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VALUES, VALUING AND EVALUATION

by

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INTRODUCTION

Professor von Wright has stated that those concepts relevant to ethics may be divided approximately into three groups¹. The three groups he suggests are value concepts, which include the concepts of good, bad and evil, normative concepts, which include obligation, right, prohibition and permission, and finally, concepts which belong to "the notion of a human act" and "notions which are relevant to action" such as desire, end, need, want, intention, motive, reason and will. Von Wright suggests that the study of this third group of concepts could be called a "Philosophical Theory of Man" or "Philosophical Anthropology", for such a study is often embarked upon if the view is held that "one can look for the foundation of morals ... in the needs and wants of man and in the specific nature of man as agent"².

This rather sweeping categorization does draw attention to an approach to ethics that has been neglected of late - the use of "Philosophical Anthropology" to clarify our

1. Georg Henrik von Wright, The Varieties of Goodness (London, 1963), p.6.

2. Ibid, pp.7-8.

understanding of value-concepts and of evaluation. In the following study, this approach will be adopted in order to discuss the capacity of men to value things, and also, to have values. The relation of evaluation to both these capacities will be discussed¹, for it will be seen that men only value and have as values, things which they believe to be good in some way or other. It will be suggested that the notion of what it is to value something will remain obscure until our understanding of evaluation is broadened to encompass particular interests, wants and purposes of individual human beings.

In a sense, this could be called a meta-ethical study, for the primary interest of the thesis is to offer a partial answer to the question, "What does it mean to say that someone 'values' something?" In answering this question, it is hoped that some light will also be thrown on the nature of values, and on the types of evaluation associated with valuing. It is thus a conceptual study of valuing, evaluation and values, and some relations that hold between them. One could say that it is an attempt to clarify and broaden our understanding of the meaning of these three words. However, it should not be thought that

1. In Chapter I the substantival and verbal uses of the word "value" are discussed. To have values and to value something are both distinguished from what it is to evaluate something.

such a study presupposes that the meanings of these words, that the concepts involved, are fixed and need only to be explicated. Although we know well enough how and when to use phrases like, "He evaluated X", "He values X", or "X is one of his values", the grounds on which we make such statements remain unclear, the relations between such concepts obscure. It is in the clarification of issues such as these that we may come to a better understanding of what the words mean. It is at this point that our reference to "Philosophical Anthropology" becomes relevant, for it will be tacitly assumed that attention to particular wants, interests and purposes of men, help to clarify the concepts mentioned, and certain relations between them.

Thus, this study should be seen not only as one of conceptual analysis, but also as one of concept construction, for concepts of what it is to value something and what it is to have values are in particular confused. (The extreme ambiguity of the word "value" contributes to this confusion.) A lucid account of this type of procedure has been offered by von Wright.

Reflection on the grounds for calling things by words is a type of conceptual investigation. ... The aim of the type of investigation of which I am speaking, is not to 'uncover' the existing meaning ... of some word or expression, veiled as it were behind the bewildering complexities of common usage. The idea of

the philosopher as a searcher of meanings should not be coupled with an idea or postulate that the searched entities actually are there - awaiting the vision of the philosopher. If this picture of the philosopher's pursuit were accurate, then conceptual investigation would, for all I can see, be an empirical inquiry into the actual use of language or the meaning of expressions.

Philosophic reflexion on the grounds for calling a thing 'x' is challenged in situations, when the grounds have not been fixed, when there is no settled opinion as to what the grounds are. The concept still remains to be moulded and therewith its logical connexions with other concepts to be established. The words and expressions, the use of which bewilder the philosopher, are so to speak in search of a meaning.¹

This being the case, I do not apologise for the fact that certain distinctions I shall draw concerning the use of the word "value" are not reflected clearly in common usage.

Although not often recognised as such, considerations that could be termed "Philosophical Anthropology" have emerged in meta-ethical studies. A very brief study of this type is attempted by Professor Hare in his book The Language of Morals, to be found in chapter eight which is called "Commending and Choosing". However, the neglect of this type of study has tended to produce very restricted and misleading views of the nature of evaluation in

1. Ibid, p.5 (von Wright's italics).

particular¹. I wish to discuss Professor Hare's attempted explanation of the logical nature of value-words, in order to show how his concept of what it is to evaluate something may be broadened to encompass varieties of evaluation other than those he describes. As it will be seen that evaluation of an object in a manner to be specified is a precondition of it being valued, this discussion is a necessary preliminary to our analysis of what it is to value something.

1. An example of such a limited view of evaluation may be found in J.O. Urmson's "On Grading", in A.G.N. Flew (Ed.), Logic and Language, Second Series (Oxford, 1961), pp.159-186.

CHAPTER I

SOME VARIETIES AND ROLES OF EVALUATION

Hare's View

In The Language of Morals Hare argues that value-words have both descriptive and evaluative meaning. The chapter, "Commending and Choosing" is devoted to an explanation of why this is so. Hare suggests that,

The reason for this will be found in the purpose for which it 'good', like other value-words, is used in our discourse.¹

The primary function of the word "good", it is suggested, is to commend. Hare claims that whenever we commend something or condemn it, it is always in order to guide choice, either directly or indirectly. It is always to guide either our own choice, or the choice of other people. Hare points out however, that not all value judgments are obviously employed in order to guide choice. To see that this is the purpose for which all value judgments are ultimately employed, we must first ask for what purpose it is that we have standards. The implication of Hare's argument is that we have no use of standards where we do

1. R.M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford, 1952), p.127.

not choose between things; where we do not choose between things of the same kind. Hare later states this explicitly:

We only have standards for a class of objects, we only talk of the virtues of one specimen as against another, we only use value-words about them, when occasions are known to exist, or are conceivable, in which we, or someone else, would have to choose between specimens.¹

Hare states that all value-judgments² are "covertly universal in character" and, as all commendations are value-judgments, they are also universal in this same sense; namely, that to say that a certain motor car is good is to imply that all motor cars that are relevantly similar are good also. Being relevantly similar in these circumstances amounts to having the same virtues that the particular motor car called "good" has. A virtue is defined as a

1. Ibid, p.128.
2. For the purposes of this study, I shall regard as synonymous the terms "value-judgment" and "evaluation".

characteristic of the thing for which it is commended, or which is regarded to be good about the thing in question. Thus, when one commends a certain thing one is guiding choice not only with respect to that particular thing, but with respect to all things relevantly similar to that one. We are able to do this because in commending a certain thing, a standard is offered by which to judge all specimens of that kind of thing. Hare then states that,

... since it is the purpose of the word "good" and other value-words to be used for teaching standards, their logic is in accord with this purpose.¹

and,

To teach a person - or to decide on for oneself - a standard for judging the merits of objects of a certain class is to teach or decide on principles for choosing between objects of that class.²

We may conclude, on Hare's view, that to use the word "good" in speaking of a certain object, is to indicate the existence of a certain standard or standards concerning that class of objects. Such a standard or standards may be used as principles of choice among different specimens of

1. Ibid, p.134.

2. Ibid.

that class of object. To find out what these standards or principles are, we must ask for what characteristics of the object it is being commended. Other ways of putting this would be to ask what goodness amounts to for that kind of thing, or to ask for the criteria of goodness for that kind of thing.

Criticisms of Hare's View

(i) The Action-guiding Nature of Value-words

Hare has stated that whenever we commend something we are either directly or indirectly guiding the choice of ourselves or others. This comment came under severe attack from P.T. Geach in his article, "Good and Evil"¹. Geach argued that it could not be said that calling a thing good influenced a person's choice unless it were the case that the person wanted a thing of that kind. Geach further argued that,

... this influence on action is not the logically primary force of the word 'good'. 'You have ants in your pants', which obviously has a primarily descriptive force, is far closer to affecting action than many uses of the term 'good'.²

1. P.T. Geach, "Good and Evil", in Philippa Foot (Ed.), Theories of Ethics (Oxford, 1967), pp.64-73.

2. Ibid, p.68.

Geach pointed out that many uses of the word good do not appear to be used in order to influence the choices of people at all. He cited as examples, good eye, and good stomach.

Hare, in an article replying to Geach¹, argued that Geach's case as he stated it was quite correct, but that his contention had never been that acts of commendation influence choice, only that they guide choice. The one, he claimed, was not equivalent to the other. This claim we must examine.

In The Language of Morals Hare makes a distinction between what it is to tell someone to do something, and what it is to get someone to do something. The two activities, he suggests, are logically distinct. We may tell a person to do something and if he is not so inclined, then attempt to get him to do it. But, in telling a person to do something, we are not necessarily even trying to get him to do it. Instructions may be given for doing something without it being the case that he to whom the instructions are addressed is even expected to do that thing. Hare

1. R.M. Hare, "Geach: Good and Evil", in Philippa Foot (Ed.), Theories of Ethics, (Oxford, 1967), pp.74-82.

states,

Telling someone to do something, or that something is the case, is answering the question 'What shall I do?' or 'What are the facts?'. When we have answered these questions the hearer knows what to do or what are the facts - if what we have told him is right. He is not necessarily thereby influenced one way or the other, nor have we failed if he is not; for he may decide to disbelieve us or disobey us, and the mere telling him does nothing - and seeks to do nothing - to prevent him doing this.¹

Hare asserts that when we try to get someone to do something, or try to persuade them to do something, we are not merely giving an answer to the question "What shall I do?", but attempting to make the questioner answer it in a particular way of our choosing.

When we attempt to apply this somewhat tenuous distinction² to that of guiding as opposed to influencing choice, the distinction seems to be something like this. In commending something, what we in fact do is just tell or indicate to someone, or perhaps remind ourselves, that the object in question has certain qualities or

1. R.M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford, 1952), p.15.
2. I say "tenuous", because it could be argued that in order to understand what it is to commend something, or to tell someone to do something, the telos or point of the utterances must be taken into account. If the telos of commending were to be regarded as something like convincing, or the telos of telling, getting some action done, then Hare's distinction would fail. An argument along these lines is offered in L.M. Loring, Two Kinds of Values (London, 1966), pp.155-157.

characteristics that provide grounds for choosing it rather than rejecting it. In doing this, we are neither getting the other person to choose that thing nor choosing it ourselves; we are merely guiding, not influencing choice. This is what commending amounts to, and in calling something "good" we are commending it. Thus Hare explicitly rejects the stronger thesis attributed to him by Geach, that value-words are used to influence action.

However, if it is the case that the action-guiding nature of value-words is to be found in the fact that they indicate the existence of characteristics in the object which are grounds for choosing it or not choosing it, surely we must say that the action-guiding element of value-words is to be found in their descriptive rather than their evaluative meaning. The characteristics to which we refer are those which act as criteria for calling the object "good", and such characteristics may be described as we would describe any other characteristics of an object. It may be the case that my statement that a shirt is jungle-green guides a guerilla fighter in his choice of shirts. The word "jungle-green" in this context would appear to be action-guiding in just the same way that Hare would claim value-words are. On the other hand, if Hare wished to strengthen his claim concerning value-words to the point of

saying that they influence choice, in his sense, then he would have to agree with Geach, that they only do so when the choosing agent has some interest in that which he is evaluating, such as wanting a specimen of that kind.

This criticism of Hare is offered in order to emphasise the lack of attention that Hare pays to the relevance of the interest¹ an agent may have in that which he evaluates, to the way in which he may utilise his evaluations. It may be the case, as Hare implies, that an interest of the agent in that which he evaluates is not an essential part of the nature of an evaluation. An agent may for example, evaluate something without wanting a specimen of that kind. However, this is not to show that interests that may accompany evaluations are not relevant to the explanation of certain roles or uses that evaluations may have in reasoning, or in influencing action. In the next section it will be shown that Hare's lack of attention to this consideration restricted his appreciation of the varieties of evaluation that are possible. The two types of evaluation mentioned in the next section are particularly relevant to understanding how evaluation is related to valuing.

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1. The type of interest with which we will be concerned in this study is that which would indicate that the agent is favourably disposed towards that which he is evaluating. To desire a specimen of the kind of thing which one is evaluating, is one example of such an interest.

(ii) Classification and Varieties of Evaluation¹

Hare has claimed that the universal nature of value-judgments and value-words is found in the fact that they teach standards for all specimens of a kind. In knowing the criteria of goodness for one specimen of a kind, we know the criteria of goodness for all specimens of that kind. Hare's universality claim rests on the assumption that all evaluations are made according to specimens of a kind, and that in choosing on the basis of evaluations we are always choosing between specimens of the one kind. J.O. Urmson presents a counter-example to this view, when he discusses evaluations from "a point of view". I do not wish to concern myself with a discussion of the universality of value-judgments, or with a discussion of whether or not it is possible to evaluate things other than according to kinds. However, Urmson's counter-example is interesting not because it succeeds, but because it introduces a type of evaluation and classification which Hare did not consider. It is in the discussion of this type of evaluation that we will gain a clue as to how evaluations are related to valuing.

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1. The word "class" will be used synonymously with the word "kind". I will refer to classes and classification rather than kinds only where it is grammatically more elegant to do so. Note that we may talk of "the class of X's" when referring to the members of a class, but not of "the kind of X's" when referring to the specimens of a kind, though I shall regard a specimen of the kind X as a member of the class of X's.

Urmson introduces the notion of an evaluation from a point of view¹ by suggesting that if we are to judge something to be good of a certain kind, we must know to which kind it belongs. We cannot have criteria for goodness of a certain kind, if we do not have criteria for the kind. He states,

If to say that something is a good X or is good as an X is to commend, express approval of, or grade highly (or something of that sort) the thing in question as of kind X or in the role of an X², there must clearly be some way of determining whether the thing is an X independently of determining whether it is a good one. If an explicit testing procedure would help, we may say that we must be able significantly to ask and answer the question 'Is this an X?' if we are able to ask and answer the question 'Is this good as a member of the kind of things called Xs?'.³

Urmson takes as an example of an evaluation "from a point of view", the statement, "This is a good thing from the farmers' point of view". His first move is to distinguish this statement from one such as "This is a good road from the farmers' point of view". The latter statement, Urmson suggests, would mean that the road is a good one, but good

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1. J.O. Urmson, The Emotive Theory of Ethics (London, 1968), pp.98-116.
 2. Urmson distinguishes between something being good of a kind, such as a good apple, and something being good according to a certain role, such as a man who is a good cricketer. The latter type of evaluation is recognised by Hare, and fits readily into his general theory.
 3. Ibid, p.100.

according to a restricted set of criteria for roads, such that criteria relating to durability would be considered, but not perhaps, criteria relating to signposts. However, such an evaluation is not equivalent to that expressed in the statement, "This road is a good thing from the farmers' point of view". For, the road could be a good thing from the farmers' point of view because it is a barrier to flooding, which has nothing to do with the road being a good road as such. It could be a very bad road.

From this point Urmson argues that whilst it makes sense to ask, "Is this a good thing from the farmers' point of view?", which is of the grammatical form "Is this a good X?", it does not make sense to ask, "Is this a thing from the farmers' point of view?" The apparently acceptable form of this question, "Is this an X?", seems to be deceptive. Urmson resists the suggestion that the statement "This is a thing from the farmers' point of view" is equivalent to the statement "This is a thing likely to affect farmers' interests", because other equivalents for related statements cannot be found. "This is a good thing likely to affect farmers' interests" is, he claims, a "distinctly odd" statement, and an implausible paraphrase of "This is a good thing from the farmers' point of view". Another argument presented to the same point is that whilst it makes perfect

sense to say, "This is indifferent from the farmers' point of view", it is self-contradictory to say, "This is an indifferent thing likely to affect farmers' interests". Of course, this latter statement could be interpreted to mean that some particular thing that happens to be of indifferent quality according to its kind is likely to affect farmers' interests. However, interpreted in this way the statement would be quite different in sense from its supposed equivalent. Urmson concludes that "thing from the farmers' point of view" cannot be interpreted as an alternative description of the class of things likely to affect farmers' interests. Nor, he claims, can it be interpreted as an alternative description of any other class, "for nothing could count in favour of either an affirmative or negative answer" to the question, "Is it a thing from the farmers' point of view?".

Although this is not a complete explication of Urmson's argument, it will suffice for our purposes. Urmson is correct in saying that there is no such thing as a thing from a point of view. Phrases such as "from X point of view", "from X standpoint", "from X viewpoint" are phrases that describe or qualify the manner in which judgments are made. It would be paramount to a category mistake to suggest that they could describe or classify objects, or events other than judgments. Despite this, we can

classify various objects according to whether or not it makes sense to make certain judgments about them. (I shall deal with this point at a later stage.) We can also classify various objects according to whether or not they are relevant to certain interests. Things that we judge to be good from a certain point of view may fall within a class of things judged to be relevant to certain interests, or in Urmson's words, judged "likely to affect" certain interests. Urmson's argument against this claim fails through a misunderstanding of the grammar of evaluation. Consider the following statements:

- (1) A knife is a thing that cuts.¹
- (2) A good knife cuts well.
- (3) A good knife is one (is a knife) that cuts well.
- (4) This (knife) is a good knife.

The first statement offers a criterion for things being classed as specimens of the kind of thing called "knife". The second and third statements offer a criterion for what it is to be a good knife. That is, that a knife perform its function well. The fourth statement is an evaluative statement concerning some knife or other.

1. For the sake of simplicity I have offered only one criterion for something being a knife, that it cuts. Although there are others, I do not think their exclusion affects the argument in any way.

I do not think that the interpretations of these statements is in any way contentious. However, note that the statement "This (knife) is a good thing that cuts" is open to a number of interpretations, one of which is equivalent to statement (4). The word "good" is an attributive adjective (in Geach's sense¹). Its use is always tied explicitly or implicitly to a substantive or substantive dummy such as the words "thing" or "one", which names or refers to what is said to be good. Thus, if we interpret the whole phrase "thing that cuts" as a substantive, and as a definition of "knife", then "This (knife) is a good thing-that-cuts" is equivalent to statement (4). However, if we interpret as the substantive only the word "thing", and the words "that cuts", as a qualifying adjectival phrase to the substantive, then the statement may be seen as not only not equivalent to statement (4), but on one interpretation to imply something that is false. The statement would then have to mean either that the knife is a good thing of some kind, and that it cuts, or that the knife is a good knife, that cuts. The former interpretation suggests that the knife is good of some kind other than knives, and cuts as well, which may not be a false statement, but is certainly not equivalent to statement (4). The latter interpretation suggests that the knife's

1. P.T. Geach, "Good and Evil", in Philippa Foot (Ed.), Theories of Ethics (Oxford, 1967), pp.64-65.

being good of the kind knives depends on something other than the fact that it cuts, or even cuts well, if we cared to add that qualification to the statement. On this interpretation, the statement implies something false if it is meant to imply that knives' goodness does not depend on their cutting power. Thus, depending on what we interpret to be the substantive to which "good" is tied, statements such as the one mentioned may be interpreted to mean quite different things. Confusion is possible where a phrase may be interpreted either as an extended substantive, or as a substantive dummy, accompanied by a qualifying adjectival phrase.

It is this type of confusion that I think Urmson has fallen into when he claims that there is something "distinctly odd" about the statement "This is a good thing likely to affect farmers' interests". The phrase, "thing likely to affect farmers' interests" is also open to this dual interpretation concerning its substantival nature. The possibility of confusion is heightened by the fact that there is no class name such as "knife" to name things that are likely to affect farmers' interests. Let us coin such a name, "blog", and list a corresponding set of statements concerning blogs, to those concerning knives.

(1a) A blog is a thing likely to affect farmers' interests.

(2a) A good blog is likely to affect farmers' interests favourably.

(3a) A good blog is one (is a blog) that is likely to affect farmers' interests favourably.

(4a) This (blog) is a good blog.

Once again, the form and interpretation of these statements seems uncontentious. Further, we may interpret the statement, "This is a good thing likely to affect farmers' interests" as equivalent to statement (4a) provided that the whole phrase, "thing likely to affect farmers' interests" is taken as the substantive, and as the definition of the word "blog". If, however, we interpret the phrase as a substantive "thing", accompanied by the qualifying phrase "likely to affect farmers' interests", we become immersed in the same difficulties outlined above. Either we must assume that we are talking about something over and above a member of the class of things likely to affect farmers' interests, or else that something that is good of this kind, is so irrespective of whether or not it affects farmers' interests. Both of these interpretations are of course, "distinctly odd".

I have interpreted the judgment that something affects interests favourably as the counterpart to the judgment that a certain thing performs its function or role well. Both are evaluations but they concern rather different kinds of thing, and thus the language in which we express these evaluations differ. If we are evaluating a thing likely

to affect farmers' interests, we may evaluate it to be a thing likely to affect farmers' interests favourably, or perhaps, to be a thing likely to affect farmers' interests to an indifferent degree. The latter judgment is clearly not self-contradictory. This same judgment, expressed in the form "indifferent thing likely to affect farmers' interests" is no more puzzling than the judgment that something is an "indifferent thing that cuts". This is merely a clumsy form in which to express such a judgment. We would be just as inclined to reformulate the latter judgment as a "thing that cuts in an indifferent manner".

I would suggest that Urmson's claim that the two statements, "This is a good thing likely to affect farmers' interests" and "This is an indifferent thing likely to affect farmers' interests" are odd and contradictory respectively, is incorrect. We must now move on to consider whether or not the former of these two statements is indeed equivalent to the statement, "This is good from the farmers' point of view".

To say that something is good from the farmers' point of view is to say that that thing is judged good according to a criterion of evaluation determined by farmers' interests. The criterion is that those interests be affected favourably, or be likely to be affected favourably by the thing in question. To say that something is a good

thing likely to affect farmers' interests, is to say that the thing fulfils the criterion for something being good of that kind of thing likely to affect farmers' interests; namely, that it is likely to affect those interests favourably. Thus, the two statements are equivalent to the extent that their validity rests on the fulfilment of the same criterion. However, I would suggest that the statement that something is good from the farmers' point of view is only significant in its dependence on the appreciation of a class or kind of thing relevant to or likely to affect farmers' interests. If we did not know what it was for something to be good of this kind, we would not understand what it would be to judge something good from the farmers' point of view.

We do not consider things from a certain point of view, let alone evaluate them from that point of view, unless we believe that the interests embodied in that point of view are relevant to the thing, or vice versa. This implies that we can distinguish that which is relevant to a certain set of interests from that which is not, if we are to believe with good grounds, that a certain thing is relevant to a set of interests. We do classify things according to whether or not they are relevant to or affect certain interests, and we cannot judge what will favourably affect certain interests, unless we know what is relevant

to, or can affect those interests at all. The fact that it is logically possible that anything could be relevant to a certain set of interests at some time or other does not affect the fact that we may classify what is relevant and what is not at a particular point in time.

Evaluations from a point of view are judgments concerning the kind of thing that is relevant to those interests embodied in the point of view. The criterion of goodness employed can only be derived from a consideration of that kind of thing that is relevant to or affects those interests. Evaluations from a point of view are evaluations according to a kind, if a very broad one. Certainly we cannot say that something is a thing from a certain point of view, but to say that something is evaluated from a certain point of view is to imply that it is evaluated according to certain interests, and we cannot make sense of what is is to evaluate something according to certain interests, unless we can judge what things are relevant to those interests.

Urmson's evaluation from a point of view would thus appear to fail as a counter-example to Hare's contention that evaluations are made according to specimens of some kind or other, though certainly Hare did not recognise such a type of evaluation. I wish to mention one other kind of evaluation based on a similarly broad type of classification. Although this is also mentioned by Urmson as an example of

an evaluation from a point of view¹, we will see that there are points of difference that distinguish the two types of evaluation. Both types of evaluation are particularly relevant to an understanding of how evaluation relates to valuing.

