

*This book is dedicated to all of those  
who have served with honour –  
from all nations, in all conflicts  
and across all times.*

# Beyond the Gates of Fire

New Perspectives on the  
Battle of Thermopylae

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## Abbreviations

|                                   |                                                              |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|
| <i>AJA</i>                        | <i>American Journal of Archaeology</i>                       |
| <i>AJP</i>                        | <i>American Journal of Philology</i>                         |
| <i>BICS</i>                       | <i>Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies</i>        |
| <i>BSA Annual</i>                 | <i>Annual of the British School at Athens</i>                |
| <i>Calif. Stud. Class. Antiq.</i> | <i>California Studies in Classical Antiquity</i>             |
| <i>CLAnt</i>                      | <i>Classical Antiquity</i>                                   |
| <i>CPh</i>                        | <i>Classical Philology</i>                                   |
| <i>CQ</i>                         | <i>Classical Quarterly</i>                                   |
| <i>CW</i>                         | <i>The Classical World</i>                                   |
| <i>GRBS</i>                       | <i>Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies</i>                    |
| <i>JHS</i>                        | <i>Journal of Hellenic Studies</i>                           |
| <i>NZACT Bulletin</i>             | <i>New Zealand Association of Classics Teachers Bulletin</i> |
| <i>TAPA</i>                       | <i>Transactions of the American Philological Association</i> |
| <i>ZPE</i>                        | <i>Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik</i>            |

## Foreword

The Battle of Thermopylae is one the most famous battles in history. In June of 2012, on the eve of a European Football Championship quarter-final match between the highly rated German team and the struggling Greek national side, Diego Maradonna, former captain and coach of Argentina, declared to the assembled sports journalists that, 'if 300 Greeks were able to hold off 10,000 Persians at Thermopylae, then eleven Greeks certainly will have a chance against eleven Germans.' Maradonna's allusion to the heroic last stand made by 300 Spartan soldiers against the military might of the Persian king in 480 BC required no further elaboration. Anyone who had been following the television broadcasts of the European Championships would already have seen several Greek supporters attending their country's group matches wearing modern replicas of ancient Greek hoplite helmets. Those costumes invoked a tradition of grim determination in the face of apparently overwhelming odds that is forever associated with King Leonidas and his 300 Spartans.

The story of Thermopylae is, however, about far more than the popular tale of 300 brave warriors who preferred death to surrender. For one thing, the Greek force that stayed with the Spartan king to the bitter end included 400 Thebans and 700 men from the city of Thespieae, as well as an unknown number of slave attendants. Their demise came after several days of fighting, not just in the narrow pass, where an army of at least 10,000 Greeks sought to halt the advance of a far larger Persian army until reinforcements arrived, but also out at sea. Off the nearby headland of Artemisium a fleet of over 300 Greek warships fought a Persian fleet that was more than double its size in several indecisive encounters.

Thermopylae was one of several major battles that were fought during the invasion of Greece by the Persian King Xerxes in 480–479 BC, and that invasion itself was part of the long-running conflict between the Persian Empire and the Greek city states, known to historians as the Persian Wars, which lasted from 499 to 478 BC. Some of the other battles are also well known, like the Athenian victory over the Persians at Marathon in 490 BC, or the naval clash at

Salamis in 480 BC, or the decisive defeat of Xerxes' army at Plataea in 479 BC. Yet none of these battles are as famous as Thermopylae.

On the face of it the Battle of Thermopylae and the associated naval encounters at Artemisium were hardly a cause for celebration. The main Greek army retreated, leaving King Leonidas and his small rearguard to their fate. That retreat, along with the withdrawal of the Greek fleet, left the Persians free to overrun central Greece and capture the great cities of Thebes and Athens. Yet from this military debacle a legend was born that has captured the imaginations of generations of writers, artists and scholars.

One of the main reasons why the story of Thermopylae is so compelling is that literary accounts survive which enable, indeed invite us to empathize with the protagonists and imagine what we ourselves might have thought, felt and done in such circumstances. The first ever work of scientific history, written in the 430s BC by Herodotus, a Greek from Halicarnassus in Western Anatolia, took the Persian Wars as its subject. Detailed records of historical events had been compiled for centuries in Egypt and the Near East, but they were official chronicles recording the military, religious and political deeds of kings. Herodotus' *Histories* (a Greek word literally meaning 'enquiries') differed from such chronicles because it was not a state authorized version of events, but the result of personal research into the activities and achievements of political entities, ethnic groups and communities, rather than individual rulers. An essential aspect of Herodotus' work was his desire to show how and why events occurred. His open-minded search for ways to explain the complex connections between peoples and events encouraged him to reflect critically upon his diverse and sometimes conflicting sources of information.

Another prominent feature of Herodotus' *Histories* is the way in which he deliberately weaves a wealth of information on places, events and, above all, people into his main narrative. Drawing on official memorials, divine oracles, local histories and a myriad of oral traditions he offers insights into the ideals and values that drove the protagonists, as well as anecdotes and sub-plots that bring the story to life in a remarkable fashion. Thus we learn about the trials and tribulations of Aristodemus, one of two Spartan soldiers who survived the battle of Thermopylae. Unjustly accused of cowardice, he only redeemed himself by a suicidal solo charge into the enemy ranks at the Battle of Plataea a year later. Herodotus uses fictitious dialogues, such as those between the Persian King Xerxes and the exiled Spartan King Demaratus, to elucidate such extreme behaviour, and he describes at length the customs of the vast array of peoples who made up the Persian Empire.

In addition to the fascinating material that Herodotus provides, modern scholars can also draw on a wide variety of accounts and reflections on

Thermopylae from later Classical literature. Some of them support or amplify Herodotus' narrative, but others are highly critical and put forward alternative versions. There is also an ever growing body of archaeological and scientific evidence that can be deployed to place the events of 480 BC in a wider context.

The chapters in this volume offer a diverse range of perspectives on the Battle of Thermopylae to stimulate the intellect and feed the imagination. The penetrating topographical, strategic and logistical analyses in the contributions by Christopher Matthew, George Rapp and Peter Londey reveal how and why the struggle to control the narrow pass at Thermopylae was so important in the course of Xerxes' invasion, and why it featured on several further occasions as a key battleground in wars for control of the Greek mainland. Matthew Trundle investigates the paradox of the public commemoration of a glorious defeat, which he identifies as a peculiarly Greek concept, linked to the emergence of historical writing and the celebration of communal, rather than personal glory. Amelia Brown traces the fascinating story of how the legend of Thermopylae grew in the telling, initially in the form of brief epigrams inscribed on memorials at the site of the recent battle, then in the prose narrative of Herodotus, and in poems, biographies, histories and other works by a variety of later Classical writers, each putting their own interpretation on events. Peter Gainsford's chapter explores an essential aspect of the earliest Greek versions of the Thermopylae story, namely their relationship to epic poetry, and especially the extent to which Herodotus' account of the battle evokes Homer's *Iliad*. In the concluding chapter Matthew Trundle examines how the Battle of Thermopylae has become the quintessential tale of bravery and defiance, woven into the fabric of Greek historical identity, but exercising an influence far beyond its homeland to provide an inspirational template for the creation of many other myths of nationhood.

