KOREAN ELECTIONS AND VOTERS IN THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY, 1985 - 1992

By

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Declaration

Except where otherwise indicated,
this thesis is my own work.

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Abstract

This thesis examines the process by which Korean voters come to their voting decision, especially in the era of democratic transition (1985-1992). The main focus of this study is on the political cleavage structures that have led Korean voters to choose one party over the others in elections. By analysing two sets of sample survey data, which cover the elections in the period of democratic transition, it attempts to unravel the nature of the two main dimensions of political cleavage: that is, the urban-rural and regional differences in electoral support, which are in essence descriptions of vote distribution at the aggregate level.

The impact of changes in the party system on the voters during this period is discussed with reference first to the patterns of movement of voters across the subsequent elections and second to the patterns of voter alignment on the two main dimensions. In general, the movements of voters were quite stable along the line of government versus opposition. Patterns in electoral support along the urban-rural dimension depict 'continuity' across the elections, whereas patterns in electoral support based on regionalism suggest 'change' as much as 'continuity.'

The past cleavage of regime versus pro-democratic support, which was often reflected in urban-rural differences in electoral support, is found to consist more of differences in socialisation. The different composition of socialisation variables, age and education in particular, between urban and rural areas accounts for the *yoch'on yado* (government-rural, opposition-urban) phenomenon. The regional differences in voting, which appeared as a new (and most important) political cleavage in the elections of this period, are mainly due to 'personalism.' The voters, who heavily rely on personality factors for their voting decision,

seem to have used the regional traits of the candidates and their parties for the evaluations of candidates most importantly.

This thesis argues that voter alignment along regional lines - lines which are vertically drawn rather than cross-cutting; highly personalised and emotion-charged rather than interest oriented; and which exhibit a centrifugal tendency - may hinder democratic stability based on the presidential system of government. Moreover, it would be unfortunate if the current pattern of regional alignment entails the permanent exclusion of some population from political power. For the formation of a more responsive political system, more care is needed for the political actors and the voters alike. Given the ideological rigidity of the society on the Right-Left continuum, the converting of the old pro-government versus pro-democratic cleavage into a conservative versus liberal framework, and, further, the rendering of the converted cleavage to a central place in electoral competition, can be a viable option in the foreseeable future if the presidential system in Korea continues to prosper.

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INTRODUCTION

Since the establishment of the South Korean government in 1948, Korean voters have been to nationwide polls more than 30 times. Except for the period of Park Chung-hee's *Yushin* regime and "the Fifth Republic" of Chun Doo-hwan, Presidents have been elected by popular vote although it is questionable whether most of the elections prior to 1987 were fair. The National Assembly has also been constituted by popularly elected members. However, only a little has been known of the characteristics of South Korean voters, especially regarding the question of how Korean voters have made their voting choices.[1] One of the obvious reasons for this negligence may be that elections prior to 1987 were not so meaningful in terms of deciding who should run the country, and thus, were not of great interest.

Elections in Korea have not yet produced alternation in office between competing political parties. Changes of government occurred, but not until 1987 by election. The government under President Rhee Syngman (1948-60) was ousted by the student uprising of April 19, 1960, and the democratic period of "the Second Republic" (1960-61) was ended by a military coup. The government under President Park Chung-hee (1961-79) was dissolved after his assassination.

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[1] See, for a review of the studies on Korean elections and electoral behaviour in general, Ahn, Byong-man, Kil, Soong-hoom, and Kim, Kwang-woong, *Elections in Korea*, Seoul Computer Press, 1988, pp. 53-81.

The government under fixed seven-year one-term President Chun Doo-hwan (1980-87) was succeeded by President Roh Tae-woo (1988-92), who was a ruling party candidate in the 1987 presidential election - an election process restored after 16 years of suspension initiated by Park in 1972. In the recent 1992 presidential election, President Kim Young-sam (1993-1997(?)) won his fixed five-year one-term presidency, but as a ruling party candidate. Although Kim had been a main opposition party leader in the Park and Chun eras, and even in the beginning of Roh's era, he and his party merged into the ruling party in 1990, relinquishing the opposition parties' majority status - witnessed for the first time in Korean electoral history in the 1988 National Assembly election.

The dominance of ruling parties in the National Assembly elections has also largely been maintained. Although at times elections have been subject to irregularities and fraud, governments in power have been successful in retaining enough electoral support. Governments in power may have been very adept in mobilising some segments of Korean voters. Election rigging may have been a factor, but this alone cannot explain the dominance of ruling parties in the Korean elections: indeed, the mass scale election fraud in the 1960 elections resulted in the student uprising which cost Rhee's presidency.

This leads us to the question of why the Korean voters cast their votes the way they did. Viewed from the impressions gathered by observations on Korean political affairs, which are usually dominated by mass demonstrations or by fierce confrontations between the ruling and opposition parties, the dominance of

ruling parties in elections looks unusual. Perhaps it is because elections may have played only secondary roles in legitimising the changes of political system which occurred from outside the electoral process. That is, because there had usually been a collapse of the political system by external forces in circumstances where an election might have produced a change of government in power,[2] elections thereafter were most likely to be *maintaining* ones. However, the elections following the 1987 one were qualitatively different from those which had periodically legitimated the existing political power structure in the past. There had been a real risk of failure for the governing party in contesting the election in 1987, and the risk was finally realised in the 1988 National Assembly election.

Nonetheless, it is obvious that a majority of Korean voters have voted for stability rather than change, even in the period of democratic transition. Who, then, are those people that regularly support a governing party or opposition? Are there social groups which support one party against the others in a consistent manner? Are there changes in the structure of electoral alignment in the period of democratic transition comparable to that of the past? The question, "who votes for whom," will be a major concern of this thesis, especially for the elections in the period of democratic transition.

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[2] See, for a discussion of such elections that Ahn identified as the "crucial" elections, Ahn, Byong-man, "Korean Political Parties and Political Development: Crucial Elections and the Process of Institutionalisation of the Political Party System," *Korea Journal*, 18 (1), 1978, pp. 30-41; "The Process of Political Changes in Korea: An Analysis of Crucial Elections and Party Politics," *Korea & World Affairs*, 9(4), 1985, pp. 625-646; and *Han'guk Chongbu-ron (Essays on Korean Government)*, 2nd ed., Seoul: Tasan, 1989, pp. 153-183.

One of the most compelling approaches to this question is to examine the structure of political cleavages in Korean society. For example, as democratisation of the authoritarian political system has become one of the most important issues in Korean politics since the mid 1950s, one of the main configurations of voters' partisan allegiance has become a polarisation around this dimension.[3] Indeed, the "*yoch'on yado* (government rural, opposition urban)" phenomenon - which describes the tendency that the governing parties mobilise traditional sectors of the public such as farmers, the less-educated, or elders predominantly in the rural areas, whereas the opposition parties' strength lies in the urban areas where the well-educated and the young voters are in a relative majority - was a dominant pattern in most of the elections prior to 1987.

A new cleavage that came to play a central role in partisan support since 1987 may have been regionalism. No one would hesitate to point out that one of the most astonishing characteristics in the elections of 1987 and thereafter has been profound regional differences in party support. Parties and their candidates had been dominant over others in the provinces in which the leaders of the parties had their origin. As there has been rapid progress in the process of Korea's democratisation in recent years, it would be natural to expect some changes in the pattern of electoral cleavages, which was formerly centred on the issue of the

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[3] See Lee, Kap-yun, "Urinara Son'gogwajong-ui Minjuhwa (Democratisation of Electoral Process in Our Country)," in Han'guk Chongch'ihakhoe (Korean Political Science Association), ed., *Han'guk Chongch'i-ui Minjuhwa (Democratisation of Korean Politics)*, Seoul: Pobmunsa, 1988, p.194.

democratisation of the authoritarian political system, but it is rather surprising that the variation of regional attributes became a dominant factor that virtually determined the patterns of partisan support. It is important, therefore, to explicate why regionalism rather than other factors appeared to be the most important factor in electoral competition during this period of democratisation.

The main thrust of this thesis is, thus, to explore the nature of electoral cleavages that lead Korean voters to choose one party against the others in elections. Part 1, which consists of two chapters, will provide background for this study. Chapter 1 will discuss development of the Korean party system, with particular attention to electoral meanings in it, and political issues involved. Chapter 2 will review the literature dealing with Korean voting behaviour: propositions developed to explain the observed patterns of partisan alignment are discussed, and similarities and differences are identified in comparison to the development of European patterns of voter alignment.

Empirical analyses follow in Part 2, by utilising two sets of sample survey data.[4] Chapter 3 will discuss the impact of party splits and mergers witnessed during the period of democratisation in terms of voters' responses - that is, movements of votes and changing patterns of voter alignments if these occurred at all. Chapter 4 attempts to unravel the nature of the *yoch'on yado* phenomenon

[4] The first set of data was collected in November 1991 by Prof. James Cotton, and the second set of data was collected just after the 1992 presidential election as a follow-up project. See, for a detailed description of the data, Appendix 1 of this thesis.

by identifying factors that bring about the observed pattern of voter alignment, and through discussion of their political implications. Chapter 5 will examine the influence of regional attributes on voting choice, which have prevailed in electoral contests since 1987. After identifying the effects of regionalism on voting, the chapter specifically tests some of the propositions that may account for regional differences in voting. That is, the causes of regional differences in partisan support will be explored. In Chapter 6, the meanings of the more immediate determinants of individual voting choices such as partisan orientations, political attitudes, economic evaluations and candidate perceptions - which are introduced in the foregoing chapters - will be fully elaborated, and their effects on voting choice in the 1992 presidential election will be weighed in a causal sequence model.

In Part 3 (Chapter 7), the future of the democratic transition process in the Korean political system will be discussed with reference to the above mentioned empirical work. From the point of view of institutional measures, the Korean political system is now considered *democratic* as there are regularly held elections which are free and competitive. It is now probable that alternation of government in power between competing parties might occur by means of election. However, the success of democratic transition may largely depend on how the pattern of electoral competition is configured. That is, the political party system must effectively link or consolidate conflicting interests among the voters. Thus, the political party system and its bases of political support need to be closely examined from this perspective. The role played by regionalism may be

particularly interesting: for the political actors it may have been a source of reducing uncertainties at first, but soon it may have become a sectoral interest that prevailed in political contests.

PART 1.
BACKGROUND: KOREAN ELECTIONS, POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AND VOTERS

Chapter 1.
The Development of Korean Party Systems and Elections

1. Introduction

The first general election of South Korea was held on May 10, 1948. The election, supervised by a United Nations commission, appointed 198 members of the "Constitution-Enacting" National Assembly. Between 1948 and 1992 Korea held 8 direct presidential elections, 13 more National Assembly elections, and 11 various local elections.[1] Although it is doubtful that elections before 1987 were fairly managed, elections have been held regularly, except for the period of the Fourth and the Fifth Republics where direct presidential elections were not held, and elections are now firmly recognised as a central feature of the nation's political system.

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[1] There have been so far four series of local elections: two during the First Republic, one during the Second Republic, and one in 1991 restored in 30 years' of suspension. Even with such a short period of experience in local elections, however, the heads of the township-level and the provincial-level self-governments have not been popularly elected but appointed by the presidents except for the one held during the Second Republic, and only the assembly members in the two levels were directly elected, thus seriously limiting the autonomy of the self-governing bodies. Popular elections of the heads of the self-governing bodies are scheduled to be implemented in 1995. It is yet to be seen whether the local self-governing bodies, which have served as a mere administrative unit dependent upon the centre, will become an autonomous body of local self-government. See, for a discussion on the local elections and self-governments during the First and the Second Republics, Yun, Hyong-sop, *Han'guk Chongch'i-ron (Essays on Korean Politics)*, rev. ed., Seoul: Pagyongsa, 1992, pp. 298-300 and pp. 683-726. Also see Park, Dong-su, *Chibangjach'i-wa Chibanguiwon Son'go (Local Self-governments and Local Assembly Elections)*, Seoul: Shina, 1991.

But have the elections "mattered" in Korea, and in what sense? For a number of years following liberation from the Japanese occupation (1910 - 1945), elections, filled with fraud or characterised by unscrupulous practices, appeared to be a tool for those in power to legitimise and promote their own political interests. The Constitution, which prescribes the methods of formation of government, for example, has been revised on nine different occasions.[2] Indeed, most of the amendments were prepared for power projection or expansion of the power of rulers, and it is not until the ninth amendment in 1987 that an agreement for amendment was achieved between the ruling and the opposition parties. It is only since the presidential election held in 1987 that succession to political power seems to have become firmly institutionalised by means of fair and competitive elections.

What role, then, have elections played in the past? Have past elections simply been a tool for justifying an existing power structure, or have they provided an opportunity for changes in political power among the competing political parties? What have been the issues or points of contest among the political parties, and are the issues at present different from the past ones? What have been the main dimensions in political competition among the parties and

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[2] Each of the six Republics in Korea so far came with a new constitution. In addition to this, the First Republic had two more amendments, and the Second and the Third Republics one more, respectively. See Kim, Ki-bom, "Revisions of the Korean Constitution (I) & (II)," *Korea Journal*, 14 (7 & 8), 1974, pp. 4-13 & pp. 18-25. Also see Ahn, Byong-man, Kil, Soong-hoom, and Kim, Kwang-woong, *Elections in Korea*, Seoul Computer Press, 1988, pp. 3-52; and Henderson, Gregory, "Constitutional Changes from the First and the Sixth Republics: 1948-1987," in Kim, Ilpyong J., and Kihl, Young-whan (eds.), *Political Change in South Korea*, New York: Korea PWPA, 1988, pp. 22-43.

their supporters? To address these questions, the historical development of the party system and patterns of party competition will be reviewed in this chapter. This chapter will explore the historical development of political cleavage structures in Korean society, and is aimed at providing a background for empirical analyses which will follow in the following chapters of Part 2.

2. Electoral Arrangements in Korean Politics (1948-1992)

Electoral arrangements in South Korean political history have undergone frequent changes in their substance, although a presidential system of government has been the norm for most of its history. Except for a brief period of the Second Republic, in which a parliamentary system of government was employed, the president who heads the executive branch of the government has largely held responsibility for running the country. The legislative body of the National Assembly, which was dominated by the ruling parties - namely, the parties of the president - for most of its history, may have been a "marginal" institution that became subservient to the executive.[3] Thus, the changes in the electoral system, achieved by amendments of the constitution that usually included a clause for

[3] See Yoon, Young O., "Policymaking Activities of the South Korean National Assembly," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, 5(1), 1986, pp. 29-48. Also see Kim, Chong-lim, "The Unwritten Rules of the Game in the National Assembly of the Fifth Republic," *Asian Perspective*, 12(2), 1988, pp. 5-34; and Han, Jong-il, "Decision-Making Process in the Korean Legislature," *Korea Journal*, 13(7), 1973, pp. 29-33 & p.43.

extending previously defined terms of the president, have been centred upon the methods of electing the president, and swung from an indirect method to direct depending on political situations of the time. Nonetheless, the electoral methods of the National Assembly have not been immune to changes as the executive's aspirations for firmer control over the Assembly necessitated them. Each of the six Republics, indeed, came with a different electoral method for the National Assembly. Table 1-1 provides for a summary of the electoral systems that Korea has experienced so far for the president and the National Assembly.

The electoral arrangements for the early years of the First Republic were a hurriedly prepared, convenient mixture of presidential and parliamentary systems of government, reflecting the parliamentary bids of the Korean Democratic Party (KDP) as well as Rhee Syngman's version of the American-style presidential system.[4] For example, the president was elected by a two-thirds majority of the National Assembly, but had power to appoint executive ministers, except for the Prime Minister which required consent from the Assembly. The unicameral National Assembly, consisting of popularly elected members in a single member district, was to serve the prescribed terms without dissolution initiated by the president. The path taken by the first president, Rhee, soon after his inauguration was to build executive dominance over the Assembly: by the first amendment in 1952, a direct election of the president, which had ensured re-election of Rhee given his popularity among the public, was adopted; and by the second

[4] See Oh, John Kie-chiang, *Democracy on Trial*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968, pp. 14-22.

amendment in 1954, he successfully circumvented constitutional restrictions on the number of presidential terms, in addition to adopting new measures that strengthened presidential power against the Assembly.[5]

A parliamentary system of government characterised the electoral arrangements of the Second Republic, created as a result of "the April 19th Student Revolution" which ousted the Rhee government in 1960.[6] The two-house Assembly - namely, the House of Representatives (Lower) consisting of members who were elected in a single member constituency, and the House of Councilors (Upper) consisting of members who were elected in a provincial-level multi-member district - was empowered to form the cabinet and to elect the ceremonial president by a two-third majority in a joint session. The Second Republic under the Chang Myon government, however, lasted less than a year, as did the electoral arrangements that were considered to be the most democratic so far.

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[5] For example, constitutional amendments were now dependent on national referendum; the Prime Ministership was abolished; and the Assembly's no-confidence vote against the presidential cabinet *en bloc* was abolished. See *ibid.*, pp. 23-50. Also see Pak, Chi-young, *Political Opposition in Korea, 1945-1960*, Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1980, pp. 88-131; and Reeve, W.D., *The Republic of Korea: A Political and Economic Study*, London: Oxford University Press, 1963, pp. 39-51.

[6] See, for a discussion focused on the rise and fall of the Second Republic, Han, Sung-joo, *The Failure of Democracy in South Korea*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974. Also see Choi, Yeam H., *Decision-making in Korean Government: Between Student Uprising and Military Coup D'Etat*, Ann Arbor: Xerox University Microfilms, 1975.

Table 1-1. Electoral System in Korea (1948-1992): For the President and National Assembly

Republics	President			National Assembly		
	Election Year	Method (Electorate)	Terms	Election Year	Method	Terms
The 1st Republic[1] (1948-60)	1948	Indirect (National Assembly)	4 yrs, 2-term fixed	1948	Unicameral: FPTP	2 yrs
	1952	Direct (Public Age over 21)	As above	1950	As above	4 yrs
	1956	As above	4 yrs, no term limit[2]	1954	As above	As above
				1958	As above	As above
The 2nd Republic (1960-61)	1960	Indirect (The Lower & Upper House)	5 yrs, 2-term fixed	1960	Bicameral: FPTP(L); & Multi-member Limited-ballot (U)	4 yrs (L) 6 yrs (U)
Military	Junta	Government	(1961-63)			
The 3rd Republic (1963-72)	1963	Direct (Public Age over 20)	4 yrs, 2-term fixed	1963	Unicameral: Mixed [FPTP & PR (1/4 of the total, National-list)]	4 yrs
	1967	As above	As above	1967	As above	4 yrs
	1971	As above	4 yrs, 3-term fixed	1971	As above	4 yrs
The 4th Republic (1972-80)	1972	Indirect (National Council for Unification)	6 yrs, term not fixed	1973	Unicameral: Two-member Single-ballot; & 1/3 of the president appointee[3]	6 yrs; 3 yrs for the appointee
	1978	As above	As above	1978	As above	As above
	1979	As above	As above			
	1980	As above	As above			
The 5th Republic (1981-87)	1981	Indirect (Electoral College for the President)	7 yrs, 1-term fixed	1981	Unicameral: Mixed [Two-member Single - ballot & PR (1/3 of the total, National-list)]	4 yrs
				1985	As above	As above
The 6th Republic (1988- ?)	1987	Direct (Public Age over 20)	5 yrs, 1-term fixed	1988	Unicameral: Mixed [FPTP & PR (1/4 of the total, National-list)]	4 yrs
	1992	As above	As above	1992	As above	As above

Note: 1 - The vice-presidents were also elected, using the same method as the presidents but only during the First Republic. The upper house (House of Councilors) was to be formed by the first amendment of the constitution in 1952 but deferred during the First Republic.

2 - Only the incumbent (Rhee Syngman) was exempted from the term limit.

3 - The presidential appointees, called *Yushin-chongu-hoe*, were technically formed by the recommendation of the president and with verification by the National Council for Unification.

The military junta, which came into power by "the May 16th Coup" in 1961 under the leadership of General Park Chung-hee, interrupted the electoral process by enforcing "the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction" to exercise legislative, executive and judicial power.[7] A presidential system of government was revived in the new constitution prepared by the military junta government, and the military junta formulated a new ruling party for its power succession in the Third Republic.[8] The direct, popular election of the president, who had restrictions on re-election over two consecutive terms, was adopted, and the president would enjoy a similar level of power Rhee had in his later years of rule. The upper House was discarded in the National Assembly, and a new element designed to enhance the ruling party's dominant position in the Assembly was added. That is, by rendering one-fourth of the quota in the Assembly into the national-list seats - in which a half of the seats would be allocated to a party that yielded the biggest share of the votes in the elections for the contested seats if the party's vote is less than 50 per cent,[9] a party coming second would gain two-thirds of the remaining half, and the other parties would gain one-third of the remaining half in proportion to their votes - the evidently dominant position of the ruling party was shielded. A minor party who could not win either three contested seats nor 5 per cent of the vote was excluded from the allocation of the

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[7] See Kim, Se-jin, *The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971, pp. 102-124.

[8] See, for a discussion on political system of the Third Republic, Chung, Kyong-cho, *Korea: The Third Republic*, New York: Macmillan, 1971, pp. 41-111.

[9] If a party won more than 50 per cent of the vote, then the national-list seats would be allocated in proportion to the vote shares, but up to the maximum of two-thirds of the national-list seats for the party.

national-list seats.[10] Moreover, party discipline was also emphasised by banning the Independents from running for a seat on the one hand, and by prescribing the nomination of candidates by the centralised party leadership on the other. During the Third Republic under Park, there was one more instance of constitutional amendment to permit his re-election for three consecutive terms.

By the adoption of the *Yushin* (revitalisation) constitution in October 1972, the meaning of elections in the political process became nearly void.[11] The presidents of the Fourth Republic, who would enjoy ever stronger power with the adoption of presidential emergency measures that could overrule the constitution, were elected by a rubber-stamp electoral college named "the National Council for Unification" consisting of non-partisan members who were popularly elected but had no obligations to the voting public. The electoral system for the National Assembly was designed to yield a two-thirds majority of the ruling party in the Assembly: that is, one-third of the quota was appointed by the president, and the ruling party was likely to secure a half of the remaining two-thirds in the contests of a two-member constituency. During the Fourth Republic, the Independents were permitted to run for a seat.

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[10] A similar threshold was maintained during the Fifth Republic: that is, 5 per cent of the vote and five contested seats. In 1988, the threshold was a party's winning five contested seats; and in 1992, it was 3 per cent of the vote.

[11] See, for a comprehensive review of the *Yushin* political system, Nam, Koon-woo, *South Korean Politics: The Search for Political Consensus and Stability*, Lanham: University Press of America, 1989. Also see Sohn, Hak-kyu, *Authoritarianism and Opposition in South Korea*, London: Routledge, 1989.

The electoral arrangements of the Fifth Republic, which shortly followed the *Yushin* system by the General Chun Doo-hwan led new military junta, were a mere duplication of the former with a few exceptions: that is, the president was elected by "the (new) Electoral College for the President" but he was to serve only a single seven-year term, and the two-member constituency system was maintained for the Assembly but the presidential appointee was abolished. Instead, one-third of the quota in the Assembly was allocated for the national-list seats, in which two-thirds of the seats would be allocated to a party that yielded the biggest share of the contested seats, not by the votes as had been in the Third Republic, and the remaining one-third was to be allocated to the other parties, in proportion to their seats won in the contests, thus still virtually guaranteeing the ruling party's majority status in the Assembly.[12] The electoral arrangements under Chun were a bit more relaxed than those of the *Yushin* system, the most distorted form of electoral representation, but were far from being representative.

A more representative form of electoral arrangement appeared in the Sixth Republic. Direct presidential elections were restored after sixteen years' suspension, and a two-member constituency system, designed so that the ruling party would gain half of the contested seats, was discarded, returning to the first-past-the-post system. The allocation method of the national-list seats was also

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[12] See, for a detailed discussion on the allocation system of the national-list seats, Yun, Hyong-sop, "Son'gojedo 40 Nyon-ui Pyonch'on-gwa Kyolgwa (Changes of Electoral System for 40 Years-on and their Results)," *Chonggyong Munhwa*, Feb. 1985, pp. 334-351. Also see Kim, Yong-ho, "Kukhoeuiwon Son'gojedo-ui Pyonhwa-wa Chongch'ijok Hyokwa Punsok (Changes in the National Assembly Electoral System and an Analysis of their Political Impacts)," in Lee, Nam-young (ed.), *Han'guk-ui Son'go (Elections in Korea), I*, Seoul: Nanam, 1993, pp. 285-310.

changed: that is, in 1988, the method was the same as that of the Third Republic - which guaranteed at least half of the seats for the biggest (ruling) party - except that the share of the contested seats was used for the allocation rather than the share of the vote. But in 1992, the seats would be simply distributed to the parties in proportion to their seats won in the elections.[13] The presidential term was further restricted to a single five-year term.

In short, the history of electoral arrangements in Korea is nothing short of a patch-work that served immediate needs of political leaders whose main concerns lay in perpetuation of political power. Debate over how to better represent the electorate has yet to come. Apart from the brief period of liberal democracy during the Second Republic, representativeness had been increasingly reduced during the Fourth Republic of *Yushin*, and only recovered in the Sixth Republic, which followed "the June Popular Uprising" in 1987. However, the distortions of representativeness in the electoral system were achieved at the cost to regimes of the very legitimacy that might have been otherwise provided by electoral means. In the following sections, the history of party politics, which inevitably centred upon electoral politics, although their importance had been curtailed by the distortions, will be reviewed.

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[13] Later in March 1994, the election law was revised so that the national-list seats, once considered for total abolition, would be allocated to the parties in proportion to their votes won in the elections. The electoral reform included strict regulations on the use of campaign funds, and revival of local elections suspended since 1961, especially for the heads of the local self-governing bodies. See Huh, Young, "Chongch'i-gaehyok, Pob-i Mannung Anida (Political Reform, Law Is Not Everything)," *Sindonga*, April 1994, pp. 150-158.

3. Development of the Party System: An Historical Overview

From the time Korea was liberated from Japan in 1945 to the establishment of separate governments in the South and the North, hundreds of political parties came into existence in the American zone of the South.[14] Many more political parties have emerged and disappeared since then, but there is not a single party which has survived to the present, and most parties existed for only a short time. Alignment or realignment of politicians was common, and parties were generally formed in the wake of an election and dissolved shortly after the election. Even the ruling parties - namely, the Liberal Party in the First Republic, the Democratic Party in the Second Republic, the Democratic Republic Party in the Third and Fourth Republic, and the Democratic Justice Party in the Fifth Republic - rose and fell with their leaders' fate, and the major opposition parties also came and went accordingly - the Democratic Party in the First Republic, the old faction of the Democratic Party in the Second Republic, the New Democratic Party in the Third and Fourth Republic, and the New Korea Democratic Party in the Fifth Republic, for example. This was due to the fact that governments were not born out of open competition among the political parties. That is, an already organised political power usually created and nurtured a ruling party as its

[14] See Kim, C.I. Eugene, and Kihl, Young-whan, "Development of Party Politics (1945-1961): An Overview," in Kim, C.I. Eugene, and Kihl, Young-whan (eds.), *Party Politics and Elections in Korea*, Silver Spring: The Research Institute of Korean Affairs, 1976, pp. 7-18, at p.9.

support base, and this was followed by the creation of an opposition party by those who were excluded, by force or by choice, from the ruling power structure.

Nonetheless, the ruling parties and major opposition parties have usually engaged in heated competition against each other for the popular vote. Although since 1952 there have been no fundamental differences in ideology among the ruling and opposition parties, the division between the ruling and opposition camps has been clearly drawn over the issue of the legitimacy of the existing regimes since the mid-1950s. Attempts at constitutional revision, which were mostly motivated by a desire to prolong the political power of the existing regimes, have generally made the question of legitimacy the focal point of political debates, and this intensified the conflict between ruling and opposition camps.

The nature of political competition during the period of the First Republic and the Fifth Republic is well illustrated by Ahn Byong-man. He describes the process by which a competitive two-party system in Korea developed to the point of institutionalisation but eventually failed to be institutionalised.[15] The process of amending the constitution, which was usually accompanied by irregularities, may have served as the major issue which eventually polarised the political

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[15] See Ahn, Byong-man, "Korean Political Parties and Political Development: Crucial Elections and the Process of Institutionalisation of the Political Party System," *Korea Journal*, 18 (1), 1978, pp. 30-41; "The Process of Political Changes in Korea: An Analysis of Crucial Elections and Party Politics," *Korea & World Affairs*, 9(4), 1985, pp. 625-646; and *Han'guk Chongburon (Essays on Korean Government)*, 2nd ed., Seoul: Tasan, 1989, pp. 153-183.

parties and the voters as well. According to Ahn, the Korean party system in the period 1948 to 1987 developed through four distinct phases in its institutionalisation process.[16] Each phase included a "crucial" election, which eventually resulted in the failure of institutionalisation of a competitive party system attained by the election.[17] The main thrust of his reasoning is that unconstitutional changes of political system may be expected as a result of "crucial" elections, unless ruling parties are prepared to accept the possibility of transferring political power through free competition, and, most likely, to their opponents.

The first phase consisted of Rhee Syngman's regime (the First Republic of 1948 to 1960), which collapsed as a consequence of the April 19th Student Revolution in 1960, along with the party system which resulted from the "crucial" election of 1958. After the "normal" 1954 election, where the ruling Liberal Party (LP) - newly formed by President Rhee in 1951 - garnered a landslide victory over the main opposition Democratic National Party (DNP), came the 1954 amendment that excepted President Rhee from the constitutional

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[16] See *ibid.*, 1989.

[17] In order to illustrate changes in the Korean party system, Ahn developed the concepts of "crucial" and "normal" elections by classifying the National Assembly elections from 1948 to 1985 into these categories. Normal elections refer to those elections which failed in creating single opposition parties to challenge the power of governments or ruling parties, which have been common in Korean politics, whereas the crucial elections are those which posed serious threats to the maintenance of the political power of governments or ruling parties. The latter generally resulted from the sudden seizure by opposition parties of a considerable proportion of parliamentary seats: that is, by gaining more than one-third of parliamentary seats opposition parties not only would be able to prevent an amendment of the constitution, which usually restricted presidential terms, but also to present themselves as a meaningful challenger for the following presidential elections. He identified the 1958, 1971, 1978 and 1985 elections as crucial elections, which resulted in unconstitutional changes in the political system.

limitation of two consecutive presidential terms. In the "crucial" 1958 election, the main opposition Democratic Party (DP) - the former DNP allied with other minor parties in 1955 to counter the ruling LP - appeared as a viable challenger for power succession. The LP at last resorted to a massive election fraud to win in the March 15th Rigged Presidential Election of 1960, and this eventuated in the Student Revolution that toppled the First Republic.

The Second Republic (1960 - 1961), which adopted a parliamentary system of government, was dominated by the DP, but lasted insufficiently long to institutionalise its party system because of the May 16th Military Coup in 1961. This begins the second phase of the institutionalisation process of the Korean party system in Ahn's classification: that is, the period of the Third Republic (1963 - 1972) under President Park Chung-hee, terminating in Park's authoritarian *Yushin* regime. In the 1963 National Assembly election, and in the subsequent 1967 election, the newly set-up ruling Democratic Republican Party (DRP) secured a two-thirds majority in the Assembly over the New Democratic Party (NDP) - which became a main opposition party through until the end of the Fourth Republic. The constitution was again amended in 1969, allowing President Park to run for a third term, but the "crucial" 1971 National Assembly election, where the NDP fared well enough to pose a meaningful threat to the maintenance of prolonged one-man rule, resulted in a two-party system that was, however, suddenly abolished by the adoption of the *Yushin* constitution.

Thus began the third phase of the development of the Korean party system in Ahn's classification - the Fourth Republic (1972 -1979) under President Park's *Yushin* regime. This phase includes the "crucial" 1978 National Assembly election, in which the popular votes won by the main opposition New Democratic Party exceeded the ruling Democratic Republic Party's votes. Although the opposition share of the seats was far less than that of the ruling party mainly because of the presidential appointees in the Assembly, this electoral victory may certainly have encouraged the opposition in demanding the democratisation of the authoritarian *Yushin* regime. This phase ended with the assassination of President Park which was followed by the military takeover of the government.

The fourth phase in Ahn's classification consists of the Fifth Republic (1981 - 1987) under President Chun Doo-hwan, which adopted a similar political system to the *Yushin* regime, although somewhat more relaxed. This phase also witnessed a "normal" election in 1981, where the ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP) won a comfortable victory over the small opposition, Democratic Korea Party (DKP), albeit under circumstances which included the banning of the political activities of key opposition figures, who later in 1985 formed the New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP). In the "crucial" 1985 National Assembly election, the NKDP, formed about one month before the election, emerged as a main opposition and later absorbed most of the Assembly members of the DKP in its membership. Thus, the NKDP, commanding far more than one-third of the Assembly seats, could effectively prevent the passage of any proposal for

constitutional revision in favour of the ruling party. Followed by the mass demonstration demanding democratic reforms in June 1987, the political order of the Fifth Republic was abandoned and a new constitution, which restored a direct presidential election, was adopted along with other democratic measures.

This ended, according to Ahn, "a vicious cycle-like process" of institutionalisation of the Korean party system, and began a period of institutionalised competitive party system. Ahn argues that the vicious cycle-like institutionalisation process of the party system was repeated at a quickened pace with each passing election, and finally reached the point where a competitive party system seemed to be institutionalised as democratisation proceeds.[18] Given events since 1987, the competitive party system may persist so that a transfer of political power can be achieved by electoral procedures, not by external forces. Further, it may be no longer "normal" that the ruling party wins a clear majority in parliament with marginal challenges from the opposition parties, thus diminishing the relevance of "crucial" elections for an analysis of elections beyond 1987.

Ahn, however, seemed to over-emphasise the discontinuous characteristics of changes in the Korean party system by relying mostly on the concept of "crucial" elections, in essence an *ad hoc* reasoning of political events. For example, within his framework it is hard to incorporate the development of

[18] See Ahn, *op cit.*, 1989, p.181.

opposition parties, which have grown through the struggle for democracy since the mid-1950s. In spite of the frequent alignments or realignments of party politicians and changes in name, it can be argued that the opposition parties maintained a single heritage from the beginnings of the Korea Democratic Party through the Democratic Nationalist, the Democratic, and the Civil Rule Party to the New Korea Democratic Party. Perhaps, the Korean party system has shown an enduring tendency since the 1950s, not only for its configuration of a two-party format but also its structuring of the vote. As Han Sung-joo pointed out, the presidential system of government that Korea has had for most of its history may have been one of the main factors encouraging politicians to be brought together around two major parties - "one for and the other against the government."[19] The division between the political parties, which had been highly politicised because of the violation of democratic game rules by the ruling power as reviewed above, may have also provided voters with a clear cue when they made a voting choice. Opposition parties, which usually formed a united front in the face of oncoming elections, may have attracted some segments of the voters who may have resented prolonged one-man rule, whereas the ruling parties mobilised other segments of the voters who have weighed stability or security of society as being of most importance.

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[19] See Han, Sung-joo, "South Korea: Politics in Transition," in Diamond, Larry, Linz, Juan J., and Lipset, Seymour Martin (eds.), *Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989, pp. 266-303, at p.296. Also see Han, Ki-shik, "Development of Parties and Politics in Korea (I) & (II)," *Korea Journal*, 14 (9 & 10), 1974, pp. 37-50 & pp. 41-57.

Undoubtedly, there may also have been other issues, other than the question of legitimacy that was emphasised by Ahn as well as the others,[20] that have shaped the votes in the long-run. Some issues like anti-Communism, which had been excessively used and abused by the Rhee government and by the military dominant regimes, for example, shaped the pattern of political competition itself: virtually, no parties on the left have existed since the Korean War. As a result, electoral choices in substance have been limited to choices among parties of the right and component factions. Other issues, like modernisation through industrialisation, which was initiated by President Park with a general acceptance of the public in 1960s, however, eventually resulted in controversy over problems of inequality between the elite and the masses, the urban and the rural dwellers, the rich and the poor, and between regions, in spite of the remarkable achievements of industrial efforts in enhancing the nation's overall economic output.

