1 satellite, which meant that Moscow achieved the capability of launching an intercontinental ballistic missile. For details see: R. A. Divine, *The Sputnik Challenge*; U. Whitaker, "Is the United States a Second Rate Power?"; R. A. Payne, "Public Opinion and Foreign Threats: Eisenhower's Response to Sputnik"; D. Healey, "The Sputnik and Western Defence".

⁶⁵ For details see: R. A. Divine, *The Sputnik Challenge*; U. Whitaker, "Is the United States a Second Rate Power?"; R. A. Payne, "Public Opinion and Foreign Threats: Eisenhower's Response to Sputnik"; D. Healey, "The Sputnik and Western Defence".

⁶⁶ For details see: J. F. Dulles, "Challenge and Response in United States Policy", 25-43. See also: D. Healey, "The Sputnik and Western Defence", 146.

aircraft carriers - or through being stationed on land in the territory of America's allies'.⁶⁷ One of these allies was Turkey.

Dulles proposed the deployment of intermediate-range ballistic missiles to some NATO allies at a NATO council meeting on 16 December 1957.⁶⁸ The US JCS also thought that 'there would be value in putting Jupiter missiles in Turkey'.⁶⁹ Turkey accepted this.⁷⁰ This, at the risk of a Soviet reaction, illustrated the closeness of Turkish-American relations in the 1950s.

Those relations culminated in the Turkish-American Agreement of Cooperation on 5 March 1959.⁷¹ The agreement did not add to Turkey's defence which was already covered by NATO. It confirmed the Turkish-American accord on the Middle East.

On 6-7 December 1959 Eisenhower visited Turkey.⁷² After the visit a joint communiqué stressed the close relationship between Ankara and Washington. Turkey was concerned at reduction of its value for Washington following a Washington-Moscow détente. Eisenhower attempted to minimize Turkey's anxiety on this. Both countries also expressed their intent to cooperate closely in NATO and other regional pacts. US interest in Turkey's economic development and the continuity of the American economic aid were also stressed.⁷³

⁶⁷ D. Healey, "The Sputnik and Western Defence", 148.

⁶⁸ Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1957, 102.

⁶⁹ FRUS, 1955-57, Vol 19, 703, Memorandum of a Conference with the President, 5 December 1957.

⁷⁰ M. Gonlubol (ed), *Olaylarla Turk Dis Politikasi*, 316-17. For the installation of the missiles see: R. P. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs 1959*, 58, 204; Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1959, 353-55. See also: Agreement relating to the introduction of modern weapons into NATO defense forces in Turkey. Exchange of notes at Ankara 18 September and 28 October 1959 in <http://turkey.usembassy.gov/10t1866/> accessed on 27.03.2009

⁷¹ For the text see: <http://turkey.usembassy.gov/10t320/> accessed on 26.03.2009

⁷² FRUS, 1958-60, Vol 10, Part 2, 819. For details of the talks between Eisenhower and the Turkish officials see: FRUS, 1958-60, Vol 10, Part 2, 820-24, Memorandum of Conference with President Eisenhower, 6 December 1959.

⁷³ For the text see: US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol XLI, 932-33, 28 December 1959.

With NATO membership in 1952, Turkey became a more loyal supporter of Washington's policies in the Middle East, in the Balkans, and internationally. In nearly every regional and international initiative and crisis Turkey supported the US, sometimes even taking the risk of a hostile Soviet response. This confirmed an international perception that Turkey was not following an independent foreign policy. Washington appreciated, supported and promoted Turkey's efforts by providing tangible and intangible support. From 1952 to 1959 NATO membership and Middle East developments deepened political, economic and military ties between Turkey and the US. These ties were soon to be shaken. In the same period Australia too developed its relations with the US. The looming instability in SEA deepened and solidified these relations.

PART 4: Review of Turkish-American and Australian-American relations from 1952-1966

b. Australia (1952-1966)

After WWII Australia's national interests conformed more with the US than with Britain. Australia therefore tried to maintain an American commitment to South East Asia (SEA). With the signing of the ANZUS treaty this was partly achieved, but America's interest in SEA remained less than Australia desired.

Events in SEA from 1952 drew the US more and more into the region, and invoked Australia more and more with the US and less with Britain, though this was a slow and uneven trend. There were six main events: Dien Bien Phu and the following Geneva Conference on French Indochina (1954), the formation of the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), the West New Guinea (WNG) controversy in the mid 50s, the escalation in Vietnam from 1955 to 1961, the Laos Crisis (1961), and Indonesia's *Konfrontasi* against Malaysia from 1963. Each affected Australian-American foreign policy relations.

The French defeat at Dien Bien Phu (1954)¹ was important in that it attracted serious American attention to SEA. Before the defeat, US officials had noted the worsening of the situation in the region. After a meeting with General Paul Ely, the chairman of the French Chiefs of Staff, in March 1954, the chairman of the JCS, Admiral Arthur

¹ The Battle of Dien Bien Phu from March to May 1954 ended with a comprehensive French defeat. For details see: H. R. Simpson, *Dien Bien Phu : the epic battle America forgot*; L. S. Kaplan & D. Artaud & M. R. Rubin (eds), *Dien Bien Phu and the crisis of Franco-American relations, 1954-1955*; Martin Windrow, *The last valley : Dien Bien Phu and the French defeat in Vietnam* London : Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2004.

Radford, told President Eisenhower that he was 'gravely fearful that the measures being taken by the French' would 'be inadequate and initiated too late to prevent a progressive deterioration of the situation'. Radford added that this could 'well lead to the loss of all' SEA 'to Communist domination'. He considered that the US 'must be prepared to act promptly and in force possibly to a frantic and belated request by the French for U.S. intervention'.² Radford's analysis was a signal that the US would not stay indifferent to the deterioration of the situation in French Indochina.

Washington then began to consider possible American intervention in French Indochina. Eisenhower and Dulles 'agreed basically' that the US 'should not get involved in fighting in Indochina unless there were the political preconditions necessary for a successful outcome'. This 'did not ... wholly exclude the possibility of a single strike, if it were almost certain this would produce decisive results'.³ The US National Security Council (NSC) also considered the extent to which the US 'would be willing to commit its resources in support of the Associated States in the effort to prevent the loss of Indochina to the Communists'.⁴ Eisenhower stated that 'that the collapse of Indochina would produce a chain reaction which would result in the fall of all of Southeast Asia to the Communists'.⁵ However his requirements for intervention were UN approval, and the support of Congress, America's allies and the people of Vietnam.⁶ He asked 'what specific nations might be induced to join' the US 'in a broadened effort to save Indochina',⁷ and continued that it 'would perhaps be better

² FRUS, 1952-54, Vol 13, Part 1, 1159, Memorandum by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) to the President, 24 March 1954.

³ FRUS, 1952-54, Vol 13, Part 1, 1150, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State, 24 March 1954.

⁴ FRUS, 1952-54, Vol 16, 472-75, Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson), 12 March 1954.

⁵ FRUS, 1952-54, Vol 13, Part 1, 1168, Memorandum of Discussion at the 190th Meeting of the National Security Council, 25 March 1954.

⁶ FRUS, 1952-54, Vol 13, Part 1, 1163-68, Memorandum of Discussion at the 190th Meeting of the National Security Council, 25 March 1954.

⁷ FRUS, 1952-54, Vol 13, Part 1, 1166, Memorandum of Discussion at the 190th Meeting of the National

... to consider Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Formosa, the free nations of Southeast Asia, the British, and the French'.⁸ On 29 March 1954 Dulles too stressed 'united action' against the Soviet and communist Chinese threat to SEA.⁹ The collapse of French influence in Indochina certainly attracted Washington's attention. It was also certain that Washington did not want to leave this region to the Communists. But equally certainly, the US would not step into this conflict unilaterally. It needed to justify its intervention by the support of its Pacific allies, one of which was Australia.

Eisenhower's search and Dulles' call for united action put pressure on Australia for two reasons. First, what Washington meant by united action was not clear.¹⁰ Second, London had been 'standing on the sidelines as an uninterested party' and was not considering united action as a solution to the Indochina situation. For London the solution should depend on negotiation. This disturbed Dulles.¹¹ It also made it hard for Canberra to give a positive reply to the American call for united action.

In April 1954 the Australian Defence Committee stressed its concerns at the lack of clarity in the American proposal for united action. The Committee reported that the US 'strategic assessment of the vital importance of Indo China as the key to the defence of South East Asia, and of the serious effects its fall to the Communists would have on the Allied strategic position in South East Asia and the Pacific' were

Security Council, 25 March 1954. For additional documentation on united action, particularly regarding broader aspects of the defence of SEA see: FRUS, 1952-54, Vol 12.

⁸ FRUS, 1952-54, Vol 13, Part 1, 1167, Memorandum of Discussion at the 190th Meeting of the National Security Council, 25 March 1954.

⁹ US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol XXX, 539-42, 12 April 1954; FRUS, 1952-54, Vol 13, Part 1, 1181-82.

¹⁰ NAA, 547239, A1838, 3004/13/3 PART 14, Record of Conversation with the New Zealand High Commissioner (Alderton), Tange, McNicol, 2 April 1954.

¹¹ FRUS, 1952-54, Vol 13, Part 1, 1202-04, the Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, 1 April 1954. For Eden's account of the US-British-French discussions regarding Indochina in January-April 1954 see: A. Eden, *Full Circle: the memoirs of Anthony Eden*, 96-124.

'broadly in line with agreed Commonwealth appreciations'.¹² On the other hand Australia was anxious because the US 'itself did not know what the next step would be' after united action.¹³ Australia would not go blindfolded into war.

As well, although Australia was allied to the US via ANZUS, it was still a part of the Commonwealth and needed to formulate its policies in conformity with the Commonwealth.¹⁴ Thus Canberra first asked London before it replied to Dulles. The British did not think Dulles' call serious. The British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Ivone A. Kirkpatrick, stated that the 'Americans wanted [the] defence of Indo-China against Communism guaranteed without being prepared to use any American Troops in its defence'. He also said that Dulles' call was an indication of an increase in American interest in SEA, but in general he did not attach a 'fresh significance' to Dulles' call for united action.¹⁵ There was a clear difference between the American and the British views on how to deal with the escalation in SEA.

This difference was the first important test of Australian-American relations after the conclusion of ANZUS.¹⁶ Australia could not simply cut its links from Britain, nor could it simply say no to the US.

¹² NAA, 677014, A816, 19/311/212, Indo China – United States' Proposals for United Action Report on Military Aspects by Defence Committee 15 April 1954. Summary of Conclusions Revised to 27 May 1954.

¹³ NAA, 547239, A1838, 3004/13/3 PART 14, Record of Conversation with the New Zealand High Commissioner (Alderton), Tange, McNicol, 2 April 1954. For Australia's anxiety see also: FRUS, 1952-54, Vol 12, Part 1, 400-401, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Raynor), 31 March 1954.

¹⁴ NAA, 539262, A816, 11/301/924, Cablegram from Australian High Commissioner's Office, Wellington, to the Department of External Affairs, 2 April 1954.

¹⁵ NAA, 539262, A816, 11/301/924, Cablegram from Australian High Commissioner's office, London, to the Department of External Affairs, 2 April 1954.

¹⁶ For a similar view see: R. B. Frankum, "Silent Partners: Australia and the United States in Vietnam, 1954-1968." Syracuse University PhD, 1997, 26.

This situation waited on the decision of the US Congress. No united action could be carried out without the support of the Congress. Meeting with the Congressional leaders on 3 April 1954, Dulles and Radford found that Congress would only support united action if the American allies gave military and political support. The leaders said that they wanted 'no more Koreas' with the US 'furnishing 90% of the man power'.¹⁷ Eisenhower and Dulles had to get the support of US Allies. Since Britain was reluctant, the second best options were Australia and New Zealand.¹⁸

Before the Americans asked for support, Canberra began to crystallize its stance. This was formulated roughly by Arthur Tange, Secretary for External Affairs, and accepted by Richard Casey, the Minister. According to Tange, before united action the French 'should be encouraged [to] continue the war'; if they could not then they 'should ... allow consideration' by the UN, or offer to the French 'further financial and material aid by other governments', and the development of an 'inter-governmental defence machinery' which would help to discuss the 'military requirements in Indochina and of potential sources of aid'. If united action became a must it still should 'await the developments at the Geneva Conference'.¹⁹ In short, Australia's key word for its reply to Washington was "delay".

Several factors strengthened Australia's preference for delay. One was American acceptance of the fact that without British support united action could not be

¹⁷ FRUS, 1952-54, Vol 13, Part 1, 1224, Memorandum for the File of the Secretary of State, 5 April 1954. For details of the meeting with the Congressional leaders see: FRUS, 1952-54, Vol 13, Part 1, 1224-25, Memorandum for the File of the Secretary of State, 5 April 1954.

¹⁸ FRUS, 1952-54, Vol 13, Part 1, 1236.

¹⁹ NAA, 539262, A816, 11/301/924, Cablegram from the Department of External Affairs to the Australian Embassy, Washington, 5 April 1954. For details of the Geneva Conference see: FRUS, 1952-54, Vol 16, 397ff; FRUS, 1952-54, Vol 13, Part 2, 1410ff; "Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference on the Problem of Restoring Peace in Indo-China" in *The American Journal of International Law* Vol 60, No 3 (July 1966): 643-45.; K. Ruane, "Anthony Eden, British Diplomacy and the Origins of the Geneva Conference of 1954"; F. C. Zagare, "Competing Game-Theoretic Explanations: The Geneva Conference of 1954"; G. C. Herring & R. H. Immerman, "Eisenhower, Dulles, and Dienbienphu: 'The Day We Didn't Go to War' Revisited".

successful. Another was the coming Australian federal elections, on 29 May 1954. Dulles put forward the first reason at a meeting on 4 April 1954 with the Australian Ambassador to Washington, Percy Spender, and the New Zealand Ambassador Leslie Knox Munro. Dulles stated the importance of the British, Australian and New Zealand contribution to united action. Especially without British participation, he added, united action could not be successful. Spender 'spoke about the difficulties of the situation in Australia' at a 'time where an election campaign is under way' which would 'not end until the election on May 29'.²⁰

Despite Australia's reasons for delay, Cabinet decided that it should not appear to the US 'to be luke-warm in supporting' united action, but 'would be well advised to let other[s] raise the difficulties associated' with that proposal. 'Australia should not permit' the US 'to think that Australia' was 'reluctant to lend it aid'.²¹ What Canberra was saying to the Americans, was that it was not against united action; rather, because of the domestic and the international situation it could not at once say yes to the American proposal.

After the fall of Dien Bien Phu on 7 May 1954²² the Geneva Conference was assembled on 8 May. During the discussions Australia was caught between the American enthusiasm and the British disinclination to participate in Indochina.²³ This was a serious dilemma for Canberra: 'it might have to decide whether to support' the

²⁰ For details of the meeting see FRUS, 1952-54, Vol 13, Part 1, 1231- 35, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright), 4 April 1954; NAA, 539262, A816, 11/301/924, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Washington to the Department of External Affairs, 5 April 1954.

²¹ NAA, 539607, A4940, C928, Cabinet Minute, Decision No 982, 6 April 1954. For the Australian cabinet position on united action see also: NAA, 539607, A4940, C928, Cabinet Minute Decision No 988, 9 April 1954.

²² FRUS, 1952-54, Vol 13, Part 2, 1494, the Charge at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State, 7 May 1954.

²³ For details see: FRUS, 1952-54, Vol 16, 397ff.

US 'in a venture that would damage its relationship with the Asian nations and, more important,' Britain.²⁴

Canberra chose delay, by supporting the British. The Department of External Affairs outlined Canberra's position on the 'complex and sometimes conflicting developments in Geneva' in its cablegram on 26 May. The cablegram stated that Australia had 'not agreed to internationalization of the military operations in Indo-China'. The coming election was not a 'principal reason' for this decision. The cable noted that the 'Geneva Conference should first have genuine opportunity to reach settlement' because the 'extent' of 'French and Vietnamese support' for united action was not certain, and because the 'greater part of the Asian world would strongly oppose' action, which could prevent it achieving UN 'backing'. Moreover the 'nature of international assistance contemplated' by the US was 'not clear'. Australia had 'no quarrel ... with the references by Churchill to establishment of a "system" of collective defence' but Canberra, like London, thought that 'every effort should be made to reach a negotiated settlement in Indo-China'. If a settlement were 'reached the possibilities would be good of securing a collective defence which would either include south and South East Asian States or their sympathy'.²⁵ Australia's policy did not change after a Liberal-Country coalition victory in the May elections.²⁶ The new cabinet did not favour 'international military intervention in Indo-China'.²⁷

²⁴ R. B. Frankum, "Silent Partners: Australia and the United States in Vietnam, 1954-1968." Syracuse University PhD, 1997, 35.

²⁵ NAA, 509693, A816, 19/311/217, Cablegram from the Department of External Affairs to the Australian Delegation to Geneva Conference, 26 May 1954.

²⁶ For details of the 29 May 1954 Australian Federal elections see:

<http://pa.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/VII/4/401.pdf> accessed on 18.06.2009;

<http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/1998-99/99rp08.htm> accessed on 18.06.2009

²⁷ NAA, 509693, A816, 19/311/217, Cablegram from the Department of External Affairs to the Australian Embassy, Washington, 1 June 1954.

By the end of the Geneva Conference discussions Dulles understood that united action was not possible.²⁸ The 'decision of the French Government to obtain a cease-fire in Indochina' on 20 June 1954²⁹ and the creation of two Vietnams, Laos and Cambodia on 20-21 July 1954³⁰ ended the possibility. Thus before Australia was forced to meet its ANZUS obligations the situation in Indo-China was resolved.³¹ Australia escaped choosing between Britain and the US.

The next significant development in American-Australian relations in this era, which drew Australia a little closer to the US, was the formation of SEATO.³² For the US SEATO was important to fill the power vacuum in Indo-China caused by the French defeat. Washington feared that the Communists would exploit this vacuum while the US 'would be left without a comprehensive regional policy'.³³ Having failed to mobilize its allies' support for united action, the US tried to develop a regional initiative which might ensure this support in future.

Interestingly, one of the first proposals for SEATO came from London. At the conclusion of the Geneva Conference the British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden

²⁸ FRUS, 1952-54, Vol 13, Part 2, 1915-20, the Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, 3 August 1954.

²⁹ FRUS, 1952-54, Vol 13, Part 2, 1920, the Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, 3 August 1954.

³⁰ FRUS, 1952-54, Vol 16, 1505-46, Indochina Documents Prepared by the International Secretariat of the Geneva Conference: Armistice Agreements for Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia; the Final Declaration on Indochina; Declarations by Cambodia, Laos, and France; Proposed Amendment by Vietnam to the Final Declaration (July 20-July 21).

³¹ For a similar view see: R. B. Frankum, "Silent Partners: Australia and the United States in Vietnam, 1954-1968." Syracuse University PhD, 1997, 60.

³² SEATO was a collective defence organization created by the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty or the Manila Pact, signed on 8 September 1954. It came into force on 19 February 1955, when it had been ratified by eight states: Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Republic of the Philippines, Thailand, Britain and the US. The formal institution of SEATO was established at a meeting of treaty partners in Bangkok in February 1955. It was primarily created to block further communist gains in Southeast Asia. The organization's headquarters were located in Bangkok, Thailand. SEATO was dissolved on 30 June 1977. For details of the formation of the SEATO see: L. Buszynski, *SEATO, the Failure of an Alliance Strategy*; D. M. Fenton, "SEATO and the Defence of Southeast Asia 1955-1965." UNSW@ADFA PhD, 2006, 28-31, M. L. Thomas, "A Critical Appraisal of Seato", 928-29; W. M. Ball, "A Political Re-Examination of SEATO", 17-20; C. O. Lerche, "The United States, Great Britain, and SEATO a Case Study in the Fait Accompli", 459-78.

³³ R. B. Frankum, "Silent Partners: Australia and the United States in Vietnam, 1954-1968." Syracuse University PhD, 1997, 62.

stated that 'the best action would be ... that the countries of the Commonwealth and of South and South-East Asia', together with the US and France, 'all agreed to work together to ensure their common defence'.³⁴ Eden's proposal signalled prospective formal cooperation between the US and Britain in SEA. This could resolve Canberra's dilemma of being caught between London and Washington.

The idea of SEATO was discussed at the ANZUS Council Meeting in June 1954.³⁵ Australia welcomed the idea, adding that 'Australian participation in a "guarantee" is dependent upon participation of both the US and Britain. Canberra saw SEATO as 'an arrangement' which committed the US and Britain 'as far as possible to act in the event of any aggressive violation by the Communists'.³⁶ Australia asked to be 'informed of the American-British drafting discussions' on SEATO, but suggested that SEATO should focus on 'economic and technical aid' to SEA 'countries ... to help them create and maintain more stable governments'.³⁷ Australia's stance again shows that Canberra did not want to leave Britain for the US, but if possible mediate between them.

SEATO was finalized on 8 September 1954. SEATO was a collective defence organization created by the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty or the Manila Pact, signed on 8 September 1954. It came into force on 19 February 1955, when it had been ratified by eight states: Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, Britain and the US. The formal institution of SEATO was

³⁴ NAA, 523480, A816, 11/301/925, Message from Mr. Eden to the Governments of Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia, 20 July 1954.

³⁵ NAA, 705126, A5954, 1426/1, Cablegram from the Department of External Affairs to the Australian Embassy, Washington, 30 June 1954; NAA, 705126, A5954, 1426/1, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Washington to the Department of External Affairs, 30 June 1954.

³⁶ NAA, 705126, A5954, 1426/1, Cablegram from the Department of External Affairs to the Australian Embassy, Washington, 30 June 1954.

³⁷ NAA, 705126, A5954, 1426/1, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Washington to the Department of External Affairs, 30 June 1954.

established at a meeting of treaty partners in Bangkok in February 1955. It was primarily created to block further communist gains in Southeast Asia. The organization's headquarters were in Bangkok.³⁸

SEATO was an important milestone in Australian-American relations. With ANZUS, it intensified the Australian-American alliance but unlike ANZUS it linked a greater portion of the Commonwealth to the US in the security of SEA. This covered 'the over-all Australian security interests.'³⁹ More, within SEATO 'Australia has to an important extent fallen into the role of a "producer of security," a role that of necessity' conferred 'a special status upon its representatives'. Australia was, 'next to' the US, 'the only SEATO member which in the event of conflict could be expected to allocate substantial forces to the area within SEATO's special purview'. 'Australia's share' in SEATO was 'likely to become more and more important—mainly because ... it would represent its principal theatre of interest, by contrast with British strategy in which Southeast Asia has only tertiary priority'.⁴⁰ Australia could feel itself more independent from the Commonwealth, and could develop relations with the US. SEATO was a mutually satisfactory solution for Canberra and Washington, and they moved closer.

The West New Guinea (WNG) controversy in the mid 50s was another development in Australian-American relations. Western New Guinea (WNG), now West Papua, is the western half of the island of New Guinea. The WNG controversy was originally

³⁸ For details see: L. Buszynski, *SEATO, the Failure of an Alliance Strategy*; D. M. Fenton, "SEATO and the Defence of Southeast Asia 1955-1965." UNSW@ADFA PhD, 2006, 28-31, M. L. Thomas, "A Critical Appraisal of Seato", 928-29; W. M. Ball, "A Political Re-Examination of SEATO", 17-20; C. O. Lerche, "The United States, Great Britain, and SEATO a Case Study in the Fait Accompli", 459-78. For details of discussions on SEATO see: FRUS, 1952-54, Vol 12, Part 1, 490-902. For the text of the South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty see: US Department of State, Bulletin, Vol XXXI, 393-94, 20 September 1954.

³⁹ G. Modelski, "Australia and SEATO", 432.

⁴⁰ G. Modelski, "Australia and SEATO", 433.

between Holland and Indonesia. The latter threatened to invade WNG by 15 August 1962. Under strong pressure from the US the Dutch, who were prepared to resist an Indonesian attack, attended diplomatic talks. On 1 October 1962, the Dutch handed over the territory to a temporary UN administration (UNTEA). On 1 May 1963 Indonesia took control.⁴¹ The controversy was important to Australian-US relations in the sense that throughout, they had different and sometimes conflicting security concerns. For the US the threat was more global, and mainly, even in SEA, from the USSR. For Australia the threat was regional, so rather than fully committing itself to the conflict it wanted to maintain a buffer on its northern defence perimeter, in pursuit of its well known strategy of forward defence. Forward Defence was the basic defence conception of Australia in the immediate post-WWII period. 'The 1956 Strategic Basis Paper envisaged three successive lines of Defence. They began with the Defence of Indo-China and, should this fall, contingency plans would be implemented to defend Malaya, giving Australia "time to build up to meet this threat, provided her basic Defence infrastructure is sound"'.⁴²

Canberra's and Washington's differing views stemmed in part from the differing in value of Indonesia to each. Because of its geographical closeness to Australia and its nationalist president Achmed Sukarno,⁴³ Indonesia was a perceived threat for Canberra, so Canberra supported the Dutch. Washington did not want to let

⁴¹ For details see: C. Lambert Maria Penders, *The West New Guinea debacle : Dutch decolonisation and Indonesia, 1945-1963*; G. Poulgrain, *From West New Guinea to Irian Jaya*; J. R. Verrier, "Australia, Papua New Guinea and the West New Guinea question, 1949-1969." Monash University PhD, 1976; S. R. Doran, "Western friends and eastern neighbours : West New Guinea and Australian self-perception in relation to the United States, Britain and Southeast Asia, 1950-1962." ANU PhD, 1999; J. E. Maskey, "Fruitless and Friendless: Australia and the West New Guinea Dispute, 1949-1962." University of Queensland PhD, 2007.