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## Preface

In a journal article published in 1958, W.K. Pritchett claimed that 'the battle of Thermopylai of 480 BC is such a well-worn subject that no fresh approach seems possible.' Yet such a statement seems far from likely. As with the arts of war itself, the study of ancient military history is constantly evolving. Over the last century and a half, research into the conflicts of the past has expanded from a purely theoretical exercise, based upon the interpretation of ancient literary and archaeological sources of evidence, into one that has incorporated more physical methods such as experimental archaeology and topographic analysis. This evolutionary process has led, in the years following the release of Pritchett's article, to a more robust appreciation of how the heavy infantryman of ancient Greece (the hoplite) functioned on the battlefield. This, in turn, has aided both the academic and layman gain a better understanding of a battle like that which was fought between the Greeks and Persians at Thermopylae in 480 BC.

Despite all of the advances in research methodologies, modern scholarship has still not been able to compose a comprehensive understanding of the battle of Thermopylae – with new publications either wading eagerly into the debate over certain aspects of the engagement or merely presenting one interpretation of it with little analysis of competing theories or sources of evidence. Modern scholars predominantly compose their interpretations of the battle of Thermopylae from the literary, artistic, topographic and archaeological evidence; yet these same scholars commonly reach vastly different conclusions. This is nothing new. Even the ancient historical writers who have commented on Thermopylae have argued in their own works over the validity of what had been published before. This lack of scholarly consensus demonstrates that the true nature of the battle of Thermopylae is far from fully understood.

This is in no part a negative reflection on the part of scholarship (either ancient or modern). Indeed, this uncertainty is an indication of the problematic source material that scholars have to work with. There are two main ancient narrative histories which recount the events of Thermopylae – those of

Herodotus and Diodorus – and passages relating to the battle can be found in more than a dozen others. Much of this evidence is often confused, regularly conflicts with the other evidence, and varies in its detail and reliability. Yet it has been this complicated, and yet inter-connected, source material that has been the mainstay of scholarship into Thermopylae for more than a century and a half. Scholarly work has usually concentrated on the decipherment and interpretation (and in some cases re-interpretation) of only one aspect relating to the battle. This has resulted in the publication of almost countless articles in scholarly journals over the years that provide insights and views on only one piece of the Thermopylae puzzle. Yet even when whole books and volumes are released that are solely dedicated to the battle, it is unlikely that every theory and model relating to the battle can be incorporated into the text.

Unfortunately, in many cases, scholars have proposed conclusions without taking all of the available evidence, or competing theories, into consideration. This has often resulted in conclusions and hypotheses which can only be considered incomplete. However, it is not the aim of this volume to condense the last 150 years of research into the battle of Thermopylae into a single comprehensive account of what happened in that fateful summer of 480 BC. Rather, what this volume does is draw together just some of the most recent scholarship into the battle of Thermopylae by examining various elements relating to the battle separately, yet in finer detail. The end result of this compilation is a collection of the most up-to-date research on such things as the terrain of the battlefield in 480 BC, the strategy that the Greeks employed for the defence of Greece, the political, social, cultural and artistic ramifications of the battle, and how both it and the site influenced engagements up to the present day.

The layout of this volume follows a series of progressive chapters, each of which is dedicated to a particular aspect of the confrontation at Thermopylae. As such, each chapter is designed to be a stand-alone text. The chapters are ordered in a way that, while not directly leading into the next, the understanding of the findings of one will aid the comprehension of elements in those that follow. Combined, these various chapters thus present a clear step towards composing a more comprehensive picture of one of the most notable battles in history.

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## *Chapter One*

### **Towards the Hot Gates: The Events leading to the Battle of Thermopylae**

*Christopher A. Matthew*

Fought in the Greek summer of 480 BC, the battle of Thermopylae is one of those landmark events that seem to punctuate the pages of history. This was a sentiment not lost on ancient historians, and the battle seems to have taken on almost legendary proportions shortly after the last blow was struck. According to the ancient Greek historian Herodotus, the confrontation fought between the large Persian Empire in the east and the independent Greek city-states in the west in the early fifth century BC, of which the battle of Thermopylae was but a part, was one of the greatest conflicts the world had seen at that time. Indeed, Herodotus saw the conflict between the Greeks and the Persians as so significant that in the introduction to his work, written only decades after the events that he describes, he states that:

I hope to do two things: to preserve the memory of the past by putting on record the astonishing achievements of both our own [Greek] people and the Asiatic peoples; secondly, and more particularly, to show how these two races came into conflict.<sup>1</sup>

According to Herodotus, tensions between these two peoples went all the way back to the Trojan War some 800 years earlier.<sup>2</sup> Whether this statement can be taken as accurate or not, what can be stated with certainty is that the battle at Thermopylae was the result of a complex series of events which had begun long before a sun even dawned on 480 BC. An understanding of these complex and interwoven events is necessary in order to place a battle like Thermopylae into its correct place within the broader context of Greek internal and external relations in the sixth and fifth centuries BC.

## Chapter Seven

### Other Battles of Thermopylae

*Peter Londey*

When people hear of Thermopylae, they think immediately of 480 BC, yet the very nature of Greek geography has ensured that the Thermopylae area has been fought over and through time and again. In this chapter I set out to describe these events, and will attempt to draw together common threads, as well as to discover differences over time. To begin with, however, two notes of caution. First, the sources for some of these events are scanty indeed, so there is a fair variety in the level of description possible. Secondly, and more worryingly, the very fame of the name 'Thermopylae' has invited writers to apply it to any action in the general area of the pass. The pass we know as Thermopylae was not the only, or even the best, route from the Sperchios Valley into the central Greece of Phocis and Boeotia. I am indeed somewhat more sceptical than the editors of this volume as to the geographical preciseness of Herodotus' account of events in 480, but I will leave that aside for another time and focus on events of later periods.