To avoid confusion, I shall refer to evaluations from a point of view, only as those evaluations which embody a characteristic interest or set of interests of a certain person, type of person, or social group. Typical of such sets of interests would be those of the housewife, the farmer, the politician or businessman. Things that are judged to be good from such points of view are typically things that promote those interests, or facilitate characteristic roles or activities consistent with those interests, and normally associated with the people that hold those interests.

The second type of evaluation to be discussed I shall call qualified evaluations. Such evaluations are qualified according to some quite specific consideration relevant to the thing involved. We may talk of things being

1. J.O. Urmson, The Emotive Theory of Ethics (London, 1968), p.105.

economically good, or aesthetically good, good in respect of stability or durability. There are at least four different ways in which such evaluations are used.

(1) We may make a number of qualified evaluations about one specimen of a particular kind. We may say of a piece of furniture that aesthetically it is good, but poor in respect of durability. In such cases we weigh up the "good points" of the object against its "bad points".

(2) We may make a qualified evaluation of a number of different specimens of a kind, comparing them in some particular respect. One power station may be economically better than another power station.

(3) We may make a qualified evaluation in comparing a number of specimens of different kinds. We may say that aesthetically a certain building is better than a certain car or bridge or table. All such evaluations are bound to the particular kind of thing about which they are made. They are relative judgments made according to the particular kind or kinds of thing in question. Thus, the criteria for durability in a table are rather different from criteria for the durability of a bridge. What may be judged to be an aesthetically good building may not be judged similarly good if considered as a sculpture. Nevertheless we may compare things of different kinds according to their durability or aesthetic quality, by comparing how well they

are evaluated within the precincts of their respective kinds. However, this does not mean that any qualified evaluation can be applied to any kind of thing whatever. If during a stroll in the countryside I were to remark that a certain river was economically poor, and there were no ways in which considerations of economics related to this particular river the evaluation would be considered, if not false, of no significance. To use J.L. Austin's term, we would say it was a "misfire"¹. In other words, we may classify things according to whether or not it is significant, or whether or not it makes sense, to make certain judgments about them at all. It is on such broad classifications that the intelligibility of qualified evaluations rest, for we do not make qualified evaluations at random, but only on those occasions where the specific considerations are believed to be relevant or of some consequence. In such cases we may regard, for example, sculptures, buildings and paintings as sub-classes of the class of things about which we can make aesthetic judgments. This feature is not peculiar to qualified evaluations. Many broad

1. J.L. Austin, How to do things with Words (Oxford, 1962), pp.14-16.

classes or kinds of thing depend on criteria derived from sub-classes for the evaluation and comparison of their specimens. Examples of such kinds would be craftsmen, commodities, students and works of art.

(4) We may also make qualified evaluations that are themselves qualified by certain points of view. For instance, we may talk of price control being economically good from the housewives' point of view, but not from the retailers' point of view. There may be other ways in which qualified evaluations can be used, but these four examples will suffice to indicate the scope of such evaluations.

Clearly the dividing line between what will be considered as an evaluation from a point of view and what will be considered as a qualified evaluation cannot be fixed rigidly. A number of specific considerations embodied in different qualified evaluations may comprise a group of interests that delineate a certain point of view. However, to say that something is good from a certain point of view is normally to imply that that thing favourably affects, or furthers certain interests. An interest in this context may be a desire that a certain thing is accomplished or retained. On the other hand, to say that something is aesthetically good, or good in respect of durability or stability is not to suggest that any interests are favourably affected, or

furthered, but rather indicates a specific area in which the thing's goodness lies. Such an area may be an interest of a person in the sense that it is something he looks with favour on, or desires, requires, hopes or demands to be good in appropriate objects. Thus, a man may require that furniture he buys be aesthetically good, and adopt as an interest the aesthetic quality of those pieces he inspects. Such an interest will lead him generally to favour those things which he judges to be good aesthetically, just as the adoption of a certain point of view might lead us to regard with favour things that will further interests embodied in that point of view. With both types of evaluation we may give more weight to some interests than others. Further it is always open to us to recognise something as a possible interest of someone else, but not of our own.

That we may evaluate things according to specific interests or sets of interests immediately introduces a greater degree of complexity to such evaluations. Not all points of view are judged to be similarly relevant or appropriate or important to the evaluation of certain things. Points of view are most commonly brought into discussions of evaluations where there are conflicts at hand. What is good from the employees' point of view may not be good from the employers' point of view. What is judged good from the point

of view of a man's career may not be judged similarly good from the point of view of his interests as a family man. In situations of choice, the more points of view there are which we consider relevant to the evaluation of an object, the more complex our choice will be. The intelligibility of our final judgment will rest not merely on the different evaluations according to different points of view, but on the weight, significance, importance or relevance we grant to different points of view. The weight given to a point of view may determine the significance of the evaluation itself. Thus, the fact that something is good from one point of view may not be considered nearly so good a ground for choosing it as the fact that it is good from some other point of view. Similar complexities arise for choices made according to qualified evaluations. The fact that a table is good aesthetically may not be nearly so important for a struggling housewife as the fact that it is good in respect of durability. This should not lead one to think that evaluations from a point of view and qualified evaluations are subjective, or more like subjective judgments than more conventional evaluations according to kinds. As Geach pointed out, that something is good of a certain kind is not likely to influence me in any way unless I want a specimen of that kind. This, however, has no bearing on the validity of

my judgments that things are good, bad, or poor specimens of their kind. Similarly, the fact that something is good from a point of view, or in a certain respect which does not concern me, may mean that I do not choose an object on these grounds. Yet the fact that I may still judge it to be good from a certain point of view or in a certain respect is not thereby affected.

The two major criticisms proffered of Hare so far are these. First, that if he desires to argue that value-words are only action-guiding, then they cannot be distinguished from descriptive words on this count. If he wants to strengthen his claim to say that value-words influence action, then he must take into account the role of interests in evaluation. Hare did not think that this was an essential part of evaluation, and thus the role of interests in affecting the role of evaluations was neglected. Second, it has been found that this neglect of the role of interests restricts Hare's appreciation of the varying types of evaluation, and types of classification relevant to evaluation. These two criticisms are related to the extent that points of view and qualified evaluations give us a clearer insight into how evaluations can influence action. For, if it is the case that a businessman evaluates things from a businessman's point of view, regarding this point of view

as not only relevant but important in his evaluation of certain things, then the type of interest that will allow a man to be influenced by his evaluations is furnished. The interest, rather than being external to the evaluation, is incorporated in it. The relevance of these conclusions to valuing can be seen in the fact that such evaluations may influence not only actions, but attitudes that people adopt towards things that they evaluate. One such attitude is that of valuing those things.

In order to show the relation between evaluation and valuing, or how an evaluation can provide a ground for someone valuing something, we will have to dispute a further claim of Hare's, namely, that we only evaluate things in order to choose between specimens of the one kind. This claim can most clearly be seen to be false in the case of point of view and qualified evaluations, although it will be seen to be false for other types of evaluation as well. I shall argue that we may evaluate things in order to decide whether or not we want them. This is the key to understanding how evaluations relate to valuing, for we necessarily want that which we value, and if our valuing is well grounded, on the basis of an evaluation.

(iii) Evaluation and Wanting - towards an explanation of Valuing

Before we consider objections to Hare's claim that we only evaluate in order to choose, I wish to make a few

general comments about the nature of valuing.

That we evaluate things to be good of a kind does not in itself explain why or how it is that we come to value things. There are numerous things that we may evaluate as good of a kind that we have no reason or inclination to value. Put in the crudest way possible, the reason why we do not value many things that we may judge to be good of a kind is that we have no particular interest in those things. Further, it does not always seem to be the case that people value things that are good of their "kind" in the conventional sense of that word¹. An axeman may value a very old and well-worn axe, refusing to replace it by a new one which is a much better specimen of its kind. Yet, when we are called upon to explain why it is that we do value something, our explanation would be incomplete if we did not explain in what way we regarded the object of our valuing to be good, or excellent or worthwhile². In other words, in explaining why it is that we do value something, we resort to some sort of favourable evaluation. To value something that we do not regard to be good in any respect at all would appear to be a contradiction in terms.

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1. The "conventional sense" I take to be Hare's which has not included things good from a point of view, or in a certain respect.
 2. This point is elaborated in chapters three and five of the thesis.

On the other hand, we do not appear to choose what we shall value and what we shall not value. As shall be argued later¹, to value something is to adopt a certain attitude towards it, to react to an object in a manner somewhat akin to liking or admiring it. Nevertheless we may decide whether or not an object is worthy of our valuing it, as we decide whether or not an object is worthy of our admiration. Such decisions involve the evaluation of the object. How then, is evaluation related to valuing?

If it is the case that we only evaluate things in order to choose between them, then this relation would appear to remain obscure. However, it is not at all clear that all evaluations must be tied, even indirectly to situations of choice. I would suggest that evaluations from a point of view and qualified evaluations are at least two types of evaluation that may be made quite independently of considerations concerning choice of the object evaluated among a range of specimens of their kind. We may make a qualified evaluation, or evaluate something from a certain point of view in order to decide whether or not we want the object we are evaluating. Consider the following example. Suppose a politician is approached by a

1. See chapter four, "Valuing and Related Concepts".

neighbouring government to accept foreign investment in his country's economy. Let us further suppose that there are no "strings" attached to the offer, political or otherwise. The politician may first ask himself, "Do I want foreign investment in my country's economy or not?". If he is an honest politician, he may then go on to ask, "Is foreign investment a good thing for the country economically?". If he decides that foreign investment is a good thing for the country's economy, he may decide that he does want foreign investment in the country. His reasons would be that foreign investment is a good thing for the country economically, and he is concerned for the economic state of the country. The politician has adopted a particular consideration or interest, the economic welfare of his country, as a criterion of evaluation.

In the example cited above, we may say that the man, in his role of a politician, adopts a certain interest which acts not only as a criterion of evaluation, but as a principle of judgment in deciding whether or not certain things made available to him are wanted or not. To decide that something is an object of want, is not to choose anything. Neither is it the case that we always decide whether or not we want things in order to choose them, for the concept of a choice only becomes relevant when we

see things as alternatives to other things. An object of want need not necessarily be seen as an alternative to anything at all¹. Evaluations from a point of view, and qualified evaluations are those most obviously related to this type of decision, for both depend on specific interests or considerations which may be adopted readily as principles of judgment. The pattern of reasoning involved resembles a practical syllogism, though the conclusion is not, as Aristotle would have required, an action. A typical pattern of reasoning involving an evaluation from a point of view would be:

I want to further interests X

Y will facilitate (or favourably affect) interests X

∴ I want Y.

Patterns of reasoning involving qualified evaluations may take a slightly different form depending on the consideration involved. For example, it may be the case that I do not actually desire every object that I see that is aesthetically pleasing, but am generally speaking, very favourably disposed towards aesthetically pleasing objects. Thus, I may reason:

1. This point will be discussed further in the Conclusion.

I am favourably disposed towards X's in general
 This is a particularly good X

∴ I want this X

It should be noted that the first person form of the first premise and conclusion of these patterns of reasoning is not essential to their nature, but only used for the sake of clarity in this context. Universal forms could be substituted without affecting the nature of the arguments. I do not wish to study in any detail the logical nature of such forms of reasoning, but only to suggest that they are common and valid forms, though not without their difficulties. One at least is the obvious need to apply what would sometimes be complex ceteris paribus clauses, for it is clear that the premises could not be said to entail the conclusions¹.

The second pattern of reasoning presented indicates the relevance of evaluations concerning more conventional kinds of thing to this type of reasoning. It may be the case that I am very favourably disposed toward food, and on the occasion of being offered a splendid meal, decide that I will eat it, though prior to the offer confessed to having

1. For a brief discussion of this type of pattern of reasoning see G.E.M. Anscombe, Intention (Oxford, 1958), pp.57-61.

no appetite. If I am very favourably disposed toward a certain kind of thing, on being presented with a good specimen I may desire or want it, although prior to that time I may not have formulated such a desire or want. That this is the case is often clouded by the fact that very often we do not know to which kinds of thing people are favourably disposed. However, when considering evaluations that people make from a point of view, or particular considerations they take into account when evaluating certain things, we are much better equipped to notice if they have an interest in that which they evaluate which would allow them to be influenced by that evaluation. We may judge this by noting the weight, favour, relevance or importance that they give to various points of view or considerations. We can infer what their interests are.

If it is accepted that we may evaluate things in order to decide whether or not we want them, then the manner in which evaluations may affect the adoption of the attitude of valuing may be clarified. It will be argued at a later stage that a symptom¹ of valuing is that we want that which

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1. The sense in which "symptom" is being used here does not preclude the possibility that a symptom of valuing could be a necessary condition of valuing. In fact it will be argued in chapter four that wanting that which one values is a necessary condition of valuing the thing. The sense in which symptom is being used will be explained in chapter four.

we value; not only that we want the thing, but that we want it on the basis of a pattern of reasoning such as those presented above. It is a pattern of reasoning involving an evaluation which embodies or is seen to relate to an interest or interests which we have in the thing evaluated. Such interests may be related directly as in the second example above, or indirectly as in the first example, to the thing that is evaluated.

However, it will be argued, that not all evaluations of this type can provide grounds for valuing something. It will be suggested that we value things, only on account of certain interests, which are derived from our values¹. Thus, the relation between evaluation, valuing and values begins to emerge. Things that we want on the basis of evaluations which are governed by values, are things that we may value. This however, is to anticipate what is to come in the following chapters.

It has been argued that Hare's account of evaluation is primarily deficient in his lack of attention to the role that interests play in evaluation. This not only restricts the range of varieties of evaluation that he takes into account, but also his view of the role of evaluations in human reasoning and in the influencing of attitudes.

1. The substantival use of the word "value" will be explained in chapter two.

CHAPTER II
THE AMBIGUITY OF "VALUE"

Before proceeding to the discussion of what it is to value something, I wish to distinguish five ways in which the word "value" is used. With each use, the word has a different meaning, although to some extent the uses are related to each other. The object of this exercise is to prevent us from falling into unnecessary muddles and obscurity, which in this area is not a difficult thing to do. What I take to be common usage will be adhered to where possible, and I shall only deviate from common usage to set up my own terminology, when the adoption of common usage leads to confusion or obscurity.

The uses of "value" I shall discuss include two uses of the word as a predicate, two uses of the word as a verb, and one use of the word as a substantive.

Predicative Use (i)

Sometimes we evaluate things according to the value they confer on, or of what value they are to, some other thing. Things are never of value per se, but always of value according to some desiderata or some set of qualifying

terms. There are at least three ways in which we may judge something to be of value relative to something else.

1. X is of value to Y
2. X is of value in/for Y
3. X is of value as a Y

Examples of the first evaluation would be:

A keen eye)
)
A slide-rule) is of value to the draftsman.
)
A tidy office)

Regular servicing)
)
Clean spark-plugs) is of value to a car.
)
An automatic choke)

Such judgments convey the idea that something or other is of use or benefit or of help in the particular role or functioning of some object or other. The subjects of such evaluations may vary enormously in their nature, including, as can be seen from the examples given, the environment in which the functioning object may be, parts of the functioning object, things utilized by the object and activities directed towards the object.

The second type of evaluation listed above is normally directed towards things that are useful, beneficial or of help in the execution of a certain activity, where the executant of the activity is not referred to. Examples of

such evaluations are,

A road-map	)	
	)	
A good sense of direction	)	is of value in finding the way.
A sober state	)	
	)	
A clear night	)	

Even balance	)	
	)	
A calm temperament	)	is of value in playing tennis.
A tightly-strung racket	)	
	)	
A lawn court	)	

In judgments of this type we may substitute "of value for" for "of value in" without changing the significance of the judgment in any way. Such judgments as these may also be made about a great number of things of different kinds of thing. It is often said of such evaluations that they are instrumental or functional in nature, in that the things that the judgments are about are things that play a functional role in facilitating some activity or other. This is probably true of large numbers of things that are evaluated in this way; however, it is doubtful whether we should regard in the examples given above, "a clear night" or "a lawn court" as functional things facilitating the execution of activities. Rather, they are over-riding conditions that will allow the proper functioning of other things involved in the activities.

The third type of evaluation listed is very much more akin to an evaluation according to a kind of thing which has specific functions, according to a kind of thing identified by its role. There are certain limits to the kind of thing that may fall under any specific evaluation of this type. Examples of this type of evaluation would be,

The stars	)	
	)	
A compass	)	
	)	is/are of value as a navigational guide.
A road-map	)	
	)	
Sign-posts	)	
A knife	)	
	)	
A sharp piece of metal	)	
	)	is of value as a cutting instrument.
A guillotine	)	
	)	
A thin piece of wire	)	

The connotation of these evaluations is that certain things may be used successfully in a certain role, or may function successfully in a certain way. The type of role or function required is stated explicitly in the evaluation. The subjects of such evaluations tend to be less various than the two types cited above, as the number of things that may function in a certain way, or function as something else tends to be smaller than the number of things that may be of use in a particular activity. This is, however, a purely contingent matter.

Of course many evaluations that we make involve some combination of the three types mentioned. We may judge that X is of value to Y in Z, or that X is of value as a Y in Z, or that X is of value as a Y in Z to S and so on. However, in the analysis of these complex evaluations, it will be found that each one breaks down into two or three independent evaluations that may be stated in their own right.

It can be seen that I have used "of value" synonymously with other phrases such as "of use", "of assistance", "of benefit" or "of help" and I think that the phrase "of value" is normally used in this way, although according to the context, some synonyms will be more appropriate than others. The third type of evaluation does have slightly different connotations, in that if a thing is judged to be of value as something else, this implies not merely that it may be used as something else, but that it may be used successfully, or functions well in a certain role, or as a certain kind of thing. Kurt Baier, however, would argue that the use of "of value" in the first two types of evaluation is very much more akin to that of the third than I have suggested. He states,

... that the road map and the guidebook proved useful to us, means that our having and using them facilitated our accomplishment of our aims the accomplishing of which conferred a

benefit. That the road map and the guidebook were of value to us means much the same as that they were useful or came in handy. However, whereas their having been useful to us leaves open the question whether or not we in fact accomplished the aim for the accomplishment of which they came in handy, and whether its accomplishment was in fact a benefit, their having been of value to us implies an affirmative answer: that we did accomplish our aim, that it was a benefit and even that it was an important one.¹

This interpretation of the use of the phrase "of value" does seem to me to be a doubtful one. When proffering advice to someone we may suggest that X would be of value to him, or that Y would be of value in doing Z. Such advice need not carry with it the implication that in utilizing X and Y the desired purpose will necessarily be accomplished. Of course, Baier's interpretation gains plausibility from the fact that the evaluation he is discussing is expressed in the past tense, "X was of value in doing Y". Certainly this statement does seem to have the implication that Y has been achieved, but this is a peculiarity of the tense of the statement, not of the value-judgment that is contained in the statement. It may be true to say that the judgment that something is of value to or in something else implies that a benefit is conferred (in a very broad sense of the word "benefit"), but to maintain that such a

1. Kurt Baier, "What is value? An analysis of the concept", in Kurt Baier and Nicholas Rescher (Eds), Values and the Future (New York, 1969), p.42.

benefit is always an important one seems a very doubtful claim indeed. If a person were to claim that a road map had been of value to him in finding some objective or other, we would have to know the nature of the situation in order to establish whether or not the benefit conferred was an important one. If he had been looking for a hospital for an injured friend, it might be. If he had been looking for a famous mushrooming area, it might not.

The term "of value" is a general term of commendation. In some ways it resembles the use of other words of commendation such as "good". As for "good", the term "of value" has particular rules of application according to the particular class of objects to which it is applied, or the particular role in which a thing is being considered. Indeed, without stretching grammatical form too far, the uses of the term could be substituted for uses of the word "good". For example we could say that for a draftsman, the possession of a keen eye is a good thing, for playing tennis, a lawn court is a good thing, and a sharp piece of metal is good as a cutting instrument. However, as a term of commendation, "of value" is not nearly so broad a term in its use, as "good". It involves evaluations of a strictly relational nature. Good apples are not apples that are of value.

Predicative Use (ii)

The second predicative use of "value" is what could be called, more specifically, the use of the monetary sense of the term "value". This sense of "value" is also used to say that things are of value, of great value, of some value, and so on. The derivative, "valuable", is often used in such contexts, and both terms have the sense of monetary worth, or worth as an item of exchange. In terms of grammatical use at least, the monetary sense of the terms "value" and "valuable" are not relational. Things may simply be of value, or valuable, they are not of value or valuable to or in or as anything. From the point of view of this thesis, the monetary sense of "value" and its subsequent use are of little importance, and are only mentioned in order that they may not be confused with the first predicative use. It will suffice to quote Kurt Baier's apt comments on the study of this sense of the term "value".

The concept of value, in the sense used in 'the value of a thing' is central to traditional economic Value Theory. The value here investigated is of course the so-called exchange or market value of a commodity. Value theory attempts to give a model of the interaction of all the forces which determine the fluctuations of the market value or price of commodities in a given market. Now, while such a theory would (if sound) be for many purposes of enormous practical importance, it would not say

anything about what we ordinarily mean by the value of things. In fact, Value Theory deliberately sets out to by-pass that question and is wholly successful in doing so. Instead of telling us the value of a commodity, it tells us its price, that is, the quantity of resources a person must relinquish if he is to secure this commodity ... But, it is only if one knows, at least roughly, what the value of a thing is, that knowledge of its price can help him to act rationally.¹

Verbal Use (i)

The first definition of the verb, "to value" offered by the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary is "to estimate or appraise as being worth a specified sum or amount". In this sense, real estate agents are said to "value a property", a buyer may be said to "value a purchase", a pawnbroker may be said to "value a person's possessions". In each case, the verb has the sense of assessing the monetary worth of the objects involved. Such assessments may vary from very high monetary worth, to very low monetary worth, including no monetary worth at all. As with the sense discussed directly above, assessments of monetary worth are not necessarily guided by any value that

1. Ibid, p.36.

the thing may be judged to have in the first sense of the word "value" that was discussed. Sometimes this sense of the term "value" is also used when people are said to evaluate the goodness of things. This use we shall see, creates an ambiguity in the meaning of the verb "to value".

The ambiguity of the word "value", particularly in its verbal use, but also in its predicative use, may be found in the gradations of meaning listed under the verb "to value". Apart from the verbal sense already quoted, the Oxford Dictionary goes on to list as meanings of the word "... to estimate the value of (goods, property etc.); to appraise in respect of value ... to estimate or regard as having a certain value or worth". To regard as having worth, comes very close to the second set of definitions which read, "To consider of worth or importance; to rate high; to esteem; to set store by ... To take account of; to heed or be concerned about ..."

In these definitions there is a subtle mixing of two distinct notions: that of assessing or appraising something in a certain way, and that of having a certain attitude towards something. There is also a slide from a clear reference to monetary value, to that of "worth and importance" which could have connotations rather closer to the first sense of "value" that was mentioned. We have

already noted the difference in sense between the two predicative uses of "value". Let us now consider the second verbal use of "value" which we have distinguished broadly, as having a certain attitude towards something.

Verbal Use (ii)

The attitudinal sense of "value" when used as a verb, I take to be expressed in statements like the following:

"He values his collection of medieval literature."

"I value my daily exercise."

"Living in a remote area, he values the opportunity of reading newspapers from the mainland."

"She values her career more than a stable family life."

"He values the Prime Minister's friendship."