In general, government parties have tended to stress the importance of anti-Communism along with the prime value of national security and political stability, and economic growth, whereas opposition parties have tended to emphasise the realisation of liberal democracy, respect for human rights and mass welfare. As past election outcomes indicate, government parties have dominated in elections by utilising those resources which they can deploy against the attack

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[20] For example, Yang, Sung-chul reviewed the politics of Korea relying solely on the question of legitimacy. See his "Where Does South Korean Political Development Stand Now?: From Legitimacy Crisis to Democratisation Trial," *Korea & World Affairs*, 23(1), 1994, pp. 5-22.

of opposition parties concerning alleged authoritarian ascendancy. However, those contending issues may have varied from occasion to occasion in terms of issue priority, and the degree of their intensity in the competition may have also varied, depending on the political process. A detailed discussion on the patterns of party competition in the elections is given in the following section, focusing on the continuity and change of these contending issues.

4. Patterns of Party Competition and Voters' Responses

From Liberation to the Korean War (1945 - 1953).

In this period, following the process of separate nation-building in the South and North, and the war between the two Koreas, the ideology of anti-Communism became the dominant rhetoric of the Rhee government. The ideological clash between right-wing nationalists and communists became irreconcilable as the country's temporary partition turned into a permanent division between two hostile political systems, and eventuated in the three years of civil war, which solved nothing but brought ruin to both halves of the country. Thereafter, party politics in South Korea have been largely limited to power struggles among parties of the right, devoid of conflicting ideological contention.

Table 1-2. The National Assembly and Presidential Election Results (1948-1952)

	National Assembly				Presidential	
	1948		1950		1952	
Party	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Candidate	Votes
Major Rhee's Group					Rhee Syngman	74.6 %
NSRRKI	26.1 %	55	6.8 %	14		
KNP	--	--	9.7 %	24		
KDP (DNP in 1950)	13.5 %	29	9.8 %	24	Lee Shi-young	10.9 %
Minor Parties	20.1 %	31	10.8 %	22	Cho Bong-am	11.4 %
Independents	40.3 %	85	62.9 %	126	Others	3.1 %
Total	100 %	200	100 %	210	Total	100 %

Note: NSRRKI - The National Society for Rapid Realisation of Korean Independence (the National Association in 1950); KNP - The Korean National Party; KDP - The Korean Democratic Party; and DNP - The Democratic National Party.

Source: Chungang-son'go-kwalli-wiwonhoe (Central Election Management Committee), *Taehanmin'guk Son'go Sa (Election History of the Republic of Korea)*, Vol.1, Seoul: Central Election Management Committee, 1973.

The momentum for rightist parties in gaining a political hegemony over other political groups - especially over leftist groups - came with a disagreement on the issue concerning the Moscow accords, which arranged a four-power trusteeship of Korea for up to five years and assigned the US and the USSR to establish a unified provisional Korean government. The left-wing groups' sudden reversal from the anti-trusteeship stance, which had originally been advocated by all political groups as one might have expected in a country that had just been liberated from almost four decades of foreign rule, became a rallying point for the right in their denunciation of the left. With the progressively deteriorating relationship between the US and the USSR, both the Soviet and the American occupation forces had moved in the direction of establishing two Korean states by sponsoring separate Korean advisory and

administrative bodies in Seoul and Pyongyang. The worsening relationship between the two super powers undoubtedly prompted the American shift to support the nationalist right-wing groups in South Korea.

Although the trusteeship project soon collapsed following Korean opposition, by late 1947 no other effective step had been taken to produce any working arrangement between the American forces south of the thirty-eighth parallel and the Soviet army north of the line. "The Korean question" was handed over to the newly formed United Nations, and the General Assembly adopted the American proposal for the establishment of a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) to supervise general elections leading to the formation of an independent Korean government.[21] The Soviet-occupied North, however, disputed the UN's authority to undertake such a mission and refused UNTCOK entry to the northern zone, mainly because of the fear that the larger population and American influence in the South would dilute Soviet strength in the North. The general election of the Constitutional Assembly was held on May 10, 1948 only in the southern part of the country, while nationalists like Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik, who did not accept the idea of founding a separate government in the south, withdrew from the election, and the communists and nationalists of the left orientation were eliminated from the contest. Two months later a constitution with a modified presidential system was adopted by the Assembly, and the Assembly elected Rhee Syngman as first

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[21] See Gordenker, Leon, "The United Nations, the United States Occupation and the 1948 Election in Korea," *Political Science Quarterly*, 73(3), 1958, pp. 426-450.

president of the Republic of Korea established on August 15, 1948. With the subsequent emergence of the Democratic People's Republic in the north, anti-Communism became an indisputable political ideology in the south.[22]

The ideology of anti-Communism was further intensified as a corollary of the Korean War (1950-53). In practice, the governments in power - especially the Rhee government and the military dominated regimes - often utilised anti-Communist ideology as a major device for political manipulation against their opponents. Anti-communism, which is in nature closely related to the national security issue, not only served as a device of governments for mass manipulation and mobilisation, but also limited the pattern of political competition itself. Indeed, as anti-Communism became an irrefutable national policy, the ideological dimension in political competition became a monolithic rather than a polarising one.[23] Even if an acute ideological cleavage could be found among the well-mobilised sectors of society, that is, among the politicians or intellectuals, there may have been an overall ideological consensus or "ideological apathy" among the mass public as a result of coercion, or acquiescence to the prevailing ideological climate.[24] Having been manipulated by the Rhee government, the national security issue relating to the ever-present threat from the north became

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[22] See Yang, Sung-chul, "Political Ideology in Korean Politics: Its Elements and Roles," in Kim, Se-jin and Cho, Chang-hyun (eds.), *Government and Politics of Korea*, Silver Spring: The Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1972, pp. 25-42.

[23] See ibid., 1972, p.32.

[24] See Han, Sung-joo, "Political Dissent in South Korea, 1948-1961," in Kim and Cho, *op.cit.*, 1972, pp. 43-69, at pp. 65-66. Also see Park, Sang-seek, "Legacy of the Korean War: Its Impact on South Korea's Domestic Politics, Economic Development, and Foreign Policy," *Korea & World Affairs*, 15(2), 1991, pp. 302-316.

one of the most important assets for the government parties - especially of the military dominated regimes - in mobilising the general public for their own purposes during politically significant occasions.

Eventually, however, the various right-wing forces that had stood behind Rhee to establish an anti-Communist regime in the south came to be divided into two opposing groups, as a result of a power struggle between Rhee and the Korean Democratic Party (KDP), which had emerged in September 1945 as a centre of those extreme right wing forces which were arranged against the rapidly rising "progressive" movement.[25] The conflict became sharp when the Democratic National Party (the former KDP) submitted a constitutional amendment bill calling for a parliamentary system of government in place of the existing presidential system of government.[26] The bill was voted down and the conflict then subsided because the Korean War broke out. In November 1951, one year before the termination of Rhee's presidency, Rhee's administration submitted a constitutional amendment bill calling for direct, popular election of the president because Rhee had little or no chance of re-election by the Assembly, following the National Assembly election of May 1950, in which Rhee's supporters won only one-fourth of the seats (see Table 1-2). The bill was also rejected, in spite of Rhee's effort in organising the Liberal Party (LP) in 1951 for parliamentary maneuvering. Political confrontation centring around the

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[25] See Oh, Byung-hun, "Trial of Liberal Democracy in Korea," *Koreana Quarterly*, 9(1), 1967, pp. 21-40.
[26] See Pak, Chi-young, *op.cit.*, 1980, pp. 88-93.

issue of a constitutional amendment became intense, but the bill prescribing popular election of the president was finally adopted only by resorting to irregularities in the wartime provisional capital of Pusan.[27] In the 1952 Presidential election, Rhee won another presidential term receiving 74.6 per cent of the popular vote without major opponents.

Rhee Syngman's One-Man Rule to the Military Government (1954 - 1963).

Rhee enjoyed considerable popularity as an independence hero and statesman who led the right-wing forces against the leftist groups, and as a key contributor to the establishment of the Republic of Korea during the chaotic post-Liberation period. Without viable political rivals Rhee had won his presidencies by substantial margins, sometimes resorting to election riggings and government interference.[28] Political figures like Yo Un-hyong and Kim Ku had been assassinated during the nation-building period, major opposition candidates like Shin Ik-hui and Cho Byong-ok died during the election campaigns of 1956 and 1960, respectively, and Cho Bong-am, leader of the Progressive Party, who had received almost 30 per cent of the popular vote for the presidency in 1956 (see Table 1-3), was subsequently convicted of treason and executed. However, Rhee

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[27] See *ibid.*, pp. 93-111.

[28] See, for a detailed analysis on the electoral irregularities of the Rhee regime, Yu, Suk-ran, "Son'go-ui Kwonwijuui-jok Unyong-gwa Yokkinung (Authoritarian Use of the Elections and its Functional Reversal)," in Han, Bae-ho (ed.), *Han'guk Hyondae Chongch'i-ron (Essays on the Contemporary Korean Politics), I*, Seoul: Nanam, 1990, pp. 373-394. Also see Han'guk-chongch'i-yon'guhoe (Research Association of Korean Politics), *Han'guk Chongch'i-Sa (Korean Political History)*, Seoul: Paeksan Sodang, 1990, pp. 285-306.

and his Liberal Party (LP), who again managed to amend the constitution, with irregularity, to permit his third term as president, encountered fierce opposition from those demanding the realisation of liberal democracy. Rhee's charisma and his appeal for "the people's unity" (around him) faded away. Triggered off by the election frauds evident in the fourth presidential (and vice-presidential) election of 1960, students revolted against the Rhee government in April, and finally brought to an end his one-man rule.

Table 1-3. The National Assembly and Presidential Election Results (1954-1960)

	National Assembly						Presidential	
	1954		1958		1960 *		1956	
Party	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Candidate	Votes
LP	36.8%	114	42.1%	126	2.7%	2	Rhee Syngman	70.0%
DP (DNP)	7.9%	15	34.2%	79	41.7%	175	Shin Ik-hui	--
Minor Parties	7.4%	7	2.2%	1	8.8%	7	Cho Bong-am	30.0%
Independents	47.9%	67	21.5%	27	46.8%	49		
Total	100 %	203	100 %	233	100 %	233	Total	100 %

Note: LP - The Liberal Party; and DP - The Democratic Party (the Democratic National Party in 1954).
* - In the Upper House election, the DP won 31 seats out of the total 58; the LP 4 seats; the minor parties 3 seats; and the remaining 20 seats were won by the Independents.

Source: Chungang-son'go-kwalli-wiwonhoe (Central Election Management Committee), *Taehanmin'guk Son'go Sa (Election History of the Republic of Korea)*, Vol.1, Seoul: Central Election Management Committee, 1973.

In this period, party politics became centred around the issue of constitutional amendment, and, further, realisation of democratic rules. The LP, which had been inaugurated by Rhee to fulfill the need to form his own force in parliament in 1951, was reorganised by Lee Ki-bung toward the end of 1953 for

the third National Assembly election of the following year. Since no president was allowed to serve more than two terms under the existing constitution, Rhee and his LP were determined to win a majority of more than two-thirds in the election for the passage of a constitutional amendment which would lift the limitation on the presidential term. In the 1954 election, the LP won 114 out of 203 seats against the disunited Democratic National Party (DNP) who won only 15 seats, a result mainly due to the administration's illegal interference in the elections. By recruiting some of the Independents, who had taken a considerable portion of the membership in parliament since the first Assembly, the LP introduced a bill amending the constitution, but the affirmative votes (135 out of 203) were one vote short of the two-thirds requirement. Originally the bill was declared defeated, but the LP dominated parliament reversed the earlier ruling on the next day, and declared the passage of the bill, mathematically rounding off the number of the votes.

This *sa-sa-o-ip* (rounding-off) constitutional amendment crisis not only had a demoralising effect on the LP as the voters were already disillusioned with its leadership, but also it led to the formation of a broad, unified opposition Democratic Party (DP) among the anti-Rhee legislators (except for Cho Bong-am's group) in 1955. Disenchantment with Rhee's administration became visible during the presidential election campaign of 1956: for example, the Democratic Party presidential candidate, "Shin Ik-hui's May 3 campaign speech on the shore of Han River .... attracted about 30,000 citizens, the largest audience ever

assembled in Korea for such a purpose."[29] Further, in spite of various election irregularities committed by the administration, the opposition DP strengthened its position in the National Assembly election of 1958: indeed, it was the first election in which a single opposition party won more than one-third of the seats. More significantly, the DP won over 80 per cent of the seats in the major cities of Seoul and Pusan, and gained almost 64 per cent of the seats in the other urban areas, while the LP showed strength only in the rural areas.[30] The breaches of the democratic rules of the game brought forward the issue of political democracy in political competition during this period: indeed, the issue of political democracy became a rallying point for opposition forces through to the end of the Fifth Republic.

In the face of the visible rise in popular support for the DP, the LP resorted to massive electoral fraud in the 1960 presidential election. Under the growing pressure of the opposition and the student uprising, and denunciation of the March 15 election as illegal, and null and void, Rhee was forced to announce his resignation, and a provisional caretaker government was formed. As Han pointed out, "the April uprising could be considered a revolutionary attempt by those with liberal-democratic orientations to destroy the 'power-dependent' pro-government forces allied with Syngman Rhee."[31] Under a new constitution

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[29] See Pak, Chi-young, op.cit., 1980, p.190.
[30] See Lee, Kap-yun, "Electoral Connection of an Authoritarian Political System: Republic of Korea (1948-85)," in *Political Leadership in a Changing Society*, Proceedings of the Second Asian-Pacific Political Science Association, Seoul, 1986, pp. 151-163, at p.155, Table 2.
[31] See Han, Sung-joo, *op.cit.*, 1974, p.138.

prescribing a parliamentary system of government, the fifth National Assembly election was held in July 1960, resulting in the overwhelming victory of the DP, which won 175 out of 233 seats in the lower House and gained 31 seats out of 58 in the upper House without major opponents (see Table 1-3).

With its indecisiveness and inconsistency regarding the punishment of former leaders of the Rhee regime, the Chang Myon government of the Second Republic, which was unable to form a stable and reliable parliamentary majority to back his post-revolutionary programs, not only alienated itself from many of its coalition partners who expected a revolutionary punishment of former pro-Rhee officials, but also failed to attract the loyalty of the former administrative and law enforcement apparatus such as the police to the new government because of its eventual punitive legislation against these agencies.[32] As a result, the Chang government not only lost its electoral and intellectual support, but also nullified the effectiveness of its administrative and law enforcement network. For its survival, perhaps at least one of these was needed. The short trial period of liberal democracy in Korea ended with the military coup on May 16, 1961. The military junta, under the leadership of General Park Chung-hee, formed a military council known as the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction which had virtually all governmental power, and suspended most political activities such as the operation of the political parties, pressure groups, and many newspapers.[33]

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[32] See *ibid.*, pp. 145-165.
[33] See Kim, Se-jin, op.cit., 1971, pp. 107-109.

Developmental Authoritarianism under Park Chung-hee (1963 - 1979).

After one and half years of direct rule, the military government drafted a revised constitution, and a national referendum ratified it on December 27, 1962. A presidential form of government was revived under the new constitution, in which the president was given greater power than that of the First Republic.[34] In the presidential election of October 1963, Park Chung-hee, head of the military junta since the coup in May 1961 and the nominee of the newly created Democratic Republic Party (DRP), won the presidency in competition against Yun Po-sun, the nominee of the major opposition party and former president of the Second Republic, by a narrow margin, gaining 46.6 per cent of the votes against the 45.1 per cent votes polled by Yun (see Table 1-4). In the following National Assembly election, Park's DRP easily gained a clear plurality with 33.5 per cent of the vote against fragmented opposition: the main opposition Civil Rule Party (CRP) won a mere 20.1 per cent of the vote. There may have been, however, strong sentiment against the military government's extra-constitutional take-over, especially among the urban voters.[35] Nonetheless, Park and the military revolutionaries were able to successfully constitute themselves within a civilian political framework by adding a new dimension of economic modernisation to politics on top of the national security issue.

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[34] See Kim, Se-jin, "National Government and Politics in South Korea," in Kim and Cho, *op.cit.*, 1972, pp. 70-90, at pp. 74-84.

[35] See Kim, C.I. Eugene, "Significance of the 1963 Korean Elections," *Asian Survey*, 4(3), 1964, pp. 765-773.

Table 1-4. The National Assembly and Presidential Election Results (1963-1978)

A: The National Assembly Elections

	1963		1967		1971		1973		1978	
Party	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats
DRP	33.5%	88(22)	50.6%	102(27)	48.8%	86(27)	38.8%	73	31.7%	68
NDP (CRP)	20.1%	27(14)	32.7%	28(17)	44.4%	65(24)	32.5%	52	32.8%	61
Minor Parties	46.4%	16 (8)	16.7%	1	6.8%	2	10.2%	2	7.4%	3
Independ-ents	--	--	--	--	--	--	18.6%	19	28.1%	22
Total	100%	131(44)	100%	131(44)	100%	153(51)	100%	146	100%	154

Note: The distribution of the national-list seats is in bracket; and the appointees are excluded. DRP - The Democratic Republican Party; and NDP - The New Democratic Party (the Civil Rule Party in 1963).

B: The Presidential Elections

1963		1967		1971	
Candidate	Votes	Candidate	Votes	Candidate	Votes
Park Chung-hee	46.6 %	Park Chung-hee	51.4 %	Park Chung-hee	53.2 %
Yun Po-son	45.1 %	Yun Po-son	40.9 %	Kim Dae-jung	45.3 %
Others	8.3 %	Others	7.7 %	Others	1.5 %

Source: Chungang-son'go-kwalli-wiwonhoe (Central Election Management Committee), *Taehanmin'guk Son'go Sa (Election History of the Republic of Korea)*, Vol.1-3, Seoul: Central Election Management Committee, 1973, 1973, and 1980.

In the 1967 presidential election, Park won a resounding victory over Yun, polling 51.4 per cent of the votes against 40.9 per cent. In the following National Assembly election, Park's DRP secured more than a two-thirds majority, polling 50.6 per cent of the votes, while Yun's New Democratic Party (NDP) - a new united opposition party formed to contest the 1967 elections - polled 32.7 per cent of the votes but gained a mere 45 (including 17 of the national-list seats) seats out of a total 175 (including 44 of the national-list seats). One of the

obvious contributing factors for the landslide victory of the incumbent Park administration and the ruling DRP was that they had successfully completed the first five-year economic development plan (1962 - 1966) and promised more for the future.[36] The organisational and financial superiority of the ruling party may have been another factor in its victory.[37]

By 1971, however, a new issue had emerged: the DRP amended the constitution to allow Park to stay in power for a third consecutive term, and, thus, the continuation of one-man rule (and official abuses and corruption associated with it) became a significant campaign issue for the opposition. Park's re-election in 1971 was confidently expected, given the remarkable economic achievements of the Park regime and the overwhelming approval recorded in the national referendum for the constitutional amendment in 1969. In the event, Park won, but with a slight margin of less than one million votes over the NDP candidate, Kim Dae-jung. Kim raised many contentious issues - Park's violation of democratic principle regarding his pursuit of the third term, corruption in administration, and the negative aspects of Park's economic development programs - and seems to have had a formula for solving problems by advocating his own programs of *Daejung Minjujuui* (mass democracy), *Daejung Kyongje* (mass economy), and *Daejung Pokchi* (mass welfare).[38] As a result, urban-rural

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[36] See Kim, C.I. Eugene, "Patterns in the 1967 Korean Elections," *Pacific Affairs*, 41(1), 1968, pp. 60-70.

[37] See ibid., pp. 69-70. Also see Han, Y.C., "Political Parties and Political Development in South Korea," *Pacific Affairs*, 42(4), 1969-70, pp. 446-464.

[38] See Lee, Chae-jin, "South Korea: Political Competition and Government Adaptation," *Asian Survey*, 12(1), 1972, pp. 38-45. Also see Kim, C.I. Eugene, "The Meaning of the 1971 Korean Elections: A Pattern of Political Development," *Asian Survey*, 12(3), 1972, pp. 213-224.

differences in political support became more salient than previously, amidst political mobilisation of the geographical bases of the candidates that was also sharpened.[39]

In the following National Assembly election, the ruling Democratic Republic Party experienced a major loss compared to previous ones, even though it was able to retain majority status, winning a total of 113 (including 27 of the national-list seats) seats out of the total 204 (including the 51 national-list seats). The opposition New Democratic Party won 44.4 per cent of the votes with 89 seats (including 24 of the national-list seats), while the ruling party gained 48.8 per cent of the votes. The main campaigning thrust of the opposition candidates was to convince voters of the need for a strong opposition in the Assembly to prevent another constitutional amendment to make Park a life-time president, a precedent remembered by the voters in the case of Rhee Syngman. The voters, who had not rejected Park's third term as president, showed a strong mood of protest against the Park regime.

Faced with declining electoral support, Park opted for a fundamental change in the rules of electoral contest. The initiation of a dialogue with North Korea for the first time in 20 years, which envisioned peaceful unification of the country, was a prelude to the change to the so-called *Yushin* system of government. In

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[39] See Kim, Jae-on, and Koh, B.C., "Electoral Behavior and Social Development in South Korea: An Aggregate Data Analysis of Presidential Elections," *The Journal of Politics*, 34(3), 1972, pp. 825-859.

October 1972, Park imposed martial law, dissolved the Assembly, banned all political activities, and prepared for a new constitution, invoking the need to strengthen the domestic system in light of the changing situation both at home and abroad - that is, dialogue with North Korea and the changing mood of the Cold War. Under the new constitutional order, which was approved by a national referendum held under martial law, the president was to be indirectly elected by a rubber-stamp electoral college, which assured Park of indefinite power, and the Assembly would be under the control of the governing party. The party would most likely command a two-thirds majority since the constitution also gave the president the power to hand-pick one-third of the Assembly membership, and also adopted a single-ballot plurality formula in two-member districts for the remaining two-thirds of the contested Assembly seats, which would guarantee the governing party at least one seat in every district.

The 1972 *Yushin* system all but ensured the perpetuation of Park's rule and curtailed civil rights, and elections under it, therefore, lost their conventional meaning. In the 1973 National Assembly election, the ruling Democratic Republic Party won exactly one half of the contested seats with 38.8 per cent of the votes, but was in a position to control exactly two-thirds of the Assembly members because of the one-third appointed members. In the 1978 Assembly election, the ruling party won only 31.7 per cent of the votes but controlled nearly two-thirds of the seats - however, the main opposition NDP, which polled 32.8 per cent of the votes, outperforming the ruling party by 1.1 per cent, claimed

a victory. In spite of some factors which tended to buttress Park's position - that is, the increasing economic prosperity, and the periodic incidents provoked by North Korea (and skillfully manipulated by the government to generate a genuine fear among the public) - the *Yushin* system eventually resulted in the alienation of many segments of society because of its coercive characteristics, and ~~was finally~~ ended ~~by~~ with the sudden and violent death of Park.

Quasi-Authoritarianism under Chun Doo-hwan (1980 - 1987).

A new junta of army officers led by Major General Chun Doo-hwan came to power in the course of a ten-month period following Park's assassination. The junta demonstrated its willingness to use military force against its own citizens, as witnessed in the suppression of the popular uprising in Kwangju. Chun adopted a similar system of government to the *Yushin* regime: the president was to be indirectly elected by an electoral college of some five thousand delegates although serving for only one term of seven years; and the ruling party would secure a majority in the Assembly with only about one-third of the popular votes, by allocating two-thirds of the proportional seats, which consisted of one-third of the total Assembly seats, to the party gaining the most votes - most likely the ruling party. The single-ballot plurality formula in a two-member district was also maintained, which meant that one party could hope to capture at best one of the two seats.

Chun's Fifth Republic, however, lacked the legitimacy it needed from the beginning: not only did Chun come to power by military coup (and was then confirmed in his presidency by an easily manipulable electoral college), but he presided during the Kwangju Incident, which cost several hundred lives and which continued to obstruct the legitimacy he sought throughout the Fifth Republic. Although Chun's new Democratic Justice Party (DJP) gained about 54.7 per cent of the seats in the 1981 Assembly elections (see Table 1-5), slightly less than the 55.5 per cent maximum possible for one party,[40] the legitimacy of Chun's regime seemed not to be established because former politicians who could challenge his regime, including the three Kims (Kim Dae-jung, Kim Young-sam and Kim Jong-pil), had been banned from political activity. Apart from coercive measures, perhaps the only thing that sustained Chun's regime was his repeated pledge to turn the office over to an elected successor in February 1988. As Eckert and others have pointed out, "the apparent assumption of Chun and his group was that continued economic growth, coupled with a few, largely cosmetic, political changes to distinguish the Fifth Republic from the Yusin (sic) system, would in time allow the new regime to gain public acceptance, just as Park's pre-Yusin regime had come to be more widely accepted in the late 1960's."[41]

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[40] If a party elects one of its members in every two-member district, it yields one-third of the total Assembly seats. With allocation of the national-list seats (two-ninths of the total - i.e., two-thirds of the one-third national-list seats), the party would be able to produce a five-ninths majority in the Assembly.

[41] See Eckert, Carter J., Lee, Ki-baik, Lew, Young-ick, Robinson, Michael, and Wagner, Edward W., *Korea Old and New: A History*, Seoul: Ilchokak, 1990, p.377.

Table 1-5. The National Assembly Election Results (1981-1985)

	1981		1985	
Party	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats
DJP	35.6 %	90 (61)	35.3 %	87 (61)
DKP	21.6 %	57 (24)	19.7 %	26 (9)
KNP	13.3 %	18 (7)	9.2 %	15 (5)
NKDP	--	--	29.3 %	50 (17)
Minor Parties	18.8 %	8	3.3 %	2
Independents	10.7 %	11	3.2 %	4
Total	100 %	184 (92)	100 %	184 (92)

Note: The distribution of the national-list seats is in bracket.
DJP - The Democratic Justice Party; DKP - The Democratic Korean Party; KNP - The Korean National Party; and NKDP - The New Korean Democratic Party.

Source: Chungang-son'go-kwalli-wiwonhoe (Central Election Management Committee), *Che 11 Dae Kukhoeuiwon Son'go Sanghwang (The 11th National Assembly Election Proceedings)*, 1981; and *Che 12 Dae Kukhoeuiwon Son'go Ch'ongram (The 12th National Assembly Election Proceedings)*, Seoul: Central Election Management Committee, 1985.

The outcome of the 1985 National Assembly election disproved this assumption. Chun's DJP retained its predominant position by polling the largest share of votes (35.3 per cent), but the New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP), formed barely one month before the election by politicians newly liberated from the ban on campaigning, outperformed both of the established opposition parties, and polled only 6 per cent less than that of the ruling party. More significantly, the NKDP outperformed the DJP in urban areas by a wide margin, as in the previous "crucial" elections in which the legitimacy of the existing regime had been put into question.[42] The strong showing of the NKDP - which campaigned for democratisation, including the demand for constitutional revision to permit

[42] See Koh, B.C., "The 1985 Parliamentary Election in South Korea," *Asian Survey*, 25(9), 1985, pp. 883-897.

direct presidential elections - was viewed as an indirect referendum that underscored the illegitimacy of the Chun regime.

Toward the end of Chun's presidency, constitutional amendment seemed to be inevitable, but the DJP and the NKDP were poles apart regarding the form of government it would have. While the ruling party pressed for a parliamentary form of government, which might perhaps have allowed the perpetuation of its rule, the opposition party preferred a presidential system, as it was confident of its capacity to defeat the ruling party in a direct presidential election.[43] Amidst the dispute over the issue, on April 13, 1987, Chun suspended any further public debate on amending the constitution to permit direct presidential elections in 1987. An indirect election of the president by an electoral college would certainly have guaranteed Chun transferring power to Roh Tae-woo, who was, on June 10, nominated as the DJP's presidential candidate. From the day of Roh's nomination large-scale mass demonstrations were mobilised throughout the country's major cities, until Roh came up with an eight-point program of democratic reform including an endorsement of direct presidential elections on June 29.

[43] See Lee, Man-woo, *The Odyssey of Korean Democracy: Korean Politics*, 1987-1990, New York: Praeger, 1990, pp. 19-43.

Democratisation and Onwards (1987 - 1992).

In December 1987, the practice of direct presidential election was restored after an interval of 16 years, and this led to the first peaceful transfer of power achieved by means of election. Heading toward the election and in spite of repeated public pledges to work together and numerous negotiations, the main opposition party was divided into the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP), led by Kim Young-sam, and the Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD), headed by Kim Dae-jung. Kim Jong-pil, a former Prime Minister under the Park regime, also ran for election as a candidate of the New Democratic Republic Party (NDRP). In this election, Roh Tae-woo, a former general and a leader of the ruling DJP hand-picked by President Chun, won his one-term five-year presidency by gaining 36.6 per cent of the votes, ahead of the two opposition leaders, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, who together polled 55.1 per cent of the votes (see Table 1-6). Had the opposition camp agreed to a single candidacy, Roh's victory would have been unlikely without resorting to massive election fraud.[44] Although there had been instances of vote-buying, intimidation, and fraud, the election results were generally accepted by the public - the opposition's defeat was attributed to the failure of a single candidacy between the two Kims.

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[44] Lee Man-woo, however, articulated a different view: "The victory of the opposition depended upon which Kim was to emerge as the single opposition candidate," and "only Kim Young-sam, broadly supported except in the Cholla provinces, had any chance of winning." See *ibid.*, p.46.

Table 1-6. The National Assembly and Presidential Election Results (1987-1992)

A: 1987-1988

1987 Presidential		1988 National Assembly		
Candidate	Votes	Party	Votes	Seats
Roh Tae-woo	36.6 %	DJP	34.0 %	87 (38)
Kim Young-sam	28.0 %	RDP	23.8 %	46 (13)
Kim Dae-jung	27.1 %	PPD	19.3 %	54 (16)
Kim Jong-pil	8.1 %	NDRP	15.6 %	27 (8)
Others	0.2 %	Minor Parties	2.5 %	1
		Independents	4.8 %	9
Total	100 %	Total	100 %	224 (75)

Note: The distribution of the national-list seats is in bracket.
DJP - The Democratic Justice Party; RDP - Reunification Democratic Party; PPD - Party for Peace and Democracy; and NDRP - The New Democratic Republican Party.

B: 1992

1992 National Assembly			1992 Presidential	
Party	Votes	Seats	Candidate	Votes
DLP	38.5 %	116 (33)	Kim Young-sam	42.0 %
DP	29.2 %	75 (22)	Kim Dae-jung	33.8 %
UNP	17.4 %	24 (7)	Chung Ju-young	16.3 %
Minor Parties	3.4 %	1	Others	7.9 %
Independents	11.5 %	21	(Park Chan-jong)	(6.4%)
Total	100 %	237 (62)	Total	100 %

Note: The distribution of the national-list seats is in bracket.
DLP - The Democratic Liberal Party; DP - The Democratic Party; and UNP - The Unification National Party.

Source: Chungang-son'go-kwalli-wiwonhoe (Central Election Management Committee), *Che 13 Dae Taet'ongryong Son'go Ch'ongram (The 13th Presidential Election Proceedings)*, 1987; *Che 13 Dae Kukhoeuiwon Son'go Ch'ongram (The 13th National Assembly Election Proceedings)*, 1988; *Che 14 Dae Kukhoeuiwon Son'go Ch'ongram (The 14th National Assembly Election Proceedings)*, 1992; and *Che 14 Dae Taet'ongryong Son'go Ch'ongram (The 14th Presidential Election Proceedings)*, Seoul: Central Election Management Committee, 1992.

Most striking was that the pattern of vote distribution showed an extreme regional bias: each of the candidates performed well exclusively in the regions with which they had a tie. The main dimension in the contest shifted from that of the oppositions' demand for the realisation of democratic rules versus the

government's pledge for stability, to the highly controversial and essentially emotional regional one. Several reasons can be cited for this extreme regional distribution of votes. However, one of the most obvious was that the potential rivalry among regions became highly visible during the campaign due to the fact that the candidates had distinctive and different regional ties (see Chapter 5 for a detailed analysis). This pattern of regional differences in electoral competition persisted in the following National Assembly election.

In the 1988 National Assembly election, however, the ruling DJP failed to secure a simple majority in parliament, winning only 125 seats of the total 299, with 34.0 per cent of the vote. Kim Dae-jung's PPD came second, winning 70 seats with 19.3 per cent of the vote, and Kim Young-sam's RDP won 59 seats, gaining 23.8 per cent of the vote. Kim Jong-pil's NDRP also won 35 seats with 15.6 per cent of the vote. This so-called *yoso yadae* (small governing party, big opposition) shattered the past pattern of executive dominance over the parliament, which had usually been achieved by governments controlling a comfortable majority in parliament. However, this *yoso yadae* did not last for long. At the end of 1989, two opposition parties, Kim Young-sam's RDP and Kim Jong-pil's NDRP, merged with the governing party, forming the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP). After this merger, some changes in the political system were expected, such as the adoption of a parliamentary based executive which could be a method of maintaining the political power of the majority ruling

coalition, but these changes were not realised, even though the ruling party commanded almost two-thirds of the parliamentary members.

In the March 1992 National Assembly elections, the ruling DLP again failed to secure a simple majority, this time by one seat, winning 149 out of total 299 seats with 38.5 per cent of the vote. Only by recruiting some of the 21 Independent parliamentary members, who together polled about 12 per cent of the vote, did the ruling party come up with a simple majority in the 14th National Assembly. In this election, the Democratic Party (DP), a coalition of the former PPD and the former RDP members who rejected joining the ruling coalition, emerged as a main opposition, winning 97 seats with 29.3 per cent of the vote. The newly-formed Unification National Party (UNP), led by a big businessman Chung Ju-young, also faired unexpectedly well gaining 31 seats with 17.4 per cent of the vote. This election revealed that any ruling party would experience difficulty winning a clear majority in parliament once the institutional distortion of allocating assembly seats had been removed. In this election, Korean voters may have delivered a protest vote against the DLP for its arbitrary decision to form a majority ruling coalition.

The December 1992 presidential election was set to choose the first civilian president in 31 years. Kim Young-sam as the ruling Democratic Liberal Party candidate promised "reforms in stability," while Kim Dae-jung called for "grand reconciliation" so as to moderate his radical image as a former dissident and to

overcome his concentrated but limited support from the Cholla region and its environs. Chung Ju-young, as a successful businessman and the founder of the Hyundai Group, tried to portray himself as an "economic president." With no difference on policies, for all agreed on the need for democratisation, revitalising the economy, and reunification with North Korea, Kim Young-sam won the presidency with 42 per cent of the votes over Kim Dae-jung, who polled 33.8 per cent, and Chung, who polled 16.3 per cent. The victory by Kim Young-sam indicates that a majority of the Korean voters preferred 'stability' to 'change.' Underneath the surface, however, regional sentiment, or regional antagonism to be specific, may have played a decisive role as indicated by the pattern of regional distribution in electoral support. Kim Dae-jung outperformed Kim Young-sam only in his stronghold Cholla region, and ran closely with Kim Young-sam in the neutral regions of Seoul and Kyonggi; further, Kim Dae-jung even came behind Chung Ju-young in the rival Kyongsang region, and ran closely with Chung in the neutral Chungchong region (see Table 5-1 in Chapter 5).

In short, party competition in Korea since its establishment in 1948 could be summarised as a contest between a dominant government party and an anti-government party. The government party has been successful in maintaining its power through electoral or other means, even though the opposition parties' challenge has been more than a marginal one, especially when the legitimacy issue was at stake. However, the voters' response has not been, by and large,

uniform: after all, the ruling party under the authoritarian governments may have been most successful in winning support from the less sophisticated voters, and the degree of their support has also fluctuated depending on political situations of the time, as reviewed above. In the next chapter, the propositions which have been developed to explain the patterns of voter alignment in the elections prior to 1987 will be reviewed. Presumably, the voters' response in the elections held after the democratisation of the political system in 1987 may be different from the previous ones, given the changes in the rules of party competition. Leaving this question to be tested with empirical data in the following chapters, the propositions developed for the explanation of the observed patterns of voter alignment - most notably, the *yoch'on yado* (government rural, opposition urban) phenomenon and regional voting - will be reviewed.

Chapter 2. Political Cleavages and Propositions: A Review

1. Introduction

In any political entity, it may not be natural to assume a complete homogeneity of its constituents. If there ~~is~~ are the rich, then there ~~is~~ are the poor; if there are whites, then there are coloureds; if there ~~is~~ are the religious, then there ~~is~~ are the non-religious; if there are the urbanities, then there are the rural dwellers; and so forth. There may be many kinds of "haves" and "have-nots," or various ranges in between.[1] However, it may be an error to assume that all cleavages or differences in a society have political significance. Whether a cleavage in a society comes to hold political relevance may be largely dependent upon its structure as well as the process by which it is politicised.