#### The Spartans, Herakleia Trachinia, and the Great Isthmus Corridor

In 426 BC, the Spartans founded a colony at Herakleia Trachinia, close to the old Malian town of Trachis, and 40 *stadia* (7.2 km) west of Thermopylae. At the same time, as part of the extended defences of the city, they built a wall across the Thermopylae pass.<sup>1</sup> But the defence of Thermopylae envisaged by the new fortification was the opposite of that in 480 BC: now the Spartans feared an enemy, presumably the Athenians and their allies, passing not eastwards but westwards through the pass, and thus threatening their control of the north-south corridor from the Sperchios Valley south to the Corinthian Gulf. This was clearly, for example, the route which Brasidas used in 424 BC when he used Herakleia as a staging point on his march north to Thrace.<sup>2</sup>

This north-south route was exhaustively explored in the 1970s by a team led by Edward W. Kase. Kase and his collaborators argued that this route, which they dubbed the 'Great Isthmus Corridor', formed the usual land route from the Malian Gulf into central Greece.<sup>3</sup> The main route, in Kase's view, skirted the eastern slopes of Mt. Oita as it climbed out of the Sperchios Valley, and was the same as the route which Pausanias claims was used by Hydarnes in 480 BC.<sup>4</sup> After crossing the ridge between Oita and Kallidromon, one could choose (as the main Persian army did in 480 BC) to take a left turn and descend into the upper part of the Kephisos Valley, in ancient Doris, or one could push on south, between the mountains of Locris on the west and Parnassus in the east, to Locrian Amphissa and ultimately to the Corinthian Gulf at Cirrha.<sup>5</sup>

Kase and his team argued that the main north-south route ran across the slopes of Mt. Oita, slightly west of Herakleia Trachinia. The city was, therefore, well placed to dominate both the route south from the Malian Gulf and the route which turned east through Thermopylae.<sup>6</sup> It is likely that the north-south route was in fact the more important (and it is more or less impossible to believe that any local inhabitant in 480 BC was unaware of it). But, as noted above, the fame of the events of 480 BC meant that any defence of either of these routes against enemies has tended to be described as being at 'Thermopylae'. On any occasion, either route might be used. Thus in 395 BC Agesilaos, on his way home from Asia, passed through 'the Thermopylae narrows' unopposed.<sup>7</sup> In 371, on the other hand, Xenophon's account of Jason of Phrae's advance into central Greece immediately after Leuctra in 371 BC implies that he took the same route as Xerxes' army in 480 BC, travelling down the Kephisos Valley to reach Boeotia.<sup>8</sup>

#### Wars Of The Fourth Century BC

When the Phocian leader Philomelos convinced his countrymen to seize the sanctuary at Delphi in 356 BC, his action initiated a ten-year war between the Phocians (with allies and mercenaries) and a number of members of the Delphic Amphiktyony, including Thessalians, Boeotians and Locrians. Direct conflict between the Phocians and eastern Locrians centred on the series of passes over Mts. Kallidromon and Kinemes, but Thermopylae was important as the route of communication between the Locrians and their Thessalian allies.<sup>9</sup> Blocking this route became a Phocian objective, and in 354 BC their General Onomarchos captured the Locrian city of Thronion, thus effectively keeping the Thessalians out of the war.<sup>10</sup>

Thermopylae became critical in 352 BC when Philip of Macedon advanced on the pass. Philip had entered the war on the side of the Amphiktyony and defeated the Phocian army at Crocus Field in Thessaly in 353 BC. But now his attempt to carry the war into central Greece was seen as a threat, not only by the Phocians, but also by the Athenians. Athens dispatched a force of indeterminate size (but at the cost of 200 talents, according to Demosthenes) to occupy the pass at Thermopylae, presumably with Phocian support. Philip did not make an attempt on the pass, and withdrew.<sup>11</sup> Even if Philip penetrated the pass itself, he would still have had a lengthy march through hostile territory.<sup>12</sup> Details of the defence are very scanty, and it is impossible to say where exactly the Athenian force was deployed. It is not clear that the defence was at Thermopylae itself. Justin does speak of the Athenians' occupying *angustias Thermopylarum* (the narrows of Thermopylae), but we should not seek too much precision here. Equally, we might be suspicious of Demosthenes' claim that Philip was unable even to get close to Thermopylae. Yet, given that there must have been something to prevent Philip from marching south to Doris and entering Phocis from the west, some sort of combined Phocian and Athenian defence west of Thermopylae would make more sense than simply defending the narrows while leaving the southern route unguarded.<sup>13</sup>

Ultimately, Philip did not need to bother forcing his passage. In 351 BC Phayllos tightened Phocian control over the Thermopylae area by capturing the Locrian towns of Alpenos and Nikaia.<sup>14</sup> But in 346 BC Philip trumped a further attempt by the Athenians and Spartans to defend the Thermopylae area by dealing directly with the last Phocian commander, Phalaikos, and allowing him to depart quietly from his base at Nikaia in eastern Locris. Further resistance was useless, and Philip could enter central Greece without opposition.<sup>15</sup> A few years later, when his intervention in the Fourth Sacred War culminated in the battle of Chaeronea of 338 BC, Philip bypassed Thermopylae altogether. The Boeotians had reoccupied Nikaia in eastern Locris, which Philip had earlier held, and thus made the coastal route through Thermopylae difficult.<sup>16</sup> Philip (in Demosthenes' account) fooled the Thebans and surprised the Athenians by taking the southern route, under the pretence of marching on Amphissa, but turned down the Kephisos Valley and was at Elateia before the Athenians, at least, realized what was happening.<sup>17</sup>

In 335 BC Philip's successor, Alexander (the Great), similarly arrived in central Greece unannounced, reaching Onchestos in Boeotia before the rebellious Thebans knew he was on the way. Arrian implies (but no more than that) that the unopposed route taken by Alexander was through Thermopylae.<sup>18</sup> Twelve years later, after Alexander's death, another Greek

revolt against Macedonia led to the Lamian War. The Athenian general Leosthenes occupied Thermopylae to prevent the Macedonian regent, Antipatros, from bringing his forces further south. But the subsequent battle was clearly fought west of Thermopylae, in the Malian plane, and resulted in the defeated Antipatros seeking refuge in Lamia at the north end of the plane.<sup>19</sup> A few years later, in 317 BC, the future Macedonian King Kassandros was campaigning in the Peloponnese, at Tegea, but needed to march back to Macedonia in a hurry. He was forced to take an indirect route, shipping his army to Thessaly from Locris and Euboea, because the hostile Aetolians had seized τὰ περὶ τὰς Πύλας στενά ('the passes around Thermopylae').<sup>20</sup> Both Diodorus' vague formulation and geographical logic show that the Aetolians were blocking not only Thermopylae itself but, much more importantly, the north-south route to the west. Kassandros will have understood, as well as Brasidas over a century earlier, that no sensible route from Tegea to Thessaly leads through Thermopylae.<sup>21</sup> The following year Kassandros marched south again, this time to Boeotia, and this time may have used Thermopylae. Diodorus tells us that he was able to force his way past the Aetolians with difficulty, whom he found guarding τὰς ἐν Πύλαις παρόδους ('the passes [or approaches] at Thermopylae'), but gives no further details.<sup>22</sup>