The attitude referred to in these statements is dependent on a certain type of assessment that is often referred to by the word "value", but which is probably more clearly labelled by the word "evaluation". Henceforth, I shall refer to that sense of "value" outlined in the first verbal use as an evaluation; that is an assessment or an appraisal, whether it be in monetary terms or otherwise. I shall reserve the verbal use of the word "value" to denote a certain type of attitude that has been alluded

to in the examples above. That these two senses are commonly confused is beyond doubt. I shall quote a comment from Nicholas Rescher in order to highlight this confusion. In discussing the objectivity of value-judgments, or evaluations, Rescher makes the following comment,

The controversy about the objectivity of values comes down to this: Is something valuable because it is valued (and so, solely because it is regarded by people in a certain way), or is something valued - properly or correctly valued - when it is valuable, that is, when it is objectively possessed of certain value-endowing features? The question can be put another way by asking what type of valuing situation is to be taken as typical. Is the paradigm evaluation that of a postage stamp, whose sole value resides in the fact that men wish to own it?¹

The confusion in Rescher's comment arises when he fails to distinguish that situation in which something is valued, which he later refers to as a "valuing situation" from that situation in which an evaluation is made. In order for the first part of his comment to make any sense at all, it must be interpreted as a reference to the attitudinal sense of "value". For, if something is valuable because it is valued this cannot mean that it is valuable because it may be assessed or appraised in any of a number of ways,

1. Nicholas Rescher, Introduction to Value Theory (New Jersey, 1969), p.56.

that is to say, evaluated, but only because it is regarded in a certain favourable way. If the word "valued" was to be interpreted in this context to mean assessed or appraised it would have to be suitably qualified as favourably valued, for the fact that something is valued, in the sense of being assessed or evaluated, does not carry with it any implications of how favourably or unfavourably it is assessed. It does not carry with it any implications about how people will regard the thing assessed or evaluated. This must wait on the outcome of the evaluation.

Nor can it be argued that to regard something favourably amounts to exactly the same thing as assessing, appraising or evaluating something highly. Let us consider some of the examples given at the beginning of this section. To assess something favourably is to bring a certain judgment about the thing; to perform a certain act at a certain point in time. If we are to interpret the statement, "He values his collection of medieval literature" to mean that he assesses his collection, what should we take the sense of the statement to be? That the person involved does this periodically? Or, perhaps the statement is part of a day-to-day commentary on what this particular person does. Perhaps it is an announcement of what he is now doing. Such interpretations are not very plausible, and become even more implausible when applied to first-person statements.

When a person says that he values something, he is not announcing the occurrence of a particular evaluation at all, but stating that he has a certain attitude to something which may continue over an unspecified period of time.

It may still be argued that even if this distinction holds, that which is evaluated favourably is always valued in the attitudinal sense. I wish to argue that this claim is also false. Let us assume that to value something is to regard it favourably or even highly. This I take to be a conceptual point about what it is to value something. If a person claimed to value something that he did not view favourably in any respect, or that he viewed favourably in some respect which he disclaimed to be relevant to his valuing the thing, he would be misusing the word "value". To value something is to have a positively favourable attitude towards it. However, the fact that we evaluate something favourably does not entail that we therefore value it. For example, I may judge that some drugs are of great value in the production of certain hallucinations and yet have a very low opinion of the activity of stimulating such hallucinations, and hold the drugs concerned in great disfavour. I may judge that a certain type of war-head is of the greatest value in conducting inter-continental warfare, and yet being pacifist positively abhor such objects and the uses to which they are put. Such

evaluations could be called disinterested evaluations, where the point of view from which the evaluation is made is not adopted by the evaluator as his own standpoint. The fact that this is so does not affect the nature of the judgment as an evaluation. Such evaluations are most commonly found in those situations where advice is being given to another person. We may say to a person "If you want to do X, then Z would be of value to you". Such a statement gives no indication of how favourably disposed we are to things of kind X or Z other than that Z would be of value to the advisee in doing X. That we have offered an evaluation however, is not in question¹.

On the basis of these arguments I shall conclude that the attitudinal sense of "value" is neither equivalent or reducible to evaluation, favourable evaluation, or any use of the word "value" in either of these senses.

The Substantival Use

The following are examples of the use of the word "value" as a substantive.

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1. These comments could be taken to imply the seemingly paradoxical view that to state a favourable evaluation is not necessarily to say something favourable about the object so evaluated. This view will be further discussed in chapter six.

"To do that would be to abandon my values."

"Freedom is the absolute value."

"His ambitions give some indication of his values."

"From the way he acts you would think he has no values."

"Deprived of everything else, he still retained his values."

Words that are sometimes used as synonyms for this sense of the word "value" include "standard", "principle", "belief" and even "morals". The word "morals" has connotations far too narrow to be an exact synonym, the word "belief" has connotations far too broad. Both "standard" and "principle" have senses very much closer to this sense of "value", although as we shall see, there are important differences.

We normally refer to peoples' values when we attempt to explain certain attitudes or actions of theirs. We refer to our own values when explaining why it is that we hold certain attitudes, or do certain things. At the same time, values are strongly dispositional in flavour. They may be utilized in order to give reasons for acting in certain ways, or having certain attitudes, but they may also be utilized in order to explain certain tendencies that a person may have in his actions and attitudes. Rescher, in contrasting reasons and values states,

... consider the claim that Smith ran 'because he wanted to get to the train on time'. Any explanation of this sort clearly cannot work out unless Smith gave explicit consideration to the train and the matter of getting to it. But if Smith stood his ground under fire 'out of devotion to duty and love of country', we are not in a position to say anything specific about what sorts of thoughts he must have 'had in mind' on the occasion in question. Value explanations do not indicate anything about specific reasons. Yet they are obviously not causal: they tell us nothing about the effective mechanisms or processes through whose functioning the actions came about.¹

Although we may not wish to agree with Rescher that in order for something to be a reason for an action it must be consciously entertained directly prior to that action, he is correct in saying that reference to a value in order to explain why a certain act (or a number of acts) were executed, need not refer to one or a number of conscious resolutions on the part of the person who has so acted, prior to the performance of those acts. Specific reference to a value may be utilized as a reason for doing something or having a certain attitude. However, we may also refer to values in a dispositional explanation of why a person acted in a certain way or tends to act in a certain way.

1. Nicholas Rescher, Introduction to Value Theory (New Jersey, 1969), p.22.

We do things on account of our values, or because of our values; we act in accord with our values or contrary to our values. In this sense, values could be said to be action guiding. Yet, it would be mistaken to equate values with deontic principles such as "One ought never to tell lies" or "One ought never to be extravagant", for a person may cite truth and thrift as values of his, without ever forming such principles. The manifestations of his adherence to these values may be too diverse to allow the formulation of a single principle for acting. The closest we or the man himself may approach to forming deontic principles might be to state ways in which he would tend to act given certain typical situations, attitudes he would tend to adopt given certain information. For this same reason it is mistaken to think of values as standards. We have different standards for appraising different types of activity and actions, for appraising different kinds of objects. Admittedly people talk of having moral standards, which depending on the circumstances may be applicable to just about any realm of action, but then values may be applicable in situations that do not even involve moral considerations. Of course, there may be values that are peculiarly applicable to different realms of activity, but they nevertheless differ from standards in that they are not formulated regulations for activities in different spheres. Standards are normally

employed to decide which act is the best in the circumstances. Values are not employed in order to decide which act to perform or which attitude to adopt; rather, it is the case that in acting in certain ways, in having certain attitudes, we adopt or adhere to certain values. Thus, to say that freedom is a value of a certain person, is to imply that he acts with regard to freedom, perhaps with regard to the maintenance of his own and other peoples' freedom. However, we may also say of such a person that he did such-and-such because he has as a value, freedom, which is to give a reason for or a rationalization of his act.

Values may conflict and it is in such situations that values may appear most like priorities in action. When there is a possibility of jeopardizing or transgressing one of two values by acting in a certain way, if we have no alternative we will attempt to decide which of our values is more important, or which has greater priority. Here is a further way in which values differ from both principles and standards. If it is the case that principles or standards applicable in the same area conflict in their application, we normally view this as a defect in those principles or standards. However, conflicts in values are common, and by no means indicate that a person has a faulty

set of values. Rather we view such a person as unlucky, for he must choose between different ways of acting, or perhaps opining, both of which he believes to be desirable.

Let us now try to formulate more clearly what it means to say that someone has a certain value. We have given as examples of values truth, thrift and freedom. To these we could add beauty, economic security, justice, bravery, equality, and any number of others. Values are points of view that may represent properties or qualities of objects, people, relations between people, states of affairs, states of affairs themselves and so on¹. When we articulate such a point of view, we give a label to one or other of these things, which we believe to be desirable in the object, person or what have you. However, we see such things to be desirable in a particular way - desirable in that they directly relate to and add to, the quality of our lives, to the excellence of the way in which we live. I would further suggest that we only label such things as values if it is the case that we believe that they will make a significant or important difference of a desirable nature, to the quality of our lives. Presumably it makes some sort of difference, of a desirable nature, if we have

1. For a fairly thorough listing of types of values see Nicholas Rescher, "The Dimensions of Values" in Introduction to Value Theory, pp.13-19.

sharp knives in the kitchen, but to say that sharpness is one of our values sounds not only strange, but absurd, because the desirability of such a property compared with others we could mention appears so trivial. Of course, if our very lives depended on sharp knives, sharpness in knives could become a value. The importance of those things which we label as values is mirrored in the dispositional nature of values that we have already mentioned. They are things that we tend to act to protect, or realise, things, when represented as a point of view, that we adopt as principles of judgment in decisions about what we should do in relevant circumstances. In summary, I would suggest that to have a value is to have a point of view which represents or may label something which we believe the realisation or protection of which will make an important difference, of a desirable nature, to the quality of our lives. When we act in order to realise or protect values, we act in accord with them, and because we regard values as important considerations, we tend to act consistently with them over substantial periods of time, in circumstances which we judge to be relevant to them. It should also be remembered that values may be articulated in order to give reasons for acting in certain ways, or for adopting certain attitudes. The notion of a value is thus a many-faceted one.

The relation between values that we hold, and things that we value is an intimate one. As we have argued, the fact that we may evaluate something favourably does not entail that we value that thing. To value something is at least to have a favourable attitude toward that thing, and we need not necessarily have a favourable attitude towards things that we evaluate favourably; that is to say, things that we evaluate, for example, to be good or of value in something or other. It has been suggested that values may be utilized in order to explain not only why people tend to act in certain ways, but also to explain certain attitudes that they tend to adopt. It will be argued at a later stage that those things that we value are things that we have evaluated favourably from a point of view or interest which is, or is governed by, a value of ours; that the measure of the things that we value are values that we hold¹.

Only one comment about use of the word "value" remains to be made. It is not uncommon to hear people say almost "in the same breath" that they both value and have as a value, say, freedom. Is it possible to both value and have as a value something? Certainly it is the case that one person may value what another man has as a value. For example, a man may have as a value political friendships, because he believes that this particular type of friendship makes an important desirable difference to the quality of his life.

1. See chapter five.

He may fulfil all the different facets of having this as a value that have been outlined. On the other hand, a person may value political friendships among other types of friendship because he has friendship as a value¹. There does not appear to be anything paradoxical in this situation. But could a man both have as a value, and value, political friendships? Although this may sound paradoxical, we will see in fact that it is not. If a person has something as a value, he will regard that as an interest or point of view with which he desires to act consistently, or with regard to, or in protection of and so on. If a person values something, he may act in a similar way towards it. However, as will be argued in chapter three, we may only value things with which we are acquainted, or with which we are experienced. Political friendship is a thing that a person may experience with not too much difficulty, and a person may say that he values his political friendships, because, generally, political friendship is a value of his. On the other hand, a person may say that he values his freedom because freedom is a value of his. By this he may mean that he believes that freedom of people generally enhances to an important degree the environment in which he,

1. This example is adapted from one given by Kurt Baier in "What is value? An analysis of the concept" in Values and the Future, pp.61-62.

among others, lives. It may be the case that it gives him pleasure to learn of the freedom of others, or the protection of the freedom of others. However, this is not to say that he may value the freedom of each and every person who has freedom, or value some entity such as freedom in general. Unless he has some direct acquaintance or experiences of such discrete cases of freedom he will not value them. Finally, a person may have as a value something not only that he does not, but cannot, value. A slave may have as a value freedom, and try constantly to realise it, but never having experienced freedom himself, or observed the freedom of others that gives him some pleasure, he could not be said to value his own, or anybody else's freedom. We may have as a value some abstract object, or unrealised state of affairs. These are not things we may value, because they are not things we can experience or be acquainted with in the appropriate sense. But we may have as values things that we may value, for something being a value is constituted primarily in the way that it affects our actions and attitudes. Material objects and existent states of affairs may influence our attitudes and actions in just this way. Thus, we may conclude that whilst things we may have as values and objects of valuing may overlap, they are not co-extensive.

In the chapters that follow an explanation of what it is to value something will be attempted. The problem will be approached in three different ways. It will be asked whether or not we may talk of proper objects of valuing, and if so, what these are. Valuing will then be compared to liking, wanting and admiring, and it will be argued that valuing is not identical with any of these. An explanation of valuing will be given in terms of how we could come to recognise that someone did value a certain thing. This will be done in terms of what will be called symptoms of valuing. Finally there will be a discussion of what could amount to good reasons or grounds for valuing something. At this point, the relation of evaluation and the having of values, to valuing something will be discussed further. In chapter six we will draw some conclusions.

CHAPTER III
OBJECTS OF VALUING

What sorts of thing do people value? They claim to value qualities in men such as honesty, generosity, courage and mercy. It is also said that men value abilities such as the ability to create works of art - novels, poems, paintings, concertos - or the ability to play a musical instrument well, or to act or sing. People sometimes claim to value states of being such as peace, happiness, tranquility or saintliness. Sometimes it is said that the acts and attitudes of other people towards us are valued, such as forgiveness, praise or respect. We value people for qualities they possess. Perhaps the most common objects of valuing are objects which we may have as possessions. These we may value in virtue of certain qualities or properties they may have which make them suitable to be used as means to ends that we desire. Or, we may value certain objects simply for the type of object that they are. We have listed as things people are said to value objects, people, qualities of these, abilities, states of being and attitudes.

This list is impressive, if only for its variety and apparent lack of cohesion. It would appear to be the case

that people may be said to value almost anything, and yet it would also appear to be the case that the number of things that we do in fact value is relatively small. However, the large variety of things that we value can appear to frustrate the task of giving them a particular characterisation of their own. Perhaps the best way to approach this task is to look, not at the different kinds of thing that may be valued, but at the mode or manner in which such objects are seen by valuing agents. We must also see if there are any particular relations which must hold between the object valued, and he who values it. We must attempt to understand the conceptual links between a valued object and the agent who values it. Our task will be to isolate what I shall call the "proper objects" of valuing.

The Notion of a Proper Object

The notion of a proper object is perhaps most clearly represented in our talk about certain sensory activities. I shall take the senses of taste and hearing as examples. We may talk about eating and tasting all sorts of edible substances which may vary in texture, colour, shape or quantity. In talking of the nature of these foods, we may describe them according to the percentage of protein,

carbohydrates or fat that they contain. This is the manner in which we give an indication of their nutritive value. If we are teaching a person how to distinguish different types of food at sight, we will give a description of their outward appearances, and even in the cooking of food, many of our comments will relate to the texture and nutritive qualities of the food. However, a third dimension of our descriptions of food involves the comments we may make on the flavours or taste of foods. We describe foods with respect to how they taste. Foods may be called "sweet", "sour", "bitter", "tangy". These words we use as names for different flavours that foods may have. We taste the sweetness or bitterness of a certain food. We may also talk of the flavours of certain foods being "pungent", "subtle", "crude", "fullsome". Such words are normally employed to comment on the quality of the flavour of the food. We may distinguish between the different flavours that different foods have, although we have not developed a vocabulary to name all these different flavours. They are normally identified by the food to which they belong. It is the flavours of food that are the proper objects of tasting. We do not taste the colour or shape or quantity of food. Neither is it the case that we are said to taste the nutritive composition of food,

although proteins and carbohydrates, for instance, are substances that we consume when we eat different foods. Nevertheless, we more often than not talk about tasting different foods, rather than tasting the flavours of different foods, for we cannot taste the flavour of a food independently of consuming the food itself. However, the concept of tasting is related and applicable to only one property of food - its flavour. To talk of tasting any other property of food would amount to a conceptual error about what it is to taste anything at all. Thus, although we may talk of tasting foods, the proper object of tasting is the flavour of the food.

Very similar comments may be made about the proper objects of hearing. We talk of hearing objects, such as bells or machines. We very often talk about hearing the occurrence of certain events. We hear cars collide, horses running, explosives detonated, trains passing over a bridge. In all these cases the proper object of our hearing is a sound caused by the particular event in question. Other aspects of such events are not objects which we could be said to hear. We cannot hear the angle at which cars collide, we cannot hear that the horse is running with his head held high, although the sound we do hear is identified by the event which caused it.

Apart from proper objects of the senses, we may also talk about proper objects of certain attitudes. Here the

connotations of the term "proper object" are slightly different, though it still serves to mark off those objects toward which the attitude may be directed from those toward which it may not. Proper objects for both senses and attitudes may be regarded as the termini toward which they are directed. The concept of what a certain sense or attitude is determines the nature of the terminus or objective to which it is directed. The termini of taste and hearing are certain properties of foods, and events or objects. They are formal objectives to which the senses are linked conceptually. Attitudes too, have their formal objectives, although these, rather than being properties of things toward which we have attitudes, are appropriate conceptualisations of those things. The type of attitude that we have will require us to conceive of or characterize the thing toward which we direct a certain attitude, in a particular way that conceptually "fits" the attitude we adopt. Sometimes such characterisations will imply that certain necessary relations hold between the thing and the agent. This will become evident as we discuss examples. I shall take as my examples fearing and hating.

The kinds of thing we may fear are obviously very various. However, in order for it to be the case that we do in fact fear something, it must be the case that we hold

certain beliefs about that thing. We do not fear things that we believe to have no relevance to us whatsoever. We fear things that we believe can affect us or people or things for which we are concerned in some way. Further, we must believe that this effect would be of an undesirable nature. We must also believe that there is some likelihood that the object of our fear will in fact affect us in an undesirable way. People in Australia no longer fear smallpox, for it is a disease they are adequately guarded against. Objects that fill these requirements I shall call "threats". In order for something to be a proper object of fear, it must be the case that the person who fears it can characterise the object as a threat. If the object cannot be so characterised, we would find it difficult to understand what a person's fear of an object amounted to. It would appear either that he was misdescribing his attitude toward the object, or lying. Of course it is possible that objects may be misdescribed as proper objects of fear. A man may see as a threat something we could not conceive of as being a threat. In such a case we may conclude that the man is suffering from some kind of nervous disorder. On the other hand, there may be quite legitimate discussion about whether or not a certain undesirable effect is of the degree to warrant it being

described as a "threat". In this respect, the requirements for satisfying the criteria for something being a proper object of fear cannot be rigidly drawn.

This element of flexibility is even more noticeable when we consider objects of hate. To hate something is to have an attitude of extreme dislike toward that thing, and perhaps in addition, to bear malice towards that thing. In order to justify something as an object of hate, the thing must be characterised not merely as undesirable, but as evil, or extremely distasteful. The extreme dislike which constitutes hating is itself dependent on the degree to which an object is characterised as distasteful or undesirable, yet there is no particular point at which we may say that such-and-such is now a proper object of hate. Nevertheless, an object that is only undesirable or distasteful to a very minor degree, or is not seen to be undesirable at all, could not be a proper object of hate.

The notion of the proper object of an attitude rests on the way in which the object is characterised. Thus, to describe a murderer merely by his physical appearance will probably not be enough to characterise him as an object of hate. However, if the same man is characterised by his infamous deeds, if he is shown to be extremely undesirable, to be evil, then we may regard him as a proper object of

hate. As for fear, hate would also appear to demand fairly immediate experience of the object¹. We tend not to hate things that are remote, even if they are evil. Thus a second element in distinguishing the objects of these attitudes is the immediacy of the relation that they bear to us. It is these two types of consideration that will be found to be relevant in characterising the proper objects of valuing: characterisation of the object, and the relation of the object to the valuing agent.

As a preliminary to our discussion of proper objects of valuing, I wish to comment on Anscombe's description of the objects of wanting². It will be argued at a later stage that a symptom of valuing something is that the object is wanted. We would therefore expect our characterisation of the objects of valuing to be compatible, if not identical with a characterisation of the objects of wanting.

1. It may be argued that we can hate people described in novels with whom we have never had any direct contact. In such cases, I would suggest that we feel "as if we know the persons" and in this sense, such cases are parasitic on, or secondary to, cases of direct or immediate experience.
2. G.E.M. Anscombe, Intention (Oxford, 1958), pp.66-77.

Objects of Wanting

As Anscombe explicates the notion, "wanting" may only occur on the part of a creature that can be said to "know" the object. Wanting is "neither wishing nor hoping nor feeling of desire, and cannot be said to exist in a man who does nothing towards getting what he wants". On these grounds Anscombe restricts objects of wanting to future states of affairs, and present and future objects¹. However, the more important aspect of Anscombe's discussion concerns the actual characterisation of objects of value. Anscombe states,

The conceptual connexion between 'wanting' (in the sense we have isolated ...) and 'good' can be compared to the conceptual connexion between 'judgment' and 'truth'. Truth is the object of judgment and good the object of wanting ...²,

for,

To say 'I merely want this' without any characterisation is to deprive the word of sense; if ... (a person) insists on 'having' the thing, we want to know what having amounts to.³

On Anscombe's view, if a person wants something in the sense stipulated, he should always be able to give an answer to

1. It will be argued in chapter four that there is a sense of "want" in which the object of want need not necessarily be absent. I thus reject Anscombe's "trying to get" criterion for wanting.

2. Ibid, p.75.

3. Ibid, p.71.

the question "What for?". If the question cannot be answered, it is difficult to understand what wanting amounts to for the person. Objects of want must have desirability characterisations, for it is only in knowing how the object is desirable, in what way it is good, that we may understand what it is to want that object.

Anscombe's use of the word "desirable" does not necessarily have connotations of the pleasant or enjoyable. These are only two among many desirability characterisations. To say that an object is wanted, is to say that it is wanted for something or other. In answering the question, "What do you want it for?" we explain in what way the object is wantable or desirable. Anscombe cites a case of a Nazi who wants to kill some Jewish children before he dies. The Nazi may maintain that this is an act that befits him, as a Nazi, in the last hours of his life. That is what he wants to kill them for. In this case there need be no question of whether or not the Nazi finds his act pleasant; he might find it distinctly unpleasant. Yet, with slavish respect for the Führer he may still believe it to be a highly desirable act.

Thus, Anscombe maintains that it is always reasonable to ask of a person who claims to want something, for what does he want that thing. If a person cannot answer this question, we have grounds for believing that he does not want the thing at all, or at least does not know himself

what it means to say that he wants that thing, for he has not distinguished the thing that he wants as a proper object of want.

I shall accept Anscombe's argument that a proper object of wanting is one that can be given a desirability characterisation. However, there is a certain point at which Anscombe's argument contains an element of glibness. It is worthy of note as it will bear relevance at a later stage to the discussion of proper objects of valuing. Throughout her argument Anscombe equates the two questions, "What do you want X for?" and "Why do you want X?" Both questions are taken to be directed towards an explanation of why an object is an object of want. They are taken to ask what it is about the object that makes it wanted. Both questions are thus directed purely towards a characterisation of the object in question. Anscombe's justification for treating the two questions interchangeably is presumably that according to the type of object being considered, one or other of the questions will be appropriate. "What for?" is a question which is grammatically better suited to questions about means to ends. However, if I want a certain object because it is pretty, strictly speaking I may not want it for anything, although there is certainly a reason why I want the object. I shall

not therefore wrangle about whether or not the two questions are strictly equivalent. However, the form of the second question, "Why do you want X?", is a form that is open to a rather different emphasis from the one that Anscombe has adopted. The question, "Why do you F X?", where "F" stands for some standpoint or activity directed towards X, may be used to ask what it is about the object that justifies the adoption of that standpoint. Here a certain ignorance as to the nature of the object is confessed. However, this question may also be used to ask, given the nature of the object, why that particular standpoint came to be adopted. This sense of the question is only meaningful when something other than a characterisation of the object is needed in order to distinguish it as a proper object of that standpoint. The attitude of hate is a case in point. As we pointed out, an object of hate must be something not only characterisable as evil, but must bear some relation to he who claims to hate the object. I know that the Emperor Nero was an evil man, but for me to hate him would be quite ridiculous. Not merely because the man is now dead, but because I have never had any experience of the man, either directly or indirectly. This qualification to objects of hate is not part of the characterisation of any such object, but a relation that must hold between an

object of hate and the person who claims to hate it.

