

TERROR

FROM TYRANNICIDE TO TERRORISM

FOREWORD BY GEOFFREY ROBERTSON
EDITED BY BRETT BOWDEN AND MICHAEL T DAVIS

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Cover: (Top) Painting by Ernest Crofts of England's King Charles I being led to his
execution. (Bottom) Terrorist bomb attack on London Bus, 2005.

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FOREWORD

If the first casualty of war is truth, the first casualty of the war on terror has been grammar. How is it possible to go to war on a common noun, or on a state of mind rather than a state? Terrorism – broadly defined as politically motivated killing of civilians – has forever been a tactic of cruel men wanting to achieve or maintain power. Among the first to protest was the playwright Euripides in 415BCE, who shamed his countrymen for their slaughter of boys and enslavement of women after the siege of Melos: the howling inhumanity he staged in *The Trojan Women* has echoed throughout subsequent centuries, in places like Guernica and Dresden, Srebrenica and Darfur, New York on 11 September and London on 7 July. And what is so new about suicide bombers? Guy Fawkes was caught ‘bang to rights’ in the basement of the Houses of Parliament, with matches and a taper leading to barrels of gunpowder, way back in 1605. Later that century, when the Restoration brought Hugh Peters (the founder of Harvard) and Sir Henry Vane (a former governor of Massachusetts) to trial at the Old Bailey, the prosecution described them, in effect, as international terrorists groomed by the fundamentalist Puritan preachers of New England to return and persuade Cromwell to execute Charles I – an event which spread terror through the crowned heads of Europe. In the 1790s, it was fear of the export from France of violent Jacobinism that led Pitt to gag the press and suspend *habeas corpus*. In short, we have been here before.

The first virtue of this account of terror throughout the ages is to make that very point. Terror has been a tactic variously of Fenians and Narodniks, American weathermen and Malaysian guerrillas, IRA and Basque separatists, well before the explosives of Islamic fundamentalists began to trouble the Western world. The motive has always been political or religious or a combination of both and the strategic objective has been to provoke the authorities into responses so repressive that they will rally supporters who would not otherwise have sympathised with their cause. An overriding lesson to be drawn from all this history of terrorist alarums and excursions is that society must not overreact: reducing human rights is not only a form of surrender but gives the perpetrators exactly what they want. Their 'propaganda by deed' theory – that ideology is better spread by inspiration from actions rather than from words – works because of the long-term consequence of panicked official repression, such as deploying torture or internment, or holding unfair trials. History shows that smart counter-terrorism policy eschews severe incursions on civil liberties, and treats atrocities not as acts of war but as the most serious of gang crimes, to be combated by better intelligence and more effective police work, and by building up international co-operation between law enforcement agencies.

Another virtue of this volume is that many of its chapters remind us that terror tactics are not confined to revolutionaries. Too often in history they have been the weapon of governments or dictators, harnessing state power to oppress and intimidate the people. The English regicides believed that executing the king was an act of justice, rather than 'cruel necessity' or general deterrence: one reason why their republican revolution did not descend into the incontinent blood-letting of Thermidor was that they maintained their respect for forms of restraint (Magna Carta, *habeas corpus*, public trial before independent judges) that they had fought to uphold against the king. But come the French Revolution, we have the example of how a makeshift legal machine (denunciation, followed by show trial in a 'revolutionary tribunal' and then a march to the gallows) can develop an unstoppable momentum. Injustice, indeed, becomes the prime instrument of state terror, operated by lawyers like Thermidor's Fouquier-Tinville and Stalin's Andrei Vyshinsky, who see themselves as merely doing their duty. Stalin's show trials convinced the

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willing dupes in the West through their use of fig-leaf legal formalities that hid the mental and physical tortures that produced the incredible confessions from the Bolsheviks. Meanwhile, trial by 'troika' in the provinces became a means of despatching millions of potential rather than actual fifth columnists. In such times, the very prospect of dissent or criticism instils fear in the paranoid minds of regime rulers and their obedient prosecutors: terror feeds off itself, in an increasingly vicious cycle.

The techniques of terror, whether perpetrated by the State or by revolutionary groups (terror from above or terror from below), are invariably cruel – unbearably so, whatever the justification. Pinochet's belief that the fear generated by his torture chambers was necessary to the national interest of Chile was as 'idealistic' as the IRA's certitude that its bombs were in the national interest of a united Ireland. Those who murder and torture for political or religious objectives are incapable of compassion or of rational persuasion: terrorists rarely apologise, and states which do deals with them to achieve short-term solutions in a hostage crisis or a hijacking will merely equip them to strike again. Whether they get away with their crimes is generally a matter of political expediency. Colonel Gaddafi, the worst man left in the world, who was until recently the chief sponsor of international terrorism, is now a valued friend to the West. He is a leopard who only changed his spots because of his own fear of al-Qa'ida (whose fundamentalists cannot abide the apostasy of government by his Green Book). Some of those he funded, like IRA killers in Northern Ireland, have been amnestied by 'peace processes' although the relatives of death squad victims are beginning to call for retribution. An emerging international criminal law questions whether amnesties can ever be valid for crimes against humanity – and terrorist outrages, when part of widespread and systematic attacks on civilians, fall within that category.

Cruel and amoral though they be, terrorists are nonetheless human and therefore predictable. As John Horgan explains in the final chapter, men of whom martyrs can be made have always had predisposing factors, notably experience of victimisation and identification with the cause of a victimised community. The real challenge for counter-terrorism is to come to imaginative grips with that victimhood and even to remove its cause – a challenge most notable today in the case of Palestine, where

Israeli Government conduct remains a provocation to Islamic communities everywhere, although they are in turn apt to ignore the provocation of Israel by the Palestinians. Despite the popular image in the West of the suicide bomber motivated by a desire to be fondled posthumously in paradise by a multitude of masseuses, there is increasing evidence that injustice, especially arising from the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq, is the factor that tips their rage over the brink to self-destruction.

The reason for our failure of empathy in relation to Islamic extremists may be that we regard them as other than human. I was in London on 7 July, where the multi-national denizens of this city, most of them unborn at the time of the Blitz, showed the same stoicism. They were unflappable, stiff upper-lipped amidst the carnage of broken buses and burned-out tube trains. Yet a few weeks later, on 7 July when the attacks failed, the city almost went to pieces: police were jumpy, there was panic at tube stations; nobody dared tackle escaping would-be bombers as they ran up the escalators and a police hit squad jumped an innocent man and pumped bullets into him – seven of them. The movie *War of the Worlds* was showing at the time, and it struck me that we were beginning to treat terrorist suspects in the way Tom Cruise treated the aliens – as sub-human, virtually indestructible (hence the seven bullets) and remorselessly advancing. 21 July was a bad day, notwithstanding the lack of casualties: there was a pervading sense of panic, as if the city realised for the first time that terrorism would now be endless. This book may help the realisation that it has simply never ended.

As with most good history updates, there are some surprises and some calls for re-evaluation. The Gestapo, for example, was not all that bad, as Nathan Stoltzfus discovers, at least if you were amongst the majority of law abiding Aryans. The Cheka, on the other hand, was not an understandable response to White Russian counter-Revolution, but a repressive agency planned by Dzerzhinskii before the civil war even started 'to conquer the enemy even if its sword does by chance sometimes fall on the heads of the innocent'. It is this insouciance towards the prospect of killing civilians and children, this merciless wish to break more eggs than necessary to make revolutionary omelettes, which characterises the terrorist through the ages. Lenin's order to exterminate the children of the Tsar (together with their valet, cook, parlour maid and doctor) paralleled

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Odysseus at Troy convincing the Greek commanders of the need to dash
out the brains of Hector's infant son.