### 279 BC: The Invasion of Brennos

In 279 BC, a Celtic army under Brennos invaded Greece. Our main source is Pausanias, whose account works hard to draw out – or create – similarities between the invasions of Brennos and Xerxes, except that this time the Greeks were fighting not for liberty, but for survival.<sup>23</sup> Pausanias gives Brennos 152,000 infantry and 20,400 cavalry (with reserves).<sup>24</sup> A Greek coalition of Boeotians, Phocians, Locrians, Aetolians, Megarians and Athenians provided the bulk of a force of around 24,000 infantry and 2,000 or more cavalry which assembled at Thermopylae. The Greeks sent their cavalry and 1,000 light-armed troops forward to the Sperchios, to try to prevent Brennos from crossing the river, but Brennos outflanked them by sending a force to cross the river further down, where it opened out and became very shallow. The Greeks fell back, and Brennos advanced to Herakleia, now held by the Aetolians; but rather than besiege the city, he turned his attentions to the Greek army.<sup>25</sup> At this point the account becomes worryingly Herodotean. The Celts assault the defenders at Thermopylae in vast numbers, attacking without order like wild animals. Greek discipline and order, together with the Celts' lack of defensive armour, ensure countless losses for the barbarians, but only forty dead for the Greeks. But there are new touches as well. The Athenian fleet coasts along

close to the battle and contributes its own fire against the Celts. For their part, the Celts are so barbaric that they seek neither omens before the battle nor to recover their dead after it.<sup>26</sup>

But Brennos – already characterized by Pausanias as reasonably well-versed, for a barbarian, in clever tactics – now showed more imagination than Xerxes.<sup>27</sup> First he sent an army through Thessaly into Aetolia, forcing the large Aetolian contingent to abandon the Greek force at Thermopylae. This was marked by a brutal attack on the city of Kallion, where the Celts massacred the population, drank the blood and ate the flesh of the plumper babies, pillaged sanctuaries and raped women till they died.<sup>28</sup>

Meanwhile, Brennos took a large detachment up the road to the south, through Aenis, guided by Herakleians and Aenianians eager to have him out of their territory. At the top, he ran into a contingent of Phocians guarding the path: after some resistance, Brennos was able to force his way through, but the Phocians were able to get word to the Greeks at Thermopylae that they were going to be surrounded.<sup>29</sup> So far, so 480 BC. But at this point the story diverges completely. The Greeks at Thermopylae, seeing no point in waiting to be massacred, got away with the help of the Athenian fleet, and returned home.<sup>30</sup> And Brennos ignored them: his intention, it turns out, was not to encircle the position at Thermopylae, nor even to capture the pass at all. Instead he marched straight south for Delphi, and attempted to capture the sanctuary. There a series of disasters befell the Celts, reading like a considerably enriched version of those which afflicted a detachment sent against Delphi (by a different route) by Xerxes in 480 BC. The hapless survivors struggled north to Herakleia and thence on into Thessaly where the last of them, Pausanias tells us, were killed on the road.<sup>31</sup>

### Later Third Century BC Conflicts

Thermopylae continued to be occupied at times of conflict, but was just as often bypassed. In 224 BC the Macedonian King Antigonus Gonatas needed to get his army to the Peloponnese to fight the Spartan King Cleomenes, but the Aetolians threatened to oppose any attempted passage through Thermopylae. He went by way of Euboea instead.<sup>32</sup> Philip V took a similar route south in 219 BC.<sup>33</sup>

In 207 BC, Philip once again wanted to move an army into central Greece, one of his objectives being to come to the relief of Opus in eastern Locris, which had been captured and sacked by Attalos I of Pergamon. But on this occasion he found that the Aetolians had placed a garrison at Thermopylae and fortified the pass with a ditch, earthwork and palisade.<sup>34</sup> Livy says explicitly that the

garrison was dislodged and the Aetolians routed *qui saltum Thermopylarum insidebant* ('those who were occupying the pass of Thermopylae').<sup>35</sup> This explicit language has generally convinced modern writers that this was a rare occasion when Thermopylae was indeed forced, though Livy is vague about how this was achieved.<sup>36</sup> Yet Livy's account makes strangely little sense on that assumption. First, Philip is said to have driven the Aetolian defenders into Herakleia, a strange direction of retreat against an enemy coming from the west; this would make far more sense if Philip were attacking up the mountain on the main route to the south. Secondly, Livy tells us that after driving the Aetolian defenders into Herakleia, Philip marched to Elateia in Phocis, and thence to Opus.<sup>37</sup> A march from Thermopylae to Opous, via Elateia, simply makes no geographical sense.<sup>38</sup> It is far more likely that Philip followed the same route as Xerxes in 480 BC and Philip II in 338 BC, using the southern road to Doris and then turning down the flat and open Kephisos Valley, certainly suitable for a forced march. Finally, the question remains of how Philip forced the evidently well defended Thermopylae Pass: Grainger's statement that he was able to 'slip a force through Thermopylae' avoids, rather than answers, this question.<sup>39</sup> Indeed, Dio says simply that Philip was unable to reach Opus quickly because the Aetolians had seized the passes (*diodoi*), but that he eventually arrived.<sup>40</sup> This account is quite consistent with Philip resorting to a longer route to bypass the Aetolian blockade. One lesson of this interpretation is that Thermopylae was easier to defend than the route to the south and through western Phocis: this should hardly surprise us.

### 191 BC: Antiochus and Glabrio

In 191 BC, Antiochus III of Syria was in Greece with an army, working in concert with his Aetolian allies. Rome had declared war on both parties, and sent an army under Marcus Acilius Glabrio to sort things out. As Glabrio advanced through Thessaly, Antiochus led 10,000 infantry and 500 cavalry forward from his base at Chalkis to join with the Aetolians at Lamia. Disappointed with the Aetolian turnout, which meant that he could not match Glabrio's army, Antiochus pulled his forces back and occupied Thermopylae.<sup>41</sup> The Aetolians provided 2,000 men to garrison Herakleia and the Aenianian town of Hypata, the latter perhaps to prevent Glabrio from making an incursion into Aetolia via the Sperchios Valley.<sup>42</sup> While Antiochus improved the fortifications at Thermopylae with a ditch, a bank and in some places stone walls, the Aetolians were unable to prevent Glabrio from ravaging the territory of Hypata and Herakleia. Glabrio then proceeded to Thermopylae and camped within the pass, near the hot springs.<sup>43</sup>

Both sides were well aware of the events of 480 BC. Antiochus feared being outflanked, and urged the Aetolians to occupy the heights of Kallidromon. The Aetolians were divided, but a total of 2,000 men occupied three high points, which Livy names as Teichious, Rhodountia and Kallidromon. For his part, Glabrio could see the value of capturing the heights, so he sent Lucius Valerius Flaccus against Teichious and Rhoduntia and Marcus Porcius Cato against Kallidromon, before launching his own attack on the troops guarding the pass. Antiochus drew up his force with light-armed troops in front of the fortifications, his phalanx close to the fortifications, archers, slingers and men with javelins on the slopes of the mountain on his left, where they could harass the enemy from above, and on the right, near the marshy ground close to the sea, a detachment of elephants, with cavalry behind.<sup>44</sup>