Anscombe obviously thought that this type of consideration was of small importance to objects of wanting, and I do not here wish to pursue a discussion on this point. However, it will be argued that such considerations, along with proper characterisation of the object, are relevant to isolating what are the proper objects of valuing. It is to this task we shall now turn.

Proper Objects of Valuing¹

I shall adopt Anscombe's method, in attempting to describe proper objects of valuing. It will be assumed that in the answer to the question, "Why do you value X?", the elements that delineate proper objects of valuing are to be found. Let us imagine a case in which a person is asked to explain why it is that he values a certain thing. Let us suppose that a woodsman is asked why it is that he values a certain axe. He may say that he uses the axe in his work, but this in itself does not appear to be an adequate explanation of why he values it. He may add that he judges it to be a very good axe with which to do the

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1. I shall use the phrase "objects of valuing" rather than "objects of value" in order to avoid confusion between objects of evaluation, and the concern of this chapter, objects of valuing.

work that occupies him. This more adequately explains why it is that the woodsman values the axe. The fact that he uses it in his work is compatible with the axe being a pretty ineffectual instrument in his work. Unless we were to assume that it was good in some other respect, or comparatively speaking was the best axe he could come by, the mere fact that the axe was employed would not appear sufficient to explain why it was valued. However, it should be noted that if the axe were merely good as an instrument for killing snakes, and not as an axe, this would not support the woodsman's claim to value the axe, unless he claimed to value it as a snake-killing instrument. The object's goodness must be found in that aspect of the thing that is seen to be desirable. However, even this does not seem enough to explain why the woodsman values the axe. So far, the axe has not been distinguished from anything else that the axeman might see to be desirable and good in a certain respect. I would suggest that a third element that is needed to distinguish objects of valuing is that they be important to the persons who value them. If it is the case that the woodsman's means of livelihood is the felling of trees, then it is reasonable to assume that a good axe is important to him. To put it crudely, objects that we value are objects that we care about, not merely ones that we notice to be desirable and

good, or approve of in some off-hand fashion. These I shall take as the three elements of an adequate characterisation of a proper object of value: that the object be desirable, that it be judged good in that respect in which it is found to be desirable, and that it be important to the person who values it. In addition to this I wish to add two requirements concerning the relation between the object and he who values it which I think are implicit in the example given. First, it must be the case that the valuing agent is acquainted with the object that he values. He must "know" the object in the sense that Anscombe stipulated that objects of wanting must be known. In addition to this, however, he must have had some experience of the object. He must have seen it or been acquainted with it in the capacity for which he values it. In terms of our example, the woodsman could not be said to value an axe that had been put into his hands that very minute. He may come to value it after some use, and expect to value it after some use, however, he could not value it in anticipation of its usefulness¹. Second, it should be the

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1. There is one exception to this rule. If it is the case that a person has valued a certain object which is replaced by an identical one or one that is very similar, he may continue to value such an object as he did the other one because his knowledge or acquaintance with this object would not amount to anything different from that with the other object. However, this depends on the fact that there is a high degree of similarity between the two objects. They are desirable, good and important in just the same ways.

case that an object which is valued is available in the capacity for which it is valued. If the object is an instrument, it must be the case that he who values it can use it, or at least thinks he can. If the object is valued, say, for its aesthetic qualities, it must be observable by he who values it and so on.

This completes the list of requirements for something being a proper object of valuing. We shall now consider these requirements one by one.

(i) Desirability

Desirability characterisations of valued objects presuppose universal premises concerning that kind of thing on which the particular desirability characterisation rests. In the case of our woodsman, the pattern of reasoning might be, "Axes are of use to woodsmen, I am a woodsman, this is an axe, this axe is of use to me". Another such pattern would be, "Objects that are aesthetically good give pleasure, this is an aesthetically good object, this object will give pleasure". A consideration that is extraneous to the actual formal presentation of the syllogisms, but essential to understanding the relevance of such syllogisms to valuing, is that the valuing agent is favourably disposed towards, or has an interest in, the kind of thing characterised in the universal premise. For example, the syllogism in itself would not explain why it is that

the axe was an object of valuing for the woodsman, unless it were the case that he desired to act in the capacity of a woodsman¹. Even if he were a woodsman, if he couldn't care less about being a woodsman, or hated being a woodsman, this pattern of reasoning could not explain to us why he valued the axe. Similarly, if it were the case that a certain person did not in fact derive pleasure from aesthetically good objects, or thought it was evil to do so, an argument to the effect that such objects do give pleasure would not be a convincing reason for thinking that that person valued aesthetically good objects. It is this consideration which helps us to understand, in part, how it is that people may value objects not directly related to themselves, but say, related to other people for whom they care. How and why we become favourably disposed towards things that affect other people, or favourably disposed towards the welfare of other people, will be discussed briefly in chapter five. It will be suggested there, that the kinds of things to which we are favourably disposed is governed by the values that we have. For the moment, however, these comments will suffice for our discussion of the desirability characterisation of an object of valuing.

1. As was seen in chapter one, such interests may be incorporated in such patterns of reasoning.

(ii) Goodness

Anscombe has described any object that may be characterised as desirable as "a good". She flirts with the idea that all goods, in this sense, could be pleasures of some kind, but leaves the problem unsolved. Aristotle has argued that the "goods" we pursue are the ends of activities¹, a modern writer, D.S. Schwayder that there are natural goods for each kind of animal which are "natural objects of desire"². However, the exact sense that we are to give to the word "good" used in this context remains a puzzle. I do not wish to pursue this problem, but only to point out that this sense of the word is quite different from that in which we talk about something being "good of a kind". The latter implies that an evaluation of the object as a certain kind of thing has taken place, the former does not. Objects of valuing are "goods" in Anscombe's sense, but also objects that are evaluated to be good of some kind.

Objects that we value are not merely objects that are desirable in some way, but also regarded highly in that same capacity or respect for which they are found to be

1. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1097^a 19-21.

2. D.S. Schwayder, The Stratification of Behaviour (New York, 1965), p.74.

desirable¹. However, such evaluations are not always made according to what we might call natural kinds, like apples, trees, houses and horses, but according to a particular interest or set of interests that the evaluator might have. This aspect of the evaluation of objects of valuing was discussed in chapter one, where we explicated the notion of an evaluation from a point of view. There it was argued that things evaluated in this way could be said to belong to rather broad classes of things, relevant to the interests embodied in the point of view. It was suggested that qualified evaluations are a similar type of evaluation in that an evaluator might adopt a certain aspect or characteristic of certain objects, as a measure by which to evaluate them, thus reflecting a particular interest in the objects. We normally adopt points of view or particular considerations in evaluation because we believe them worthwhile standpoints from which to look at things. We view with favour that way of looking at things, and consequently things that are judged good from that standpoint. Thus, a person with the interests of a businessman will view with favour an investment judged

1. Sometimes we may regard an object highly because although it is not a good one of its kind or in that respect we find desirable, it is the best available to us. However, if it were the case that good ones of that kind were available to us, we would not value a poor specimen of that kind.

to be good from his point of view. A person who views with favour consideration of the aesthetic qualities of objects will be favourably disposed to objects judged to be aesthetically good. In evaluation from a point of view, or qualified evaluations, the explanation of why a particular object, evaluated to be good, is viewed with favour is inherent in the type of evaluation. We need only point to the fact that the person who has so evaluated the object has adopted that point of view, or that standpoint, for looking at objects. To adopt a point of view is tacitly to acknowledge it as a worthwhile consideration. On the other hand, I may regard highly a very good meal, not because I am evaluating it from any point of view or in any particular respect, but merely because I am favourably disposed to things of that kind, to food, and particularly good food. An explanation of why we tend to be favourably disposed to certain kinds of thing and not others is extremely difficult to give. I suspect it is partly concerned with the kind of being that we are. This point will be discussed in a little more detail when we consider human values in chapter five.

Point-of-view evaluations also give some insight into what we might call the "person-relative" nature of valuing. A man may value a certain instrument not because it is good

of its kind, but because given his kind of limitations, or his style of doing things, it is good from his point of view. In such cases, requirements that the instrument would not be expected to fulfil in order for it to be a good one of its kind may be introduced in considering what would be good for that man. For example, a man may value a certain lathe not because it is a good one of its kind, but because, having an injured hand, it is the best one for his use. Of course, such a man may always be mistaken about what in fact is the best lathe for his use. Such judgments should not therefore be written off as mere subjective preferences.

It is possible to regard with favour anything to which may be given a desirability characterisation. However, not all things that may be given a desirability characterisation may in fact be regarded with favour, and not all things that we regard favourably are necessarily things that we value. However, if it is the case that a certain object is good of a kind or in a certain respect to which we are favourably disposed, and judge to be desirable, it is far more likely that we will value that thing because we will regard that thing highly, or be very favourably disposed towards it. I would suggest that for an object to be a proper object of valuing, it must also be regarded as important by

the valuing agent. In just what sense such objects should be believed important we shall now discuss.

(iii) Importance

Within the precincts of this study it is impossible to give anything like a full account of the notion of importance. Comments that will follow are highly selective and are not intended to give a full account, but only to discuss some aspects of importance that appear relevant to valuing.

Perhaps the sense of importance with which we are most familiar is that called by Dorothy Emmett, "hypothetical relational importance"¹. This sense of the word "importance" is normally used to describe some means that is necessary to, or extremely helpful in the pursuit or achievement of a certain end. Some examples are:

It is important to understand concept B if you want to understand concept A.

If the dish is to be cooked satisfactorily, it is important to simmer the meat at a low heat.

If you want to be an opening batsman, it is important to know how to handle fast bowlers.

"Being important" in these examples amounts to making a great difference to whether or not the end is achieved, or to whether or not success is attained in a certain activity.

In such contexts, "importance" carries the connotation of

1. Dorothy Emmett, "Emphasis and Importance", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. LI, p.306.

favourably affecting the achievement of an end, rather than unfavourably affecting it. Something that adversely affects the achievement of a certain activity is not described as important to it, although avoidance of or abstinence from that thing may be described as important. In this sense of "importance" things are always important to, or for, something else. This sense of the word "importance" is not a contentious one.

Is there a categorical sense of "importance" in which we may say simply, "B is important, more important than A or E or D."? This suggestion could amount to two different things: either, to the suggestion that we can compare the importance of different things; or to the suggestion that things can be important, without being important to anything in particular. The former suggestion I shall accept, the latter reject. If a student were to say "Studying quantum mechanics is more important than learning how to dice onions", how should we construe such a remark? We might interpret that to mean that as far as the student is concerned, a mastery of quantum mechanics is more important to his future employment than a mastery of the dicing of onions. We might also interpret his remark to mean that a study of quantum mechanics is more important to a mastering of physics than the dicing of onions is to the

mastery of cooking. Both these interpretations are quite acceptable. However, if our student were to claim that quantum mechanics just is more important, more significant than dicing onions, what sense could we give to such a claim? If we were to ask in what way one is more important than the other, we would be asking for an explication of what the things were important to. If we understood "more significant" to mean, "making a greater difference", we could still ask, what quantum mechanics made a greater difference to, for things cannot "make a difference" at all, without making a difference to something or other. I would thus resist the suggestion that things may be important, or more important than other things, per se. However, I would suggest that things may be relationally important, other than in the pursuit of some end or in the performance of some activity; more explicitly, things can be important to other things, independently of the formation of an hypothesis about a desired end. Thus, to say that an understanding of quantum mechanics is important in the study of physics is to say that quantum mechanics makes a big difference, of a favourable nature, in the study of physics. To say that a university degree is more important than a good batting average may be to imply that a degree is more important in attaining a comfortable life than a good batting

average is. In this relational sense, we may make categorical assertions about the importance of things.

However, we do not appear to value things simply because they are important to something or other. We value things because we believe that they are important to us, important to our lives. This is not to say that valuing cannot be altruistic, for there are no obvious grounds at all for saying that other people, and the welfare of other people, are not relevant to, and cannot be important to, our own lives. However, it may be argued that surely we may value something that is of assistance to another person, or conducive of happiness in another person whether or not we have any relations with that person, or feel any affinity with him at all. For example, it may be argued that a person can value slum clearance, because it is of benefit to a certain number of people, with whom he does not happen to have any contact at all. This is an objection against which I cannot argue conclusively. However, some doubt can be thrown on the objection, by considering a number of cases in which there is no clear relation between the valued object and the valuing agent. Consider the following cases:

1. "I value so-and-so as a comic actor."

(a) said by the manager of a professional grid-iron team,

- (b) said by a theatrical producer.
- 2. "I would value regular rainfalls in this area."
 - (a) said by a tourist from a coastal town,
 - (b) said by a farmer living in the area.
- 3. "I value Mary's education."
 - (a) said by Mary's hairdresser,
 - (b) said by Mary's father.
- 4. "I value a good pin-cushion."
 - (a) said by a nuclear physicist,
 - (b) said by a seamstress.

The point of these examples is not that the speakers listed under (a) could not value what they claim to value, but rather that it sounds implausible, prima facie, that they should value these things. Yet, it does not sound at all implausible that the speakers listed under (b) should value these things. The third example indicates that this implausibility is not to be explained in the fact that only things that are of direct relevance to the valuing agent's own interests appear as proper objects of valuing. A man need not value his daughter's education only because it is going to assist him in some way. He may value it because he cares for his daughter, and it gives him pleasure to see her availing herself of a good education. We do not expect him to have an indifferent attitude towards the welfare of

his daughter. However, for the speakers listed under (a) we cannot see the significance of the valued objects to them. We would want to ask of them "Why do you value that?" whereas for the speakers listed under (b) this question would not appear so pressing, for we can see how their objects of valuing could be not only relevant but important to the type of person that they are, or the type of life that they lead. Further, this implausibility would not be dispelled merely by indicating some relation or other between the valued object and the valuing agent. If the grid-iron manager were to say that he knew the comic actor was a good one, and that the producer had happened to mention to him that he valued the actor, we would still remain unconvinced. On the other hand, if the grid-iron manager were to confess to fatherly concern for the producer, knew that this particular comic-actor was an important member of the troupe, and was eager for the producer to succeed, his case would begin to sound more convincing. Or, the grid-iron manager might confess a secret pleasure that he gets from viewing performances from just this actor. Once again, his case would begin to sound more plausible, for the significance or importance of the valued object to the valuing agent is being revealed. On these grounds, although of course they are only intuitive, I would tend to reject the objection cited above.

Is there a significant difference in saying that something is important in one of the two senses outlined above, and in saying that something is important to someone? If we interpret "importance" to mean "making a (great) difference of a favourable nature", then I do not think that there is a significant difference. Rather, the problem lies in designating more concisely to what in fact a difference is made. But this does not appear to be a problem associated only with talk about things being important to people. If we talk about quantum mechanics being important to an understanding of physics, it may be similarly difficult to designate at just which points in the study of physics a knowledge of quantum mechanics will make a difference. Of a person, we may say that things make a favourable difference to his life if they make his life happier, if they further his interests or ambitions, if they satisfy needs or desires. That different people will find different things to be important to them is of course an implication of this account. However, this does not seem to be a remarkable fact, given that not all people have the same needs, desires, interests, ambitions and so on. However, if a person claims that something is important to him, he should be able to stipulate in what way it is important, or to what aspect of his life that thing makes a difference. He

may claim that a certain thing is important because it makes him happy, or furthers some interest and so on. If a person were to claim that something was important to him, and yet gave no indications whatsoever of being adversely affected when he was deprived of that thing, we would tend to doubt that it was after all important to him. Or, if he were to claim that something was important to him, but could not enunciate why, or how it was important to him, we would at least have difficulty in understanding what it meant to say that that thing was important to him. I would suggest that these features are common to our understanding of any instance of relational importance.

Things may be either directly or indirectly important to persons. Certain ends or certain states of affairs may in themselves make a favourable difference to a person's life. Or, it may be the case that certain things are important to the achievement of such ends or the creation of such states of affairs. Such things may be said to make a favourable difference to the person concerned, to the extent that they are instrumental in producing the relevant end or state of affairs. Such things we may say are indirectly important to the person concerned. I would suggest that objects of valuing are either directly or indirectly important to the person who values them, or more correctly, are judged to be so by the person who values them.

This completes the requirements for a thing being characterised as a proper object of valuing. If it is the case that something may be characterised by the person who claims to value it as desirable, is evaluated to be good in that capacity in which it is desirable, and is important to the valuing agent, then it may be regarded as a proper object of valuing for the valuing agent.

However, as was argued previously, in order for something to be regarded as a proper object of valuing, certain relations must hold between the object and the valuing agent, which cannot strictly be called part of the characterisation of the object. These, we suggested, were that the agent be acquainted with the object of valuing, and that the object be available to the valuing agent. Let us now consider the nature of these two relations.

(iv) Acquaintance

It will be argued in chapter four that valuing is essentially an attitude adopted as a reaction to the presence of an object. In other words, we cannot value things on the advice of other people, or value things because of judgments that other people have made about them, but only according to our own judgments about those things. Further, we may distinguish what it is to have a reaction to a certain object or state of affairs as distinct from having some

reaction to the expectation of attaining an object or actually experiencing a certain state of affairs. And, if it is the case that to value something is to react in a certain way to that thing, and not merely to some hope for the thing, or expectation of it, then I would suggest that we must have some direct acquaintance with objects that we value. Such acquaintance is over and above that required for evaluating the object, or even judging the object's importance. We may do this, even if the object is not yet attainable. We may say that a certain object is desirable in such-and-such a way, and is good in that same respect, and would be important if it could be obtained, and even that it would be valued if it could be obtained. However, we do not in such circumstances claim to value the object, and we cannot be said to value it, or claim to value it until we have in fact directly experienced or observed it in that capacity for which it is valued. I shall postpone further discussion of this notion of acquaintance until chapter four. This relation which must hold between the valued object and the valuing agent somewhat overlaps with the second relation that we have mentioned - availability.

(v) Availability

I shall explicate this notion by means of some examples. Let us suppose that a man needs to travel between Australia and England for certain purposes, and desires to do so very much. Let us further suppose that the man believes that plane travel is by far the best way to commute between the two countries, and on the basis of this claims to value plane travel between the two countries as a means of furthering his interests. However, let us suppose that the man is very poor, and cannot afford to fly to England, and cannot think of any other way of getting himself aboard a plane to fly to England. What are we to make of his claim that he values plane travel in these circumstances? He appears to value a certain thing because it is a means to an end which is desirable for him, and let us assume, important to him. He has evaluated this means as the very best available to him in pursuing his end. However, it is not in fact the case that this means is available to him; he cannot avail himself of it, no matter how much he desires to. But if he cannot avail himself of the object in that capacity for which he claims to value it, how can he be said to value it at all? To value something we must in fact have been favourably affected by the thing in some way, not merely live in the hope that this will come about.

Suppose a young student of art observes a painting which he judged would be instructive to his work, if he could study it. If, for some reason or other he is prevented from seeing the painting again, could he nevertheless claim to value it? For the reasons given above, we must conclude that he cannot be said to value the painting. But, suppose the student can get to see the painting fairly frequently. If he believes that the painting, or the study of it, is of value to his own painting, and if it is the case that painting and learning more about it are important to him, he would have good grounds for saying that he does value the painting.

These two examples illustrate two different ways in which a person may avail himself of a valued object. The second example particularly indicates that we do not have to have as a possession things that we may avail ourselves of.

Let us take another case. Suppose there is a student of art who finds a certain type of sunset inspiring. Although such sunsets are not infrequent, it is pure chance whether or not he happens to see them. He has no way of telling whether or not they will occur on any given night. In what sense could the student be said to avail himself of those sunsets? Admittedly he sees them with his own eyes, and attends to them when he sees them, but that he is able to do

this at all depends on something - the occurrence of the sunsets - that is not in his control. On the other hand, although the student is aware that he has no control over their appearance he may be confident that the sunsets will appear, and that he will continue to see them sometimes and draw inspiration from them. Thus, he may still be said to be able to avail himself of these sunsets, and intend to avail himself of them in the future.

However, the availability condition as it has been explicated so far does not take into account those instances where we may value something altruistically. Let us take as an example a father valuing his daughter's education, not on account of purposes of his, but simply because he cares for his daughter. In such a case, it is not the father who avails himself of the education, but his daughter. But, if it were not the case that she availed herself of the educational facilities open to her, he could not regard the educational facilities as a source of satisfaction to him, as an important influence in his daughter's development. Of course such facilities would retain the potentiality to so influence his daughter, but if in fact they did not, the father would be deprived of the grounds on which he based his valuing of his daughter's education. In cases of altruistic valuing, I would suggest that although the valuing agent need not avail himself of the valued object, if

it is not availed of by the person for whom it is valued, the valuing agent will be deprived of adequate grounds on which to value that object. Such cases, I would suggest, are derivative in nature, depending on the notion of a valuing agent availing himself of that which he values.

I hope that these examples indicate that what availability will amount to in any situation of valuing depends largely on the type of object that is valued. Availing oneself of an aesthetically good object, and availing oneself of an axe amount to very different sorts of acts. Very broadly we may say that to avail oneself of an object of valuing is to utilize it, or take advantage of it, in that capacity for which it is valued.

One further qualification concerning availability remains to be made. That is, that in order for something to be an object of valuing it is not merely sufficient that the object has been availed of at some time in the past by the valuing agent, but that he also believes that he may avail himself of that object in the future. This I think is implied in the stipulation that the object is available, for if an object has been availed of, but a person does not believe that it can be again, he is not justified in claiming that it is available to him now.

This completes the discussion of the means by which we may isolate proper objects of valuing. It has been argued that in order to isolate such objects we need not only to give the objects a certain type of characterisation, but also establish that certain relations hold between the object and the valuing agent. Thus the fact that something is desirable, evaluated as good in that capacity for which it is desirable, and believed to be important to the valuing agent, is sufficient to characterise the object as an object of valuing. In Anscombe's sense of the questions, these factors will answer the questions, "What do you value X for?", or "Why do you value X?". However, to assert that one is acquainted with the object of valuing, and that that object is available to one in the required sense, is not to characterise the object, but rather to state that certain relations obtain between the object and the valuing agent, that are necessary for it to be an object of valuing. It is these factors that may answer the question "Why do you value X?", where it is not the characterisation of the object that is in dispute, but the suitability of the standpoint one adopts toward an object, characterised in this way. And, if it is the case that these relations do not obtain, the characterisation of the object will not in itself establish that object as a proper object of valuing.

CHAPTER IV
VALUING AND RELATED CONCEPTS

Reactions

For the purpose of this study I shall define a reaction very broadly as some change undergone by the agent, due to some influence. I wish to exclude that sense of "reaction" in which it is said that to react is to bring about some reciprocal change in the object which first influenced the agent.

There is a large group of actions and attitudes that may be seen as possible reactions occurrent on acquaintance with or contact with a whole range of different kinds of thing. Among these we may list to dislike, embrace, adopt, hate, love, like and value. We shall discuss both liking and valuing, as liking is the reaction most profitably compared with valuing both for its similarities and dissimilarities. At a later stage we shall also discuss some opposites of valuing, reactions that may be regarded as antitheses of valuing.