In their classical study on the development of European party systems and voter alignments, for example, Lipset and Rokkan identified four main cleavages that were produced by the two waves of "National" and "Industrial" revolutions accompanied by extension of the suffrage: that is, the two cleavages of "Subject vs Dominant Culture" and "Church vs Government" were a corollary of the

[1] For example, Rae and Taylor broadly define a cleavage as "a family of sets of individuals," including cleavages of opinion and behaviour as well as societal cleavages. See Rae, Douglas W., and Taylor, Michael, *The Analysis of Political Cleavages*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970, pp. 23-24.

conflicts over the mobilisation by the "nation-builders" during the nation-building period.[2] The Industrial Revolution also produced two more cleavages, "Primary vs Secondary Economy" and "Workers vs Employers, Owners," that were formulated by conflicting economic interests within the nation. The established party alternatives, which nonetheless varied across nations in terms of which set or sets they have developed for their national party systems, according to Lipset and Rokkan, "have remained roughly the same through decades of subsequent changes in the structural conditions of partisan choice."[3] Since then, two more waves of social change - that is, the emergence of the welfare state and post-industrialism - have been identified. This resulted in the new "sectoral" and "value" cleavages, respectively, but only adding the new cleavages to the old cleavages, rather than replacing the old ones, for their political significance.[4]

The formation of political cleavages in Korea, however, took a quite different path compared to that of European experience. That is, the latent cleavages that might be produced by the nation-building process or by the industrialisation were not politicised. One of the reasons for lacking the "Subject vs Dominant Culture" cleavage in the political sphere may be that nationalist sentiments were far too great to materialise any movements against mobilisation of the nation-builders, especially during the years of post-liberalisation. One

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[2] See Lipset, Seymour Martin, Rokkan, Stein, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction," in Lipset and Rokkan (eds.), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, New York: The Free Press, 1967, pp. 1-64.

[3] See ibid., p.52.

[4] See, for a review of the new cleavages, Harrop, Martin, and Miller, William L. Miller, *Elections and Voters: A Comparative Introduction*, London: Macmillan, 1987, pp. 193-202.

might expect nationalist sentiments to be higher in a nation just being liberated from foreign occupation. Further, ethnic and linguistic homogeneity may have posed a limitation for "cultural" resistance against the "dominant" nation-builders. If there had been any movement against the dominant nation-builders, it was rather a movement toward the unification of the two Koreas which took the separate path of nation-building. Nor had the cleavages of a "Church vs Government" kind emerged, as there had been no such vested institutions that might have claimed a functional role in the state.

The conflicts over economic interests in the "commodity" or "labour" markets have also yet to be politicised. Although the rapid process of state-sponsored industrialisation since the 1960s, which transformed Korean society from a basically agrarian economy into an industrialised one, may have resulted in stratification of society into various social groups which share a common economic interest, no class-based parties of political significance have emerged so far. Above all, the parties based on working-class interest have not been able to exist because of society's ideological rigidity on the left-right continuum, as a result of the distinct ideological foundation of the two Koreas.

What, then, are the main cleavages that shape Korean voting patterns? One of the most often cited is the "urban vs rural" cleavage that has been reflected in differences of partisan support. That is, there has been a long-observed tendency for rural residents to give their support more to the government party, while

urban residents have been more likely to support the opposition. This was commonly called the *yoch'on yado* (government-rural, opposition-urban) phenomenon. Another cleavage that has attracted particular attention, especially since the presidential election of 1987, is a regional one. The voters' inclination to support a party which shares the same regional traits has become an irrefutable pattern in party competitions since 1987. These are, however, in essence a description of the patterns of vote distribution, observed most often at the aggregate level, thus posing limitations on the understandings of the nature of these cleavages. Several studies since the 1960s, nonetheless, have developed propositions for the explanation of the observed phenomena. A review of the propositions is given in the following sections.

2. The *Yoch'on Yado* Phenomenon

Although there were variations in defining urban and rural areas and/or in the calculations of government/opposition party votes among the researchers, most of the studies agreed that the *yoch'on yado* phenomenon or the urban/rural difference in electoral support had been evident in most of the elections - regardless of whether an election had been presidential or parliamentary - from the mid-1950s to the present. For example, with a five-scale typology of the urban-rural continuum for the major opposition party votes based on two party

calculation, Kim and Koh confirmed the *yoch'on yado* phenomenon, that "the government party relied heavily on rural votes while the opposition thrived in the cities," in the presidential elections from 1963 to 1971;[5] Kim and Choe also observed "statistically significant differences" in the two major party votes among the voters in the four-scale types of the urban and rural districts in the National Assembly elections held between 1963 and 1978;[6] and Lee Kap-yun came up with three types of electoral districts, "government dominant rural districts, neutral urban districts, and opposition dominant metropolitan (Seoul and Pusan, and the two largest cities) districts," by looking at the votes for the ruling and the main opposition party distributed by a three-scale typology of the urban-rural continuum in the National Assembly elections from 1954 to 1985.[7]

This pattern was also evident in the recent elections: for example, Kim Hong-nack observed that "the level of support for the government party was inversely related to the degree of urbanisation," while "the opposition parties as a whole" performed better in the more urbanised districts in the 1988 National Assembly election.[8] In the 1992 National Assembly election, Park Chan-wook found that "the more rural the electoral district is, the more support for the

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[5] See Kim, Jae-on, and Koh, B.C., "Electoral Behavior and Social Development in South Korea: An Aggregate Data Analysis of Presidential Elections," *The Journal of Politics*, 34(3), 1972, pp. 825-859, at p.845.

[6] See Kim, Hong-nack, and Choe, Sun-ki, "Urbanization and Changing Voting Patterns in South Korean Parliamentary Elections," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, 6(3), 1987, pp. 31-50, at p.40.

[7] See Lee, Kap-yun, "Electoral Connection of an Authoritarian Political System: Republic of Korea (1948-85)," in *Political Leadership in a Changing Society*, Proceedings of the Second Asian-Pacific Political Science Association, Seoul, 1986, pp. 151-163, at p.154.

[8] See Kim, Hong-nack, "The 1988 Parliamentary Election in South Korea," *Asian Survey*, 29(5), 1989, pp. 480-495, at p.488.

[ruling] DLP in the district; the more urban the electoral district is, the more support for the [main opposition] DP in the district."[9] A disruption of this pattern was also noted, however: in the 1992 presidential election, for example, Lee Nam-young found a "reverse relationship" between the degree of urbanisation and the opposition vote, which could have resulted from the regional voting patterns that became one of the most important factors since 1987.[10] That is, because the candidates' regional strongholds contained one or more metropolitan areas, the bivariate-level cross-tabulations may have no longer provided as neat a picture of the *yoch'on yado* phenomenon as before. With regionalism controlled, as Park Chan-wook found in the 1988 National Assembly election, urbanisation may have maintained "a degree of influence on the party vote."[11] If compared to the past - for example, Kim and Koh found a similar level of influence exerted by regionalism and urbanisation in the 1971 presidential election [12]- the influence of urbanisation may have been relatively smaller.

In order to explain the long-observed differences of electoral support between urban and rural areas, several different hypotheses, which can be categorised into three broad lines of thought, are developed. The first, in general, pays more attention to differences in the socio-political "composition" of voters

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[9] See Park, Chan-wook, "The Fourteenth National Assembly Election in Korea: A Test for the Ruling Democratic Liberal Party," *Korea Journal*, 33(1), 1993, pp. 5-16, p.7

[10] See Lee, Nam-young, "The Voter's Choice: The 14th Presidential Election of Korea," *Korea Journal*, 33(1), 1993, pp. 17-26, at p.20.

[11] See Park, Chan-wook, "The 1988 National Assembly Election in South Korea: The Ruling Party's Loss of Legislative Majority," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, 7(3), 1988, pp. 59-76, at pp. 70-71.

[12] See Kim and Koh, op.cit., 1972, pp. 847-851.

living in urban and rural areas; the second to the differences in party or other means of "organisational infrastructure" that garners the votes; and the third specifically depicts problems involved in the process of "urbanisation or modernisation" as a source of such differences in electoral support. One point on which the three all agree is the dependent variable, namely, the government-opposition cleavage.

The first two groups of hypotheses stem from the earlier studies by Yoon Chun-joo, in which he argues that the urban-rural difference in electoral support results from the gap in the degree of political development between the urban and the rural areas.[13] That is, in modernised urban areas "comprehensive voting" - that is, voting with a high degree of political interest and based on one's own opinions and judgment - is practised, whereas in rural areas "conformity voting," in obedience to the various kinds of extensive government interference, is more common.[14] This parallels the *tojo ch'on'go* (urban-low, rural-high) phenomenon in voting rates, which describes the tendency of a higher voting rate in the less modernised - thus, easily "mobilisable" by the government - rural areas.[15] In

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[13] See Yoon, Chun-joo, "Up-min-ui T'up'yohaengt'ae (Voting Behaviour of Up [Semi-rural] Inhabitants)," *Asea Yon'gu (Asiatic Study)*, 4(1), 1961, pp. 1-54; *Urinara-ui Son'go Shilt'ae (The Electoral Realities of Korea)*, Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1981; *Han'guk Chongch'i Ch'egye (Korean Political System)*, rev. ed., Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1987; and *T'up'yoch'amyo-wa Chongch'i-baljon (Electoral Participation and Political Development)*, enlgd. ed., Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1989.

[14] See *ibid.*, 1989, p.44.

[15] See Yoon, Chun-joo, *op.cit.*, 1981, pp. 337-446. Also see, for empirical studies supporting the mobilised voting hypothesis, Mo, Chong-ryn, Brady, David, and Ro, Jae-hun, "Urbanisation and Voter turnout in Korea: An Update," *Political Behaviour*, 13(1), 1991, pp. 21-32; and Kim, Chong-lim, "Political Participation and Mobilised Voting," in Kim, Chong-lim (ed.), *Political Participation in Korea: Democracy, Mobilisation and Stability*, Santa Barbara: Clio Books, 1980, pp. 119-141.

short, he views the *yoch'on yado* phenomenon as a corollary of different characteristics of urban and rural voters that, in turn, result in different reactions against mobilisation by the government which used to employ its administrative networks to garner political support.

The point regarding conformity or mobilised voting, which can successfully explain the government party's relative strength in rural areas, is further developed by Kim Chong-lim.[16] With his sample survey data, Kim observed that "there is a greater tendency toward mobilised voting in small cities, towns, and villages scattered throughout the provinces than in the most urbanised metropolitan centers."[17] He then argued that the level of individual modernity - which was likely to be lower in rural areas - was the key variable resulting in the phenomenon of mobilised voting.[18] As for the political orientations of the mobilised voters, he concluded that the usual beneficiaries of mobilised votes are the government party and its candidates, "because mobilised voting grows in part out of the submissive attitudes toward the sources of power, social and political,

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[16] See Kim, Chong-lim, op.cit., 1980.

[17] See ibid., p.128.

[18] See ibid., pp. 130-132. Also see, for the empirical studies linking political attitudes to socio-economic attributes, Lee, Young-ho, "The Korean People's Political Orientations: A Multivariate Analysis (I) & (II)," *Koreana Quarterly*, 13(1-2 & 3), 1971, pp. 11-30 & pp. 19-42; Choe, Hong-gi, "Urban-Rural Difference in Attitudes and Behaviour," *Korea Journal*, 12(2), 1972, pp. 4-13; Kim, Se-jin, "Attitudinal Orientations of Korean Workers," *Korea Journal*, 12(9), 1972, pp. 18-30; Lee, Hong-koo, "Political Culture and Political Development in Korea: An Aspect of the Political Behaviour of Low-Income Groups in Seoul," *Korea Journal*, 18(1), 1978, pp. 16-29; Lee, Nam-young, "The Democratic Belief System: A Study of the Political Culture in South Korea," *Korean Social Science Journal*, 7, 1985, pp. 46-89; Bark, Dong-suh, and Kim, Kwang-woong, *Han'gugin-ui Minju-chongch'i-uishik (Democratic Political Awareness of Korean)*, Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1987, pp. 81-114; and Han, Bae-ho, and Uh, Soo-young, *Han'guk-chongch'i-munhwa (Korean Political Culture)*, Seoul: Pobmunsa, 1987, pp. 71-144.

and furthermore, there is hardly any other institution more powerful than the government itself."[19] This contention was further demonstrated by Choi and Lee's analysis, which showed a strongly positive relationship between Park Chung-hee's electoral support and voter turnout in 1971 - a relationship which was even stronger in rural areas.[20] The implications of these propositions for political development in Korea are rather optimistic - as society became more modern, the social basis of mobilised voting would become eroded, thus "depriving the regime in power of its once-secure electoral advantage."[21]

Kim Chong-lim also pointed out the government party's illegal use of government apparatus as an "organisational" advantage in garnering votes: "In an authoritarian political system such as Korea's, the huge and powerful government machinery is often placed at the service of the government party during the election period."[22] While the government party may have been more effective in "mobilising" voters in the rural areas - where the level of political awareness is lower - by manipulating powerful government machinery and personnel during the election campaign, as Han Y.C. argued, the opposition party showed a poor showing in rural areas because of its weak organisational infrastructure in the rural areas, limiting its scope mainly to urban centres.[23]

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[19] See ibid., p.133.

[20] See Choi, Sung-il, and Lee, Chae-jin, "Environment, Policy, and Electoral Participation: A Comparison of Urban and Rural Areas," in Kim, Chong-lim (ed.), *Political Participation in Korea: Democracy, Mobilisation and Stability*, Santa Barbara: Clio Books, 1980, pp. 165-180, at p.178

[21] See Kim, Chong-lim, op.cit., 1980, p.138. Also see Yoon, Chun-joo, *op.cit.*, 1989, p.50.

[22] See ibid., p.133.

[23] See Han, Y.C., "Political Parties and Elections in South Korea," in Kim, Se-jin and Cho, Chang-hyun (eds.), *Government and Politics of Korea*, Silver Spring: The Research Institute on

For the explanation of the opposition's relative strength in urban areas, Kim and Koh hypothesised that the major source of urban-opposition alignment is the stronger democratic commitment of the urban residents.[24] Urban residents, who have better access to mass media and formal education, are less tolerant of violations or breaches of democratic norms, and thus become more anti-government in their political propensity. An indirect test of this hypothesis was provided by a study by Ahn, Kil and Kim, which pointed out that persons who are younger, have higher education, have more income, and who live in urban areas, are more likely to have democratic consciousness, but are less likely to be satisfied with the existing political system.[25] According to Kim, Kihl and Chung, "it is this feeling of alienation then that has been keeping them away from voting and their sense of political efficacy is shown not through the regular, institutionalised political channels, but often through the irregular, non-institutionalised political channels."[26] These citizens may have provided a social basis of political support - that is, either through regular or irregular channels - for the opposition parties which have stood for the liberalisation and democratisation of the political system.

Korean Affairs, 1972, pp. 127-147, at pp. 137-138. Also see his "Political Parties and Political Development in South Korea," *Pacific Affairs*, 42(4), 1969-70, pp. 446-464.

[24] See Kim and Koh, op.cit., 1972, p.847.

[25] See Ahn, Byong-man, Kil, Soong-hoom, and Kim, Kwang-woong, *Elections in Korea*, Seoul Computer Press, 1988, pp. 231-268.

[26] See Kim, C.I. Eugene, Kihl, Young-whan, and Chung, Doock-kyou, "Voter Turnout and the Meaning of Elections in South Korea," *Asian Survey*, 13(11), 1973, pp. 1062-1074, at p.1074.

Within the framework of "compositional" approach, another explanation for the *yoch'on yado* phenomenon was proposed by Lee Kap-yun.[27] For the explanation of this pattern, he identified satisfied and dissatisfied social groups and their distribution in districts. The main thrust of his reasoning was that an authoritarian government would be supported by those voters whose demands were easier to meet with its policies and programs, while opposition parties would be supported by those whose demands were more difficult.[28] Among social groups, the farmers and the upper and middle class were those most likely to be satisfied, as the authoritarian governments in Korea had been able to meet the social and economic demands of these groups, while the educated and the working poor were those most likely to be dissatisfied, as the demand for democracy by the educated were difficult to meet because of the nature of the successive authoritarian regimes, and the demands for income redistribution by the working class were difficult to meet because of the growth-oriented economic policy. Thus, he explained the dominant position of opposition parties in the metropolitan areas by "the fact that the metropolitan residents are highly educated, and the fact that economic inequality in the cities has been high," and that rural voters have opted for the government party because most of them are farmers and the local economy is relatively equal.[29] However, the empirical evidence of the political orientations of social groups ran counter to his proposition regarding the working class, as they tended to support the governing

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[27] See Lee, Kap-yun, op.cit., 1986, pp. 156-162.
[28] See ibid., pp. 156-160. Also see Park, Chong-min, "Authoritarian Rule in South Korea: Political Support and Governmental Performance," *Asian Survey*, 31(8), 1991, pp. 743-761.
[29] See ibid., p. 161.

party.[30] Perhaps, their relatively low level of education made the working class prone to mobilisation by the government, apart from the fact that there have been virtually no parties of significance putting their demands for a more equitable economy and for the rights of the working class, which could be easily taken as being left-oriented, the officially banned ideology.

For some others, the *yoch'on yado* phenomenon is more of a direct consequence of urbanisation, which has been accompanied by rapid industrialisation since the 1960s. For example, the more congested, anonymous and competitive socio-political settings of urban communities, according to Lee Chae-jin, "are likely to render the urban dwellers less susceptible to governmental and communal pressures for their electoral participation," and "the densely populated urban communities tend to produce more social and economic problems, including housing, transportation, water supply, and sanitation, which can in turn engender a sense of alienation and dissatisfaction among the urbanites;" thus "they may refrain from participating in voting procedures or from voting for the governing elites."[31] An empirical study by Choi and Lee using aggregate-level data for the 1971 presidential and National Assembly elections confirmed that the urban environmental settings exert, at least, a partial impact on voting choice, in addition to social compositional variables such as

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[30] See, for a recent study that found political propensities of the working class toward the government party, Sung, Kyong-ryung, "Han'guk-ui Sahoe-gyegup-kwa Chongdang-gujo (Social Class and Party System in Korea)," in Lee, Un-jin, and Kim, Sok-jun, et al., *Han'guk-ui Chongch'i-wa Son'gomunhwa (Politics and Electoral Culture in Korea)*, Seoul: Sahoe-munhwa Yon'guso, 1992, pp. 13-69.

[31] See Lee, Chae-jin, "Urban Electoral Participation in Korea," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 16(2), 1972, pp. 303-312, at p.308.

education and age, which depict the level of modernisation.[32] Similar results were found in a study by Kim and Choe: the level of urbanisation as well as modernisation in districts showed inverse correlations with government party support in the Assembly elections during the Park regime.[33]

Although a firm conclusion cannot be drawn from this review regarding the relative merits of these propositions, which needs an empirical test, it becomes clear that the urban-rural cleavage of electoral support has not been formulated by the conflicts over economic interests in the "commodity" market despite its phenomenal similarities with European experiences. Instead, the *yoch'on yado* phenomenon may result from the difference in political attitudes among the voters between urban and rural areas - the unit conveniently regarded as a measurement for various aspects of their socio-political life. What is needed most is, therefore, to explicitly explore linkages that may lead urban voters as opposed to rural residents to prefer parties in the opposition. For example, it may result from the difference in their democratic values, which may be largely attributable to education attainment or difference in political socialisation, as in much of Korean electoral history the democratisation of the political system has been the main dimension in electoral competition; or it may result from their difference in other value orientations that are attributable to other sources specifically associated with urbanisation or modernisation. In addition, there are

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[32] See Choi and Lee, op.cit., 1980, pp. 174-177. Also see, for a study pointing the relevance of urbanness in electoral turnout, Mo, Brady and Ro, op.cit., 1991, pp. 21-32.
[33] See Kim and Choe, op.cit., 1987, pp. 45-46 (Table 6 at p.43).

a few more number of further questions which need to be answered. For example, to what extent does this pattern of voter alignment exert its effect on the voter's choice? To put the issue differently, how strong is this relationship? Has this relationship fluctuated from time to time, especially in the period after the issue of political democratisation no longer holds its political significance? How strong is this relationship if compared to other relationships that may exist?

3. Regional Voting Patterns

Regional voting - namely, voters' tendency to favour the candidates from their region - has been a significant factor, especially in presidential elections. This pattern of regional voter alignment was first observed in the 1963 presidential election - Park Chung-hee fared better in his native Kyongsang regions, and in the adjacent Cholla regions, while Yun Po-sun was favoured by the provinces around Seoul. This was called as the *Nam-Puk* (South-North) phenomenon of votes, as Park performed better in the southern regions, compared to Yun's better performance in the northern regions (see Table 5-1 and Figure 5-1 in Chapter 5). In the 1967 presidential election, Park increased his command of electoral support in his Kyongsang region, while at the same time polling more electoral support across all the regions than 1963, except for declined support in Cholla. This pattern of regional voting was called as the *Tong-So* (East-West)

phenomenon of vote distribution - that is, the opposition candidate Yun fared better than Park in the western provinces including Seoul, Kyonggi, South Ch'ungch'ong, and Cholla (North and South), while Park fared better in the remaining eastern provinces of Kangwon, North Ch'ungch'ong, and Kyongsang (North and South), including Cheju. With the opposition candidate Kim Dae-jung, whose origin was Cholla, the pattern of regional voter alignment - namely, the *Tong-So* phenomenon - became more prominent in the 1971 presidential election: Kim Dae-jung won about two-thirds of the votes in the Cholla region, whereas Park won about three-fourths of the votes in the Kyongsang region (see Table 5-1).

Regional voting - which had not been visible but might have been latent as a result of the suspension of direct presidential elections - appeared again on an expanded scale in the 1987 presidential election and onwards. Each of the four major candidates running for the presidential office in 1987 happened to have a regional tie in the three major regions of Kyongsang (North, Roh Tae-woo, and South, Kim Young-sam), Cholla (Kim Dae-jung), Ch'ungch'ong (Kim Jong-pil, especially in South). Thus, the electoral contest in 1987 became a regional one, each candidate outperforming the others in his respective region. Moreover, the regional pattern of vote distribution was again reproduced in the 1988 National Assembly election. That is, the four major parties led by the four major candidates in 1987 won almost every seat in their respective regions. In the National Assembly elections of the past, however, no such regional patterns of

electoral support were apparent. For example, neither in the 1971 National Assembly election, held shortly after the regionalism driven presidential election,[34] nor in the recent 1985 National Assembly election,[35] had such patterns of regional voting emerged. In spite of the party mergers carried out first by the ruling and then by the opposition party in 1990, both of which may have aimed at widening their bases of support across regions, the pattern of regional voter alignment was a significant factor, if not a dominant one, in the subsequent National Assembly and presidential elections in 1992.

One plausible reason regarding the source of regional differences in electoral support, stems from studies that emphasise "cultural" aspects of Korean society. According to several socio-psychological studies, for example, Korean voters have maintained a strong sense of collective regional identity as a facet of political culture that values personal connections or ties in societal life.[36] The sense of regional attachment, which is susceptible to inter-generation transference

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[34] See, for a regional distribution of the votes, Kim, C.I. Eugene, "The Meaning of the 1971 Korean Elections: A Pattern of Political Development," *Asian Survey*, 12(3), 1972, pp. 213-224, at p.220 (Table 4). Also see his, "Patterns in the 1967 Korean Elections," *Pacific Affairs*, 41(1), 1968, pp. 60-70; and "Significance of the 1963 Korean Elections," *Asian Survey*, 4(3), 1964, pp. 765-773.

[35] See, for a distribution of the votes in the major cities of the regional hinterlands, Koh, B.C., "The 1985 Parliamentary Election in South Korea," *Asian Survey*, 25(9), 1985, pp. 883-897, at p.891 (Table 2).

[36] See Cho, Kyong-kun, "Chongch'i-sahoehwa-ui Shigag-eso-bon Yong-Honam-gan-ui Chiyokkamjong Shiljae-wa Akhwa-mit Ku-Haeso (Existence, Aggravation, and Dissolution of the Regionalism Between Kyongsang and Cholla: From the Perspective of Political Socialisation), *Haptong-Haksuldaehoe-Palp'yo-Nonmunjip (Proceedings of the Joint Conference of the Korean Political Science Association and the Association of Korean Political Scientists in North America)*, 7, 1987, pp. 107-126; and Kim, Chin-kuk, "Chiyokkamjong-ui Shilsang-gwa Ku-Haesobangan (The Reality of Regional Sentiment and Some Suggestions for Its Dissolution)," in Han'guk Shimrihakhoe (Korean Association of Psychology), ed., *Shimrihag-eso-bon Chiyokkamjong (Regional Sentiment from the Psychological Perspective)*, Seoul: Songwonsa, 1988, pp. 221-254.

as it is acquired during the early stage of socialisation, often results in in-group favouritism or out-group resentments.[37] Thus, it is their basic assumption that prejudice or stereotype against peoples in other regions, which became a symptom of regional collectivism in social life,[38] may have been a source of political mobilisation by politicians, turning it into inter-regional resentment or regional favouritism in the political sphere.[39] For example, Kim Chin-kuk argued that regional voting is an incremental manifestation of the regional antagonism. That is, voters' regional antagonism, stemming from in-group cohesion and out-group hostility, forms a basis of perceptions on regional interests - which could have been identified with the success of their regional candidate in electoral contests; and the perceptions, which produced the vicarious personalism based on regional traits and manifested in the electoral contests, in turn reproduce the regional antagonism on an expanded scale.[40]

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[37] See, for the empirical studies on regional prejudice and stereotypes, Lee, Chin-suk, "P'aldoin-ui Songgyok T'uksong-e-daehan Sonipkwannyom (Prejudice on the Characteristics of Localities in the Eight Regions)," *Sasanggye*, Dec. 1959, pp. 74-87; Kim, Chin-kuk, "Yong-Honam Taehaksaeng-ui Sanghogan Ch'aijigak Yon'gu (Kyongsang and Cholla University Students' Perceptions of the Differences between Kyongsang and Cholla People)," *Sahoe-shimrihak Yon'gu (Studies in Social Psychology)*, 1987, 3(2), pp. 113-147; and Kim, Hye-suk, "Chiyokkan Kojong-gwannyom-gwa P'yon'gyon-ui Shilsang (The Reality of Stereotypes and Prejudice among the Regions)," in Han'guk Shimrihakhoe (Korean Association of Psychology), ed., *Shimrihag-eso-bon Chiyokkamjong (Regional Sentiments Viewed from the Psychological Perspective)*, Seoul: Songwonsa, 1988, pp. 123-169.

[38] See, for a study hypothesising a reactionary process of social contacts as a source of regional conflict, Song, Pok, "Chiyokkaldung-ui Kujojok Yoin: Chiyog-idong-ui T'uksong-ul Chungshim-uro (Structural Factors in Regional Conflict: Centred on the Nature of Regional Migration)," in Han'guk Chongch'i Hakhoe (Korean Political Science Association), ed., *Han'guk Chongch'i-ui Minjuhwa (Democratisation of Korean Politics)*, Seoul: Pobmunsa, 1988, pp. 269-289.

[39] See Moon, Sok-nam, "Chiyokkyokch'a-wa Kaldung-e-gwanhan Han-Yon'gu: Yong-Honam, Tu Chiyog-ul Chungshim-uro (A Study of Regional Disparities and Conflicts: Focusing on the Two Regions of Kyongsang and Cholla)," *Han'guk Sahoehak (Korean Sociology)*, 18, 1984, pp. 184-209; Kim, Chin-kuk, op.cit., 1988, pp. 238-241; and Pae, Kyu-han, "Son'gogwajong-gwa Chiyokkamjong (Regionalism and Electoral Process)," in Han'guk Sahoehakhoe (The Korean Sociological Association), ed., *Han'guk-ui Chiyokchuui-wa Chiyokkaldung (Regionalism and Regional Conflict in Korea)*, Seoul: Songwonsa, 1989, pp. 307-330.

[40] See Kim, Chin-kuk., op.cit., 1988, p. 240.

Some others seek more direct sources of regionalism or regional voting. For example, Kim Kwang-soo argued that the Cholla voters' political propensity toward the opposition results from their perceptions of regional disadvantages, as the Cholla region, indeed, suffered most in the geographically skewed patterns of economic development and recruitment of the ruling elite since the 1960s, which favoured the Kyongsang region.[41] Regarding regional disparities in the economy and in the political recruitment of ruling elites, various evidence has been put forward. For example, Kim Man-heum analysed the regional pattern of recruitment of high-rank government officials, in which he found that the Kyongsang region had been over-represented in the administration, the legislature, and the military, especially since the government under Park Chung-hee.[42] Ahn Young-sik, and Kim Hyun-il, had drawn the same conclusion from their respective analyses of the regional pattern of recruitment in government controlled enterprises and the military elite.[43] Recent evidence also points to the same conclusion: among those who made public their personal assets - namely,

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[41] See Kim, Kwang-soo, "Han'guk-chongch'i-e-itsoso-ui Cholla-do (The Cholla Region in Korean Politics)," *Han'guk Chongch'i Hakhoebo (Korean Political Science Review)*, 20(1), 1986, pp. 85-107. Also see Kim, Man-heum, "Han'guk-ui Chongch'i-gyunyol-e-gwanhan Yon'gu: Chiyokkyunyol-ui Chongch'igwajong-e-daehan Kujojok Chopkun (A Study on Political Cleavage in Korea: Structural Approach to the Political Process of the Regional Cleavages)," Ph.D. Dissertation, Seoul National University, 1991.

[42] See ibid., pp. 80-95. Also see Kim, Yong-hak, "Elite Ch'ungwon-T'allag-ui Chiyokkyokch'a (Regional Disparities in the Recruitment or Exclusion of the Elite)," in Kim, Jong-chul and Choe Chang-jip, et al., *Chiyokkamjong Yon'gu (Studies of Regionalism)*, Seoul: Hagminsa, 1991, pp. 258-288.

[43] See Ahn, Yong-sik, "Kugyong-giopch'e Imwon Kun-Yongnam Ch'ulshin-i Manta (Those from Kyongsang and the Military Are Outnumbered in the Government Controlled Enterprises)," *Sindonga*, Jan. 1988, pp. 364-371; and Kim, Hyun-il, "Changgundul-ui Kohyang (Native Regions of the Generals)," *Wolgan Chungang*, Nov. 1988, pp. 144-158.

the high-rank public officials under the new Kim Young-sam government - those from Kyongsang doubled in number to those from Cholla, 36.9 per cent and 16.0 per cent, respectively.[44] Regional disparities in industry, income and infrastructure also became evident as a result of uneven economic development under the Park regime, which tended to follow a Seoul-Pusan axis, favouring the capital area and the Kyongsang region in the southeast, and neglecting the Cholla provinces of the southwest.[45] An empirical study on the voters' perceptions of economic disparities found that most Korean voters considered the government economic policies as a main reason for regional economic disparities, and this was even more acute among Cholla voters, while Kyongsang voters were more prone to seek other kinds of reasons.[46] According to this line of "functional" approach, the evident regional disparities became a major source in the sharpening of regionalism, which already existed in the form of regional identity based on the variance of regional attributes, thus resulting in regional voting. Above all, regional antagonism, resulting from regional disparities, may have been most acute between Kyongsang and Cholla, as Kyongsang can be easily equated with the most benefited region and the region of the government while

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[44] See *Donga Ilbo (Donga Daily Newspaper)*, 8 Sept. 1993)

[45] See Choe, Won-kyu, "Kyongjegaebal-ui Kyokch'a-wa Chiyokkamjong (Disparities in Economic Development and Regionalism)," in Kim Jong-chul and Choi Chang-jip, et al., *Chiyokkamjong Yon'gu (Studies of Regionalism)*, Seoul: Hagminsa, 1991, pp. 310-333; and Kim, Man-hem, op.cit., 1991, pp. 52-68. Also see, for a review of the socio-economic indices distributed by regions, Koh, Hung-hwa, *Charyo-ro Yokun Han'gugin-ui Chiyokkamjong (Regional Sentiments of Korean: Fabricated with Reference Materials)*, Seoul: Songwonsa, 1989, pp. 129-137.

[46] See Park, Yong-nam, "Onul-ui Chiyokkamjong Shilt'ae (Realities of Today's Regionalism)," in Kim Jong-chul and Choi Chang-jip, et al., *Chiyokkamjong Yon'gu (Studies of Regionalism)*, Seoul: Hagminsa, 1991, pp. 40-80, at pp. 68-69. Also see Kim, Man-heum, *Han'guksahoe Chiyokkaldung Yon'gu (A Study of Regional Conflict in Korean Society)*, Seoul: Hyondaesahoe Yon'guso, 1987, pp. 63 & 107.

Cholla is the region to have suffered most and the region of the opposition.[47] Indeed, four out of the five presidents (Park, Chun, Roh and Kim Young-sam) Korea has had so far were from the Kyongsang region, while Cholla has produced Kim Dae-jung, a main opposition figure who has fought with Park, Roh and Kim Young-sam, successively, but without success. The Kwangju incident in 1980, where many civilians were killed in the course of the new military junta's quelling of the popular uprising, may have contributed to the sense of collective discontent in the Cholla region.[48]

Regarding the question of to what extent regional attributes exert an impact on voting choice, several studies agreed that the effects of regional attributes are the single most important, if not dominant, variable in relation to other socio-economic attributes. In his aggregate-level analysis of voting choice in the 1988 National Assembly election, for example, Park Chan-wook found that "in determining the vote for each of the four parties, regionalism shows a much stronger influence on the party vote than does urbanisation."[49] A study by Shin Kwang-young also found the dominant effects of the variable of regional origin on voting in 1987 and in 1988, compared to the variables of class, age, gender, occupation and education.[50] In multivariate analysis of voting choice in the 1992

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[47] See Kim, Man-hem, op.cit., 1991, p.111.
[48] See Park, Yong-nam, op.cit., 1991, pp. 75-79.
[49] See Park, Chan-wook, op.cit., 1988, p. 70.
[50] See Shin, Kwang-young, "T'up'yohaengwui-wa Chiyokchuui (Voting Behaviour and Regionalism)," in Han'guk Sahoehakhoe (The Korean Sociological Association), ed., *Han'guk-ui Chiyokchuui-wa Chiyokkaldung (Regionalism and Regional Conflict in Korea)*, Seoul: Songwonsa, 1989, pp. 335-352.

presidential election, Park Chan-wook again found that native region, in addition to age, was one of the most important social background variables.[51]

Although there is little dispute about the substantial impact of regionalism on voting and the existence of regionalism, however, what is generally missing among the studies reviewed above is the linkage between them. That is, what are the most considered intervening variables when voters make the choice according to their regional ties? Is it perceived disadvantages or advantages, or is this choice an emotional one? If both factors operate, which one is dominant? What are the implications of this regional pattern of voter alignment for political development in Korea? These are questions which need to be explored to draw a firm conclusion about the nature of regional voting. The emergence of regionalism as a political factor, in addition to the political cleavage of urban-rural, is perhaps a lagged but clear sign in the development of new political cleavages in Korean society, as Yang Sung-chul put it two decades ago: "by institutionalising the north-south political issues of the 40's and 50's (anti-communism and the unification formula), attention was diverted to differences within the south rather than the problems between the south and the north."[52]

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[51] See Park, Chan-wook, "Korean Voters' Candidate Choice in the 1992 Presidential Election: A Survey Data Analysis," *Korea & World Affairs*, 17(3), 1993, pp. 432-458, at pp. 446-447 (Table 1). Also see, for a similar finding for the voting choice in 1988, Lee, Kap-yun, "T'up'yohaengt'ae-wa Minjuhwa (Voting Behaviour and Democratisation)," in Kim, Kwang-woong (ed.), *Han'guk-ui Son'go-jongch'ihak (Studies on Korean Electoral Politics)*, Seoul: Pobmunsa, 1988, pp. 167-181, at p.177 (Table 5).

[52] See Yang, Sung-chul, "Political Ideology in Korean Politics: Its Elements and Roles," in Kim, Se-jin and Cho, Chang-hyun (eds.), *Government and Politics of Korea*, Silver Spring: The Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1972, pp. 25-42, at p.37.

PART 2. THE KOREAN VOTERS, 1985-1992:

AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Chapter 3.