Does cruelty matter if it is to advance a cause believed to be just?
Maybe Allende would have prevailed had he set up torture chambers
for his enemies first, but then he would have survived as no better than
Pinochet. The intentional killing or torture of civilians can never be
excused, whether it comes as a deliberate act of class malice (e.g. the Red
Brigades and the tedious Baader-Meinhofs) or because they represent
a 'guilty' race (of Israelis or Americans, or American allies) or simply
because they are people (including Muslims) sitting on a London bus,
happy to live and work in a country that does not observe Sharia law.

In war, the slaughter of civilians is a war crime, contrary to the Geneva
Conventions. In peace it is a crime against humanity that must be investi-
gated and punished in the ordinary way, rather than a state of emergency
warranting general loss of civilian liberties. Michael T Davis and Paul
Pickering, in their essays on the British Government's reactions to the
French Revolution and to the Chartists, remind us just how tempting
it is for politicians to scaremonger during a moral panic over terror-
ism and rush to pass 'gagging acts' suspending *habeas corpus*. Lawyers
in the employ of the State are apt, in such circumstances, to abandon
professional principle and to conduct staged trials in front of juries too
frightened to acquit.

The impact of 11 September and 7 July and the mass murders in
Bali discos and Madrid trains and Moscow theatres has conditioned our
minds to regard terrorism as an ever-present possibility. The government
reaction, in the US and UK and Australia in particular (the three nations
most anxious to crusade in Iraq), has been to cut back *habeas corpus* as a
protection for aliens and for terrorist suspects (they are held in Britain
for up to twenty-eight days – the government favours ninety). These and
other departures from human rights rules and norms are excused because
there is a 'state of emergency' but as a matter of law, this excuse only
applies to situations that 'threaten the life of the nation'. Fundamentalist
Islamic terrorism threatens to take lives, from time to time, in Western
nations, but not to impair state functions or cause more than temporary
inconvenience. Similarly, attempts to stop radical preachers by inventing
new hate speech crimes are doomed to failure. It is an offence in most

jurisdictions to provoke violence or incite others to commit murder or to bring about civilian deaths recklessly: not even the first amendment to the US Constitution protects those who shout 'Fire!' in crowded theatres. But criminal restrictions on speech create martyrs or drive incendiary mullahs underground: at one stage the UK proposed a law against 'glorifying terrorism' so wide-ranging it would have banned a sympathetic biography of Robespierre.

There is a sense in which terrorism, in Walter Laquer's words, is 'the weapon of the weak', but suicide bombing is usually a weapon used against the weak, those ordinary citizens blown to pieces whilst going to work in trains or buses or relaxing in crowded cafes or discotheques. What is owed to these victims is not a 'counter-terrorism' in which uniformed men in tanks and planes inflict the equivalent grief on people in the community from which the terrorists come or which they seek to empower: that simply locks the vicious cycle. Courage is required to counter the fear which terrorism spreads, a courage that comes from belief in the value of liberal democracy and which manifests itself in a willingness to address the real grievances that provoke the terrorists in the first place. It does the dead a disservice to call their killers 'evil' or 'cowards' or to otherwise dehumanise them by perceiving them as aliens. The point, surely, is that they are fellow human beings and that the barbarity of their actions morally diminishes humankind: our own reactions must demonstrate that no provocation can make us sink to their level.

Geoffrey Robertson QC
Doughty Street Chambers
December, 2007

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Geoffrey Robertson QC has been counsel in many landmark cases in constitutional, criminal and media law in the courts of Britain and the Commonwealth and makes frequent appearances in the Privy Council and the European Court of Human Rights. In 2002 he was appointed as an appeal judge for the UN war crimes court in Sierra Leone, serving as the court's first President. His most recent book is *The Tyrannicide Brief* (2006). He is also the author of *Crimes against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice*, *The Justice Game* and *Robertson and Nicol on Media Law*. He writes and broadcasts regularly on international legal issues and creates *Geoffrey Robertson's Hypotheticals* for television around the world. He is founder and head of Doughty Street Chambers and he is a Bencher of the Middle Temple, a Recorder (part-time judge) in London, an executive Member of Justice, and a trustee of the Capital Cases Trust. He is visiting Professor in Human Rights at Queen Mary College, University of London.

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(2001), and *Shades of Green: Environmental Activism around the Globe* (2006), and is co-author of *Courageous Resistance: The Power of Ordinary People* (2007). His work has been published in seven languages in scholarly publications and has appeared in *Die Zeit* and *Atlantic Monthly*. He has been a scholar in West Germany (Fulbright 1984–86) and East Germany (1988–89) and a H F Guggenheim Foundation Research Scholar for the study of political violence.

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CHAPTER 1

Terror(s) throughout the Ages

Brett Bowden

As Hannah Arendt has poignantly noted, the 'terror of tyrants, despots, and dictators is documented from ancient times on, the terror of revolutions and counter-revolutions, of majorities against minorities and of minorities against the majority of humanity, the terror of plebiscitary democracies and of modern one-party systems, the terror of revolutionary movements and the terror of small groups of conspirators'. She further emphasises that history has demonstrated time and again that, 'as a means of frightening people into submission', terror can and does 'appear in an extraordinary variety of forms' and is 'closely linked' with a wide variety of 'political and party systems'.¹ Nowhere is this observation more in evidence than in the history of Arendt's own birthplace, Europe, from which she was forced to flee to escape the horrors of Nazi terror. While it was the omnipotent and omnipresent terror of the Nazi state that posed a threat to Arendt and so many of her fellow Germans and their European neighbours, more recently Europe (and the world) has been reminded in the most shocking manner of the terror threat that non-state radical groups pose to the state and its people. For centuries Europe has been confronted by a wide array of incidents, epochs, regimes and waves of terror that have ebbed and flowed across the continent and its constituent islands. So while they are brutal and shocking, the bombings in Madrid, on 11 March 2004 and in London, on 7 July 2005 – and the motivations behind them – are just the latest moments

in a long and complex history of terror that has all too often cast a pall across Europe.

Of course, by the time of the Madrid and London terrorist attacks, much of the world already had its attention firmly focused on the threat posed by terrorism in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks on New York and Washington DC. In fact, we are regularly reminded that we live in an age of terror. Virtually anywhere we turn terror and terrorism is on the tip of the tongue: from politicians, policymakers and pundits to the usually politically disengaged and disinterested 'person on the street'. Turn on any news service or pick up any newspaper and we cannot help but be confronted by issues of terror and terrorism. This heightened alertness to the spectre of terror and terrorists applies just as much to the scholarly world as it does to world leaders and the general public. Thus, given that the attacks on the London Underground were almost coincident with the 400th anniversary of the Gunpowder Plot, historians and other interested observers were given cause to pause and reflect on these two landmark moments in not only British history, but European and world history. Questions were asked, speculations were offered: Was Guy Fawkes a terrorist? Do these events have anything in common? This volume endeavours to go a little bit further by drawing together a range of leading scholars who bring a wealth of knowledge and expertise on the diverse experiences of terror that have befallen Europe from the Gunpowder Plot of 1605 (see Chapter 3 by Kyle) through to the London terrorist attack of 2005 (see Chapter 15 by Alonso). Within these four centuries are examples of just about every species of terror described by Arendt. From the terror of the absolutist state to the terror of the radical fringe, from the terror of the Left to the terror of the Right, from separatists to religious radicals and almost every brand of terror in between. In the past 400 years Europe has witnessed the worst terrors of the state; what is sometimes referred to as 'terror from above'. Many European countries have also experienced the horrors of 'terror from below'; that is, acts of terrorism perpetrated by non-state actors or terrorist organisations.