Those reactions listed above are not only directed toward some object or other, but towards some object

with which the agent is acquainted. This type of reaction should be distinguished from another in which we may include wishing for, thinking of, trying to get, aspiring to, admiring and wanting which, whilst all directed towards some object or other (which may include intentional objects), need not be directed toward an object with which the agent is acquainted¹. The actions and attitudes listed here may be reactions on acquaintance with the object, but need not be. We may want or aspire to something because on report it sounds an appropriate object to want or aspire to in the circumstances. However, the reactions cited in this list, as for the first, by no means represent a completely homogeneous group. The reactions in this second group that I shall compare to valuing are wanting and admiring, although the latter two will also be seen to differ from each other in some respects.

In order to make the distinction between these two groups a little clearer, we need to look into the notion of acquaintance that is being used here. Surely, it could be argued, one cannot even want or admire something without at least having some acquaintance with it. Wherein lies the difference between these two reactions and those of

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1. It should be emphasized that neither of the two lists presented is meant to represent the full range of these two different types of reaction. These are only selected examples.

liking and valuing? I shall concentrate on the acquaintance involved in wanting, admiring and liking, and then compare these with valuing.

Acquaintance and Reactions

(i) Wanting

Normally when we want something with which we ourselves are not acquainted we do so either on the authority of someone or something else, or out of a conviction of our own that the object of our want could not be something that on acquaintance we could come to reject. Objects of want under the latter description could be things such as a swimming pool in the backyard, a million dollars, to be a company director or champion athlete, to own a first edition of Erasmus or Francis Bacon, or to be able to play Scarlatti as well as Wanda Landowska. Of course I am not suggesting that these things could be wanted unequivocally by any or every person, but only that they are objects which could be wanted unequivocally by different sorts of people whom we can readily imagine. That such people very often find themselves mistaken in their desires may be true, but not relevant to our purpose which is merely to explain how they come to want certain things.

The former circumstance, in which we want something under

the influence of some authority needs a little more explanation. First, we must recognise that the range of possible authorities in this sense is enormous. We may want something after reading about it in a book or catalogue or a travel poster. We may want certain things in our youth upon the recommendation of parents or respected friends, teachers or officials of organisations to which we belong. We may take the advice of experts or authorities in various fields in which we are interested. Or, it may be the case that we cannot isolate the authority upon which we act in terms of a single person or source, but rather recognise ourselves to be influenced by the norms to which our society clings. We may pursue what are commonly acceptable objects of want believing that the majority can't do wrong, or that the old and tried is always the best. These, among others, are forms of authority on which we act with varying degrees of credence; they are forms of authority we accept in wanting, wishing for and aspiring to things with which we have no direct personal acquaintance.

It is to these authorities that we often appeal when asked to explain why we want certain things. In explaining why we want such things we very often need not only to cite our authority, but justify it as an authority. If I want to be a doctor because my parents would wish it so, it is very likely that someone will challenge me on what

authority they have to influence what I should want. Appeal to such authority is a very commonplace thing, and indeed it must be because our personal experience is so limited that if we did only act upon knowledge of what we were experienced in and acquainted with, our range of wants, aspirations and so on would remain incredibly limited. It is certainly the case that even in wanting something of which we have no personal experience we may have a great many true beliefs or knowledge about that thing. It is this characteristic of wanting that allows us to want future objects and states of affairs. And, in seeing this, the fact that we should want things despite the absence of acquaintance with them becomes quite unremarkable. We normally do not even give such reasons gained from "secondary" sources an inferior status to reasons derived from our own observation. In fact, very often we give them a superior status if the authority from which they are gained is thought to be a trustworthy one or of more than average competence.

It should be obvious by now that the acquaintance to which we are referring is a personal observation or experience of the object involved. To have this acquaintance it is normally not merely sufficient to know of the nature of the object, but to have derived this knowledge by

direct experience or observation of the object. Our reactions on such acquaintance with the object are not merely reactions to some report of the object, but reactions to confrontation with the object itself. Before we consider why such acquaintance is necessary for us to be justified in saying that we like something or value it, I wish to discuss briefly the notion of admiring something. It will be seen to be a case that has similarities both with wanting and with liking and valuing.

(ii) Admiring

We may come to regard something as an object of admiration merely by reading about, or being told of, such a thing. Children are told of the exploits of national heroes and come to admire such men and even claim the lives of such men as models for their own. In order for such a reaction to occur, the exploits of such men need not be observed directly by the children even if they are contemporary heroes. On the other hand, very often we do come to have admiration of certain things through direct experience or observation of them. We may admire entertainers for their talents after observing them in a performance, certain works of art after seeing them in a gallery, the physical prowess of an athlete in action, or buildings which we judge to be outstanding in their architectural design.

For some of these things, the degree to which we could admire them without being personally acquainted with the object of admiration is questionable. A mere description of an actor's performance may not conjure up for us the same admiration that the observation of a performance may. The study of the plans of a certain building combined with the observation of photographs of the building may not convey to us sufficiently the grandeur of the object that would bring forth our admiration. Of course, it could be argued that if it were the case that another actor read of a certain performance he could in fact admire it because his knowledge of the art of the stage is so much greater than our own; similarly with an architect studying the plans of a building. Be this as it may, it does seem to be the case that we may come to admire things in a reaction to direct acquaintance with the object or in a reaction to knowledge gained indirectly about the object. To this extent, admiring resembles wanting in respect of acquaintance needed with the object in order to react in a certain manner.

However, unlike wanting, we cannot claim to admire future objects, events and states of affairs. The object of our admiration must be either something present or in the past. We cannot admire what is possibly to come. In this respect, admiring resembles both liking and valuing,

although it will be seen that all three differ in respect of objects, and states of affairs in the past.

A further point of difference with valuing that admiring shares with wanting and liking is that we may admire things as it were "from afar". In admiring an object, we do not need to have an acquaintance with it, that merges into an avallance of the object. This point, however, foreshadows a comparative discussion of liking, admiring and valuing that is to come. It will suffice for the moment to note those similarities and differences of admiring with other reactions we are considering and move on to a consideration of the relation between acquaintance and liking. This relation will be found to be very similar to that between acquaintance and valuing.

(iii) Liking

If we claim to like something because so-and-so whom we respect as an authority on this kind of thing has said that it has qualities which make it likable, we have not really justified our liking of that thing. We have given reasons why we are justified in believing that the thing will be liked on acquaintance, but not why it is liked. To explain why we like something is to explain something more than why we are favourably disposed towards the thing. We may be favourably disposed towards something without having any direct experience of it at all. To like something

is to imply that it has measured up to certain expectations or requirements that we think are appropriate in that kind of thing.

However, if we decide that we like something, we do so because it has measured up under our scrutiny; the satisfaction that we have derived from the object is a satisfaction consequent upon the scrutiny of the object. Very often the requirements we employ rest on personal preferences - we may prefer certain colours rather than others in clothing. We may be said to know what our preferences are in such things, and even be said to know what sort of thing we will like in considering clothing. However, if a person were to describe to us an article of clothing that we think we will like, it would be an inappropriate response to say "I like that", simply because we can only predict that we will like the thing on acquaintance, not affirm that we do like it now. It is only on acquaintance with the object of liking that we undergo the change or react in such a way that is liking the object.

This of course does not hold true of wanting where we may undergo the change of coming to want something merely by hearing or reading about it, or perhaps imagining what it would be like. Exactly what the relation is between

an object of liking and liking it will not be discussed. However, we can at least say that acquaintance with or experience of the object is a necessary condition of liking it. This is not to say that an object of liking is a necessary condition for liking it, which is as absurd as it sounds; it is acquaintance with the object that is a necessary condition of liking it.

What such acquaintance actually amounts to can only be described by referring to what acquaintance amounts to for different kinds of thing. If we claim to like peace, we must have lived through a time of peace, if I say that I like a certain dress, I must have at least had a good look at the dress. If we say that we like a certain food we should have tasted that food. To like a certain game, we must have taken part in it ourselves or have observed it and found it entertaining. We cannot like a certain play without having read it or heard it or seen it, a house without having lived in it, a job without having worked at it, and so on. It may be claimed that we can like a plan merely upon hearing it. However, in a case such as this, description of the plan, the presentation of a plan, may be done independently of putting a plan into action. We do not have to observe a plan in action in order to be acquainted with it. We may become acquainted

with a plan merely by having it described to us. However this is a particular feature of things like plans, strategies and manoeuvres and cannot be regarded as a counter-example against cases already cited. Sometimes we may specify that we like things in certain respects; we may like something for the way it looks or the shape that it has. In such cases, what "being acquainted with" amounts to is set out in a much more explicit fashion. If I like something for its visual characteristics I must have seen the thing; if I like something for its shape I must have observed the shape.

Apart from these considerations there are actual borderline cases of acquaintance which should be mentioned. A person may claim to like a certain man although he has never met him. In support of his claim the person may bring together a large number of facts about the man: facts concerning appearance, abilities, personality, beliefs, attitudes, manner of behaviour, capacity to work and so on. Given such knowledge, a person might be said to feel "as if he knew the man". Such feelings are not uncommon when studying in detail the works of a certain novelist or poet. We get some insight into how the novelist thinks and feels. We feel toward that man as we would toward someone with whom we had conducted long discussions. In

cases such as this, a person might talk about liking a man, and indeed his familiarity with the man could come very close to personal acquaintance. I would tend to think, however, that such acquaintance would be restricted to the type of case I have mentioned and would not be readily applicable to other kinds of thing or states of affairs that could be objects of liking. It is a case parasitic on others which involve personal acquaintance with a person.

Another case which may appear to be a borderline case of acquaintance is that in which we hear some brief description of an object or state of affairs and make a comment such as "I like the sound of it", or "I like the idea". In such cases it is inaccurate to claim that we are speaking of the object or state of affairs involved. Rather, we are referring to some part of it or some properties or qualities of it that have been mentioned to us. Indeed, these statements are often made in order to convey some reservation - "It sounds good, but I'll wait to see the real thing". In cases such as these we cannot talk of acquaintance with the object.

Some Reactions - Points of Comparison and Difference

In the comments that follow, I shall take it to be the case that if two attitudes that are reactions do not share in common the same proper object, they cannot be

regarded as identical attitudes. The terminus or objective toward which an attitude is directed, the proper object of an attitude, is conceptually linked to that attitude. The attitudes that we have described are ones that we cannot hold, as it were, in isolation, but must always be directed towards something or other. They are not properly explicable except in terms of what (proper objects) they may be directed towards. Thus, to grasp the concept of liking, or wanting or admiring or valuing, it is not sufficient merely to grasp what it is to like or admire, for example. We must grasp what it is to like or admire some thing. This will inevitably raise questions not only of what characterisation various proper objects will have, but what relations must hold between the agent and the object in order for that attitude to be adopted.

By point of contrast we may note that the concepts of certain "feelings" that human beings may have do not always stand in need of the same type of explanation. A person may feel depressed, miserable, hurt, or joyous without necessarily having these feelings on account of any particular thing. Of course they may, but they need not. However, we cannot wander around simply feeling admiration or liking or valuing or wanting. These attitudes must be directed towards something or other, because they are always reactions to something or other. This is the first characteristic that wanting, admiring, liking and valuing share in

common, though the nature of the proper object of valuing will be seen to differ from the other three.

A second point that these four reactions have in common is that they are all favourable reactions to some object. Things that we like, want, admire or value are things which to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the attitude and its intensity, we would prefer to have and/or preserve rather than those things which we do not like, want, admire or value. Things that we regard in these ways are things that we find more pleasing than displeasing, things whose goods are seen to outweigh their ills, once again to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the type and degree of our regard.

A third respect in which these attitudes conform is that very often in justifying any one of these attitudes towards an object we will pronounce a judgment or verdict about the thing, which is a favourable verdict. Such a verdict may be articulated on the basis of an evaluation, or on the basis of a personal preference to which we aver. Illocutions of this type J.L. Austin called "verdictives". He describes them in the following way:

... verdictives are typified by the giving of a verdict, as the name implies, by a jury, arbitrator, or umpire. But they need not be final; they may be, for example, an estimate,

reckoning, or appraisal.¹

and

Verdictives consist in the delivering of a finding, official or unofficial, upon evidence as to value or fact, so far as these are distinguishable.²

Among verdictives, Austin lists to interpret as, to measure, to grade, rank, assess, describe, analyse and characterise. It is just these sorts of illocutionary acts in which we indulge in attempting to explain or justify why it is that we want, like, admire or value something. We pronounce our judgment or verdict of the thing concerned by ranking it according to appropriate standards, or describing or characterising it in order to reveal its desirability, or interpreting or analysing the thing in order to bring someone else to our understanding of it. In all such cases what we are doing is articulating the verdict or judgment, or perhaps opinion, that has led us to want, like, admire or value the thing.

Having noticed these similarities in the four attitudes, we will now discuss their differences.

1. J.L. Austin, How to do things with Words (Oxford, 1962), p.150.

2. Ibid, p.152.

(i) Wanting and Valuing

As we have discussed wanting in some detail in chapter three, our comments need only be brief. We do not need to have personal acquaintance with those things we want. We may want things that are as yet unattainable and may never be attainable. Thus, we need not avail ourselves of things that we want. Things that we want, although believed desirable, need not be things believed good in that respect in which they are desirable. However, as we cannot want things that have happened in the past, so we cannot value things of which we may not ever again avail ourselves. We may value things for the effect they have had, provided that effect persists, but we cannot say, value a tool that has been lost or destroyed which we would value for its everyday use. We may want things on the authority of others. We cannot value things on the authority of others. For these reasons I think it is fairly clear that wanting cannot be equated with valuing. Those grounds on which we would be justified in wanting something are not sufficient to justify us in adopting the attitude of valuing something, neither in respect of characterisation of the object, nor in relations obtaining between the agent and the object.

(ii) Admiring and Valuing

Let us first make a few comments on what it is to admire something. The grammar of admiring is similar to that of many "emotional" reactions, consequent on some knowledge of a thing. One may be overcome with admiration as one is with fear or loathing. We talk of expressing admiration, feeling admiration, feigning admiration and colloquially of being "choked" with admiration. We may judge things to be fearsome or loathsome as we may judge things to be admirable. On the other hand, we may fear or loath the onset of something, although we cannot admire the onset of something. This is not to say that we cannot admire say, a person for instigating the onset of a certain set of events. But in such cases we admire the person for certain actions or activities which we regarded as an achievement of his. That is to say, we are admiring something that has occurred. As stated previously, we cannot admire things in the future, but only what is present or past.

To admire someone is to imply that we approve of that person, or what he has done, and not only do we approve but find ourselves impressed. We believe of a man's achievements, if we admire them, that they are something out of the ordinary, perhaps not attainable by every man. The same may be said of many other things that we may admire,

including a woman for her beauty, a building for its architectural structure, a ballet dancer for her grace, a mathematical proof for its elegance, an animal for its courage or tenacity and so on. When we admire things for aesthetic qualities we find them not only pleasing or satisfying, but pleasing or satisfying to a superlative degree. We admire things because they are out of the ordinary: out of the ordinary in being extremely good of their kind.

In the case of objects, however, it may be a little misleading to say that our admiration implies approval. If we take approval to mean simply being favourably disposed towards, then the admiration of objects does imply that we approve of them. But the contexts in which we most often and characteristically express our approval are those in which we may be said not merely to have favoured, but to have sanctioned something - a certain course of action, a certain choice or decision, appraisal or opinion. Persons in seeking the sanction of others will ask, "Do you approve?". However, although we may ask of a person "Do you admire that building?", it would be strange to ask him simply, "Do you approve of that building?", although we may be able to ask him whether or not he approved of its construction, or the way that it was planned. To approve or disapprove in the

sense of giving or withholding a sanction suggests that such approval or disapproval can have, or could possibly have had, some effect on that toward which it is directed. A person may change his plans or refrain from acting in a certain way. However, although we may not view an object such as a building or a vase with any great favour we do not believe that this will affect the object in any way. Provided these two different senses in which the word "approve" may be used are noted, we may say that admiration implies approval.

In many ways, valuing would appear to resemble admiring. We have a favourable attitude to those things we value, we believe them to be good in some respect or other and we do not value things in the future. However, we may admire things at a distance, things which we do not avail ourselves of, and things that are past and gone, such as careers of great men. Further, the grammar of valuing seems to differ from that of admiring. We do not talk about feeling our valuing, or expressing our valuing, though we may state that we do value something. Things that we value are regarded as good in some respect, but need not be judged to be out of the ordinary. We may admire many things that we regard to be important in some way, but they need not be important to us, or appear particularly important

to anything. We may admire a brooch in a shop window for its exquisite design, and never stop to think in what way it could be important. And, looking ahead to our discussion of valuing later in this chapter, we may admire a thing for a moment, just in passing, which we shall see is not characteristic of valuing. These points of difference are sufficient I think to conclude that we should not identify valuing with admiring.

(iii) Liking and Valuing

I have left the concept of liking until last, because perhaps in its very amorphous nature it is most difficult to distinguish from valuing, but perhaps most useful as a comparison with valuing.

I shall attempt a fairly brief discussion of what it is to like something, although I do not claim for it any great profundity or certainty. D.S. Schwayder presents as an analysis of liking,

A likes O if and only if he believes that O exists or that O is the case and regards O as something which he now believes it would have been a purpose of his to bring into existence or to bring about had the thought occurred to him that that would have been possible. One likes the warm sunshine if he is aware of the warmth of the sun as something he would if he could have acted to move himself into, had he known (as he now does) of its nearby presence.¹

1. D.S. Schwayder, The Stratification of Behaviour (London, 1965), p.171.

Shwayder characterises objects of liking in behavioural terms. He suggests that for every kind of animal there are "natural objects of desire and aversion", such that the kind of animal concerned can be observed to regularly move toward that which he desires and away from that to which he has an aversion¹. He suggests that objects of liking may be characterised as analogous to natural objects of desire. (He calls these "natural goods".) When an animal moves toward an object as he does toward a natural good, Shwayder suggests that the animal is displaying his awareness of the object in a certain way, a way which indicates that the animal is appreciatively aware of the object thought to be a natural good. Shwayder suggests that it is those objects of which an animal may be said to be appreciatively aware, that are objects of liking².

I have two objections to Shwayder's analysis. The first is the lesser one. It is logically possible that two things that we may like cannot exist concurrently. Suppose it to be the case that at different times we come into contact with two such objects, one of which we like considerably more than the other. Suppose it to be the case that on coming into contact with the object we like less, we realise that it has only come into existence at

1. Ibid, p.74.

2. Ibid, pp.169-170.

the expense of the other. In view of this, we may not believe that it would have been our purpose to bring that object into existence had it occurred to us that it was possible, not because we did not like it, but because we like it less than we liked the other object. This objection does not rest on the fact that we still like the other object, which would contravene one of Shwayder's conditions, but only that our memory of liking it leads us to believe that we would like it more than the other object, if we could once again bring it into existence. This, of course, is not a fatal objection to Shwayder, and may be overcome by inserting an "all things being equal" clause in his analysis. If this tends to make the analysis a little vague, perhaps we may be excused in view of the broad and vague nature of the notion that liking is.

The second objection concerns the behavioural nature of Shwayder's analysis. Consider the following case. Suppose a man fallen among thieves is being forced to assist in a robbery. He knows that if he were not indulging in these activities now, if he had not acceded to their demands, he would be dead, but as it happened, the thieves needed an extra man, and so his life has been prolonged. It could be the case that prior to this time the man believed he was dispensable to the thieves, although he now realises that he

is not. Consequently, he may believe that it would have been a purpose of his to bring about this situation if he had thought that it was possible. I do not think that in this case it is plausible to assert that the man likes assisting in a robbery or likes being indispensable to the thieves. He may be rather relieved that he is, yet still be quite aware that he is acting under duress and doing something that he abhors. To deny this case, is I think, to deny that we may act out of expediency and out of duress to avoid perhaps the worse of two evils. In some situations we may not like any of the alternatives, and yet know that we must choose one.

This counter-example indicates the weakness in a behavioural account of liking, because Shwayder's characterisation of an object of liking cannot block it. Objects of liking for Shwayder are things of which we are appreciatively aware. However, to be appreciatively aware of something, on Shwayder's account, is to regularly move toward that thing as we would toward a natural good. This implies that our likes must be constant over a period of time, which I would suggest, is simply false. Many people's likes, especially those of children, change with alarming rapidity. It is not merely the case that we do not observe people moving regularly towards things that they like, but

rather that often they do not like them long enough to do so. Further, it may be true of me, for example, that I like a certain painting. There is no reason to think that I shall regularly move towards this painting or even a copy of it. I may merely express my pleasure when I happen to see it. Again we may regularly move towards objects out of curiosity, but surely we can be curious about something without necessarily liking it. Thus, although it may be objected to the counter-example, that the man is not appreciatively aware of his activity, if being appreciatively aware only means regularly moving towards the object, and even this must be rejected on other grounds, then I would suggest that Shwayder's analysis is inadequate.

The term "appreciatively aware" is a good one to convey the way in which we react when we decide that we like something. However, it must be given more content than Shwayder allows it. I would suggest that to be appreciatively aware of an object is to take pleasure¹ in it and be acquainted with it in the sense previously outlined. And,

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1. The concept of pleasure is, of course, a thorn in the side of the philosopher. However, I think we do have a concept of pleasure which involves a feeling of satisfaction and joy on acquaintance with an object of our liking. It should be noted that Shwayder could not adopt this view, as he attempts to analyse pleasure in terms of liking. Although I cannot argue for it here, I think it is a mistaken view, although obviously the two concepts are closely related.

when we say that we like something which is not immediately present, we admit to a disposition to take pleasure in that object when it is present. It is also the case that we are more inclined to seek out, or move towards, those objects which we like than those which we do not. These complete the comments I wish to make about the concept of liking.

Depending on the degree to which we like something, liking may appear to be very similar to valuing. In many cases we will like something which we see to be desirable, are favourably disposed towards, think good in that respect for which it is desirable. Our liking involves the same type of acquaintance that is required for valuing, and we may avail ourselves frequently of objects which we like. To this extent, I think liking is a misleading concepts because in individual cases it may involve beliefs about the object and behavioural reactions towards it which whilst quite consistent with the fact that we like something, and explainable in such terms, are not essential to all cases of liking, or necessary to an analysis of liking.

We need not necessarily believe that that which we like may be evaluated to be good in some respect. I may like a dress for its colour, simply because I have a preference for that colour. I need not regard it as good of the kind colours (whatever that would mean), or even think that it is

a good colour for me in the sense of suiting my complexion. In fact, I may like the colour and yet regretfully admit that it does not suit me at all.

Things that we like need not be availed of. Very often we may admit to liking something in passing; a landscape through which we are travelling, a car parked by the side of the road, the performance of a certain actor we see only once. Liking may be a very much more fleeting and immediate experience than valuing could ever be.

We do not always, and very frequently don't, like things that we regard to be important to us in some way. Things that we like need not necessarily be seen to have any great relevance to us at all. Very often we may admit to liking what we regard to be trivia, almost as it were because of their trivial nature. Thus we may like a pop-song, not for any merit in the music or lyrics, but simply because it is frivolous, light, and unimportant.

Many things that we like we need not want. I may like a certain necklace, but because I have a similar one, be quite prepared to give it away. I may like a certain painting, but not want to possess it or even go to look at it often.

I think these differences give us good grounds for saying that liking is not the same as valuing, though in some cases of liking and its consequent manifestations, the

two attitudes may appear similar.

These comparisons have been directed towards dispelling confusion, not so much in formal literature about the concepts, for there is very little of a comparative nature, but rather in common usage that I myself have noticed. I also hope that if the types of distinctions I have made are accepted, they give weight to the claim that the attitude of valuing is one that is deserving of analysis, and is in fact an independent concept suitable for analysis. It is to this task we shall now turn.