Before the battle, Livy gives Glabrio a speech in which he stresses how this new defence of Thermopylae is the mirror image of that of 480 BC. Now it is the defenders who are 'Syrians and Asiatic Greeks, the most worthless peoples among mankind and born for slavery'; Antiochus is a luxurious, dissolute leader, who has spent his time in Greece at (his own) wedding feasts, and has now set up his position deeper into the protective narrows than the Spartans did; while it is the Roman attackers who are now fighting for Greek *libertas*.<sup>45</sup>

The Romans then advanced to attack the well-entrenched defenders, and generally had a hard time of it. Antiochus' phalanx allowed the advanced light-armed troops to get back, and maintained its cohesion, falling back gradually on the fortifications, while the attacking Romans suffered from missile fire on their right flank from the men stationed up the slopes. The attackers were, according to Livy, on the point of having to withdraw, when Cato's force appeared at the rear of Antiochus' position. Flaccus had been unsuccessful, but Cato had surprised the defenders at Kallidromon, the easternmost of the three high points, and appeared on the heights above Antiochus' camp. The sight threw Antiochus' camp into a panic, and his whole army fled. Casualties were heavy, though probably exaggerated in the sources: 200 Romans dead, as against the greater part of Antiochus' army of 10,000.<sup>46</sup>

The problem historically with this re-enactment of the events of 480 BC is just that: it was a re-enactment, in the minds (or at least the accounts) of some of the participants.<sup>47</sup> Plutarch in his life of Cato the Elder gives a long and highly dramatized account of Cato's march over the mountain.<sup>48</sup> He also clearly indicates that it is based on an autobiographical account written by Cato himself, and comments on Cato's propensity for boasting and overstating the importance of his own actions.<sup>49</sup> Plutarch's account, though richer, is not fundamentally at odds with the briefer versions in Livy and Appian. It

is entirely likely that their ultimate source (via Polybius, perhaps) for Cato's role was Cato himself: a Cato who not only wanted to big note himself, but also wanted to turn his own role into a re-enactment of the decisive event in the tragedy of 480 BC. As a result, I think we have no way of knowing exactly how the events of 191 BC played out in reality.

### Events of Succeeding Centuries

Having dealt in some detail with the defence of Thermopylae in the first three centuries after Leonidas, I must now treat the next 2,000 years more cursorily. There were certainly incursions and invasions, many of which must have passed through or close by Thermopylae. But the sources are often very sketchy, so that there is not much to say, at least in a brief survey such as the present one. Often we know where invading groups ended up, but not exactly how they got there. For example, in around AD 170 a band of 'brigands', the Kostobokoi, overran places as far south as Elateia. It is argued that their likely route was through an unguarded Thermopylae.<sup>50</sup> A century later, when the Herulians invaded Greece in AD 267, burning Athens, Corinth, Sparta and Argos, Syncellus tells us that the Greeks garrisoned Thermopylae; but we have no further details of any attempted defence.<sup>51</sup> In the second half of the fourth century AD, a fort was constructed at the Dhema Pass, at the north end of the direct route between the Malian and Corinthian Gulfs – apparently to no avail.<sup>52</sup> When Alaric invaded Greece with his Visigoths in AD 395, according to the rather literary accounts available to us, he found Thermopylae undefended and traversed the pass 'as if through a stadium or a plane sounding with the tramp of horses'.<sup>53</sup>

In AD 539, in the reign of Justinian, another version of the old story was replayed, when an army of Huns invaded Greece. On this occasion they found Thermopylae defended against them, but then discovered the other path up the mountain and were able to enter Greece and plunder everywhere except the Peloponnese.<sup>54</sup> Most likely, like Brennos and – I have suggested – Philip V, they simply took the southern route and entered central Greece through Doris and Phocis.<sup>55</sup> At some stage, presumably after the invasion of the Huns, Justinian improved the defences at Thermopylae, greatly strengthening the fortifications, adding water storage, and walling off what Procopius describes as many unguarded paths up the mountain. In addition, he improved the fortifications of many cities, including Herakleia and a place opposite it, Myropoles.<sup>56</sup> There also seems to have been a standing garrison of 2,000 men stationed at Thermopylae.<sup>57</sup> Procopius' reference to multiple paths (and the scorn he shows Xerxes for only having found one of them) may well

suggest that Justinian's system of fortifications included the various routes up to the southern route towards the Corinthian Gulf. Procopius' account of the fortification of Herakleia and the unknown Myropoles seems on the surface to be a description of fortifications to guard against incursions down the Sperchios Valley. However, he also speaks of a cross wall across the valley between the two fortifications, which does not seem plausible in the broad lower Sperchios. Cherf suggests, on the contrary, that these fortifications were intended to guard the Dhema Pass, and cites visible remains which fit Procopius' description.<sup>58</sup> This would be evidence once again that in antiquity defence of Thermopylae itself and defence of the pass to the south were considered parts of the same problem.

Bulgars invaded Greece on several occasions in the tenth century, and Uzes in the eleventh; both groups penetrated as far as the Gulf of Corinth, presumably using the southern route from the Malian Gulf.<sup>59</sup> In 1204, after the fall of Constantinople to the Fourth Crusade, a Latin army under Boniface of Montferrat invaded Greece. The attempt by local aristocrat Leo Sgouros to defend Thermopylae against the invader failed because local landowners decided to back the winner and surrendered without a fight; he abandoned the pass and retreated to his base on the Acrocorinth.<sup>60</sup> In 1458 Sultan Mehmed II, the conqueror of Constantinople, passed through Thermopylae as the Ottomans extended their control from northern to southern Greece.<sup>61</sup>

Three-and-a-half centuries later Ottoman armies were once again seeking access to central and southern Greece, during the Greek War of Independence. Areas in the Peloponnese and central Greece had revolted from Ottoman rule in 1821, and each campaigning season Ottoman armies were forced to attempt the march from northern to southern Greece, on both the east and west sides of the central Pindos range.<sup>62</sup> The route down the east naturally went either through or close to Thermopylae, and there was regular conflict in the area. But this was now a mobile war, fought with firearms and often by small groups. Many of the Greek soldiers were bandits (*klephts*) and freedom fighters rolled up into one. An attempt to defend the pass at Thermopylae probably made less sense than it had in the past.