Given the considerable span of time and space covered in this volume and the diverse range of purveyors of terror, there might seem to be little benefit to be gained by even trying to compare and contrast the different

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moments or experiences of terror. But common to them all, to a certain extent, is the experience of terror, and for that reason alone we think it is a worthwhile exercise to try and glean what lessons we can from the history of terror in order that we might better be able to understand the current moment of terror and perhaps even better prepare ourselves for possible terrors to come. It is also important to be able to take a breath, stand back, and try to put the present in some sort of perspective. As noted, we are regularly reminded that we live in an age of terror: we cannot help but be reminded of that when entering an airport, getting on a bus or being confronted by government advertising asking us to be on the lookout for anything 'suspicious'. Stay-at-home citizens and world-travellers alike are regularly reminded to be 'alert but not alarmed'. The underlying message is that nowhere and no-one is altogether out of harm's way: terror and terrorists can strike anywhere and at any time, they may even walk amongst us.

At the same time, much of the world is busy waging what will likely be an endless 'war on terror'. Given the terrorist threat and the concomitant war on terror, if we were to take a little too seriously all of the rhetoric about the current state of terror, we might literally find ourselves frozen with terror. But in a certain sense, one way or another we do find ourselves in the grip of terror. And when we are not being squeezed by the grip of terror then we are being wrapped up by the growing tentacles of counter-terrorism. This current wave of terror and counter-terror washing across the globe raises a number of important questions that have all too readily been brushed aside by world leaders. What do we mean by terror? How is it described, measured and experienced? Is the post-September 11 phenomenon something altogether new? Is the war on terror really a war like no other, as we are regularly reminded? Is the current terrorist threat unprecedented? While it has been suggested that terrorism as we know it today is uniquely 'a phenomenon of our time',² such thinking runs the risk of obscuring or narrowing the range of angles from which we might approach these pressing concerns. Rather, clues, pieces of the puzzle, and even the answers to some of these questions, and more, and the lessons therein, are to be found in history; a history during which waves of terror have ceaselessly ebbed and flowed.

What is Terrorism? Who are the Terrorists?

In the wake of the latest outbreak of terror much time, space and energy have been devoted to exploring the phenomenon – terrorism – and the agents or perpetrators – terrorists – from virtually every conceivable angle. The wave of fundamentalist terrorism has given rise to countless contemporary definitions of what terrorism is, who the terrorists are, what their specific objectives are, and how they are best combated. Some commentators have even introduced their accounts by going a little further back into the history of terrorism, relating stories of the First Jewish Revolt against Rome (66–69CE) and the role of the Zealots who carried concealed short daggers, *sicas*, to slit the throats of their Roman enemies. Others have noted that the term ‘assassin’ comes to us from the eleventh century when Hasan ibn-Sabah’s corps of drug-crazed killers known as *fidais* were dubbed ‘hashish-eaters’, or *hashshashin*, by those they terrorised. I think that adding to at length or extensively repeating this veritable shopping list is of minimal value, possibly even counter-productive. Rather, one of the objectives of this chapter and this book is to show that terror, terrorism and terrorists have come in many forms and guises down through the centuries.

Despite the current urgency and the array of definitions this has given rise to, as Paul Wilkinson noted (prior to the recent proliferation of terrorism experts and the broader rush to understand terrorism and terrorists), there is ‘no adequate and generally accepted scientific theory of political violence or of political terrorism’.³ This is perhaps not all that surprising given the difficulty of achieving any sort of consensus about what terrorism is and who the terrorists are. For instance, in September 2006 all 192 member states of the United Nations General Assembly agreed to adopt the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. But there was no agreement on precisely what constitutes terrorism or how best to define it; that task is left to the discretion of individual member states. Even then there is still argument and disagreement about the most appropriate definitions. The United States serves as a good example: each of the various departments or agencies concerned with combating terrorism, of which there are many, employs a definition that reflects its own priorities and parameters. The European Union on the other hand has defined terrorism and terrorists in its Council Framework Decision

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2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism. Interestingly, despite the extensive history of terrorism on European soil, it was the 11 September 2001 attacks in the US that prompted the EU to revisit the issue, noting that terrorism offences ‘must be committed with the aim of intimidating people and seriously altering or destroying the political, economic or social structures of a country (murder, bodily injuries, hostage taking, extortion, fabrication of weapons, committing attacks, threatening to commit any of the above, etc.)’. A terrorist group is defined as ‘a structured organisation consisting of more than two persons, established over a period of time and acting in concert’. But the problem of arriving at a definition that is widely accepted is highlighted by the Organization of Islamic Conference’s Kuala Lumpur Declaration on International Terrorism of April 2002 in which it reiterates the right of legitimate ‘resistance to foreign aggression and the struggle of peoples under colonial or alien domination and foreign occupation for national liberation and self-determination’. Having stated this, they ‘underline the urgency for an internationally agreed definition of terrorism, which differentiates such legitimate struggles from acts of terrorism’.⁴ On top of this definitional quandary, the tags ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ are also used rather indiscriminately and prejudicially to discredit a range of groups that various governments of the world find threatening or objectionable for one reason or another, many of which might come under the umbrella of ‘legitimate resistance’ as identified by the Organization of Islamic Conference.

Despite the problem of definitional specificity confronting governments, policymakers and international organisations, political terror is said to range from ‘genocide, massacre and political murder and torture at one end of the scale of violence to physical beatings, harassment and defamation campaigns at the other’ – all of which, and more, are covered in this volume. The latter should not be overlooked or underplayed because of their lesser visual impact or capacity to induce moral outrage among outside observers. Wilkinson suggests that political terrorism exists when there is ‘a sustained policy involving the waging of organised terror either on the part of the state, a movement or faction, or by a small group of individuals’.⁵ Hence, an isolated incident or act of political violence, or even a series of random acts does not necessarily

constitute political terrorism. An imperative here is motive; despite what might seem to be the general pointlessness of terrorism, it is almost always employed to some end or ends. 'Terrorism is intimidation with a purpose: the terror is meant to cause others to do things they would otherwise not do. Terrorism is coercive intimidation.'⁶ In essence, then, as Carl Wellman suggests, standing at the 'conceptual core' of terrorism is a 'pair of concepts – terror and coercion'; the former, terror, is the 'essential means', while the latter, coercion, the 'essential end'. While there are any number of external political aims and objectives to any given act of political terror, the 'internal objective and defining end of every act of terrorism is coercion'.⁷