Symptoms of Valuing

The point of the following comments will be to suggest how we may recognise that a person does in fact value something. Some reference will be made to comments contained in chapter three on the proper objects of valuing. I shall be postulating, in a sense somewhat akin to the Wittgensteinian one, symptoms of valuing rather than criteria of valuing. In distinguishing these Wittgenstein states,

If medical science calls angina an inflammation caused by a particular bacillus, and we ask in a particular case 'Why do you say this man has got angina?' then the answer 'I have found the bacillus so-and-so in his blood' gives us the criterion, or what we may call the defining criterion for angina. If on the other hand the answer was, 'His throat is inflamed', this

might give us a symptom of angina. I call 'symptom' a phenomenon of which experience has taught us that it coincided, some way or other, with the phenomenon which is our defining criterion. Then to say 'A man has angina if this bacillus is found in him' is a tautology, or it is a loose way of stating the definition of 'angina'. But to say, 'A man has angina whenever he has an inflamed throat' is to make an hypothesis.¹

As Wittgenstein points out himself, the dividing line between criteria and symptoms is at best a blurred one.

In practice, if you were asked which phenomenon is the defining criterion and which is the symptom, you would in most cases be unable to answer this question except by making an arbitrary decision ad hoc. It may be practical to define a word by taking one phenomenon as the defining criterion, but we shall easily be persuaded to define a word by means of what according to our first use, was a symptom.²

On the basis of this latter comment I shall take it that the fact that something is a symptom, or is called a "symptom" by us, need not exclude that possibility of it being a necessary condition of that for which it is a symptom. Some of the symptoms to be mentioned are necessary conditions of valuing. However, I wish to use the term "symptom" rather than "criterion", because very often in offering explanations of concepts like valuing we will refer to behavioural characteristics among other things, by which

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1. Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and the Brown Books (Oxford, 1958), p.25 (my underlining).
 2. Ibid (Wittgenstein's italics).

we normally recognise whether or not a person has a certain attitude. But, if such characteristics are included in an analysis of the attitude as criteria of the relevant term, it is normally expected that those criteria should be satisfied every time that the term is used. Very often sets of criteria are rejected when criteria such as these are not seen to be satisfied in every case. Instances of this would be Anscombe's "trying to get" in her analysis of wanting, and Shwayder's "regularly moving towards" in his analysis of liking. This does not necessarily mean that the philosophers have an inaccurate picture of that which they are trying to analyse. Rather, they make too strong a claim for the characteristics they have correctly recognised. Too strong, in the sense that if these characteristics were not mentioned at all, the accounts of the concepts concerned would not be accurate, and perhaps extremely misleading, for sometimes our formation of such concepts to some extent rests on the observation of such characteristics.

Such characteristics may be described as defeasible, in that although they very often do occur, they may be absent in cases where that which they are a characteristic of still exists. Thus, I shall take as my hypothesis that given certain symptoms that I will outline, it is defeasibly the case that if an agent has those symptoms we may say that

he values a certain thing. If these comments leave the reader with an uncomfortable feeling of vagueness, I can only suggest that perhaps the demand for a clear-cut set of necessary and sufficient conditions in an analysis of valuing and other like concepts is merely a philosopher's "pipe-dream".

One symptom of valuing something is that we want or desire that which we value. This I take to be a necessary condition of valuing something. Where and when and how often the thing is wanted will depend on the way in which it is seen to be desirable. If I see something to be desirable as a certain means to an end, I shall want that thing to be utilized whenever I attempt to attain that end. If I find something desirable as a constant source of inspiration or comfort to me, I may desire it to be within my observation constantly, as much as possible, or perhaps when I feel particularly in need of such fillips.

In order to argue that wanting is in fact a symptom of valuing, let us imagine a case in which a man claimed to value something but claimed not to want it. Suppose that a cricketer claimed to value a certain cricket bat: he could stroke with it more easily and truly than he could with any other cricket bat he had ever owned and had hit all his high scores with the bat. Suppose that one day, directly before a cricket match our cricketer is praising

this particular cricket bat to a friend. He tells him that he values it over any other cricket bat he possesses or has possessed. As he is about to go to the wicket his friend hands him his much valued cricket bat, but is told by the cricketer that he does not want that bat. The friend questions him suggesting that perhaps he only uses the bat for very important matches, of which ~~this~~ is not one, or that the bat is only suitable for use in certain weather, or against certain types of bowler, or on certain types of pitches. Perhaps it is the case that through some temporary disability the cricketer feels he would be better off with another type of bat at this time, or perhaps he now wishes to keep the bat as a souvenir. Let us suppose that the cricketer rebuts all these explanations saying that although he values the bat more than any other bat for playing cricket under any conditions whatsoever, he just does not want to use it for playing cricket. What are we to make of such a case?

We could understand the cricketer if he claimed that he had wanted the bat in past matches and explained why the reasons for wanting it then were not adequate now. We could then go on to ask how he came now to value the bat. Or, if he also claimed not to value the bat we could understand why it was of no special interest to him in playing cricket now; it would not appear to be particularly unreasonable

that he did not want the bat. But, if he claims to value that bat here and now as an instrument with which to play cricket and claims that he does not want to use it to play cricket, we must at least remain doubtful whether the reasons he gives for valuing the bat are the proper ones, and at most, doubtful about whether he really values the bat at all.

We could say in such a case that the cricketer's actions and utterances are practically inconsistent. His stated reasons for valuing the bat are not consistent with his actions and attitude directed toward that which he claims to value. The qualities that he claims the bat to have would give him good reason for using the bat in a cricket match and wanting to use it whether or not on account of these qualities he claimed to value the bat. And, in claiming to value the bat for qualities that bring to him success in cricket matches he has at least committed himself to recognising that these qualities in a cricket bat are of some worth in a cricket match. If he claimed nevertheless not to want to use the bat in a cricket match, he should be able to explain why it is that his beliefs about the bat do not provide a good reason for him using it, or at least give some indication as to why in this particular case they do not provide good reasons. It could be suggested that it is at least logically possible that a person could

recognise a set of beliefs or some knowledge as a good reason for valuing something, but not be aware that in having these reasons one also had good reasons for wanting that thing. However if it is the case that we only value things which we believe to be available, have availed ourselves of, and intend, if given the opportunity to avail ourselves of in the future it would be inconsistent to assert at the same time that we do not want such things.

In order to clarify the way in which we want things that we value, let us consider some different senses of wanting. Sometimes we use the word "want" specifically to indicate a deficiency or deprivation. It may be said of a man that he "wants" for something or that he is "wanting in" something or other. In such cases we could also talk of a lack, or of the man lacking in something - "He is lacking in determination" or "He lacks determination" or "He was found lacking in determination".

We may also talk of "wants" in the sense of requirements or needs. We may talk of a man's wants being satisfied, or of his being in great want. In such cases we could use as a synonym the word "need". Very often in such cases, wants are taken to be necessities either for the continuation of life, or for some project or other. We may say of a man that he wants food in order to live, or a spanner in order

to continue his work. Such wants may be talked of as enduring in that at any one time they may be only temporarily abated by a sufficient supply of that which is wanted.

A third and more diverse sense of "want" is that in which to say that one wants something is to express a desire for something. Of course a man who wants for something or who has certain wants that must be satisfied may also express a desire that his wants be removed or satisfied but he may want in these first two senses and not necessarily want in the third sense. This is the most common sense of "want" in which I may talk of the wanting of objects or events or activities or actions or qualities. But even here, wanting may amount to different things.

Of things I do not possess I may want to acquire them or attain them or achieve them or obtain them. Of things I possess I may want to maintain them or retain or perhaps preserve them. Of things that are available to me although not necessarily possessions of mine I may want to avail myself and also preserve or maintain them. Of things I have lost I may want to regain them. Such expressions of desire are normally thought of in the absence of something or other that we do desire - they are thought of as a protestation against some deprivation or other. It is perhaps this feature of wanting that prompted Anscombe to say that wanting

"cannot be said to exist in a man who does nothing towards getting what he wants"¹. Thus those cases in which we have either never possessed something that we desire, or have lost something that we desire are the ones normally associated with this use of the word "want". However there is a sense of "want" employed when referring to objects that we do have in our possession or are available to us. A hopeful young sister may ask of me "Do you want this piece of jewellery" or "Do you want to use the car today?" In such cases there is no question of my being deprived - the piece of jewellery is mine, I may use the car if I so desire. What is in question is not the satisfaction of some deprivation, but rather the avoidance of some possible deprivation. My reply to my sister may be that I still desire to wear (want) that piece of jewellery, or that I do want the car this day, and in such cases to the question "Do you want it?" we normally reply, "Yes, I do (want it)". We express a desire to "hang on to what we've got".

If it is the case that objects of valuing can only be things with which we are acquainted and of which we have availed ourselves, then this third sense of wanting can only in part be relevant to valuing. Objects that we value are objects

1. G.E.M. Anscombe, Intention (Oxford, 1958), p.67.

which are either wanted in the sense of desiring to avoid a possible deprivation or wanted in the sense of desiring to regain. It need not be the case that in order to want things in the former of these two senses we need in fact to be threatened with their removal. It need only be the case that in being able to conceive of ourselves being deprived of them we desire to retain their availability, or desire them to remain available to us. Whilst considering wanting it is interesting to note that because of the availability condition we may not value things in the past except in the sense of valuing effects of those things which are in existence now. If it were the case that my mother was dead, I may talk of valuing the influence that my mother had on my life which I may see as present and continuing into the future. It is this that is the subject of my wanting - the continuing existence of a certain influence rather than the reproduction of something past. For, if it were the case that I claimed to value a person because he had done a certain thing, this would imply that I desired him to continue to do that thing or perhaps if it were an isolable event, to do it again. In order for this to be part of a valuing situation it would have to be the case that I believed this possible in order for it to be the case that I believed that I could avail myself of the person. One may be able to wish for, in Anscombe's sense,¹ that which is past

1. Ibid, pp.66-67.

and cannot be returned, but one cannot both want, and believe available such an object.

Having made clear the sense in which we are using "want" we may say then, that a symptom of valuing is wanting that which one claims to value, and with reference to the last point we may add that such wanting involves the belief that it is not impossible for that want to be gratified. Gratification here will consist in the wanting agent being able to avail himself of the object in question. We have argued that wanting, in the relevant sense, is a necessary condition of valuing.

The second symptom of valuing is that a person who claims to value something will hold a certain set of beliefs about that thing. This symptom is also a necessary condition of valuing something. Those beliefs about the object which would be seen as necessary include that the object is seen to be desirable in some way, good in that respect for which it is seen to be desirable, and important to the valuing agent. In other words, it is a necessary condition of someone valuing something that he be aware of the object as a proper object of valuing. If a person claims to value something, a symptom of this valuing will be that he does or can characterise the object in a way which we would judge to be proper for an object of valuing. In addition to this,

a further symptom of valuing, also a necessary condition, would be that he is favourably disposed towards that which he claims to value, in the sense that he will believe that the availability of that which he values will affect him favourably. Some ways in which we could be said to be favourably disposed towards objects of valuing will be described in chapter five. There it will be argued that when we are favourably disposed towards an object of valuing, we are so on account of some value or values of ours.

A fourth symptom of valuing is that he who values an object will avail himself of it. I shall not mention again what availing could amount to in varying situations. This was discussed in chapter three, where it was suggested that generally speaking to avail oneself of an object that one values is to utilise it or otherwise take advantage of it in that capacity for which it is valued. It was seen that it is certainly a necessary condition of valuing an object, that a person believe that it is possible for him to avail himself of that object.

However, the symptom of actually availing oneself of an object should not be regarded as a necessary condition. A person may be restrained by misfortune, force, or weakness of will in availing himself of an object. In such cases we may say that provided a person still believes that efforts of

his can make a difference to whether or not he avails himself of the object he will try to avail himself of the object until he is restrained further or until his determination gives out. To this point, we may still say that the person values the object. A person's efforts may be futile, but it is only when he gives up hope of availing himself of an object, when he concludes that it is no longer rational to believe that he can or could avail himself of an object, that we may say that he has ceased to value that object. Thus, trying to avail oneself of an object may be regarded as a secondary symptom, given certain circumstances, of valuing something. It may be the case that a person tries to avail himself of an object which he refuses to believe he cannot avail himself of. In the circumstances, we may still be correct in saying that a person values an object, though we would regard his grounds for doing so as inadequate. This symptom should thus be regarded as a defeasible one. It will normally accompany valuing, but need not necessarily. However, it should be noted with such symptoms, that where they do not occur, we should be able to produce some evidence to show that that particular case of valuing is in some way atypical. At least, we should be able to show that there is explanation of why the symptom did not obtain. In the cases I have outlined, such an explanation is possible.

Finally, if a person values something, a fourth symptom

of this will be that he will seek to protect it if its availability is in jeopardy, seek to regain it if its availability ceases, and seek to preserve it in order that it may retain that which makes it desirable. Thus, if a man values a certain tool, he will protect it from loss as much as he can, care for the tool so that it retains its usefulness and will try to find it if it is lost. Of course, if something we value is lost and we may replace it by a very similar or identical specimen of the same kind, this will amount to regaining a comparable specimen of that same kind of thing which we value.

These activities would only be appropriate at certain times. We do not spend time consciously protecting an object if we do not believe we are in danger of losing its availability. We do not try to regain an object unless it has ceased to be available. With availing, these should be regarded as dispositional symptoms. It is not the case that a man who values something can be seen constantly performing these acts, but that he will be disposed to do them when the occasion arises.

Given this, a person may still not protect, preserve or attempt to regain something that he values if he is constrained from doing so, or is perhaps caught in a conflict, having to decide which of two things that he values he will

seek to protect or regain. That he may be able only to attempt to regain one of two objects that he values does not entail that he ceases to value the other. Only when he ceased to believe that he could regain a certain object, and ceased to believe that he could again avail himself of it, would he cease to value it. Once again it should be noted that if these symptoms do not obtain, we should be able to provide some explanation for this that would indicate that factors external to the person's valuing an object were responsible for their absence.

This concludes the description of what I shall call the symptoms of valuing. If all these symptoms obtain, we have sufficient grounds on which to claim that a person values something. Unless the word should mislead, it should be noted that a symptom has not been regarded as something that is necessarily over and above, and separately identifiable from that which it is a symptom of. Rather, in the case of valuing, the symptoms of valuing are a cluster of dispositions and beliefs on which these dispositions are based, which comprise what it is to value something. The word "symptom" has been used to describe a number of different characteristics of valuing, some of which need not necessarily obtain in every case of valuing. It was thought that to use the word "criteria" to describe such characteristics could be misleading, if it was taken to be

the case that in order for some characteristic to be a criterion of the word "valuing", it would have to be present in every phenomenon which we wish to call an attitude of valuing.

The symptoms of valuing we have listed are that the valued object be wanted, that beliefs be held about it that indicate it to be a proper object of valuing, and that it be an object to which the valuing agent is favourably disposed. These we cited as necessary conditions of valuing. Other symptoms were that the object be availed of, protected, maintained, and that some attempt be made to regain or replace it, in relevant circumstances. Valuing, I would suggest, is a cluster concept consisting of the maintenance of these attitudes, beliefs and dispositions.

Antitheses of Valuing

Perhaps the easiest way to establish what sorts of attitudes could be antitheses of valuing is to look at all those reactions which could be seen to display an unfavourable attitude towards an object in a person. Among these we may list what could be described as uncommitted attitudes, such as being disinterested in something or careless of it. We may hesitate to call such attitudes unfavourable. If anything, they tend to indicate that a

person may have no particular opinion or attitude toward such a thing at all. Then we may list what could be called mildly unfavourable attitudes such as to dislike, or to have a disposition to avoid; we could also list here the act of rejecting as when we reject a plan or a certain specimen of some kind in favour of another specimen.

Thirdly, we may list what are positively unfavourable reactions, indicating a strongly unfavourable attitude, such as to shun, despise, fear, hate, dread, hold in contempt, or denigrate. Things toward which we have reactions of this third type may also be things of which we are careless, seek to avoid, or reject. However, these last three may occur without such an unfavourable attitude accompanying the reaction.

Intuitively, I would think that if an antithesis is to be found to valuing at all, it must lie among this third group. When we value something, we do in fact have a very favourable attitude to that thing. Although it may not be an extraordinarily good specimen of some kind or other that would prompt us to admire it, it is something that is nevertheless good in that respect for which it is desirable, and judged to be important to us. The dispositions to act that we have seen constitute the fact that someone values something are consistent with the belief that it is important.

When we look for an antithesis of valuing, we are not looking for some attitude which merely lacks the features that valuing has, but is a direct opposite to valuing. Those sorts of things that we would be led to shun and denigrate would be the sorts of things toward which we could have an attitude which was the antithesis to valuing. Things that we shun and denigrate could however be things for which we felt contempt, despised, hated or feared, and I do not think that any one of these attitudes alone could be regarded as the antithesis to valuing. As we have stated, valuing does not appear to be a feeling that we have, but rather a cluster of dispositions, attitudes and beliefs held toward an object. Perhaps because of this, it is difficult to state exactly what sort of attitude could be regarded as an antithesis of valuing.

Apart from offering these clues, I do not wish to attempt to state exactly what would be an antithesis to valuing, but only to emphasise that just as valuing itself is something more than merely liking or wanting an object, so an antithesis to it would have to be some attitude that was far more than a mere indifference. A consideration of the grounds that we have for valuing things will I think add force to this suggestion.

CHAPTER V

REASONS FOR VALUING THINGS

When we give reasons for valuing things, our reasons relate to two different aspects of the things in question. Some of the reasons that we give are offered in order to explain why it is that we value a thing of a certain kind, or a kind of thing that has certain properties or qualities. Other of our reasons are given in order to explain why it is that we value a certain specimen of a certain kind of thing.

A further explanation that we may give concerns how we came to value the particular thing that we do. Such an explanation would concern the conditions that prevailed in our contact with the object. Thus, this third type of explanation would concern how we became acquainted with the object and how we were able to avail ourselves of the object. As mentioned before, provided it is the case that availability remains, we may value identical or very similar specimens of the same kind which may replace that specimen which we first claimed to value. This third type of explanation is not one with which we shall be concerned in this chapter, for strictly speaking, it does not involve

reasons why we value something, but rather is part of an explanation of how we are able to value something.

In chapter three it was suggested that the features of a proper object of valuing could be discovered by considering what would be an adequate answer to the question, "Why do you value X?". It was stated that an adequate answer to this question would involve reference to the thing's desirability, its goodness according to a kind, or in some respect or other that was seen to be desirable, and its importance to the person who valued it. It was also suggested that apart from the thing being characterised as desirable by the valuing agent, the object should be something to which he was favourably disposed, for the fact that we may characterise something as desirable does not necessarily mean that we are favourably disposed towards it. In chapter one it was argued that we may decide whether or not we want something, if we evaluate it to be good of a kind of thing in which we have a certain interest. The type of interest that was seen to be relevant here was that which reflected that we were favourably disposed towards that which we were evaluating. It was suggested that when we evaluate something from a certain point of view which we have adopted, the interest which reflects the favourable

disposition that we have to the object is embodied in the very criterion of the evaluation. Similarly it was argued that if we evaluate a thing according to a particular aspect of that thing, when we make a qualified evaluation, we may evaluate the thing according to a certain interest to which we are favourably disposed; an interest which will lead us to prefer those objects which satisfy it. On the basis of these considerations, it was suggested that we may have such an interest in certain kinds of thing. We may be favourably disposed toward certain kinds of thing such that a presentation of a good one of that kind may prompt us to want to acquire or possess it. In such cases, although such an interest may not affect the criteria of evaluation for that kind of thing, it may influence the role that our evaluations play in deciding whether or not we want specimens of that kind of thing. The example was given of a person, favourably disposed toward food, who decided that she wanted to consume what she judged to be a particularly good meal, though prior to this time she had confessed to no appetite.

As Anscombe has argued, an answer to the question "Why do you want it?" will give a desirability characterisation to an object that explains why it is wanted. Many such desirability characterisations will relate to the kind of

thing that the object is, or to certain qualities or properties that it possesses. It may be the case that if we are favourably disposed towards a certain kind of thing or towards things with certain qualities, that the mere fact that an object is of a certain kind, or has those qualities, will give us reason for wanting the object and provide us with a desirability characterisation of it. However, if the wanting about which we are talking is seen as a symptom of valuing that object, the grounds for wanting the object in these circumstances are not necessarily provided by any desirability characterisation whatsoever. The grounds for wanting the object in these circumstances should be the same that we would offer for valuing the object. We should want the object, not merely because it is of some kind, or has some quality or property that would provide a desirability characterisation, but because we believe it to be good in these respects, and important to us. However, this should not lead us to conclude that after all, valuing something is merely wanting it. For, as we have seen, to value something is to maintain a cluster of dispositions which amount to more than merely wanting something, and the reasons that we have for wanting something in valuing it are far and above those that would be required in a normal situation of wanting in order to make that wanting explicable. Further, we could still want something for all these reasons, and yet be seen not to value it. However, if the reasons that we have for wanting something

in valuing are not the reasons that we may be said to have for valuing the thing, that wanting cannot truly be said to be a symptom of our valuing the thing. This point will be elaborated in our discussion of reasons for valuing a particular thing.

Reasons for Valuing a Kind of Thing

The reason for valuing the particular specimen that we do, may be found in the fact that that particular one is one we have evaluated to be good of its kind, or in some respect. This aspect of reasons for valuing things we will discuss later. That a certain kind of thing, or quality, is desirable to us, is regarded favourably, and is seen to be important, provides the reasons for valuing a certain kind of thing. So far we have left unexplicated the notion of an interest which indicates a favourable disposition towards something. Neither have we discussed the way in which values are relevant to such favourable dispositions, or the desirability characterisation that we may give an object. Two examples of the type of interest that would be relevant here are the desire for something that we believe will satisfy a need of ours which we want satisfied, and the desire for something that we believe will bring us pleasure. To desire something on either of these grounds is

to have an interest in that thing or kind of thing that would indicate a favourable disposition towards it. These are two such interests of the type that I would suggest we have in a thing when we believe that the pursuit of that interest will bring us happiness or satisfaction. In what follows, I shall attempt to give some explanation of the nature and rationale of such interests. It is at this point that our notion of a value will be seen to be relevant to that of valuing something.

(i) Needs and Pleasures

Keeping in mind that the desire to satisfy a need or pursue some pleasure are only two examples of the type of interest I have in mind, I wish to make some general comments about the nature of pleasure and needs.

The experience of needs and pleasures are common to all human beings, but experiences which in an important sense we cannot be said to choose to have or not have. Of course there are certain choices which we can make which might make it appear that we can choose what we find pleasurable, what we count as a need and what we count as the satisfaction of a need or the experience of something pleasurable. We may choose to participate in a certain activity which we know brings us pleasure. For example, I may choose whether or not

I shall go to a certain chamber music concert which I know will bring me pleasure. We may choose to embark on a certain course of action which we know will involve the satisfaction of certain needs. For example, a person may choose to embark on a certain course of study which will require his seeking a financial subsidy and a quiet environment in order to do justice to his ability and aspirations. He may be said to knowingly choose a course of action which will entail the satisfaction of certain needs.

Still other choices are open to us in this area. We are able to appraise pleasures we have experienced and needs that we may have. I may appraise some pleasures to be very much more satisfying than others. I may choose to pursue the pleasures which I believe to be most satisfying at the expense of some others. I may appraise certain needs that I may have in terms of their immediacy or in terms of how far-reaching the effects of their satisfaction would be, thus deciding that certain needs are more important than others. On the basis of such appraisals I may choose to pursue the satisfaction of some needs rather than others.