One famous engagement in the area took place in the first months of the war, on 5 May 1821. The able Turkish commander Omer Vrioni was advancing south from Larisa in Thessaly. A Greek force under Diakos, a young commander who became something of a popular hero, and the Bishop of Salona (Amphissa) met the Turks at Alamanna, at a bridge across a stream running into the Sperchios on the south side of the valley, only 4 or 5 km west of Thermopylae.<sup>63</sup> The Greeks were comprehensively defeated, and both Diakos and the bishop were captured and executed. One of them, according

to rumour (though rumour could not agree which one) was roasted on a spit. The sequel is interesting. Omer Vrioni did not march through Thermopylae, but rather climbed the pass to the south, only to run into a force under Odysseas Androutsos, one of the most prominent Greek commanders in the first part of the war, at Gravia, on the southern side of ancient Doris. After a spirited engagement, Androutsos retreated, and Omer Vrioni was able to march down the Kephisos Valley to Levadia in Boeotia.<sup>64</sup>

#### AD 1941: Allies Vs Germans

We come at last to a campaign which is, at least, well documented: the German invasion of Greece in the Second World War. After Germany's ally, Italy, had bogged down after invading Greece in October 1940, overwhelming German forces entered Greece on 6 April 1941. The Germans outnumbered the defenders, mainly Greeks, British, Australians and New Zealanders, and had vastly superior numbers of tanks and aircraft. The British Official History begins its account of the campaign: 'The British campaign on the mainland of Greece was from start to finish a withdrawal.'<sup>65</sup> Defensive positions were prepared, and within days abandoned, as a series of new defensive lines were tried and found wanting. One of those lines was at Thermopylae. On 15 April, only nine days after the Germans entered Greece, the decision was made to withdraw from the Aliakmon line in southern Macedonia; the plan was now that the Anzac Corps, formed of Australians and New Zealanders, should hold the Germans at Thermopylae.<sup>66</sup> The Germans had a separate force advancing towards southern Greece west of the Pindos mountains, against mainly Greek opposition; there was no need to fear an incursion up the Sperchios Valley, like that mounted by Brennos' Celts. And even in the conditions of modern warfare, Mt. Oita and the mountains to the west formed a formidable barrier to troops on the ground. The result was that for Anzac Corps the problem at Thermopylae was the same as it ever was: to defend the two routes, one east through Thermopylae itself, the other south up the ridge and down into the upper Kephisos Valley near the modern towns of Brallos and Gravia.<sup>67</sup>

The Anzac Corps Commander, Australian Lieutenant General Thomas Blamey, deployed the New Zealanders to defend the coastal road through Thermopylae and the Australians to defend the passes to Brallos and Gravia. The Thermopylae area is vastly changed since antiquity, through silting by the Sperchios River and through sea-level changes.<sup>68</sup> What was once a narrow pass is now a broad coastal plain. The New Zealand 24th and 25th Battalions were deployed in this plain, while the 26th Battalion remained in reserve further east at Molos, where the coastal plain was much narrower. The New

Zealanders were commanded by Major General Bernard Freyberg, who on 25 April 1915 had created a diversion at Gallipoli by swimming ashore and lighting flares near the neck of the peninsula, well away from the intended landings.<sup>69</sup> Meanwhile, five Australian battalions, some considerably under-strength, occupied the road which climbed from the Sperchios Valley, over the ridge and down to Brallos. This was not quite the route used by armies in antiquity, which went up by an easier route slightly further west. Australian Colonel George Vasey deployed one battalion astride the road, another two on the left and right respectively, a battalion in reserve at the top of the pass, and the final battalion and some further sub-units in reserve near Brallos.<sup>70</sup>

The defenders had to cope with some fears which did not trouble their ancient counterparts. The range of modern guns meant that the New Zealand battalions would be vulnerable to shelling from the coast of Euboea, across the straits, if the Germans made an advance in that direction. There was also a danger that the Germans might land paratroopers in Boeotia, and block the defenders' retreat.<sup>71</sup> The Australians high on the Brallos pass could look back across the plain of the Sperchios and watch the stream of Allied vehicles streaming south from Lamia, being attacked by German fighters and dive-bombers. At the same time, Vasey could position his own guns – albeit on a ledge two-thirds of the way up the escarpment – to prevent the Germans from repairing the bridge over the Sperchios.<sup>72</sup>

On 20 April Vasey told his Orders Group, 'Here we are and here we stay.'<sup>73</sup> However, the odds were not in the Allies' favour. Gavin Long estimates that the Australians and New Zealanders each needed a division to defend their position; the Australians, especially, were under strength.<sup>74</sup> Enemy air superiority was complete: on the 20<sup>th</sup> a German bomb blew up a two-ton dump of the explosive ammonal near Australian brigade headquarters; next day German Messerschmitts machine-gunned the Australian positions on the pass. Nevertheless, the Australian 6th Division commander, Major General Iven Mackay, commented later that he did not consider evacuation: 'I thought that we'd hang on for about a fortnight and be beaten by weight of numbers.'<sup>75</sup> But in fact this defence of Thermopylae was not destined to last any longer than previous ones. The Allied decision to evacuate Greece altogether was made late on 21 April, just as the last battle for Thermopylae was beginning in earnest.<sup>76</sup> All that was to be done now was to plan the retreat, though fighting continued: the New Zealanders especially came under attack by infantry and tanks, though the Australians also had to hurry their final withdrawal as German forces approached their positions. By the evening of 24 April 1941, the last attempt to defend Thermopylae was over.<sup>77</sup>

## Conclusion

There is a persistent idea that the pass at Thermopylae is the only way into central Greece. Livy states this categorically.<sup>78</sup> In a recent book on Philip of Macedon, Ian Worthington states, equally categorically, 'whoever controlled Thermopylae controlled access to southern Greece' (yet on the very next page has Philip considering the option of entering Phocis through Doris).<sup>79</sup> We are somehow spellbound by Thermopylae, by the legend, by the assumption that Thermopylae was *the* place to make a stand. Yet this survey of later defences of the area has shown that Thermopylae itself can easily be bypassed, and often has been. To defend central Greece requires that two roads be guarded, as the Australians and New Zealanders in the Second World War immediately saw. The mystery about 480 BC is not so much why the Spartans and their allies defended the pass – it was, after all, certainly one route into southern Greece – as why Xerxes did not simply ignore the defenders and go the other way. It would have meant taking the route he did in fact use, but sooner; and an army in Phocis would have forced the evacuation of Thermopylae as surely as paratroopers in Boeotia might have 2,400 years later.