Given the various typologies of terror catalogued herein and the fact that there is no stereotypical terrorist or purveyor of terror – think Jacobins, Hitler, Stalin, Franco, bin Laden, Abu Nidal, Ilich Ramírez Sánchez (Carlos the Jackal), Red Brigades, Baader-Meinhof Gang, IRA, ETA, Stern Gang, Timothy McVeigh, Aum Shinrikyo, Theodore Kaczynski (Unabomber), and so on – is it at all surprising that there is no theory of terror? Furthermore, despite the proliferation of studies dedicated to terrorism, or perhaps because of it, is it any wonder that 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' are notoriously difficult to define to any degree of general agreement or satisfaction, or that there is still a coherent theory to be developed which includes them? According to Samuel Huntington – best known for the 'clash of civilisations' thesis – 'Understanding requires theory; theory requires abstraction; and abstraction requires the simplification and ordering of reality'.⁸ While this book does rely on a somewhat abstract concept of terror across 400-plus years of history, when it comes to understanding matters such as terror and terrorism I am not sure that an all-encompassing grand theory is particularly helpful; it may even serve more to blinker than to enhance. This is not to suggest that there are no insights to be gained by drawing on a range of theories. Theories of revolution and resistance, theories of totalitarianism, among others, might well help us to better understand certain aspects of terror. But as Huntington pointedly notes, 'No theory can explain all the facts', hence we are 'forced to generalize about phenomena which never quite operate according to the laws of human reason'.⁹ As Walter Laqueur suggests, when it comes to matters of terrorism and terrorists, generalisations 'are

exceedingly difficult and understanding think Jeremy Waldron is not necessarily to stand it (so we can do about it)'.¹¹ And exercise that John collection.¹² As Wal of difficult question interesting and disti turn, its relationship

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exceedingly difficult'.¹⁰ Thus, in this instance I suspect that little insight
and understanding is to be gained by generalisations alone. Rather, I
think Jeremy Waldron is on the right track in suggesting that the point
is not necessarily to theorise or even 'define "terrorism" but to under-
stand it (so we can figure out, in a reasonably sophisticated way, what to
do about it)'.¹¹ And that, in part, is the very difficult but very important
exercise that John Horgan undertakes in the concluding chapter to this
collection.¹² As Waldron has done, the general aim here is to ask a series
of difficult questions in order 'to focus a discussion of what we think is
interesting and distinctive about this phenomenon' we call terror and, in
turn, its relationship to terrorism and terrorists.¹³

Totalitarianism–Terrorism

In a speech to the United States Congress nine days after the terrorist
attacks on New York and Washington DC, President George W Bush
declared that the terrorists responsible for those attacks were 'the heirs
of all murderous ideologies of the twentieth century ... they follow
in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism'. While various
world leaders and many others in positions of power and influence have
engaged in a lot of grandstanding and sloganeering in waging the war
on terror, there is actually something in this statement which should give
us cause to ponder: is there any measure of truth or reality to it? Is there
some link between the current wave of fundamentalist terrorism – in
New York, Washington DC, Madrid and London, but also in Bangla-
desh, Egypt, India, Indonesia (Bali and Jakarta), Iraq, Jordan, Pakistan and
elsewhere – and earlier twentieth-century epochs of terror, particularly
the totalitarian reigns of terror that crippled Nazi Germany and Stalinist
Russia and also Italy and Spain? (See the chapters in this volume by Geif-
man, Kallis, McDermott and Stoltzfus.) In fact, is there something that
links all of these epochs of terror with even earlier moments of terror
in our long and sometimes torturous history? Is there a more substantial
link between terrors past and terrors present than Bernard Crick's quip
that, 'in an age of bureaucrats, tyrannicide is plainly less useful than ter-
ror'.¹⁴ These questions in turn raise further fundamental and important
questions: is it possible or is it even desirable to compare and contrast
different moments of terror or periods of heightened terrorism? How

does one measure and compare the experience of terror, bearing in mind that it is largely a phenomenological and subjective experience? The last thing anyone wants to do in making these comparative observations is to diminish the terror or loss experienced by any individuals or groups by suggesting that X did not have things quite so bad as Y. That is certainly not the intention here. That said, there is something to be gained by the brief inquiry undertaken herein and by this book's broader excursion through the history of terror in Europe. If nothing else, we should come out the other side with a better understanding of our history and through it a better understanding of our present and a better idea of what the future holds in store.

One of the problems in trying to address these questions of comparison and the heritage or ideological lineage of modern extremist terrorism is the heated and volatile atmosphere in which these inquiries must necessarily take place. Political terror is not alone in having a purpose; counter-terror has its own (manifold, opportunist) political aims and objectives. As Alain Badiou notes, 'today . . . the word "terrorist" is an intrinsically propagandistic term. It has no neutral readability'. Thus, when it comes to matters of terrorism, and therefore counter-terrorism, 'to explain is to justify'.¹⁵ In effect, when it comes to discussions of fundamentalist or extremist Islamic terrorism, by and large terrorism is and can only be thought of as an absolute evil. No debate need be entered into for none is necessary. Terrorism is nihilistic indifference. Terrorism is evil writ large. Today, to talk of terrorism, or to label an individual or a group as terrorist, or to accuse a country of giving comfort to terrorists, is very much a case of 'persuasion-by-naming'.¹⁶ This has not always been the case. In a speech on 5 February 1794, the Jacobin leader, Maximilien Robespierre, is reputed to have uttered words to the effect that, 'terror is nothing other than justice, prompt, severe, inflexible; it is therefore an emanation of virtue'. In the Reign of Terror that followed the French Revolution the swift inflexible 'justice' of the guillotine claimed somewhere between 18,000 and 40,000 heads, Robespierre's among them. The Russian revolutionaries, and the Pole who actually killed Tsar Alexander II on the streets of St Petersburg in 1881, are thought to have claimed the title 'terrorists' with some pride. Further muddying the supposedly clear waters of the morality of terrorism are the terrorist-like

tactics employed in the territories.¹⁷ More recently, the Israeli or Fighters for the Cause, name the 'Stern Gang'. They were sometimes prepared to sacrifice the lives of our political leaders.

Groups such as the Red Army Faction, examples of the new terrorism, the heads of state and governments, the commander of the armed forces, the about from the streets, the colonial world, the world of the colonial powers, the world of the liberationists. The turn labelled as enemy, and so forth. This is saying that 'one person will be so, but the others have been imperialists. In colonialism, others who label themselves as imperialists (such as Guineans) for political conversion, unmake themselves, willing to become people like themselves as people.

Let us return to the epochs and reigns of terror, the challenges posed by the over-heated and the over-heated discussions of this path, albeit that that September 11 day equivalent of that are high on the

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tactics employed by the Resistance to Nazi Germany in occupied ter-
ritories.¹⁷ More recently, the Zionist organisation Lehi (Lohamei Herut
Israel or Fighters for the Freedom of Israel), better known by its earlier
name the 'Stern Gang', is one of the few groups or movements of recent
times prepared to lay claim to the tag 'terrorist', declaring: 'terror is part
of our political battle'.¹⁸

Groups such as the Stern Gang and the like-minded Irgun are good
examples of the notion that yesterday's terrorists can become tomorrow's
heads of state and government. Menachem Begin, for instance, went from
commander of the Irgun to Prime Minister of Israel. Similar examples
abound from the Roman Empire, to the Jacobins, to much of the post-
colonial world, where revolutionaries once labelled as terrorists by the
colonial powers later wrote themselves into history as freedom-fighters
and liberationists. Their vanquished overlords on the other hand were in
turn labelled as enemies of the people, state terrorists, tyrants, imperialists,
and so forth. This is an appropriate moment to briefly consider that old
saying that 'one person's terrorist is another's freedom-fighter'. This may
well be so, but the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive; freedom-
fighters have been known to employ terror tactics, as have tyrants and
imperialists. In certain respects, then, terrorists are generally made by
others who label them and their actions as terrorist; sometimes retrospec-
tively (such as Guy Fawkes and his fellow conspirators?), and sometimes
for political convenience. And, on the odd occasion, they may even get to
unmake themselves. No longer is it the case that anyone or any organisa-
tion willingly proclaims themselves as terrorists; the exceptions perhaps
being people like Carlos the Jackal or Abu Nidal, who might consider
themselves as professional terrorists for hire.