Party Manoeuvrings and Changing Voters, 1985 - 1992

1. Introduction

For the past several years of democratisation, Korean political parties have gone through several series of party formation, mergers and splits. Political parties were newly formed and merged for upcoming elections or as a result of elections. There have been three major changes in the configuration of parties since 1985: the first is the emergence of the New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP) as the main opposition party and its virtual absorption of the Democratic Korea Party (DKP) immediately after the 1985 National Assembly election; the second is the party split in the opposition camp into the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) led by Kim Young-sam and the Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD) led by Kim Dae-jung shortly before the 1987 presidential election; and the third is the creation of the governing Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) coalesced in 1990 from the three parties - the ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP), Kim Young-sam's RDP and the New Democratic Republic Party (NDRP) led by Kim Jong-pil.

The first series of changes in party configuration signified the changing mode of Korean party politics, which followed the NKDP's strong showing in the 1985 National Assembly election. The existing power configuration of the Fifth Republic (1981-1987) was to be undermined as a result of the impressive emergence of the new opposition party led by Lee Min-woo, who was closely allied with two leading figures of the opposition, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam. During the early years of the Fifth Republic, the ruling DJP under the all-powerful president, who was elected indirectly by an electoral college of some five thousand members, maintained a dominant position in parliament with only a marginal challenge from the moderate opposition DKP (and from the minor Korea National Party). However, the political system of the Fifth Republic was fundamentally challenged by the NKDP, which had successfully campaigned for democratic change in the 1985 election. By the virtual absorption of the DKP immediately after the election, the NKDP commanded 103 out of the 276 National Assembly seats, arithmetically representing 48.9 per cent of the 1985 votes. Of the series of demands the NKDP put forward, a constitutional revision to hold the direct election of the president had become an all-important issue which dominated Korean politics until Roh Tae-woo, the DJP's presidential nominee for the scheduled indirect presidential election, came up with the June 29 declaration in 1987. In the declaration, Roh urged President Chun Doo-hwan to hold a direct presidential election along with other democratic measures, including restoration of civil rights of Kim Dae-jung.[1] A new constitution was

[1] See, for a detailed description of political process during this period, Lee, Man-woo, *The Odyssey of Korean Democracy: Korean Politics, 1987-1990*, New York: Praeger, 1990, Ch. 2,

drafted by consensus between the DJP and the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) - a Kim Young-sam led splinter party of the NKDP, which made the NKDP defunct - and a direct presidential election was to be held on December 16, 1987.

As the presidential election was imminent, the opposition camp divided into Kim Young-sam's RDP and Kim Dae-jung's PPD to compete for the presidency with the ruling DJP's Roh Tae-woo and the NDRP's Kim Jong-pil (who had also been banned from political activities under the Fifth Republic because of his alleged corruption during Park Chung-hee's regime). The ruling DJP succeeded in electing its candidate as the president of the Sixth Republic (1988-1992), albeit narrowly. In the subsequent National Assembly election of 1988, however, the DJP failed to secure half of the seats, although it still commanded the biggest share of seats. One of the success stories of the opposition-controlled assembly - perhaps with tacit approval of the Roh controlled DJP - may have been the summoning of the National Assembly hearings on the irregularities conducted during Chun's seven-year rule, known as "liquidation of the Fifth Republic." Notwithstanding the electoral failure and success of the opposition camp in those elections, the second series of changes in party configuration - more specifically, the split of the opposition parties - resulted in the four party system, in which each party became strongly associated with its leader's home province. Electoral competition between the parties shifted subsequently from a focus on the

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pp. 19-44; also see, for the text of the June 29 Declaration, Appendix 1 of his book, pp. 145-148.

democratic-authoritarian axis, which had characterised Korean party politics since the mid-1950s, to a regional one.

The creation of the ruling DLP in 1990 through the merger of President Roh's DJP, the opposition RDP and Kim Jong-pil's NDRP again upset the existing party system. Further, the party merger between the ruling and opposition parties, which had traditionally engaged in hostile confrontation, was unprecedented. As a result of the formation of the DLP, Kim Dae-jung's PPD was left alone in opposition. A few assembly members of the former RDP who had not joined the ruling coalition also remained in opposition, forming the (small) Democratic Party. Subsequently in 1991, the PPD and the "small" Democratic Party led by Lee Ki-taek formed a new united opposition Democratic Party (DP) for the upcoming National Assembly and presidential elections of 1992. In the third series of changes in party configuration, the emergence of the Unification National Party (UNP) as a viable third party is noteworthy. This party was newly formed by a big businessman Chung Ju-young about a month before the National Assembly election on March 24, 1992. It may have been the UNP that attracted those floating voters who had possibly become disenchanted both with the arbitrary merger of the DLP and with its change of leadership to Kim Young-sam, but who were unlikely to support the opposition DP mainly because of its strong affiliation with the Cholla region.

As briefly reviewed above, the Korean parties had gone through extensive processes of party manoeuvrings since 1985, from the emergence of an outspoken opposition party of the NKDP, to its split into parties based on personal leadership, to a merger between the governing and the opposition parties. Although all of the three series of changes in party configuration share a common historical pattern of Korean party politics - that of instability in the party system - each of them differs in the context in which the changes occurred and in the extent to which the changes exerted impact on the existing party system as well as the power configuration (let alone impact on the pattern of voter alignment). For example, the first two took place within the opposition as a result of election reverses, and leadership splits, respectively, whereas the third series pervaded the whole party system, resulting from "the common reckoning that the 'one-Roh, three-Kim' stalemate ... would not guarantee a confident power succession by any of the three [merged] parties."[2] Moreover, the first series of changes led to a collapse of the existing power configuration eventually, whereas the last two contributed to the maintenance of this either implicitly or explicitly.

How, then, have the voters responded to these changes in the party system? In other words, to what extent were the voters influenced by these changes in the party configuration when they made their voting choice? Were there significant changes in the pattern of voter alignments if these existed at all? More

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[2] See Park, Jin, "Political Change in South Korea: The Challenge of the Conservative Alliance," *Asian Survey*, 30(12), 1990, pp. 1154-1168, at p.1158. Also see, for an analysis of the DLP merger, Kim, Hak-joon, "New Political Development with a Vision for the 1990s and Beyond," *Korea & World Affairs*, 14(1), 1990, pp. 34-53.

specifically, were there changes in the main dimensions of voter alignments, resulting from the party splits/mergers? These are questions to be considered in the following sections. The electoral impact of the first series of changes in the party configuration, in spite of its importance in the democratisation process, however, cannot be explicitly assessed because the NKDP had gone through a party split before the 1987 election. Thus, the following sections will deal with the electoral impact of the last two series of party splits/mergers by utilising sample survey data.[3]

2. Changing Voter Preferences Resulting from the Opposition Split, 1985-88

In the direct presidential election of 1987, which was restored after 16 years of suspension, four main candidates contested the presidency of the Sixth Republic: Roh Tae-woo of the ruling DJP; Kim Young-sam of the RDP and Kim Dae-jung of the PPD in the opposition; and Kim Jong-pil of the NDRP, a revived party of Park Chung-hee's Democratic Republic Party. The four main parties also contested the subsequent 1988 National Assembly election. In both of the

[3] See, for a detailed description of the data, Appendix 1 of this thesis. For the purpose of this chapter, a few characteristics of the data are noteworthy. First, with regard to the timing of the surveys, the first survey was carried out in November 1991, that is, after the DLP and the DP merger and before the creation of the UNP for the March 1992 National Assembly election. The second survey was carried out immediately after the December 1992 Presidential election. Second, the survey data employed for the analysis in this thesis were weighted so that the data correspond to the official returns of the 1987 Presidential election, for the first survey data, and those of the 1992 Presidential election for the second survey data.

elections, the DJP proved its ability to prolong its ruling status by securing the biggest share of the votes, while the opposition, which once claimed to represent the public's democratic will as signified by the strong showing of the NKDP in the 1985 election and in the democratisation process onwards, suffered a defeat mainly because of the leadership split.

Table 3-1. Flow of the Votes, 1985 -1988: Column Percentages (Frequencies)

A. Between 1985 and 1987

	1985						
1987	DJP	NKDP	DKP	Others	NonVoter	NewVoter	Total (N)
Roh Tae-woo	71.6%	12.5%	9.3%	37.9%	18.6%	13.7%	32.2 % (369)
Kim Young-sam	11.5%	33.1%	43.5%	17.4%	24.4%	31.3%	24.7 % (283)
Kim Dae-jung	5.0%	43.9%	28.9%	13.2%	16.9%	34.8%	23.8 % (273)
Kim Jong-pil	7.9%	5.4%	8.7%	22.0%	8.1%	1.8%	7.1 % (82)
Non-Voter	4.0%	5.1%	9.5%	9.5%	32.0%	19.4%	12.2 % (140)
Total (N)	30.1% (345)	32.6% (374)	5.4% (62)	2.5% (28)	23.1% (265)	6.4% (73)	100% (1147)

Note: The respondents who were not eligible to vote in 1987 are excluded.

B. Between 1985 and 1988

	1985						
1988	DJP	NKDP	DKP	Others	NonVoter	NewVoter	Total (N)
DJP	69.4%	6.2%	8.3%	15.8%	17.8%	16.1%	28.6 % (334)
RDP	11.4%	38.0%	51.4%	4.7%	19.5%	28.0%	25.0 % (292)
PPD	5.2%	44.6%	20.0%	10.6%	14.8%	29.0%	22.9 % (267)
NDRP	8.7%	7.1%	14.6%	55.6%	9.3%	3.2%	9.3 % (109)
NonVoter	5.3%	4.1%	5.8%	13.2%	38.7%	23.7%	14.1 % (165)
Total (N)	29.5% (345)	32.0% (374)	5.3% (62)	2.4% (28)	22.8% (266)	8.0% (93)	100 % (1168)

Note: The respondents who were not eligible to vote in 1988 are excluded.
DJP - The Democratic Justice Party; NKDP - The New Korean Democratic Party; DKP - The Democratic Korean Party; RDP - The Reunification Democratic Party; PPD - The Party for Peace and Democracy; and NDRP - The New Democratic Republican Party.

Source: The 1991 Survey

Table 3-1 reports the movement of votes, resulting from the second series of party realignment, that is, the opposition party split. Panel A shows the flow of the votes between the 1985 election and the 1987 Presidential election, and Panel B between the 1985 and 1988 National Assembly elections.[4] These two tables are almost identical, except for negligible differences in the detailed figures, reflecting that the 1987 and the 1988 elections were fought in similar political settings. By reading down each column in the table, we can see how each group of voters in 1985 was distributed in 1987 and 1988.

It is apparent from the table that the DJP votes were, first of all, the least affected by the second series of party realignments: about 70 per cent of the 1985 DJP votes stayed with it in the 1987 and 1988 elections. Of the 1985 DJP votes, there also emerged no significant pattern of defection to the other parties. The DJP in 1987 and 1988 also had fewer influx votes from the other parties: the only exception may be the minor party votes. Perhaps most of these were KNP voters, whose defection to Roh in 1987 was the largest (about 38 per cent), but later in 1988 a majority of the 1985 minor party votes (about 56 per cent) flew to Kim Jong-pil's NDRP. The relative stability of the DJP votes is not unexpected, as it maintained its party organisation and leadership relatively intact. However, the stability of the DJP votes is remarkable if viewed in the context of the changing political atmosphere. That is, considering the fact that the elections of 1987 and

[4] Since the data for Table 3-1 were collected in 1991, the 1985 figures, which have a six year gap of recall, may inevitably contain some measurement errors. Of these, the votes for the NKDP were over-estimated at cost of the votes for the DKP (and the other minor parties).

1988 were fought in a more free and competitive manner than those in the past, the stable DJP vote suggests that the ruling party may have had a solid basis of electoral support beyond its ability to mobilise the unsophisticated and ill-informed voters. Further, given the pattern of electoral competition of the four parties, in which each party commanded its respective regional stronghold thus leaving less room for electoral manoeuvring of the ruling DJP, the stable DJP vote was even more remarkable.

A greater volatility in the movement of the opposition parties' votes could be expected, and Table 3-1 shows this was the case. The 1985 NKDP votes were distributed to Kim Dae-jung and his PPD, and to Kim Young-sam and his RDP (to a lesser degree), without much defection to the others. The same pattern was noticeable in case of the 1985 DKP votes, but this time the larger portion went to Kim Young-sam and his RDP. The main beneficiary of the movement of the 1985 minor party votes was Kim Jong-pil, particularly his NDRP. Of the non-voters in 1985, the largest portion again abstained, and the rest were rather evenly distributed to the main parties. Nearly two-thirds of the new voters, namely, those who were not eligible to vote in 1985, supported either Kim Young-sam or Kim Dae-jung (and their parties). A significant portion of the new voters also abstained.

In looking at the vote movement of the opposition parties, however, it is also remarkable that most of the 1985 NKDP and the DKP votes stayed with the

main opposition, that is, either Kim Young-sam (and his party) or Kim Dae-jung (and his party). Indeed, their defection to the other parties, that is, to the DJP or the NDRP, were less than that of the ruling DJP. This clearly indicates that there exists a solid opposition tendency in the Korean electorate, which suggests that both the ruling party and the opposition mobilise quite different sources of electoral support. This supports the contention made by Lee Kap-yun that the Korean electorate is polarised into supporters and opponents of the government.[5] The observed volatility of the opposition party votes could be, then, attributed to the fragile nature of the opposition parties.

The pattern of voter movement between 1985 and 1987/ 1988 which emerged from this analysis is that of continuity. Not to mention the stability of the DJP votes, it was also very rare that the supporters of the main opposition parties in 1985 moved to the ruling party in 1987 and 1988. No comparable attempts were made for earlier elections using sample survey data. However, Darcy et al. estimated voter mobility between 1981 and 1985 using the official election data, in which a model of pro-government partisan stability and anti-government instability was proposed.[6] They found that support for the new NKDP, which "came not as much from the disintegrating opposition parties as

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[5] See Lee, Kap-yun, "*Che 5 Konghwaguk Kukhoeuiwon Son'go-ui Punsok-kwa Chonmang* (An Analysis of the National Assembly Elections in the Fifth Republic and its Implications)," *Han'guk Chongch'i Hakhoebo (Korean Political Science Review)*, 19(1), 1985, pp. 47-58, at p.52.

[6] See Darcy, R., Hyun, Chong-min, Huston, James, and Kim, Hyun-woo, "Political Party Support in the Korean Fifth Republic: An Ecological Analysis 1981-1985," *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 26(2), 1991, pp. 295-306. Also see Kim, Hyun-woo, "1980 Nyondae Han'gugin-ui Son'gohaengt'ae (Korean Electoral Behaviour in the 1980s)," in Lee, Nam-young, ed., *Han'guk-ui Son'go (Elections in Korea), I*, Seoul: Nanam, 1993, pp. 185-219.

from those not participating in the previous election,"[7] was a main source of party instability, especially in the opposition, across the two elections. Nonetheless, it was also observable that the defection to the ruling DJP (12 to 14 per cent[8]) of the main opposition party votes, that is, the votes of the DKP and the KNP in 1981, was limited as much as in this analysis. This also suggests that there existed a coherent opposition tendency in the electorate, which may have led to the first series of changes in the party system - that is, the NKDP merger with the DKP, which did not last for long, however.

Despite the fact that the opposition parties enjoyed deep-rooted electoral support and had, indeed, together polled a majority of the votes since 1985, it was not likely the main opposition parties would reunite. The two Kims, who commanded the evenly divided basis of opposition support and who once failed to agree on a single candidate in 1987, were unlikely to come up with a reunified opposition party because of their serious political rivalry. For the ruling party, however, which had been faced with decreasing electoral support since the late seventies, the stability in partisan support may mean that it had a limited ability to expand its basis of electoral support above and beyond its former supporters, who consisted of more or less than one-third of the electorate. This may have been a decisive factor that made the ruling party seek a coalition with some of the opposition parties later in 1990, in the wake of its loss of a majority in the 1988 National Assembly elections.

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[7] See ibid., p.303.
[8] See ibid., Table 5, p. 302.

3. Changing Voter Preferences as a Result of the DLP Merger, 1987-1992

The merger of the ruling and opposition parties was an unprecedented one in Korean political history if viewed in terms of its scale and nature. Although party mergers/splits were rather common among the opposition parties whose intention was to strengthen their electoral fortunes for upcoming elections, cross-changes of politician's party affiliations between the ruling and opposition parties were rather exceptional and personal. Mergers/splits were less evident in the ruling parties, although these were reshaped by those who came to power as a result of changes in the political system (see Chapter 1 for a review). The division between the government and the opposition parties, which once looked impossible to overcome as they traditionally engaged in hostile confrontation, became blurred, at least at the leadership level, by the merger of the parties to form the new ruling DLP.

In retrospect, the ruling DLP accomplished what it wanted by the merger, that is, to keep itself in power. It secured a majority of the National Assembly seats albeit narrowly, and elected its presidential candidate, Kim Young-sam, in the elections of 1992. However, its electoral success was a limited one. That is, the DLP's overall share of the votes was greatly reduced in the 1992 elections, compared with that before the merger. For example, the constituents of the DLP together polled about 73 per cent of the votes both in the 1987 and 1988

elections, but in the 1992 elections, the DLP's share of the votes was reduced to less than three-fifths of the former share of its constituents' votes (see Table 1-6 in Chapter 1). The main opposition, DP, regained its strength by securing about one-third of the seats, more than its prior share of one-fourth. Kim Dae-jung, the leader of the main opposition, finished second in the presidential election by polling about one-third of the votes. The emergence of the UNP as a viable third party was also remarkable: the UNP polled 17.4 per cent of the votes in the National Assembly election, and its presidential candidate, Chung Ju-young, polled 16.3 per cent.

The impact of the third series of changes in the party configuration on the voters may have been more far-reaching, but at least two main sources of voter mobility can be identified. The first source is in the opposition, especially among the former supporters of the RDP: that is, by joining with the ruling DJP, Kim Young-sam may have lost a significant degree of the political support commanded as an opposition leader. It is also expected that there would be some degree of voter mobility in the case of the ruling coalition, where some voters were former supporters of the DJP and the NDRP. That is, there appear to have been those who were dissatisfied with the leadership change to Kim Young-sam in the DLP. This is exemplified by the various splinter groups who deserted the DLP - their shared interest may have been in opposing Kim's leadership.[9] Table 3-2 shows how voting choices in 1987 were distributed in the elections of 1992:

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[9] See Lee, Hong-yung, "South Korea in 1992: A Turning Point in Democratisation," *Asian Survey*, 33(1), 1993, pp. 32-42.

Panel A reports the voter movement between the 1987 and the 1992 presidential elections, and Panel B between the 1987 presidential election and the 1992 National Assembly election.

Table 3-2. Flow of the Votes, 1987-1992: Column Percentages (Frequencies)

A. Between 1987 and the 1992 Presidential Elections

	1987						
1992	Roh	YS	DJ	JP	NonVoter	NewVoter	Total (N)
Kim Young-sam	59.2%	51.3%	2.4%	38.9%	23.2%	22.2%	36.2 % (543)
Kim Dae-jung	7.7%	11.3%	82.2%	10.7%	14.3%	29.6%	29.1 % (437)
Chung Ju-young	18.3%	18.5%	5.1%	25.4%	6.7%	14.4%	14.1 % (211)
Others	5.1%	9.1%	2.0%	14.5%	7.8%	14.7%	6.8 % (101)
NonVoter	9.6%	9.9%	8.4%	10.5%	48.1%	19.1%	13.8 % (208)
Total (N)	35.3 % (530)	16.7 % (251)	23.5 % (353)	3.8 % (57)	8.6 % (128)	12.0 % (181)	100 % (1500)

Note: Roh - Roh Tae-woo; YS - Kim Young-sam; DJ - Kim Dae-jung; and JP - Kim Jong-pil.

B. Between 1987 and the 1992 National Assembly Elections

	1987						
1992	Roh	YS	DJ	JP	NonVoter	NewVoter	Total (N)
DLP	59.5%	42.2%	5.9%	39.8%	16.6%	22.6%	35.2 % (525)
DP	9.2%	24.2%	81.1%	9.3%	17.6%	29.6%	31.9 % (475)
UNP	12.2%	17.2%	3.7%	18.2%	6.1%	7.4%	10.2 % (152)
Others	7.1%	6.8%	1.3%	10.3%	4.8%	7.8%	5.7 % (85)
Non-Voter	11.9%	9.7%	8.0%	22.4%	54.9%	32.5%	17.1 % (255)
Total (N)	35.5 % (530)	16.8 % (251)	23.7 % (353)	3.8 % (57)	8.6 % (128)	11.5 % (172)	100 % (1491)

Note: The respondents who were not eligible to vote in the 1992 NA election are excluded. DLP - The Democratic Liberal Party; DP - The Democratic Party; and UNP - The Unification National Party.

Source: The 1992 Post-Election Survey

In looking at the tables, there emerge several points to be noted. First, the support for Kim Dae-jung, and his party, was quite consistent. Of those who had

supported him in 1987, more than four-fifths stayed with him and his DP in 1992. Out-flow votes in other directions were minimal, among which abstention was the biggest but not higher than for his counterparts. This could be expected, as he and his DP were the least disturbed by the third series of party realignment. In-flow votes from the other directions, which were slightly higher than the out-flow votes, indicate that Kim Dae-jung and his DP had net gains, albeit limited. It is noteworthy that his DP had the biggest in-flow votes from the 1987 votes of Kim Young-sam among the DLP components, but the in-flows were substantially reduced in the presidential election. This clearly indicates that the DP (former PPD) attracted some former Kim Young-sam supporters through the merger with the (small) Democratic Party composed of former RDP members who split with Kim Young-sam over his decision to merge with the DJP. The DP, which contained some former RDP members whose constituencies largely coincided with Kim Young-sam's regional strongholds, may have been more successful in gaining the in-flow votes of former Kim Young-sam supporters in the National Assembly election than in the presidential election. In practice, however, the DP won none of the seats in the single member district contests for the National Assembly in Pusan and Kyongnam.

Second, there is also remarkable stability in the movement of the 1987 Roh Tae-woo vote. Nearly 60 per cent of his supporters stayed with the ruling DLP and its presidential candidate. Although the movement from 1987 to 1992 was a little more volatile than that in Table 3-1 covering 1985-1987/88 (the comparable

figures were about 70 per cent), his 1987 support yielded the least defections among the DLP components. The biggest share of the out-flow votes, including those to nonvoting, went to a new comer, Chung Ju-young and his UNP. The defections to Kim Dae-jung and his DP were minimal. Despite the fact that Roh had withdrawn his party membership of the DLP before the presidential election, Kim Young-sam was successful in retaining the 1987 Roh supporters - indeed, far more so than in retaining his own supporters.

Third, Kim Young-sam, indeed, suffered a significant loss from his former supporters. More than half of his 1987 voters deserted him in the 1992 National Assembly election, and nearly half of them did so in the presidential election. Nearly one-fifth of the former Kim Young-sam supporters deserted to Chung Ju-young and his UNP, who also accommodated a substantial portion of the defectors of the DLP components. Nonetheless, Kim Young-sam won more support among his former supporters in the presidential election than his DLP did in the Assembly election, by largely regaining those who had switched to the DP in the Assembly election. That is, the out-flow votes to Kim Dae-jung were halved if compared with those to the DP, and there were similar levels of defections in other directions. The in-flow votes to Kim Young-sam show that he won more support from the 1987 Roh voters than his own. That is, among those who voted for Kim Young-sam in 1992, there were more of the 1987 Roh voters (59.2 %) - who were also far bigger than the 1987 Kim Young-sam voters in absolute figures - than his former supporters (51.3 %). However, it may not

have been possible for the DLP to stay in power without support from the former Kim Young-sam voters (and from the former Kim Jong-pil voters to a lesser degree).

The fourth point of note is that about 40 per cent of the 1987 Kim Jong-pil voters stayed with Kim Young-sam and the DLP. Among the components of the DLP, the former Kim Jong-pil voters were the most volatile. Among those who deserted him in 1992, a majority chose not to vote in the National Assembly election, but went to Chung Ju-young in the presidential election. It is noteworthy that the flow to the UNP in the Assembly election was the biggest of all if the flow to non-voting is excluded. It is also apparent that many of the switchers went to minor parties. The out-flows to Kim Dae-jung and his DP were the least of all. In addition, a majority of the non-voters in 1987 again abstained in 1992: Kim Young-sam won a fair share of support from the 1987 non-voters in the presidential election, and both the DP and the DLP won a similar degree of support from the 1987 non-voters. The most favoured direction of support among the new voters, namely, those who were too young to vote in 1987, was to Kim Dae-jung and his DP - excluding non-voting in the Assembly election. The flows to Kim Young-sam and the DLP were, though, not much less than those to Kim Dae-jung and the DP.

Finally, the new comer, Chung Ju-young and his UNP, attracted a significant portion of the defectors of the DLP components, many more than did

Kim Dae-jung and his DP. In terms of absolute size, the in-flow from the former Roh voters was the biggest - for example, 97 out of 211 in Panel A. These observations clearly support the general expectation that Chung Ju-young and his UNP would naturally erode the electoral basis of the governing party, as Chung and his party not only gained a majority of defectors from the DLP components, but also the in-flow from Roh comprised nearly half of Chung's votes. From another point of view, however, it should also be noted that Chung and his party eroded the basis of the opposition party by accommodating a majority of the defectors of the DLP components. That is, being a popular direction of the defectors of the DLP components - especially those of Kim Young-sam and Kim Jong-pil who might have flown to Kim Dae-jung and his party in the absence of the UNP - Chung and his UNP also eroded the basis of the opposition support as much as it did that of the governing party. Indeed, in terms of relative defection, defined by the percentages of out-flow as shown in Table 3-2, Chung and his UNP attracted more switchers from the former Kim Young-sam and Kim Jong-pil voters than from Roh. The direct in-flow from the former Kim Dae-jung votes was minimal, however.

In short, there was continuity as much as change in the vote movement across the two elections. The support of Kim Young-sam and Kim Jong-pil underwent the most significant changes by the DLP merger, as expected. Another potential source of vote movement in the ruling party side, namely, the 1987 Roh supporters, saw no substantial impact from the merger. Kim Dae-jung

and his DP had shown a limited ability to expand their basis of electoral support beyond the already solid, but limited, basis of support. The main opposition's inability to accommodate the defections, especially those from the former Kim Young-sam voters (and the Kim Jong-pil voters), may have been one of the decisive factors that resulted in its electoral defeat. Accommodation of the defections, which resulted from the DLP merger, was undertaken by a third party in 1992, and, further, it performed its role surprisingly well by attracting defections from all of the DLP components.

4. Changing Patterns of Electoral Support: 1985, 1987, and 1992

In most of the past Korean elections, the *yoch'on yado* phenomenon - that the ruling party gets greater support in less urbanised areas, while the opposition receives much more support in more urbanised areas - was the most frequently observed pattern of voter alignment.[10] Studies of recent elections also observed this pattern of urban-rural differences in voting. For example, in his district level study of the 1988 National Assembly election, Park Chan-wook demonstrated that there remained "a reasonably strong and negative relationship between

[10] See Chapter 2 for a detailed assessment. See, for studies that identified the pattern of urban-rural voter alignments in the elections before 1987, for example, Lee, Kap-yun, "Electoral Connection of an Authoritarian Political System: Republic of Korea (1948-85)," Proceedings of the Second Asian-Pacific Political Science Association Conference, 1986, pp.151-163; and Kim, Hong-nack and Choe, Sun-ki, "Urbanisation and Changing Voting Patterns in South Korean Parliamentary Elections," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, 6(3), 1987, pp.31-50.

urbanisation and the DJP vote," and the RDP and the PPD won "appreciable support in metropolitan and urban districts."[11] This was so after controlling for regional differences, which exerted a far stronger influence in determining the vote for each of the parties.

Regional differences in party support had also been a frequently observed pattern of voter alignment, especially in presidential elections.[12] This pattern was first observed in the 1963 presidential election, in which Park Chung-hee drew his support heavily from the Kyongsang provinces.[13] Regional voting became intensified in 1971, as Kim Dae-jung, who had strong electoral support from the rival Cholla provinces, became the opposition candidate.[14] In the 1987 presidential election, there re-emerged profound regional differences in electoral support. The four main candidates performed best in each of their home provinces: Roh Tae-woo in North Kyongsang (Kyongbuk), Kim Young-sam in South Kyongsang (Kyongnam), Kim Dae-jung in Cholla, and Kim Jong-pil in Ch'ungch'ong. In the following National Assembly election of 1988, this pattern of regional voting was repeated virtually intact. All of the four main parties, led by the same leadership as in 1987, became regional parties. The elections of

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[11] See Park, Chan-wook, "The 1988 National Assembly Election in South Korea: The Ruling Party's Loss of Legislative Majority," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, 7(3), 1988, pp.59-76, at p.71.

[12] See Chapter 2 for a review.

[13] See Kim, C.I. Eugene, "Significance of the 1963 Korean Elections", *Asian Survey*, 4(3), 1964, pp. 765-773; and his "Patterns in the 1967 Korean Elections," *Pacific Affairs*, 41(1), 1968, pp. 60-70.

[14] See Kim, Jae-on, and Koh, B.C., "Electoral Behavior and Social Development in South Korea: An Aggregate Data Analysis of Presidential Elections," *The Journal of Politics*, 34(3), 1972, pp. 825-859.

1992 also confirmed that the regional nature of voting, namely, voting for the candidates or the parties of the same regional attachment, continued to play a significant role in shaping the voter's choice.[15] What differentiates the recent pattern of regional voting from that of the past is that the region-party alliance, which hardly appeared as a significant factor in the past National Assembly elections, and which may have been merely a tendency toward voters favouring their region's political leaders in the presidential elections, became increasingly a party-oriented one.

In the following section, the impact of the party splits/mergers on voting choices will be discussed with reference to these two main dimensions of voter alignment. That is, by exploring changes in the patterns of voter alignment, how the voters responded to the party splits/mergers can be closely examined. To measure changes in the patterns of voter alignment over time, multiple regression analyses were performed with dependent variables of voting choice in 1985, 1987, and 1992, and with independent variables of urban-rural location and residential region, which were selected as indicators of the two dimensions of voter alignment.[16] By comparing the regression coefficients of the independent

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[15] See Park, Chan-wook, "The Fourteenth National Assembly Election in Korea: A Test for the Ruling Democratic Liberal Party," *Korea Journal*, 33(1), 1993, pp. 5-16; and Lee, Nam-young, "The Voter's Choice: The 14th Presidential Election of Korea," *Korea Journal*, 33(1), 1993, pp. 17-26.

[16] For the purpose of this chapter, the variables of urban-rural location and residential region are employed to examine changes in the patterns of urban-rural and regional voting, as these are most frequently observed patterns. The nature of the urban-rural differences in party support still needs to be tested with socio-economic and attitudinal indicators. Alternative ways of coding the variable of region may be either using regional identification variable, which can be obtained by directly asking a respondent's regional identification, or obtaining data on a respondent's region of origin. The surveys employed here collected the latter kind of data, and the data will be used

variables, which are reported in Table 3-3 for the governing party votes and in Table 3-4 for the opposition party votes, the impact of the party splits/mergers on the voters can be identified.[17]

Changing Patterns of Governing Party Support.

Table 3-3 reports the effects of urban-rural location and residential region on governing party choices in 1985, 1987 and 1992. For example, in 1985, those who lived in rural areas were about 11 per cent more likely to vote for the ruling DJP than those who lived in metropolitan areas, after the effect of residential region on voting was accounted for (see b's in the table). Similarly, the former were about 14 per cent more likely to vote Roh Tae-woo than the latter in 1987. Those who lived in Kyongbuk were about 16 per cent more likely to vote for the

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in the later Chapters, in relation to the residential region variable. See Chapter 4 for a detailed analysis on the urban-rural dimension of voter alignment, and Chapter 5 for regional voting.

[17] For the purpose of comparison between the models, 'b' - the unstandardised partial regression coefficient of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression - is particularly useful, as it estimates the effect of an independent variable, statistically holding constant the other variables listed. The b's, which are comparable across models, can be interpreted as a percentage probability, where the lowest possible value of an independent variable is 0 and the highest 1. The 'beta' is a standardised coefficient, which indicates the relative strength of the variables in a model. The standardised coefficients are particularly useful when the unit of measurement of the variables varies. Logit estimates, which are commonly used for binary dependent variables, are also reported in the Tables, but as a diagnostic means only since OLS regression does not give serious misleading results unless the distribution across the two categories is highly skewed. The logit estimate is the change in the log of the odds ratio associated with a unit change in the dependent variable. See Hanushek, Eric A., and Jackson, John E., *Statistical Methods for Social Science*, New York: Academic Press, 1977, pp. 187-210; and Achen, Christopher H., *Interpreting and Using Regression*, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982. Also see Aldrich, John H., and Nelson, Forrest D., *Linear Probability, Logit and Probit Models*, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1984.

DJP than those in Seoul in 1985, after the effect of urban-rural location on voting was accounted for, and about 28 per cent more likely to vote for Roh Tae-woo in 1987. In 1987, those in Kyongbuk were about 62 per cent (subtracting -.343 from .275) more likely to vote Roh than those in Cholla.

Table 3-3. Effects of Location and Region of Residence on the Governing Party Votes: In 1985, 1987, and 1992 (A Multivariate Assessment)

	1985 (DJP)			1987 (Roh Tae-woo)			1992 (Kim Young-sam)		
Variables	b	beta	logit	b	beta	logit	b	beta	logit
Location									
(Metropolitan)									
City	.043	.037	.250	-.008	-.007	.038	.023	.021	.130
Rural	.110*	.097	.666**	.135**	.122	.801**	.138**	.121	.849**
Region									
(Seoul)									
Kyonggi	.058	.043	.131	.053	.041	.117	-.025	-.020	-.237
Kangwon	.149	.059	.451	.166^	.067	.482	.068	.027	.071
Ch'ungch'ong	.085	.052	.109	-.031	-.019	-.332	.095^	.056	.212
Cholla	-.394**	-.254	-2.19**	-.343**	-.227	-2.33**	-.400**	-.269	-3.29**
Kyongbuk	.160*	.106	.553*	.275**	.188	1.07**	.205**	.134	.760**
Kyongnam	-.002	-.001	-.140	-.036	-.029	-.277	.366**	.278	1.48**
Intercept	.390		-.406	.334		-.654	.337		-.644
R^2 (pseudo-R^2)	.098		.082	.115		.099	.196		.168
c (%)			62.9 %			67.2 %			69.5 %

Note: (1) pseudo- $R^2 = [1 - (\ln L_1 / \ln L_0)]$, where L_0 denotes the likelihood value for the null model (i.e., with an intercept only) and L_1 denotes the likelihood value for the full model (see Dhrymes, Phoebus J., "Limited Dependent Variable," in Griliches, Zvi, and Intriligator, Michael D., eds., *Handbook of Econometrics, Vol. III*, 1986, pp. 1567-1631, at p.1585); c - The overall percentage correctly predicted by the model in the classification table with the observed frequencies.

(2) Coding of the dependent variables: 1985, DJP vote=1, others=0; 1987, Roh Tae-woo vote=1, others=0; 1992, Kim Young-sam vote=1, others=0. Non-voters were excluded.

(3) ** - p<.01; * - p<.05; and ^ - p <.10 in a two-tailed test.

Source: The 1991 Survey for 1985 and 1987, and the 1992 Post-election Survey for 1992.

A comparison of b's between the first two columns at Table 3-3 indicates changes in the patterns of the governing party support, resulting from the second series of changes in the party configuration. One of the differences is that Roh Tae-woo improved his support from those living in Kyongbuk, compared with that of the DJP in 1985. The Cholla voters' disenchantment with the ruling DJP was largely maintained in 1987.[18] The Ch'ungch'ong voters, who had been more likely to support the DJP in 1985 than those in Seoul, show a far reduced level of support for Roh in 1987. The level of the DJP support among the Kangwon and Kyonggi (and Kyongnam) voters is similar to that of Roh Tae-woo support. The urban-rural difference in the governing party support also became steeper in 1987 than was so in 1985. The logit estimates are similar to those of the OLS in substantive details.

These comparisons clearly indicate that the pattern of the governing party support also underwent a change as a result of the establishment of the four party system, although the governing party support remained the most stable of all as shown in the above section. The changes in the pattern of regional voting are remarkable: Roh pulled more support from his Kyongbuk than did the DJP, less support in the other candidates' regional strongholds, and maintained a similar level of support in the "neutral" regions of Kyonggi and Kangwon. The stable governing party support between 1985 and 1987 may, then, have stemmed from

[18] There were obviously measurement errors for the Cholla voters, especially for the recalled vote of 1985. According to the election statistics, the Cholla voters were about the national average in supporting the ruling DJP. Thus, the difference of the Cholla voters' support for the governing party between 1985 and 1987 may have been far greater than here.

the urban-rural dimension of party support, which also shows a similar pattern in 1992.