In some situations we may take action to negate pleasures and needs we have previously experienced. We may, for example, take action to free ourselves from addiction say, to nicotine or alcohol. This may involve not only efforts to

reduce and finally dispel the need for these things, but also to dispel the pleasure that is taken in them. In such circumstances we may be said to choose to take action to dispel certain needs and the appreciation of certain things as pleasures. A man committed to luxury may choose to change his style of life in such a way that things that were once needs, in the sense of being necessities for him, are discarded. Such a person may attempt to make it the case that he no longer needs a car, ten suits instead of two, a four-course meal every night and so on. This he may do by conscientiously abstaining from the use of or indulgence in these things. Often people may be successful in such enterprises.

However, although it may be true in all these cases listed that we have some control over pleasures and needs that we have and pursue, that there is a certain element of choice in what we pursue and experience as pleasures and needs, it is not the case that we may simply deem something to be a pleasure or a need. Neither is it the case that we may simply deem that something will cease to be a pleasure or a need, or that some course of action will involve the satisfaction of a need. A man cannot simply deem it to be the case that standing on his head will dispel his need for alcohol, or that cleaning sewers will be pleasant, or that

sustenance will no longer be a need for him as a human being. And if it is the case that a course of action satisfies a certain need or brings us pleasure, it will do so independently of our deeming it to do so. This is not to say that people do not attempt to deem it to be the case that certain things will be pleasurable or will amount to a need or the lack of a need. Very often in such cases we talk of a person "choosing" that something will be pleasurable for him, or that something does really amount to a need. We may hear of a person that he "chooses it to be the case that X will be a need" or that he "chooses to believe that Y will bring him pleasure". However, the point of such comments is to indicate that the person is deluding himself, that what he maintains to be the case is not the case, and cannot be deemed by him to be the case. The word "choice" is inserted in our comments with a tone of irony.

In those situations where we can make choices about pleasures and needs, it is quite often possible to give reasons for pursuing the pleasures and needs that we do or negating certain pleasures and needs. We may have reasons embodied in the appraisals that we make for pursuing one course of action rather than another. However, such situations do not provide us with reasons for pursuing pleasures or desiring to satisfy needs at all. To give reasons for desiring to do this at all is quite a different

matter from giving reasons for pursuing one particular pleasure rather than some other, or the satisfaction of one particular need rather than some other. What reasons can we give for desiring to pursue pleasures and satisfy needs at all? Is it possible for such reasons to be given?

To these questions, I would suggest, we can give what might appear only a partly satisfactory answer. Such desires are based on the belief that we can differentiate between different ways of living or styles of life according to how happy or satisfying we find them. In doing this we can differentiate between lives that are more lacking in pleasures and encumbered with unsatisfied needs than are others. And, that we desire to live in a manner that is as happy and satisfying as we can make it, is I think, a fact about human beings for which there is no rationale forthcoming. If a person gives as a reason for desiring something that it will make him happier, all things being equal, it is difficult to imagine what could possibly be an answer to the question, "But why do you think that the fact that you are made happier by this thing provides a reason for desiring it?" We are prompted to retort, "What sort of explanation do you want?", for we seem to have come to a dead end.

This difficulty may be explained by the claim that if we desire to live at all, we desire to live as happily as we believe possible. If we desire to live at all, we do not desire to subject ourselves to what we believe are

unnecessary sufferings or deprivations; unpleasantness we believe we could avoid without incurring some greater unpleasantness. This is not to say that a rational being can never desire to suffer, but would never desire to suffer unless he believed some good were to be attained through it, including that of a greater suffering being avoided. Thus, on this claim, if a person gives as a reason for desiring something that it will make him happy or happier, this reason should be regarded as no less a final one than the reason that he desires something because he desires to live. If the finality of the claim that something will produce happiness or more happiness is seen to be comparable to the claim that something will preserve life, as a reason for desiring something, then we may be able to give a satisfactory account of what reasons one can have for pursuing pleasures and satisfying needs. For, there is something peculiar in a person responding to the claim that such-and-such is desired because I want to live, with the question, "But why do you think that is a reason?" In this case, as for the previous one, we want to ask in what way the reason is seen to be inadequate, or not a reason at all. If this comparison is accepted, I think a helpful parallel can be drawn between things we desire because we want to live, and things we might desire on account of our conception of what it is to lead a happy life.

Most of us are aware of the fact that if one desires to live at all, certain needs must be satisfied. If we are to survive at all we must at least have sustenance and perhaps shelter. Because these needs are common to us all, it seldom occurs to us to ask of another, "Why do you desire sustenance and shelter?" Given that a person desires to live at all it is clear that he will need certain things in order that his survival will be possible; he will need at least that the necessary conditions of his survival be satisfied. In such circumstances, a person may be regarded as giving an adequate reason for desiring sustenance and shelter if he claims that he desires to live. If he did not desire to live, we would wonder what adequate grounds could be supplied for his desiring sustenance and shelter for himself. Of course if it is the case that the acquisition of the means of survival can only be accomplished at some great price such as the sacrifice of others' lives, the adequacy of such a reason may be brought into question. We do not necessarily even in this case always desire the means to, or that which is necessary to, a desired end. However, this is not to dispute that if we desire to live, all things being equal, this can be an adequate reason for desiring that which is necessary to our continued survival. Indeed, what further reason could we be required to give?

Just as the desire to live may provide an adequate reason for desiring sustenance and shelter, so the desire for a happy life may provide an adequate reason for pursuing certain pleasures and the satisfaction of certain needs seen to be constituents of that life. If it is the case that we desire a style of life because we believe it is the happiest we can attain, then to desire things believed necessary to such a life is explicable in the desire for that style of life. For example, if a man desires to lead a life of scholastic endeavour he may desire the satisfaction of certain needs and the pursuit of certain pleasures, if he recognises such things as scholastic pleasures, which are necessary conditions of such a life. He may also desire certain things, not because they are necessary conditions of this style of life, but because they compliment it or enrich it in some way. He may desire such things as a quiet environment, access to relevant literature and the opportunity to peruse such literature. If he believes that the scholastic life is as happy a one as he can attain, to say that he desires this life, is to give an adequate reason for desiring the pursuit of such pleasures and the satisfaction of such needs, provided there are no significant countervailing considerations.

It is in this manner that we usually explain why it is that we desire to satisfy certain needs and pursue certain pleasures.

More generally, I would suggest that we desire to pursue pleasures and satisfy needs because we think that these activities will produce happier or more satisfying lives for us. It may be suggested that the original question, "Why do we desire to satisfy needs or pursue pleasures at all?" has still not been answered satisfactorily; that this may only be answered by explaining how the satisfaction of needs and the pursuit of pleasures can be conducive to happiness, whatever we take happiness to be. To this I can only reply that if happiness is regarded as a state of well-being, and satisfaction as at least some state of non-deprivation, it is tautologically the case that the fulfilment of such desires will be conducive to happiness and satisfaction.

If this is accepted, I would propose that a person will judge as the happiest and most satisfying life for him that which is most conducive to his well-being and free from those deprivations judged frustrating to him as a human being. We could here use other words such as that which he judges to be the most worthwhile life, or that life which he sees to be an excellent one. Such lives, Kurt Baier has called "ideal lives"¹ and it is to this notion that we

1. Kurt Baier, "What is value? An analysis of the concept", in Values and the Future (New Jersey, 1969), pp.42-47.

shall now turn.

(ii) Ideal Lives and Values

Baier has suggested that different styles of life are appraised according to what we see to be the ideal, or most excellent, life for a human being to lead. This, I would suggest, could be glossed in terms of what we would regard to be the happiest or most satisfying life for a human being. Our conception of what will bring us happiness or satisfaction would govern what we regarded as an ideal life. Our conception of what would be an ideal life would be gained from observing what changes in our life appear most conducive to happiness or satisfaction. However, the body of knowledge we would accumulate in this matter is not a mere matter of empirical investigation. Baier states,

Such knowledge, involving as it does the appraisal of changes in a person's life, can be properly called evaluative. Yet, such knowledge is clearly empirical, based on what people find worthwhile or the opposite. Of course, in a sense it is not based on observation alone but on what is often called feeling. But it is empirical knowledge nonetheless. It is as much based on experience as is the burnt child's learning from experience, the bitter experience of the burn. What makes the experience 'bitter' and thereby an important element in the learning, is not however something found by observation, i.e. by the child's seeing or hearing his own anguished cries.¹

1. Ibid, pp.46-47.

Thus, apart from the empirical observation, two other factors are relevant to the accumulation of knowledge on which we may base our judgment of what is an ideal life. We observe changes in our life, but also are aware of the effects they have on us, and the extent to which these effects are conducive or non-conducive to, in our terminology, happiness or satisfaction. (It should be noted here that if two such arbiters are that which brings us pleasure and that which satisfies needs that we have, our conception of what would be an ideal life is to some extent determined. For, although that which brings us pleasures and that which satisfies needs or is a need may be changed by education and change of circumstance at any given time, as we pointed out before, we cannot of our own choosing make something pleasurable or make something constitute a need or the satisfaction of it.) I do not think as Baier would suggest, that such knowledge must all be gained through personal experience. We may believe on good grounds that something will bring us happiness if we observe it to bring happiness to someone whom we judge to be relevantly similar to ourselves. Such a person might be one who has a similar temperament to us, similar talents, similar likes and dislikes and so on. This, however, is a minor point. There seem to be greater objections to Baier's claim that we discriminate between different styles of life by comparing them with an ideal life.

It is a highly contentious point that people do in fact have such conceptions of ideal lives. Although we have used this notion in order to clarify certain points about the nature of pleasures and needs, it is a notion that can only be accepted with a good deal of qualification. To suggest that people generally have a conception of what would be an ideal life for them is to claim quite a lot.

In order to have a conception of what an ideal life would be, we would expect a person to know not only what would not be constituent of such a life, but on the positive side, what were the elements of a life that made it ideal. "Ideal" we take here to mean the perfect type, not merely what appears preferable to some other. The accumulation of such knowledge as Baier outlines would be progressively accumulated over a number of years. We do not find out in a very short space of time what is "worthwhile and the opposite", to use Baier's words. If a person does arrive at a conception of what an ideal life would be for him, he may not be able to justify it fully in explaining why certain things tend to be more satisfying than others, but we would at least expect him to believe that some things were the most satisfying for him on good grounds. Such grounds would require either that he had experienced other styles of life or ways of living and found them not to be as satisfying, or perhaps believed for example, that life Z

would not be as satisfying as life Y because Z was similar to X which he had found not as satisfying as Y. If a person is to have a well-grounded conception of what an ideal life is for him, we would expect him to be able to summon, if not the gamut of human experience, a wide range of experience and observation on which to base his judgment.

Of course, a person may decide at a very early stage what is his ideal life whether this be on good grounds or not. But for the more cautious this may be a decision never reached, or if reached at all, probably late in life. It may be the case that only a partial decision is reached such that a person would claim that such-and-such at least would be part of his ideal life, and so-and-so at least would be absent.

However, even if it is incorrect to claim that every person has a conception of an ideal life for him, we can at least proceed on the claim that most people do have some knowledge of certain things being far more conducive of happiness or satisfaction than some others. It is in such knowledge that values are grounded, and in having values at all, we have some of the constituents of what would be our conception of the ideal life. We defined a value not only as something with which people may act consistently, or use as a reason in action, but also as a label for something the realisation or protection of which will make an important

difference, of a favourable nature, to the quality of our lives. I would suggest that the sort of favourable difference that the realisation of values make is to make our lives more satisfying or happy than they otherwise would be. However, very very small differences can be described in this way. Values, I would suggest, label those states of affairs which we would regard as necessary conditions of an ideal life. Herein lies their importance. Whilst we may not have a fully formed conception of what an ideal life would be, and thus not know what the sufficient conditions of such a life would be, we can at least decide on what some of the necessary conditions would be. It is these things that we call our values.

The pursuit of certain pleasures and the satisfaction of certain needs may be judged by us to be necessary constituents of a type of life which ^{wc} would imagine to be the happiest or most satisfying for us. More correctly we may claim that we could not conceive of a life that we might judge to be the happiest or most satisfying for us that did not include the satisfaction of certain needs and the pursuit of certain pleasures. Examples of such things might be religious and political freedom and the contemplation of good literature or aesthetically pleasing objects or environments in which we might live. These we might adopt as values of ours, and in desiring to attain them or retain them, we have an interest

in those things which indicates that we are favourably disposed towards them, in the way that we are towards objects that we value.

I would suggest that the kinds of thing that we are disposed to value as opposed to merely liking or admiring or wanting, are those kinds of thing which we believe to be conducive to or facilitate the realisation of or maintenance of values of ours. This is not to say that there is a one-to-one correlation between things that we value and values that we have. It may be the case that I value a certain person's freedom. This does not necessarily imply that I have as a value, freedom. It may be the case that that person's freedom facilitates some activity of mine, say furthering my knowledge in a certain area. It could be the case that I held learning in this area as a value, rather than freedom. This could be the basis on which I valued a certain man's freedom. However, if it is the case that I have certain values, such as freedom and theoretical learning, it is likely that I shall value objects and activities which in my judgment facilitate or are conducive to such things. In fact, if it were the case that I denied valuing specimens of any kind of thing that was related in this way to values of mine, and with which I was acquainted, could avail myself and thought good, it would become doubtful

whether or not I held those values at all. If it is the case that I have certain values, then I shall be disposed to value certain kinds of thing. It is not the case that valuing something or other entails that I hold any particular value, although if I do value something, the reason for this will be in part that I have some value or other to which that kind of thing is seen to be relevant. If, to some of our values we give greater priority than others, we are likely to value more those kinds of thing that are conducive to these values¹.

I have described the kinds of thing that we value as those seen to be conducive to, or to facilitate the realisation or maintenance of, values. This does not mean that all things that we value should be regarded as means to ends. It may be the case that a man has as a value high aesthetic quality in objects he possesses. He may derive great pleasure from the observation of a certain vase which he claims to

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1. Although I have stated that values are necessary constituents of what might be judged an ideal life, this does not preclude the possibility of us giving some values greater priority than others, of recognising some values to be more important than others. Although they may all be necessary constituents of a certain style of life, this is not to say that the realisation of some will not have, say, wider repercussions of a favourable nature than some others.

value. It is not the case that possession of the vase is a means to realising his value, or even maintaining it. Rather, in possessing such an object and taking pleasure in it, he is acting in accord with his value. Nevertheless, we may talk of the vase facilitating the realisation of the man's value. On the other hand, if a person has as a value financial security, he may value a certain instrument he uses in his work as a means of bringing about the realisation of that value.

In summary, we may say that a person will have adequate reasons for valuing a certain kind of thing, if it is the case that,

- (1) that kind of thing's desirability is found in the fact that it is conducive to, or facilitates the realisation or maintenance of some value;
- (2) specimens of that kind of thing are seen to be important because they are conducive to, or facilitate, the realisation or maintenance of a value;
- (3) a favourable attitude is held towards that kind of thing on the grounds that pursuit of that interest will promote the realisation or maintenance of some value.

Two such interests of the type alluded to in the third condition would be that something is desired because it is pleasurable, or because it will satisfy some need, which contributes to that happiness or satisfaction deemed necessary for what could be judged to be an ideal life. The realisation of such states of affairs, we have suggested, is the realisation of values of ours.

Reasons for Valuing a Specimen of a Kind

The reasons for valuing a specimen of a certain kind will be identical to those for valuing a certain kind of thing, and will in addition include the fact that that specimen is judged to be a good one of its kind. It should be remembered that to this claim we added the qualification that in certain cases a specimen of a certain kind will be valued not because it is good of its kind, but because it is the best available, or the only one available. Such cases are, of course, not uncommon, though I think to take them as paradigm cases of valuing is to create a misleading impression of the type of attitude that valuing is. If it is the case that we value objects because they facilitate or are conducive to the maintenance or realisation of values, and if it is the case that their desirability is to be found in such considerations, the

success with which any given object will fulfil this role will depend on its goodness according to some kind or other, according to that respect in which it is found to be desirable. It has been argued that we desire to realise values because we see them to be constituents of a happy life, and that it is of our nature to desire as happy a life as we believe possible at any given time. Thus, those things which we value are the things which we may say maximise our opportunities at any given time to pursue a happier life. Unless it is the case that our valuing cannot be directed elsewhere through lack of availability, we will value those things that facilitate most ably the realisation of our values. Unless for contingent reasons we are restrained, we will value things judged good of their kind.

The claims that an object of valuing is one that is good of its kind and also good in that respect for which it is desirable do not prima facie appear to amount to the same thing. Let us examine these two claims more closely.

It was argued in chapter three that to give a desirability characterisation of an object in the case of wanting was to give an answer to the question "Why do you want it?" (or "What do you want it for?"). Similarly, it was suggested that in the first instance, to obtain a desirability characterisation of an object of valuing we should ask "Why do you value it?"

(or "What do you value it for?"). If it was the case that in giving desirability characterisations of valued objects we were to claim that they were things that we liked or enjoyed, which on Anscombe's account are quite adequate desirability characterisations, then what would it mean to claim that objects of valuing must be good in that respect for which they are found to be desirable? In such cases I would suggest that what is desirable about the object is the very thing that it is, the kind of thing that it is, whether it be a vase, a sunset, an orchestral performance or a horse. In this case, a specimen that we value would be one that we judge to be good of that kind of thing that we are disposed to like, that we are favourably disposed towards. Yet, not all things that we can characterise as desirable in the sense of liking can be seen as specimens of kinds which we can evaluate. We may claim, for example to want a certain colour in a dress because we like it. Although certain colours may be good for something or other, they are not of themselves good, poor or indifferent. They are not things in themselves that can provide criteria of evaluation. However, we may well ask what it would mean to value, as we have explicated the notion, a colour just for being the colour that it is. In what way could valuing that colour amount to having anything more than a preference for it, or liking it, unless, of course, we valued it in some role, say

as the kind of thing that gave relief to irritated eyes? How could we be said to avail ourselves of such a thing, except in a role such as the one suggested? Objects of wanting that may be characterised as desirable, but which are not capable of an evaluation, would I think, be ruled out by other conditions we have laid down for valuing, especially those concerning the availability and importance of the object.

The second problem concerning the evaluation of those things which we value is more a difficulty of language than a real problem. We very often talk about things being good of their kind when we talk about things being good oranges, bridges, houses, dogs and what have you. The impression is therefore given that such objects have a kind to which they belong, which is their kind. However, in that we classify all sorts of objects in differing ways, supplying criteria of classification from which may be derived criteria of evaluation, there is no reason to think that things can belong to one and only one kind, designated by a class name such as "horse" or "knife" which is normally used in referring to those things. Cross classifications are quite common, and the type of classifications on which point of view and qualified evaluations rest are good examples of these. Thus, something may be judged to be desirable in a certain respect which is a quality of that object, and as

has been argued in chapter one, the fact that we may judge that object good in that respect rests on the possibility of being able to delineate a very broad class of objects or kind of thing that manifest that quality or property at all. We may talk of things being desirable in their stability or aesthetic nature, and good in these respects as well. In evaluating them as such, we are evaluating them according to a very broad kind of thing which does not have a class name. However, this is not to say that we are not evaluating them according to any kind at all. To say that a table is valued for its aesthetic quality although it is not good as a table, is not to claim that it is not good according to any kind.

It has been suggested that evaluations from a point of view may include what were called "person-relative" evaluations. We may evaluate things to be good for us, given our limitations, our interests or our abilities. Such evaluations should not be regarded as subjective in the sense of being unfalsifiable. The criteria for such evaluations may be examined. A person may always be mistaken about what is good for him, and such evaluations are by no means his exclusive domain. Other people may make them for him. Thus, it cannot be claimed that a person giving reasons for valuing something is, on our account, simply able to claim that something is desirable and good in that respect for which it

is desirable, and be in a privileged position to assert this.

Finally a comment must be made on the role that these evaluations play in providing grounds for valuing something. It was argued earlier that the reasons we give for wanting something in valuing it should be the same as those that we claim for valuing this thing. To give reasons for valuing something is to give reasons for reacting to that thing in a certain way. Such a reaction will amount to wanting that thing, in the sense of wanting to retain it or regain it if the thing is made unavailable, desiring to avail oneself of the object, protecting it or preserving it as the case may be. There is no particular isolable phenomenon among these which we may call the "valuing" of the object, but rather it is a reaction consisting of these different dispositions to act in various ways, given acquaintance with the object. What unifies all these different dispositions to act in these ways toward the object is the set of reasons, or grounds on which they are adopted. In wanting to retain the object, in being disposed to avail oneself of the object, in being disposed to protect or preserve the object, the grounds for doing so remain the same.

If it were the case that a person claimed to value an object because it facilitated financial security, and yet

claimed to want it only because it was pretty, and not because it facilitated financial security, we could understand why he wanted the object, but not how he came to believe that he valued that object. Similarly, if he claimed to value the object because it was good as an aid to financial security, but did not want it because of this, or claimed to value it because it facilitated financial security, which he judged important, but claimed that he did not want it for these reasons but just because it was pretty, we would tend to conclude that that person was either confused in his terminology, or did not value the thing at all.

On the other hand, a person could decide that he wanted something for all the reasons he might value it, and yet not be prepared to avail himself of, preserve or protect the object for these reasons. In such a case we could conclude that he did not value the object after all. When we evaluate an object to be good in that respect for which it is seen to be desirable, even if it is the case that thereafter we are disposed to act in a way that would be described as valuing the object, it is not necessarily the case that we do so evaluate the object in order to consciously decide whether or not we shall value it. We may, but it could be the case that such reasons are adopted at the outset in order to justify us merely wanting the object. If it is the

case that from this point we manifest those dispositions which would be seen to constitute us valuing the object because of these reasons, these would be the reasons we gave for valuing it.

However, it need not be the case that in order for an evaluation to constitute a reason for valuing some thing that evaluation must first be made in order to decide whether or not we value it. I mention this point because it would seem to me to be the case that many objects that we claim to value are ones that we first wanted on grounds that at a later stage are seen to provide grounds for valuing that thing.

In summary, I would suggest that adequate reasons for a person valuing something of a certain kind would be that the thing is desirable on account of a value, important on this account, viewed favourably on this account, and evaluated to be good in that respect for which it is seen to be desirable.

Values and Evaluation

It has been suggested that we come to adopt values by appraising which are the ways in which our lives could change to produce what we would regard as the most happy or satisfying life for us. Such an appraisal we may regard as

an evaluation if it is taken to be the case that we can talk about the goodness of a style of life, according to how fully the criteria of happiness and satisfaction are fulfilled. Further, we may talk of evaluating certain changes in our life according to the extent to which we judge them to contribute to the attainment of a style of life which we might judge to be ideal. On the basis of such evaluations we may choose to pursue one style of life rather than another, or to pursue the attainment of certain changes rather than others. It is on such evaluations that our values are based. Those possible states of affairs which our values represent may be seen as that which fulfils or partly fulfils the criteria for what we would judge to be an ideal life. In giving reasons for valuing something, it is not only the evaluation of the particular object which is relevant to those reasons, but evaluations by which we establish our values. It would appear that ultimately we should also be able to justify why it is that we take certain things as values and thus be guided by these in what we value.

Herein lies a difficulty for the claim that adequate reasons may be given for valuing something. There need not necessarily, although there may, be dispute about what are adequate criteria for the best type of life that a man could

lead. The point of real difficulty seems to be that at which we must decide what will fulfil or satisfy these criteria. For such judgments would appear to be necessarily subjectively oriented, and to create conflicting judgments that cannot be resolved. A person may claim, for example, that the satisfaction of certain needs and the pursuit of certain pleasures, among other things, are those which produce the most happiness and satisfaction for him. In such a claim he may be mistaken out of ignorance or self-deception which can be revealed to him. Apart from this, however, there seem to be good grounds for claiming that not all people derive the greatest happiness and satisfaction from pursuing the same things. In explanation of this we can point to the different talents, skills, temperaments and intelligence of different human beings. This in itself would not be a problem if it were possible to discover some logical connection between different types of person, and that which constituted their greatest happiness or satisfaction. However, such a task would appear to be at the moment an impossible one, perhaps resting on knowledge that only psychologists could provide us with.