Let us return to the searching question of comparing different historical
epochs and reigns of terror with the current moment of terror. Despite the
challenges posed by the shifting boundaries of terrorism outlined above
and the over-heated nature of the rhetoric that accompanies contempo-
rary discussions of terror, I think it is worth venturing some way down
this path, albeit tentatively. Amidst reality-stretching claims to the effect
that September 11 (and the ongoing terror threat) represents a modern-
day equivalent of the Crusades – and other equally exaggerated assertions
that are high on emotion and short on perspective – it is worth recalling

Hannah Arendt's sobering observation that 'the two forms of terror that have been historically the most effective and politically the bloodiest' are 'the terror of tyranny and the terror of revolution'.¹⁹ This is an assessment which I think is well borne out by the studies of tyrannical and revolutionary terror explored in this book (see especially the chapters by Burgess, Davis, Geifman, Gough, Jensen, Kallis, McDermott, Pickering and Stoltzfus). But it is the terror of tyranny with which George W Bush associates the current wave of terror, so let us explore that thought a little further.

Arendt suggests that 'even the desert of tyranny, insofar as it is still some kind of space, appears like a guarantee of freedom' when compared to totalitarian regimes in which 'total terror destroys the space between' people in the body politic. Totalitarianism distinguishes itself from other tyrannical regimes and revolutionaries who employ terror as a weapon in that it 'no longer use[s] terror as a means of intimidation'. Rather, totalitarianism's 'essence is terror'. Totalitarian terror grips all, today's executioners are tomorrow's potential victims, and 'no one except for the leader in power at the moment is immune from terror'. Under totalitarian government the role of 'positive laws is taken by total terror'. But the terror pervading the body politic under totalitarian government ceases to be merely a 'means for the suppression of opposition'. Rather, terror becomes totalised once it is 'independent of all opposition, it rules supreme when nobody any longer stands in its way'. Just as 'lawfulness is the essence of non-tyrannical government and lawlessness is the essence of tyranny, then terror is the essence of totalitarian domination'. But just as lawfulness can only set 'limits to actions', 'not inspire them', so too 'terror in totalitarian government is not sufficient to inspire and guide human behavior'. For under the cloud of 'total terror not even fear can any longer serve as an advisor of how to behave, because terror chooses its victims without reference to individual actions or thoughts'.²⁰ As Arendt further explains:

If, for example, we apply to the phenomenon of totalitarian terror the category of means and ends, by which terror would be a means to retain power, to intimidate people, to make them afraid, and so in this way cause them to behave in certain ways and not in others, it becomes clear that totalitarian terror will be less effective than any other form of terror in achieving that end. Fear cannot possibly be a reliable guide if what I am constantly afraid of can happen to me regardless of anything I do.²¹

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that 'the two forms of terror that are the most effective and politically the bloodiest' are 'the terror of revolution'.¹⁹ This is an assessment based on studies of tyrannical and revolutionary systems, especially the chapters by Burgess, McDermost, Pickering and Stoltz-Weber in which George W Bush associates the concept of tyranny with the thought of a little further.

of tyranny, insofar as it is still some distance from freedom' when compared to totalitarianism, destroys the space between people in the system. It distinguishes itself from other tyrannical systems in that it employs terror as a weapon in that it is 'a means of intimidation'. Rather, totalitarianism grips all, today's executioners are not just the leader in power but the entire system. Under totalitarian government the terror pervades the system. But the terror pervading the system ceases to be merely a 'means to an end', rather, terror becomes totalised once the system rules supreme when nobody any longer is the essence of non-tyrannical rule. In the presence of tyranny, then terror is the essence of tyranny, just as lawfulness can only set 'limits' to 'terror in totalitarian government and human behavior'. For under the cloud of terror, no one can serve as an advisor of how to act without reference to individual interests, as explains:

phenomenon of totalitarian terror the category of terror would be a means to retain power, to maintain, and so in this way cause them to act. In other words, it becomes clear that totalitarianism is a form of terror in achieving that which it would if what I am constantly afraid of doing I do.²¹

The riposte that 'the means have become the ends' is not a sufficient explanation. Rather, the 'question of the meaning of terror in totalitarian systems' becomes one that must be 'answered outside the category of means and ends'. The aim of totalitarian or total terror is to reduce its victims to 'a completely indistinguishable and indefinable specimen of the species homo sapiens'. Totalitarianism and total terror transforms people 'into something that is even less than animal, namely, a bundle of reactions', which, like Pavlov's dog, 'will always react in the same way'. In Arendt's haunting assessment, 'Totalitarian terror, then, is no longer a means to an end; it is the very essence of such a government'.²² And as Dana R Villa summarises, the 'aim of totalitarianism is nothing less than the remaking of humanity and the world'.²³ By Arendt's influential account, then, totalitarian terror is distinguishable from contemporary fundamentalist terror which, as outlined above, relies on the pairing of terror, the essential means, with coercion, the essential end. But, with respect to the point made by Villa, in some small way the current wave of fundamentalist extremist terror and its stated aims and objectives might be seen to have something in common with totalitarian terror: the remaking of the world, or considerable parts of it according to some sort of grand plan. By some accounts, the aims of Osama bin Laden and al-Qa'ida follow roughly these lines: a wakeup call to all Muslims, such as in the September 11 and the terrorist attacks in Spain and the United Kingdom; jihad against the West; drive infidels out of the holy lands of Islam; topple puppet and apologist governments in the region; establish an Islamic Caliphate across North Africa, the Middle East, and much of Asia; all of which culminates in world conquest.