From this analysis, two tentative conclusions can be drawn. First, the impact of both of the two main dimensions in voter alignment was sharpened in the 1987 presidential elections: this was indicated by the increased b's of the two categories of the variables in 1987 overall, and also by the R-squared and the c statistics. Of these, the b figures of Kyongbuk and Ch'ungch'ong showed the most distinct change. Second, as regards the relative importance of the two dimensions in determining the governing party support, indicated by the standardised regression coefficients (beta's), the regional one was far stronger than the urban-rural influence both in 1985 and 1987. The latter conclusion, however, may be quite misleading as there was evidence that those in Cholla showed highly skewed responses in the data toward the opposition NKDP. If we take account of the measurement errors, the effects of the two main dimensions in 1985 may be even, or the regional one may be weaker, in terms of their relative importance. Nonetheless, it becomes clear that the regional variables exerted a stronger, if not dominant, influence in the governing party choices among the two dimensions of party support. This was particularly so in the electoral contests in 1987, where the four major candidates actively sought regional appeals in their respective regional strongholds. It is, however, noteworthy that the variables of urban-rural location also had some significant impact on the governing party choices.

A comparison of b's between the last two columns of Table 3-3 indicates changes in the patterns of the governing party support, resulting from the DLP merger. First of all, there is little difference in the patterns of the b's of the urban-rural location variables across the two elections of 1987 and 1992. In other words, there has been continuity rather than change in the urban-rural dimension of electoral support for the governing party. This similarity is a quite striking one, given that Roh Tae-woo (who shared a common background with his predecessors, Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan) and Kim Young-sam (who had long been an opponent of dictatorial rules) had nothing much in common, except for the fact that both of them had run for presidency as a ruling party candidate. Through the party merger, the DLP may have expected that it could shift its social basis of party support, or at least minimise the urban-rural pattern of voter alignment, which had characterised the past electoral contests between "dictatorship and democracy." In 1992, however, the DLP candidate was again more successful in winning votes from those who were traditionally supportive of the government, that is, in the rural areas, perhaps the older and the less educated.

Two main changes are notable in the regional patterns of governing party support between 1987 and 1992: first, the increased propensity of the Kyongnam voters supporting the DLP candidate in 1992, and, second, the relative setback of the Kyongbuk voters supporting Kim Young-sam. As a result of the change in its

leadership, the DLP further mobilised support from those in Kyongnam - indeed, much more than Kim Young-sam did in 1987 as an opposition candidate (see Table 3-4) - but lessened the support from those in Kyongbuk, who had shown a stronger leaning toward Roh in 1987. To be sure, the Kyongbuk voters still showed a significant leaning toward the DLP candidate in 1992. Kim Young-sam was also somewhat successful in retaining the support of Ch'ungch'ong voters, who had been away from Roh in 1987. Cholla voters maintained, or rather intensified, their political propensity against the governing party. The changes in the degree of Kim Young-sam support among the Kangwon and Kyonggi voters are notable, compared with that of Roh and the DJP. The level of Kim Young-sam support in Kangwon was far reduced, although there was still a leaning toward the DLP candidate, and Kyonggi voters withdrew their electoral support for the governing parties in 1992.

In looking at the relative importance of the two categories of variables in determining governing party support, the regional nature of voting far is salient (see the beta figures). Indeed, the tendency of regional voting for the governing party became more acute in 1992 than in 1987. The overall increase of the predictability, which was shown in terms of the R-squared and the c statistics in the table, may be attributable to the increased tendency of regional voting. In short, the DLP may have been successful only in broadening its political support geographically by the merger of the parties commanding respective regional

strongholds, but it failed in altering its basis of social support, which obviously had been a purpose of the party merger in 1990.

Changing Patterns of Opposition Party Support.

Table 3-4 reports regression coefficients of the two categories of variables, for the main opposition party votes this time. First of all, compared with the patterns of the governing party support, the b's of the urban-rural variables were smaller in magnitude across the models, especially in 1987 and 1992, although they were all in the opposite direction to those predicting support for the governing party. This tells us that the pattern of voter alignment following the urban-rural dimension relates more to the governing party than the opposition. It therefore supports the contention made by Darcy et al. that "the opposition tendency in the electorate, being more negative against the government rather than positive toward a particular party, will be more fragmented and unstable from election to election."[19] As a result of the party split, the opposition parties failed to consolidate the anti-government tendency in the electorate in 1987, although there is a clear indication that Kim Young-sam was more successful in mobilising the anti-government tendency than Kim Dae-jung. In 1992, the main opposition DP again failed in attracting the anti-government tendency, partly

[19] See Darcy et al., op.cit., p.132.

Table 3-4. Effects of Location and Region of Residence on the Opposition Party Votes: In 1985, 1987, and 1992 (A Multivariate Assessment)

	1985 (NKDP/DKP)			1987 (Kim Young-sam)			1987 (Kim Dae-jung)			1992 (Kim Dae-jung)			1992 (Chung Ju-young)		
Variables	b	beta	logit	b	beta	logit	b	beta	logit	b	beta	logit	b	beta	logit
Location															
(Metropolitan)															
City	-.052	-.044	-.313	.005	.004	.038	.005	.005	-.080	.017	.016	.026	-.018	-.022	-.096
Rural	-.114*	-.100	-.730**	-.103**	-.101	-.621**	-.020	-.019	-.451	-.018	-.017	-.416	-.059^	-.069	-.450^
Region															
(Seoul)															
Kyonggi	-.063	-.047	-.138	-.020	-.016	-.156	-.036	-.030	-.007	-.134**	-.112	-.437^	.151**	.162	.853**
Kangwon	-.155	-.061	-.459	-.024	-.010	-.158	-.118^	-.052	-.381	-.302**	-.116	-1.77**	.126*	.066	.820^
Ch'ungch'ong	-.127^	-.077	-.257	.035	.023	.202	-.219**	-.149	-1.14**	-.197**	-.122	-.722*	.071^	.056	.437
Cholla	.394**	.252	2.09**	-.222**	-.158	-2.80**	.634**	.455	3.27**	.598**	.419	3.91**	-.144**	-.130	-7.41[a]
Kyongbuk	-.265**	-.174	-1.04**	.034	.025	.158	-.286**	-.211	-3.24**	-.280**	-.191	-1.48**	.026	.022	.131
Kyongnam	.002	.002	.145	.291**	.252	1.24**	-.228**	-.199	-1.44**	-.299**	-.237	-1.59**	-.073*	-.074	-.787**
Intercept	.597		.365	.274		-.957	.313		-.823	.403		-.457	.169		
R^2 (pseudo- R^2)	.125		.101	.122		.116	.354		.302	.338		.281	.068		.099
c (%)			63.9 %			74.7 %			83.1 %			79.0 %			83.7 %

Note: (1) pseudo- $R^2 = [1 - (\ln L_1 / \ln L_0)]$, where L_0 denotes the likelihood value for the null model (i.e., with an intercept only) and L_1 denotes the likelihood value for the full model (see Dhrymes, 1986, p.1585); c - The overall percentage correctly predicted by the model in the classification table with the observed frequencies.

(2) Coding of the dependent variables: 1985, NKDP/DKP votes=1, others=0; 1987, Kim Young-sam vote=1, others=0, and Kim Dae-jung vote=1, others=0; 1992, Kim Dae-jung vote=1, others=0, and Chung Ju-young vote=1, others=0. Non-voters were excluded.

(3) ** - p<.01; * - p<.05; and ^ - p <.10 in a two-tailed test.

(4) [a] - Consists of an empty cell; thus, a statistical test not relevant.

Source: The 1991 Survey for 1985 and 1987, and the 1992 Post-election Survey for 1992.

because of its strong regional image, and partly because of the emergence of the UNP led by Chung Ju-young which attracted most of the floating voters resulting from the DLP merger.

Contrary to this, stronger regional voting characterised the support for the main opposition parties.[20] This is particularly so for the support of Kim Dae-jung, who had been strongly favoured by those in Cholla in 1987 and again in 1992. The regional pattern of his support in 1987 showed that Kim Dae-jung was the most affected by regionalism. That is, Kim Dae-jung was exclusively supported by the Cholla voters, who were thus the least supportive of all the other candidates; but at the same time, he was also the least favoured in the other candidates' strongholds. In the case of the other candidates, however, this was not so. For example, Kim Young-sam, who also mobilised his Kyongnam voters most in 1987, did not suffer as much as Kim Dae-jung neither in Kyongbuk (Roh's stronghold) nor in Ch'ungch'ong (Kim Jong-pil's stronghold). This was the case for Roh Tae-woo as well.

By 1992, support for Kim Dae-jung had become increasingly regionalistic. In addition to the low support for him in Kyongbuk, Kyongnam and Ch'ungch'ong, voters in Kangwon and Kyonggi also showed a significant

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[20] The significant regional differences in the NKDP support in 1985 may result from the NKDP's strong showing in Seoul rather than the regional nature of voting observed in 1987 and onwards. That is, since the NKDP performed far better in Seoul than anywhere else, by using the Seoul voters as a reference category in the model most of the regional variables seemed to be statistically significant.

tendency to vote against him. The relatively good performance of the UNP candidate in Kangwon and Kyonggi may have been a factor that resulted in Kim Dae-jung's relatively poor performance in these regions. The DP merger, which followed the DLP merger to widen its regional basis of electoral support, then had failed in widening its appeal in 1992. If there had been a change in the parties' regional strongholds because of the leadership change in the ruling DLP, the change may have resulted in the relative success of the UNP and its presidential candidate because of the main opposition's inability to overcome its strong regional image.

5. Conclusion

While the Korean parties have undergone several stages of changes in their configuration since 1985, the forgoing analysis revealed that the voters exhibited a coherent tendency in their electoral choices. The extent of electoral change by 1992 was far more modest than might have been expected from such changes in the party system. One of the main contributing factors to the partisan stability of the voters may be a government-opposition cleavage, which had often produced a pattern of voter alignment along the urban-rural dimension. As seen above, the governing parties have been far more successful in winning support from the rural voters over time, in spite of the parties' changing characteristics resulting

from the changes in the party system. In this vein, the pattern of urban-rural voter alignment shown in 1992 deserves more attention. The party mergers across the opposition and the government hardly resulted in changes of voting pattern along the urban-rural dimension. Thus, it can be argued that the voter movement away from Kim Young-sam in 1992 among his 1987 supporters resulted from his change of partisan stance. Kim Young-sam' electoral success in 1992 may have, instead, lain in maintaining the support of the traditional governing party voters, in addition to the mobilisation of the DLP constituents' regional strongholds. It is even more intriguing that the out-flow votes of Kim Young-sam were largely contained by the minor party candidates, especially by Chung Ju-young, rather than by the main opposition.

The patterns of regional voting over time showed that there was change as much as continuity. With rather strong regional ties to the parties, or the party leaderships, among the electorates, the parties maintained stable support from where they were strong; but regional voting became a source of change at the same time, as the voters, who increasingly viewed the parties as regionalistic, were easily cross-pressured by such changes of leadership in the parties. The fact that the regional attributes continued to shape voting choice in 1992 is hardly surprising as the four major candidates were still active in politics. Indeed, the two main candidates, namely, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, again performed best in their respective regional strongholds in 1992 as they did in the regionalism-driven four party contests in 1987. What is surprising is the

performance of Chung Ju-young, who mobilised the support of the formerly "neutral" regions of Kyonggi and Kangwon (Chung claimed a regional tie in Kangwon) at the cost of aggravating the performance of Kim Dae-jung in these regions. He also accommodated the defecting voters of the DLP constituents far more than Kim Dae-jung, especially those in Kim Jong-pil's regional stronghold, Ch'ungch'ong. Although the nature of regional voting still needs to be pursued, it can be argued that if the region-party allegiance looms large it may become a source of electoral volatility, as changes in party leaderships - and the changes of regional traits of the parties accordingly - would be more frequent with the current electoral arrangement of the five-year one-term fixed presidency.

Chapter 4. The Pro-Government vs Pro-Democratic Cleavage: Urban-Rural Difference, Socialisation, or What?

1. Introduction

Since the early 1960s, urbanisation in Korea has occurred rapidly in close association with its modernisation process. For example, in 1960 only 28 per cent of the population lived in urban areas, but by 1990 about 72 per cent of the population was living in the cities (see Table 4-1). This growth has been due largely to migration of the rural population, accompanied by the fast growing economy, which sustained an increased rate of almost 10 per cent per annum, measured in GDP. According to the estimation by Kwon Tai-hwan of net population movement between 1960 and 1985, the cities inherited the rural population approximately in proportion to their size: Seoul had the biggest share of the in-migrants, followed by the cities of Kyonggi, Pusan, and the cities of Kyongbuk and Kyongnam in due sequence.[1] A rapid increase in the school attendance rate was also witnessed: by the 1980s, about 90 per cent of children of secondary school age were attending school. The adult illiteracy rate dropped from 29.4 per cent in 1960 to under 5 per cent by 1990. The adult population

[1] See Kwon, Tai-hwan, "Estimates of Net Migration for Korea," *Bulletin of the Population and Development Studies Center*, 4 (1975), pp. 54-101; 7 (1978), pp. 43-57; and 17 (1988), pp. 36-69.

who had no schooling had also decreased to some 14 per cent of the total by 1985, compared to about 57 per cent in 1960.

Table 4-1. Selected Indicators of Socio-economic Development in Korea, 1960-1990

	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990
Total Population in Millions (3)	25.0	29.2[b]	31.5	34.7	37.4	40.4	43.5
Urban Population as Percentage of Total (3)	28.0	33.6[b]	43.2	48.4	57.3	65.4	74.4
Average Annual Growth Rate of GDP: 1960-70, 1970-80, & 1980-90 (2)	---	8.6	---	9.6	---	9.7	---
Distribution of GDP (%) (4)							
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing	38.2	41.3	29.7	27.0	17.8	12.8	9.1
Industry	18.6	23.9	27.2	31.3	37.9	41.8	44.8
Service, etc.	43.2	35.8	43.1	41.7	44.3	45.4	46.1
GNP per capita (US dollars) (4)	82[a]	114	223	574	1418	2194	5569
Adult Illiteracy Ratio (%, Age 15+) (1) & (2)	29.4	31.9[b]	12.4	9	7	N/A	4
Gross Enrollment Ratio by Age-group (1)							
Primary School (%)	96	100	103	107	109	97	108
Secondary School (%)	27	34	42	56	80	90	87
Post-secondary School (%)	4.7	6.2	7.9	9.6	14.1	34.2	39.2
Distribution of Adult Population by Education(1)							
No Schooling (%, Age 25+)	56.9	43.6	34.4	25.3	19.8	14.4	11.0[c]
Primary School (%, Age 25+)	29.6	35.2	38.2	39.3	34.6	28.1	21.7[c]
Secondary School (%, Age 25+)	10.9	17.5	21.8	28.7	37.0	46.5	51.3[c]
Post-secondary School (%, Age 25+)	2.6	3.6	5.6	6.7	8.6	11.0	16.0[c]

Note: [a] - 1961; [b] - 1966. [c] - Calculated from the 1990 Census.

Sources: (1) UNESCO, *Statistical Yearbook*, 1965, 1974, 1976, 1982, 1992; (2) World Bank, *World Development Report*, 1983, 1984, 1988, 1989, 1992, 1993; (3) Economic Planning Board, *Population and Housing Census Report*, 1960, 1966, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990; (4) Korean Statistical Association, *Korea Statistical Yearbook*, 1966, 1971, 1982, 1991.

The urban areas, which became the centre for economic growth led by the industrial sector, attracted mainly the younger portion of the population between the ages of 15 to 34, with their increasing socio-economic opportunities,

especially in job and education.[2] In the political sphere, it was the urban centres that provided the opposition with the basis of political protests as well as electoral support. Within this context, most of the studies of Korean voting behaviour often cited the urban-rural difference in electoral support as a natural dimension of voter alignment. Under past authoritarian regimes, in which the political forces had been usually polarised into pro-government and anti-government on the issue of regime legitimacy, the urban population's political propensity toward the opposition and the rural population's leaning toward the government were often regarded as a manifestation of their differences in value orientations attributed by different experiences in socio-economic and political life. For example, it was speculated that people in urban areas, who tended to be younger, better-educated and higher in socio-economic status, were, with their higher level of modernity, more committed to the democratic values, and thus less likely to support the government.[3]

However, previous findings that demonstrated a substantial association between the level of urbanisation and voter preferences are often incomplete in grasping the nature of the urban-rural pattern of voter alignment, as there is no specification of the linkages that may have led urban voters to prefer the

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[2] See Repetto, Robert, Kwon, Tai-hwan, Kim, Son-ung, Kim, Dae-young, Sloboda, John E., and Donalson, Peter J., *Economic Development, Population Policy, and Demographic Transition in the Republic of Korea: Studies in the Modernization of the Republic of Korea, 1945-1975*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981, pp. 75-101.

[3] See Lee, Nam-young, "The Democratic Belief System: A Study of the Political Culture in South Korea," *Korean Social Science Journal*, 7, 1985, pp. 46-89. Also see Kim Chong-lim, "Political Participation and Mobilized Voting," in Kim Chong-lim, ed., *Political Participation in Korea: Democracy, Mobilization and Stability*, Santa Barbara: Clio Books, 1980, pp. 119-141.

Table 4-2. Correlation Matrices for the Socio-economic Variables: Lower Triangle from the 1991 Survey, Upper Triangle from the 1992 Survey

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
(1) Urban-Rural		-.281**	.406**	.418**	.025	-.625**	.196**	.004	.304**	.097**	-.071**	.100**	.043	-.211**
(2) Age	-.192**		-.609**	-.371**	-.030	.378**	-.018	-.035	-.251**	-.044	.141**	-.051*	.019	.221**
(3) Education	.311**	-.562**		.494**	.249**	-.435**	.093**	-.160**	.367**	.139**	-.176**	.121**	.047	-.078**
(4) Family Income	.283**	-.275**	.433**		.098**	-.478**	.201**	-.097**	.256**	.129**	-.081**	.093**	.047	-.037
(5) Sex	.028	-.044	.214**	.103**		-.014	.063*	-.002	-.042	-.002	-.075**	-.029	-.059*	.024
(6) Farming	-.657**	.352**	-.453**	-.332**	.007		-.259**	-.259**	-.336**	-.087**	.078**	-.129**	-.056*	.297**
(7) Self-employed	.176**	-.024	.102**	.145**	.013	-.255**		-.292**	-.379**	-.099**	.053*	.019	.041	-.081**
(8) Blue-collar Work	.140**	-.072**	-.143**	-.109**	.032	-.249**	-.248**		-.379**	-.099**	-.017	-.038	-.100**	-.151**
(9) Routine Non-manual	.246**	-.294**	.329**	.142**	-.030	-.364**	-.363**	-.354**		-.128**	-.103**	.112**	.099**	-.066*
(10) Manager/Prof	.093**	.071**	.180**	.220**	-.030	-.125**	-.125**	-.122**	-.178**		.015	.034	.001	.068**
(11) Buddhist	-.068*	.162**	-.171**	-.171**	-.077**	.083**	.026	-.001	-.077**	-.030		-.322**	-.156**	-.010
(12) Protestant	-.008	-.034	.078**	.063**	-.106**	-.035	.001	-.031	.037	.037	-.321**		-.126**	-.028
(13) Catholic	.142**	.013	.039	.030	-.081**	-.131**	.067*	-.024	.066*	.016	-.203**	-.163**		.028
(14) Subjective Status (Type of Housing)	.077**	-.197**	.360**	.378**	.008	-.152**	.047**	-.169**	.175**	.112**	-.052	.059*	.021	

Note: Variable Coding: Urban-rural (metropolis=1, city=0.5, rural=0), Education (primary=0, middle school=0.33, high school=0.66, university=1)
Occupational Variables (1=respondents' occupation + head of households' occupation for those who were not engaged in a paid work, 0=the others)
Subjective Status (low=0, lower middle=0.33, middle=0.66, upper middle/upper=1), Housing (owner=1, long-term lease=0.5, monthly rent=0)

opposition parties and rural voters to favour the government party. That is, since the socio-economic variables - which had differentiated urban and rural voters, and which were found to be associated with voting preferences and other attitudinal variables - are closely related, arguments based on the bivariate relationship between voting preferences and each of the socio-economic variables are not only incomplete but may be quite misleading in some cases. For example, the older tend to be less-educated, the farmers tend to be older and less-educated, the less-educated tend to earn less income, and the rural areas consist of more of the voters who are older, less-educated, earn less income and are farmers than their metropolitan counterparts (see Table 4-2).

In his bivariate level analysis, for example, Lee Nam-young explained the negative relationship between family income and the governing party support observed in the 1992 presidential election as a result of the fact that "low-income earners seem to be more interested simply in maintaining their jobs than in changing the whole economic structure" under the deteriorating economic situation, and thus tended not to support the opposition parties which proposed somewhat radical economic reforms.[4] However, the negative relationship between the level of family income and governing party support can be due to improper controls: that is, the level of family income is positively correlated with the level of education, which is also negatively, and perhaps more strongly, correlated with governing party support. Take another example: looking at the

[4] See Lee, Nam-young, "The Voter's Choice: The 14th Presidential Election of Korea," *Korea Journal*, 33(1), 1993, pp. 17-26, at pp. 22-23.

bivariate relationship between voting choice and social class, Song Kyong-ryung argued that there exists "a discordant (or an inverse) relationship" between the class structure and the party system, as the ruled - such as farmers, workers and petty bourgeoisie - seemed to be the most supportive of the governing party, and those who are most likely to benefit from the ruling party, including the bourgeoisie, seemed to be the least supportive of the governing party.[5] As will be demonstrated below, however, the seemingly discordant relationship may be simply a statistical artifact due to lack of proper controls. Furthermore, it has been rare for researchers to specifically link the socio-economic variables with attitudinal variables that may determine the voter's choice.

The following sections will attempt to unravel the nature of the urban-rural dimension of voting. By looking initially at urban-rural differences in voting in a multivariate model, it will be possible to assess, first, whether urban-rural differences in voting are a reflection of the different socio-economic setting between urban and rural areas, and second, which aspects of socio-economic life are important in leading the voters to make different choices. Second, by additionally controlling for the voter's political attitudes, we will attempt to assess by which process the urban-rural dimension of voting - or anti-government voting - is exercised. That is, by controlling for the voter's immediate political

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[5] See Sung, Kyong-ryung, "Han'guk-ui Sahoe-gyegup-kwa Chongdang-gujo (Social Class and Party System in Korea)," in Lee, Un-jin, and Kim, Sok-jun, et al., *Han'guk-ui Chongch'i-wa Son'gomunhwa (Politics and Electoral Culture in Korea)*, Seoul: Sahoe-munhwa Yon'guso, 1992, pp. 13-69, at p.48.

tendencies, it may be possible to explore the linkages between socio-economic variables and voting choice.

2. Social Composition and Urban-Rural Differences in Voting

Let us begin by examining bivariate relationships between the voter's socio-economic characteristics and voting choice. Table 4-3 reports the unstandardised regression coefficients of the socio-economic variables with the dependent variables of voting choice in the 1987 and the 1992 presidential elections. The ordinary least squares regression analysis was performed for each category of the socio-economic variables. The estimates of the bivariate model can be seen as the baseline of effects of the independent variables before taking into account effects of other variables that may be associated with them, thus giving only limited information about the voter's decision.

Tables 4-3 and 4-4 show that all of the socio-economic variables under study have some significant relationships with voting at the bivariate level, albeit various in their degree of association. In other words, the voters' socio-economic characteristics listed may have exerted some influence on their voting decision. For example, among the voters in the 1987 presidential election, a person who lived in a rural area was some 10 per cent more likely to vote for Roh Tae-woo

Table 4-3. Social Structures and Voting Choice in 1987/1988: Bivariate Relationships (b's)

Variables	Roh	YS	DJ	DJP	RDP	PPD
Urban/Rural						
(Metropolitan)	(.343)	(.327)	(.250)	(.314)	(.336)	(.247)
City	-.015	-.025	.039	-.013	-.030	.035
Rural	.103**	-.156**	.047	.097**	-.147**	.041
r^2	.010	.021	.002	.009	.018	.002
Gender						
(Female)	(.411)	(.251)	(.258)	(.385)	(.266)	(.244)
Male	-.090**	.060*	.026	-.103**	.050^	.044
r^2	.009	.004	.001	.012	.003	.033
Age						
(Over 50)	(.594)	(.122)	(.240)	(.550)	(.106)	(.269)
20s	-.343**	.224**	.089*	-.318**	.282**	.027
30s	-.315**	.196**	.036	-.300**	.242**	-.009
40s	-.183**	.193**	-.045	-.192**	.169**	-.054
r^2	.081	.039	.012	.073	.058	.004
Religion						
(None/Others)	(.350)	(.270)	(.310)	(.309)	(.305)	(.277)
Buddhist	.147**	-.035	-.132**	.150**	-.023	-.106**
Protestant	-.095*	.064	.015	-.063	-.041	.081*
Catholic	-.066	.087	-.050	-.055	.018	.031
r^2	.035	.009	.019	.031	.002	.023
Education						
(Primary School)	(.539)	(.114)	(.298)	(.477)	(.115)	(.316)
Middle School	-.139**	.094*	-.066	-.123**	.116**	-.086^
High School	-.202**	.195**	-.023	-.158**	.209**	-.055
University	-.320**	.344**	-.032	-.284**	.349**	-.064
r^2	.050	.069	.002	.040	.069	.004
Job, Head of Household						
(Self-employed)	(.352)	(.280)	(.268)	(.272)	(.314)	(.301)
Farmer	.126**	-.145**	.017	.183**	-.160**	-.029
Manual Worker	-.005	.013	.034	.063	-.052	.007
Routine Non-manual	-.027	.045	-.002	.033	.043	-.059
Manager/Professional	-.014	.208**	-.114^	.006	.097	-.179**
r^2	.014	.037	.005	.019	.031	.010
Household's Income						
(Under 500,000 won)	(.432)	(.227)	(.260)	(.357)	(.269)	(.273)
500,000 - 990,000	-.071*	.049	.027	.014	-.029	-.007
1,000,000 - 1,490,000	-.151**	.139**	-.028	-.067	.077^	-.010
Over 1,500,000	-.129*	.137*	.027	-.125*	.138**	-.017
r^2	.011	.012	.002	.010	.016	.0001
Subjective Status						
(Low)	(.417)	(.230)	(.267)	(.374)	(.234)	(.278)
Lower-middle	-.028	.025	.004	-.027	.372	-.014
Middle	-.101*	.084*	.025	-.079*	.098**	-.013
Upper-middle/Upper	-.109^	.207**	-.095	-.083	.177**	-.040
r^2	.008	.014	.004	.005	.012	.0005

Note: ** - p<.01; * - p<.05; and ^ - p<.10 in a two-tailed test.
Intercepts are in bracket.

Source: The 1991 Survey.

Table 4-4. Social Structures and Voting Choice in 1992: Bivariate Relationships (b's)

Variables	YS	DJ	JY	DLP	DP	UNP
Urban/Rural						
(Metropolitan)	(.405)	(.330)	(.168)	(.385)	(.418)	(.130)
City	-.015	.009	.023	-.001	-.046	.033
Rural	.076*	.024	-.045	.161**	-.087*	-.064**
r^2	.005	.0004	.005	.020	.006	.012
Gender						
(Female)	(.467)	(.322)	(.148)	(.468)	(.359)	(.111)
Male	-.096**	.031	.031	-.086**	.051^	.024
r^2	.010	.001	.002	.008	.003	.001
Age						
(Over 50)	(.611)	(.289)	(.078)	(.557)	(.324)	(.073)
20s	-.349**	.102**	.112**	-.222**	.120**	.060*
30s	-.247**	.041	.159**	-.214**	.070^	.097**
40s	-.088*	.037	.038	-.032	.024	.029
r^2	.079	.007	.029	.042	.009	.012
Religion						
(None/Others)	(.349)	(.403)	(.146)	(.373)	(.425)	(.122)
Buddhist	.199**	-.193**	.049*	.160**	-.144**	-.008
Protestant	.074*	-.047	.007	.053	-.010	.006
Catholic	-.012	.003	.022	-.084	.047	.039
r^2	.030	.031	.003	.023	.019	.001
Education						
(Primary School)	(.567)	(.331)	(.074)	(.546)	(.333)	(.067)
Middle School	-.061	.002	.051	-.081^	.024	.070*
High School	-.205**	-.0003	.147**	-.140**	.042	.070**
University	-.256**	.034	.102**	-.244**	.143**	.079**
r^2	.040	.001	.025	.028	.011	.008
Job, Head of Household						
(Self-employed)	(.390)	(.344)	(.170)	(.353)	(.437)	(.123)
Farmer	.120**	.010	-.076*	.184**	-.107*	-.058*
Manual Worker	.049	-.027	.022	.121**	-.099*	.003
Routine Non-manual	-.035	.021	.011	.004	-.013	.041
Manager/Professional	.245**	-.265**	-.050	.253**	-.206*	-.086
r^2	.019	.011	.009	.027	.012	.013
Household's Income						
(Under 500,000 won)	(.525)	(.363)	(.077)	(.538)	(.370)	(.048)
500,000 - 990,000	-.117**	-.023	.096**	-.107**	.003	.065*
1,000,000 - 1,490,000	-.127**	-.040	.115**	-.152**	.003	.129**
Over 1,500,000	-.143**	-.027	.110**	-.169**	.062	.072*
r^2	.010	.001	.012	.013	.002	.017
Type of Housing						
(Owner Occupier)	(.476)	(.309)	(.151)	(.458)	(.360)	(.116)
Monthly Rent	-.079	.040	-.040	-.009	.013	-.015
Long-term Lease	-.158**	.083**	.046*	-.101**	.072*	.023
r^2	.022	.007	.005	.009	.005	.001

Note: ** - p<.01; * - p<.05; and ^ - p<.10 in a two-tailed test.
Intercepts are in bracket.

Source: The 1992 Post-election Survey.

(and about 16 per cent less likely to vote for Kim Young-sam) than a comparable person who lived in a metropolitan area. Male voters, the younger, and the better-educated were less likely to be supportive of the governing party candidates in 1987 and in 1992 than female counterparts, the older, and the less-educated, respectively. Voters whose religious affiliations were Buddhism, whose occupations were farmer, and who were earning less income, showed political propensity toward the governing party and its candidates across all the models. In addition, those who had managerial and professional jobs favoured Kim Young-sam disproportionately both in 1987 and in 1992. People who assigned themselves as middle-class or above were less likely to vote Roh Tae-woo in 1987 than the others, and those who dwelled in their own house were more likely to vote Kim Young-sam in 1992 than those who occupied other types of housing.

As mentioned above, it may be premature to conclude that the relationships between the socio-economic variables and voting choice observed at the bivariate level are genuine. There may be two main sources of misleading results. First, there are obviously many more politically relevant variables that may affect voting choice. Although it may be impractical to attempt to explain all the forces that influence a voter's decision in an election, an argument based on a bivariate relationship is even more problematic. Second, it is possible that the observed bivariate relationships may be spurious. Since the socio-economic variables are interrelated, the bivariate relationships measure different aspects of the same

voters without distinguishing their different impacts on voting choice. The latter point can be more serious if one attempts to construct a theoretical model, as each of the socio-economic variables may have different theoretical implications. For example, the negative relationship between the level of a household's income and the governing party support - that is, the more a person earns, the less the person supports the governing party (a proposition which is highly doubtful) - may mislead a researcher unless other relevant variables, which may be related both to a person's level of income and voting choice, are taken into account.

To test different impacts of the socio-economic variables on the voter's choice, the coefficients are estimated using a series of ordinary least squares equations. Basically, three regression models for voting choice were employed by introducing additional controls. The first model takes on the effects of geographical location on voting choice by employing the variables of residential type (urban/rural), and region. The native region variables were also entered into the equations as a control variable to insure that any relationship detected is not actually due to regional factors. (Detailed discussions of regional effects on voting will follow in Chapter 5.) The second model introduces additional control variables of socialisation: gender, age, religion and education. The third model considers the effects of a person's location in the social structure by introducing additional variables of occupation, income, subjective status or housing type. Thus, by looking at changes of the coefficient in due course, it is possible to assess: (1) whether or not the geographical differences in voting (in this chapter,

the focus is on the urban-rural difference) exist if differences of the socio-economic characteristics of the voters are considered; (2) which aspects of socio-economic life result in such differences in voting if the differences are due to differences in social composition between the geographical units; and (3) to determine which aspects of socio-economic life exert most significant impact on voting, and to identify their varying degrees of influence. The unstandardised regression coefficients of the three models are reported in Table 4-5 and Table 4-6 for voting choices in 1987/1988 and 1992, respectively.

First of all, the urban/rural differences in voting, which were significant in the first model, became insignificant when the voters' socio-economic characteristics were controlled.[6] Indeed, by the second model, in which the socialisation variables were entered into the equations, the effect of urban/rural residency on voting became negligible. When the regional attributes were controlled in the first models, rural voters tended to favour (by some 12 per cent) the governing party candidates compared with those in metropolitan areas. This is a clear indication that the observed urban/rural difference in voting may be a mere reflection of differences in social composition between urban and rural areas. That is, the reason for rural voters' favouring the governing party and its

[6] Regarding this observation, however, a reservation needs to be made for the models in the 1992 National Assembly election, in which those who lived in the cities (other than the metropolises, i.e., Seoul, Pusan, Inchon, Taegu, Kwangju, and Taejon) showed some significant difference in their voting for the DLP and the UNP, compared with those in the metropolitan areas (and of course compared with those in the rural areas as well). No firm answers can be provided for this, but it is likely that the UNP had relative success in the cities rather than the metropolitan areas, as the special cities in the regional hinterlands coincided largely with the regional strongholds of the DLP - i.e., Pusan and Taegu, including Taejon - and the DP - i.e., Kwangju.

Table 4-5. Urban-Rural, Socialisation, Socio-economic Interests, and Voting Choice in 1987 and 1988: A Multivariate Assessment (b's; Controlling for Regional Attributes)

	Roh Tae-woo			Kim Young-sam			Kim Dae-jung			DJP			RDP			PPD		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
Urban/Rural(Metro)																		
City	-.014	-.009	-.005	-.006	-.006	-.009	.021	.020	.021	-.017	-.018	-.025	.025	.020	.018	.009	.013	.017
Rural	.118**	.029	.035	-.125**	-.062	-.050	.017	.033	.059	.115**	.038	.010	-.089*	-.026	-.021	.006	.015	.066^
Socialisation																		
Gender(Female)																		
Male		-.065*	-.065*		.031	.034		.014	.015		-.089**	-.095**		.013	.019		.052*	.047*
Age (50+)																		
20s		-.294**	-.300**		.118**	.124**		.120**	.112**		-.301**	-.327**		.204**	.220**		.070*	.057
30s		-.280**	-.282**		.102*	.111*		.091**	.080*		-.286**	-.297**		.168**	.181**		.052	.031
40s		-.187**	-.188**		.128**	.135**		.040	.032		-.201**	-.206**		.117*	.123**		.028	.016
Religion (No/Others)																		
Buddhist		.068^	.067^		-.076*	-.074*		-.026	-.022		.066^	.071^		-.046	-.048		-.006	-.007
Protestant		-.091*	-.094*		.092*	.092*		-.025	-.022		-.073^	-.072^		-.008	-.012		.045	.045
Catholic		-.088	-.092^		.077	.081		-.024	-.026		-.092^	-.084		.019	.011		.061	.055
Education(Primary)																		
Middle School		-.054	-.053		-.014	-.013		-.004	-.014		-.029	-.014		-.003	-.004		-.023	-.032
High School		-.058	-.062		.068	.070		-.004	-.008		-.004	.025		.050	.030		-.028	-.032
University		-.141*	-.146*		.180**	.165**		-.001	.016		-.078	-.031		.155**	.106^		-.034	-.008
SE Interests																		
Job(Self-employed)																		
Farmer			-.020			.008			-.041			.097			-.016			-.103*
Manual Worker			-.007			.042			.020			.072			-.035			.009
Non-manual			.021			.0003			-.011			.070^			-.008			-.050^
Manager/Prof			-.046			.140*			-.033			-.048			.059			-.114*
Income(< 500,000)																		
500 - 990,000			-.049			.034			.018			.015			-.029			.019
1,000 - 1,490,000			-.033			-.0005			.052^			-.018			.020			.034
Over 1,500,000			-.047			.042			-.048			-.041			.035			.033
Self-Status (Low)																		
Lower-middle			.031			-.036			.008			.017			-.036			.002
Middle			.002			.006			.0003			.017			.011			-.036
Upper-middle/Upper			-.006			.046			-.034			.035			-.001			.020
Intercept	.455	.792	.821	.412	.203	.162	.092	.036	.032	.457	.763	.693	.422	.229	.258	.096	.034	.077
R-Squared	.153	.264	.267	.178	.249	.258	.560	.572	.578	.137	.239	.246	.183	.246	.253	.553	.561	.570

Note: Coefficients for Regional Attributes not shown. ** - p<.01; * - p<.05; and ^ - p<.10 in a two-tailed test. Source: The 1991 Survey.