Finally, the legend of Leonidas might seem a burden to subsequent defenders of the pass; even the Australian Official Historian points out the distinguished history of the place guarded by the Anzacs in 1941.<sup>80</sup> Yet, mercifully, none of the subsequent groups of defenders has considered that historical re-enactment has required them all to die. That sensible decision, perhaps, has forced them to live in the shadow of Leonidas. The Greek poet Constantine Trypanis wrote:

It is not easy to fight at Thermopylae.  
You need courage, for you are fighting  
Another man's battle. Thermopylae can never  
Belong to us. He was brave, the Australian  
Farmer who fell there in nineteen forty-one  
With an oath that lashed the rock. Every pass  
Must be defended once, and Leonidas  
Had made his inimitable stand.  
But the gods enjoy playing soldiers, dressing them  
In pretty clothes, and putting them to fight  
On the same fields.<sup>81</sup>

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- (the catalogue of heroines), on whose route see M.D. Northrup, 'Homer's Catalogue of Women' *Ramus* 9 (1980), 150–159.
60. As the bibliography on the Catalogue of Ships is very extensive, the best place to begin investigation is the standard commentaries; and E. Visser, *Homers Katalog der Schiffe* (Stuttgart/Leipzig, Teubner, 1997). Note that for the present discussion it does not matter whether the Catalogue itself is based on the political geography of the Bronze Age or the contemporary Iron Age (both views are widely held).
  61. On the Catalogue's route see Kirk (n. 43) 183–186, with discussion of various explanations for the division into three sections and the route followed.
  62. The conjectural route shown in Fig. 1 takes it that the route after Mount Ossa goes to the head of the Peneius and follows its course downstream. Much of the uncertainty is caused by a reference to Dodona, far to the west across the Pindus mountains, in Gouneus' contingent (*Il.* 2.750). This is very distant not only from the rest of Section 3, but also from the other locations named in that contingent: the River Peneius is in Thessaly; the Perrhaebi and Enienes belong there too, near Mount Olympus (cf. *h.Ap.* 216–218: both lie *en route* between Olympus and Iolcus); the river Titaressus (Titaesus) is identified by Strabo (9.5.19–20) as the Europus, coming down from the Titarus mountains. Fig. 1 interprets 'Dodona' as a minor settlement in Thessaly, following Cineas, Philoxenus, and Strabo (*BNJ* 603 F 2b = Steph. Byz. s.v. Δωδώνη; sch. H on *Od.* 14.327; Strabo 7a fr. 1a, 1b). A contrary view: Visser (n. 60) 721–735 takes it that Dodona refers to the famous oracle, and that it is the Perrhaebi and Enienes that have been moved across the mountains; and that this is to be explained either by historical migrations or by a poetic fiction. Either interpretation requires disregarding some of Strabo's testimony.
  63. Simon. fr. eleg. 13.8–10 W2 (my translation, to emphasise how fragmentary the text is).
  64. D. Boedeker, 'Hero Cult and Politics in Herodotus: The Bones of Orestes' in C. Dougherty, L. Kurke (eds.) *Cultural Poetics in Archaic Greece* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993) 164–177, especially 166–167.
  65. Hall, *Ethnic Identity* (n. 51) 19.
  66. Hall, *Ethnic Identity* (n. 51) 34–40.
  67. Ionians at *Il.* 13.685; see I.C. Rutherford, 'Ionians', in *The Homer Encyclopedia* (n.56) vol. 2, 415–416, for other possible subtler allusions to Ionians.
  68. Diod. 4.60.2, 5.80.2. On Tectamus see further Hall, *Hellenicity* (n. 54) 84.
  69. Diod. 5.80.3.
  70. List of Dorids: *Catalogue of Women* fr. 10(a).1–19 Merkelbach-West = fr. 10.1–19 Most; association with Argos at 3–4. Dorus marries Phoroneus' daughter: fr. 10(b) M-W = fr. 11 Most, supplemented (see West, *Hesiodic Catalogue* [n. 57] 58–59 for the supplement, which is rock-solid). Note that the *Catalogue's* list of Dorids appears to have no space for Tectamus.

## Chapter 7: Other Battles of Thermopylae

1. Thuc. 3.92
2. Thuc. 4.78
3. See especially: E.W. Kase, G.Z. Szemler, N.C. Wilkie and P.W. Wallace (eds.) *The Great Isthmus Corridor Route: Explorations of the Phokis–Doris Expedition* (Dubuque, Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1991)
4. Paus. 10.22.8; Kase et. al. (n. 3) 22–23
5. See the map at Kase et. al. (n. 3), fig. 1–4
6. Szemler, at Kase et al. (n. 3) 118, argues that Herakleia could indeed control the southern route, but that it was too far above the plain and too far west of Thermopylae to control the pass in that direction. That may explain the Spartans' fortifying Thermopylae as well; nevertheless, the city will have provided a useful base for operations against an enemy attempting to pass through Thermopylae, in either direction.
7. Diod. Sic. 14.83.3
8. Xen., *Hell.* 6.4.21
9. J. Buckler, *Philip II and the Sacred War* (Leiden, Brill, 1989) 33–34, 41
10. Buckler (n. 9) 54–55. Onomarchos followed this up by invading Doris, at the head of the Kephisos Valley, thus also taking control of the route south from the Malian Gulf.
11. Dem. 19.84 (with the claim about cost), 19.319; Diod. Sic. 16.38.1–2; Just. *Epit.* 8.2.8; discussion at Buckler (n. 9) 80–81.
12. See comments at Buckler (n. 9) 92
13. Dem. 19.319, taking Pylai from 19.318 as the implied object of προσελθεῖν. I. Worthington, *Philip II of Macedonia* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2008) 67 suggests that Philip may have considered the route via Doris into Phokis, but judged it too 'arduous and dangerous', given the likelihood of Phokian attack.
14. For discussion, see Buckler (n. 9) 92–96
15. Aesch. 2.132–134; Diod. Sic. 16.59
16. Dem. 11.4, 11.47
17. Dem. 18.152–153. Athenian surprise at this outcome, vividly described at Dem. 18.168–170, could imply that Athenians still thought of the coastal Thermopylae route as the 'normal' route into central Greece. We should never underestimate ancient geographical ignorance.
18. Arr. *Anab.* 1.7.5. Arrian says that Alexander was at Onchestos before the Thebans realised that he was εἰσω Πυλῶν ('inside the Gates [i.e. Thermopylae]'), but this need not necessarily be read as a description of his route (Arrian seems well-informed of the route as far as Thessaly, less well so thereafter). Rather, the term may simply mean, as a literal reading would suggest, that Alexander was now, unexpectedly, inside central Greece.
19. Hyp. 6.12; Diod. Sic. 8.11.3–12.4; Just. *Epit.* 13.5.8 (with Herakleia substituted for Lamia); Polyæn. *Strat.* 4.4.2 (possibly suggesting that the battle took place near the Sperchios).
20. Diod. Sic. 19.35.1–2
21. Brief discussion at Szemler in Kase et al. (n. 3) 126
22. Diod. Sic. 19.53.1
23. Paus. 10.19.12. I use 'Celts' for the Greek *Galatai*, often translated 'Gauls'. Diodorus (22.9.1) and Justin (*Epit.* 24.6.5) are too eager to get Brennos to Delphi to describe events at Thermopylae.
24. Paus. 10.19.9
25. Paus. 10.20.3–9
26. Paus. 10.21
27. Paus. 10.20.6
28. Paus. 10.22.2–7. Kallion appears on maps, including in Barrington, as Kallipolis, an alternative form of the name. How much to believe of Pausanias' account is problematic. Some elements may be designed to recall the Persians in 480 BC (pillaging of sanctuaries, *passim*; raping of women till they died, Hdt. 8.33); the babies are probably intended to indicate once again that the Celts were worse barbarians than the Persians.
29. Paus. 10.22.8–11
30. Paus. 10.22.12
31. Paus. 10.22.12–23.13; Hdt. 8.35–39
32. Polyb. 2.52.7–8. Aetolian opposition will also, of course, have closed the direct southern route to Antigonus.