But the extremist terrorism that currently threatens the world works in a considerably different manner: acts of terrorism can have a range of different ends and target audiences. As we recall from above, terrorism seeks to coerce and intimidate people and governments into doing things they would not ordinarily do. For instance, the first-order aim of contemporary fundamentalist terrorist attacks is primarily to kill, maim, and draw attention and, in doing so, instil terror among the general population. The drawing attention aspect of any given terrorist act is equally as important as the body count, perhaps even more so; for as Wellman

importantly notes, each and 'every act of terrorism is by its very nature an act of communication'.²⁴ September 11 is a good case in point, while the number of lives lost was both significant and horrific, the graphic collapse of the iconic World Trade Center towers was a loud and clear act of communication from Osama bin Laden and al-Qa'ida to the Western world (and to Muslims everywhere). The second-order objective might be to intimidate the relevant government into adopting or changing a particular policy it would not otherwise choose to follow. This in turn might be aimed at some further or third-order ends, such as the speculative series of goals sought by al-Qa'ida as outlined above. Whatever the particular aim, the point should be clear enough. In thinking of contemporary terrorism, then, it is useful to distinguish between the two distinct targets of terrorism: the targets of the terrifying act and the targets of coercion. Ordinarily this will be two distinct people or groups of people, but it need not necessarily be so.²⁵

In his comparison of contemporary extremist terrorism with the type of terror described above, Waldron suggests that 'the intimidation practiced by terrorists is straight Jack Benny-style coercion'; that is, threats or acts of terror that come with a choice – do this or else there will be more of the same – as opposed to 'Arendtian terrorization'. But he does not altogether discount the notion that the 'terrorist strategy may be to coerce the government (Jack Benny-style) by terrorizing the population (Arendt-style)'.²⁶ As he explains it, 'Terrorism is not just simple coercion. It looks to the possibility of creating a certain psycho-social condition, ψ , in a population that is radically at odds with the range of psycho-social states $\{\phi_1, \phi_2, \dots, \phi_n\}$ that the government wants or needs or can tolerate in its subject population'. The condition ψ might approximate a state of terror such as the heightened 'morality salience induction' outlined below, or it might even approach an Arendtian-esque 'bestial desperate panic'.²⁷

While this argument seems straightforward enough, might it not be drawing a rather long bow to speculate that the current moment of terror even comes close to Arendtian-style terror or a 'reign of terror'? The *Oxford English Dictionary* defines this as 'a state of things in which the general community live in dread of death or outrage'. Just as most people had nothing to fear from Guy Fawkes and his followers, on any

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given day at this moment in time, when our leaders daily reaffirm their
 commitment to a war on terror, most people do not actually fear for their
 very lives or even feel the intense existential anguish described below.
 The current moment of terror is not characterised by the total terror that
 pervaded Nazi Germany, nor does it have much in common with the
 terror that swept Paris following the French Revolution. The chances of
 falling victim to terror have been much higher in other epochs or locales
 of terror: in Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia, post-revolutionary Paris, or
 for certain Northern Irish citizens or Spanish politicians (on Northern
 Ireland and Spain see especially the chapters herein by Patterson, Wein-
 berg and Alonso). And I think it would be going too far to suggest that
 anyone is really claiming or arguing otherwise. The point is not to rank
 or scale epochs and moments of terror along a continuum. Rather, the
 point is to draw on the range of experiences of terror known to us and
 to learn what valuable lessons we can from them.

Before we can begin to understand terrorism and terrorists, if it is
 indeed possible (see chapter by Horgan), I think we would benefit by
 also seeking to acquire a better understanding of terror; and this is my
 concern here. As noted, much attention has been directed towards terror-
 ism and terrorists, yet considerably less effort has been directed towards
 exploring the root from which these phenomena spring and are made
 possible: the very idea of terror itself. That is, the actual experience of
 terror and, in turn, how it relates to terrorism. One of the aims of this
 chapter, and this book more generally is to explore and, where possible,
 join some of the dots between the terrors of our times, from the terror
 of tyranny to the terror of contemporary fundamentalist terrorism. In
 doing so we hope to shed some light on how terror is conceived both as
 a tool and as something that is experienced. We further seek to explore
 how or if the experience of terror has shifted across time and space: is
 terror in the here and now experienced as it was in 1605 – when Guy
 Fawkes and his followers sought to blow up the British Parliament – or
 at points in between and beyond, or is it something altogether differ-
 ent? This chapter and the book help us better understand the current
 moment of terror through a more holistic understanding of the experi-
 ences of terror throughout the ages.

Terrorism—Terror

The emotion or psychological response we call terror – what the *Oxford English Dictionary* describes as the ‘state of being terrified or greatly frightened; intense fear, fright, or dread’ – has been with us as long as sentient beings have walked or shuffled the Earth. The articulated and expressed idea of terror, however, did not appear in recorded human history until the late fourteenth century (c.1375). The notion of terrorism and those ‘Hell-hounds called Terrorists’, as described by Edmund Burke, did not pop up on the radar of history until the Reign of Terror that followed the French Revolution, first appearing around 1795 (see the chapter by Gough).²⁸ The 400-year gap between the appearances of the two terms does not mean that in the interim there was no agent or agents doing the terrorising, that we were merely scared of our own shadows or by irrational myths and legends; although plenty of this did go on, for we have indeed been terrorised by shadows, the dark, lights in the sky, eclipses and the like. In the context of the exercise undertaken in this chapter (and the book more broadly) and in the spirit of the time, the two ideas or concepts – terror and terrorism – are closely linked: for there to be terror, some (human) agent, tyrants or terrorists, are more than likely doing the terrorising. The primary concern here, then, is the terrorised, the terrorisers, and the terror(s) that links them.

The point of departure and the foundation upon which these inquiries are based is an examination of terror’s linguistic origins, just what terror is, and how it is experienced. Contemporary terms such as *terror*, *terrible*, *terrorise*, *terrorism*, *deter* and *deterrent*, all derive from the Latin words *terrere*, meaning ‘to tremble or to cause to tremble’, and *detertere* meaning ‘to frighten from’. Generally speaking, terror is thought of as fitting ‘into the category of instinct-response which humans share with most animals’, whereby an overwhelming ‘fear of violence done to the body is at the basis of the terror process’.²⁹ First and foremost terror is a phenomenological or subjective experience; it ‘is in the heart and mind of the victim’ and manifests in the form of ‘intense existential anguish’.³⁰ Terror, then, is an emotion or psychological response, like love or anger, or envy or fear. But it is something more than just bottom-of-the-garden variety fear: I can be afraid of the dark, even very afraid, but that hardly constitutes terror. More acutely, terror is further described as a ‘uniquely

human response long been recorded from other animals. self-conscious awe and dread absolute marv tion. But cons the fragility an anxiety and, i stultifying ter the human ca

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human response' or reaction to the 'threat of annihilation'. For it has long been recognised that one of the things that sets human beings apart from other animals is the fact that we possess both consciousness and self-consciousness which can instil in us overwhelming senses of both awe and dread. Being alive and cognisant of that fact generates a sense of absolute marvel and wonder, and can be an incredibly humbling realisation. But consciousness and self-consciousness, and in turn knowledge of the fragility and fleeting nature of life, inevitably evoke feelings of dread, anxiety and, in the extreme, absolute earth-shattering, mind-numbing, stultifying terror. Terrorism – in all its guises – capitalises on or exploits the human capacity to experience terror.³¹

Under certain controlled and controllable circumstances most people actually enjoy experiencing stringently regulated doses of fear or horror; we enjoy having the proverbial pants scared off us by horror or slasher movies, and we queue for what seems an eternity to experience hair-raising and spine-tingling rides at amusement theme parks. But at all times we or someone we trust remains in control (or so we think and hope); and we always have the option of pausing the movie, turning the lights up, or getting off the ride and heading for the safety and assuredness of the Earth-bound park bench. This is not the case when it comes to the terror – the politically motivated terror and use or threats of violence – instilled in us by tyrants and terrorists. Someone or some other group is calling the shots and no matter what we might say or do, we are virtually impotent to influence their decision making and the seeming arbitrary and indiscriminate nature of their violence. As to whether terrorist acts are actually arbitrary and indiscriminate or intended to appear so is a significant point. Rather than simply choosing targets at random, terrorists might in fact seek to give that impression, with the perception of randomness instilling greater fear and nervousness amongst those affected. Terrorism can, however, be categorised as indiscriminate in the sense that terrorists do not discriminate between the 'guilty' and the 'innocent' in choosing their targets. What is also missing from our self-inflicted experiences of fear is the coercive element inherent in terrorism and the threat of more acts of terror to come.