Table 4-6. Urban-Rural, Socialisation, Socio-economic Interests, and Voting Choice in 1992: A Multivariate Assessment (b's; Controlling for Regional Attributes)

	Kim Young-sam			Kim Dae-jung			Chung Ju-young			DLP			DP			UNP		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
Urban/Rural(Metro)																		
City	.008	-.001	.007	.032	.034	.028	-.017	-.014	-.021	-.063	-.069^	-.067	.011	.014	.009	.048	.052^	.055^
Rural	.110**	.021	.031	.017	.041	.022	-.063*	-.022	-.018	.103**	.056	.070	-.039	-.013	-.031	-.039	-.026	-.018
Socialisation																		
Gender (Female)																		
Male		-.082**	-.075**		.042*	.038^		.020	.018		-.078**	-.072*		.051*	.047^		.017	.017
Age (50+)																		
20s		-.338**	-.327**		.141**	.128**		.078*	.081*		-.199**	-.207**		.110**	.118**		.044	.042
30s		-.240**	-.221**		.098**	.079*		.102**	.104**		-.197**	-.193**		.076^	.080*		.070*	.061^
40s		-.079*	-.081*		.045	.052		.022	.020		-.015	-.015		.010	.024		.015	.006
Religion (No/Others)																		
Buddhist		.028	.025		-.054*	-.048^		.075**	.080**		.029	.031		.00002	.001		-.011	-.010
Protestant		.072*	.067*		-.032	-.025		-.009	-.007		.066^	.065^		-.020	-.017		-.004	-.007
Catholic		-.029	-.047		.010	.029		.017	.022		-.084	-.082		.038	.050		.036	.022
Education(Primary)																		
Middle School		.044	.034		-.024	-.008		.010	.010		.037	.037		-.028	-.015		.023	.014
High School		-.027	-.042		-.029	-.008		.079*	.079*		.046	.054		-.031	-.013		-.006	-.029
University		-.054	-.103^		-.016	.036		.044	.049		-.028	-.035		.039	.073		.0003	-.020
SE Interests																		
Job(Self-employed)																		
Farmer			-.044			.081^			-.022			.001			.007			-.0001
Manual Worker			-.003			.034			.021			.074^			-.026			-.004
Non-manual			.034			.003			-.012			.054			-.042			.032
Manager/Prof			.176*			-.140*			-.062			.213**			-.130^			-.111^
Income(< 500,000)																		
500 - 990,000			.024			-.036			.002			.009			-.068			.021
1,000 - 1,490,000			.011			-.020			.004			-.018			-.077^			.076*
Over 1,500,000			.015			-.025			.001			-.002			-.013			.024
Housing (Owner)																		
Monthly Rent			-.032			.041			-.087^			.027			-.005			-.029
Long-term Lease			-.103**			.102**			-.015			-.040			.059*			-.014
Intercept	.399	.646	.653	.294	.229	.199	.208	.064	.075	.342	.485	.447	.444	.358	.411	.189	.142	.122
R-Squared	.252	.351	.364	.492	.509	.522	.099	.131	.135	.197	.245	.254	.356	.372	.379	.050	.059	.071

Note: Coefficients for Regional Attributes not shown. ** - p<.01; * - p<.05; and ^ - p<.10 in a two-tailed test. Source: The 1992 Post-Election Survey.

candidates overall may be nothing more than the fact that, for example, the rural areas consisted of more of the older and the less educated voters, who tended to favour the governing party candidates. Comparable evidence can be found in the analyses by Lee Kap-yun and Park Chan-wook, where the urban-rural differences in voting became negligible when other socio-economic characteristics of the voters were taken into account.[7]

A further test is provided in Table 4-7, in which each of the socialisation variables is controlled, in addition to those in the first models. The models for Kim Dae-jung and his party vote were not estimated as the urban-rural difference was not significant for them in the first models. The table shows that the urban-rural difference in voting was largely accounted for either by education or by age across the models, except for the difference in the 1987 Kim Young-sam vote - which was not accounted for by any single variable but by the combination of education, age and religion. This analysis indicates that the urban-rural difference in voting results from differences in educational attainment or age composition between the urban and rural areas that result in differences in voting choice. In accounting for urban-rural differences in voting, education seemed to be somewhat more important than age. But when age was added as a control as shown in the second models at Tables 4-5 and 4-6, education appeared to exert

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[7] See Lee, Kap-yun, "T'up'yohaengt'ae-wa Minjuhwa (Voting Behaviour and Democratisation)," in Kim, Kwang-woong (ed.), *Han'guk-ui Son'gojongch'ihak (Studies on Korean Electoral Politics)*, Seoul: Pobmunsa, 1988, pp. 167-181; and Park, Chan-wook, "Korean Voters' Candidate Choice in the 1992 Presidential Election: A Survey Data Analysis," *Korea and World Affairs*, 17(3), 1993, pp. 432-458.

only some residual effect on voting.[8] Thus, it can be argued that the urban-rural difference in voting ultimately results mainly from differences in age composition, and partly from differences in education attainment between urban and rural voters. In short, the *yoch'on yado* (government-rural, opposition-urban) phenomenon may have been nothing more than urban-rural differences in the aggregate tendency of the individual voter's characteristics, especially those of age (and education), that have led them to make different choices.

Table 4-7. The Urban-Rural Difference, Socialisation Variables, and Voting Choice (b's of Rural): In 1987/1988 and 1992 (Controlling for Regional Attributes)

	1987/1988				1992			
Controls	Roh	YS	DJP	RDP	YS	JY	DLP	UNP
Regional Attributes (1)	.118**	-.125**	.115**	-.089*	.110**	-.063*	.103**	-.039
(1) + Education	.043	-.073^	.052	-.034	.005	-.021	.044	-.025
(1) + Age	.062	-.096*	.063	-.051	.031	-.035	.056	-.026
(1) + Religion	.100*	-.108**	.098**	-.079*	.110**	-.067*	.102**	-.038
(1) + Gender	.117**	-.124**	.114**	-.088*	.108**	-.063*	.102**	-.039
All of the above	.029	-.062	.038	-.026	.021	-.022	.056	-.026

Note: ** - p<.01; * - p<.05; and ^ - p <.10 in a two-tailed test.

Let us now examine the effect of each of the socialisation variables, which largely accounted for the urban/rural differences in voting. Of the socialisation variables, age seemed to exert the strongest impact on voting choice across the models (see the second models at Table 4-5 and 4-6). For example, across all the

[8] Given the higher correlation figures between education and the urban-rural variable (.311 in the 1991 survey data and .406 in the 1992 survey data) than those between age and the urban-rural variable (-.192 in 1991 and -.281 in 1992), it may not be so surprising that education was more important than age in accounting for the urban-rural difference in voting. However, in making voting decisions, age differences appeared far more important than education.

models those in their twenties, who were similar in other respects on the list, were some 30 per cent less likely to vote for the governing party and its candidates than those in their fifties and over, except for the DLP in which the difference was about 20 per cent. Alternatively, the opposition parties and their candidates were favoured most by those in their twenties (but note that Chung Ju-young and his UNP in 1992 were most favoured by those in their thirties). Compared with the patterns of governing party support, the b's of the age variables for the models of the opposition party support were smaller in their magnitude although their directions were all against the governing party. This indicates that the opposition parties shared rather evenly, especially in 1987, the support of the younger age cohorts that was reflected in the anti-government vote. Kim Young-sam, who once pulled more support from the younger age cohorts in 1987 as an opposition candidate, lost this support in 1992 as a result of his change in partisan stance. If compared with the bivariate relationships shown in Tables 4-3 and 4-4, the b's of age were virtually the same (slightly reduced) across the models, except for the b's for Kim Dae-jung and his party vote, which increased in magnitude. Once effects of the other variables, especially those of regional attributes, were taken into account, Kim Dae-jung and his parties pulled more support from the younger age cohorts as did the other opposition parties and candidates. Independent of other variables on the list, the male voters were also less likely to support the governing party and its candidates than female.

Religious affiliations also appeared to exert some significant effect on voting, after holding constant other variables on the list, especially in the presidential elections. For example, in 1987 Buddhists favoured Roh Tae-woo the most and Kim Young-sam the least, and in 1992 Chung Ju-young the most and Kim Dae-jung the least; in 1987 Protestants favoured Kim Young-sam the most and Roh Tae-woo the least, and in 1992 they favoured Kim Young-sam again. Of the models in the National Assembly elections, religious affiliations exerted some significant influence only for the governing party choices. That is, in 1988 the DJP was favoured by Buddhists but disfavoured by Protestants and Catholics, and in 1992 the DLP was favoured by Protestants. The pattern that emerged from this analysis is that differences in electoral support among the religious groups are not related to the party lines of government vs opposition but to a specific candidate. The voters may have taken into account the candidates' religious affiliations when voting - that is, Kim Young-sam is affiliated with the Protestant church, Kim Dae-jung the Catholic church, and Roh Tae-woo/Chung Ju-young with Buddhism. It seems unlikely that the religious institutions played a significant role in politically socialising the mass public along the party lines, even though some of the Christian churches often produced some prominent anti-government activists during the authoritarian regimes.[9]

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[9] See Sohn, Hak-kyu, *Authoritarianism and Opposition in South Korea*, London: Routledge, 1989. Also see Huang, Sung-mo, "Protestant Churches in Korea: Their Impact on Cultural Change," *Koreana Quarterly*, 9(1), 1967, pp. 41-55.

It is also noteworthy that the bivariate b's of Buddhists for the governing party candidates, that is, for Roh Tae-woo (.147) and for Kim Young-sam (.199) shown at Tables 4-3 and 4-4, respectively, were far reduced in the second models. This indicates that the bivariate relationships may have contained spurious components accounted for by other socialisation variables. Indeed, those who practised Buddhism were more likely to be the older, the less-educated and female, and those who exhibited political leanings toward the governing party (see the correlation matrix at Table 4-2).

Some residual effects were found for education, especially for those who had a university education, in the choice of Roh Tae-woo, and in the choice of Kim Young-sam and his RDP in 1987/1988. In 1992, however, virtually no effects of education on voting choices remained across the models when the other characteristics of the voters were taken into account. Compared with the bivariate relationships, the decrease in the effects of education on voting behaviour in the multivariate analysis is quite drastic. Thus, it can be speculated that the significant leaning toward the opposition in 1987/1988 among those who had a university education related to their greater commitment to "democratisation." Concerns over regime characteristics, which might result partly from educational attainment,[10] still prevailed in the electoral contests.

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[10] According to Lee Nam-young's regression analysis on democratic attitudes, the strongest determinant of such attitudes was educational attainment: indeed, about twice as strong as the age or political interest variables. See Lee, Nam-young, "The Democratic Belief System: A Study of the Political Culture in South Korea," *Korean Social Science Journal*, 7, 1985, pp. 46-89, at p.68 (Table 5). Also see Dong, Won-mo, "University Students in South Korean Politics: Patterns of Radicalisation in the 1980s," *Journal of International Affairs*, 40(2), 1987, pp. 233-255.

By the third models (see Table 4-5 and 4-6), in which the variables of a person's socio-economic interests were added, the b's of socialisation variables remained virtually unchanged. It was rather the b's of socio-economic variables, which exerted some significant effects on voting at the bivariate level, that generally lost their significance. For example, income and self-perceptions of social status virtually lost significance across all the models. The farmers' tendency of favouring the governing party and its candidates all but disappeared across the models. There was also no substantial improvement in the overall explanatory power by the addition of socio-economic interest variables in the equations (see the changes of R-squared statistics across the models). These results indicate that socialisation variables have priority over socio-economic interests in voting choice. The seemingly "discordant (or inverse)" relationship between voting choice and income, or social class,[11] simply did not exist.

There were rather indications of relationships in a right direction between voting choice and social structure, especially in 1992. For example, of the occupational categories, the managerial/professional segment maintained its preference for Kim Young-sam in 1992, as it did in 1987 (and for his RDP in 1988). It is also noteworthy that Kim Dae-jung and his DP were less supported by the managerial/professional segment in 1992. Its tendency of favouring Kim Young-sam deserves special attention in that this was consistent across the two

[11] See Sung, Kyong-ryung, op.cit., 1992.

elections despite his dramatic shifting of political stance, and furthermore support increased over time. Perhaps the managerial and professional segment - which consisted of such occupational groups as higher rank public and private sector employees, lawyers, university lecturers, doctors, artists, etc. - may have supported Kim Young-sam, an opposition candidate, in 1987 because it may have preferred democratic change, but in 1992, where what mattered was pace of democratisation rather than democratisation itself, it again chose to support him, as the governing party candidate. In 1992, the farmers favoured Kim Dae-jung somewhat (by about 8 per cent more than the self-employed), but in 1988 they were disenchanted with his PPD by about 10 per cent, independent of other variables on the list. In 1992, those who were not dwelling in their own house, especially those who lived in long-term leased housing, but were similar in other respects, showed their significant electoral leaning (some 10 per cent) against Kim Young-sam.[12] However, it may be too early to argue that the electoral impact of the socio-economic interests of voters has some significant ongoing political implications. This may be highly dependent on how political parties articulate voters' socio-economic interests in forthcoming electoral competitions. After all, the influence of a person's location in the social structure was negligible overall when other characteristics of the voter were taken into account.

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[12] The data on type of housing are only available in the 1992 survey. The variations exposed by the housing type indicate a possible hypothesis of interest-oriented voting that differences in property ownership result in such differences of voting choice. However, it may have been a phenomenon specific to the elections of 1992 as the issue of housing price - especially the price of apartments - was raised by Chong Ju-young and his UNP during the 1992 National Assembly and presidential election campaigns. Nonetheless, the fact that the beneficiary of this housing price issue was the main opposition candidate, Kim Dae-jung rather than Chong himself is an affirmative indication of the interest-oriented voting hypothesis, which exhibits a congruent relationship on the party lines of government vs opposition.

~~What then are the reasons that~~ why were voters' socio-economic interests ~~were~~ given so little due regard ~~when they decided who to vote for~~? An obvious answer can be sought in the existing party system, in which class-oriented parties are kept out. For example, no parties of importance based on working-class interests came to exist after the 1960s, as political activities of trade unions - such as donations of political funds, formal support of a particular party or candidate, and party formation - were strictly barred by the law.[13] The few "progressive" parties, which claimed to represent the interests of the under-privileged, including the working-class, gained less than 2 per cent of the popular vote in the post-1987 elections. Class-related issues of wealth redistribution or a social group's other specific concerns have not yet proved salient in electoral contests. Rather, it has been such issues as those related to regime characteristics that have bound political contests of the parties. Up to the elections of 1992, issues of "democratisation," "social stability" or "economic development" were the major points of contention where the parties tried to project themselves as more capable managers than the others. For these reasons, it is not so surprising to behold that a voter's socio-economic interests have not been reflected much in his/her voting decision as yet.

Overall, the influence of the socialisation variables was dominant over the socio-economic interest variables when the voters decided how to vote in

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[13] See Kim, Young-rae, *Han'guk Iikchiptan-gwa Minjujongch'ibaljon (Interest Groups and Development of Political Democracy in Korea)*, Seoul: Taewangsa, 1990, pp. 227-242.

1987/1988 and in 1992. Regarding the significant differences in electoral support across age cohorts, gender and educational level, it is most likely that the voters' different value orientations resulting from their different experience in political socialisation may have resulted in such differences of electoral preferences. The differences in the governing party support relating to the age cohorts are the most impressive among the socialisation variables. Why, then, are the younger voters more likely to support the opposition? There may have existed a good deal of age-related attitudinal differences, which in turn affected voters' decisions, but how? For example, is the difference in political preference among the age cohorts mainly due to "life-cycle effects" or because of "generation effects"?[14] Can the differences in the governing party support between male and female also be attributed to differences in political attitudes? These kinds of questions still need to be pursued further, in order to explore the nature of the urban-rural dimension of voter alignment.

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[14] See, for a review of theories explaining age-related phenomenon in political socialisation, Niemi, Richard G., and Sobieszek, Barbara I., "Political Socialisation," *Annual Review of Sociology*, 3, 1977, pp. 209-233, at pp. 225-228. See, for an argument that weighs the (political) generation effects in Korea, Ahn, Chung-si, "Political Culture and Political Socialisation of the Post-war Generation in South Korea," *Korea Journal*, 28(5), 1988, pp. 4-20; and Chung, Jin-min, "Han'guksahoe-ui Sedaemunje-wa Son'go (The Generation Problems and Elections in Korean Society)," in Lee, Nam-young (ed.), *Han'guk-ui Son'go (Elections in Korea), I*, Seoul: Nanam, 1993, pp. 115-137.

3. Political Attitudes, Issue Standing, and Voting

From the analysis above, it has become clear that the urban-rural difference in voting is a mere reflection of a dimension of voter alignment that mainly results from some voters' tendency towards anti-government voting. Given that only a negligible effect of the urban-rural residence in voting choice remained after taking into account the socialisation variables, age (and education) in particular, it is hardly compelling to pursue other sources that are specifically associated with direct consequences of urbanisation. However, the nature of the urban-rural dimension of voter alignment - the dimension which was often regarded the same as the democratic-authoritarian dimension of political alignment because of its close correspondence to party systems in the past - still needs to be pursued. By introducing additional controls of the voters' political attitudes, this section will attempt to unravel the nature of the urban-rural dimension of political alignment.

The additional control variables introduced in the following analyses are basically those which measure an individual's immediate political tendency. The aim in adding the attitudinal variables - which may vary among social groups, and also impact on voting choice - to the regression equations above, is to identify the main attitudinal variable that accounts for the urban-rural dimension of voter alignment, the dimension in this case largely comprised of the age

differences in voting. That is, by looking at the changes of the coefficients across the models, components of the effects of the socio-economic variables that are accounted for by the newly added political attitude variables can be identified.

Table 4-8. Rotated Factor Loadings for the Selected Attitudinal Variables

	Anti-gvn't Group	Pro-gvn't Group	Regime Support	Political Interest	Aware-ness	Morality
Chaeya, Contribution to Democracy	.849	-.034	.007	.056	.015	-.022
Labour Activists	.822	.005	-.053	.014	.045	-.002
University Students	.821	-.077	-.015	.022	.031	-.032
Religious Institutions	.648	.267	-.056	.042	-.009	.008
Big-business, Contribution to Democracy	.115	.767	.101	-.046	.008	.054
The Military	-.054	.716	.117	-.124	.114	-.057
America	.035	.685	.139	.128	-.118	.003
Past Elections, Fair	-.049	.064	.672	.028	-.048	.204
Democratisation, well Advanced	-.034	.109	.610	.021	.012	-.223
Intra-party Politics, Democratic	-.112	.182	.560	-.075	.271	-.175
No need for Big Changes	.033	.098	.532	-.151	-.034	.119
Been in Campaign Rally	-.004	-.017	-.032	.749	-.038	-.064
Interested in Politics	.131	-.036	-.043	.709	.179	.105
Influence of Vote-buying, Negative	.021	-.073	.084	.042	.671	.253
Regionalism, Serious	-.041	.139	-.353	-.070	.566	-.046
Opposition Party Unification, Desirable	.090	-.031	.141	.100	.503	-.184
Political Corruption, Unacceptable	-.055	.034	-.045	.066	-.044	.819
Personal Experience of Vote-buying, No	.020	-.050	.147	-.378	.098	.414
Eigen Value	2.63	2.17	1.30	1.22	1.15	1.06
Variance Explained (%)	14.6	12.1	7.2	6.8	6.4	5.9

Source: The 1991 Survey.

For the models of 1987/1988, six attitudinal variables are identified using a factorial solution, and indexed to run 0 to 1 - simply by adding up, and dividing

the sums by the numbers of the variables clustered together in each of the six categories. The factor loadings, extracted by the principal components method of the 18 selected variables and orthogonally rotated, are reported in Table 4-8. Then, the six variables were scaled to run 0 to 1, and grouped into two to build up two additional equations.

The first category of attitudinal variables consists of "the political interest index" (scaled 1 for those who participated in a campaign rally, and were interested in politics very much), "the awareness index" (scaled 1 for those who saw the influence of vote-buying activities of politicians as negative, regionalism as serious, and the recent opposition party unification as positive), "the morality index" (scaled 1 for those respondents who had no experience of receiving money or other material gains from politicians in the campaign processes, and enunciated corruption of politicians unacceptable), and "the regime support index" (scaled 1 for those who evaluated past elections fair, the democratisation process advanced, the parties managed democratically, and the societal system as needing no big changes). The second category measures the voters' evaluations of the various political groups' contribution to democratisation: that is, "the anti-government group evaluation index" was scaled 1 for those respondents who evaluated the activities of university students, anti-government forces (*Chaeya*), labour-movement activists, and religious institutions most positively; and "the pro-government group evaluation index" was scaled 1 for those respondents who

evaluated the high ranking military officers, the businesses (*Chaebol*), and America most positively in the democratisation process.

In the case of the 1992 models, three attitudinal variables were employed: that is, self-designated socio-political tendency, which runs progressive to conservative, political efficacy regarding the input functions of elections to political process, and an index of issue standing regarding demonstrations, the teacher's union, withdrawal of the US army, and permission for personal-level contact with North Korea. (See Appendix 1 for detailed discussion of variable constructions, and wordings for the survey data sets.) The two variables of self-designated socio-political tendency and political efficacy are controlled first, and "the issue standing index" is followed to build up two additional models.

In building up the models, no causal assumptions are made between the two categories of attitudinal variables. Rather, these are the variables that measure various aspects of the voters' political life: with one group representing the voters' general political orientation towards the political system, and the other delineating the specific concerns of group evaluations in the case of 1987/1988; and in 1992, one represents the voters' general political tendency, and the other depicts the voters' viewpoints reflected in issue standing. The main objective here is to identify a major dimension that accounts for the urban-rural dimension in voting, thus providing an insight into the nature of the urban-rural dimension of voting. In other words, it is to identify the underlying political forces that

were reflected in the differences in voting choice across the social groups. By additionally controlling for two categories of the attitudinal variables in due sequence, it is possible to identify which attitudinal aspects account for mostly, if not entirely, the effects of socialisation and socio-economic interest variables on voting. Tables 4-9 and 4-10 report the coefficient estimates of the socio-economic variables in 1987/1988 and in 1992, respectively: the first models are without controls - the same as the final models at Table 4-6 and 4-7, the second models are with controls of the first category of attitudinal variables, and the third models with additional controls of the second category of the variables.

Let us begin by briefly examining the models in 1987/1988. There emerged three general patterns in the changes of the b's of socialisation and socio-economic interest variables with the additional controls of attitudinal variables: (1) variables showing more change in the second models than in the third; (2) variables showing more change in the third models than in the second; and (3) variables not showing much change. First, the effects of gender and age on voting across the models were accounted for more by the first category of attitudinal variables that measured the voters' general political orientation towards the political system. Second, the effect of university education on voting was accounted for more by the second category of attitudinal variables that measured the voters' evaluations of political groups. To be sure, however, the attitudinal variables employed here did not have a substantial impact in reducing the effects of gender, age and education. Third, the effects of religious affiliation on voting remained virtually the same across all the models, and the

Table 4-9. Social Structures, Political Attitudes, and Voting Choice in 1987 and 1988: A Multivariate Assessment (b's; Controlling for Regional Attributes)

	Roh Tae-woo			Kim Young-sam			Kim Dae-jung			DJP			RDP			PPD		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
Urban/Rural(Metro)																		
City	-.005	-.012	-.005	-.009	-.007	-.010	.021	.026	.020	-.025	-.031	-.024	.018	.019	.018	.017	.022	.018
Rural	.035	.018	.028	-.050	-.050	-.054	.059	.074^	.066^	.010	-.004	.006	-.021	-.022	-.025	.066^	.081*	.077*
Socialisation																		
Gender(Female)																		
Male	-.065*	-.040	-.041	.034	.035	.024	.015	-.010	-.007	-.095**	-.080*	-.079*	.019	.021	.017	.047*	.033	.038^
Age (50+)																		
20s	**-.300****	**-.248****	**-.233****	**.124****	**.096***	**.089^**	**.112****	**.097****	**.083***	**-.327****	**-.271****	**-.257****	**.220****	**.187****	**.186****	**.057**	**.034**	**.023**
30s	**-.282****	**-.248****	**-.239****	**.111***	**.095***	**.091***	**.080***	**.069***	**.061^**	**-.297****	**-.260****	**-.252****	**.181****	**.162****	**.160****	**.031**	**.015**	**.009**
40s	**-.188****	**-.187****	**-.179****	**.135****	**.134****	**.131****	**.032**	**.033**	**.025**	**-.206****	**-.205****	**-.198****	**.123****	**.122****	**.123****	**.016**	**.018**	**.011**
Religion (No/Others)																		
Buddhist	.067^	.061^	.056	-.074*	-.069^	-.067^	-.022	-.023	-.019	.071^	.062^	.058	-.048	-.042	-.041	-.007	-.005	-.002
Protestant	-.094*	-.090*	-.091*	.092*	.093*	.094*	-.022	-.027	-.026	-.072^	-.070^	-.070^	-.012	-.010	-.011	.045	.041	.043
Catholic	-.092^	-.076	-.075	.081	.076	.075	-.026	-.035	-.036	-.084	-.070	-.069	.011	.005	.004	.055	.049	.049
Education(Primary)																		
Middle School	-.053	-.042	-.047	-.013	-.009	-.007	-.014	-.021	-.016	-.014	-.004	-.010	-.004	-.002	-.001	-.032	-.038	-.035
High School	-.062	-.054	-.052	.070	.076	.075	-.008	-.015	-.016	.025	.030	.033	.030	.036	.033	-.032	-.035	-.034
University	-.146*	-.133*	-.114^	.165**	.166**	.158*	.016	.007	-.008	-.031	-.021	-.001	.106^	.106^	.100	-.008	-.013	-.021
SE Interests																		
Job(Self-employed)																		
Farmer	-.020	-.013	-.021	.008	.008	.011	-.041	-.046	-.040	.097	.107^	.099	-.016	-.017	-.012	-.103*	-.112**	-.110*
Manual Worker	-.007	-.007	-.007	.042	.041	.041	.020	.023	.022	.072	.076	.075	-.035	-.037	-.035	.009	.007	.005
Non-manual	.021	.014	.012	.0003	.003	.004	-.011	-.006	-.006	.070^	.066	.063	-.008	-.006	-.003	-.050^	-.049	-.050^
Manager/Prof	-.046	-.026	-.036	.140*	.128^	.133^	-.033	-.033	-.023	-.048	-.019	-.028	.059	.043	.043	-.114*	-.126*	-.117*
Income(< 500,000)																		
500 - 990,000	-.049	-.037	-.041	.034	.029	.031	.018	.013	.018	.015	.027	.024	-.029	-.035	-.036	.019	.013	.018
1,000 - 1,490,000	-.033	-.036	-.035	-.0005	.002	.002	.052^	.053^	.051^	-.018	-.022	-.021	.020	.023	.022	.034	.035	.035
Over 1,500,000	-.047	-.032	-.033	.042	.035	.035	-.048	-.056	-.056	-.041	-.028	-.029	.035	.027	.028	.033	.026	.026
Self-Status (Low)																		
Lower-middle	.031	.034	.031	-.036	-.038	-.037	.008	.008	.011	.017	.020	.018	-.036	-.039	-.039	.002	.001	.004
Middle	.002	-.015	-.018	.006	.014	.015	.0003	.006	.008	.017	-.0001	-.003	.011	.020	.022	-.036	-.030	-.029
Upper-middle/Upper	-.006	-.008	-.020	.046	.047	.052	-.034	-.030	-.023	.035	.033	.018	-.001	-.002	.006	.020	.025	.025
Intercept	.821	.633	.702	.162	.293	.262	.032	.017	-.053	.693	.473	.529	.258	.423	.433	.077	.092	.024
R-Squared	.267	.309	.316	.258	.269	.270	.578	.590	.597	.246	.291	.298	.253	.266	.268	.570	.584	.590

Note: Coefficients for Regional Attributes and Political Attitudes not shown. ** - p<.01; * - p<.05; and ^ - p<.10 in a two-tailed test. Source: The 1991 Survey.

Table 4-10. Social Structures, Political Attitudes, and Voting Choice in 1992: A Multivariate Assessment (b's; Controlling for Regional Attributes)

	Kim Young-sam			Kim Dae-jung			Chung Ju-young			DLP			DP			UNP		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
Urban/Rural(Metro)																		
City	.007	.010	.014	.028	.024	.021	-.021	-.021	-.021	-.067	-.064	-.060	.009	.006	.002	.055^	.055^	.055^
Rural	.031	.033	.033	.022	.019	.019	-.018	-.018	-.018	.070	.072	.072	-.031	-.034	-.033	-.018	-.018	-.018
Socialisation																		
Gender(Female)																		
Male	-.075**	-.070**	-.062*	.038^	.029	.023	.018	.020	.019	-.072*	-.067*	-.059*	.047^	.040	.033	.017	.019	.018
Age (50+)																		
20s	-.327**	-.315**	-.234**	.128**	.118**	.056	.081*	.079*	.074^	-.207**	-.200**	-.115*	.118**	.109*	.035	.042	.041	.033
30s	-.221**	-.212**	-.157**	.079*	.072*	.030	.104**	.103**	.099**	-.193**	-.188**	-.131**	.080*	.073^	.023	.061^	.060^	.054
40s	-.081*	-.077^	-.073^	.052	.047	.044	.020	.020	.019	-.015	-.011	-.007	.024	.020	.017	.006	.006	.005
Religion (No/Others)																		
Buddhist	.025	.025	.005	-.048^	-.049^	-.034	.080**	.080**	.082**	.031	.032	.011	.001	.001	.019	-.010	-.010	-.008
Protestant	.067*	.067*	.049	-.025	-.028	-.014	-.007	-.005	-.004	.065^	.066^	.048	-.017	-.019	-.003	-.007	-.006	-.004
Catholic	-.047	-.047	-.056	.029	.029	.036	.022	.022	.023	-.082	-.081	-.091	.050	.050	.058	.022	.022	.023
Education(Primary)																		
Middle School	.034	.025	.016	-.008	-.002	.005	.010	.012	.013	.037	.033	.023	-.015	-.010	-.002	.014	.016	.017
High School	-.042	-.049	-.056	-.008	-.002	.003	.079*	.080*	.081*	.054	.050	.043	-.013	-.008	-.002	-.029	-.029	-.028
University	-.103^	-.097^	-.062	.036	.034	.007	.049	.046	.044	-.035	-.034	.003	.073	.072	.039	-.020	-.022	-.026
SE Interests																		
Job(Self-employed)																		
Farmer	-.044	-.042	-.044	.081^	.077^	.077^	-.022	-.021	-.021	.001	.004	.001	.007	.002	.005	-.0001	.001	.001
Manual Worker	-.003	.002	.001	.034	.032	.033	.021	.019	.019	.074^	.075^	.074^	-.026	-.028	-.026	-.004	-.005	-.005
Non-manual	.034	.039	.033	.003	-.002	.002	-.012	-.011	-.011	.054	.058	.051	-.042	-.047	-.041	.032	.032	.033
Manager/Prof	.176*	.176*	.138^	-.140*	-.146*	-.116^	-.062	-.059	-.056	.213**	.216**	.177*	-.130^	-.136^	-.101	-.111^	-.109^	-.105^
Income(< 500,000)																		
500 - 990,000	.024	.021	.009	-.036	-.039	-.030	.002	.007	.007	.009	.011	-.002	-.068	-.071^	-.060	.021	.023	.025
1,000 - 1,490,000	.011	.005	-.004	-.020	-.023	-.016	.004	.010	.011	-.018	-.016	-.026	-.077^	-.080^	-.071	.076*	.079*	.080*
Over 1,500,000	.015	.008	.002	-.025	-.026	-.021	.001	.006	.006	-.002	-.002	-.009	-.013	-.056	-.050	.024	.028	.028
Housing (Owner)																		
Monthly Rent	-.032	-.026	-.026	.041	.036	.035	-.087^	-.088^	-.088^	.027	.030	.031	-.005	-.009	-.010	-.029	-.029	-.029
Long-term Lease	-.103**	-.101**	-.088**	.102**	.099**	.089**	-.015	-.014	-.015	-.040	-.038	-.025	.059*	.056^	.044	-.014	-.014	-.015
Intercept	.653	.585	.680	.199	.184	.110	.075	.131	.125	.447	.450	.550	.411	.395	.308	.122	.156	.146
R-Squared	.364	.369	.405	.522	.526	.550	.135	.138	.138	.254	.256	.295	.379	.382	.414	.071	.073	.073

Note: Coefficients for Regional Attributes and Political Attitudes not shown. ** - p<.01; * - p<.05; and ^ - p<.10 in a two-tailed test. Source: The 1992 Post-election Survey.

managerial/professional segment's tendency to favour Kim Young-sam remained also virtually unchanged.

In the case of the models in 1992, there appeared two notable patterns in the changes of the b's of socialisation and socio-economic interest variables. First, the issue standing index had some impact in reducing the effects of age, university education and managerial/professional occupation on voting across the models. There, however, still remained substantial effects of these variables on voting to be accounted for. Second, the effects of gender, religious affiliation and housing type on voting remained virtually the same across the models. In addition, there were virtually no changes in the effects of socialisation and socio-economic interest variables on voting by the second models, where the voters' self-designated ideology and political efficacy were taken into account.

As regards the effects of political attitudes on voting, the OLS partial regression coefficients for each variable, after holding other variables on the list constant, are reported at Table 4-11. In 1987, for example, those who perceived regionalism as serious, unification of the opposition parties as positive, and influence of vote-buying activities as negative, were somewhat more likely to have voted for Kim Dae-jung (and less likely for Roh Tae-woo) than those at the opposite extreme. Those who evaluated past elections as fair, parties internally democratic, the political system democratised, and no need for a big change, were far more likely to have voted for Roh Tae-woo (and less likely for Kim

Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam); and those who evaluated the anti-government groups' political activities positive on democratisation were more likely to have voted for Kim Dae-jung (and less likely for Roh Tae-woo). Attitudes toward political corruption (although most of the respondents were firmly against it), political interests, and evaluations of the pro-government groups' activities were not useful in differentiating voters' choices in 1987.

Table 4-11. Political Attitudes and Voting Choice in 1987 and 1992:
A Multivariate Assessment (Controlling for Social Structures and Regional Attributes)

A: 1987 and 1988 (Continued from Table 4-9)

	Roh	YS	DJ	DJP	RDP	PPD
Political Interest Index	.002	-.056	.057	.050	-.065	-.001
	(.001)	(-.039)	(.040)	(.033)	(-.045)	(-.001)
Awareness Index	-.144*	-.027	.118*	-.152*	-.014	.157**
	(-.061)	(-.012)	(.055)	(-.066)	(-.006)	(.073)
Morality Index	.062	.018	-.011	.074	.002	-.026
	(.036)	(.011)	(-.007)	(.044)	(.001)	(-.016)
Regime Support Index	.569**	-.274**	-.216**	.572**	-.293**	-.285**
	(.199)	(-.103)	(-.082)	(.204)	(-.108)	(-.108)
Anti-government Group Evaluation	-.186**	.082	.171**	-.171**	.010	.143**
	(-.090)	(.043)	(.090)	(-.085)	(.005)	(.076)
Pro-government Group Evaluation	.067	-.027	-.015	.107	-.097	.055
	(.028)	(-.012)	(-.007)	(.045)	(-.043)	(.025)

Note: Beta's are in bracket. ** - p<.01; * - p<.05; and ^ - p<.10 in a two-tailed test.

B: 1992 (Continued from Table 4-10)

	YS	DJ	JY	DLP	DP	UNP
Subjective Political Tendency	.003	.073^	-.038	-.012	.051	-.028
	(.001)	(.037)	(-.025)	(-.006)	(.025)	(-.020)
Political Efficacy	.132*	-.032	-.072	.023	-.022	-.042
	(.062)	(-.016)	(-.045)	(.011)	(-.010)	(-.030)
Issue Standing Index	-.376**	.290**	.023	-.392**	.345**	.037
	(-.219)	(.176)	(.018)	(-.228)	(.203)	(.032)

Note: Beta's are in bracket. ** - p<.01; * - p<.05; and ^ - p<.10 in a two-tailed test.