⁴² A. Hawke, Australia's Defence Policy - From Dependence to Independence in our Strategy, 21 June 2000 at <http://defence.gov.au/media/SpeechTpl.cfm?CurrentId=1423> accessed on 22.06.2009 For details see: P. Dibb, *Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities : Report to the Minister of Defence*; M. Gubb, *How Valid was the Criticism of Paul Dibb's 'Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities?'*.

⁴³ For details on Sukarno see: J. D. Legge, *Sukarno : A Political Biography*; R. D. Bharadwaj, *Sukarno and Indonesian nationalism*.

Indonesia, with nearly 80 million people, fall to the Communists, so the US decided to be neutral.⁴⁴

Australia's support for the Dutch was not only because of Indonesia's perceived threat. Canberra knew that there was no cultural link between Indonesia and WNG, and that Djakarta did not have a legal basis for its claim there. As well, a weak government in WNG would bring the Communist threat close to Australian territory. The Dutch should stay in WNG as a buffer.⁴⁵

From the end of 1956 Australia attempted to end American neutrality on WNG. On 20 October 1956 Canberra asked for Washington's 'sympathy' with its 'point of view'.⁴⁶ The US did not respond.⁴⁷ A year later, the US policy was still the same. At an ANZUS Council meeting in October 1957, in reply to Australia's concerns 'at the growth of Communist influence in Indonesia and the increasingly injurious effects of Sukarno's policies', Allen Dulles, the Director of Central Intelligence, said that 'he would not regard Sukarno as a Communist but there was no doubt that he was becoming increasingly subject to Communist influences'. Richard Casey, the Minister for External Affairs, 'stressed [the] disastrous effect' of Indonesia's 'success' on the WNG issue. Dulles replied that 'the transfer of [WNG] to Indonesia in the foreseeable future' was definitely against security interests' of the US, but the US 'had not felt able to change its policy [of neutrality] ... because of [the] adverse effect this would have on American ability to maintain influence with those Indonesian leaders who

⁴⁴ FRUS, 1955-57, Vol 22, 143-44, Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, 15 March 1955.

⁴⁵ D. Ball & H. Wilson (eds), *Strange Neighbours : the Australia-Indonesia Relationship*, 174-77.

⁴⁶ NAA, 554216, A1838, 852/10/43 PART 16, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Washington, to the Department of External Affairs, 20 October 1956; FRUS, 1955-57, Vol 22, 313-14, Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, 19 October 1956.

⁴⁷ FRUS, 1955-57, Vol 22, 323-24, Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy), 31 October 1956.

might provide an alternative to Sukarno as well as American loss of influence on other Asian countries'.⁴⁸

In 1958 and 1959 Washington continued its policy of neutrality. At an ANZUS Council meeting on 1 October 1958 Dulles illustrated this. He said that 'Indonesia should be dependent' upon the US rather than the USSR 'or the Soviet bloc'.⁴⁹ He added that if US-Indonesia relations developed, there would be 'a considerable dependence upon the' US and it would be 'highly unlikely' that the Indonesians 'would in fact attempt to take' WNG 'by force'. He thought this policy was 'the wisest'.⁵⁰ On the other hand, Dulles was concerned at the possibility 'that the Netherlands might decide that it was not worth their while to hang on to' WNG.⁵¹ At a National Security Meeting on 29 January 1959, Eisenhower released NSC 5901,⁵² which stated American neutrality on the WNG question, and announced 'the provision of both technical assistance and economic aid to Indonesia'. This US thought that this would maintain the American presence in Indonesia and prevent its loss to the Communists, which would be the basis of American policy on Indonesia and WNG. The President said that 'this seemed to be a policy of walking a tightrope' but 'he could see no other solution' to the WNG dispute. He said that 'the Dutch were such very good friends of' the US 'and such good allies' that the US 'should try to win them over' to the American 'point of view'. He 'commented that perhaps Australia was a harder nut to crack than The

⁴⁸ NAA, 652219, A1838, TS383/1/6, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Washington to the Department of External Affairs, 5 October 1957. See also: FRUS, 1955-57, Vol 22, 466-71, United States Minutes of ANZUS Council Meeting, 4 October 1957.

⁴⁹ FRUS, 1958-60, Vol 17, 285, Minutes of ANZUS Council Meeting, 1 October 1958.

⁵⁰ FRUS, 1958-60, Vol 17, 285, Minutes of ANZUS Council Meeting, 1 October 1958.

⁵¹ NAA, 554235, A1838, 852/10/43 PART 27, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Washington to the Department of External Affairs, 13 October 1958.

⁵² For details of the National Council Security Report 5901 see: FRUS, 1958-60, Vol 17, 334-44, National Security Council Report, 3 February 1959.

Netherlands'.⁵³ The US clearly did not perceive Indonesia as the threat that Australia did.

In February 1959 Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio's visit to Australia relieved Canberra's anxieties. From 10 to 15 February Subandrio had 'high-level discussions with' Australian officials 'toward the principal end of re-assuring Australia that Indonesia does not pose a threat to this country's security'. On 14 February 'in a Joint Communique ... Indonesia categorically ruled out the use of force as a means to settle' the WNG 'problem and Australia adopted a more flexible policy by agreeing not to impose objections if Indonesia were able to acquire this territory through peaceful negotiations with the Netherlands'.⁵⁴ In turn Menzies visited Indonesia in December 1959, and 'had a number of frank discussions with Indonesian leaders including Sukarno, and seems to have developed good personal rapport with the latter'. 'Sukarno stated publicly that Indonesia had no intention of using force' in the WNG 'dispute'.⁵⁵ These official visits had a relieving effect on Australia-Indonesian relations but did not totally eliminate Canberra's perceptions of an Indonesian threat.

The change in the US administration from Eisenhower to John Fitzgerald Kennedy in 1961 did not bring a significant change in American policy on WNG. Howard Beale, the Australian Ambassador to Washington, met Dean Rusk, Kennedy's Secretary of State, on 27 January 1961 to see whether the US administration would change its policy on WNG. Beale explained Australia's anxieties and 'defence and strategic reasons ... against Dutch New Guinea getting into the hands of an expansionist or a Communist Indonesia.' Rusk replied that the Administration really had not developed

⁵³ FRUS, 1958-60, Vol 17, 330, Memorandum of Discussion at the 395th Meeting of the National Security Council, 29 January 1959.

⁵⁴ FRUS, 1958-60, Vol 17, 349.

⁵⁵ FRUS, 1958-60, Vol 17, 460-61, Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to Acting Secretary of State Dillon, 31 December 1959.

a policy as yet on this issue, but added that the US 'would not wish to inflame passions in Indonesia where the stakes were very high'.⁵⁶

On 8 December 1961 Beale met W. Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and reiterated Australia's concerns. Harriman replied that the US 'hope was that the Dutch and the Indonesians could be got together for bilateral talks'. These talks would aim at a '“two bite” operation'. The first 'would be to get the Dutch out [to] a trusteeship or some similar arrangement, with access being accorded to the Indonesians to make their own views be known to the Papuans'. The second bite would be 'a plebiscite at which they [Indonesia] might reasonably hope to secure' WNG 'if they behaved well'.⁵⁷ Canberra did not 'share' the US 'optimism about the prospects for or outcome of bilateral Dutch-Indonesian talks'⁵⁸ but it could not change the American stance.

Australian discomfort with the US view led Canberra to ask for American help in a more straightforward manner. In January 1962, Beale again met Harriman saying that 'Sukarno was a dangerous man, his country could come under Communist control' and Australia 'therefore wanted to keep him out of' WNG 'if possible'. 'The best and perhaps the only way of doing this was for' the US 'to take a strong stand with him'. Beale directly asked, 'if Indonesia attacks the Dutch' will the US 'take military action to assist them to defend themselves?' Harriman said 'no'. Beale then asked 'if, when Indonesia attacked, Australia went to the military aid of the Dutch and then asked' the US 'to give military assistance, would the' US 'do so'. Harriman replied that 'the answer must be same as above'. Then Harriman briefly repeated US

⁵⁶ NAA, 842163, A1838, TS686/2/3, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Washington to the Department of External Affairs, 27 January 1961.

⁵⁷ NAA, 546058, A1838, 915/9 PART 41, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Washington to the Department of External Affairs, 11 December 1961.

⁵⁸ NAA, 546059, A1838, 915/9 PART 42, Cablegram from the Department of External Affairs to the Australian Embassy, Washington, 15 December 1961.

policy on WNG. He said that the WNG problem was 'part of a wider one: how to keep the countries' of SEA 'neutral and prevent Communism - Russian or Chinese - from gaining further influence in the area'. He added that 'he thought Australia's best interests lay in preventing this too'. He 'said that in his view, to oppose Sukarno with force or to speak so bluntly as to identify' the US 'clearly with the Dutch case, would be to destroy all chance there might be of the' US 'exerting any influence on him and drive him and his regime into the hands of the Russians'.⁵⁹ The US did not want to confront Indonesia on the WNG issue.

By 1962 the US had become more determined to solve the WNG issue. In part it quit its policy of neutrality and became a third party to the WNG issue.⁶⁰ With American mediation, the Dutch accepted bilateral conversations with the Indonesians on the WNG issue. The former even agreed to transfer WNG to Indonesia before the conversations.⁶¹ The vital step was proposed by the US Ambassador to India, Ellsworth Bunker, on 2 April 1962. His plan became the basis of the solution to the WNG controversy. It asked the Dutch to abandon administrative authority in WNG to the UN. Indonesia would then give WNG an opportunity for self-determination.⁶² The US made the Dutch accept this plan.⁶³

Washington then offered the Bunker proposal to Australia.⁶⁴ Harriman told Beale that Australia had ANZUS and US support against any Indonesian threat.⁶⁵ On 10 April,

⁵⁹ NAA, 546060, A1838, 915/9 PART 43, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Washington to the Department of External Affairs, 8 January 1962.

⁶⁰ R. B. Frankum, "Silent Partners: Australia and the United States in Vietnam, 1954-1968." Syracuse University PhD, 1997, 122.

⁶¹ R. B. Frankum, "Silent Partners: Australia and the United States in Vietnam, 1954-1968." Syracuse University PhD, 1997, 122.

⁶² G. Greenwood & N. Harper (eds), *Australia in World Affairs 1961-1965*, 324-26.

⁶³ R. B. Frankum, "Silent Partners: Australia and the United States in Vietnam, 1954-1968." Syracuse University PhD, 1997, 125.

⁶⁴ For Australia's opposition to the Bunker proposal see: NAA, 546062, A1838, 915/9 PART 45, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Washington to the Department of External Affairs, 4 April

Rusk repeated the same American guarantee.⁶⁶ From the beginning of the WNG problem Canberra had asked several times for a solid American guarantee against an Indonesian threat. Now the US gave it.

The American promises, although only oral, were enough for Canberra to lay aside its reservations about the Bunker proposal.⁶⁷ Australia's support shifted from the Dutch to Indonesia.⁶⁸ Australia sent Athol Townley, Minister for Defence, to develop relations between Australia and Indonesia.⁶⁹ The joint communiqué, after Menzies' visit to the US, showed that Australia accepted the Bunker proposal as the main element of the solution to the WNG issue.⁷⁰ Washington had managed to eliminate both the Dutch and the Australian opposition to the Bunker proposal.

On 15 August 1962 Holland and Indonesia completed discussions for a UN-led transfer of sovereignty of WNG from the Netherlands to Indonesia.⁷¹ On 14 September, the Netherlands Parliament ratified the end of Dutch rule in the East Indies.⁷² The WNG problem resolved in line with US policy. Neither the voice and interests of the Papuans, nor the fact that the transfer made Indonesia a colonial power, were considered.

1962; NAA, 546064, A1838, 915/9 PART 47, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Washington to the Department of External Affairs, 5 April 1962.

⁶⁵ NAA, 248081, A1838, 250/7/10 PART 3, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Washington to the Department of External Affairs, 6 April 1962.

⁶⁶ NAA, 248081, A1838, 250/7/10 PART 3, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Washington to the Department of External Affairs, 10 April 1962.

⁶⁷ NAA, 1173407, A4231, 1961/1962/SOUTH EAST ASIA, Despatch No 4 from the Australian Embassy, Djakarta to the Department of External Affairs, 19 April 1962.

⁶⁸ NAA, 546065, A1838, 915/9 PART 48, Record of Conversation between the Minister for External Affairs and the Netherlands Ambassador (J. G. de Beus), 11 May 1962.

⁶⁹ NAA, 1173407, A4231, 1961/1962/SOUTH EAST ASIA, Despatch No 5/1962 from the Australian Embassy, Djakarta to the Department of External Affairs, 17 June 1962.

⁷⁰ R. B. Frankum, "Silent Partners: Australia and the United States in Vietnam, 1954-1968." Syracuse University PhD, 1997, 127.

⁷¹ NAA, 546068, A1838, 915/9 PART 51, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Washington to the Department of External Affairs, 31 July 1962.

⁷² NAA, 1107127, A703, 539/1/11, *Agreement between The Republic of Indonesia and The Kingdom of the Netherlands concerning West New Guinea (West Irian)*; NAA, 1172486, M2576, 24, Despatch No 1/62 from the Australian Embassy, the Hague to the Department of External Affairs, 14 September 1962.

The US needed to sort out WNG because of an escalation of events in South Vietnam in 1962. Washington wanted to free its 'diplomatic and military resources'.⁷³ Nonetheless WNG gave Australia a clear illustration of the significance of the American security guarantee. Although ANZUS was concluded in 1952, Australia had doubted the American immediate security guarantee in any escalation in SEA. With American's oral assurance, Canberra abandoned the Dutch and supported the US, thereby affirming Australian defence policy since 1945. The Australian Ambassador to Thailand, Malcom R. Booker, commented Australia 'must encourage and support the Americans in holding positions in South-East Asia as far forward as possible'.⁷⁴

Australia supported America in South Vietnam from 1955 to 1961, and in this period slowly further detached itself from the Commonwealth. The US wanted to contain Communism in South Vietnam. It supported Ngo Dinh Diem⁷⁵, a nationalist trying to reform the Vietnamese elite. After the Geneva Conference, Diem managed to stabilize South Vietnam by suppressing domestic uprisings with US support.⁷⁶ Unlike WNG issue, the US took a strong stance in supporting South Vietnam.

Australia's support for the American course in Vietnam increased gradually. The Republic of Vietnam was declared on 23 October 1955, with Diem elected as 'president in what was clearly a fraudulent election'.⁷⁷ The US quickly recognized the

⁷³ R. B. Frankum, "Silent Partners: Australia and the United States in Vietnam, 1954-1968." Syracuse University PhD, 1997, 129.

⁷⁴ NAA, 1173407, A4231, 1961/1962/SOUTH EAST ASIA, Despatch No 2/62 from the Australian Embassy, Bangkok to the Department of External Affairs, 19 April 1962.

⁷⁵ Ngo Dinh Diem was the first President of South Vietnam (1955-1963). For details of Diem see: B. B. Fall, *The two Viet-Nams: a political and military analysis*, 234-53.

⁷⁶ For details see: B. B. Fall, *The two Viet-Nams: a political and military analysis*, 254-59; Ralph Bernard Smith, *An International History of the Vietnam War*, Vol 1, 35-53.

⁷⁷ J. E. Jessup, *An Encyclopedic Dictionary of Conflict and Conflict Resolution*, 1945-1996, 792.

new government, as did Australia.⁷⁸ The US next asked Australia to support its position in Vietnam. Robert E. Huey, Officer in Charge of Vietnam-Laos-Cambodia Affairs in the State Department, made this request. Spender agreed to give Australia's support but he said that 'gradualness' would be a better theme for escalation in Vietnam.⁷⁹ The Department of External Affairs also considered that 'Australia should not be committed rigidly' to the US policy.⁸⁰

Australia's support for the US course in Vietnam increased after Washington clarified its policy in NSC 5612/1.⁸¹ One aim of this policy was to support South Vietnam's peace and stability. This led Australia to update its policy. Casey stated Australia's sympathy for the American position in Vietnam,⁸² and Australia supported South Vietnam's stability by economic and technical aid⁸³ via the Colombo Plan. The Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and Social Development in Asia and the Pacific, dated from 1950, aiming to enhance economic and social development of the countries of the region. The Colombo Plan was established on 1 July 1951 by Australia, Canada, India, Pakistan, New Zealand, Sri Lanka and the United Kingdom.⁸⁴ Until 1962 Australia continued its economic aid and the transfer of technology and also military assistance to South Vietnam.⁸⁵ Australia's willingness to support South Vietnam increased its closeness to the US in SEA.

⁷⁸ R. B. Frankum, "Silent Partners: Australia and the United States in Vietnam, 1954-1968." Syracuse University PhD, 1997, 135.

⁷⁹ NAA, 530732, A5954, 2309/1, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Washington to the Department of External Affairs, 9 May 1955.

⁸⁰ NAA, 636281, A5462, 2/16/1 PART 1, Telegram from the Department of External Affairs to the Australian Embassy, Washington, 11 May 1955.

⁸¹ On 5 September 1956, Eisenhower approved NSC 5612/1, "U.S. Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia". A partially declassified text is printed in *United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967*, Vol 10, 1082-95.

⁸² NAA, 842151, A1838, TS686/1 PART 4, Cablegram from the Department of External Affairs to the Australian High Commission, London, 20 September 1955.

⁸³ For details see: NAA 548811, A1838, 3014/10/1 PART 1A, Memorandum for the Minister for External Affairs from J.K. Walker, Assistant Secretary

⁸⁴ For details of the Colombo Plan see Colombo Plan Secretariat's website at: <http://www.colombo-plan.org/> accessed on 25.06.2009

⁸⁵ For details of the Australian aid see: R. G. Casey, *Friends and Neighbours: Australia and the World*, 87-94; US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol XLVIII, 977-83, 24 June 1963; Current Notes in

In 1959 a new crisis arose - a civil war in Laos. It became more serious in 1961⁸⁶, and it moved Australia closer to the US. For the US the Laos Crisis, in a general sense, was not very different from any other crisis in SEA. Laos should not be lost to Communism. 'If Laos fell, then Thailand, the Philippines, and of course Chiang Kai-shek [in Taiwan] would go'.⁸⁷ Australia too was 'deeply concerned'⁸⁸ about Laos. Yet again it first sought to understand the American attitude.⁸⁹ The term "gradual closeness" became the key phrase for US-Australian relations from 1952 to 1966.

Washington's reaction was to respond to the escalation in Laos via SEATO, 'without further delay', 'in order to reassure Asian Allies'.⁹⁰ With American support SEATO organized Plan 5,⁹¹ which provided 'for offensive operations by the Royal Laotian Army, with active SEATO support, to restore the Government's control'.⁹² As in other crises except Vietnam, the US did not intervene single handedly. It sought allied support.

The Laos Crisis let Australia see the increasing US interest in SEA, but still Australia wanted to be sure that the US would seriously commit itself to the region. Canberra asked for 'a clarification of [the] American views on the nature and objectives of any SEATO intervention'. The Americans said that 'their objective would be political and

International Affairs, Vol 33, No 3, 44-45, March 1962. For the statistics of the Australian aid within the Colombo Plan see: Current Notes of International Affairs, Vol 35, No 4, 32, May 1964.

⁸⁶ For details see: FRUS, 1961-63, Laos Crisis, Vol 24.

⁸⁷ FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 24, 19-20, Notes of Conversation between President-Elect Kennedy and President Eisenhower, 19 January 1961.

⁸⁸ FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 24, 1-4, Memorandum of Conference with Eisenhower, 2 January 1961.

⁸⁹ FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 24, 26-40, Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nitze) to Secretary of Defense McNamara, 23 January 1961.

⁹⁰ FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 24, 50-54, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos, 10 February 1961.

⁹¹ FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 24, 126-29, Memorandum from the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to Kennedy, 13 April 1961.

⁹² NAA, 691104, A5818, VOLUME 26/AGENDUM 1093, Cabinet Submission No 1093. See also: W. W. Rostow, "Vietnam and Asia" 469.

would be designed to bring pressure on the Communist bloc'.⁹³ Canberra then decided that 'Australia must follow' the US lead and that: 'it should be made clear ... that, on the basis of a SEATO intervention, Australia would stand ready to accept the role indicated under Plan 5 and to make the indicated contribution.' Cabinet also decided that the consequences of intervention should be emphasized to the US.⁹⁴ Australia was again ready to support the US, but not before being reassured by Washington of its determination to solve the crisis.

After WNG the only unbalancing element in Australian-American relations was Indonesia's *Konfrontasi* policy⁹⁵ against Malaysia starting from 1963. *Konfrontasi* stemmed from the Indonesian reaction to a British proposal for a Federation of Malaysia.⁹⁶ Britain informed the US of its 'grave concern' about Indonesia, and the need for talks by the US, Britain and Australia. According to Britain 'Sukarno's territorial ambitions were not satisfied with West Irian and constituted a real danger to Borneo, Timor, greater Malaysia, and the rest of New Guinea'.⁹⁷ The Australian Cabinet accepted the British proposal to meet the US, New Zealand and Britain 'to discuss the British assessment of Indonesia's expansionist intentions, its current Borneo activities and a common policy on Indonesia'. Cabinet decided that Australia should support Britain, and also believed that a federated Malaysia would be 'the best available solution to the internal problems of the territories and to maintain

⁹³ NAA, 691104, A5818, VOLUME 26/AGENDUM 1093, Cabinet Submission No 1093.

⁹⁴ NAA, 691104, A5818, VOLUME 26/AGENDUM 1093, Cabinet Minute Decision No 1340, 1 May 1961. For Australia's acceptance for an active role in Laos within the framework of ANZUS and SEATO see: NAA, 691260, A5818, VOLUME 32/AGENDUM 1343, Report by the Australian Chiefs of Staff Committee about Possible Military Intervention in Laos, September 1961; NAA, 691260, A5818, VOLUME 32/AGENDUM 1343, Cabinet Minute Decision No 1569(HOC), 13 September 1961.

⁹⁵ For *Konfrontasi* see: G. Poulgrain, *The Genesis of Konfrontasi: Malaysia Brunei Indonesia 1945-1965*; J. S. Djiwandono, *Konfrontasi revisited: Indonesia's foreign policy under Soekarno*; J. A. C Mackie, *Konfrontasi: the Indonesia-Malaysia dispute, 1963-1966*.

⁹⁶ Malaysia would be made up of the Federation of Malaya, Singapore and the three British dependencies on Borneo: the Protectorate of Brunei and the Crown colonies of Sarawak and North Borneo. See: FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 23, 707. For the Indonesian reaction see: FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 23, 711, Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy, 17 February 1963. See also: NAA, 1338483, A4940, C3739, Cabinet Minute Decision No 675, 5 March 1963; NAA, 1338483, A4940, C3739, Quadripartite Talks on Indonesia, 4 February 1963.

⁹⁷ FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 23, 657, Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), 16 January 1963.

Malaysia ... as a Western aligned group'.⁹⁸ Australia's position and responsibilities in the Commonwealth became an issue in its relations with the US.

Both Canberra and Washington supported federation,⁹⁹ but Washington was reluctant to commit itself to an action which could impair its relations with Djakarta. During the quadripartite talks on Indonesia on 11 and 12 February 1961 the US 'did not appear to take drastic measures which could adversely affect their relations with Indonesia'.¹⁰⁰ The US decided to 'assume no responsibility' in the region¹⁰¹ and regarded 'Malaysia as primarily the responsibility of the British and secondly Australia and New Zealand'.¹⁰² Australia did not like this, but decided 'to support the creation of Malaysia and to accept the risk' of 'tension' in its 'relations with Indonesia'.¹⁰³ Australia and the US parted views on Indonesia.¹⁰⁴

This did not mean that Washington left Canberra alone in Malaya. On his visit to Australia in June 1963, Averell Harriman, the US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, stated that the US 'would wish Australia to extend to Malaysia its present defence commitments to Malaya'. He also said that 'if there should be an overt attack on Malaysia and if Australian forces should become involved', ANZUS would 'come into operation'.¹⁰⁵ At a meeting with President Kennedy on 8 July Menzies asked, 'if Australian troops stationed in North Borneo were attacked, would

⁹⁸ NAA, 1338483, A4940, C3739, Cabinet Minute Decision No 632, 5 February 1963.

⁹⁹ NAA, 1338483, A4940, C3739, Cabinet Minute Decision No 675, 5 March 1963; FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 23, 710, Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy, 17 February 1963.

¹⁰⁰ For details of the talks see: NAA, 1338483, A4940, C3739, Memorandum from Garfield Barwick, Minister for External Affairs to the Australian Cabinet Submission No 576, 26 February 1963.

¹⁰¹ FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 23, 710, Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy, 17 February 1963.

¹⁰² NAA, 1338483, A4940, C3739, Memorandum from Garfield Barwick, Minister for External Affairs to the Australian Cabinet Submission No 576, 26 February 1963.

¹⁰³ NAA, 1338483, A4940, C3739, Cabinet Minute Decision No 675, 5 March 1963.