Not surprisingly, perhaps even inevitably, the experience of terror and the threat of terrorism have given rise to 'terror management theory',

or TMT. According to TMT, terrorist attacks and the threat of further terrorism disrupt our means of dealing with the ever-present but generally well managed feelings of terror. In doing so, terrorism threatens to undermine the 'psychological equanimity' that is essential to our everyday functioning. As a group of experimental social psychologists describe it, September 11 and the subsequent attacks on the Madrid commuter trains and the London Underground 'constituted an extremely potent and enduring morality salience induction'.³² Or to put it another way, people were literally scared for their life, they were terrified by the threat of harm to themselves and others. This response fits with Raymond Aron's thinking that an act of political violence might be regarded as an act of terror or a terrorist action 'when its psychological effects are out of proportion to its purely physical result'.³³ To a certain extent, then, those specific acts of terrorism achieved their desired first-order effect in that acts of terrorism are intended to instil terror or widespread panic. For instance, three to five days after the September 11 attacks 44 per cent of adults across the United States reported one or more 'substantial symptoms of stress', with symptoms ranging from acute anxiety disorders and post-traumatic stress disorder to increased incidences of a range of other psychopathologies. Ninety per cent of adults surveyed had one or more symptoms to 'at least some degree', while 35 per cent of children had one or more symptoms of stress and 47 per cent were worried about their personal safety or that of loved ones. Other reactions to terrorist attacks and a corresponding elevated 'morality salience induction', or being terrified, are spikes in the levels of drug and alcohol abuse and compulsive gambling.³⁴ The attack on the Madrid commuter trains might have even been successful in achieving certain second-order objectives, with the people of Spain soon thereafter dumping the elected government for an alternative government that promised to withdraw its moral and material support for the war in Iraq.

In this respect contemporary terrorism relies on the observable fact that 'states of psychic terror among individuals and groups may be induced by an entirely irrational fear or dread or wild rumour'.³⁵ The 'War of the Worlds' radio broadcast in 1938 is a case in point. Without wanting to exaggerate this point, modern forms of terrorism in some ways count on there being a certain degree of irrationality behind

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our fears and, in turn, our experiences of terror. Fears that might be described as largely irrational range from a debilitating fear of flying and being terrified of dying while doing so (such as that experienced by former Arsenal and Dutch striker, Dennis Bergkamp, to the point that it often prevented him from playing away games), to the more widespread and generalised fear of dying in a terrorist attack. Even if one lives in London or New York the chances of dying at the hands of an act of terrorism are probably less than one's chances of winning the lottery. But, just as people continue to buy lottery tickets despite the odds, the long odds of falling victim to a terrorist act do not stop people from being afraid, some possibly even terrified. (It is perhaps not so irrational if you live in strife-torn Baghdad, but that is another issue for another place). To say that these fears are largely irrational is not to trivialise them, nor does it make them any less salient. Moreover, specific terrorist acts such as that on the London Underground in 2005 do indeed generate immediate and location-specific instances of terror, especially for those caught up in the immediate chaos. But the one act has a ripple effect: in the immediate term the fear engulfed those living, working or holidaying in London on the very day (and their distant loved ones), but also thereafter. The shockwaves then spread further afield, instilling fear into anyone who saw themselves as a potential victim because of their specific circumstances: the city in which they live, the country that city is located in, the nature of the government that governs the country. These outcomes of widespread fear are all designed to enhance the terrorists' prospects of achieving second- and third-order terror objectives, as outlined above. The fear and terror subsides with the passage of time, just as it is mitigated by one's distance from the point of impact, or 'ground zero'. But it remains with us and is kept simmering as we are regularly reminded by terrorists and counter-terrorists alike that the terror is manifold; it is both past event and future possibility, or even probability.

Conclusion

What have we learnt from this brief comparative analysis of the different forms of terror that have plagued humankind's recent past? I think one of the important lessons we might draw on flows from Hannah Arendt's

observation that fear is at the very heart of totalitarian government: 'on one hand, fear as the principle of action, namely fear of the people by the ruler and fear of the ruler by the people, on the other'.³⁶ The notion that fear is one of the driving factors behind tyrants and totalitarians dovetails with the more recent yet similar suggestion from the social psychologists developing terror management theory in their assessment of the current wave of fundamentalist terrorism. They propose that terrorism and terrorists 'can be viewed as products of terror management errors stemming from fear and weakness'.³⁷ If Arendt and those behind TMT are correct, then in effect fear can be located on both sides of the terrorism-terror or terrorist-victim equation; it can be thought of as both a cause and an effect. While this might not explain each and every incidence of terror, it is one lesson or trait common to a number of modes of terror that might help us to understand and maybe even combat terrorism. Further comparative analysis of terror(s) throughout the ages may provide yet more valuable insights.

Given the value of including terror in our considerations of terrorism and terrorists, there is something disconcerting in Jeremy Waldron's highlighting of the point that by some accounts, 'the "terror" in "terrorism" might be largely meaningless'.³⁸ If this is the case then it should not be so. In thinking about and confronting terrorism we need to bear in mind that the 'concept of terror that defines terrorism is that of "great fear, dread or anxiety", where the greatness of the fear or dread is measured either by the intensity of the emotion felt or by the magnitude of the harm feared'.³⁹ Like Waldron I agree that considerable insight might be gained into the phenomena we call terror and terrorism if we recognise that tyrants and terrorists alike 'assign an important role to psycho-social conditions rather like terror, even if they do not always amount to terror in the most literal sense of the word'.⁴⁰ For as Wellman notes, 'Although the fear of great harm is preferable to the actual existence of the harm feared, terror, whether its magnitude be great or small, is itself a species of harm'. And as we should all appreciate, 'the experience of terror is intrinsically undesirable'.⁴¹ Following this line of thought it is worth remembering an argument posed by Edmund Burke who, we recall from earlier in this chapter, was one of the first to use the word and, in doing so, denounced 'terrorists'. Burke wrote:

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No passion so effectively robs the mind of all its powers of acting and reason-
ing as fear. For fear being an apprehension of pain or death, it operates in a
manner that resembles actual pain. Whatever therefore is terrible, with regard
to sight, is sublime too, whether this cause of terror, be endured with great-
ness of dimensions or not; for it is impossible to look on any thing as trifling,
or contemptible, that may be dangerous.⁴²

While Ovid might have been right when he speculated: *Terror in his ipso major solet esse periculo* (Fear is oft greater than the danger found),⁴³ as some of the chapters in this volume demonstrate, this has not always been the case.

With these thoughts in mind it is also instructive to consider Arendt's salient and none too subtle point that 'Political science cannot content itself with simply establishing the fact that terror has been used to intimidate people'.⁴⁴ That fact is plain enough for all to see with the most cursory of glances at the history of humankind. And, as this volume focuses on, nowhere is this more readily evident than in Europe in the past 400 years. Along with the terror of tyrants, despots, dictators, revolutionaries, counter-revolutionaries, majority and minority groups, conspirators and political parties of various persuasions as identified by Arendt, to further complicate our understanding of terror we can add some more recently evolved purveyors of fear and threat to this all-too-long list: eco-terrorists, narco-terrorists and cyber-terrorists, among others.