33. Polyb. 4.67.7
34. Polyb. 10.41.5; Livy 28.5.8
35. Livy 28.7.3
36. For example, J.A.O. Larsen, *Greek Federal States: Their Institutions and History* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1967) 372, n.3; W.K. Pritchett, *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography*, vol.5 (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985) 192–193; Szeimler at Kase et al. (n. 3) 128; J.D. Grainger, *The League of the Aitolians* (Leiden, Brill, 1999) 327.
37. Livy 28.7.3–8
38. Obviously it was possible to march from Thermopylae to Elateia, as T. Quinctius Flaminius did (in the other direction) in 197 (Livy 33.3.6). But Elateia represents a considerable detour if one's immediate objective is Opus.
39. Grainger (n. 36) 327 – tries to combine the quite discordant accounts of Livy 28.7.3 and Polyb. 10.42.
40. Dio. Cass. 17.57–58
41. Livy 36.15.1–7; App. Syr. 17. J.D. Grainger (*The Roman War of Antiochus the Great* (Leiden, Brill, 2002) 243) suggests that the Aetolians were understandably cautious about concentrating their forces after their horrific experience with Brennos.
42. Livy 36.16.3–4; see also: Grainger (n. 41) 244
43. Livy 36.16.1–5; App. Syr. 18
44. Livy 36.16.6–17.1; App. Syr. 18
45. Livy 36.17.2–16
46. Livy 36.18.5–19.12; App. Syr. 19–20; both probably depend on the lost account of Polybius (cited by Livy at 36.19.11).
47. Grainger (n. 41) 246 suggests that knowledge of the past affected the outcome of the battle by offering that Antiochus' soldiers were *expecting* Cato and his 2,000 men to attack from the hills, and so when this actually happened panic set in. I am more interested in the way it made people tell the story of the battle.
48. Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 13–14
49. Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 14
50. Paus. 10.34.5; Cherf in Kase et al. (n. 3) 135
51. Georgius Syncellus, *Ecloga Chronographica*, 466. For a general discussion of the Herulian invasion, see F. Millar, 'P. Herennius Dexippus: The Greek World and the Third-Century Invasions' *JRS* 59 (1969) 26–29.
52. Cherf in Kase et al. (n. 3) 138
53. Eunap. *VS* 476; Claudian (*Gothic War* 186–188) similarly implies that Thermopylae was not defended.
54. Procop. *Hist.* 2.4.10–11
55. The view of Cherf at Kase et al. (n. 3) 139
56. Procop. *Aed.* 4.2.2–25
57. Procop. *Hist.* 8.26.1; Procop. *Arc.* 26.31–33
58. Cherf in Kase et al. (n. 3) 140–141; see also: P.A. Mackay, 'Procopius' De Aedificiis and the Topography of Thermopylae' *AJA* 67.3 (1963) 241–255
59. Rosser in Kase (n. 3) 148–151
60. P. Lock (*The Franks in the Aegean, 1204–1500* (London, Longman, 1995) 68–72) suggests that Sgouros' abandonment of Thermopylae may have had as much to do with the slight to his personal honour as to the difficulty of defending the pass without local support.
61. Inalcik in Kase et al. (n. 3) 161.
62. C.M. Woodhouse, *The Greek War of Independence in its Historical Setting* (New York, Russell & Russell, 1952) 62–63; D. Dakin, *The Greek Struggle for Independence 1821–1833* (London, Batsford, 1973) 92
63. 'Diakos' ('the Deacon') was a nickname. His real name was Athanasios.
64. T. Gordon, *History of the Greek Revolution*, Vol. 1, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh, William Blackwood, 1844) 272–273; W.A. Phillips, *The War of Greek Independence, 1821 to 1833* (London, Smith, Elder & Co., 1897) 62; Woodhouse (n. 62) 70–72.
65. I.S.O. Playfair, *The Mediterranean and the Middle East*, vol. 2 *The Germans Come to the Help of their Ally* (London, HMSO, 1956) 83. On the respective forces, see: G. Long, *Greece, Crete and Syria* (Canberra, Australian War Memorial, 1986) 94.
66. Playfair (n. 65) 89
67. The Australian Official History points out that eventually the position could still be outflanked, either via Euboea or, on the west, through the mountains or via the west coast: Long (n. 65) 140.
68. See, in general, J.C. Kraft, G. Rapp, J.G. Szeimler, C. Tziavos, and E.W. Kase, 'The Pass at Thermopylae, Greece' *Journal of Field Archaeology* 14:2 (1987) 181–198
69. For a brief account, see P. Londey, 'Bulair: The Attack that Didn't Happen' *Wartime*, 34 (2006) 16–17
70. Long (n. 65) 140–141; D. Horner, *General Vasey's War* (Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1992) 101–102
71. Long (n. 65) 142
72. Horner (n. 70) 102
73. Horner (n. 70) 103
74. Long (n. 65) 142
75. Long (n. 65) 143
76. Playfair (n. 65) 98
77. Playfair (n. 65) 98–99; Long (n. 65) 143–151; Horner (n. 70) 105–107
78. Livy 36.15.6–12; 36.17.4
79. Worthington (n. 13) 66, 67
80. Long (n. 65) 140
81. C.A. Trypanis, 'Thermopylae 1941' (lines 1–11), reprinted in R. Cromie (ed.), *Where Steel Winds Blow* (New York, David McKay Company, 1968) 33.

#### Conclusion: The Glorious Defeat

1. J. Belich, *The New Zealand Wars* (Auckland, Penguin, 1986) 166
2. J. Cowan, *The New Zealand Wars: a History of the Maori Campaigns and the Pioneering Period* (Wellington, W.A.G. Skinner, 1922–1923) 366
3. W. Fox, *The War in New Zealand* (Christchurch, Capper Press, 1866) 100
4. A monument now stands at the site of the battle. It states simply: Erected / in commemoration of / Battle of Orakau / Fought March 31st / April 1st and 2nd 1864
5. Cowan (n.2) 390
6. Fox (n.3) vi–vii
7. Fox (n.3) ix
8. These were produced almost immediately after the battle and are published as *Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives*, New Zealand, dated to 4th April 1864.
9. See: G.F. von Tempskey, *Memoranda of the New Zealand Campaign in 1863–4* (Auckland, Auckland Institute Museum)
10. Fox (n.3) 98–100
11. von Tempskey (n.9) 136
12. C. Pugsley, *Anzacs at Gallipoli* (Auckland, Reed, 2001) 1
13. A. Beevor, *Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege* (London, Penguin, 1994) 399
14. Beevor (n.13) 399–401