¹⁰⁴ For the closeness between the US and Indonesia see: FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 23, 663, Memorandum from Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy, 6 March 1963.

¹⁰⁵ NAA, 1338485, A4940, C3812, Report of Meeting with Mr. Averell Harriman, United States Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 7 June 1963.

the ANZUS treaty take effect?'. Kennedy 'agreed that the Australians should know the exact commitment under the ANZUS treaty and that Sukarno and others should also know it'.¹⁰⁶ Washington did not want to damage Australia's closeness.

The problem in Malaya escalated when Britain and Malaya signed an agreement, on 9 July 1963, to establish Malaysia on 31 August 1963.¹⁰⁷ Sukarno launched Indonesia's *Konfrontasi* against this in September 1963.¹⁰⁸ After US oral assurances in June, July and September, Menzies told Parliament that 'Australia would give military assistance to defend Malaysia in the event of any armed invasion or of subversive activity supported, directed, or inspired from outside Malaysia.'¹⁰⁹ Washington then clarified its June and July assurances to Australia by saying that American help to Australia in terms of 'an armed attack against Australian forces in Malaysia' would only cover an 'overt attack' not 'subversion, guerrilla warfare or indirect aggression'.¹¹⁰ The main reason for Washington's reluctance to help Australia in Malaysia was that it considered *Konfrontasi* a British (and Australian and New Zealand) responsibility, and was concentrating on developments in South Vietnam.¹¹¹ There Washington would commit itself singlehandedly. In all the other crises, Washington did not want to intervene directly, opting at most for indirect support.

¹⁰⁶ FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 23, 732, Memorandum of Conversation, 2 October 1963.

¹⁰⁷ A. J. Stockwell (ed), *British Documents on the end of the Empire Series B: Malaysia*, Vol. 8, 633-34, 657.

¹⁰⁸ O. K. Gin (ed), *Southeast Asia : a Historical Encyclopedia, from Angkor Wat to East Timor*, Vol 2, 845.

¹⁰⁹ FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 23, 731, Memorandum of Conversation, 2 October 1963.

¹¹⁰ NAA, 248085, A1838, 270/1/1 PART 1, Cablegram from Garfield Barwick to Robert Menzies, 22 October 1963; FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 23, 745-47, Memorandum from the Department of State to President Kennedy, 14 October 1963; FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 23, 747-49, Memorandum of Conversation, 16 October.

¹¹¹ NAA, 248085, A1838, 270/1/1 PART 1, Record of Four-Power Talks, 16 October 1963; NAA, 248085, A1838, 270/1/1 PART 1, Record of Four-Power Talks Meetings of the Working Party on 16/17 October 1963; NAA, 248085, A1838, 270/1/1 PART 1, Record of Four-Power Talks, 17 October 1963; NAA, 842154, A1838, TS686/1/1 PART 1, Minute by the Defence Committee at the Meeting held on Thursday 7 November 1963; FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 23, 753-56, Memorandum of Conversation, 18 October 1963.

After Kennedy's assassination in November 1963,¹¹² Lyndon Baines Johnson became president and changed American policy on *Konfrontasi*. Johnson reduced American aid to Indonesia,¹¹³ and Rusk 'sent a very strong message indeed to Sukarno concerning his anti-Malaysian policy.'¹¹⁴ The US wanted 'Sukarno to hold back.'¹¹⁵ Johnson sent Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, to Indonesia as 'a last attempt to warn' Sukarno 'bluntly of the consequences of his ... policy'. Johnson 'wanted to be able to meet Congressional criticism if he certified that the giving of aid to Indonesia was in the best interests of the' US 'by saying that he had persuaded' Sukarno 'to stop confrontation'.¹¹⁶ The US still preferred indirect policies in situations which might sever or damage its relations with potential allies like Indonesia or institutional allies like Australia.

In the spring of 1964 the situation in Malaysia escalated, fuelling British anxieties.¹¹⁷ London requested Australia's support.¹¹⁸ Canberra did not want to deploy too many resources to Malaysia because of events in South Vietnam, so decided to help the British with only minimal defence items.¹¹⁹ Britain pressured Australia for more military assistance,¹²⁰ but Australia recognised that US views 'were of first class importance and that' Australia 'would not undertake a commitment without having

¹¹² FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 4, 627.

¹¹³ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 26, 5-10, Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson, 6 January 1964; FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 26, 13-14, Memorandum Prepared by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), 7 January 1964.

¹¹⁴ NAA, 546045, A1838, 915/8A PART 5, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy in Washington to the Department of External Affairs, 6 January 1964.

¹¹⁵ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 26, 16-20, Summary Record of the 521st National Security Council Meeting, 7 January 1964.

¹¹⁶ NAA, 546045, A1838, 915/8A PART 5, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy in Washington to the Department of External Affairs, 22 January 1964.

¹¹⁷ NAA, 1160359, A1209, 1964/6040 PART 2, Text of Message from Sir Alec Douglas-Home to Sir Robert Menzies, 10 April 1964.

¹¹⁸ NAA, 1160359, A1209, 1964/6040 PART 2, from J.K. Waller, Acting Secretary to John Bunting, Secretary in Prime Minister's Department, 13 April 1964.

¹¹⁹ For the requested items and those provided see: NAA, 1160359, A1209, 1964/6040 PART 2, Memorandum from E. J. Bunting to Menzies, 14 April 1964. See also: NAA, 1160359, A1209, 1964/6040 PART 2, Menzies' reply to Douglas-Home's Message of 10 April, 13 April 1964.

¹²⁰ NAA, 1160359, A1209, 1964/6040 PART 2, Text of Message from Alec Douglas-Home to Robert Menzies, 1 June 1964; NAA, 1160359, A1209, 1964/6040 PART 2, Our Commitment to Malaysia, Undated; NAA, 1160247, A1209, 1964/6040 PART 3, Defence Committee Minute, 29 June 1964.

ascertained' the US position.¹²¹ This was a clear indication that Australia now felt closer to the US than to the Commonwealth.

In 1965 further escalation of events in Indonesia decreased Washington's neutrality. At the beginning of 1965 anti-American activities in Indonesia, and especially attacks to the US Information Agency (USIA) libraries in Surabaya and Medan,¹²² led the Johnson administration to stiffen its attitude towards Indonesia. The US found these anti-American activities intolerable and decided on a 'further substantial reduction in size of USAID mission in Indonesia'.¹²³ The continuation of violence against American personnel and property led the US to close 'all USIA Libraries and Reading Rooms in Indonesia'.¹²⁴ This did not change Sukarno's attitude.¹²⁵ Anti-American activities were followed by even more serious events.

One event was a coup attempt against Sukarno in September 1965.¹²⁶ It failed but was a significant blow to Sukarno's power.¹²⁷ After the coup, with the increasing role of the army and the decreasing role of Sukarno in Indonesia, the US thought that the army could be a solution for *Konfrontasi* and, that because of its anti-Communist stance, a significant army figure could be an alternative to Sukarno in improving Indonesian-American relations. This was General Suharto, Commander of the Indonesian Army's Strategic Reserve Command, to whom most of the key

¹²¹ NAA, 1160247, A1209, 1964/6040 PART 3, Cablegram from the Department of External Affairs to the Australian High Commission, London, 3 July 1964.

¹²² FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 26, 223-25, Memorandum from Director of the United States Information Agency Rowan to Secretary of State Rusk, 18 February 1965.

¹²³ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 26, 228-30, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia, 20 February 1965.

¹²⁴ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 26, 241, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball), 2 March 1965.

¹²⁵ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 26, 255-63, Report From Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker to President Johnson, undated.

¹²⁶ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 26, 300-301, Memorandum for President Johnson, 1 October 1965; FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 26, 304-306, Memorandum From the Director of the Far East Region (Blouin) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton), 4 October 1965.

¹²⁷ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 26, 335-37, Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, 26 October 1965.

Indonesian commanders were loyal.¹²⁸ Sukarno's announcement of new Cabinet in February 1966 fuelled student demonstrations, supported the army.¹²⁹ In March the army, which claimed the support of the 'People of Djakarta'¹³⁰ won an 'apparent victory over Sukarno'¹³¹. The policy of *Konfrontasi* began to ease and on 11 August 1966 a peace treaty between Indonesia and Malaysia ended it.¹³²

Between 1952 and 1966 crises in SEA increased American attention to the region. In all these crises except Vietnam, Washington used indirect measures. Directly or indirectly, Australia increasingly supported American policies, thereby moving from the Commonwealth towards Washington. From 1945 Canberra tried to find ways to commit Washington to SEA and the South Pacific. The crises from 1952 to 1966 finally achieved this. This served Australian strategic interests, and was the major reason why Australia supported the US in all these crises. Even difficulties in US-Australian relations, such as WNG and *Konfrontasi*, did not damage the growing closeness between Washington and Canberra. In this mood the two allies turned to Vietnam. While Australia's diagonal of the wavy cross continued to rise throughout the crises in SEA, Turkey's diagonal began to slope downwards with developments in the Middle East.

¹²⁸ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 26, 371-73, Intelligence Memorandum, 18 November 1965; FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 26, 375-79, Intelligence Memorandum, 22 November 1965; FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 26, 388-90, Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, 22 December 1965.

¹²⁹ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 26, 395-99, Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, 2 February 1966; FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 26, 402-404, Briefing Notes for President Johnson, 15 February 1966; FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 26, 411-14, Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, 4 March 1966; FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 26, 420-21, Memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Berger) to Secretary of State Rusk, 14 March 1966.

¹³⁰ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 26, 417-18, Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, 12 March 1966.

¹³¹ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 26, 419, Memorandum from the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson, 12 March 1966.

¹³² FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 26, 427-28, Memorandum from Donald W. Ropa of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow), 18 April, 1966; FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 26, 449-57, Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson, 1 August 1966; FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 26, 463-65, Intelligence Note from the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk, 12 August 1966.

PART 5: The Cyprus Question and the Vietnam War

a. Turkey

This chapter examines Turkish–American relations from the 60s to the mid-70s within the framework of the Cyprus Question and the Cuban Missile crisis. It gives a brief background to the Cyprus Question in the mid 50s to show that it was a “sleeper”, which the closeness between the US and Turkey glossed over.

This closeness was shaken by the Cuban Missile crisis in October 1962, which triggered Ankara’s concerns about the reliability of the American alliance. The crisis showed that Turkey’s significance for Washington in the Eastern Mediterranean was decreasing. At the same time Turkish and Greek Cypriot activities were escalating the situation on Cyprus. Turkey approached Washington on Cyprus many times, but the latter did not want to be a direct party of the question. This deepened Turkey’s concerns about American alliance.

Turkey and the US might have resolved this tension but for other issues, such as Turkey’s withdrawal from the Multilateral Force in 1965, Turkey’s reaction to the American use of force in the Vietnam War in 1965, problems caused by American military personnel in Turkish bases, the problem of opium cultivation in Turkey at the beginning of 1970s and most significant of all, Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus in 1974 and the consequent American arms embargo. Unlike Australia Turkey did not support the US in Vietnam and did not send troops. In short, in this period Turkey’s arm of the wavy cross moved away from the US.

Cyprus was essentially Greek when the Ottoman Empire conquered it in 1571. Ottoman settlers came, and by the nineteenth century there was a substantial Turkish minority.¹ In 1878 the Ottomans leased the island to the British in return for support against Russia.² Britain annexed Cyprus in 1914 following the Ottoman alignment with Germany. Turkey and Greece recognized Britain's 'annexation of Cyprus' in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.³ During the first half of the twentieth century nationalism was an influential political and psychological force in Cyprus which affected both the Greek and Turkish communities. For the Greek Cypriots the main nationalist attempt was to unite Cyprus with Greece (Enosis - union).⁴ This began in the 1930s.⁵ From then on the divergence between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities signalled a potential problem.

In the late 1930s and 1940s Turkey 'was satisfied with the British presence on the island, believing that this would serve as a deterrent against Soviet as well as German expansionism in the area'. On 30 October 1948 the Turkish Foreign Minister told the Turkish Parliament that 'there is not a Cyprus problem as such'.⁶ Until the 1950s Turkey 'considered events in Cyprus as a British internal affair'.⁷ With the impact of 'decolonization pressures' in the 1950s Cyprus began to be debated

¹ For the historical background of Cyprus see: N. Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt : an Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece*; V. Tatton-Brown (ed), *Cyprus BC : 7000 Years of History*; D. Alastos, *Cyprus in history : a survey of 5,000 years*; G. F. Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, Vol 1, 1-329, Vol 2, 1-496, Vol 3, 497-1142, Vol 4, 1-618, F. Alasya, *Kibris Tarihi*; Glen D. Camp, "Greek-Turkish Conflict over Cyprus", 43. See also: H.D. Purcell, *Cyprus*, 163-68; S. Panteli, *A New History of Cyprus : From the Earliest Times to the Present Day*, 27-28.

² J. A. McHenry, "The Uneasy Partnership on Cyprus 1919-1939: The Political and Diplomatic Interaction between Great Britain, Turkey, and the Turkish Cypriot Community." University of Kansas PhD, 1981, 1-32; M. S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1774-1923: a study in international relations*, 224.

³ See Article 20 of Treaty of Peace with Turkey signed at Lausanne on 24 July 1923 http://www.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_of_Lausanne accessed on 1.03.2009

⁴ J. A. McHenry, "The Uneasy Partnership on Cyprus 1919-1939: The Political and Diplomatic Interaction between Great Britain, Turkey, and the Turkish Cypriot Community." University of Kansas PhD, 1981, 32-33.

⁵ T.W. Adams, "The American Concern in Cyprus", 96.

⁶ S. Bolukbasi, "The Johnson Letter Revisited", 508.

⁷ S. Bolukbasi, "The Johnson Letter Revisited", 507.

between Greece, Britain and Turkey. Because this could undermine the cohesiveness of NATO's south-eastern flank, Washington wanted 'to carve out policies that would lead to [a] peaceful settlement that would not simultaneously rupture' this cohesiveness.⁸ But the US did not want an active role in Cyprus. It supported neither of NATO's flanking allies, Turkey or Greece, 'at the expense of the other'. The US expressed officially its hope that 'a peaceful solution of the Cyprus problem would be worked out among her three NATO allies'.⁹ The US would be neutral in the problem.

By the mid 50s the Turkish and Greek Cypriots were organizing against each other. The Greek Cypriots attempted to lay 'the foundations of a struggle for the self-determination of Cyprus', with the support of the Papagos government in Athens. Their struggle had two main components: an anti-British terrorist network, 'EOKA (Ethniki Organosi Kiprion Agoniston - National Organization of Cypriot Fighters)'; and, a political front led by Archbishop Makarios. The political organization aimed to settle the Cyprus question in the UN with Greece's backing on the self-determination principle.¹⁰ Against the Greek Cypriot claims, the Turkish Cypriots initially backed the British administration and opposed the Greek Cypriots' idea of self-determination. By the mid 50s Turkish Cypriots argued that if Britain gave up its sovereignty over the island, Turkey should retrieve it. Against EOKA, the Turkish Cypriots formed their paramilitary organization TMT (Turk Mukavemet Teskilati – Turkish Resistance Organization). TMT's political claim was for 'partition of the island between Greece and Turkey'.¹¹

⁸ T. Kalaitzaki, "Perceptions of the US Involvement by Athens and Ankara in the Greek-Turkish Dispute (1954-1999)." Bilkent University PhD, 51-52.

⁹ T.W. Adams, "The American Concern in Cyprus", 96-97.

¹⁰ T.W. Adams & A. Cottrell, *Cyprus between East and West*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press), 8-10 in T. Kalaitzaki, "Perceptions of the US Involvement by Athens and Ankara in the Greek-Turkish Dispute (1954-1999)." Bilkent University PhD, 54.

¹¹ S. Bolukbasi, "The Johnson Letter Revisited", 507; K.H.Karpat, *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition 1950-1974*, 137-39.

Cyprus became a UN member in 1960, with Greece's appeal for the island's self determination. London opposed the internationalization of the issue, which would 'harm' Anglo-Greek and Greek-Turkish relations, while allowing the UN 'to discuss Cyprus on the pretext of self-determination would open the flood gates for the pursuit of territorial claims everywhere.'¹² Thus Britain opposed the Greek appeal, and Ankara supported Britain, arguing that Cyprus was a British internal affair.¹³ The internationalization of the question brought a new dimension, with Britain and Turkey on the one hand and Greece on the other.

Washington could not accept this division. To prevent the destabilization of the south-eastern flank of NATO it backed Britain at the UN and 'fully' shared the British view.¹⁴ With the opposition of the NATO countries Greece's proposals were rejected by the General Assembly.¹⁵

Washington wanted to prevent any escalation of dissent between NATO allies which might be fuelled by discussions at the UN. Secretary Dulles told the Turkish Prime Minister that the US considered that discussion of the Cyprus question in the General Assembly would 'lead to no solution' and would 'serve only to intensify existing friction and thereby prejudice Western unity'. Washington believed 'that its major objective, i.e., to lessen inter-Allied tension', could 'best be furthered if it abstains

¹² For the British position see British Factual Note: FRUS, 1952-54, Vol 8, 710-12, The British Ambassador (Makins) to President Eisenhower, 20 September 1954.

¹³ Yearbook of the United Nations 1954, 94-96 in http://unyearbook.un.org/1954YUN/1954_P1_SEC1_CH7.pdf accessed on 09.03.2009

¹⁴ FRUS, 1952-54, Vol 8, 715, the Secretary of State to Prime Minister Churchill, 21 September 1954. For the US position on Cyprus see: FRUS, 1952-54, Vol 8, 704-08, Position Paper Prepared in the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, 14 September 1954.

¹⁵ Yearbook of the United Nations 1954, 94-96 in http://unyearbook.un.org/1954YUN/1954_P1_SEC1_CH7.pdf accessed on 09.03.2009

from voting on inscription of the question on the agenda'.¹⁶ Dulles argued that 'the proper place for negotiations about Cyprus' was 'on the Island and not in the UN; therefore' the US hoped 'the Greek Government' would 'seek to influence the non-communist Cypriot leaders to start serious negotiations with the British looking toward self-government'. The US also planned 'to encourage the British to negotiate with the Cypriots'.¹⁷ The US wanted to encourage Britain, Greece, the Cypriots and Turkey to find a solution.¹⁸

The Cyprus issue escalated in 1955¹⁹ and Britain convened the London Tripartite Conference on 29 August. It was suspended on 7 September 'pending Greek and Turkish consideration of British proposals for granting self-government to Cyprus.' On 6 September 'a series of violent anti-Greek riots broke out in Istanbul and Izmir resulting in extensive damage and destruction of Greek-owned shops and Orthodox churches'. 'The rioting was ... in response to a number of anti-Turkish incidents in Salonika on September 5'.²⁰ The Conference ended in failure. Greece ignored Turkey's interests in Cyprus,²¹ Britain and Turkey rejected self-determination and Britain did not want to lose Turkey's friendship.²² The Conference and the events in Turkey and Greece showed that it would be very hard for the three parties to find a compromise solution by themselves.

¹⁶ FRUS, 1952-54, Vol 8, 717, the Secretary of State to the Turkish Ambassador (Erkin), 21 September 1954.

¹⁷ FRUS, 1952-54, Vol 8, 722, Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President, 2 November 1954.

¹⁸ For a similar view see: S. Bolukbasi, "The Johnson Letter Revisited", 508.

¹⁹ In March 1955 Archbishop Makarios told the EOKA terrorists to begin action. Greece supported this. For details see: Yearbook of the United Nations 1956, 123 in http://unyearbook.un.org/1956YUN/1956_P1_SEC1_CH7.pdf accessed on 10.03.2009

²⁰ FRUS, 1955-57, Vol 24, 543, Letter From the Counsellor of the Embassy in Greece (Thurston) to the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Baxter), 12 September 1955; F.A. Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, 236-37. On 6 September, the day before the London Conference was scheduled to end, a bomb exploded in the courtyard of the Turkish consulate in Thessaloniki, adjacent to the house of Atatürk. For details see: M. Stearns, *Entangled Allies, U.S. Policy toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus*, 28. See also: T. Kalaitzaki, "Perceptions of the US Involvement by Athens and Ankara in the Greek-Turkish Dispute (1954-1999)." Bilkent University PhD, 57.

²¹ D.Folliot, *Documents on International Affairs*, 1954, 230-35.

²² D.Folliot, *Documents on International Affairs*, 1954, 235-40.

Washington was still reluctant to intervene. US response to the 5-7 September incidents indicated this. The State Department merely expressed its disappointment. The Department conveyed its 'wish' that Turkey, Greece and Britain maintain 'flexible positions and ... willingness' to 'consider proposals ... in good faith to ameliorate [a] problem' which was 'becoming dangerous to stability in [the] Eastern Mediterranean'.

²³ Dulles also sent personal messages to the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers emphasizing 'the importance that the U.S. Government attaches to continued close cooperation between Greece and Turkey'.²⁴ Washington's anxiety was the stability of NATO's eastern flank.²⁵ As Monteagle Stearns commented:

It was inconceivable to the U.S. government that two states which felt themselves directly threatened by the Soviet Union, which had insistently sought the protection of NATO membership, and which were receiving large amounts of military and economic aid from the United States would permit bilateral problems to get out of hand.²⁶

They were already out of hand. In 1956 the Menderes government put forward the idea of "taksim" (partition of Cyprus).²⁷ Yet neither Athens nor Ankara wanted to deny Washington's concern for maintaining the cohesion of NATO's south-eastern flank.²⁸ Prime Minister Menderes on 28 December 1956 and Prime Minister Karamanlis on 14 March 1957 gave similar statements that even though the Cyprus Question was

²³ FRUS, 1955-57, Vol 24, 281, Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey, 9 September 1955.

²⁴ US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol XXXIII, 496-97, 26 September 1955. The letters outraged the Greeks and gratified the Turks. See: M. Stearns, *Entangled Allies, U.S. Policy toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus*, 30-31.

²⁵ FRUS, 1955-57, Vol 24, 297, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece, 20 September 1955.

²⁶ M. Stearns, *Entangled Allies, U.S. Policy toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus*, 9.

²⁷ S. Bolukbasi, *Barisci Cozumsuzluk*, 71.

²⁸ For a similar view see: S. Bolukbasi, *Barisci Cozumsuzluk*, 72.

very significant it should not harm Greece's and Turkey's international alliance responsibilities.²⁹

Greece and Britain attempted to alleviate the Cyprus escalation. For example from 1955 to 1958 a number of conferences on Cyprus took place and a number of proposals were made (the Radcliffe Proposal, December 1956; the Foot Plan, December 1957; and the Macmillan Plan, June 1958). None were successful.³⁰ Greece applied to the UN for international support in 1957 and 1958. It was refused.³¹

Britain proposed the Macmillan Plan which foresaw a division of sovereignty between Turkey, Greece and Britain. Turkey accepted this. Greece did not. Nevertheless London announced that it would implement the plan in 1958, which would grant self-government to Cyprus. London's claim was that continuing EOKA terrorism made the British control expensive and difficult. In August 1958, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan met the Greek and Turkish prime ministers, Constantine Karamanlis and Adnan Menderes to push for the plan.³² In this way London expressed its desire to leave the Cyprus problem in Turkish and Greek hands.

Greek and British attempts from 1955 to 1958 showed that neither the UN nor Britain could solve the problem.³³ This left Greece and Turkey as the main contending

²⁹ S. Bolukbasi, *Barisci Cozumsuzluk*, 72; S. Bolukbasi, "The Johnson Letter Revisited", 509.

³⁰ N. Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt: an Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece*, 205-209, 273-77, 294-305; T. Ehrlich, *Cyprus 1958-1967*, 19, 28.

³¹ Yearbook of the United Nations 1957, 72-76 in http://unyearbook.un.org/1957YUN/1957_P1_SEC1_CH7.pdf accessed on 10.03.2009; Yearbook of the United Nations 1958, 71-76 in http://unyearbook.un.org/1958YUN/1958_P1_SEC1_CH6.pdf accessed on 10.03.2009

³² H. Macmillan, *Riding the Storm, 1956-1959*, 674-89; N. Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt: an Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece*, 305.

³³ S. G. Xydis, "The UN General Assembly as an instrument of Greek policy: Cyprus, 1954-58," 154-158; S. Bolukbasi, *Barisci Cozumsuzluk*, 74.

parties. In 1958, they agreed to negotiate. On 18 December, the Turkish and Greek Ministers for External Affairs, Fatin Rustu Zorlu and Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza, discussed the situation in Paris and decided on a meeting between the prime ministers.³⁴

Menderes, Karamanlis, Zorlu and Averoff met in Zurich from 6 to 11 February 1959 for 'a final solution of the Cyprus question'. On 11 February they 'issued a statement announcing they had reached an accord'. The proposed accord was presented to Britain. On 17 February Turkish and Greek Cypriot leaders Fazil Kucuk and Makarios joined the prime ministers in London 'for final discussions on the proposed agreement'.³⁵ The parties reached resolutions which established an independent Cyprus.³⁶ The constitution of the Republic of Cyprus was proclaimed on 16 August 1960.³⁷

The 1960 Constitution did not really resolve the situation on Cyprus. Neither Greek nor Turkish Cypriots thought Cyprus' independence sustainable.³⁸ Both communities on the island started to complain about the different provisions of the constitution. Turkish Cypriots complained about the 'extension of the Island's tax laws', about 'the 70-30 ratio in the public service', and discord of Turkish and Greek Cypriot views on

³⁴ FRUS, 1958-60, Vol 10, Part 1, 753, Telegram from the Embassy in France to the Department of State, 19 December 1958.