In 1992, those who claimed that they were "progressive" in socio-political matters were a little more inclined toward Kim Dae-jung than those who claimed to be "conservative." Those who evaluated the input functions of the electoral process affirmatively were more likely to have voted for Kim Young-sam. The voters' viewpoints on the political agenda seemed to exert a strong impact on voting choice: those who maintained the most "liberal" views on the issues of demonstrations, the teachers' union, withdrawal of the US army, and personal-level contact with North Korea, were far less likely to have voted for Kim Young-sam and the DLP (and far more likely for Kim Dae-jung and the DP) than those who were the most "conservative" on these issues. Overall, the contribution of the attitudinal variables to the models was not, however, so extensive (the R-squared statistics showed about 4 to 6 per cent increase for the models of the governing party and its candidate votes both in 1987/1988 and 1992). The logit estimates for the final models, reported in Tables 4-12 and 4-13, are similar in their substantive detail.

There are a few more points to be noted regarding the effects of age, which seems to have been a main component of the urban-rural differences in voting. First, for the models of 1987, the components of the age effect on voting were largely attributable to the first category of the attitudinal variables, especially to "the regime support index," whereas in the 1992 models "the issue standing index" accounted for the effects of age. That is, the accounted effects of age cohorts were mostly attributable to the different viewpoints of the voters: younger voters may have been more critical about the regime characteristics, and

Table 4-12. Social Structures, Political Attitudes, Regional Attributes, and Voting Choice in 1987/88 (Logit)

	Roh	YS	DJ	DJP	RDP	PPD
Urban/Rural (Metro)						
City	-.377	.113	.739	-.506	.443	.107
Rural	.545	-.591	.609	.132	.191	.614
Gender (Female)						
Male	-.591*	.418^	.010	-.510*	.179	.322
Age (50+)						
20s	-1.12**	.536	1.46**	-1.59**	1.61**	.463
30s	-.826*	.371	.760	-1.27**	1.33**	-.089
40s	-.580^	.533	.788	-1.01**	1.11**	.265
Religion (No/Others)						
Buddhist	.038	-.277	.067	.380	-.449^	.344
Protestant	-.768**	.733**	-.205	-.209	-.243	.798*
Catholic	-.681^	.444	.160	-.408	-.235	1.14*
Education (Primary)						
Middle School	-.778*	.056	.278	-.169	-.162	.289
High School	-.575	.390	.313	.379	-.190	.526
University	-.507	.512	.183	.247	.100	.640
Job (Self-employed)						
Farmer	-.070	-.174	-.289	.621	-.371	-1.01
Manual Worker	-.100	.166	.417	.092	-.081	.508
Non-manual	.049	.108	-.164	.491	-.013	-.694^
Manager/Prof	-.072	.529	.037	.142	.104	-1.55^
Income (< 500,000)						
500 - 990,000	-.170	.253	.216	.498^	-.403	.078
1,000 - 1,490,000	-.110	-.017	.992*	.083	-.080	.752^
Over 1,500,000	-.317	.073	-.299	-.297	-.026	.381
Self-Status (Low)						
Lower-middle	.076	-.082	.110	-.229	.068	-.211
Middle	-.250	.156	.132	-.189	.208	-.321
Upper-middle/Upper	.290	.181	-.903	.561	-.294	.200
Political Interest	.213	-.862*	1.26*	.503	-.564	.178
Awareness	-.703	-.071	.774	-.668	.106	.652
Morality	.553	.001	.215	.188	.142	.010
Regime Support	3.45**	-1.96**	-2.25*	3.16**	-1.64**	-2.94**
Anti-gvn't Group	-1.53**	.943*	2.39**	-1.55**	.382	1.72**
Pro-gvn't Group	1.17*	-.806	-.923	1.68**	-1.23*	-.131
Residential Region(Seoul)						
Kyonggi	.137	-.180	-.356	.300	-1.12**	.411
Kangwon	.230	.403	-.656	1.21^	-.015	-1.49
Ch'ungch'ong	-1.05*	1.06*	-1.03	-.554	-.084	-.818
Cholla	-2.25**	-1.39^	1.84**	-1.79**	-2.00*	2.34**
Kyongbuk	.757*	.178	-2.30*	1.09*	-.324	-3.04*
Kyongnam	-.823*	1.14**	-.644	-.478	1.15**	-1.58**
Origin (Seoul/Kyonggi)						
Kangwon	-1.26*	-.068	1.67*	-.560	-.756	1.85*
Ch'ungch'ong	-.746^	-1.00*	1.33*	-1.28**	-.843*	1.58*
Cholla	-1.87**	-2.30**	3.89**	-1.86**	-2.36**	4.01**
Kyongbuk	-.362	-.480	.786	-1.14*	-.511	1.24^
Kyongnam	-1.04*	.829^	-1.35	-.879*	-.164	.113
Others	-.581	-.296	1.21	-.814	-.421	1.34^
Intercept	1.27	-.808	-6.16	-.028	.053	-4.63
Pseudo-R^2 (% c)	.284(78.6)	.272(77.6)	.563(90.2)	.281(81.1)	.268(77.8)	.569(89.2)

Note: ** - p<.01; * - p<.05; and ^ - p<.10. % c - Overall percentage correctly predicted.

Table 4-13. Social Structures, Political Attitudes, Regional Attributes, and Voting Choice in 1992 (Logit)

	YS	DJ	JY	DLP	DP	UNP
Urban/Rural(Metro)						
City	.120	.026	-.110	-.317	-.019	.479
Rural	.361	-.117	.033	.569^	-.378	-.340
Socialisation						
Gender(Female)						
Male	-.467**	.063	.313	-.356*	.185	.245
Age (50+)						
20s	-1.35**	.325	.775*	-.718*	.469	.629
30s	-.723*	.213	.846*	-.701**	.353	.707^
40s	-.140	.312	.251	-.120	.245	.463
Religion (No/Others)						
Buddhist	.019	-.357	.680**	.055	.020	.051
Protestant	.440^	-.099	-.156	.288	-.141	.248
Catholic	-.138	.325	-.057	-.571	.256	.274
Education(Primary)						
Middle School	.145	.129	-.138	-.100	-.035	.453
High School	-.362	.140	.455	-.043	.120	-.134
University	-.427	.174	.081	-.293	.392	-.185
SE Interests						
Job(Self-employed)						
Farmer	-.227	.958^	-.533	-.214	.005	.288
Manual Worker	-.097	.340	.246	.334	-.208	.086
Non-manual	.425^	.169	-.259	.456	-.366	.136
Manager/Prof	1.05*	-1.62^	-.550	1.19*	-1.10^	-1.52
Income(< 500,000)						
500 - 990,000	-.225	-.068	.242	-.131	-.345	.451
1,000 - 1,490,000	-.301	.198	.045	-.420	-.291	.999^
Over 1,500,000	-.218	-.079	.207	-.380	-.147	.603
Housing (Owner)						
Monthly Rent	-.043	.538	-1.35*	.395	-.112	-.446
Long-term Lease	-.436*	.695**	-.184	-.028	.249	-.159
Political Attitudes						
Self-assigned Ideology	.290	.284	-.284	-.258	.469	-.150
Political Efficacy	.903*	-.305	-.754^	-.004	-.104	-.416
Issue Standings	-2.76**	2.18**	.404	-2.19**	1.74**	.553
Regional Attributes						
Resident (Seoul)						
Kyonggi	-.411	-.266	.552^	.528^	-.308	-.454
Kangwon	-.267	-.701	.112	.848^	-1.35*	.013
Ch'ungch'ong	-.178	-.133	.382	.925**	-1.28**	-.262
Cholla	-2.03**	2.31**	-6.37[a]	-.167	.804^	-6.66[a]
Kyongbuk	-.259	.024	-.050	.676^	-.675^	-.433
Kyongnam	1.29**	-.694^	-.920*	.865**	-1.31**	.001
Origin (Seoul/Kyonggi)						
Kangwon	.249	-1.31*	.621	-.701^	.400	.001
Ch'ungch'ong	.172	-.411	.085	.065	-.267	-.165
Cholla	-1.61**	2.27**	-1.50**	-1.30**	1.64**	-.130**
Kyongbuk	1.03**	-1.32**	-.101	.673*	-.849*	-.068
Kyongnam	.663^	-1.17*	-.205	.444	-.632^	-.355
Others	.208	-.436	.801*	-.551	.271	.286
Intercept	1.07	-2.65	-1.98	.990	-1.28	-2.76
Pseudo-R^2 (% c)	.356(79.4)	.458(85.7)	.181(82.7)	.252(75.1)	.322(79.6)	.115(87.8)

Note: ** - p<.01; * - p<.05; and ^ - p<.10. % c - Overall percentage correctly predicted.
[a] - Consists of an empty cell; thus, a statistical test not relevant.

less conservative on the political issues. Second, the attitudinal variables employed here did not uniformly account for the effects of age on voting. For example, the effects of the 40s age cohort remained virtually unchanged, whereas the effects of the 20s and the 30s age cohorts were substantially accounted for by the attitudinal controls. This suggests that the tendency of anti-regime voting largely occurred among the younger age cohorts. In 1992 in particular, the anti-regime voting exercised by the younger voters mostly benefited Kim Dae-jung and his DP. In addition, the tendency of anti-regime voting was also associated with other socialisation and socio-economic attributes, although the degree of association may have been limited. For example, the effects of gender and university education (and managerial/professional occupation especially in 1992) on voting were accounted for somewhat by controls of the attitudinal variables.

Overall, however, the component of age effects on voting accounted for by the attitudinal variables was surprisingly small. It may be important to reflect on why this should be so. One answer could be that there may be other intervening variables that explain some portion of the unaccounted effects. In this regard, collection of data regarding life-cycle effects might be rewarding, as the data employed here measured the differences in the voters' political attitudes, which may have largely resulted from the generation differences. Another answer may lie partly in that the voters were less polarised across the attitudinal dimensions

than might be expected, with the assumption that the attitudinal variables on the list were sufficient although it cannot be claimed that they were exhaustive.

4. Conclusion

This chapter has gone through queries about the urban-rural dimension of voting. There are a few findings to be emphasised in a broader context. First of all, what are the implications of the finding that the urban-rural difference in voting was a reflection of the difference in socio-economic compositions between the urban and rural areas? From a theoretical perspective, the finding suggests that there is negligible difference in voting between urban and rural areas, which might result from concerns specific to urban or rural settings. These concerns might include urban problems such as overcrowding, insufficient housing, crime, pollution, etc. that may have contributed to the urban dwellers' discontent with the government;[15] or the opposition party's inadequate organisation in the rural areas *vis-à-vis* the government party's advantages of mobilising administrative networks there.[16] The contention Kim Chong-lim made one and half decades ago that "in the long run the regime must face up to a situation in which there would no longer be a broad enough social basis of mobilized voting, ... which has so far

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[15] See Choi, Sung-il and Lee, Chae-jin, "Environment, Policy, and Electoral Participation: A Comparison of Urban and Rural Areas," in Kim, Chong-lim (ed.), *Political Participation in Korea: Democracy, Mobilization and Stability*, Santa Barbara: Clio Books, 1980, pp. 176-77.
[16] See Han, Y.C., "Political Parties and Elections in South Korea," in Kim, Se-jin and Cho, Chang-hyun (eds.), *Government and Politics of Korea*, Silver Spring: The Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1972, p. 138.

supplied approximately 10 per cent or more of the total electoral votes cast for the regime,"[17] is clearly upheld by the findings.

The succeeding section attempted to unravel the nature of the differences in voting preference based on socialisation attributes, which seemed to be dominant over other socio-economic characteristics of the voters, let alone the effects of regional attributes. The factor of age in voting preference is plausible, given that Korea has gone through rapid, large-scale socio-economic change in the last few decades, and thus the younger age cohorts, with less experience of war, poverty or social disorder than their older counterparts, may have preferred "change" to "stability." Undoubtedly, the widespread educational opportunity for the younger age cohorts may have accentuated the effects of age on voting. One aspect of socialisation influence was tested in the above section by incorporating the variables of voters' value orientations; however, the finding suggests that there is still more to be explained about the age effect in voting, although there was a clear indication that voters' political orientations - which may lead to making a different voting choice - were varied across the age cohorts. At best, the voters' political orientations provided a partial explanation for the process by which the voters in different age groups exhibited different political preferences.

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[17] See Kim Chong-lim, "Political Participation and Mobilised Voting," in his *op.cit.*, 1980, p. 138.

Chapter 5. Regional Differences in Electoral Support: A New Cleavage?

1. Introduction

With regard to voter alignments in elections since 1987, one of the most frequently observed tendencies has been voting patterns based on regional lines. The election returns of the presidential election of 1992 revealed that the parties and presidential candidates alike fared best in the regions with which they were personally affiliated. Each of the candidates enjoyed overwhelming electoral support in their own home provinces - or rather in the regions they hailed from - and the parties also won heavy support in the National Assembly elections from the regions with which their leaders were affiliated. To be sure, no parties of importance were regionalistic if viewed in terms of their organisations - the parties maintained regional branches down to the level of National Assembly districts, and also with few exceptions competed for every single seat nationally.

The alliance of region and party has been so vividly illustrated in the election statistics of recent times that there is little dispute in recognising it as a major factor in voters' decisions. After all, the tendency of regional voting, that is, voters' favouring of candidates from their home region, has not been a new phenomenon in Korean electoral politics, particularly in presidential elections.

Figure 5-1. Map of Korea: Provinces and the Special Cities



Source: Modified from the map provided by Lee, Deog-an. ("*Chaebols*, Government Policies and their Impact on the Spatial Dynamics of Industry and Labour," Ph.D. Thesis, The Australian National University, 1992, p.3.)

Table 5-1.The Official Election Returns for the Major Candidates and Parties, 1963 - 1992: Regional Distribution

	Presidential Elections													National Assembly Elections						
	1963		1967		1971		1987				1992			1988				1992		
	Park	Yun	Park	Yun	Park	DJ	Roh	YS	DJ	JP	YS	DJ	JY	DJP	RDP	PPD	NDRP	DLP	DP	UNP
Seoul	30.2	65.1	45.2	51.3	40.0	59.4	30.0	29.1	32.6	8.2	36.4	37.8	18.0	26.2	23.4	27.0	16.1	34.8	37.3	19.4
Kyonggi	33.1	56.9	41.0	52.6	48.9	49.5	41.0	28.1	22.1	8.7	36.6	31.9	22.7	36.4	24.1	15.5	17.6	36.5	31.6	19.9
Kangwon	39.6	49.1	51.3	41.7	59.8	38.8	59.3	26.1	8.8	5.4	41.5	15.5	34.1	43.6	21.6	4.0	20.2	38.7	11.7	32.0
Ch'ungbuk	39.8	48.9	46.6	43.6	57.3	40.7	46.9	28.2	11.0	13.5	38.3	26.0	23.9	43.7	16.0	1.4	33.3	44.3	23.7	21.8
Ch'ungnam	40.8	49.4	45.4	46.8	53.5	44.4	26.2	16.1	12.4	45.0	36.3	28.6	24.5	30.2	15.0	3.8	46.5	37.9	22.0	17.9
Chonbuk	49.4	41.5	42.3	48.8	35.5	61.5	14.1	1.5	83.5	0.8	5.7	89.1	3.2	28.8	1.3	61.5	2.5	32.1	54.8	4.8
Chonnam	57.2	35.9	44.6	46.6	34.3	62.6	7.3	1.0	91.3	0.3	3.5	93.4	1.8	19.5	0.7	73.6	1.1	20.1	66.3	4.7
Kyongbuk	55.6	36.1	64.0	26.4	75.6	23.3	68.1	26.6	2.5	2.4	62.5	8.9	17.3	49.9	26.0	0.8	14.9	48.2	9.7	21.2
Kyongnam	57.6	35.2	67.3	25.5	66.9	32.1	36.6	53.7	6.9	2.6	72.8	10.9	8.9	36.1	45.7	1.5	8.6	48.5	14.0	15.4
Cheju	69.9	22.3	56.5	32.1	56.9	41.4	49.8	26.8	18.6	4.5	40.0	32.9	16.1	36.0	27.1	6.0	3.4	34.1	19.9	--
Total	46.6	45.1	51.4	40.9	53.2	45.3	36.6	28.0	27.1	8.1	42.0	33.8	16.3	34.0	23.8	19.3	15.6	38.5	29.2	17.4
SD	12.7	12.3	9.2	10.0	13.5	13.0	19.2	15.1	32.0	13.3	21.3	29.9	10.1	9.2	13.1	26.7	14.4	8.4	18.8	8.5

Note: Park - Park Chung-hee vote; Yun - Yun Po-sun vote; DJ - Kim Dae-jung vote; Roh - Roh Tae-woo vote; YS - Kim Young-sam vote; JP - Kim Jong-pil vote; JY - Chung Ju-young vote; DJP - Democratic Justice Party vote; RDP - Reunification Democratic Party vote; PPD - Party for Peace and Democracy vote; NDRP - New Democratic Republican Party vote; DLP - Democratic Liberal Party vote; DP - Democratic Party vote; UNP - Unification National Party vote.

Source: Chungang-son'go-kwalli-wiwonhoe (Central Election Management Committee), *Taehanmin'guk Son'go Sa (Election History of the Republic of Korea)*, Vol. 1, 2, 3, 1973, 1973, 1980; *Che 13 Dae Taet'ongryong Son'go Ch'ongram (Election Returns of the 13th Presidential Election)*, 1988; *Che 14 Dae Taet'ongryong Son'go Ch'ongram (Election Returns of the 14th Presidential Election)*, 1993; *Che 13 Dae Kukhoeuiwon Son'go Ch'ongram (Election Returns of the 13th National Assembly Election)*, 1988; *Che 14 Dae Kukhoeuiwon Son'go Ch'ongram (Election Returns of the 14th National Assembly Election)*, 1993.

This tendency was manifest throughout the presidential elections of the third Republic until the direct election of the president was abrogated in 1972: Park Chung-hee started to draw heavy support from his Kyongsang provinces in 1963, consolidated it in 1967, and reinforced it in 1971, whereas Yun Po-son had been favoured strongly in his home regions of Seoul and Kyonggi both in 1963 and 1967[1], and Kim Dae-jung was most favoured in his Cholla provinces in 1971 (see Table 5-1).

In the 1987 presidential election, held after sixteen years' suspension, the tendency of regional voting was reproduced on an expanded scale. The three viable candidates fared best in their respective regions: Roh Tae-woo in Kyongbuk (North Kyongsang), Kim Young-sam in Kyongnam (South Kyongsang), and Kim Dae-jung in Chonnam and Chonbuk (South and North Cholla). The fourth candidate, Kim Jong-pil also won disproportionately strong support from his home region of Ch'ungnam (South Ch'ungch'ong). The regional voting pattern of Kim Dae-jung was noteworthy, in that not only was his regional vote the biggest of all, but also he won the least support in the other candidates' strongholds. The electoral fortunes of Roh Tae-woo as a ruling party candidate may have lain in his ability to hold support in the "neutral" regions of Kyonggi, Kangwon and Ch'ungbuk, except for Seoul in which the opposition

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[1] With regard to Yun's better performance in Seoul and Kyonggi, the effect of regionalism might have been smaller, as the region with which Yun identified happened to be the most urbanised area, where the opposition was traditionally strong. According to Kim and Koh's aggregate level analysis, however, the effect of regionalism remained fairly strong when urbanisation was adjusted for; indeed, not much less than that of 1971, especially in 1967. See Kim, Jae-on, and Koh, B.C., "Electoral Behaviour and Social Development in South Korea: An Aggregate Data Analysis of Presidential Elections," *The Journal of Politics*, 34(3), 1972, pp. 852-853.

parties have been so far successful. In the National Assembly elections of 1988, the pattern of regional voting was repeated virtually intact. One minor, but important, exception may have been that Kim Jong-pil's NDRP strengthened its support mainly in the "neutral" regions, including Ch'ungbuk in its stronghold, largely at the expense of the ruling party votes.

In 1992, Kim Young-sam as a candidate of the new ruling DLP won most of his support in the Kyongsang provinces, securing most of the votes of Kyongbuk. The regional voting pattern for Kim Dae-jung was similar to that of 1987, except that he slightly improved his support in Ch'ungch'ong, former stronghold of Kim Jong-pil and his NDRP. The second runner-up, Chung Ju-young fared relatively well in the other "neutral" regions, in addition to performing best in his native Kangwon. A similar pattern of regional voting was maintained in the National Assembly elections held early that year, although the regional variation of the votes was less marked. What was most distinctive about regional voting in the recent elections was not only its extent but the fact that it occurred in the National Assembly elections. Indeed, no such regional patterns of electoral support had been apparent in the past National Assembly elections: for example, in the 1971 National Assembly election, held shortly after the presidential election of that year in which regionalism was a factor, no such patterns of regional voting had emerged.[2]

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[2] See Kim, C.I. Eugene, "The Meaning of the 1971 Korean Elections: A Pattern of Political Development," *Asian Survey*, 12(3), 1972, pp. 213-224, at p.200 (Table 4).

If regional differences in party support are not only a profound but also a consistent influence in recent elections, what forms the basis of it? That is, what are the underlining factors that render the regional identity or regional sentiment which the voters might be expected to possess susceptible to partisan mobilisation? Furthermore, what are the causes of the observed regional differences in political support? These are a few of the complex of questions to be explored in this chapter. Nonetheless, there still remains a more fundamental question: that is, how strong is the influence of regional attributes on a voter's choice? This issue will also be discussed in this chapter in relation to other significant electoral cleavages.

2. The Pattern of Regional Voting: The Bases

The administrative regions or provinces in Korea, often used as a unit of analysis, largely reflect long-standing historical and geographical divisions. The present regional divisions are inherited from the Choson dynasty (1392-1910), which divided the country into eight regions.[3] Following the division of the country in 1945, South Korea fully commands three out of the former eight regions - that is, Ch'ungch'ong, Cholla, and Kyongsang, including Cheju - and shares two regions of Kyonggi and Kangwon with North Korea, which fully

[3] See Eckert, Carter J., Lee, Ki-baik, Lew, Young-ick, Robinson, Michael, and Wagner, Edward W., *Korea Old and New: A History*, Seoul: Ilchokak, 1990, pp. 109-115.

commands the remaining three regions in the north. The regions of Ch'ungch'ong, Cholla and Kyongsang were further partitioned into two each - that is, North and South Ch'ungch'ong, North and South Cholla, and North and South Kyongsang. In the foregoing analysis, a convention is made: separating out Seoul from Kyonggi, putting North and South Ch'ungch'ong, and North and South Cholla together, but leaving North and South Kyongsang separate.

The basis of the region-party alliance which is most often cited is that Korean voters have strongly maintained a sense of collective regional identity, that is, regionalism or regional consciousness, as a facet of political culture that values personal inter-connections or ties in societal life.[4] It is argued that regionalism or regional consciousness became a source of regional antagonism based upon sentiments of regional prejudice, and experiences of regional disparities in the political and economic sphere.[5] Further, the sense of regional

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[4] See Chapter 2 for a review.

[5] See, for example, Moon, Sok-nam, "Chiyokkyokch'a-wa Kaldung-e-gwanhan Han-Yon'gu: Yong-Honam, Tu Chiyog-ul Chungshim-uro (A Study of Regional Disparities and Conflicts: Focusing on the Two Regions of Kyongsang and Cholla)," *Han'guk Sahoehak (Korean Sociology)*, 18, 1984, pp. 184-209; Kim, Kwang-soo, "Han'guk-chongch'i-e-itsoso-ui Cholla-do (The Cholla Region in Korean Politics)," *Han'guk Chongch'i Hakhoebo (Korean Political Science Review)*, 20(1), 1986, pp. 85-107; and Kim, Chin-kuk, "Chiyokkamjong-ui Shilsang-gwa Ku-Haesobangan (The Reality of Regional Sentiment and Some Suggestions for Its Dissolution)," in Han'guk Shimrihakhoe (Korean Association of Psychology), ed., *Shimrihag-eso-bon Chiyokkamjong (Regional Sentiment from the Psychological Perspective)*, Seoul: Songwonsa, 1988, pp. 221-254. Also see, for the studies of regional prejudice and stereotypes, Lee, Chin-suk, "P'aldoin-ui Songgyok T'uksong-e-daehan Sonipkwannyom (Prejudice on the Characteristics of Localities in the Eight Regions)," *Sasanggye*, Dec. 1959, pp. 74-87; Kim, Chin-kuk, "Yong-Honam Taehaksaeng-ui Sanghogan Ch'aijigak Yon'gu (Kyongsang and Cholla University Students' Perceptions of the Differences between Kyongsang and Cholla People)," *Sahoe-shimrihak Yon'gu (Studies in Social Psychology)*, 1987, 3(2), pp. 113-147; and Kim, Hye-suk, "Chiyokkan Kojong-gwannyom-gwa P'yon'gyon-ui Shilsang (The Reality of Stereotypes and Prejudice among the Regions)," in Han'guk Shimrihakhoe (Korean Association of Psychology), ed., *Shimrihag-eso-bon Chiyokkamjong (Regional Sentiments Viewed from the Psychological Perspective)*, Seoul: Songwonsa, 1988, pp. 123-169. Also see, for the studies of

attachment is said to relate more to the place of origin than to place of residence (especially for those who live in Seoul and Kyonggi, a vast majority of whom are more or less recent arrivals from the other regions), as it may be acquired during the early stage of the socialisation process through family, school or peer groups, and it is also highly likely to be a subject for generation transference.[6]

In Table 5-2, the regional (residential and region of origin) distributions of the 1992 votes based on the survey data are recorded.[7] In addition, the regional distribution of votes is further disaggregated by the variables of age and mobility - mobility is measured by the years of residency in a local community, the unit smaller than a region. This operation is aimed at detecting any interactions

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regional disparities in the economy and in the political recruitment of ruling elites, Kim, Man-heum, "Han'guk-ui Chongch'i-gyunyol-e-gwanhan Yon'gu: Chiyokkyunyol-ui Chongch'igwajong-e-daehan Kujojok Chopkun (A Study on Political Cleavage in Korea: Structural Approach to the Political Process of the Regional Cleavages)," Ph.D. Dissertation, Seoul National University, 1991; Kim, Yong-hak, "Elite Ch'ungwon-T'allag-ui Chiyokkyokch'a (Regional Disparities in the Recruitment or Exclusion of the Elite)," in Kim, Chong-chul and Choe, Chang-jip, et al., *Chiyokkamjong Yon'gu (Studies of Regionalism)*, Seoul: Hagminsa, 1991, pp. 258-288; and Choe, Won-kyu, "Kyongjegaebal-ui Kyokch'a-wa Chiyokkamjong (Disparities in Economic Development and Regionalism)," in Kim, Chong-chul and Choi, Chang-jip, et al., *Chiyokkamjong Yon'gu (Studies of Regionalism)*, Seoul: Hagminsa, 1991, pp. 310-333.

[6] See Cho, Kyong-kun, "Chongch'i-sahoehwa-ui Shigag-eso-bon Yong-Honam-gan-ui Chiyokkamjong Shiljae-wa Akhwa-mit Ku-Haeso (Existence, Aggravation, and Dissolution of the Regionalism Between Kyongsang and Cholla: From the Perspective of Political Socialisation), *Haptong Haksuldaehoe Palp'yo Nonmunjip (Proceedings of the Joint Conference of the Korean Political Science Association and the Association of Korean Political Scientists in North America)*, 7, 1987, pp. 107-126. Also see Kim, Hye-suk, op.cit., 1988.

[7] The native region of the respondents was measured by asking the place of origin - i.e., the region where a respondent's grandfather come from. Admittedly, this is a crude measure of a person's sense of regional attachment, and there may be various alternative ways of tapping the sense of regional attachment. However, any single measure of this kind may contain merits as well as demerits in itself in grasping a person's sense of regional belongness or identification: e.g., if it is measured with the place of birth, then it has merits of being more accurate in measuring a person's regional identification, especially for the first generation of migrants, but at the cost of losing a measurement of the evident inter-generation transference of regional identification, especially for the second and the third generation of migrants.

between age (and mobility) and regionalism in voting, as they are the variables that may be expected to negate or enhance the effect of regionalism. One might expect that younger voters are less prone to regional voting than the older, and so are those who show a high level of physical mobility, if regionalism is understood as a sense of community attachment, regardless of political propensity.

The regional (residential) distribution of the votes, first of all, shows a close proximity to the official returns shown at Table 5-1. A few exceptions can be found in the case of Kangwon and Ch'ungch'ong, in which votes for Kim Young-sam were slightly over-represented at the expense of votes for Kim Dae-jung. Not surprisingly, the distribution of the votes according to region of origin is also as good an indicator of regional voting as is residential region. Indeed, it is more graphic in revealing the pattern of regional voting. Kim Dae-jung performed best *only* among the voters of Cholla origin, and Kim Young-sam, the president elected, not only won most of the votes of Kyongsang origin but also performed the most successfully, though not overwhelmingly, in gaining support of the voters originating from the other regions. Chung Ju-young fared relatively well - indeed, better than Kim Dae-jung - among the voters whose native regions were other than Cholla and Kyongsang. In addition, the above observations were also appropriate to the case of the regional voting patterns in the 1987 presidential election, reported at Table 5-3.

Table 5-2. The Major Candidate Votes in the 1992 Presidential Election: Distributed by Region of Residence and Origin with Additional Controls of Age and Mobility (%, the Minor Candidate Votes not Shown)

	Kim Young-sam					Kim Dae-jung					Chung Ju-young					Total (N)				
		Age		Mobility			Age		Mobility			Age		Mobility			Age		Mobility	
	All	Young	Old	High	Low	All	Young	Old	High	Low	All	Young	Old	High	Low	All	Young	Old	High	Low
Total	42.0	31.0	57.3	35.0	46.6	33.8	36.2	30.5	35.3	32.8	16.3	21.3	9.4	21.0	13.3	100.0 (1293)	100.0 (752)	100.0 (541)	100.0 (511)	100.0 (782)
Resident																				
Seoul	34.4	23.4	60.9	31.2	38.5	38.8	43.5	27.5	41.6	35.2	17.4	21.1	8.5	16.5	18.6	25.3	30.7	17.8	35.7	18.5
Kyonggi	35.8	24.3	56.4	28.6	45.1	27.3	31.2	20.3	30.4	23.4	29.7	36.0	18.4	34.9	23.0	19.3	21.3	16.5	27.4	14.0
Kangwon	49.5	26.1	85.3	25.5	66.6	8.0	10.1	4.9	14.6	3.3	26.3	37.1	9.8	42.3	14.8	3.3	3.5	3.1	3.5	3.2
Ch'ungch'ong	50.3	30.3	67.3	44.3	52.2	20.5	28.3	13.8	31.3	16.9	20.6	27.6	14.7	11.8	23.5	9.8	7.7	12.6	6.1	12.2
Cholla	3.2	1.2	4.6	2.4	3.4	96.3	97.5	95.4	97.6	95.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	13.9	9.8	19.5	7.2	18.2
Kyongbuk	59.8	43.0	75.1	50.1	62.6	11.4	17.2	6.2	12.2	11.2	17.2	17.4	16.9	25.7	14.7	11.3	9.2	14.0	6.5	14.4
Kyongnam	73.5	63.6	88.4	66.5	76.7	10.8	14.2	5.7	13.9	9.4	7.9	12.0	1.9	12.2	6.0	17.2	17.7	16.5	13.9	19.6
Origin																				
Seoul	35.4	12.3	65.2	27.4	41.7	20.4	29.3	8.8	28.2	14.2	34.9	49.8	15.7	37.6	32.8	3.8	3.7	3.9	4.2	3.5
Kyonggi	44.5	37.0	54.4	41.8	46.5	23.8	26.8	19.7	24.0	23.5	23.4	26.6	19.2	25.6	21.7	9.5	9.3	9.8	10.4	8.9
Kangwon	42.8	30.7	70.7	28.7	60.8	10.0	14.4	0.0	15.9	2.5	34.2	37.3	26.9	41.4	24.9	5.5	6.6	4.0	7.8	4.0
Ch'ungch'ong	45.2	29.8	66.2	40.6	48.3	21.3	25.8	15.2	26.0	18.2	22.7	28.5	14.8	21.3	23.7	19.1	19.0	19.4	19.5	18.9
Cholla	7.4	5.4	10.0	7.3	7.4	87.5	87.0	88.2	85.5	88.8	2.7	4.0	1.1	4.0	1.9	25.6	25.3	26.1	25.0	26.0
Kyongbuk	62.2	45.8	81.7	50.0	68.4	10.6	15.2	5.2	12.6	9.6	17.2	22.3	11.0	28.5	11.4	17.4	16.3	19.0	15.0	19.1
Kyongnam	73.3	61.1	89.7	65.2	77.3	6.9	8.9	4.2	8.7	6.0	9.8	14.0	4.0	12.8	8.2	14.6	14.4	14.8	12.3	16.1
The Others	45.8	32.6	79.2	35.8	56.6	19.9	19.5	20.8	17.3	22.7	32.2	45.0	0.0	42.8	20.7	4.4	5.5	3.0	5.8	3.5

Note: Age Young - less than 40; Old - 40 and over. Mobility High - less than 10 years of residency; Low - 10 years and over.
Non-voters are excluded from the calculation.

Source: The 1992 Post-election Survey.

Table 5-3. The Major Candidate Votes in the 1987 Presidential Election: Distributed by Region of Residence and Origin with Additional Controls of Age (%, the Minor Candidate Votes not Shown)

	Roh Tae-woo			Kim Young-sam			Kim Dae-jung			Total (N)		
		Age			Age			Age			Age	
	All	You-ng	Old	All	You-ng	Old	All	You-ng	Old	All	Young	Old
Total	36.7	25.8	49.5	28.1	33.6	21.6	27.1	30.6	22.9	100.0 (1007)	100.0 (546)	100.0 (461)
Resident												
Seoul	34.2	23.0	49.4	27.8	27.6	27.9	30.5	40.1	17.5	25.1	26.6	23.3
Kyonggi	42.1	30.1	62.0	22.7	28.4	13.4	27.5	34.7	15.3	15.2	17.5	12.5
Kangwon	56.4	31.4	75.8	19.9	32.7	10.1	18.7	30.4	9.6	4.1	3.3	5.0
Ch'ungch'ong	37.0	24.8	47.2	25.9	31.0	21.7	10.0	7.4	12.1	11.8	9.9	14.1
Cholla	7.7	2.9	11.2	1.7	4.2	0.0	89.7	92.9	87.3	12.9	9.9	16.4
Kyongbuk	66.2	51.4	84.5	27.3	38.4	13.5	1.4	2.6	0.0	11.8	12.0	11.5
Kyongnam	32.4	21.6	48.0	54.0	58.2	48.1	8.5	12.7	2.5	19.2	20.8	17.2
Origin												
Seoul	64.7	62.0	67.4	25.0	30.8	19.4	10.3	7.2	13.2	2.3	2.1	2.6
Kyonggi	49.2	35.6	65.0	38.7	52.5	22.8	7.0	4.9	9.4	7.9	7.8	8.0
Kangwon	41.2	19.8	68.6	30.0	38.9	18.7	23.1	34.3	8.7	5.8	6.0	5.5
Ch'ungch'ong	38.3	27.8	50.3	23.2	27.2	18.6	13.2	15.8	10.1	18.1	17.8	18.5
Cholla	10.6	5.9	16.5	4.7	5.2	4.2	82.8	86.3	78.3	24.8	25.5	23.9
Kyongbuk	59.1	45.9	74.2	29.6	38.1	20.0	3.5	5.1	1.7	16.3	16.0	16.7
Kyongnam	38.8	26.6	50.8	55.7	63.4	47.9	2.3	4.5	0.0	18.4	17.1	20.0
The Others	39.8	28.0	62.5	35.2	44.2	17.7	17.6	21.7	9.6	6.4	7.8	4.8

Note: Age Young - less than 40; Old - 40 and over.

Source: The 1991 Survey.