Values, and the adoption of values, are in some respects similar to beliefs and the adoption of beliefs. One man may believe something that we do not believe, because he is

able to amass evidence which we cannot. Whether or not this is only contingently the case, we cannot rationally adopt a belief simply because we know that some other man does.

(We may, however, if we believe him to be an authority.)

Similarly with values, we cannot rationally adopt something as a value, if we do not have grounds for believing that that value is a necessary constituent of what might be an ideal life for us, although we may know full well that other people have such a value. (Once again we may adopt something as a value if we see a person who we judge to be relevantly similar to us adopt it.) Just as we cannot rationally believe things on evidence we regard to be false, we cannot rationally have as values things we do not believe to be conducive to a happy life. Yet, as people may differ about the status of evidence for beliefs, so much more do they appear to differ over that which is conducive to a happy life. And, to the extent that such beliefs are based on different personal experiences, there seems no room to debate.

Perhaps after all this does not show cause for despair. Although a person may feign happiness or satisfaction, there does not appear to be anything logically impossible to prevent methods being derived to establish whether or not people are happy or satisfied. And, if this could be done, it may still

be the case that what were reasons for one person valuing something, would not be reasons for another person valuing that same thing. But, in order for a set of reasons to be adequate, must it be the case that they may be adopted by anyone as an adequate set of reasons for them valuing something? We can certainly ask the same question of what might be regarded as adequate reasons for performing certain acts. I would tend to think that this feature of reasons for valuing things is only troublesome so long as we cannot establish whether or not the reasons that a person gives are reasons that are truly his, and not proffered, say, for the sake of expediency or conformity. I do not think this difficulty is one that could be regarded as inherent in the nature of valuing and values, and for which there is no possible solution.

Be this as it may, the fact would still remain that what one man values or has as a value may not necessarily be what another man should or can rationally value or have as a value. What is good for one man may not be good for another man, not because their criteria of evaluation differ, but because that which satisfies the criteria for each one may differ. I do not myself see this as a great problem, unless a very rigid view of the type of evaluations that are open to us is adopted. I shall leave comment on this for my conclusion.

CHAPTER VI

SOME CONCLUSIONS AND QUERIES

The discussion of valuing and values that has been presented raises at least two issues which are of interest in the field of ethics. The first, and more narrow issue that I would point to concerns the account that philosophers are to give of evaluation. The second and broader issue concerns the role that the study of evaluation and of value-concepts is seen to have in the study of ethics. These two issues will be seen to be closely related though not identical. Let us attend to the narrower issue first.

Some Thoughts on Evaluation

It has been suggested that we may evaluate things of certain kinds to which we are favourably disposed in order to decide whether or not we want or value those things. It was argued that such decisions should not be regarded as choices, because in order to decide whether or not we want something, or value it, we need not necessarily see that thing as an alternative to any thing at all. This was taken to be an essential feature of a choosing

situation; that if we choose at all, we do so between things that are seen as alternatives. However, to this argument there may be presented a counter-argument that not all senses in which we use the word "choice" do in fact require that a choice be made between alternatives. We may say of a person that he did something "of his own choosing" or "of his own free choosing" or simply that he "chose to do it". In such a case, it could be argued, we are not referring to a situation of weighing up alternatives at all, but rather using these words to emphasise that the person did what he did of his own free will, or on his own decision.

Although I shall readily admit that the word "choice" is used in this way, I do not think it is a sense that is relevant to the claim that things are evaluated in order to choose between them. This can be indicated by re-considering a comment made by Professor Hare:

We only have standards for a class of object, we only talk of the virtues of one specimen as against another, we only use value-words about them, when occasions are known to exist, or are conceivable, in which we, or someone else, would have chosen between specimens.¹

1. R.M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford, 1952), p.128.

The choosing to which Professor Hare refers is that which is conducted between a number of objects of the same kind. I would suggest that when we "talk of the virtues of one specimen as against another" we are weighing up alternatives; we are weighing them up according to their merits. In such a situation, to say that we are "choosing" between specimens, is to describe a certain sort of activity. However, I would suggest that when we say that a person did something by choice, or of his own choosing, we are describing the manner in which he did something. We are suggesting that he did the action freely. The difference in the two senses can be illustrated by the fact that we could say in a certain context that a person's choice between a number of things was made of his own choosing. The word "choosing" is not redundant here, but rather indicates that his choice was made freely, as opposed to being made under duress or compulsion. This sense of the word "choosing" does not describe a particular act, but a manner in which many acts, activities, decisions and judgments can be made.

Another sense in which the word "choose" is sometimes used is that in which a person may be said to deem that something will be the case. This sense we mentioned in discussing needs and pleasures in chapter five. A person may be said to "choose" that X will be the case where what

is meant is that X will be brought about merely by his indicating that he desires it, or by pronouncing or judging that it will be so. To suggest that when we decide whether or not we want or value something we choose whether or not we want or value it in this sense is as erroneous as suggesting that in this sense we choose whether or not to believe things, or whether or not propositions are true or false. For to argue in all these cases that we may choose or deem that these things shall be so, is to imply that they can be so irrespective of considerations of whether or not there are grounds or reasons for such things being the case or not the case. It is not too difficult to see that if this were the case, our concepts of what it is to believe something or what it is for proposition to be true would be completely undermined. Such concepts depend on the acknowledgment of conditions that must be fulfilled if something is to be judged believable, or true. Similarly for valuing and wanting, we have argued that only under certain conditions could we decide we wanted or valued something. These conditions were outlined in the discussion of proper objects of wanting and valuing. I would thus conclude that in none of these three senses could we be said to choose what we want or value where the word "choose" is taken to refer to some isolable act or judgment.

However, this is not to deny Hare his claim. He has only stated that we have standards of evaluation for objects "when occasions are known to exist, or are conceivable, in which we, or someone else, would have chosen between specimens". This of course, is not to claim that we always evaluate things in order to choose between them. Neither is it the case that in stating that we teach or decide standards of goodness for a class of objects in order "to teach or decide on principles for choosing between objects of that class" does Hare commit himself to the claim that evaluations may not be used for any other purposes. The claim that standards of evaluation are adopted as principles of choosing does not preclude the possibility that they may be adopted as principles of other types of judgment. And, it is open to Hare to argue that given a kind of thing to which we are favourably disposed, we may only decide in a certain situation that we want a specimen that happens to be good of that kind, because we understand it to be the case that had we had a range of such specimens to choose between, we would have chosen the best one any way, or chosen to pursue or attempt to acquire the best one. In other words, he may wish to argue that the cogency of the reason for wanting something, that it is good of a kind to which we are favourably disposed, depends on our understanding of the manner in which we choose between things of the one kind.

On the other hand, it could be argued that the notion of choice that Hare employs is a misleading vehicle for an explanation of the nature of evaluation. It may be the case that ultimately we only evaluate things in order to establish what Nicholas Rescher has called "rational preferences"¹. This view would seem to be promising in that it could be argued that a rational preference may be expressed not merely in choosing a good specimen of one kind among other specimens of that kind, but also in wanting or valuing something that is judged good of a kind to which we are favourably disposed. Von Wright has argued that the notion of a preference should not be identified with that of a "preferential choice"², and this would seem to leave the way open for some notion of a preference to be seen as logically prior to choosing on the basis of an evaluation as well as wanting or valuing things on evaluative grounds. It could be argued that the relevance that evaluations have to choosing, wanting and valuing can only be explained in terms of what it is to establish a preference for one thing rather than another. It should also be noted that whilst "preference" is a relation term, that

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1. Nicholas Rescher, "Evaluation and the Logic of Preference", in Introduction to Value Theory (New Jersey, 1969), p.73.
 2. Georg Henrik von Wright, The Logic of Preference (Edinburgh, 1963), pp.15-16.

between which it may hold need not be seen as alternatives. It could be said of me that I prefer the writings of Dostoevsky to those of Tolstoy, without viewing them as alternatives in any way at all. These, however, are only suggestions. It has not been the object of this study to produce a new account of evaluation, but merely to indicate through a consideration of valuing, some further directions in which the study of evaluation could proceed.

Related to these considerations are others concerning the role that evaluations may have in reasoning. If it is the case that the fact that something is good of a certain kind can be a reason for wanting or valuing it, what sort of reason are we to take this to be? It was pointed out in chapter one that the premises or considerations that were claimed to form patterns of reasoning by which we might decide whether or not we wanted something did not entail the conclusion that we did want that thing. Yet, it was claimed that they were adequate grounds on which to want something, and could only be absent in a set of reasons for valuing something when the object valued was not good of a kind, but the best available of that kind¹. This is a difficulty that

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1. It is certainly the case that we may evaluate specimens of a certain kind in order to choose which one we will avail ourselves of. However, this does not entail that in evaluating them we choose whether or not we shall value them. It is only after we have made such a choice, if we make it at all, that we might come to value them, because, among other things, they are good of a certain kind.

is perhaps not peculiar to evaluations, but is also relevant to many other judgments and considerations. The problem is a general one concerning what it is for something to be a reason for a certain judgment, decision or action, and what is it for something to be a good ground or adequate reason for deciding that something is the case? Unless we can reach some decisions on these points it is difficult to isolate what might be problems peculiar to evaluations employed as reasons for adopting certain attitudes or performing certain acts.

This problem would appear to be particularly pressing if evaluations from a point of view and qualified evaluations are accepted as legitimate evaluations. As we have illustrated, such evaluations more clearly than any others present the possibility of the one evaluation being an adequate reason for one person adopting a certain attitude or performing certain acts, but not an adequate reason for another person. Of course to some extent this has been recognised by both Hare and Geach in their debate over the action-guiding nature of value-words. However, Hare's point was that unless a certain interest prevailed, an evaluation would only guide action, would only give grounds for acting in a certain way, rather than influencing action. On the account we have given not only favourable point of view and qualified evaluations, but any other kind of evaluation need not

necessarily guide certain actions or attitudes unless appropriate interests are sustained in the object. The fact that a certain specimen of a kind is good does not in fact provide us with a ground for wanting that thing unless it is the case that we have a certain interest in that kind of thing. The same may be said of valuing. Of course it could be argued that evaluations do supply such grounds, or potential grounds that, as it were, become significant when the appropriate interest is supplied. However, I think it is one thing to claim that evaluations may be performed independently of such interests, which they may, and another to claim that evaluations of a favourable nature may play the role of grounds for adopting certain attitudes, or performing certain acts towards subjects, independently of interests we may have in them. If an evaluation cannot be a ground for say wanting something or valuing it independently of such interests, then should we regard it as a ground at all? It could be argued that as for choosing, evaluations can only be seen to supply such grounds for wanting or valuing when either a real or hypothetical situation is constructed around them to which the evaluation is seen to be relevant. This point I would accept.

However, I think it is a mistake to equate the judgment that some evaluation could provide a ground for choosing, wanting, or valuing something given certain conditions, and the claim that something is a ground for choosing, wanting or valuing something because certain conditions obtain. If these two claims are equated, then I think that we must conclude with Hare that all evaluations are action- or attitude-guiding. That is, they provide grounds for choosing or wanting or valuing something whenever they are made; it is a feature of every evaluation in whatever context it is made. The equating of a hypothetical and a categorical assertion in this context is misleading for the following reason.

If we take this view, we only obscure the differences that exist in various roles that evaluations may have. If it is the case that I want or value something that is a good specimen of a certain kind to which I am favourably disposed, then the favourable evaluation of that thing will supply a reason for my wanting or valuing it. If I am not so disposed towards that thing it will not, though it could, if my

interest were otherwise. If a person articulates a favourable evaluation to us in order to explain his wanting or valuing something, there is no reason for us to think that that evaluation is a ground for us wanting or valuing the thing unless we have a similar interest in it. The evaluation is being used merely to explain, not to guide.

Again, if a person pronounces that a specimen of a certain kind is good, that is no reason for us to assume that this provides a ground for him wanting or valuing or even choosing that object. In other words, the fact that a favourable evaluation is made does not necessarily imply that the person who has made it is favourably disposed towards that thing in such a way that it could be a ground for him wanting, valuing or choosing it.

These claims may appear to undermine the claim that to articulate a favourable evaluation about something is to commend, to say something favourable about it. I think it can be shown that to say something favourable about an object, which is what I shall take "commend" to mean, is not necessarily to claim that there are grounds for wanting, valuing, choosing or adopting any other attitude or activity towards it, although it does imply that there would be such grounds given certain conditions.

I take it to be axiomatic that to articulate a favourable evaluation about something is to say something

favourable about it. However, as our discussion of valuing has shown, for many instances of evaluation, we can only explain those evaluations fully by considering other evaluations on which they rest. In particular we noticed the way in which point of view and qualified evaluations may derive their criteria from other broader evaluations which established values of ours. It was suggested that interests which indicated a favourable disposition toward a kind of thing and which were held in virtue of one or other of our values could be embodied in the very criteria of those evaluations. Thus, a thing could be judged good if it satisfied certain demands or furthered certain interests.

It was noted that we may cross-classify things that we evaluate, such that a thing may belong to more than one kind and simultaneously be good and bad of different kinds. It was assumed throughout this study that evaluations always rest on some classification or other, although some of these were seen to be very broad classifications. Given that this is the case, I would suggest that the validity of any one evaluation cannot be seen to rest with the criteria employed, but rather with whether or not those criteria are satisfied in the degree that they are claimed to be satisfied.

Thus, in articulating a favourable evaluation, we are saying something favourable about the thing, but our

judgment is conditional on the criteria employed. The thing is viewed favourably within the limits of the criteria of evaluation employed, and not necessarily according to any other possible sets of criteria. I would suggest, somewhat cautiously, that what is meant by saying something favourable about the thing in this context is that it is seen to be preferable to at least some other specimens of its kind according to the desiderata of that kind. The desiderata of a kind I take to be the criteria of goodness for that kind.

I would suggest that whenever we make an evaluation we do so according to desiderata, properties that would be desired in the thing according to its nature, role or function, rather than properties by which we may merely distinguish or classify certain things as against other things. That criteria of goodness are properties which are desiderata accounts for the fact that we prefer those things which satisfy the desiderata. It is this feature which at least in part distinguishes evaluations from classifications, and in evaluating something we can only evaluate it, conceptually speaking, according to desiderata. Yet, it is possible to distinguish between desiderata that are appropriate in an object and would be desired by someone, desiderata that are in fact desired by other people but not by ourselves, and desiderata which we

ourselves desire. We can hypothesise about what would be desiderata in a given object, what are in fact desiderata for other people, and decide what are desiderata for ourselves in various objects. The first consideration we may speculate upon irrespective of the circumstances in which we find the object. The second and third will depend on the interests that we or other people have in the objects concerned. We may recognise properties as desiderata in objects without necessarily acknowledging that we or anyone else does at this moment desire them. However, whether or not we decide that certain desiderata are in fact desired by ourselves or other people will depend on whether or not we or they are favourably disposed towards the thing in question. We cannot ourselves have as desiderata properties of things to which we are not favourably disposed.

If this is the case, then it would appear that evaluations that we make can be made on rather different levels. We may call "good" specimens of kinds of thing to which we are not favourably disposed. We are saying something favourable about the thing, but only within the limits of certain desiderata which are properties in those things that we do not desire. In such evaluations there is an implied hypothesis that if someone were favourably disposed towards that kind of thing, he would prefer this specimen. It could be said that for the moment we put ourselves in such a

person's place. If we call something "good" in explaining why we want or value it, we are implying that we are favourably disposed towards that thing, although we need not expect other people to be so disposed. If we call something "good" in giving advice to another person we are not necessarily committing ourselves to being favourably disposed towards that kind of thing.

The account that I have given of the role that evaluation plays in wanting and valuing calls for distinctions such as these. If we were to interpret the word "commend" to mean recommend, then we would have to assume that in giving reasons for wanting or valuing things that are seen to be good of a kind we would have to understand a person either to be exhorting his listener to want or value what he wants or values, or else to be recommending those objects in some other way. I would suggest that this claim would be just contrary to fact. We do not assume that everyone does or should want what we value. We recognise people to have interests other than ours, and, if it is the case as I have suggested in chapter five that such interests may include the desire to satisfy needs and pursue pleasures, then by virtue of different temperaments, talents, skills and so on, these interests may be irrevocably different.

Further, we must recognise that if it is the case that things may be cross-classified, and evaluated differently according to different kinds, then many of our favourable evaluations may be qualified to a great extent. To say something favourable about something given certain desiderata, cannot be taken to entail that we cannot say other unfavourable things about the object, which overall prompt us to view it with disfavour.

This interpretation I put forward merely as a suggestion. Whether or not it is correct, I think it gives some indication that if the relation between evaluation and valuing is considered in a broader study of the nature of evaluation, it seems probably that the interests we have in those things we evaluate must be taken into account if we are to give an accurate account of the force of articulated evaluations presented in explanations of why we value things. We have interpreted Hare somewhat charitably in that although he may never explicitly state that evaluations are always made to guide choice either directly or indirectly, this is certainly implied very strongly. I have not denied that this claim may still stand as some sort of ultimate analysis. What I have suggested is that as it is presented, it cannot adequately explain instances of evaluation, and their articulation, which are relevant to valuing.

In this section, I wish to make one final comment concerning evaluations relevant to the adoption of values. The difficulty with these evaluations was that what might satisfy the criteria of evaluation for one person, in deciding what would be constituents of an ideal life, need not necessarily satisfy another person. This may appear to be a problem if it is the case that the validity of an evaluation rests on whether the criteria of goodness are satisfied to the degree that is claimed. However, we pointed out that this was only a problem so long as there was no known method of establishing this, a problem not inherent in the evaluation. In considering this problem it is perhaps more fruitful to consider what we would require of an evaluation in order to call it objective. I would cite at least two criteria. First, the criteria of goodness must be open to debate. That is, although different criteria may be decided upon at different times, it should be open to question whether or not they are appropriate criteria. I could call a rotten apple good, if I took as my criteria decaying flesh and brown, soft skin. Such an evaluation might still be valid within these limits, but if I were to claim that all my criteria of evaluation were my own affair and not open to debate, we could hardly call this, among other such evaluations, objective. Second, we should be able to test whether or not the criteria or desiderata are satisfied to the degree that it is claimed they

are satisfied. It was this second condition that was seen to be lacking in evaluations made in order to establish values. However, it was pointed out that if it were possible to establish whether or not these criteria were satisfied for different people, we may still have the case of the same criteria demanding different satisfaction in different cases. This would seem to be an insurmountable difficulty if we regard evaluations as merely some other kind of classification. However, if these criteria are regarded as desiderata, that which is, or could or would be desired by some person other, perhaps the difficulty is not so great. For, it is not clear that if something is a desiderata, it can and will be satisfied for all men in the same way. This of course, is to admit that such evaluations would have to be person-relative. However, as we have argued before, person-relative evaluations are not necessarily subjective. I suggest this as a possible way out of this problem. Further work needs to be done concerning what is claimed for a property as a desideratum that is not claimed for it as a criterion of classification.

In summary, three possible areas of investigation relevant to an analysis of evaluation would seem to emerge from the discussion of evaluation, valuing and values that has been presented. First, if it is not the case that we

always evaluate among specimens of a kind in order to guide choice directly or indirectly, what other sort of analysis of evaluation, of the purpose of evaluation, could we give? Second, is it the case, after all, that in such an analysis, the interest that an agent might have in what he evaluates is relevant to an analysis of evaluation, particularly to the roles that evaluations may have in reasoning. Third, in what way do the criteria of an evaluation (what I have called "desiderata") differ from the other criteria of classification? Can we afford to presume that they are no different?

Philosophical Anthropology Re-considered

The conceptual analyses of value-concepts conducted by philosophers such as Hare, Urmson and von Wright are, in their different ways, attempting to answer a problem posed by G.E. Moore. He stated in Principia Ethica,

Ethics is undoubtedly concerned with the question what good conduct is; but, being concerned with this, it obviously does not start at the beginning, unless it is prepared to tell us what is good as well as what is conduct. ... if we examine good conduct alone of all good things, then we shall be in danger of mistaking for this property, some property that is not shared by other things: and thus we shall have made a mistake about Ethics even in this limited sense; for we shall not know what good conduct really is.¹

1. G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge, 1957), p.2.

In order to establish what it is for things to be good, these philosophers have generally looked at what it meant to say that something was "good" in human discourse. This study has been labelled as meta-ethics, although von Wright at least has expressed doubts about the viability of a distinction between meta- and normative ethics¹.

Philosophical Anthropology, von Wright suggested, was a study which contended that an explanation of the foundation of morals was to be found in the "needs and wants" of man, and in notions relevant to human acts such as desire, end, want, reason and will. This area of ethics has been neglected, I would guess, because it has been believed that an analysis of value concepts, and particularly those concerned with human conduct, could not be assisted by noticing all the different motives with which people might make evaluations, and do certain things. With this I would agree.

However, this is not to deny that certain activities such as evaluation may not have a purpose or point, or "telos", to use the Greek word, the explanation of which is to be found somewhere within the realm of concepts such as desire, need and want which are relevant to human action. As we suggested at the outset, even Hare acknowledged at least this, when he looked for the purpose for which

1. Georg Henrik von Wright, The Varieties of Goodness (London, 1963), pp.2-4.

evaluations are made, and that for which they might be articulated. Thus it was found that Hare appeared in difficulty, in claiming that to say of something that it was "good" was always to guide action in some way or other. It was suggested that if what Hare meant by "commend" was to recommend in some way, then this would appear to be false for many situations in which we might use the word "good". I have taken as my primary example of this those circumstances in which we might be explaining why we value something, or why we have a certain value. That such a distinction should be made is evidenced by the fact that to evaluate something in order to decide whether or not we value it may be to decide on some sort of rational preference for ourselves within the sphere of valuing. In explaining why we value something, however, we may indicate how we came to decide that we did, without suggesting that some other person need necessarily accept our preference as one of theirs.

How great a part the purposes for which we articulate evaluations are to play in an analysis of evaluation I shall leave an open question. However, if they are not considered at all, analyses of evaluation may prove to be inaccurate as we have shown Hare's to be.

Apart from these considerations, if we regard an evaluation

as some sort of judgment we should ask what sorts of reasoning, attitudes and actions it is relevant to. It would seem that to attempt to isolate evaluation and value-concepts from their context of human reasoning in order to analyse them is an idle task. In considering values and valuing I hope to have shown how a concept of evaluation can be relevant to them, and how they are relevant to each other. My analysis has been within the realm of Philosophical Anthropology to the extent that these concepts are seen to have their roots in certain desires that I would claim to be common to all human beings. If it is the case that Ethics is concerned with the evaluation of conduct or of human beings according to certain aspects, perhaps it is in the light of concepts such as these that a proper understanding of the evaluation of human conduct or human beings is to be found, for our values would seem to guide attitudes that we hold just as much as evaluations of particular things. Our valuing of certain things as well as our values would seem to influence our actions just as much as particular evaluations. Yet, both our valuing things, and our values, depend on different types of evaluation.

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Bibliographical Note

The books and articles listed below form a selective bibliography of readings which I judge to have been most relevant in the writing of this thesis. They by no means give an accurate indication of the amount that has been written on evaluation, or about value-words and value-concepts in general. However, the amount of literature written on valuing and values is small, and much that has been written on evaluation has only a very tenuous relation to the topics dealt with in this thesis.

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