³⁵ FRUS, 1958-60, Vol 10, Part 1, 766; S. Bolukbasi, *Barisci Cozumsuzluk*, 74.

³⁶ FRUS, 1958-60, Vol 10, Part 1, 770-71. The agreements on Cyprus consisted of four documents: an agreement establishing the structure of the Republic of Cyprus; a treaty of guarantees between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom; a treaty of alliance between Greece, Turkey, and the Republic of Cyprus; and a 17 February declaration by the Government of the United Kingdom of its intention to grant independence to Cyprus. For texts see: PRO CAB 129-96, C. (59) 25, 16 February 1959.

³⁷ FRUS, 1958-60, Vol 10, Part 1, 835. For details see: NAA, 3043059, A1209, 1960/45, Cyprus constitutional developments 1960; T. Kalaitzaki, "Perceptions of the US Involvement by Athens and Ankara in the Greek-Turkish Dispute (1954-1999)." Bilkent University PhD, 60. For the text of the constitution see:

<http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/portal/portal.nsf/All/C44572D7363776ACC2256EBD004F3BB3?OpenDocument> accessed on 10.03.2009; <http://www.kypros.org/Constitution/English/> accessed on 10.03.2009

³⁸ See: S. Bolukbasi, "The Johnson Letter Revisited", 510; FRUS, 1958-60, Vol 10, Part 1, 830-31, Telegram from the Consulate General in Nicosia to the Department of State, 5 April 1960; S. Bolukbasi, *Barisci Cozumsuzluk*, 89.

the formation of municipalities.³⁹ Greek Cypriots believed Turkish Cypriots got disproportionate representative rights in the Constitution, and wanted to change it. Turkish Cypriots were concerned that any change in the constitution might lead to other changes which could erode their rights and lead gradually toward cultural and political isolation, and might even lead to union with Greece.⁴⁰ This communal discord played an important role in the escalation of events in Cyprus from 1960 to 1963.

The Cyprus Republic was proclaimed only two and a half months after a coup d'état in Turkey on 27 May which toppled the Menderes Government.⁴¹ Turkey entered a period of political instability which would continue for five years.⁴² This led Ankara to focus on domestic politics more than on foreign policy issues. The Cyprus issue lost some significance in Turkish foreign policy. In this light Turkey accepted the treaties, because the US approved of them, and because they protected Turkish Cypriots constitutionally and gave Turkey the right to intervene.⁴³ This illustrated the new Turkish junta's (The Committee of National Unity) foreign policy. It declared that it would continue Turkey's NATO and other western alliance responsibilities.⁴⁴ It did not

³⁹ T. Ehrlich, *Cyprus 1958-1967*, 43-44.

⁴⁰ For a similar view see: S. Bolukbasi, *Barisci Cozumsuzluk*, 92; T. Kalaitzaki, "Perceptions of the US Involvement by Athens and Ankara in the Greek-Turkish Dispute (1954-1999)." Bilkent University PhD, 61.

⁴¹ FRUS, 1958-60, Vol 10, Part 2, 842-44. For Washington's recognition of the new administration see: FRUS, 1958-60, Vol 10, Part 2, 850, Letter from President Eisenhower to President Gursel, 11 June 1960.

⁴² S. Bolukbasi, *Barisci Cozumsuzluk*, 83. For details of the coup, on 27 May 1960, and the period of political instability see: Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish experiment in democracy, 1950-1975*, 212-27; W. Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, 88-172; K. H. Karpat, "The Military and Politics in Turkey, 1960-64: A Socio-Cultural Analysis of a Revolution", 1665-81; W. F. Weiker, *The Turkish Revolution, 1960-1961: Aspects of Military Politics*, 20-47, 154-62.

⁴³ S. Bolukbasi, *Barisci Cozumsuzluk*, 81-82; T. Kalaitzaki, "Perceptions of the US Involvement by Athens and Ankara in the Greek-Turkish Dispute (1954-1999)." Bilkent University PhD, 62-63.

⁴⁴ FRUS, 1958-60, Vol 10, Part 2, 844; Haluk Ulman & R. H. Dekmejian, "Changing Patterns in Turkish Foreign Policy: 1959-1967", 774.

attempt to bring significant change to Turkish foreign policy and Turkish-American relations.⁴⁵ Turkey remained as close to the US as from 1952 to 1959.

Between 1960 and 1963, however, Turkish-American relations were shaken by four issues: Turkey's attempts to get more American aid in order to cover its foreign debt, the chrome issue, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and Cyprus.

The first issue was the Committee of National Unity's attempts to increase American aid to meet Turkey's debts.⁴⁶ President Cemal Gursel applied to the US for 100 million Turkish Lira,⁴⁷ while Minister of Foreign Affairs Selim Sarper told US Secretary of State Christian A. Herter that, 'Turkey needed \$400 million' to meet its foreign debt.⁴⁸

The US did not want to lose Turkey's friendship,⁴⁹ but paying another country's foreign debt would set an impossible precedent. From 26 August to 1 September 1962 US Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson visited Turkey. Turkish officials explained the economic crisis and their need for the American aid. Johnson promised an increase in American aid.⁵⁰ US aid to Turkey increased significantly. In 1962 it was \$188 million and in 1963 \$237 million,⁵¹ far less than Turkey wanted.

⁴⁵ *The New York Times* 2 June 1960 in O. Sander, *Türk - Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-64*, 201. See also: O. Sander, *Türk - Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-64*, 201; G. S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance, Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971*, 85-87; N. Uslu, *Türk Amerikan İlişkileri*, 175, 196-208.

⁴⁶ FRUS, 1958-60, Vol 10, Part 2, 867, Memorandum of Conversation, 2 August 1960. O. Sander, *Türk - Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-64*, 204. For a brief summary Turkish economic situation in 1960 see: FRUS, 1958-60, Vol 10, Part 2, 860-61, Special National Intelligence Estimate, 19 July 1960.

⁴⁷ FRUS, 1958-60, Vol 10, Part 2, 854, Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, 13 July 1960.

⁴⁸ FRUS, 1958-60, Vol 10, Part 2, 881, Memorandum of Conversation, 21 September 1960.

⁴⁹ FRUS, 1958-60, Vol 10, Part 2, 878, Letter From the Ambassador to Turkey (Warren) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Jones), 11 August 1960.

⁵⁰ *Cumhuriyet* 26-29 August 1962.

⁵¹ O. Sander, *Türk - Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-64*, 206; *Cumhuriyet* 31 August 1962.

Then the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Turkish Aid Consortium formed in 1962 began to impact on American aid.⁵² In 1964 it fell to \$148 million.⁵³ This reduction was the first factor in mid 60s which negatively affected Turkish-American relations.

The second issue was about a reduction in American requirements for Turkish chrome in 1963. The US was the main importer of Turkish chrome, but in 1963 the USSR lowered the price of its exported chrome, and American firms started to buy it from the USSR.⁵⁴

The third issue was the Cuban Missile Crisis.⁵⁵ The crisis began in the NATO defence strategy of flexible response, which was formulated after the strategy of limited war, and the Soviet reaction to this. Flexible response aimed to provide the US 'with the capability of responding with conventional and even unconventional forces to global contingencies of varying levels of intensity'. While the Kennedy Administration 'launched a strategic modernization program based on the "triad" of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and intercontinental bombers, it also pursued a major expansion of general-purpose forces designed to be able to fight two major wars and one limited contingency simultaneously'.⁵⁶ Under flexible response, a Soviet conventional attack would be

⁵²TGNAP, Vol 10, 645-48, 9 January 1963;

<http://www.dtm.gov.tr/dtmweb/yaziciDostu.cfm?dokuman=pdf&action=detayrk&yayinID=1045&icerikID=1156&dil=TR> accessed on 30.03.2009; O. Sander, *Türk - Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-64*, 206.

⁵³ O. Sander, *Türk - Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-64*, 207.

⁵⁴ For details see: *Cumhuriyet* 29 April 1963; FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 16, 748, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey, 8 January 1963; O. Sander, *Türk - Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-64*, 208.

⁵⁵ In this study the Cuban Missile Crisis is examined in terms of its effect on the Turkish-American relations. For details of the Crisis see: J. A. Nathan, *The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited*; W. J. Medland, *The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962: Needless or Necessary*; M. J. White, *The Cuban Missile Crisis*; R. F. Kennedy, *13 Days: The Cuban Missile Crisis*; FRUS, 1961-63, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Vol 11, 1ff.

⁵⁶ For details see: S. Foerster and E. N. Wright (ed), *American Defense Policy*, 160, 174-75, 199-201, 625-26.

met with conventional weapons. This approach automatically increased the role of Turkish conventional capability. However the Jupiter missile bases in Turkey went under Soviet threat, because the Soviets' counter to flexible response was basically 'to seize the initiative at the earliest possible moment, advance into NATO territory, and destroy NATO forces' in the event of war.⁵⁷

Soviet attempt to counter balance this new NATO strategy started the crisis. The crisis was sparked by Khrushchev's decision to place Soviet missiles in Cuba by 1962, to enhance the 'political prestige and power in Soviet Politics' and to 'redress the military balance cheaply in terms of resources'.⁵⁸ The missiles in Cuba threatened the balance of power between the US and the USSR.⁵⁹ After the US identified the missile sites in Cuba,⁶⁰ and blockaded Cuba,⁶¹ there were several exchanges of notes between the US and the USSR.⁶² This correspondence highlighted Turkey's role.

On 27 October 1962 Khrushchev wrote to Kennedy⁶³ that the USSR was 'willing to remove' the missiles from Cuba if the US would 'remove' theirs from Turkey. The USSR would give 'a solemn promise to respect the inviolability of the borders and sovereignty of Turkey, not to interfere in its internal affairs, not to invade Turkey, not to make available our territory as a bridgehead for such an invasion, and ... [to] restrain those who contemplate committing aggression against Turkey, either from

⁵⁷ M. Mackintosh, "Soviet Strategic Policy", 274.

⁵⁸ W. W. Rostow, *The Diffusion of Power: an Essay in Recent History*, 253. For Soviet motives to place the missiles to Cuba see also: W. J. Medland, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: Evolving Historical Perspectives", 433-34.

⁵⁹ T. C. Sorensen, *Kennedy*, 764.

⁶⁰ FRUS, 1961-63, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Vol 11, 1, Briefing Paper, 1 October 1962.

⁶¹ FRUS, 1961-63, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Vol 11, 121-22, Record of Meeting, 19 October 1962; FRUS, 1961-63, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Vol 11, 146-147, Minutes of the 506th Meeting of the National Security Council, 21 October 1962.

⁶² See: FRUS, 1961-63, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Vol 11.

⁶³ See: FRUS, 1961-63, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Vol 11, 257-60, Message from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, 27 October 1962.

the territory of the Soviet Union or from the territory of Turkey's other neighboring states'. He added that the US would 'make a similar statement within the framework of the Security Council regarding Cuba'.⁶⁴ In his reply on the same date⁶⁵ Kennedy stated that if the USSR 'would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba' the US 'would agree ... (a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba'. He did not mention the Jupiters in Turkey, but did write that the 'effect of such a settlement on easing world tensions would enable us to work toward a more general arrangement regarding "other armaments"'.⁶⁶ On 28 October, Khrushchev rephrased his demand for the removal of Jupiters in Turkey, without mentioning Turkey.⁶⁷ With Kennedy's reply on the same day the crisis was eased.⁶⁸

Previously, on 20 October, US Attorney General Robert Kennedy met the Soviet Ambassador, Anatoly F. Dobrynin. Kennedy said that 'President Kennedy had been anxious to remove those missiles from Turkey and Italy for a long period of time'. The President 'ordered their removal some time ago, and it was our judgement that, within a short time after this crisis was over, those missiles would be gone'.⁶⁹ Possibly depending on this conversation, Khrushchev did not mention Turkey in his letter on 28 October.⁷⁰ There is no clear evidence of a bargain on the Jupiters in Turkey between Kennedy and Khrushchev, but in March 1987 the former Secretary of State Dean Rusk 'shed new light' on whether the US would have been 'prepared ultimately to consider the removal of the Jupiter missiles in Turkey in return for a

⁶⁴ FRUS, 1961-63, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Vol 11, 258-59, Message from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, 27 October 1962.

⁶⁵ For the text see: FRUS, 1961-63, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Vol 11, 268-69, Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union, 27 October 1962.

⁶⁶ FRUS, 1961-63, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Vol 11, 269, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union, 27 October 1962.

⁶⁷ For the text see: FRUS, 1961-63, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Vol 11, 279-83, Message from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, 28 October 1962.

⁶⁸ For the text see: FRUS, 1961-63, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Vol 11, 285-86, Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union, 28 October 1962.

⁶⁹ R. F. Kennedy, *13 Days: the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 108-109.

⁷⁰ For a similar view see: O. Sander, *Türk - Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-64*, 222.

Soviet agreement to withdraw the missiles in Cuba and defuse the crisis'. Rusk wrote that it was 'clear' to him 'that President Kennedy would not let the Jupiters in Turkey become an obstacle to the removal of the missile sites in Cuba because the Jupiters were coming out in any event'.⁷¹ Even before the Cuban missile crisis, Kennedy and Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara were anxious about the provocative nature of the Jupiters, and before the crisis Kennedy ordered the removal of the Jupiters from Turkey.⁷² They had lost their strategic importance for Washington, and to this extent, so had Turkey.

The Jupiter bases put Turkey under threat. The US recognized that an attack on Cuba 'would very likely result in Soviet reprisals' against Turkey.⁷³

The USSR now 'turned its efforts to establish a continuous naval presence in the Mediterranean'. The Soviets aimed to 'neutralize' the US Sixth Fleet.⁷⁴ This would inevitably change Turkey's role in American strategic plans. A restructuring and modernization of American weapon systems in the Middle East became necessary. The Jupiters were not only provocative, but 'obsolescent' and of 'little military value'.⁷⁵ Washington decided to replace them with Polaris submarines, which were less vulnerable to Soviet attack.⁷⁶ This shift decreased the importance of Turkey's geographical proximity to the USSR.

⁷¹ FRUS, 1961-63, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Vol 11, 275.

⁷² Robert F. Kennedy, *13 Days: the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 94-95.

⁷³ FRUS, 1961-63, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Vol 11, 101, Letter from the Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) to President Kennedy, 17 October 1962. See also: T. C. Sorensen, *Kennedy*, 680-86; R. F. Kennedy, *13 Days: the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 96.

⁷⁴ J.C. Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics: the Military Dimension*, 99-100.

⁷⁵ T. C. Sorensen, *Kennedy*, 696.

⁷⁶ J.C. Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics: the Military Dimension*, 78.

Washington now tried to convince Ankara of the need to remove the Jupiters. McNamara wrote to the Turkish Minister of National Defence, İlhami Sancar, that because of their high vulnerability and 'the rapid advances in technology' the Jupiters 'no longer form a major part of the Alliance's missile strength'. McNamara suggested 'another modern weapon system, the F - 104Gs', and 'the Polaris missile submarine system'. He added that 'this modern weapon system' would create 'a more formidable military posture for Turkey and for NATO'.⁷⁷ This created resentment in Ankara,⁷⁸ which accepted the changes on 23 January 1963.⁷⁹ Ankara had no choice. This crisis undermined Turkish-American relations because Turkish officials began to think that Turkey now mattered less to the US.

The Cuban Missile Crisis was a test of Turkish-American relations,⁸⁰ which led Turkey to start to reconsider its foreign policy direction. There were two points in this reconsideration: one was that Turkish officials began to think that Turkey now mattered less to the US and the other was ironically a criticism of 'American influence which so much monopolized' Turkish foreign policy.⁸¹ Ankara began to look for other options. As *New York Herald Tribune* stated while Washington was considering removing the Jupiters, Ankara was thinking of a Turkish parliamentary visit to the USSR.⁸² Thus one consequence of Turkey's foreign policy reconsideration was a smoothing of the Turkish-Soviet relations, at least in principle.⁸³

⁷⁷ FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 16, 743-44, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey, 5 January 1963. See also: *Cumhuriyet* 29 November 1962; *Cumhuriyet* 23 December 1962; *Cumhuriyet* 2 January 1963.

⁷⁸ *Cumhuriyet* 10-11 January 1963; *Cumhuriyet* 13 April 1963. See also: TGNA, Vol 10, 180, 17 December 1962.

⁷⁹ For details see: FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 16, 748-49, Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, 18 January 1963; FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 16, 750-51, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey, 23 January 1963; *Cumhuriyet* 22 January 1963; *Cumhuriyet* 24 January 1963; *Cumhuriyet* 26 January 1963; TGNA, Vol 11, 25-26, 10 January 1963.

⁸⁰ TGNAP, Republic Senate Debates, Vol 7, 232, 4 December 1962.

⁸¹ F.A. Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, 129.

⁸² *New York Herald Tribune* 30 January 1963 in *Cumhuriyet* 1 February 1963.

⁸³ N. Safran, *From War to War: the Arab - Israel Confrontation, 1948 - 1967; a Study of the Conflict from the Perspective of Coercion in the Context of inter-Arab and Big Power Relations*, 128-129.

Cuba might not have mattered, except at this time the Cyprus Question was escalating. Washington and Ankara's differing views on Cyprus put strain on Turkish-American relations. Washington saw the Cyprus Question in a Cold War light and was concerned about what it saw as a strengthening communist movement in Cyprus. The local communist movement in Cyprus was mainly run by the Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL). It supported an independent, demilitarized and non-aligned Cyprus, and a federal solution of the internal aspect of the Cyprus problem. It was founded in 1926 with the name Communist Party of Cyprus (CPC). The Communist Party set as its aim not only the struggle against exploitation but also the liberation of Cyprus from the British.⁸⁴ In 1961, the US National Security Council reported that the 'inadequacies of the Makarios government, as contrasted with the discipline, energy, and able leadership of the local Communist Party', were 'most worrisome'.⁸⁵ Kennedy believed that 'the US should assume a more active role in Cyprus than in the past and desires that the program to this end be pushed vigorously ... to contain and reduce communist strength'.⁸⁶ In 1962 Kennedy reiterated that the US 'should also do all ... toward aiding and encouraging the Cyprus Government to cope with its serious Communist problem'.⁸⁷

Ankara worried more about inter-communal disputes on Cyprus. Relying on the Treaty of Guarantee it sought to protect Turkish Cypriots' interests on the island. In 1962 Ankara sent fourteen notes to the Cyprus Government, from 1960 to 1963 it sent eleven notes to Greece, and in 1962 it sent five notes to Britain complaining about Greek Cypriot opposition to the constitution. When Makarios visited Ankara in November 1962, Turkish officials told him that without Turkey's consent the

⁸⁴ For details see: www.akel.org.cy accessed on 16.03.2009

⁸⁵ FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 16, 514, National Security Action Memorandum No. 71, 23 August 1961.

⁸⁶ FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 16, 516, National Security Action Memorandum No. 98, 25 September 1961.

⁸⁷ FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 16, 529, National Security Action Memorandum No. 169, 28 June 1962.

constitution could not be changed.⁸⁸ Washington was aware of the seriousness of the events in Cyprus⁸⁹ but continued to believe that it 'should concentrate on informal negotiation between communities [and that] any effort by either party to draw' the US 'into dispute should be politely but firmly rejected'.⁹⁰ Rusk conveyed this decision to Turkey in April 1963.⁹¹

Washington's decision increased Ankara's resentment, especially when the inter-communal conflict turned into serious violence on 21 December 1963.⁹² On 23 December the Turkish Foreign Minister Feridun Cemal Erkin told Raymond Arthur Hare, Ambassador to Turkey, that in order to stop this violence US 'participation could be decisive even if only on token basis'.⁹³ Erkin also said that 'Turkey resented U.S. efforts to restrain it from the use of force'.⁹⁴ Rusk advised Hare to inform Erkin that the US and Britain had a 'quite different reading' from that of Turkey on events in Cyprus and Washington demanded that Turkey 'consult with other guarantor powers' to establish 'calm on [the] island'.⁹⁵ On 25 December President Gursel asked President Johnson 'to do all' in his 'power' to stop the escalation.⁹⁶ Johnson's reply reiterated Washington's general concern about events, and stated that he would 'continue to do everything' he could 'to support any and all actions proposed by the three guarantor powers'.⁹⁷

⁸⁸ TGNAP, Vol 30, 207, 5 May 1964.

⁸⁹ See: FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 16, 543, Telegram from the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State, 16 January 1963.

⁹⁰ FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 16, 540, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus, 9 January 1963.

⁹¹ *Cumhuriyet* 29 April 1963.

⁹² FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 16, 592, Telegram from the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State, 22 December 1963.

⁹³ FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 16, 594, Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, 23 December 1963.

⁹⁴ FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 16, 595, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey, 24 December 1963.

⁹⁵ FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 16, 595, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey, 24 December 1963.

⁹⁶ US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol L, 90, 20 January 1964.

⁹⁷ US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol L, 90, 20 January 1964.

To change Washington's views Ankara threatened to use force on the island. On 28 January 1964 Prime Minister Inonu told Hare that if Washington did not give some kind of an assurance by the next morning, Turkey would have to intervene.⁹⁸ Inonu's warning changed Washington's mind. The US decided to send to 'Cyprus a contingent of 1200 U.S. soldiers as part of a 10,000-man NATO peacekeeping force designed to facilitate mediation of the crisis by separating the warring parties.'⁹⁹ But 4 February Makarios rejected any deployment of NATO forces, killing this idea.¹⁰⁰ Escalation in the island had more variables than Turkey had been considering.

Turkey did not give up. It wanted to drag Washington into Cyprus either independently or via the UN. It continued to threaten the use of force. On 12 February events on the island worsened with a Greek Cypriot attack on Turkish Cypriots in Limassol.¹⁰¹ This attack increased the State Department's anxiety about Turkey's military intervention,¹⁰² so Washington pressed for a UN Security Council decision for a UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. This was adopted in 4 March 1964.¹⁰³ Events on the island continued to escalate,¹⁰⁴ and Inonu sent Makarios an ultimatum stating that if the attacks did not stop, Turkey would intervene militarily.¹⁰⁵ Both Washington and the UN increased efforts to assemble and deploy a UN force.¹⁰⁶ Turkey's tactic seemed to be working.

⁹⁸ G. W. Ball, *The Past has Another Pattern: Memoirs*, 341.

⁹⁹ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 16, 8.

¹⁰⁰ S. Bolukbasi, "The Johnson Letter Revisited", 514.

¹⁰¹ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 16, 27-28, Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, 14 February 1964; FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 16, 29, Telegram from the Department of State to, the Embassy in Turkey, 14 February 1964.

¹⁰² FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 16, 41, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, 26 February 1964; S. Bolukbasi, "The Johnson Letter Revisited", 515.

¹⁰³ Yearbook of the United Nations 1964, 151-55 in http://unyearbook.un.org/1964YUN/1964_P1_SEC1_CH9.pdf accessed on 14.04.2009

¹⁰⁴ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 16, 50, Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, 10 March 1964.

¹⁰⁵ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 16, 51, Circular Telegram from the Department of State to All Posts, 12 March 1964.

¹⁰⁶ Yearbook of the United Nations 1964, 155 in http://unyearbook.un.org/1964YUN/1964_P1_SEC1_CH9.pdf accessed on 14.04.2009

Inonu's strategy was not to intervene in the island but to drag the US more into the Cyprus issue. Ankara was hoping that with this tactic the US would support Turkey and put pressure on Athens and Makarios to stop the escalation. Moreover Inonu was anxious about the possibility of open conflict between Turkey and Greece, which would have been a serious blow to NATO and to Turkish-American relations.¹⁰⁷

On 16 March 1964 the Turkish Parliament authorized Inonu to intervene militarily in Cyprus.¹⁰⁸ On 15 April Inonu put even more pressure on the US. He said that 'after the establishment of the UN force the US adopted a hands-off attitude', and added that 'if our allies do not change their attitude, the Western Alliance will break up [and] a new kind of world will then come into being on a new pattern, and in this new world Turkey will find herself a place'.¹⁰⁹ Inonu implied that Turkey could leave the American alliance if the US did not support Turkey's course in Cyprus. This did not change the US stance. During Erkin's visit to Washington, on 29 April, Johnson asked him to give the UN 'a little more time to work out a solution'. Johnson also stressed the importance of avoiding 'a shooting war over Cyprus' which could change 'the whole situation' and create a 'far graver problem'.¹¹⁰

In the last weeks of May, conflict on the island again escalated.¹¹¹ On 2 June the Turkish Security Council 'decided to invade Cyprus'.¹¹² Turkey made its last move.

¹⁰⁷ For similar evaluations see: O. Sander, *Türk - Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-64*, 229; S. Bolukbasi, *Barisci Cozumsuzluk*, 119.

¹⁰⁸ TGNAP, Vol 3, 120, 16 March 1964.

¹⁰⁹ *The New York Times* 17 April 1964 in S. Bolukbasi, "The Johnson Letter Revisited", 516.

¹¹⁰ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 16, 76-78, Memorandum for the Record, 29 April 1964.

¹¹¹ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 16, 94-96, Telegram from the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations, 21 May 1964.

¹¹² G. W. Ball, *The Past has Another Pattern: Memoirs*, 350.