However acute the similarities are between any two modes of terror and however fine the threads that link the current moment of terror with the various epochs and instances of terror throughout the ages, we must also acknowledge the differences in scale, immediacy, level of threat and danger, pervasiveness of the threat, and so on. While Arendt singles out the shortcomings of the political sciences, the sentiment is one that equally applies to the broader social and behavioural sciences, and virtually any and every field of inquiry that concerns itself with the human condition. For as this chapter and the book demonstrate, the various purveyors and regimes of terror 'assign quite different functions to terror' in their respective settings.⁴⁵ But this is not to say that epochs and moments of terror throughout the ages do not have anything in common; perhaps they do, even if it is nothing more than the abstract idea of terror itself.

For that reason, in endeavouring to understand terrorism and terrorists we cannot afford to overlook the significance of the experiences and constructions of terror that makes terrorism and terrorists both possible and a reality.

Notes

Chapter 1: Terror(s) throughout the Ages

1. Hannah Arendt, 'Mankind and terror [1953]', in Jerome Kohn (ed), *Essays in understanding, 1930-1954* (New York, 2005), p. 297.
2. Igor Primoratz, 'What is terrorism', *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, 7(2), 1990, p. 136.
3. Paul Wilkinson, *Political terrorism* (New York & Toronto, 1974), p. 125. It is worth stipulating that what we are exploring herein are instances of political violence and political terror, or politically motivated violence and politically motivated terror. Excluded are purely criminal and other forms or instances of terror that might otherwise fall under the broad umbrella of terrorism.
4. For more definitional issues relating to terrorism, see Alex P Schmid & Albert J Longman, *Political terrorism: a research guide to concepts, theories, data bases and literature* (New Brunswick NJ, 2005).
5. Wilkinson, *Political terrorism*, pp. 15, 17.
6. Primoratz, 'What is terrorism', p. 130.
7. Carl Wellman, 'On terrorism itself', *Journal of Value Inquiry*, 13(4), 1979, p. 251.
8. Samuel P Huntington, *The soldier and the state: the theory and politics of civil-military relations* (Cambridge MA, 1957), p. vii.
9. *ibid.*
10. Walter Laqueur, *The age of terrorism* (Boston, 1987), p. 73.
11. Jeremy Waldron, 'Terrorism and the uses of terror', *The Journal of Ethics*, 8(1), 2004, p. 35.

12. See also John Horgan, *Walking away from terrorism: accounts of disengagement from radical and extremist movements* (London, 2008).
13. Waldron, 'Terrorism and the uses of terror', p. 7.
14. Bernard Crick, *Political theory and practice* (London, 1971), p. 233.
15. A Badiou, 'Philosophy and the "war against terrorism"', in *Infinite thought: truth and the return to philosophy*, trans. O Feltham & J Clemens (London, 2004), pp. 145–6.
16. Ted Honderich, *Political violence* (Ithaca, 1976), p. 31.
17. RM Hare, 'On terrorism', *Journal of Value Inquiry*, 13(4), 1979, p. 244.
18. 'Terror' in *He Khazit* (or *The Front*, a Lehi underground newspaper), Issue 2, August 1943.
19. Arendt, 'Mankind and terror', p. 298.
20. Hannah Arendt, *The origins of totalitarianism* (London, 1958), pp. 464–8; and 'Mankind and terror', p. 303.
21. *ibid.*, p. 302.
22. *ibid.*, pp. 302–4.
23. Dana R Villa, *Politics, philosophy, terror: essays on the thought of Hannah Arendt* (Princeton, 1999), p. 17. (Emphasis in original.)
24. Wellman, 'On terrorism itself', p. 253.
25. *ibid.*, p. 254.
26. Waldron, 'Terrorism and the uses of terror', p. 17.
27. *ibid.*, p. 22.
28. Edmund Burke, 'Letter to the Earl Fitzwilliam [Christmas 1795]', in EJ Payne (ed), *Select works of Edmund Burke*, 4 vols, (Indianapolis, 1999), vol. 3, p. 316.
29. Raymond T McNally, 'Terror', in L Gregory (ed), *Oxford companion to the mind* (Oxford, 1987), p. 770.
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31. Tom Pyszczynski, Sheldon Solomon & Jeff Greenberg, *In the wake of 9/11: the psychology of terror* (Washington DC, 2003), pp. 8, 15.
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33. Raymond Aron, *Peace and war: a theory of international relations*, trans. Richard Howard & Annette Baker Fox (New York, 1966), p. 170.
34. Mark A Schuster et al., 'A national survey of stress reactions after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks', *New England Journal of Medicine*, 345(20), 2001, pp. 1507–12; Pyszczynski et al., *The psychology of terror*, p. 192.
35. Wilkinson, *Political terrorism*, p. 10.
36. Arendt, *Origins of totalitarianism*, p. 461.

37. Pyszczynski et al., *The psychology of terror*, p. 196.
38. Waldron, 'Terrorism and the uses of terror', p. 9.
39. Wellman, 'On terrorism itself', p. 251.
40. Waldron, 'Terrorism and the uses of terror', p. 9.
41. Wellman, 'On terrorism itself', p. 255.
42. Edmund Burke, *A philosophical enquiry into the origin of our ideas of the sublime and beautiful*, ed. James T Boulton (Notre Dame IN, 1968), Part Two, Section II, p. 57.
43. Ovid, *Heroides*, 16. 351.
44. Arendt, 'Mankind and terror', p. 297.
45. *ibid.*

Chapter 2: The Theory and Application of Terrorism

1. Arthur H Garrison, 'Terrorism: the nature of its history', *Criminal Justice Studies*, 16(1), 2003, pp. 39–52.
2. On 27 January 2006 Hamas won seventy-six out of the 132 seats in the Palestinian Parliament in open elections defeating the Fatah party, which had controlled the Palestinian government for ten years.
3. The Lohamei Herut Israel (the Fighters for the Freedom of Israel), also known as the Stern Gang, named after its leader, Avraham Stern. The Lehi was led by the future Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. The Lehi rejected the legitimacy of the Jewish Authority and British rule of Palestine and used terror as a tool to eject Britain from Palestine in order to achieve the formation of Israel. On 6 November 1944 they assassinated the British representative Lord Moyne and on 17 September 1948 they assassinated the UN representative Count Folke Bernadotte. On 9 April 1948, with the Irgun, they attacked the Palestinian town Deir Yassin, killing or forcing out the entire population.
4. The full name of the group was the Irgun Tsvai Leumi, Hebrew for 'national military organisation'. The Irgun, beginning in February 1944 under the leadership of another future Israeli Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, conducted various attacks on British authorities and institutions. Their goals were to oppose and force out the British in Palestine as well as engage in attacks on Arab military forces and advance the principle that all Jews had a right to return to Palestine and form a Jewish state. On 22 July 1946 they bombed the British headquarters at the King David hotel killing 91 people and they participated in the attack on Deir Yassin.
5. David C Rapoport, 'The four waves of rebel terror and September 11', *Current History*, 100(650), 2001, pp. 419–24.
6. 'It shall not be hidden from you that the people of Islam had suffered from