This triggered a strong reaction from Washington. It was a turning point in Turkish-American relations. On 5 June 1964, President Johnson wrote to Inonu summarizing the American reaction.¹¹³ This is known as Johnson's Letter. Johnson put forward four main points. First, he stated the importance and the necessity of Turkish-American consultation 'before any such action' as intervention was 'taken'. Second, he said that the US could not accept Turkey's right to intervene stemming from the Agreement of Guarantee, since 'the possibilities of ... consultation' stated in the Agreement 'have by no means been exhausted in this situation'. Third, he warned that if Turkey intervened and as a result the USSR attacked Turkey, the NATO allies would not help Turkey. Fourth, he stated that according to the 1947 Turkish-American bilateral agreement, the Turkish armed forces could not use the weapons given by the US 'for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus'.¹¹⁴ He concluded by inviting Inonu to Washington 'to have a personal discussion of this situation'.¹¹⁵ These points showed that the US would not change its Cyprus policy, and gave Turkey a clear choice: if you intervene you will be alone.

Even so, what Johnson meant and what the Turks chose to understand from the letter differed. According to Johnson the letter was a tool to stop Turkish intervention, and to push Turkey to negotiate with Greece. On the other hand what Turkey considered the patronizing style of the letter aggravated its concerns about the American guarantee, which had started with the Cuban missile crisis. In his reply on 13 June 1964 Inonu stated these concerns. He made five points. First, Ankara would

¹¹³ The letter was released by the White House in January 1966. For its text see: FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 16, 107-110, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey, 5 June 1964. See also: Correspondence between President Johnson and Prime Minister Inonu, June 1964, released by the White House, 15 January 1966, *Middle East Journal*, Vol 20 No 3 (1966 Summer), 386-88. For background to Johnson's letter see also: H. Sahin, *Johnson Mektubu Turk-ABD Iliskilerini Degistiren Olayin Perde Arkasi*.

¹¹⁴ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 16, 107-110, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey, 5 June 1964.

¹¹⁵ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 16, 110, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey, 5 June 1964.

not intervene. Second, Inonu was disappointed at Johnson's 'wording and content'. Third, throughout the escalation of events Turkey had 'taken a special care to consult' the US 'on this matter', and had also consulted with 'the other guaranteeing powers, before taking any unilateral action' according to the provisions of the Guarantee Treaty. Fourth, Inonu argued for a difference in Ankara's and Washington's interpretation of NATO's basic ideal, and expressed Turkey's 'great sorrow and grave concern'. He particularly rejected Johnson's denying 'the obligation of the NATO allies to protect Turkey in case she becomes directly involved with the USSR as a result of an action initiated in Cyprus'. Fifth he stated that if NATO would not help Turkey in this case and if NATO's structure was 'so weak as to give credit to the aggressor's allegations, then it means this defect of NATO needs to be remedied'.¹¹⁶ These words clearly expressed Turkey's disillusion at Washington's stance on the Turkish-American alliance. They also started a new phase in Turkish-American relations.

American officials foresaw Inonu's attempt to draw Washington into Cyprus. On 11 June 1964 the Under Secretary of State, George W. Ball, told Johnson that 'Inonu' was 'doing everything possible to maneuver us into taking responsibility for bringing about a settlement'.¹¹⁷ Washington accelerated its efforts at mediation. Accepting Johnson's invitation, Inonu visited Washington on 22-23 June 1964.¹¹⁸ Turkish and American officials could not agree, but did accept that a solution might be reached by Turkish-Greek negotiation.¹¹⁹ On 24-25 June 1964 Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou came to Washington.¹²⁰

¹¹⁶ Correspondence between President Johnson and Prime Minister Inonu, June 1964, as released by the White House, 15 January 1966, *Middle East Journal*, Vol 20 No 3 (1966 Summer), 388-93.

¹¹⁷ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 16, 132-33, Memorandum from the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson, 11 June 1964.

¹¹⁸ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 16, 132-33, 145.

¹¹⁹ For details see: FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 16, 146-48, Memorandum of Conversation, 22 June 1964; FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 16, 148-51, Memorandum of Conversation, 23 June 1964. For text of statements

Acheson's first round of mediation, which started on 4 July, brought no solution.¹²¹ Turkish officials expressed their disappointment about American reluctance to intervene by asking why the US 'should feel warranted in taking such strong action in Vietnam ... and at same time restrain [Turkey] when it [was] similarly inclined [to] act in its own interest'.¹²² The situation worsened when Greek Cypriots attacked Turkish villages on 7-8 August, and Turkish jets bombarded Greek Cypriot positions.¹²³ Turkey's bombardment 'greatly disturbed'¹²⁴ the Americans, but it showed how seriously Ankara thought the issue, and it showed that Turkey would move apart from Washington on it.

After a cease-fire on the island on 11 August¹²⁵ the second round of Acheson's mediation started on 15 August. Acheson suggested to Turkey a Turkish leasehold base in Cyprus in return for enosis. Turkey refused, and again the talks reached no solution.¹²⁶

The American position on Cyprus became an important debate in the TGNA. The Government and the opposition expressed their disillusionment. They said that since the US did not support Turkey's legitimate course, the closeness of Turkish-American

by President Johnson and Prime Minister Inonu, see: Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, Book 1, 798-801.

¹²⁰ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 16, 132-33, 145.

¹²¹ For details of the first round of mediation talks see: FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 16, 179-99.

¹²² FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 16, 220, Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, 7 August 1964.

¹²³ *Cumhuriyet* 8-10 August 1964; FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 16, 230-31, Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, 8 August 1964. For details of Turkish-American conversation before the Turkish bombardment see: FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 16, 219-222, Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, 7 August 1964.

¹²⁴ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 16, 223, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece, 7 August 1964.

¹²⁵ *Cumhuriyet* 11-13 August 1964.

¹²⁶ For details of the second round of Acheson's mediation see: FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 16, 250-93; *Cumhuriyet* 13-28 August 1964.

relations brought no advantageous solution for Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots.¹²⁷ Inonu stated that Britain and Greece had blocked Turkish intervention and had also questioned its legitimacy under the Guarantee Agreement. On the other hand Turkish intervention had been blocked by Turkey's allies (the US) and the UN.¹²⁸ Ahmet Oguz from the opposition, Republican Peasants Nation Party, stated that Turkish foreign policy could not be conducted by seeking American permission for any political decision.¹²⁹ Sadetin Bilgic, the deputy leader of the main opposition party, the Justice Party, said that Turkey should follow a policy more nationalistic and independent of the US.¹³⁰

These discussions signalled a 'new path' in Ankara's relations with Washington. First, Ankara would follow a more autonomous foreign policy within the framework of NATO.¹³¹ This was implemented by abolishing the judicial privileges given to American officials in Turkey,¹³² and by reconsidering the provisions of bilateral agreements with the US.¹³³ Second, Ankara would follow a multi dimensional foreign policy. It would develop relations with the Arab, African and Asian countries,¹³⁴ and it would look for new trade alternatives with Eastern Bloc countries.¹³⁵ Turkish-Soviet official communications were also improved, a Treaty of Culture was signed,¹³⁶ and Turkey decided to export \$ 20 million of agricultural goods to the USSR in return for machinery and road equipment.¹³⁷ These contacts continued in 1965 with other

¹²⁷ For details of the discussions see: TGNAP, Vol 32, 302-40; TGNAP, Vol 32, 347-93, 8 September 1964.

¹²⁸ TGNAP, Vol 32, 387, 8 September 1964.

¹²⁹ TGNAP, Vol 32, 308, 7 September 1964.

¹³⁰ *Cumhuriyet* 14 October 1964.

¹³¹ *Cumhuriyet* 28 August, 2 September 1964.

¹³² *Cumhuriyet* 1-2 October 1964.

¹³³ *Cumhuriyet* 25 December 1964.

¹³⁴ *Cumhuriyet* 28 August, 2 September 1964.

¹³⁵ *Cumhuriyet* 22 October 1964.

¹³⁶ *Cumhuriyet* 24, 30 October 1964; *Cumhuriyet* 1, 3-7 November 1964.

¹³⁷ *Cumhuriyet* 15 November 1964.

official visits.¹³⁸ The 'new path' was a turning point in Turkish foreign policy, Turkey's regional role and Turkish-American relations.

The US Embassy reported that these developments might have 'serious implications'.¹³⁹ Ambassador Hare was concerned at 'Soviet influence in and over Cyprus', especially after Turkish visits to Moscow.¹⁴⁰ For the US the main problem in Turkey's 'new path' was the Turkish-Soviet rapprochement. It deepened when Ankara decided to withdraw from NATO's Multilateral Force in January 1965.¹⁴¹ The Multilateral Force (MLF) was an American proposal to produce a fleet of submarines and warships, each manned by international NATO crews, and armed with multiple nuclear-armed Polaris ballistic missiles. The proposal was inspired by the complaints of NATO countries that the nuclear defence of Europe was beholden to the US. The result would be a fleet of warships manned and operated by NATO command, instead of an assortment of independent forces ultimately under their own domestic banners. Turkey decided to become a member of MLF at the NATO Council's Ottawa Meeting on 23 May 1963.¹⁴² The 'new path' shook nearly 20 years of Turkish-American alliance.

In order to ease the effects of Turkey's 'new path', the US gave Turkey an extra \$70 million credit, which increased American aid in 1965 to \$140 million.¹⁴³ The US also

¹³⁸ *Cumhuriyet* 5,6,7,8 January 1965; *Cumhuriyet* 7 February 1965.

¹³⁹ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 16, 310, Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, 8 September 1964.

¹⁴⁰ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 16, 333, Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, 30 November 1964.

¹⁴¹ *Cumhuriyet* 18 January 1965; M. Gonlubol (ed), *Olaylarla Turk Dis Politikasi*, 501-02.

¹⁴² For details see: A. Priest, "In Common Cause": The NATO Multilateral Force and the Mixed-Manning Demonstration on the USS Claude V. Ricketts, 1964-1965"; A. Buchan, "The Multilateral Force: A Study in Alliance Politics"; W. L. Kohl, "Nuclear Sharing in Nato and the Multilateral Force"; R. E. Osgood, "The Case for the Multilateral Force"; *Cumhuriyet* 25 April 1963; *Cumhuriyet* 20, 24, 25 May 1963.

¹⁴³ *Cumhuriyet* 15 January 1965.

stated that Washington was not offended by the Ankara-Moscow rapprochement.¹⁴⁴

These steps show that Washington did not want to lose its ally to the Soviet Bloc.

'New path' continued under Suat Hayri Urguplu's government¹⁴⁵ which came to power on 20 February 1965.¹⁴⁶ The new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hasan Isik, stated that Turkey's relationship with the Arab, Asian and African states would be developed. He added that Turkey would accept foreign aid from the USSR and from the OECD Turkish Aid Consortium.¹⁴⁷ The National Defence Minister also stated that some Turkish troops might be withdrawn from NATO.¹⁴⁸ At the UN General Assembly in September 1965 the Urguplu government voted against the American use of force in Vietnam.¹⁴⁹

Turkey and the US might have avoided this split, as they did after the Cuban missile crisis, but there were other destabilizing factors. These were Ankara's determination to continue its multi-faceted foreign policy, Turkish public reactions against NATO, the problem of American soldiers in Turkish bases, the problem of opium cultivation in Turkey at the beginning of the 1970s, an escalation in Cyprus, and the ensuing US arms embargo.

Turkey continued its 'new path' after 1965.¹⁵⁰ Significantly, it continued to develop relations with the USSR and the Arab states.¹⁵¹ Ankara signed a new trade

¹⁴⁴ *Cumhuriyet* 1 February 1965.

¹⁴⁵ For the new government's programme see: *Cumhuriyet* 27 February, 7 March 1965; FRUS, 1969-76, Vol 29, 1054-58, National Intelligence Estimate, 3 February 1970.

¹⁴⁶ *Cumhuriyet* 21 February 1965.

¹⁴⁷ *Cumhuriyet* 10 March 1965.

¹⁴⁸ *Cumhuriyet* 8 May 1965.

¹⁴⁹ B. Oran (ed), *Türk Dis Politikası 1919-1980*, Vol 1, 690.

¹⁵⁰ For details see: B. Oran (ed), *Türk Dis Politikası 1919-1980*, Vol 1, 655-807.

¹⁵¹ For details see: K. H. Karpat, *Turkish Foreign Policy in Transition 1950-1974*, 93-107.

agreement with Moscow on 22 March 1965.¹⁵² After Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko visited Ankara on 17-22 May 1965, a common communiqué was signed.¹⁵³ Urguplu visited the USSR on 9-16 August 1965, and after this a cultural cooperation agreement was signed, and the development of Turkish-Soviet trade relations was agreed.¹⁵⁴ On 20-27 December 1966, Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin visited Turkey, the first visit of a Soviet Prime Minister to Turkey.¹⁵⁵ On 25 March 1967 an economic and technical cooperation agreement was concluded.¹⁵⁶ Turkey's official visits to the USSR became regular after 1967. Prime Minister Demirel visited on 19-29 September 1967,¹⁵⁷ followed by Minister of Foreign Affairs Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil on 8-12 July 1968¹⁵⁸ during which the Turkish-Soviet Economic Committee was established.¹⁵⁹ On 12-21 November 1969 President Cevdet Sunay made the first visit of a Turkish president to the USSR.¹⁶⁰ On 11-17 April 1972 Nikolai Podgorny, of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, visited Turkey and the Statement of Good Neighborhood Principles was signed.¹⁶¹ On 26-29 December 1975, Kosygin again visited Turkey. From 1976 Turkish-Soviet relations developed in the military field.¹⁶² The Turkish-Soviet rapprochement was one of the most important turning points in Turkey's Cold War foreign policy.

Turkey also developed its relations with the Arab states, especially with Suleyman Demirel's victory in the October 1965 elections. Demirel stated that Turkey would follow a multi faceted foreign policy with the Arab and the African states. After this

¹⁵² *Cumhuriyet* 23 March 1965.

¹⁵³ *Cumhuriyet* 22, 23 May 1965.

¹⁵⁴ *Cumhuriyet* 13, 17, 18 August 1965.

¹⁵⁵ *Cumhuriyet* 22, 23, 27 December 1966.

¹⁵⁶ B. Oran (ed), *Türk Dis Politikasi 1919-1980*, Vol 1, 778.

¹⁵⁷ *Cumhuriyet* 21, 29, 30 September 1967.

¹⁵⁸ *Cumhuriyet* 9 July 1968.

¹⁵⁹ *Cumhuriyet* 11 July 1968.

¹⁶⁰ *Cumhuriyet* 22 November 1969.

¹⁶¹ B. Oran (ed), *Türk Dis Politikasi 1919-1980*, Vol 1, 778.

¹⁶² B. Oran (ed), *Türk Dis Politikasi 1919-1980*, Vol 1, 779.

official statement bilateral cultural and commercial relations were developed between Turkey and the Arab States.¹⁶³

Washington continued to help Turkey. It gave Turkey \$ 200 million via aid consortium in 1965¹⁶⁴ and it also voted in favor of Turkey on the Cyprus question in the UN General Assembly on 18 December 1965.¹⁶⁵ But the media release of Johnson's letter in 1966 fuelled an angry Turkish reaction.¹⁶⁶ Public reaction was hostile not only towards Turkish-American relations, but also Turkey's role in NATO. It felt that Turkey did not have an independent role within NATO, and that the American stance on Cyprus, and especially Johnson's letter showed that NATO was not an absolute security guarantee for Turkey.¹⁶⁷

Another destabilizing factor in Turkish-American relations after 1965 was problems with American personnel in Turkish bases. This had long been so, but Turkey now decided to act on it. One of these problems was the judicial exemption of American personnel in Turkey.¹⁶⁸ After an agreement with American officials, the Demirel government terminated the exemptions on 24 September 1968.¹⁶⁹ This eased restrictions on Turkish judicial authorities to exercise jurisdiction over American personnel. It was followed by another agreement on 3 July 1969, which revised and

¹⁶³ W. B. Sherwood, "The Rise of the Justice Party in Turkey", 54; M. Gonlubol (ed), *Olaylarla Turk Dis Politikasi*, 534-35. See also: Joseph S. Szyliowicz, "The Turkish Elections: 1965", 493. For details see: K. H. Karpat, *Turkish Foreign Policy in Transition 1950-1974*, 127-34; B. Oran (ed), *Turk Dis Politikasi 1919-1980*, Vol 1, 789-96; O. Kurkcuoglu, "Turkiye'nin Arap Orta Dogu'suna Karsi Politikasi (1945-1970)", 250; O. Sander, *Turkiye'nin Dis Politikasi*, 233-37.

¹⁶⁴ *Cumhuriyet* 27 July 1965.

¹⁶⁵ Yearbook of the United Nations 1954, 212 in

http://unyearbook.un.org/1965YUN/1965_P1_SEC1_CH12.pdf accessed on 28.04.2009

¹⁶⁶ *Cumhuriyet* 14, 16, 19 January 1966; *Cumhuriyet* 9 February 1966.

¹⁶⁷ For details of these criticisms see: N. Uslu, *Turk Amerikan Iliskileri*, 196-98.

¹⁶⁸ G. S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance, Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971*, 168-69; N. Uslu, *Turk Amerikan Iliskileri*, 186-89.

¹⁶⁹ For the text see: <http://turkey.usembassy.gov/19t6317/> accessed on 28.04.2009

unified secret agreements between the US and Turkey.¹⁷⁰ Turkey took more control over the American presence. Its unlimited trust in the US on Turkish soil faded.

In the 1970s another destabilizing factor in Turkish-American relations was opium cultivation in Turkey. At the beginning of 1970s the US put pressure on Turkey to stop this. The Demirel government rejected this, stating that 'the opium producing provinces' were 'important strongholds of his Justice party'.¹⁷¹ After a coup on 12 March 1971, the new government of Nihat Erim agreed to stop cultivation, but after the 1973 elections the Bulent Ecevit government lifted this ban. This triggered a strong American reaction against Turkey.¹⁷²

The most destabilizing factor in Turkish-American relations was a worsening of the Cyprus situation.¹⁷³ 'The dispersion of Turkish riots throughout the island in 1960 was transformed into the formation of [Turkish] enclaves in the 1963-74 period'.¹⁷⁴ On 20 July 1974 Turkey intervened into Cyprus.¹⁷⁵ This provoked an American arms embargo which continued until 1978.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁰ I. Soysal, *Soguk Savas Donemi ve Turkiye Olaylar Kronolojisi (1945-1975)*, 319; O. G. Isyar, "An Analysis of Turkish-American Relations from 1945 to 2004: Initiatives and Reactions in Turkish Foreign Policy", 25.

¹⁷¹ FRUS, 1969-76, Vol 29, 1072, Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, undated.

¹⁷² For details of the opium crisis see: C. Erhan, *Beyaz Savas Turk-Amerikan iliskilerinde Afyon Sorunu*; P. Robins, "The Opium Crisis and the Iraq War: Historical Parallels in Turkey-US Relations". See also: FRUS, 1969-76, Vol 29, 1050-54, 1061-62, 1065-1071, 1073-76, 1085-89, 1092-1104, 1111-18, 1123-25; US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol LXXII, 110-11, 27 January 1975

¹⁷³ For details see: N. Uslu, *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations 1959-2003*, 35-115; FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol 29, 849- 1035; M. Stearns, *Entangled Allies U.S. Policy Toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus*, 113-15; S. Bolukbasi, *Barisci Cozumsuzluk*, 167-221; G. D. Camp, "Greek-Turkish Conflict over Cyprus", 54-57; M. Dundar, "The US Policy on the Cyprus Question: Continuity and Change." Bilkent University MA, 2005, 5-21.

¹⁷⁴ R. J. Fisher, "Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity-Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse", 310.

¹⁷⁵ For details see: S. Bolukbasi, *Barisci Cozumsuzluk*, 221-42; I. Soysal, *Soguk Savas Donemi ve Turkiye Olaylar Kronolojisi (1945-1975)*, 346-48; E. Yavuzalp, *Kibris Yangininda Buyukelcilik 1967 – 1970*, 168, 238-39; C. Hitchens "Uncorking the Genie: The Cyprus Question and Turkey's Military Rule", 25-27; G. D. Camp, "Greek-Turkish Conflict over Cyprus", 57-58; N. Uslu, *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations 1959-2003*, 115-39; M. Dundar, "The US Policy on the Cyprus Question: Continuity and Change." Bilkent University MA, 2005, 21-27.

¹⁷⁶ For details see: O. Sander, *Turkiye'nin Dis Politikasi*, 125-28; N. Uslu, *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations 1959-2003*, 139-72; G. S. Harris,

These frictions generated a new phase in Turkish-American relations. Since 1945 Washington had been directly involved in issues which were of common concern to the US and Turkey in the Middle East. When Ankara wanted to draw the US into the Cyprus question, Washington demurred. Throughout the reconsideration of Washington's strategic thinking on the Middle East following the Cuban Missile Crisis, Ankara understood that Turkey was no longer as crucial as it once was. On the other hand Turkey, because of the lessening of American aid, the chrome problem and the Cuban Missile Crisis, reconsidered its foreign policy strategy to decrease its dependence on the US. Ankara was still in need of Washington's umbrella, so it could not be too blunt but the Cyprus question was a "sleeper" in Turkish-American relations. It had been there since 1950s, but when it escalated in the 1960s, it built on those other factors to shake Turkish-American alliance seriously.

This deterioration was the major reason why Turkey did not contribute to the US war effort in Vietnam. In March 1966 the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggested that Turkey send medical supplies and cement to Vietnam, but the proposal was not pursued.¹⁷⁷ In 1967 the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs refuted media rumors of a Turkish-American agreement to send Turkish troops to Vietnam.¹⁷⁸ Regional issues led Turkey some distance away from the US. Australian-American relations after the formation of ANZUS followed a very different path.

Turkey Coping with Crisis, 192-96; M. Dundar, "The US Policy on the Cyprus Question: Continuity and Change." Bilkent University MA, 2005, 29-34.

¹⁷⁷ *Cumhuriyet* 1 March 1966.

¹⁷⁸ *Cumhuriyet* 7 April 1967.

PART 5: The Cyprus Question and the Vietnam War

b. Australia

In the period under review, Australia's closeness to the US peaked during the Vietnam War. As the war intensified and the US increased its commitment, Australia strengthened its support. This underlines how valuable the US presence in SEA was for Canberra. It underwrote Australia's forward defence policy. If the US were in SEA Australia was safe against any threat from the north.

Especially after the end of *Konfrontasi* freed its defence capabilities, Australia's determination to support the US became more apparent. Washington used this to steadily increase its demands for Australian commitment, and Australia accepted nearly every US demand. From 1965 to 1967 Australia sent a third of its defence capability to Vietnam, and introduced conscription for foreign service for the first time in its history. Only after the Tet offensive in 1968 did this slacken, and by then Washington and Canberra were revising their Vietnam strategies in response to public opinion and the deterioration of the military situation. By the time Gough Whitlam came to power in late 1972 Washington had lost its passion for the Vietnam War, so the thirty year Australian-American partnership remained intact.

This chapter argues that Australia's determination to support the US in the Vietnam War was to show its loyalty to the US so that if Australia were threatened the US would help. Australia was in Vietnam because the US was there. With the Vietnam War the US completely replaced Britain as Australia's principal protector.

The US began to focus more seriously on Vietnam with President Kennedy's election. It formed a Vietnam Task Force in mid-1961, in May began a 'Program of action to prevent Communist domination of South Vietnam', and sent Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson to visit SEA.¹

After his tour, Johnson signalled how Washington would accelerate its efforts in Vietnam. He stated that among the countries he visited, 'the threat to peace and progress' was 'most direct and immediate in Viet Nam', and that American aid to South Vietnam should be increased. He stressed that 'a mere increase in the level of military aid' would not alleviate the situation. 'There must be new methods for the use of all such aid' which 'must be pursued ... with the cooperation of other free nations'.² Washington would attempt to mobilize its allies. This was also stressed by General Maxwell D. Taylor, the President's Military Representative. He said 'it would be desirable to obtain the participation of other SEATO countries'.³

Because of its membership, SEATO was ideal for the US to obtain international support for Vietnam. Kennedy instructed the State Department to contact SEATO

¹ FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 1, 135. See also: FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 1, 85-86, Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow), 28 April 1961; FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 1, 129-31, Telegram from the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (McGarr) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt), 10 May 1961. For the program see: United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Vol 11, 1-12, Memorandum by Edward G. Lansdale, USAF, 8 May 1961; United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Vol 11, 138-54, A Program of Action to Prevent Communist Domination of South Vietnam, 6 May 1961. See also: FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 1, 92-115, Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the President, 3 May 1961.

² FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 1, 149-51, Paper Prepared by the Vice President, undated; FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 1, 152-57, Report by the Vice President, undated. See also: Johnson's memorandum to the President, on 23 May, reporting on his mission to Asia. The text is printed in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Vol 11, 159-66.

³ FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 1, 224, Paper Prepared by the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/ Washington, July 15, 1961.

allies, especially Britain and Australia, on allied coordination in Vietnam.⁴ SEATO support would relieve the dangerously escalating situation and to gain 'ground militarily as well as in building public morale.'⁵ During a National Security Council meeting in November 1961, Kennedy asked for more support from countries in SEA, including Australia.⁶ Rusk also stated the importance of the British and Australian support.⁷ In short, the State Department hoped to use SEATO to justify the American action in Vietnam, especially to the American public.

Australia followed these developments carefully. In 1961 SEATO was at least as important for Australia. It was a 'powerful deterrent' to Communist aggression, and an important platform for the coordination of its members 'individual defence efforts'.⁸ It could keep Australian defence efforts close to the US.

On 17 November 1961 the Australian Ambassador in Washington, Howard Beale, was officially informed that the US 'was considering increasing its assistance' to South Vietnam, and 'an indication of Australia's views and willingness to assist was requested'. On 5 December Beale suggested that 'demonstrable Australian support' for South Vietnam 'would make a very favourable impression' on the US. This was discussed in Canberra on 14 December. It was clear from these discussions that any motivation for assistance was mainly 'political', and that the armed services 'were

⁴ United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Vol 11, 312, Memorandum for the Secretary McNamara from William P. Bundy, 10 October 1961; United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Vol 11, 322-23, Memorandum for Record by Roswell Kilpatric, 11 October 1961.

⁵ FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 1, 582, 239. Letter from the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to the President, 12 November 1961. For the significance of SEATO member's support for the US actions in Vietnam see: FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 1, 477-532, Letter from the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to the President, 3 November 1961.

⁶ FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 1, 587-88, Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, 13 November 1961; FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 1, 607-10, Notes on the National Security Council Meeting, 15 November 1961.

⁷ FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 1, 612-14, Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President, 15 November 1961.

⁸ NAA, 777720, A1209, 1961/340, Brief for the Australian Delegation to the Seventh Meeting of the SEATO Council of Ministers, 27-30 March 1961.

unwilling, for manpower reasons, to make more than a token commitment' to South Vietnam. Beale was informed on 19 December that 'while Australia could supply small arms and ammunition it could make no more than a token contribution in training'.⁹ Albeit with limited means, Australia wanted to show loyalty to the US as a SEATO and an ANZUS ally.

The US welcomed even this token offer. Rusk 'said that if it were politically wise to accept Australian help we should do so'. General Lionel C. McGarr, Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in Vietnam, 'said he would be glad to have small numbers of Australians if they were willing to serve under the MAAG'.¹⁰ The US Ambassador to Vietnam said that 'he regarded an early increase in the Australian contribution (he appears to have had in mind the use of military personnel at least for the protection of civilian projects) as a matter of the highest importance'.¹¹ The Director of the Vietnam Task Force, Sterling J. Cottrell, observed that there was 'an outside chance that this "token" concept might later be broadened to involve larger third country military contributions'.¹² At this stage the quantity of the Australian military personnel was not crucial for the US. Their presence could trigger support from the other allies.

Australian officials were also able to offer other Australian aid. In a memorandum to the Minister for External Affairs, Garfield Barwick, Brian Hill, Australia's Ambassador to South Vietnam, and B. W. Woodberry, Second Secretary, stated that 'Vietnamese consciousness of dissatisfaction with Australia's [aid] performance' had 'been slow to

⁹ NAA, 4681228, M4324, 15, Australia's Military Commitment to Vietnam (Paper tabled in the House of Representatives, 13 May 1975), 5.

¹⁰ FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 2, 54, Letter from the Commander in Chief, Pacific's Political Adviser (Martin) to the Director of the Vietnam Task Force (Cottrell), 19 January 1962.

¹¹ NAA, 4681228, M4324, 15, Australia's Military Commitment to Vietnam (Paper tabled in the House of Representatives, 13 May 1975), 6.

¹² FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 2, 351, Memorandum from the Director of the Vietnam Task Force (Cottrell) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman), 27 April 1962.

reveal itself', but suggested that in order to 'retain a position of influence in Vietnam' Australian aid should 'be more generous financially'. It also suggested that Australia should increase its technical assistance under the Colombo Plan.¹³

The Joint Intelligence Committee accepted these suggestions in April 1962. The Committee's report stated that the 'loss of South Vietnam, in the face of' US 'public undertakings to prevent its fall to communism, would be a serious blow to the prestige of the West', particularly the US, 'in Asia'. It 'would be taken as direct evidence' that the US 'was unable or unwilling to protect' SEA from the communists. This would cause 'a chain reaction' which would affect 'other sensitive areas throughout Asia, ranging from Korea to Pakistan'.¹⁴ These considerations indicate that the Defence Department saw the situation in a way very similar to Washington.

These comments were made soon after the President of Vietnam Diem requested international support for his regime from ninety-three governments on 31 March 1962.¹⁵ In June, Menzies replied that Australia would aid South Vietnam.¹⁶ He meant economic aid, but Canberra and Washington were considering Australian military support for South Vietnam. A token Australian force contribution was discussed in an ANZUS Council Meeting on 8-9 May 1962.¹⁷ Barwick asked '[h]ow far and deep' the US would go in Vietnam, and 'whether there had been a political decision' in Washington that SEA, 'particularly was of such vital significance that "come hell or high water" the' US 'would defend it, with all the implications' that the US 'would follow up the path of escalation'. Rusk replied that 'the answer' of the US 'was nearer

¹³ NAA, 581880, A1838, 3014/10/15 PART 2, Memorandum No 153 from Brian C. Hill and B. W. Woodberry to Garfield Barwick, 19 February 1962.

¹⁴ NAA, 1146176, A1209, 1962/482 PART 1, Final Report by Joint Intelligence Committee (Australia), April 1962.

¹⁵ Current Notes in International Affairs, Vol 33, No 6, 37-39, June 1962.

¹⁶ Current Notes in International Affairs, Vol 33, No 6, 39, June 1962.

¹⁷ For details see: NAA, 842163, A1838, TS686/2/3, 11th ANZUS Council Meeting.

“yes” than that of any other government he knew of”.¹⁸ Rusk emphasized the level of American support to South Vietnam and the necessity for SEATO support, and stressed the importance of SEA for Washington.¹⁹ Barwick and Rusk agreed to show the Australian flag in South Vietnam.²⁰ On 24 May, Athol Townley, the Minister for Defence, announced that Australia would send thirty military advisers to Vietnam,²¹ to be integrated into US defence programs.²² So began Australia’s Vietnam War.²³

This greatly increased the closeness between the US and Australia. During Menzies’ visit to the US on 17 - 20 June 1962, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs and Chairman of the Task Force on Southeast Asia, Averell W. Harriman, told Menzies that Kennedy was ‘grateful [for] Australian participation’ as it was ‘extremely important to have contributions on a multilateral basis and avoid the onus [of] a charge’ that the US was ‘replacing French colonialism’.²⁴ Kennedy’s satisfaction with Australian support was also stressed in the joint communiqué on Menzies visit on 20 June.²⁵

¹⁸ NAA, 842163, A1838, TS686/2/3, Meeting of ANZUS Council, Canberra, 8-9 May 1962.

¹⁹ NAA, 842163, A1838, TS686/2/3, Meeting of ANZUS Council, Canberra, 8-9 May 1962.

²⁰ NAA, 842163, A1838, TS686/2/3, ANZUS Council Meeting, Australian Mass Communication Media Coverage from 9 to 13 May 1962; NAA, 437119, A1209, 1962/708, Memorandum from Keith Brennan (Assistant Secretary) to J. F. Nimmo Esq., (Acting Secretary Prime Minister’s Department) about Discussions with US Secretary of State (Mr. Dean Rusk) –Wednesday, 9 May 1962, 5 June 1962.

²¹ Current Notes in International Affairs, Vol 33, No 5, 36-37, May 1962; NAA, 4681228, M4324, 15, Australia’s Military Commitment to Vietnam (Paper tabled in the House of Representatives, 13 May 1975), 7. See also: FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 2, 418-26, 203. Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State, 23 May 1962.

²² FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 2, 478-81, Status Report on Southeast Asia, Prepared by the Southeast Asia Task Force, 27 June 1962.

²³ The Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV) arrived in Saigon between 3 July and 3 August. For details see: NAA, 581905, A1838, 3014/10/15/2, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Saigon to the Department of External Affairs, 3 August 1962; NAA, 581905, A1838, 3014/10/15/2, Notification to I.C.C. of Australian Army Training Team, 3 August 1962.

²⁴ NAA, 546066, A1838, 915/9 PART 49, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Washington, to the Department of External Affairs, 22 June 1962.

²⁵ For the text of the joint communiqué between Kennedy and Menzies see: Current Notes in International Affairs, Vol 33, No 6, 36-37, June 1962.

Australian support opened the door to further American demands. The next American request for assistance came on 14 February 1963,²⁶ when the US Deputy Chief of Mission in Vietnam, William C. Trueheart, asked Hill whether the US 'might ask Australia for a small' component of RAAF C47 Dakota transport aircraft.²⁷ Canberra's reply was negative. It told Hill that Australia 'would prefer not to receive ... [at that] point a request for R.A.A.F. participation in South Vietnam'. Australia's 'assistance' had 'so far been in fields other than direct combatant involvement'. The Department's anxiety was the difficulty 'to explain to Australian public opinion what change had occurred since May' 1962 'to require active Australian participation in air operations'.²⁸

This did not stop Washington asking Hill for 'one Dakota squadron and 16 additional pilots' on 2 April.²⁹ Hill replied that 'a request for a much smaller contribution (say 4 or 5 Dakotas) would be much more realistic', although it is unlikely that the 'Australian Government would be able to meet even that'.³⁰ Canberra's resources were small. At a SEATO meeting in Paris, on 4 April, Air Marshal Sir Frederick Scherger told Admiral Harry D. Felt, Commander in Chief of the USN in the Pacific, 'that Australia could not supply Dakotas to Viet-nam because of the possibility that the squadron would be re-armed with Caribous in the near future'. Felt 'also accepted that RAAF

²⁶ NAA, 4681228, M4324, 15, Australia's Military Commitment to Vietnam (Paper tabled in the House of Representatives, 13 May 1975), 8.

²⁷ NAA, 4681228, M4324, 15, Australia's Military Commitment to Vietnam (Paper tabled in the House of Representatives, 13 May 1975), 8; NAA, 681387, A1838, TS696/8/4 PART 4, Teletype Message from Waller to the Minister for External Affairs, 25 February 1963; NAA, 681387, A1838, TS696/8/4 PART 4, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Saigon to the Department of External Affairs, 16 February 1963; NAA, 681387, A1838, TS696/8/4 PART 4, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Saigon to the Department of External Affairs, 14 February 1963.

²⁸ NAA, 681387, A1838, TS696/8/4 PART 4, Cablegram from the Department of External Affairs to the Australian Embassy, Saigon, 28 February 1963.

²⁹ NAA, 4681228, M4324, 15, Australia's Military Commitment to Vietnam (Paper tabled in the House of Representatives, 13 May 1975), 8; NAA, 681387, A1838, TS696/8/4 PART 4, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Saigon to the Department of External Affairs, 2 April 1963.

³⁰ NAA, 681387, A1838, TS696/8/4 PART 4, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Saigon to the Department of External Affairs, 2 April 1963. For details see: NAA, 681387, A1838, TS696/8/4 PART 4, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Washington to the Department of External Affairs, 3 April 1963; NAA, 581881, A1838, 3014/10/15 PART 3, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Saigon to the Department of External Affairs, 2 April 1963; NAA, 581881, A1838, 3014/10/15 PART 3, Cablegram from the Department of External Affairs to the Australian Embassy, Washington, 3 April 1963.

C130s were not suitable for the area and he was told that the Australian helicopters were not yet operational'. He 'did not refer to the separate request for the services of pilots'.³¹ The US thought that Australia's reason for rejection was understandable.

On 14 May the US again pressed Australia for RAAF pilots, but again Canberra rejected it. General Paul D. Harkins, US Commander in the US Military Assistance Command in Vietnam, asked Hill if the US might 'pursue with Australia the idea of sending sixteen RAAF pilots to Viet-nam for training and other combat duties'.³² The Department of Defence 'opposed the request because of manpower shortage' and although the Department of External Affairs 'saw some merit in accepting, it was decided that the Army training team was sufficient to demonstrate Australian support'.³³ Australia also declined a South Vietnam request for RAAF personnel.³⁴ Australia's defence capability remained a factor in the level of its commitment to Vietnam.

On 5-6 June 1963 an ANZUS Council meeting 'reaffirmed the determination of the three ANZUS partners to work together, and with other countries equally determined to preserve their national independence, in promoting the peace and security of SEA'.³⁵ After this meeting Harriman visited Canberra. He stated the importance of an Australian presence in South Vietnam. In a subsequent press conference, he said

³¹ NAA, 681387, A1838, TS696/8/4 PART 4, Memorandum from the First Assistant Secretary (J. K. Waller) to the Minister for External Affairs (Barwick) about the Vietnamese Request for Australian Pilots, 24 July 1963.

³² NAA, 681387, A1838, TS696/8/4 PART 4, Memorandum from the First Assistant Secretary (J. K. Waller) to the Minister for External Affairs (Barwick) about the Vietnamese Request for Australian Pilots, 24 July 1963.

³³ NAA, 4681228, M4324, 15, Australia's Military Commitment to Vietnam (Paper tabled in the House of Representatives, 13 May 1975), 8; NAA, 681387, A1838, TS696/8/4 PART 4, Memorandum from the First Assistant Secretary (J. K. Waller) to the Minister for External Affairs (Barwick) about the Vietnam's request for Australian pilots, 24 July 1963.

³⁴ NAA, 681387, A1838, TS696/8/4 PART 4, Memorandum from the First Assistant Secretary (J. K. Waller) to the Minister for External Affairs (Barwick) about the Vietnam's request for Australian pilots, 24 July 1963.

³⁵ For the text of the Final Communiqué of the ANZUS Council Meeting see: US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol XLVIII, 967-69, 3 June 1963.

that Australia had been 'taking a very keen interest in' SEA and the US was 'very glad that the Australian flag' was 'alongside the American flag [in] the troubled spots' in SEA. 'The question about the size of the military effort is entirely a matter for the Australian Government and the Australian people to decide'. The US would 'welcome them very much as partners in these enterprises to try to protect the countries of SEA. 'Australia' was 'playing a very important role.' He also noted the closeness between the US and Australia.³⁶ Canberra's rejection of the American request for RAFF help did not seem to affect Australian-American relations.

At this time, Washington was not seeking a significant military contribution from its allies. It was not making one itself. What it wanted was the political support to justify its efforts in Vietnam internationally. But in mid-1963 the situation in South Vietnam started to deteriorate significantly. Diem's decision to prohibit the display of religious flags, including Buddhist flags on Vesak, the birthday of Gautama Buddha, inflamed this. Buddhists, who had an important majority in South Vietnam, rose against Diem on 8 May. Protesters against the ban were shot by government troops and nine were killed. The riots continued until August. Diem suppressed them violently.³⁷

His actions cost Diem not only the confidence of Washington, but also of his own people.³⁸ The American position was summarized by Theodore J. C. Heavner, the Deputy Director of the Vietnam Working Group, on 25 August 1963. He said that the US 'stands firmly for religious freedom', both in its 'domestic life' and in its 'foreign policy'. The US 'is concerned about the Buddhist dispute on South Viet-nam', not only because of its 'own ideals but also because this controversy can only help the

³⁶ NAA, 1335343, A1209, 1963/6587, Press Conference given by Averell Harriman, United States Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and Garfield Barwick, 6 June 1963.

³⁷ For details of the Buddhist Crisis and the consequences see: S. Karnow, *Vietnam A History*, 295-97; George McT. Kahin, *Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam*, 148-53; FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 3, 277ff.

³⁸ For details see: FRUS, 1961-63, Vietnam, January-August 1963, Vol 3, 277ff.

Communist Viet Cong.’³⁹ The Diem government was no longer an effective representative of American political interests in Vietnam so it needed to be changed.⁴⁰ The Buddhist Crisis and Diem’s fall into disfavour brought a new dimension to the Vietnam War.

Canberra too dissociated itself from Diem’s government.⁴¹ Australia stated that it would continue its support to South Vietnam if Diem passed a resolution that would end this religious discrimination.⁴² Australia was also discontent about AATTV operations outside of ‘training purposes’ and use of Australian barbed wire for unsuitable purposes in Vietnam.⁴³ Australian reaction to Diem was another important sign of how closely Canberra followed Washington’s actions in Vietnam.

The American and Australian reactions were accepted in the UN. Its condemnation of Diem’s acts foreshadowed his end. The UN Steering Committee of the General Assembly decided that the acts against Buddhists in South Vietnam were violations of human rights.⁴⁴ On 1 November 1963, Diem’s presidency was ended by a military coup and he was assassinated.⁴⁵ Three weeks later Kennedy was assassinated and the US entered a new phase of Vietnam under Johnson.

³⁹ US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol XLIX, 395, 9 September 1963.

⁴⁰ For details of the American attitude see: FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 4, 1-426.

⁴¹ NAA, 1146176, A1209, 1962/482 PART 1, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Washington to the Department of External Affairs, 19 July 1963.

⁴² NAA, 1146178, A1209, 1962/482 PART 2, Cablegram from the Department of External Affairs to the Australian Embassy, Saigon, 12 August 1963. See also: NAA, 1146178, A1209, 1962/482 PART 2, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Bangkok to the Department of External Affairs, 26 August 1963.

⁴³ NAA, 1146178, A1209, 1962/482 PART 2, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Saigon to the Department of External Affairs, 26 August 1963.

⁴⁴ Yearbook of the United Nations 1963, 47-50 in

http://unyearbook.un.org/1963YUN/1963_P1_SEC1_CH3.pdf accessed on 09.07.2009

⁴⁵ For details see: S. Karnow, *Vietnam A History*, 320-27; G. McT.Kahin, *Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam*, 182-202; FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 4, 427-537; JFK and the Diem Coup by John Prados, 5 November 2003 in <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/index.htm> accessed on 09.07.2009; United States Department of Defense, *The Pentagon Papers: the Defense Department History of United States Decision Making on Vietnam*, Vol 2, 201-276.

After Diem's fall, South Vietnam experienced political chaos. General Duong Van Minh took control of South Vietnam after the coup⁴⁶ and seemed to promise a better administration⁴⁷ but he could not stabilize the situation.⁴⁸ General Nguyen Khanh overthrew him on 30 January 1964.⁴⁹

While these events were destabilizing South Vietnam, the US was developing a new program to diversify its commitment to Vietnam. This was named Strategic Hamlet.⁵⁰ Increasing Viet Cong control in Vietnam put pressure on the US to increase its commitments. The US 'decided, late in 1961, to increase materially its assistance to' South Vietnam 'and to expand its advisory effort into one which would implement a "limited partnership". ' In 1962 this became a 'unifying concept for a strategy designed to pacify rural Vietnam (the Viet Cong's chosen battleground) and to develop support among the peasants for the central government'.⁵¹ The US was attempting to organize South Vietnam's domestic structure, which would necessitate a deepening of the American commitment.

The US signalled that it might request suitable assistance from Australia. This would not be military, but 'aid of the peace corps variety, for men who would go into the villages and help to win the allegiance of the ordinary people' in Vietnam '(e.g. administrators, sanitation experts, agricultural experts and so on.)'⁵² Washington

⁴⁶ FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 4, 567-68.

⁴⁷ FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 4, 666-79, Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman) to the Secretary of State, 5 December 1963.

⁴⁸ FRUS, 1961-63, Vol 4, 698-700, Memorandum from Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson, 11 December 1963.

⁴⁹ For details of the the Khanh Coup see: FRUS, 1964, Vol 1, 1-49.

⁵⁰ For details of the program see: United States Department of Defense, *The Pentagon Papers: the Defense Department History of United States Decision Making on Vietnam*, Vol 2, 128-159.

⁵¹ United States Department of Defense, *The Pentagon Papers: the Defense Department History of United States Decision Making on Vietnam*, Vol 2, 128.

⁵² NAA, 248086, A1838, 270/1/1 PART 2, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Washington to the Department of External Affairs, 15 February 1964.

passed National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 288 in March 1964,⁵³ which aimed to 'make it clear' that the US was 'prepared to furnish assistance and support to South Vietnam for as long as it takes to bring the insurgency under control'. In order to maintain this, foreign assistance was required.⁵⁴ Washington would approach Canberra once more.

Johnson wanted to maintain 'a broader multilateral presence waging [this] anticommunist crusade'.⁵⁵ Rusk visited Saigon on 17-20 April,⁵⁶ and at a National Security Council Meeting after the visit, he stated:

We need to get more flags flying in South Vietnam. We need to help persuade other countries to provide assistance to Vietnam.⁵⁷

This triggered a new policy to attract support from as many allies as possible, named the 'Many flags campaign'.⁵⁸ In a press conference on 23 April 1964, Johnson said that he wanted to 'see some other flags' in Vietnam 'in an attempt to stop the spread of [C]ommunism in that area of the world, and the attempt to destroy freedom'.⁵⁹

Australia now began to consider plans to increase its aid within the framework of Strategic Hamlet.⁶⁰ On 6 May 1964 an expected request came from the US. The US Ambassador to Canberra, William C. Battle, formally requested 'further aid to South Vietnam'. The aid sought was 'non-military' in 'such categories engineers [,] medical

⁵³ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 1, 172-73, National Security Action Memorandum No. 288, 17 March 1964.

⁵⁴ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 1, 202, Memorandum From the Director, Far East Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Blouin) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton), 30 March 1964.

⁵⁵ W. I. Cohen & N. B. Tucker (eds), *Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World: American Foreign Policy, 1963-1968*, 130.

⁵⁶ For details of Rusk's visit see: FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 1, 225-303.

⁵⁷ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 1, 258, Summary Record of the 528th Meeting of the National Security Council, 22 April 1964.

⁵⁸ C. E. Neu, "Lyndon Johnson's Foreign Policy in Perspective", 698.

⁵⁹ Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Johnson, 1963-64, Book.1, 522.

⁶⁰ NAA, 581881, A1838, 3014/10/15 PART 3, "Additional Assistance for South Vietnam" from J. K. Waller, First Assistant Secretary Division I to Barwick, 30 April 1964.

personnel [,] flying instructors etc' and included 'a considerable list of equipment ranging from heavy machinery to fertilizers'. Menzies stated that 'he would certainly like to do something to assist the Americans particularly in an election year'.⁶¹

On 29 May Cabinet, after consulting the Joint Planning Defence Committee, accepted part of the American request.⁶² It decided 'to provide the following additional aid for South Vietnam':

- (a) An additional 30 Army NCO's for service with the A.A.T.T. Vietnam
- (b) An Army dental team of one dental officer, a dental mechanic and a dental operating room assistant complete with mobile-equipment
- (c) An Army driving and servicing instructional team together with a Light Aid Workshop Detachment, each of ten personnel. These groups working together could teach their skills and techniques to Vietnamese personnel at a suitable corps centre.⁶³

The US was not satisfied with Canberra's reply. American military authorities in Saigon stated that there was 'no military requirement for the army dental teams, the army driving/servicing instructional team or the light aid workshop detachment'. They suggested that 'Australia should instead send an additional 23 army training

⁶¹ NAA, 681387, A1838, TS696/8/4 PART 4, Cablegram from Australian High Commission, Wellington to the Department of External Affairs, 6 May 1964. For details of the US request see: NAA, 581881, A1838, 3014/10/15 PART 3, Memorandum from J. K. Waller, First Assistant Secretary Division I to Barwick, 6 May 1964; NAA, 4681228, M4324, 15, Australia's Military Commitment to Vietnam (Paper tabled in the House of Representatives, 13 May 1975), 8-9.

⁶² NAA, 1163424, A5827, VOLUME 7/AGENDUM 224, Cabinet Minute, Decision No 252, 29 May 1964. For the Joint Planning Committee's views on Military Assistance to South Vietnam see: NAA, 1728783, A1838, 696/8/4 PART 5, Report by the Joint Planning Committee at a Meeting on 19 May 1964.

⁶³ NAA, 1728783, A1838, 696/8/4 PART 5, Cablegram from the Department of External Affairs to the Australian Embassy, Washington, 29 May 1964.

personnel.⁶⁴ The US wanted to receive military support from Australia for its own needs in the field.

The Minister for Defence, Shane Paltridge, omitted the aid items not required by US authorities, adding that 'consultations were also proceeding for the provision by the Army of some further 20 specialist instructors and advisers.'⁶⁵ At the end of June the AATTV force increased from 60 to 83.⁶⁶

This increase showed that Australia was ready to provide more assistance to the US. Moreover, Australia was willing 'to make ... approaches to relevant capitals seeking help to Vietnam.'⁶⁷ From the US point of view there was still not enough international support for the US in Vietnam. The crisis in the Gulf of Tonkin⁶⁸ in early August helped charge this. On 2 August three North Vietnamese fast patrol boats carried out a torpedo attack against the US 'destroyer "Maddox" which was on patrol on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin, some 30 miles off-shore'. A second attack was claimed on 4 'August on the "Maddox" and another destroyer, ... "Turner C. Joy" ',⁶⁹ but this second report was an invention. National Security Agency 'officers deliberately distorted critical intelligence' on the attacks and told the White House only what it wanted to hear.⁷⁰ Johnson agreed that a 'firm, swift retaliatory strike must be carried

⁶⁴ NAA, 4681228, M4324, 15, Australia's Military Commitment to Vietnam (Paper tabled in the House of Representatives, 13 May 1975), 10.

⁶⁵ NAA, 781561, A1209, 1961/818 PART 2, Additional Australian Military and Economic Assistance in South Vietnam, Press Statement No 552 by the Minister for Defence Senator the Hon. Shane Paltridge, 8 June 1964.

⁶⁶ NAA, 4681228, M4324, 15, Australia's Military Commitment to Vietnam (Paper tabled in the House of Representatives, 13 May 1975), 10. The Australian team suffered its first combat casualty on 6 June 1964 when Warrant Officer K. G. Conway was killed during a Viet Cong attack on a special forces camp.

⁶⁷ NAA, 781561, A1209, 1961/818 PART 2, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Washington to the Department of External Affairs, 17 July 1964; NAA, 781561, A1209, 1961/818 PART 2, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Washington to the Department of External Affairs, 18 July 1964.

⁶⁸ For details of Tonkin incidents and US reactions see: FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 1, 589-665.

⁶⁹ NAA, 781571, A1209, 1961/818 PART 3, Cablegram from the Department of External Affairs to the Australian Embassy in Washington, 5 August 1964. See also: FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 1, 589; FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 1, 604-605.

⁷⁰ *The New York Times* 31 October 2005.

out.’⁷¹ On 10 August, ‘Johnson signed into law Joint Resolution 1145, “To Promote the Maintenance of International Peace and Security in Southeast Asia” as Public Law 88-408.’ The Joint Resolution had passed ‘the Senate (88-2) and the House of Representatives (416-0)’ on 7 August. It ‘expressed Congressional approval and support of the “determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.”’⁷² This resolution was an open indication of a coming significant increase in the American commitment.

Australia was quick to support Johnson. On 5 August Menzies told Battle that he ‘sympathised’ with Johnson and thought he was ‘pursuing the right course of action.’⁷³ That day Paul Hasluck, the Minister for External Affairs, stated that the Australian government believed that Johnson’s decision ‘was completely justified as North Vietnam could not be left undisturbed in its capacity to launch and renew such attacks.’⁷⁴ On 11 August Hasluck told the House:

The Government, the Congress and the people of the United States of America have gained our respect and honour for their acceptance of the great responsibilities that come with great power and for their sober, determined but restrained use of power for the peace and security of other peoples. ... In the face of the events, the Australian government is convinced that ... there is no current alternative to the effort of assisting in South Vietnam to preserve its independence and there is no current alternative to using force as necessary to check the southward thrust of militant Asian communism. ... It is our hope that the restrained but determined actions of the United States will have a strong deterrent effect on the aggressor. ... In seeking peace, ... we ourselves within the limits of our capacity are determined to stand with our Allies in SEATO. ... Our support [to the US] in this case was considered and not automatic. ... [W]e support the action of the United States and believe it to have been justified by

⁷¹ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 1, 609.

⁷² FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 1, 664.

⁷³ NAA, 781571, A1209, 1961/818 PART 3, Cablegram from the Department of External Affairs to the Australian Embassy in Washington, 5 August 1964.

⁷⁴ NAA, 781571, A1209, 1961/818 PART 3, Statement by the Minister for External Affairs on Wednesday, 5 August 1964.

the circumstances that provoked it and by its effect on the endeavours to bring peace to South-East Asia.⁷⁵

On 21 August, Hasluck wrote to several European nations, as well Israel and Japan, to seek support to extend 'assistance to South Viet Nam in both the civil and defence fields'.⁷⁶ In a circular telegram to Australian missions abroad on 3 September, Hasluck, stated three main priorities of Australian foreign policy for Vietnam. The first was 'to have a Government in South Vietnam' that would 'continue to fight [the] Viet Cong ... to give some prospect of eventually unifying the country behind a stable and non-Communist and preferably anti-Communist Government' which would 'still provide the local circumstances to enable the' US 'to keep a foothold in' SEA. The second was 'to retain an active' US 'presence' in SEA. The third was 'to prevent ... any failure' in SEA 'of such a kind as to lead to a collapse of the will to resist in other countries'.⁷⁷ Hasluck's words highlighted the importance of the presence of the US in SEA to Australia.

Australia's ready support made the US even more demanding. In Washington in late November, McNamara told Hasluck that if it became 'necessary to apply increased pressure on North Vietnam by air attack it would be very helpful to have Australian aircraft either participating or standing by to protect Thailand, Laos and South Vietnam'. McNamara also said that the US 'would be looking chiefly for a public demonstration of Australian support'.⁷⁸ This signalled the next American request.

⁷⁵ NAA, 582788, A1838, 3020/11/161/2 PART 7, Statement by leave in the House of Representatives by the Minister for External Affairs, (Paul Hasluck), 11 August 1964.

⁷⁶ NAA, 581882, A1838, 3014/10/15 PART 4, Letter from Hasluck, 21 August 1964.

⁷⁷ NAA, 1327836, A1209, 1961/818 PART 4, Savingram from the Department of External Affairs to All Posts (except Consulates), 3 September 1964.

⁷⁸ NAA, 4681228, M4324, 15, Australia's Military Commitment to Vietnam (Paper tabled in the House of Representatives, 13 May 1975), 11.

The US had been 'pressing' conscription on the Australians. 'The Johnson administration actively lobbied the Menzies government to conscript Australian men for Vietnam'.⁷⁹ On 10 November 1964 Australia announced a compulsory national service scheme, including for overseas service, the first time ever.⁸⁰ It was the most striking development in terms of Australia's determination to support the US. Menzies announced it in his Budget Speech. He had decided to introduce it against strong resistance from the Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which objected to 'the concept of random selection for national service' because of its combat inefficiency. The Tonkin Gulf incident, *Konfrontasi*, and the escalation in Vietnam 'outweighed the army's objections'.⁸¹

On 14 December Johnson requested 200 additional combat advisers, minesweepers, LST3s, salvage and repair ships, and hospital ships.⁸² On 18 December Menzies' reply stated Australia's strong support for the American course in Vietnam, but that Australia could not provide all the material and servicemen on Johnson's list.⁸³ Menzies offered an additional 17 military advisers since the 'rest of the military list' was beyond Australian defence capability.⁸⁴ Once again Australia responded affirmatively but within the boundaries of its defence capabilities.

The situation in Vietnam became more serious at the beginning of 1965, fuelling both Washington's and Canberra's anxieties. In his telegram to the Department of State

⁷⁹ P. Ham, *Vietnam: The Australian War*, 167.

⁸⁰ For details see: P. Edwards, *A Nation at War: Australian Politics, Society and Diplomacy during the Vietnam War 1965-1975*, 355-80.

⁸¹ P. Ham, *Vietnam: The Australian War*, 167.

⁸² G. St. J. Barclay, *A Very Small Insurance Policy: the Politics of Australian Involvement in Vietnam, 1954-1967*, 75; NAA, 1565664, A1945, 248/4/100, Message from Lyndon B. Johnson to Robert Menzies, 14 December 1964.

⁸³ NAA, 1327836, A1209, 1961/818 PART 4, Message dated 18 December 1964 from Prime Minister to President Johnson.

⁸⁴ NAA, 1327836, A1209, 1961/818 PART 4, Notes on Paper on Further Assistance in South Vietnam, 17 December 1964. See also: NAA, 5322392, A5828, 659/FAD, Cabinet Minute, Decision No 659(FAD), 17 December 1964.

on 6 January, the US Ambassador to Vietnam, General Maxwell D. Taylor stated that in Vietnam there was 'a seriously deteriorating situation characterized by continued political turmoil, irresponsibility and division within the armed forces, lethargy in the pacification program.'⁸⁵ In January 1965 Australia's Ambassadors in Washington and Saigon were 'informed that Ministers were gravely concerned at the outlook in Vietnam and recognised the necessity of taking whatever steps were possible to advance Australia's vital interest in securing success in South Vietnam.'⁸⁶

On 16 January Alexis U. Johnson, the US Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam, again raised 'the question of Australian aid'. He said that Johnson and US Defence officials 'had concluded that the most urgent need in both the military and non-military fields was for combat advisers.'⁸⁷ On 17 January the Australian Government 'decided to promise full public and diplomatic support for the' US if it 'decided upon increased military activity'.⁸⁸ On 27 January Cabinet agreed 'to increase A.A.T.T.V. from 83 to 100'.⁸⁹ On 29 January the Defence Minister announced that in addition to the advisors, Australia would provide an Australian engineering team, 3,000 tons of galvanized corrugated iron and 'about one million copies of text books' to South Vietnam.⁹⁰ Australia was both increasing and diversifying its aid.

⁸⁵ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 2, 13, Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State, 6 January 1965.

⁸⁶ NAA, 4681228, M4324, 15, Australia's Military Commitment to Vietnam (Paper tabled in the House of Representatives, 13 May 1975), 13. See also: NAA, 4172139, A1945, 248/4/101, Cablegram from the Department of External Affairs to the Australian Embassy, Saigon and Washington, 8 January 1965; NAA, 1565664, A1945, 248/4/100, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Washington to the Department of External Affairs, 6 January 1965; NAA, 1565664, A1945, 248/4/100, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Saigon to the Department of External Affairs, 13 January 1965.

⁸⁷ NAA, 1565664, A1945, 248/4/100, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Saigon to the Department of External Affairs, 17 January 1965.

⁸⁸ NAA, 4681228, M4324, 15, Australia's Military Commitment to Vietnam (Paper tabled in the House of Representatives, 13 May 1975), 14. See also: NAA, 1565664, A1945, 248/4/100, Cabinet Minute, Decision No 675(FAD), 18 January 1965.

⁸⁹ NAA, 1565664, A1945, 248/4/100, Cablegram from the Department of External Affairs to the Australian Embassy, Saigon, 27 January 1965.

⁹⁰ NAA, 581885, A1838, 3014/10/15 PART 7, Savingram from the Department of External Affairs to the Australian Embassy, Washington, 6 February 1965.

In February the situation in Vietnam continued to deteriorate, triggering a new American response. On 7 February the Viet Cong 'carried out coordinated attacks on South Vietnam'.⁹¹ Johnson retaliated with *Operation Flaming Dart*, 'which targeted North Vietnamese facilities'. This 'did not deter Viet Cong'.⁹² On 10 February 'the Viet Cong detonated a bomb at a hotel in the coastal city of Qui Nhon being used as a billet for U.S enlisted men'. In the attack 23 'Americans were killed and more than 20 wounded'.⁹³ The 'second round' of *Flaming Dart* 'destroyed a significant portion of Chanh Hoa barracks and prompted American officials to push forward a new, sustained bombing campaign', *Operation Rolling Thunder*, which aimed 'to interdict supplies and personnel infiltrating into South Vietnam from the North'.⁹⁴

Australia supported America's response. On 8 February Hasluck re-stated the importance of the American determination to fight for freedom and independence in SEA and to end North Vietnamese aggression.⁹⁵ On 9 February Paltridge assured McNamara of Australia's support by referring to Hasluck's statement, repeated Australia's 'willingness to participate whenever ... requested', stated that 'Joint Military Staff talks would be essential before' Australia 'committed forces' to Vietnam, and added that, after examining the results of the Joint Staff talks, the Australian government would consider the deployment of troops.⁹⁶ Australia once more stressed its determination to support the American position in Vietnam.

The Vietnam War entered a new phase when the first American combat troops arrived in March 1965. On 8 March 'two Marine Battalion Landing Teams, under the

⁹¹ NAA, 4172383, A1945, 248/4/104, Cablegram from the Australian Mission to the United Nations, New York, to the Department of External Affairs, 8 February 1965.

⁹² A. Wiest (ed), *Rolling Thunder in a Gentle Land: The Vietnam War Revisited*, 214.

⁹³ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 2, 212.

⁹⁴ A. A. Wiest (ed), *Rolling Thunder in a Gentle Land: The Vietnam War Revisited*, 214.

⁹⁵ Current Notes in International Affairs, Vol 36, No 2, 99-100, February 1965.

⁹⁶ NAA, 1565664, A1945, 248/4/100, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy Washington (from Paltridge) to the Prime Minister and Acting Minister, 9 February 1965.

command of Brigadier General Frederick J. Karch, landed at Danang'.⁹⁷ Hasluck supported this by stressing his anti-communist stance and holding the People's Republic of China responsible for the escalation in Vietnam.⁹⁸ He stated that Australia and the US were in 'constant communication' and Australia was confident about the US moves in Vietnam.⁹⁹

After March 1965, Australia four times decided 'to increase troop levels in Vietnam' (on 18 August 1965, 8 March 1966, 20 December 1966 and 17 October 1967). All were 'essentially a logical extension of the 1965 decision to send combat forces to Vietnam, and a measure of the importance placed on the American alliance'.¹⁰⁰

In April Johnson approved an 18-20,000 man increase in US 'military support forces to fill out existing units and supply needed logistic personnel', and 'the deployment of two additional Marine Battalions and one Marine Air Squadron and associated headquarters and support elements' to Vietnam.¹⁰¹ As in previous instances this increase would be followed by a US request for more Australian military support.

Before any new American request, on 6 April 1965, the Defence Committee suggested that one 'Australian infantry battalion could be made available' if the Americans requested.¹⁰² On 7 April Cabinet decided that Australia 'would be willing to

⁹⁷ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 2, 413. For details see: J. Shulimson & C. M. Johnson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Landing and the Buildup*, 1965, 6-15.

⁹⁸ Current Notes in International Affairs, Vol 36, No 5, 235-38, May 1965.

⁹⁹ CAPD, (Representatives), Vol 45, 447, 31 March 1965.

¹⁰⁰ NAA, 4681228, M4324, 15, Australia's Military Commitment to Vietnam (Paper tabled in the House of Representatives, 13 May 1975), 23.

¹⁰¹ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 2, 537-39, National Security Action Memorandum No. 328, 6 April 1965.

¹⁰² NAA, 3315545, A1945, 248/4/111, Further Military Assistance to South Vietnam Report by the Defence Committee, 6 April 1965.

assist the American build up of forces in South Vietnam by the provision of one battalion if and when requested' by the US.¹⁰³

This was welcomed in Washington. Keith Waller, the Australian Ambassador to Washington, conveyed Cabinet's decision to Rusk, who replied 'that the President would be deeply appreciative of the Australian Government's decision'. He added that 'the presence in South Vietnam of the Australian battalion would be worth many times its actual numbers in terms of "political psychology" ' within the US and South Vietnam.¹⁰⁴ For the US, third country military assistance was more significant politically than militarily. It showed that the US did not stand alone.¹⁰⁵

On 29 April Menzies announced his government's decision to commit an Australian battalion to South Vietnam. He noted the importance of Australia's responsibilities to SEATO and ANZUS, and said that if Australia did not help the US in Vietnam then the US might not help Australia in the event of a threat.¹⁰⁶ Canberra was determined to follow Washington in Vietnam to maintain the stability of ANZUS and to oppose the Communists.

The debates in Parliament on Cabinet's decision illustrated why Australia sent a battalion to Vietnam. The opposition Labor Party criticized the decision. Senator McKenna stated that the Australian battalion would not have a military value, but only

¹⁰³ NAA, 3315545, A1945, 248/4/111, Cablegram from the Department of External Affairs to the Australian Embassy, Washington, (from Minister for Waller), 9 April 1965. See also: NAA, 3315545, A1945, 248/4/111, Memorandum by Shane Paltridge, Minister of Defence, 20 April 1965.

¹⁰⁴ NAA, 3315545, A1945, 248/4/111, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Washington to the Department of External Affairs, 13 April 1965.

¹⁰⁵ United States Department of Defense, *The Pentagon Papers: the Defense Department History of United States Decision Making on Vietnam*, Vol 2, 249-50.

¹⁰⁶ NAA, 3340862, A1945, 248/4/114, Cablegram from the Department of External Affairs to All Posts, 29 April 1965. For the text of Menzies' statement see: CAPD, (Representatives), Vol 45, 1060-61, 29 April 1965.

a 'propaganda value'.¹⁰⁷ Paltridge defended the government by stressing Australia's responsibility under SEATO to protect South Vietnam.¹⁰⁸ Senator Lilico argued that only the US had the capability to provide sufficient defence against the Communist threat in SEA,¹⁰⁹ and that Australia was increasing its commitment in order to show its loyalty to the US.¹¹⁰ Other supporters said that Australia was in Vietnam because its allies and 'great friends' were there. They reiterated that only the US would come to help if Australia was under threat.¹¹¹ The Government supported the US in order to show its loyalty to SEATO.

Again the Australian announcement had a very positive effect in Washington. Johnson was 'impressed' by Canberra's decision. He said that the Australian Cabinet 'was the only one which had been one hundred per cent' with the US, and he reiterated the closeness between the US and Australia.¹¹²

On 7 May the Department of External Affairs conveyed Cabinet's aim to all Australian missions. The Australia decision was 'not made on the merits of the problem in South Vietnam but on the basis simply of supporting the Americans in order to strengthen' US 'attachment to Australia'. Australia welcomed and supported the 'commitment of American power in South Vietnam' because it was 'vital to the whole balance in South and South East Asia'.¹¹³ The situation maintained the stability of Australia's forward defence policy. If the US were in Vietnam, no threat would come from the

¹⁰⁷ CAPD, (Senate), Vol 28, 581, 5 May 1965.

¹⁰⁸ CAPD, (Senate), Vol 28, 589, 5 May 1965.

¹⁰⁹ CAPD, (Senate), Vol 28, 594, 5 May 1965.

¹¹⁰ CAPD, (Senate), Vol 28, 594, 5 May 1965.

¹¹¹ CAPD, (Representatives), Vol 46, 1268, 5 May 1965.

¹¹² NAA, 581907, A1838, 3014/10/15/3 PART 1, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Washington to the Department of External Affairs, 5 May 1965. See also McNamara's positive comments on the Australian battalion: NAA, 582714, A1838, 250/9/11 PART 1, Cablegram from Australian Embassy to the Department of External Relations, 9 June 1965.

¹¹³ NAA, 581907, A1838, 3014/10/15/3 PART 1, Savingram AP 34 from the Department of External Affairs to All Posts, 7 May 1965.

north. The Australian battalion that arrived in Vietnam at the beginning of June 1965 was brigaded with 'the 173rd US Air Force Brigade of Airborne'.¹¹⁴

The US continued to increase its forces. For this escalation McNamara's visit to Saigon (16-20 July) was a turning point.¹¹⁵ On his return McNamara recommended that 'US ground troops in Vietnam' be increased by 'October to 34 manoeuvre battalions ...-together with increases in helicopter lift, air squadrons, [etc.]- [that] would bring the total US personnel in Vietnam to approximately 175,000'. He added that 'the deployment of more men (an additional perhaps 100,000) may be necessary in early 1966'. He also stated the importance of the extension of third country forces.¹¹⁶ 'By June 1965, with no more than five thousand third-country forces in Vietnam, it was clear that even the considerable increase scheduled for the next months could not come close to providing the need[ed] reinforcement' of US forces.¹¹⁷ On 26 July Johnson asked Menzies for an 'increase in the numbers of Australian combat troops'.¹¹⁸

Menzies asked the Department of External Affairs and the Defence Committee to consider this. External Affairs argued that 'in the immediate future' Australia could 'only look for marginal extra contributions'.¹¹⁹ The Defence Committee estimated that an increase in Australia's commitment to Vietnam was possible.¹²⁰ Given this, the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee decided on 17 August 'that the Australian

¹¹⁴ NAA, 1728864, A1838, TS696/8/6 PART 2, Air and Sea Lift of Australian Troops Completed (Statement by Shane Paltridge, Minister for Defence), 10 June 1965; NAA, 1728864, A1838, TS696/8/6 PART 2, Command Arrangements in Vietnam by the Defence Liaison Branch, 10 June 1965.

¹¹⁵ For details of McNamara's visit see: FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 3, 153-70.

¹¹⁶ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 3, 171-79, Memorandum from Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson, 20 July 1965.

¹¹⁷ G. McT.Kahin, *Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam*, 336.

¹¹⁸ NAA, 4681228, M4324, 15, Australia's Military Commitment to Vietnam (Paper tabled in the House of Representatives, 13 May 1975), 23-24.

¹¹⁹ NAA, 4681228, M4324, 15, Australia's Military Commitment to Vietnam (Paper tabled in the House of Representatives, 13 May 1975), 24.

¹²⁰ NAA, 1497654, A5827, VOLUME 30/AGENDUM 970, Australian Military Assistance to South Vietnam, Report by Defence Committee, July 1965.

Infantry Battalion in South Vietnam be built up to a Battalion Group by the addition of ancillary and supporting units totalling some 350 personnel'.¹²¹

The Defence Committee's report suggested a possible 'further objective' by February/March 1966 - 'an additional infantry battalion'. 'To have the capability to achieve this objective the rate of intake of National Servicemen would have to be maintained during 1966 at 8,400 per annum'.¹²² On 27 August the US JCS put forward *Concept for Vietnam*, under which the US basic strategy would be 'to intensify military pressure on the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam] by air and naval power ...in concert with RVN [Republic of Vietnam] and third country forces; and to maintain adequate forces in the Western Pacific and elsewhere in readiness to deter and to deal with ChiCom aggression'.¹²³ In other words, Australia began to think of increasing its commitment before the US asked for it.

At the beginning of 1966 the war escalated when more North Vietnamese troops began infiltrating into the South. This had 'quadrupled to an estimate [of] 4500 per month in January 1966, compared with an infiltration rate of 1000 per month early in 1965'.¹²⁴ The US looked to its allies. The US Ambassador at Large, Averell W. Harriman, visited Canberra in early January 1966.¹²⁵ Harriman noted the acceptance of the US position by many countries, and that Johnson 'very much welcomed the military and moral support which the Australian Government' gave the US. He 'hoped

¹²¹ NAA, 1497654, A5827, VOLUME 30/AGENDUM 970, Cabinet Minute, Decision No 1153(FAD), 17 August 1965.

¹²² NAA, 1497654, A5827, VOLUME 30/AGENDUM 970, Australian Military Assistance to South Vietnam, Report by Defence Committee, July 1965.

¹²³ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 3, 357, Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara, 27 August 1965.

¹²⁴ I. McNeill, *To Long Tan the Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1950-1966*, 185.

¹²⁵ NAA, 3340853, A1945, 248/4/138, Telegram from the US Embassy, Canberra to Robert Menzies, 5 January 1966; NAA, 3340853, A1945, 248/4/138, Telegram from P. J. Lawler (Acting Secretary at the Prime Minister's Department) to Edwin A. Cronk (Charge d'Affaires at the US Embassy, Canberra).

that Australia would do what it could to obtain the support of other members of the Commonwealth for the policies' which the US was 'pursuing in Vietnam'.¹²⁶

After a record 16 year term, Menzies resigned and on 26 January 1966 Harold Holt was sworn in.¹²⁷ Holt's government maintained the closeness between the US and Australia. In his first communication with the US president on 1 February 1966, he reiterated Australia's 'strong support' for the US 'resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam'.¹²⁸ In mid-February the US Vice President, Hubert H. Humphrey, visited Canberra and told Cabinet of the importance of the Allied effort: Vietnam was 'a common struggle'. After conveying his appreciation of the Australian troops in Vietnam he 'urged that Australia should do what it could to encourage assistance in Vietnam from the NATO countries'. Holt replied that 'Australia was an ally' of the US 'and was anxious to shape its efforts in such a way as to make the most effective total contribution'.¹²⁹ On 19 February Holt went further: 'we hope to announce soon what Australia can do to supplement our forces in Vietnam'.¹³⁰

The easing of *Konfrontasi* now allowed Australia to expand its military commitment in Vietnam. On 2 March, Cabinet decided to send 'a self-contained task force which ... would be under Australian command'.¹³¹ On 8 March Holt told Parliament of the Government's decision that 'the battalion will be replaced by a self-contained

¹²⁶ NAA, 3340853, A1945, 248/4/138, Record of Discussions between the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee and Governor Averell Harriman, 10 January 1966.

¹²⁷ After a record 16-year term, Sir Robert Menzies resigned and on 26 January 1966 Harold Holt was sworn in. See: <http://primeministers.naa.gov.au/> accessed on 15.07.2009

¹²⁸ NAA, 3340853, A1945, 248/4/138, Cablegram from the Prime Minister's Department to the Australian Embassy, Washington, (for Waller from Bunting), 1 February 1966.

¹²⁹ NAA, 3340875, A1945, 248/4/145, Memorandum on Prime Minister's Luncheon Speech for Vice – President Humphrey- (from the Secretary, Prime Minister's Department to Griffiths), 15 February 1966, NAA, 3340875, A1945, 248/4/145, Visit by Hubert Humphrey to Canberra, February 1966, Summary Record of Discussions in the Cabinet Room at Parliament House, Canberra, 19 February 1966.

¹³⁰ NAA, 4681228, M4324, 15, Australia's Military Commitment to Vietnam (Paper tabled in the House of Representatives, 13 May 1975), 28. See also: NAA, 3340875, A1945, 248/4/145, Cablegram from the Department of External Affairs to the Australian Embassy, Saigon & Washington, 22 February 1966.

¹³¹ NAA, 3340875, A1945, 248/4/145, Cabinet Minute, Decision No 60, 2 March 1966.

Australian task force under Australian command embracing all personnel serving there and enlarging' Australia's 'contribution to a total of some 4,500 men - in effect, a trebling' Australian forces in Vietnam.¹³²

On 31 March Holt's speech in Parliament on Vietnam elaborated why Cabinet significantly increased its commitment:

Australian has a vital interest in the effective presence and active participation of the United States as a great power in the area of Asia and the Pacific. We have an obligation to support the United States in this role - an obligation arising from our treaty relationships, from our role as an ally in supporting the United States in international diplomacy and politics, and from the fact that our interational [sic] interests are directly involved in preserving South East Asia from aggression and from Communist domination.¹³³

In July Holt visited Washington, at Johnson's invitation and declared that Australia was 'All the way with [the US President Lyndon Baines Johnson] LBJ'.¹³⁴ In August Rusk visited Canberra for the 11th SEATO Council meeting and the annual ANZUS Council meeting, and expressed his great respect for the Australian troops in Vietnam.¹³⁵ On 20 October Johnson visited Canberra as part of his trip to Asia. He did not ask for an increase in Australia's military or financial commitment in Vietnam, but for support in the coming Manila Summit Conference of countries in the Vietnam War, on 24 October. Holt welcomed this trust.¹³⁶ As Johnson foresaw, in the Manila 'Declaration of Goals of Freedom, the Joint Communiqué, and the Declaration of Peace and Progress in Asia and the Pacific', the countries in the Vietnam War (the

¹³² NAA, 3340875, A1945, 248/4/145, Statement by the Prime Minister (Harold Holt) in the House of Representatives, 8 March 1966.

¹³³ NAA, 3340868, A1945, 248/4/148, Savingram from the Department of External Affairs to All Posts, 1 April 1966.

¹³⁴ For various press comments on Holt's visit to Washington and his statements see: NAA, 429688, A1728, 14, Personal Papers of Prime Minister Holt: Volume 14 of press cuttings.

¹³⁵ US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol LV, 169-73, 1 August 1966.

¹³⁶ US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol LV, 707-11, 7 November 1966; NAA, 555442, A1838, 250/9/9/13, Meeting of Cabinet with Johnson, Cabinet Room Parliament House, 21 October 1966.

US, Australia, New Zealand, Korea, the Philippines, South Vietnam and Thailand) reiterated their unity in the defence of South Vietnam. Holt repeated his support for the American presence in Vietnam and emphasized the determination of Australia 'to continue its contribution on both [the] military and non-military sides' to Vietnam.¹³⁷

Immediately after his success in the November 1966 election, Hold stated that he wanted a 'very early Cabinet consideration [on] sending an extra battalion to Vietnam'. The Ambassador to Washington reported that such 'an additional military contribution ... would be greatly appreciated' by the US. Australian Service and Departmental advisers reported on this on 13 December, recommending an increase of approximately 900 troops in order to 'overcome known deficiencies in the existing forces'.¹³⁸ On 20 December 1966 Holt announced the general terms of Australia's new contribution,¹³⁹ that Cabinet had 'decided to increase the total number [of troops] ... by more than one-third to a total of 6,300'.¹⁴⁰

1967 was not very different from 1966 in terms of Australian support for the US. 'By 1967 Johnson had been escalating the war steadily for eighteen months, with dismal results'.¹⁴¹ The subsequent debate in Washington 'divided the Johnson administration' on continuing or ending the bombing in Vietnam. The former group was still ascendant,¹⁴² so the US continued to justify 'an expanded role for United

¹³⁷ NAA, 1160431, A1209, 1966/7728, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Manila to the Department of External Affairs, 24 October 1966. For details of the Manila Conference sessions, statements and the text of the joint communiqué see: NAA, 1160431, A1209, 1966/7728, Vietnam - Manila conference - Brief and background papers.

¹³⁸ NAA, 4681228, M4324, 15, Australia's Military Commitment to Vietnam (Paper tabled in the House of Representatives, 13 May 1975), 29-30.

¹³⁹ NAA, 3343077, A1945, 248/4/177, Telegram from the Department of External Affairs to the Australian High Commission, Kuala Lumpur, 20 December 1966.

¹⁴⁰ NAA, 4681228, M4324, 15, Australia's Military Commitment to Vietnam (Paper tabled in the House of Representatives, 13 May 1975), 30.

¹⁴¹ S. Karnow, *Vietnam A History*, 517.

¹⁴² S. Karnow, *Vietnam A History*, 516.

States Ground Forces'.¹⁴³ The Australian Cabinet continued its political and military support. In February, Hasluck proposed an increase in civilian aid to Vietnam of \$ 2 million for 1967.¹⁴⁴ Holt stayed "all the way with LBJ".

Johnson's determination to increase the American commitment in Vietnam inevitably led American officials to look for an expansion in third country support.¹⁴⁵ During the first half of 1967, the US made no 'formal request to Australia for an additional commitment in Vietnam', but US 'military sources in Saigon and Washington made American wishes quite clear to Australian officials'. On 18 April, McNamara told Hasluck that 'he had no doubt that' the US 'could no longer lose the war', and added that Australia could carry out its task in Vietnam 'more quickly' with three battalions.¹⁴⁶ In a news conference on 12 July McNamara again stated the importance of additional third country support.¹⁴⁷ On 13 July US officials discussed force augmentation in Vietnam. General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the JCS, reported that 'the Australians might be able to provide one additional battalion', and that 'he had military reports that the Australians are ready and willing and that the Australian government would be receptive to a request for additional troops'. McNamara said that 'more Australians and Koreans would be a valuable asset to the total effort'.¹⁴⁸ Once again one of America's first references for third country support was Australia.

¹⁴³ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 5, 1, Paper Prepared by the President's Special Consultant (Taylor), 1 January 1967.

¹⁴⁴ Current Notes in International Affairs, Vol 38, No 2, 70, February 1967.

¹⁴⁵ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 5, 119-22, 54. Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, 10 February 1967.

¹⁴⁶ NAA, 4681228, M4324, 15, Australia's Military Commitment to Vietnam (Paper tabled in the House of Representatives, 13 May 1975), 31-32.

¹⁴⁷ US Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol LVII, 167-70, 7 August 1967.

¹⁴⁸ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 5, 612-13, Notes of Meeting [the President's Meeting with Secretary McNamara, General Wheeler, General Westmoreland and George Christian], 13 July 1967.

After this meeting, on 18 July, Johnson sent a message 'to Bangkok, Canberra, Manila, Saigon, Seoul, and Wellington'. It noted:

The Vietnamese themselves fully recognize that they must do more, and General Westmoreland feels substantial additional need for external help. Accordingly, Messrs. Clifford and Taylor will be in a position to review these questions with you on a totally private basis as fully as possible, and to indicate the actions that we ourselves have in mind.¹⁴⁹

A small group of American officials then visited Asia to seek further third country support. From 22 July to 5 August, General Maxwell D. Taylor, Special Consultant to the President, Clark M. Clifford, the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board members, visited allied nations contributing troops to the war effort in Indochina and South Vietnam. William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, noted that although 'the official purpose of the trip was to consult the other member nations of the Manila Pact, ... a more vital yet privately-held aspect was to secure additional force contributions from these governments'.¹⁵⁰

The Clifford-Taylor talks held in late July were 'broad-ranging rather than narrowly focused on the question of troop levels'. They 'provided a forum for a mutual exchange of views; they led to no immediate decision' by Australia. In terms of troops Clifford reported Johnson's words that if the countries 'closer to the danger and more closely affected' than the US made 'an additional effort in the reasonably near future', it would 'benefit their position greatly by enabling' the US 'to make an immeasurably greater contribution'.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁹ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 5, 633.

¹⁵⁰ FRUS, 1964-68, Vol 5, 632.

¹⁵¹ NAA, 4681228, M4324, 15, Australia's Military Commitment to Vietnam (Paper tabled in the House of Representatives, 13 May 1975), 32-33; NAA, 1728515, A1838, TS696/1/1/2, Clifford-Taylor Mission Notes of Meeting at Prime Minister's Lodge, Canberra, 30 July 1967.

By 18 August 1967 Australian officials agreed that 'commitment of a third battalion would pose many difficulties; instead they favoured making available additions to the Task Force'.¹⁵² But on 6 September Cabinet decided in principle to increase its contribution with an extra battalion in Vietnam.¹⁵³ To explain Cabinet's decision being only in principle, Holt told Edward Clark, the US Ambassador, 'that he should let President know that "we were not going to sleep", but that there were some important difficulties and complexities in the situation for the Government'.¹⁵⁴

Washington was not pleased. During Treasurer William McMahon's visit to the US on 2 and 3 October, he faced quite a sharp reaction from McNamara when he conveyed Australia's decision to limit its defence commitment because of rising costs. McNamara claimed that Australia 'could do more' in Vietnam.¹⁵⁵ This was effective. On 17 October Holt announced an increase in Australian forces, including 'an additional battalion, a tank squadron and some other elements'.¹⁵⁶ This was the fourth and the last increase in Australia's military commitment to Vietnam.

In December 1967, Holt drowned while swimming off the Victorian coast.¹⁵⁷ On 8 January 1968, John Grey Gorton became Prime Minister and 'simply inherited' Holt's policy in Vietnam.¹⁵⁸ 1968 was also the year of the Tet Offensive,¹⁵⁹ which fuelled

¹⁵² NAA, 4681228, M4324, 15, Australia's Military Commitment to Vietnam (Paper tabled in the House of Representatives, 13 May 1975), 33.

¹⁵³ NAA, 1890010, A5840, 563/FAD, Cabinet Minute, Decision No 563(FAD), 6 September 1967.

¹⁵⁴ NAA, 4681228, M4324, 15, Australia's Military Commitment to Vietnam (Paper tabled in the House of Representatives, 13 May 1975), 33.

¹⁵⁵ NAA, 1728515, A1838, TS696/1/1/2, Cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Washington, to the Department of External Affairs (from McMahon to the Prime Minister), 4 October 1967.

¹⁵⁶ NAA, 1728515, A1838, TS696/1/1/2, Message from Harold Holt to Harold Wilson, 16 October 1967; Current Notes in International Affairs, Vol 38, No 10, 411-14, October 1967.

¹⁵⁷ <http://primeministers.naa.gov.au/meetpm.asp?pmld=17> accessed on 16.07.2009

¹⁵⁸ R. B. Frankum, "Silent Partners: Australia and the United States in Vietnam, 1954-1968." Syracuse University PhD, 1997, 302.

¹⁵⁹ The Tet Offensive was a Viet Cong campaign. Its purpose of the offensive was to strike military and civilian command and control centres throughout South Vietnam and to spark a general uprising among

intense anti-war feeling in the US and Australia.¹⁶⁰ In March, Gorton decided to 'place a ceiling on the commitment of combat forces'.¹⁶¹ The political effect of the offensive was so big that it even halted Australian determination to support its ally. The offensive was also a major blow to Washington, especially in terms of American determination to stay in Vietnam. As US resolve weakened, 1969 became the beginning of the end for Australia's commitment in Vietnam. The change in American strategic thinking was expressed by the new US President, Richard Milhouse Nixon, in his Guam Doctrine speech on 25 July 1969. Nixon implied that the US expected its allies to take care of their own defence, and stated that 'we must avoid that kind of policy that will make countries in Asia so dependent upon us that we are dragged into conflicts such as the one that we have in Vietnam'.¹⁶² He added:

I want to be sure that our policies in the future, all over the world, in Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the rest, reduce American involvement. One of assistance, yes, assistance in helping them solve their own problems, but not going in and just doing the job ourselves.¹⁶³

The Guam Doctrine was a shock to 'Australia's security system, highlighting to Australia that although both countries [had] many common interests, they were all not identical'.¹⁶⁴ Nixon's words added to the pressure on Canberra to withdraw from

the population that would then topple the Saigon government, thus ending the war in a single blow. The operations were named as the Tet Offensive because they began during the early morning hours of 30 January 1968, Tết Nguyên Đán, the first day of the year on a traditional lunar calendar and the most important Vietnamese holiday. The offensive was countrywide and well coordinated, with more than 80,000 communist troops striking more than 100 towns and cities, including 36 of 44 provincial capitals, five of the six autonomous cities, 72 of 245 district towns, and the national capital. For details see: J. J. Wirtz, *The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War*; J. R. Arnold, *The Tet Offensive 1968*; M. J. Gilbert & W. Head, (eds), *The Tet Offensive*; D. Oberdorfer, *Tet!: The Turning Point in the Vietnam War*.

¹⁶⁰ For public reaction in Australia see: P. King, *Australia's Vietnam*, 106-28.

¹⁶¹ P. King, *Australia's Vietnam*, 53.

¹⁶² J. Kimball, "The Nixon Doctrine: A Saga of Misunderstanding", 62.

¹⁶³ J. Kimball, "The Nixon Doctrine: A Saga of Misunderstanding", 64.

¹⁶⁴ K. F. Amponin, Achievability of self-reliance within an alliance framework defence policy, at http://www.defence.gov.au/adcdocs/Publications/Geddes%20Papers%202003/02%20Achievability%20of%20Self%20Reliance_Major%20Amponin.pdf accessed on 16.07.2009

Vietnam. On 9 December 1969 Cabinet decided on the withdrawal of Australian forces from Vietnam.¹⁶⁵

On 20 April 1970 Nixon ordered a 'withdrawal of 150,000 American troops by April 1971'.¹⁶⁶ At the same time public protests continued. Australia's anti-war spirit was illustrated in the first Moratorium march in Melbourne in May 1970, perhaps the largest political protest ever witnessed in Australia,¹⁶⁷ but 1971 too was a year of protest, and probably accelerated Australia's withdrawal. From 1969 to 1972 Australian forces were scaled down.¹⁶⁸

This did not harm Australian-US closeness. In December 1972 the Australian Labor Party came to power under E. Gough Whitlam's leadership. Whitlam had a more nationalist outlook, less pro-American than pro-Australian,¹⁶⁹ but he did not 'bring an abrupt change in Australian foreign policy'. He used the term "continuity within change", but he interpreted Australia's national interests 'differently' and put forward the means by which 'they could be achieved[,] could be conceived differently'. A major element of his foreign policy was 'a greater degree of independence from "great and powerful friends" '. In December 1972 before the US had extricated itself from Vietnam,¹⁷⁰ the last Australian combat troops left Vietnam and 'Australia's decade long military involvement in Vietnam was over'.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁵ NAA, 3325296, A5869, 38, Cabinet Minute, Decision No 30, 9 December 1969.

¹⁶⁶ N. Harper, *A Great and Powerful Friend a Study of Australian American Relations between 1900 and 1975*, 333.

¹⁶⁷ P. Ham, *Vietnam: The Australian War*, 517.

¹⁶⁸ P. Edwards, *A Nation at War: Australian Politics, Society and Diplomacy during the Vietnam War 1965-1975*, 237-320.

¹⁶⁹ For details see: G. Whitlam, *the Whitlam Government 1972-1975*, 25-181.

¹⁷⁰ N. Harper, *A Great and Powerful Friend a Study of Australian American Relations between 1900 and 1975*, 335.

¹⁷¹ Sun 19 December 1972 in P. Edwards, *A Nation at War: Australian Politics, Society and Diplomacy during the Vietnam War 1965-1975*, 320.

Whitlam's foreign policy, especially its 'rhetoric ... soured relations between Canberra and Washington'¹⁷² but did not fundamentally harm them. Whitlam accepted the value of Australia's defence relationship with the US.¹⁷³ In May 1973 he told Parliament that the 'maintenance' of the 'alliance with the US under ANZUS remains most important' for Australia's security.¹⁷⁴ His visit to the US in October 1974 'took place in a ... cordial atmosphere' and 'Australian commentators believed that Washington had developed a new respect for a loyal, but independently minded, ally'.¹⁷⁵ In April 1975 the fall of Saigon marked the end of the war¹⁷⁶, but the thirty year old partnership remained 'intact'.¹⁷⁷

Australia committed to Vietnam because the US was there. From 1949 Australia steadily strengthened its alliance with the US. This was institutionalized with ANZUS and SEATO, but the Vietnam War was a crucial opportunity for Australia to show that it was a staunch ally of the US. Being in Vietnam also suited Australia's forward defence policy. When the US decided to enter Vietnam, Australia entered; when it decided to leave, Australia left.

¹⁷² P. Edwards, *A Nation at War: Australian Politics, Society and Diplomacy during the Vietnam War 1965-1975*, 328.

¹⁷³ P. Edwards, *A Nation at War: Australian Politics, Society and Diplomacy during the Vietnam War 1965-1975*, 321.

¹⁷⁴ CAPD, (Representatives), Vol 84, 2648, 24 May 1973.

¹⁷⁵ P. Edwards, *A Nation at War: Australian Politics, Society and Diplomacy during the Vietnam War 1965-1975*, 328.

¹⁷⁶ P. Edwards, *A Nation at War: Australian Politics, Society and Diplomacy during the Vietnam War 1965-1975*, 341.

¹⁷⁷ R. B. Frankum, "Silent Partners: Australia and the United States in Vietnam, 1954-1968." Syracuse University PhD, 1997, 315.

Conclusion: The Wavy Cross

This study aimed to draw out the tensions and the clashes in world-view in the alliance between a superpower operating in multiple theatres and two regional powers with more localized concerns. It presented parallel analyses of Turkish-American and Australian-American interactions in a series of case studies from the formation of the UN through the Korean War to the respective issues of Cyprus and the Vietnam War.

These interactions took diagonally opposite courses. From 1945 to 1975 Turkey shifted from seeking the closest possible US alliance to a more autonomous posture. Australia moved in the opposite direction. This contrast was conceptualized as a diagonal cross. The cross was wavy because each diagonal, one for Australia and one for Turkey, was not linear; each wobbled and dipped according to events, and in the contrasting Turkish and Australian stances towards the US.

At the end of WWII Ankara felt two major reasons to look for a US alliance. One was the possibility of Turkey's alienation from post-war Western alliances. The other was the Soviet demands on the Turkish straits and Turkey's eastern provinces. To deal with these two issues Ankara first used the UN, more specifically the San Francisco Conference, as a platform to approach the US. It argued that Turkey's founding principles were the same as the ideals of the US and offered itself as a US ally. Such an alliance offered Turkey two advantages: national security and economic aid.

Once the UN was formed, the privileged position of the great powers in the Security Council, one of them the USSR, weakened Turkey's prospects for using the UN to

maintain its security. Soviet pressure also put an extra burden on Turkey's defence budget, handicapping its economic development. Turkey therefore tried harder to affiliate itself with Washington.

As the Cold War intensified, Washington increasingly saw value in Turkey first as a friend, then as a Middle East pivot, and then as a NATO ally. Turkey's NATO membership was a result of the change in Washington's strategic thinking from 1949 to 1952. Firstly, the Soviet threat brought the US and Turkey into alignment, and was instrumental in securing US military and economic aid for Turkey. Moreover, a significant decrease in British influence in the region meant that Turkey became America's most suitable regional ally, and the key factor in strengthening NATO's south-western flank. Turkey reinforced this by its quick and astute decision to deploy troops to Korea in 1950. The Korean War led Washington to focus on regional defence in different parts of the world, one part inevitably being the Middle East. As a result, the importance of Turkey's geostrategic location further grew for the US. This increased the extent to which America was prepared to offer Turkey further military and economic aid.

Thus Turkey began its arm of the wavy cross as a US ally. From 1952 to 1964 Turkey became increasingly dependent on the US, and Turkish–American relations experienced their closest phase in the military, economic and political spheres. Turkey believed that this closeness would bring with it more economic aid. Even when, from the mid 1950s, Washington rejected most of Turkey's demands for more aid, the alliance was so strong that neither let this deter relations. In nearly every regional and international initiative and crisis, Turkey supported the US, even at the risk of a hostile Soviet response.

Turkish-American relations reached their climax in the 60s, but also their limit. They were eroded by their conflicting views on Turkey's importance to US defence interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Cuban Missile Crisis, the Jupiter missiles dispute and Cyprus cooled relations considerably. The Turkish arm of the wavy cross began to slope down.

Johnson's Cyprus letter of 5 June 1964 was the major turning point in Turkish-American relations. Particularly after its public release in 1966, the letter was a significant blow to Turkey's hopes for an ever-closer American alliance. This created serious tension in Turkish-American relations. Turkey understood that it was no longer as crucial as it had been for Washington. This forced Ankara to move from a one-dimensional foreign policy dependent on the US, to a multidimensional one. The wavy cross continued down, bottoming in 1974 with Turkey's Cyprus intervention and the subsequent American political and economic reaction.

In short the Turkish-American alliance after 1945 was double-layered. One layer was the maintenance of national security; the other was economic and military aid. From 1945 to 1975 these layers overlapped at different stages. For Turkey domestic policy needs shaped Turkish-American relations. The US was not the vital element; US aid was. In other words, foreign policy was the means and domestic policy was the end.

Unlike Turkey, Australia's relations with the US from 1945 to 1975 followed a fluctuating upward curve. After WWII, Australia sought to be more dominant in its region than Turkey could be in the Middle East. Australia's sturdy independence and its readiness to speak for small countries at the formation of the UN was a prime

example of this policy. Canberra was ready to defy the US regardless of Washington's potential significance in the south Pacific. Thus in 1945, Ankara and Canberra were at far extremes of the wavy cross.

Australia's quest for a more independent posture on the international stage continued after the UN was formed. This is seen in the Manus base and in the Japanese Peace Treaty issues. Although these were a source of tension between Australia and the US, they led Australia to see that it could only aspire to be a nation of influence, rather than a truly big player, in south Pacific affairs. To do more would require a formal US alliance and a US-backed regional organization, preferably allowing for more regional autonomy. This feeling became more pronounced in Australian policy circles after the election in 1949 of the Menzies government and its Minister for External Affairs, Percy Spender. Like H. V. Evatt before him, Spender valued Australia's independence, but regional unrest steadily pushed him under the US umbrella. Australia's arm of the wavy cross slowly but surely continued its upward slope.

At the end of 40s Washington had a clear understanding of its broad security interests, but only a vague idea of regional dynamics. Canberra, like Ankara, laboured hard to sharpen and influence this. The Korean War helped both countries to strengthen their ties with the US. Their deployment of troops to Korea was a significant point on the wavy cross. Their diagonals intersected at about this time, after which divergent regional factors pushed them in opposite directions.

The rise of Communism in SEA was one regional factor which strengthened US-Australian relations and led to an institutionalized alliance via ANZUS in April 1952.

Thereafter Australia's arm on the wavy cross continued to rise. As threat perceptions diminished in the Middle East, they increased in the Pacific, with parallel consequences in the allies' respective attitudes towards the US. Even difficulties in Australian-American relations, such as the Western New Guinea (WNG) issue and during Konfrontasi, barely slowed an increasing closeness between Washington and Canberra which culminated in Vietnam.

The Vietnam War was the high point of the wavy cross for Australia in the 1945-75 period. As the war intensified and the US increased its commitment, Australia strengthened its support. Australia decided to withdraw from Vietnam only after Nixon's Guam Doctrine was announced.

In short, Australia's relationship with the US in the early post-WWII period was based on more than national security considerations. Until the Menzies government in 1949, the Australian-American relationship had a double layered structure similar to that in Turkish-American relations at the same time. One layer was the maintenance of national security, as in Turkey's case, but this was not predominant. For Canberra the main objective was first to establish and then to maintain Australia's independence and, as much as possible, leadership in its neighbourhood. After ANZUS and particularly with the crises in SEA in 60s, national security perceptions asserted themselves as the principal element in Australian-American relations.

While the arms of the wavy cross moved in opposite directions for Australia and Turkey, both chose the US as their protector. Australia chose the US because of the significance of its political and military presence in the Pacific and SEA. With the American presence, Australia could assure regional stability and also its external

security. For Turkey on the other hand, regional stability seemed reasonably secure with its membership in NATO. The US-alliance was important from this point insofar as the economic and military aid associated with it enabled Ankara to carry out its own domestic policy. For Ankara, national security played a diminishing role in US relations; for Canberra, an increasing role.

Yet in both cases the crucial factor was thinking in Washington. Had there been no change in Washington's threat assessments, Turkey would not have received American aid via the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, nor become a member of NATO. Similarly, ANZUS was formed after changes in Washington's policies. The US did not enter the Vietnam War because of Canberra's urging, but because of its own anti-Communist anxieties. Whatever policies and tactics Canberra and Ankara followed from 1945 to 1975, they got only as close to the US as Washington wanted. They became American allies very largely on Washington's terms.

Washington's terms determined the extent to which Turkey's and Australia's foreign policies were 'truly independent'. From a global perspective, the Soviet threat to the Middle East increased between 1945 and 1975. Turkey however, assessing the situation through a regional lens, saw the US alliance neutralise Soviet threat in this period. The future of Cyprus thus became more compelling to Turkey's leaders. Until Johnson's letter the situation was not critical, but then Turkey felt that its regional interests were affected, and began to behave more independently.

From 1945 to 1949 the Australian Labor Government focussed on an independent foreign policy. A possible US alliance was not the key determining factor, nor were Australian decisions made in response to any specific or inherent criticism of US

policy in the region. Washington had its own views on what was happening in the Pacific, formed independently of Canberra, which it did not consider an equal. Both served to widen the distance between the two. But from 1950 national security concerns began to dominate Australian-American relations, and Washington became receptive to Canberra's push for a regional alliance. In turn Australia moved closer to the US and followed Washington's course almost unconditionally.

In short, the superpower's terms set the parameters of these alliances at any given time. When perceptions of threat dominated, the middle power's independent stance faded. The wavy cross, which still reflects Turkish and Australian relations with the US, highlights certain comparative patterns between two seemingly different countries, and illuminates the multifaceted relations between a great and a middle power. The cross is regional: it has little impact on great power policies. They pursue their own interests. The concerns of middle powers are at most diversions for them. Middle powers however feel a real tension between national security and an inclination towards a more independent regional stance, but where these collide, in the end concerns for national security prevail.

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