It may be plausibly maintained, therefore, that Kim Dae-jung's better performance in Seoul is partly due to the fact that Seoul accommodated a large portion of migrants from Cholla (see Table 5-4), let alone the fact that Seoul consisted of more younger voters. Though it may be tempting to express this hypothesis, however, a firm conclusion cannot be drawn from this observation alone. Rather, it should be the subject of a multivariate approach, which will follow later in this chapter. At this point, nonetheless, it is noteworthy that studies of regionalism in Korea need to recognise two different levels in

operationalising regionalism - i.e., the residential and native region - which might differ in their implications. For example, on the one hand, if we are interested in the hypothesis that regional voting is an expression of the voters' perceptions of regional economic disparities, then the residential region may be a more proper unit of analysis, and on the other hand, if our interests lie in emotional factors as such, the native region may be a more proper unit.

Table 5-4. The Regional Distribution of the Population: Distributed by Region of Origin (%)

Residential Origin	Seoul	Kyonggi	Kangwon	Ch'ung-ch'ong	Cholla	Kyongbuk	Kyongnam	Sub-total (N)
Seoul	9.1	5.0	0.0	3.2	0.0	0.0	1.1	3.8 (57)
Kyonggi	10.8	31.1	1.4	2.9	1.5	0.0	1.2	9.6 (144)
Kangwon	7.3	6.1	64.5	2.5	0.0	1.0	2.7	6.4 (96)
Ch'ungch'ong	23.1	19.2	5.0	79.4	3.2	2.1	3.8	18.7 (281)
Cholla	28.5	16.7	2.8	6.6	93.0	1.2	8.8	24.7 (370)
Kyongbuk	8.6	9.5	18.1	4.4	0.8	86.6	13.5	17.8 (267)
Kyongnam	6.5	3.4	1.9	0.0	1.0	7.2	66.7	14.7 (220)
The Others	6.2	9.0	6.2	1.1	0.4	1.8	2.1	4.3 (65)
Sub-total (N)	25.8 (387)	19.6 (294)	3.9 (58)	9.5 (142)	12.6 (189)	11.8 (177)	16.9 (254)	100.0 (1500)

Note: The others includes those who are originated from North Korea, Cheju, and overseas.

Source: The 1992 Post-election Survey.

Another point to be noted is that Kim Dae-jung was the least favoured in regions other than Cholla. This was clearly observable from the regional distribution of the votes based on the variable of region of origin. This is quite surprising, given that he was a well-known career politician as a freedom fighter, he did almost win the presidency in 1972, and he was after all the first runner-up

in 1992. If regional voting is a manifestation of the regional sentiments or prejudices of the voters, this observation clearly supports the argument put forward by Kim Chin-kuk that "regionalism in Korea is more of a relationship between Cholla (a minority) and the others (a majority) than a conflict between certain regions [Kyongsang and Cholla]."[8]

Now let us examine voting patterns of the sub-groups further divided by age and mobility in addition to the regional variables. (See Table 5-2 and 5-3.) First of all, the rows which report the mean scores of the votes show that the younger and the more mobile were less likely to have voted for the governing party candidates.[9] The tendency of the younger voters' favouring the opposition was discussed in Chapter 4. Regarding the tendency of less electoral support for Kim Young-sam among those who were more physically mobile, it is likely that some of the factors which make people move from an area to another area, such as home ownership or job opportunity, may have influenced voting choice.[10] In addition, the columns which report the total scores show that Seoul and Kyonggi consists of more younger and mobile voters. No notable regional variations are found in the case of the region of origin, however.

Is it the case, then, that younger and more mobile voters, who might be expected to exhibit less tendency towards regional voting, behave differently

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[8] See Kim, Chin-kuk, op.cit., 1988, pp. 236.

[9] In case of the 1987 votes, the mobility variable is not available.

[10] A preliminary analysis revealed that mobility had no independent effect on voting, once the voters' socio-economic characteristics were taken into account (the results are not shown).

above and beyond their observed electoral propensity against the ruling party candidates? In other words, were there any significant interaction effects of regionalism and age (or mobility) on voting choice? The tables suggest the answer is a negative one. The relationship between regionalism and age (or mobility) on the voting choice seems to be nothing more than additive. Across the age groups, for example, Kim Young-sam support in 1992 was proportionately higher in those regions where his support was stronger overall. Similar observations can be made in the case of Kim Dae-jung and Chung Ju-young votes in 1992 as well as the votes of 1987. An important implication of this is that regional voting may have been prevalent across the society even to the extent that the least likely affected groups were also prone to it.

The next step taken here is to measure or to recognise the effects of regionalism at both the level of residential and of native regions. For this purpose, OLS regression equations are estimated of voting choices in 1987/1988 and 1992, first, with the region of origin variable and, second, with the addition of the residential region variable (see Table 5-5). From the second model, it appears that differences in voting based on regional origin remained largely significant, after taking into account the effects of residential region, which also exerted some significant additional effects.

Table 5-5. The OLS Estimates of the 1987/1988 and the 1992 Vote: Residential and Native Region (b's)

A: 1987/1988

	Roh		YS		DJ		DJP		RDP		PPD	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Origin (Seoul/ Kyonggi)												
Kangwon	-.091	-.152^	-.051	-.037	.134*	.160**	-.025	-.069	-.040	-.099	.043	.127*
Ch'ungch'ong	-.119*	-.093	-.122*	-.159*	.028	.083^	-.200**	-.157*	-.070	-.135*	.005	.091*
Cholla	-.399**	-.322**	-.306**	-.301**	.735**	.637**	-.402**	-.325**	-.267**	-.280**	.695**	.593**
Kyongbuk	.080	.0002	-.056	-.079	-.052	.021	-.047	-.168*	.026	-.017	-.058	.062
Kyongnam	-.114^	-.036	.212**	.075	-.080*	-.027	-.127*	-.060	.211**	-.017	-.097*	.024
Other	-.104	-.075	.001	-.044	.077	.086	-.155*	-.126	.088	-.002	.039	.076
Residential (Seoul)												
Kyonggi		.049		-.077^		.017		.054		-.144**		.049
Kangwon		.215*		-.147^		-.032		.166^		-.044		-.130*
Ch'ungch'ong		-.003		-.005		-.106*		-.036		-.019		-.134**
Cholla		-.100		-.112^		.240**		-.099		-.150**		.286**
Kyongbuk		.200**		-.060		-.097*		.273**		-.105^		-.132**
Kyongnam		-.081		.138**		-.060		-.064		.220**		-.130**
Intercept	.502	.467	.352	.401	.097	.092	.507	.469	.324	.412	.117	.096
R-squared	.118	.143	.144	.167	.532	.559	.094	.126	.125	.175	.505	.553

B: 1992

	YS		DJ		JY		DLP		DP		UNP	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Origin (Seoul/ Kyonggi)												
Kangwon	.020	-.030	-.132**	-.102^	.070	.116*	-.084	-.134^	-.030	.049	.031	.015
Ch'ungch'ong	.045	-.003	-.039	-.028	-.031	.002	.082	.020	-.113*	-.056	-.034	-.015
Cholla	-.343**	-.301**	.639**	.502**	-.235**	-.160**	-.307**	-.269**	.480**	.398**	-.153**	-.120**
Kyongbuk	.211**	.146*	-.141**	-.113*	-.087*	-.031	.178**	.140*	-.203**	-.131*	-.022	-.020
Kyongnam	.324**	.128*	-.180**	-.111*	-.161**	-.050	.227**	.155*	-.237**	-.111*	-.071^	-.082^
Other	.051	.031	-.053	-.046	.065	.083	-.082	-.089	.049	.045	.025	.022
Residential (Seoul)												
Kyonggi		-.013		-.073*		.106**		.118**		-.125**		-.008
Kangwon		.083		-.116^		-.020		.213*		-.281**		.031
Ch'ungch'ong		.118*		-.095*		.007		.270**		-.260**		-.060
Cholla		-.116*		.241**		-.066		.015		.081^		-.079*
Kyongbuk		.057		-.071		-.005		.120^		-.165**		-.017
Kyongnam		.257**		-.139**		-.081^		.180**		-.252**		.007
Intercept	.408	.403	.250	.294	.259	.206	.429	.349	.357	.441	.178	.186
R-squared	.216	.245	.459	.492	.076	.096	.158	.183	.314	.355	.035	.041

Note: ** - p < .01; * - p < .05; and ^ - p < .10 in a two-tailed test.

Source: The 1991 Survey; and the 1992 Post-election Survey.

Now let us examine the second model more closely. First, across all the models, region of origin was a more significant factor than residential region mainly for the voters who had regional ties with Cholla, in which Kim Dae-jung and his parties were favoured. A similar pattern also appeared in the case of those voters among Chung Ju-young's supporters in 1992 who had regional ties with Kangwon. Apart from these, the other candidates and parties were far more successful in pulling support from their respective home regions than from those who shared the same regional backgrounds but who were living elsewhere: the voters of Kyongbuk origin in 1988 showed quite an extreme example of this[11] - that is, they were less likely to have voted for the DJP, the party led by their fellow regional leader, than the voters of Seoul/Kyonggi origin (to be sure, the voters of Kyongbuk origin were far more likely to have voted for the DJP than the voters of Cholla origin) - but in general the voters showed a tendency to favour the candidates and the parties of their regional origin wherever they lived. Second, the votes of Kim Dae-jung and his party were the most regionalistic of all, and further, he and his parties fared better only among the voters of Cholla

[11] There were two more notable cases showing opposite directions of support between the regional attributes of origin and residency. That is, the Kangwon origin voters showed a lesser electoral propensity for Roh Tae-woo in 1987 (and more for Kim Dae-jung), but the Kangwon resident voters were more likely to have supported Roh; and the Ch'ungch'ong origin voters were more likely to have supported Kim Dae-jung (and less likely for Kim Young-sam and Roh Tae-woo), but the Ch'ungch'ong resident voters were less likely to have supported Kim Dae-jung. Thought no firm explanations can be provided, it can be speculated that the Kangwon and Ch'ungch'ong origin voters, who were mostly living in Seoul/Kyonggi, may have developed different views in politics from their counterparts who were living in their regional hinterlands (see Table 4-12, in which the effects of residential region (of Kangwon and Ch'ungch'ong) became insignificant when the voters' socio-economic characteristics and political attitudes were taken into account).

origin and those living in Cholla across the models. The voters of Kangwon and Ch'ungch'ong origin showed a tendency of favouring Kim Dae-jung and his party in 1987/1988 but only compared to the voters of Seoul/Kyonggi origin, who were the least likely to have supported him and his party. If compared to the other groups of voters, their leaning towards Kim Dae-jung and his party was minimal. This pattern became more acute in 1992, where Chung Ju-young, who pulled more support from among the voters of Kangwon origin and the Kyonggi resident voters at the expense of erstwhile supporters of Kim Dae-jung, entered the electoral contests. Third, Kim Young-sam and his DLP in 1992 were largely successful in retaining the regional strongholds of the coalition partners and in further mobilising the support of Kim's own regional bases. It might have been easier for him to retain Roh's regional strongholds because of their geographical and cultural proximity. Fourth, the regional voting manifest in the behaviour of those voters who had ties with Cholla and Kyongsang either by origin or by residency was the strongest of all. Notwithstanding their regional rivalry, this may be partly due to the fact that both regions continued to produce viable presidential candidates in 1987 and in 1992.

What, then, are the factors that made the voters susceptible to partisan mobilisation in accordance with regional attributes? In other words, what is the explanation for why such regional variations in voting should occur? In this following section, this question will be explored by introducing controls of additional variables that might account for regional variations of voting. The

analysis will be limited to the voting choices in 1992, as the 1991 survey data set is short of the variables that permit further exploration.

3. Causes of Regional Voting: A Multivariate Assessment

There are five groups of variables controlled for: each of them is distinct in nature, and thus each may provide alternative explanations for regional voting. The first group of variables consists of socio-economic variables, and the second political attitude variables, the same variables already employed in Chapter 3. Two economic evaluation variables, that is, retrospective and prospective, are controlled in the third models; and the party disposition variables are controlled in the fourth models. (A detailed discussion on the newly added variables can be found in Chapter 6). The economic evaluation variables are measured by a four scale item relating to the voter's economic evaluations at a regional level; and the party disposition variables measure the voter's self-designated partisan leaning toward the ruling party or the opposition.[12] The fifth group of variables contains

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[12] This is a concept similar to party identification. Although Korean parties have been fluid as a result of frequent regime changes from the forces outside of party system, it has been rare for party maneuvers to occur across the ruling and the opposition camp, except for the recent example of the formation of the DLP. Thus, it is feasible that the voters may have been accustomed to distinguish the party in office or in power against the party out of office. See, for similar attempts to incorporate the concept in Korean context, Park, Chan-wook, "Korean Voters' Candidate Choice in the 1992 Presidential Election," *Korea & World Affairs*, 17(3), 1993, pp. 432-458, at pp. 441-442; and Cho, Chung-bin, "Yukwonja-ui Yoya-songhyang-gwa T'up'yohaengt'ae (Voters' Government-Opposition Disposition and Voting Behaviour)," in Lee, Nam-young (ed.), *Han'guk-ui Son'go (Elections in Korea), I*, Seoul: Nanam, 1993, pp. 49-65.

the index variables that measure a voter's evaluations of the candidates on various items.[13]

By introducing controls for these variables stepwise, it is aimed to identify which group or groups of variables are most successful in accounting for the effects of regional attributes, and to measure the extent to which these effects are accounted for by the additional controls, thus providing for an insight in to the mechanism by which regional voting is substantiated. Tables 5-6 and 5-7 report the OLS partial regression coefficients of the five models, corresponding to the five groups of additional controls stepwise for the voting choices in the 1992 presidential and National Assembly elections. The observed changes in the value of the coefficients indicate the portion of the effects of regional attributes accounted for by the newly added variables. At Table 5-8, the logit estimates are also reported but only for the final models.

Let us briefly examine the effects of the newly added variables first. Overall, most of the variables appear to be significant, and to an expected direction, in the final models. For example, those who possessed the most liberal views on political issues were, other things being equal, about 14 per cent less likely to have voted for Kim Young-sam, and about 8 per cent more likely to

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[13] The respondents were asked to choose a candidate who would be the most capable of delivering each of the following seven issue items - i.e., democratisation, economic equality, social stability, economic development, solution of regional disparity, unification, and solution of corruption. The variables were indexed in a manner that a voter who favours the most a certain candidate gets a score of seven and favours the least gets a score of zero. Then it was divided by 7 so that it ranged 0 to 1.

have voted for Kim Dae-jung, as compared with their most conservative counterparts (see Table 5-6). Those who claimed their partisan disposition to be towards the ruling party were about 18 per cent more likely to have supported Kim Young-sam (and about 6 per cent less likely to have supported Kim Dae-jung) than those who had no particular partisan disposition, ~~net of other things~~. Those ~~whose perception was strongest~~ with the strong perception that their region would be economically better-off in the near future were, all other things being equal, about 14 per cent more likely to have voted for Kim Young-sam, and were about 15 per cent less likely to have voted for Chung Ju-young (rather than Kim Dae-jung), as compared with their counterparts whose perception of their region's future was that it would be worse-off. This indicates that economic voting may have been particularly important for supporters of Kim Young-sam and Chung Ju-young.[14] The effects of the candidate evaluation variables showed that each of the candidates were most strongly preferred to the other candidates by those who evaluated each of them the most favourably. These patterns were also maintained in the National Assembly votes with a few exceptions (see Table 5-7): that is, the economic evaluation variables were not significant, and if compared to those in the presidential votes, the effects of candidate evaluation were smaller in their magnitude, whereas the effects of partisan disposition were bigger in their magnitude.

[14] As will be shown in Chapter 6, economic evaluations based on personal, regional, and national levels are closely correlated.

Table 5-6. The OLS Estimates (b's) of the 1992 Presidential Vote for the Major Candidates:
Regionalism, Political Attitude, Economic Evaluation, Party Disposition and Candidate Evaluation (Coefficients for the Socio-economic Variables not Shown)

	Kim Young-sam Vote						Kim Dae-jung Vote						Chung Ju-Young Vote					
	(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Origin (Seoul/Kyonggi)																		
Kangwon	-.030	.029	.010	.006	-.003	.027	-.102^	-.135*	-.127*	-.127*	-.119*	-.069^	.116*	.104^	.109^	.117*	.117*	.043
Ch'ungch'ong	-.003	.023	.017	.029	.036	.0003	-.028	-.044	-.044	-.049	-.053	-.035	.002	.001	.005	-.002	-.004	.008
Cholla	-.301**	-.267**	-.242**	-.234**	-.157**	-.081*	.502**	.482**	.454**	.451**	.388**	.186**	-.160**	-.156**	-.152**	-.158**	-.165**	-.082*
Kyongbuk	.146*	.185**	.177**	.189**	.160**	.104*	-.113*	-.137**	-.140**	-.145**	-.129**	-.092**	-.031	-.033	-.028	-.034	-.029	-.005
Kyongnam	.128*	.165**	.146*	.152**	.108*	.065	-.111*	-.131**	-.117*	-.121*	-.091*	-.068^	-.050	-.049	-.047	-.050	-.043	-.022
Other	.031	.038	.028	.051	.045	.028	-.046	-.055	-.053	-.062	-.066	-.035	.083	.091	.096	.079	.083	.068
Residential (Seoul)																		
Kyonggi	-.013	-.038	-.042	-.048	-.074^	-.077*	-.073*	-.104**	-.099**	-.096**	-.077*	-.081**	.106**	.124**	.123**	.125**	.128**	.149**
Kangwon	.083	-.022	-.025	-.011	-.017	-.065	-.116^	-.122^	-.123^	-.125^	-.114^	-.105*	-.020	.044	.050	.030	.028	.092
Ch'ungch'ong	.118*	.021	.026	.028	-.025	-.048	-.095*	-.096*	-.096*	-.096*	-.050	-.028	.007	.053	.050	.045	.050	.040
Cholla	-.116*	-.222**	-.188**	-.168**	-.146**	-.114*	.241**	.234**	.216**	.210**	.197**	.067^	-.066	-.005	-.013	-.031	-.035	.040
Kyongbuk	.057	-.029	-.012	-.020	-.040	-.030	-.071	-.057	-.066	-.060	-.036	-.052	-.005	.023	.020	.020	.019	.049
Kyongnam	.257**	.212**	.203**	.198**	.208**	.111**	.139**	-.139**	-.136**	-.131**	-.131**	-.100**	-.081^	-.079^	-.075^	-.080^	-.084^	-.001
Political Attitudes																		
Political Efficacy			.132*	.104*	.069	.029			-.032	-.022	-.005	-.045			-.072	-.051	-.042	.025
Subjective Ideology			.003	.004	.048	.015			.073^	.073^	.043	.011			-.038	-.039	-.046	.0002
Issue Standing Index			-.376**	-.342**	-.215**	-.138**			.290**	.278**	.179**	.078*			.023	-.003	-.017	.023
Regional Economy																		
Retrospective Evaluation				.053	.053	.007				-.005	-.009	-.015				-.080^	-.078^	-.017
Prospective Evaluation				.341**	.267**	.143**				-.137*	-.079	-.023				-.238**	-.230**	-.151**
Party Disposition (None)																		
Governing Party					.279**	.178**					-.106**	-.064**					-.077**	-.039^
Opposition Party					-.132**	-.095**					.175**	.082**					-.015	.014
Candidate Evaluations																		
Favourite, YS						.435**						-.194**						-.090**
Favourite, DJ						-.204**						.548**						-.105**
Favourite, JY						-.496**						-.358**						1.14**
Intercept	.403	.653	.680	.445	.389	.456	.294	.199	.110	.197	.194	.250	.206	.075	.125	.308	.334	.127
R-squared	.245	.364	.405	.424	.505	.617	.492	.522	.550	.553	.594	.732	.096	.135	.138	.158	.165	.463

Note: ** - p < .01; * - p <.05; and ^ - p <.10 in a two-tailed test. (0) - No Controls; (1) - Controls for the Socio-economic variables; (2) - Controls for the political attitude variables plus (1); (3) - Controls for the regional economic evaluation variables plus (2); (4) - Controls for the party disposition variables plus (3); (5) - Controls for the candidate evaluation variables plus (4).

Table 5-7. The OLS Estimates (b's) of the 1992 National Assembly Vote for the Major Parties:
Regionalism, Political Attitude, Economic Evaluation, Party Disposition and Candidate Evaluation (Coefficients for the Socio-economic Variables not Shown)

	DLP						DP						UNP					
	(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Origin (Seoul/Kyonggi)																		
Kangwon	-.134^	-.105	-.119^	-.119^	-.133*	-.125*	.049	.032	.042	.044	.054	.091	.015	.010	.014	.018	.021	-.020
Ch'ungch'ong	.020	.035	.032	.036	.044	.024	-.056	-.060	-.059	-.061	-.065	-.054	-.015	-.026	-.024	-.023	-.025	-.017
Cholla	-.269**	-.248**	-.218**	-.215**	-.107*	-.048	.398**	.389**	.358**	.357**	.272**	.136**	-.120**	-.132**	-.131**	-.130**	-.151**	-.093*
Kyongbuk	.140*	.162**	.159**	.164**	.131*	.099^	-.131*	-.149**	-.149**	-.151**	-.131**	-.108*	-.020	-.023	-.019	-.018	-.010	.0003
Kyongnam	.155*	.169**	.149*	.152*	.097^	.073	-.111*	-.129*	-.111*	-.112*	-.073	-.060	-.082^	-.075	-.073	-.071	-.059	-.049
Other	-.089	-.083	-.088	-.079	-.078	-.092	.045	.058	.061	.057	.049	.069	.022	.016	.019	.018	.020	.013
Residential (Seoul)																		
Kyonggi	.118**	.119*	.116*	.113*	.079^	.080^	-.125**	-.115*	-.111*	-.110*	-.085*	-.089*	-.008	-.026	-.026	-.028	-.021	-.015
Kangwon	.213*	.161^	.170^	.173^	.159^	.138^	-.281**	-.245**	-.250**	-.254**	-.238**	-.235**	.031	.028	.030	.022	.023	.047
Ch'ungch'ong	.270**	.211**	.214**	.215**	.138*	.122*	-.260**	-.238**	-.239**	-.241**	-.235**	-.164**	-.060	-.034	-.036	-.039	-.025	-.027
Cholla	.015	-.040	-.009	-.002	.023	.054	.081^	.102^	.079	.074	.058	-.030	-.079*	-.060	-.067	-.071	-.077^	-.030
Kyongbuk	.120^	.069	.085	.080	.045	.055	-.165**	-.138*	-.150**	-.150**	-.115*	-.126*	-.017	-.008	-.011	.016	-.011	-.004
Kyongnam	.180**	.155**	.151**	.148**	.154**	.106*	-.252**	-.238**	-.235**	-.236**	-.235**	-.220**	.007	.007	.010	.003	-.0002	.036
Political Attitudes																		
Political Efficacy			.023	.012	-.026	-.040			-.022	-.016	.004	-.026			-.042	-.041	-.031	.008
Subjective Ideology			-.012	-.012	.044	.030			.051	.051	.012	-.011			-.028	-.028	-.040	-.010
Issue Standing Index			-.392**	-.379**	-.205**	-.152**			.345**	.338**	.205**	.138**			.037	.035	.001	.017
Regional Economy																		
Retrospective Evaluation				.012	.016	-.003				-.016	-.023	-.030				-.037	-.036	-.008
Prospective Evaluation				.132^	.030	-.036				-.060	.018	.049				-.0005	.019	.056
Party Disposition (None)																		
Governing Party					.271**	.214**					-.117**	-.092**					-.079**	-.053*
Opposition Party					-.253**	.225**					.253**	.191**					.033	.057*
Candidate Evaluations																		
Favourite, YS						.254**						-.116**						-.093*
Favourite, DJ						-.144**						.363**						-.136**
Favourite, JY						-.146*						-.290**						.489**
Intercept	.349	.447	.550	.463	.432	.445	.441	.411	.308	.352	.337	.384	.186	.122	.146	.163	.180	.101
R-squared	.183	.254	.295	.298	.423	.455	.355	.379	.414	.414	.484	.545	.041	.071	.073	.074	.088	.180

Note: ** - p < .01; * - p <.05; and ^ - p <.10 in a two-tailed test. (0) - No Controls; (1) - Controls for the Socio-economic variables; (2) - Controls for the political attitude variables plus (1); (3) - Controls for the regional economic evaluation variables plus (2); (4) - Controls for the party disposition variables plus (3); (5) - Controls for the candidate evaluation variables plus (4).

Now let us examine the pattern of the changes in regional effects on voting, model by model. In the first models, in which the effects of socio-economic variables were adjusted for, there are few notable changes in the effects of regional attributes. The effects of regional attributes remained virtually intact across all the models. The first models can be seen as a baseline for further controls, i.e., a model of total causal effects, as the effects of causally prior (or in the same rank) variables are partialed out. At this point, however, it is noteworthy that regional differences in voting cannot be attributed to differences in social composition among the regions or among those who had the same regional backgrounds.

In the second models, in which the political attitude variables were additionally controlled, the effects of Cholla residency and origin showed a slight but notable change, in that their magnitudes were somewhat reduced (roughly 3 to 4 per cent each) for votes for Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung and their respective parties. There also emerged a small but notable decrease in the magnitude of the effects of native regions in particular. In the third models, in which the effects of the evaluation of regional economy were additionally taken into account, however, no notable changes occurred. In the fourth models, where the variables of party disposition were additionally controlled, there emerged a few notable changes again for the two Kims and their parties. Most of the effects of regional attributes were uniformly reduced, and their degree of decrease was

roughly proportional to their magnitude, although varied in the absolute sense. There were two exceptional cases: that is, the effects of Kyonggi and Kyongnam residency for Kim Young-sam, in that the effects were somewhat strengthened. It is also noteworthy that the effect of Ch'ungch'ong residency on Kim Dae-jung's vote became insignificant.

In the final models, where the candidate evaluation variables were additionally controlled, the changes of the effects of regional attributes were remarkable across all the models. For example, the effects of Cholla origin were nearly halved by the introduction of candidate evaluations across all the models. Similar changes were found regarding the effect of Cholla residency on the Kim Dae-jung vote, and regarding the effects of Kyongnam residency and origin on the Kim Young-sam vote. It is also noteworthy that the effects of Kyongbuk origin were somewhat reduced across all the models. The effects of Kyonggi residency, however, remained as they were before or were even somewhat strengthened.[15] The effect of Kyonggi residency was positively reflected in the Chung Ju-young votes, which was also (negatively) reflected in the choices of Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam. A caution is needed for this interpretation, however, given the somewhat different estimates of the logit models, especially for the Kim Dae-jung vote: that is, the effects of Kyonggi and Kangwon

[15] The reason for this is not clear from this analysis. But one feasible, and partial, explanation may be that the effect of Kyonggi residency was suppressed somewhat, as the voters of Kyonggi origin, who form a majority of Kyonggi residents, showed a negative tendency of support for Chung Ju-young. Nonetheless, Kyonggi voters were less inclined to support Kim Dae-jung, with and without controls.

residency, which appeared significant in the OLS model for Kim Dae-jung, were insignificant in the logit model, whereas the effect of Ch'ungch'ong residency for his vote, which were insignificant in the OLS model, became significant, after holding constant the other variables on the list.[16] (See Table 5-8). The logit estimates for the other models are nonetheless largely identical to those of the OLS estimates.

Table 5-8. Regionalism, Political Attitude, Economic Evaluation, Party Disposition and Candidate Evaluation:
Controlling for Social Structure (A Multivariate Assessment (logit)) for the 1992 vote

	YS	DJ	JY	DLP	DP	UNP
Regional Attributes						
Origin (Seoul/Kyonggi)						
Kangwon	.171	-.695	-.312	-1.04*	1.10*	-.418
Ch'ungch'ong	.071	-.202	.121	-.010	-.099	-.381
Cholla	-.691	1.71**	-1.93**	-.382	.752*	-1.19*
Kyongbuk	.757	-1.17^	-.028	.403	-.549	-.109
Kyongnam	.178	-.794	-.355	-.027	-.154	-.538
Others	.230	-.284	.801*	-.733	.439	-.117
Resident (Seoul)						
Kyonggi	-.739^	.031	1.48**	.422	-.180	-.563
Kangwon	-.300	.281	.508	.592	-1.07	-.251
Ch'ungch'ong	-1.11*	1.28*	.628	.542	-1.09*	-.383
Cholla	-2.04*	2.64**	-6.06[a]	.278	.362	-5.96[a]
Kyongbuk	-.747	.942	.277	.541	-.639	-.364
Kyongnam	1.18**	-.388	-.769	.739*	-1.41**	.095
Political Attitudes						
Political Efficacy	.151	-.348	.099	-.425	-.241	.223
Self-assigned Ideology	.965^	-1.30^	.214	-.081	.121	.139
Issue Standings	-1.65**	1.20*	.593	-.865*	.317	.424

[16] There was another difference in the estimates between the OLS and the logit models for Kim Dae-jung in case of the income variable, which appeared significant in the logit model, especially when the candidate evaluation variables were additionally controlled for, but insignificant in the OLS model. No firm answers can be provided for these inconsistencies, although this evidence leads us to a caution in the interpretation of the estimates of the OLS model for Kim Dae-jung vote. Perhaps, the more polarised distribution of the vote propensity for Kim Dae-jung, and the voters' evaluations on him, may have resulted in such differences in the estimation between the linear probability and the logit models. See, for a discussion on comparisons of the logit and the OLS measures, Denk, Charles E., and Finkel, Steven E., "The Aggregate Impact of Explanatory Variables in Logit and Linear Probability Models," *American Journal of Political Science*, 36(3), 1992, pp. 785-804.

Regional Economy						
Retrospective Evaluation	.345	-.132	-.484	-.217	-.156	-.444
Prospective Evaluation	1.65*	-.436	-3.43**	.173	.173	.637
Party Disposition (None)						
Governing Party	1.14**	-1.22*	-.229	.899**	-.959**	-.397
Opposition Party	-.707*	1.00**	.289	-1.47**	1.32**	.306
Candidate Evaluation						
Favourite, YS	3.83**	-3.12**	-1.56*	1.48**	-.656	-1.18*
Favourite, DJ	-2.08**	5.83**	-2.91**	-1.13**	2.26**	-2.17**
Favourite, JY	-4.19**	-4.00**	10.23**	-.523	-1.96**	2.78**
Urban/Rural(Metro)						
City	.098	.084	-.388	-.263	-.197	.561
Rural	-.058	.272	.383	.476	-.134	-.388
Socialisation						
Gender(Female)						
Male	-.162	.491	.048	-.187	-.025	.140
Age (50+)						
20s	-1.41**	-.258	1.14*	-.533	.361	.488
30s	-.767^	-.292	1.83**	-.722*	.268	.765^
40s	-.585	.112	1.30*	-.108	.105	.724
Religion (No/Others)						
Buddhist	.237	-.142	.585^	-.047	.327	-.282
Protestant	.513^	.439	-.562	.342	-.121	.270
Catholic	-.217	.427	.086	-.639	.117	.284
Education(Primary)						
Middle School	.583	.555	-1.45*	-.164	.208	.224
High School	.379	-.094	-.823	.219	.177	-.735
University	.237	.128	-1.17^	-.011	.585	-.639
SE Interests						
Job(Self-employed)						
Farmer	.465	1.10	-1.11	.162	-.638	.624
Manual Worker	-.225	.630	.802*	.404	-.291	.298
Non-manual	.333	.799	-.568	.424^	-.404	.337
Manager/Prof	.846	-2.22^	-1.12	.981^	-.835	-1.70^
Income(< 500,000)						
500 - 990,000	-.692	1.38*	.620	-.248	-.244	.378
1,000 - 1,490,000	-.678	1.56*	.253	-.459	-.408	1.01^
Over 1,500,000	-.594	1.17^	.792	-.439	-.290	.652
Housing (Owner)						
Monthly Rent	-.106	.562	-1.78*	.650	-.770	-.196
Long-term Lease	-.388	.966**	-.383	.132	.088	-.239
Intercept	-.705	-3.24	-1.66	.509	-.846	-2.73
Pseudo-R^2 (% c)	.598(88.4)	.727(92.9)	.579(91.2)	.396(81.5)	.474(84.6)	.233(88.7)

Note: ** - p<.01; * - p<.05; and ^ - p<.10. % c - Over percentage correctly predicted.
[a] - Consists of an empty cell; thus, a statistical test not relevant.

Another notable pattern which emerged is that changes in the effects of regional attributes for the National Assembly votes were in general far smaller than those for the presidential votes, except for the effects of Cholla origin: in the

case of the DLP vote, a larger portion of it was accounted for when the partisan disposition variable was controlled, but for the DP vote a larger portion of it was accounted for by the candidate evaluation variables. However, it should be also noted that a substantial portion of the effects of regional attributes still remained to be accounted for. For example, there still remained about 28 per cent difference in the estimated votes of Kim Dae-jung between the voters of Kyongbuk origin and Cholla origin, even after controlling for the variables on the list. For Kim Young-sam, the largest gap remained between Cholla and Kyongnam residents, that of about 23 per cent.

From the above analysis, there emerge several points to be emphasised with regard to possible explanations for the causes of regionalism.[17] First, let us discuss the economic aspects of regional voting with reference to the above evidence. It is a widely held notion that the geographically skewed pattern of economic development, particularly since the Park Chung-hee regime, favoured the Kyongsang provinces and worked relatively disadvantageous to the Cholla provinces, and thus the voters showed geographically distinct patterns of party support accordingly. In this regard, it is proper to look at the indirect effects of residential regions *via* the economic evaluation variables rather than the effects of region of origin. The evidence provided here was, however, not a resounding one for economic explanations of regional voting. The indirect effects of residential region *via* the economic evaluation lent some support to the economic

[17] See Chapter 2, for a detailed discussion on the propositions that have been developed to explain regional voting.

explanation of regional voting, but the effects accounted for were small in their magnitude.

It was rather the so-called favourite son effects that accounted for the largest portion of the effects of regional attributes. This is especially so for those voters who had ties with Cholla, and Kyongnam residents, indicating that they may have evaluated the candidates largely on regional lines. What this tells us is that Korean voters, whose prime concern lies in the personality or personal competence of the candidates when they decide for whom to vote,[18] may have resorted to the regional backgrounds of the candidates as a yardstick of their voting decision. As Henderson once put it, "the value of sending a local son to the capital through the examination system could be transferred with lightening speed to the value of sending him by election."[19]

The indirect effects of regional attributes *via* political attitudes or party dispositions were also notable, especially for those who had ties with Cholla

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[18] See Chapter 6 for a detailed discussion. For example, when the respondents were asked about a major reason for voting choices, nearly 56 per cent of them picked that of personality-based responses in this survey, which followed by 23 per cent of policy-related responses. Similar results had been found in the surveys which tapped this kind of questions in the past: for example, in 1972 the comparable figure by Chung Chul-soo was about 74 per cent - which might have been higher than the national one because the survey was carried out in the Kyongbuk region; and in 1963 that was 66 per cent according to the survey by Yoon Chun-joo and Kil Soong-hoom. In the National Assembly elections, the comparable figures were somewhat lower: in 1978 it was 55 per cent according to Yoon and Kil, and in 1985 it was about 47 per cent according to the survey by Ahn Byong-man, Kil Soong-hoom and Kim Kwang-woong. Chung Chul-soo also found that the comparable figures in the National Assembly elections were lower by about 10 per cent. See Chung, Chul-soo, "T'up'yohaengdong-ui Sahoeshimrijok Yon'gu (A Socio-psychological Study of Voting)," *Mulli Nonch'ong*, Vol.1, 1973, pp. 15-43, at p.21; and Ahn, Byong-man, Kil, Soong-hoom, and Kim, Kwang-woong, *Elections in Korea*, Seoul Computer Press, 1988, p.196.

[19] See Henderson, Gregory, *Korea: The Politics of the Vortex*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968, p.218.

either by origin or residency, indicating that their regional voting was partly due to their differences in value orientations, and partisan leanings. An exceptional case was Kyongnam, where the voters seemed not to be differentiated by party disposition in voting for Kim Young-sam. Indeed, regional voting based on differences in political attitudes and partisanship was more a matter of origin than of residency.

If we view the unaccounted effects as a manifestation of regional antagonism or regional sentiment, it becomes clear that the voters in the other regions may also have acquired a sense of regional consciousness that is highly susceptible to partisan mobilisation; such mobilisation being most visible in the differences between Cholla and Kyongsang voters. There were also clear evidences that the DP led by Kim Dae-jung had suffered the most from the consequence of regional voting based on regional antagonism, which was all directed against the DP other than in its regional stronghold.

4. Conclusion

In this chapter, we have examined differences in electoral support among regions, which showed a highly acute pattern of region-party alliance since the 1987 presidential election. The analysis with the survey data of the 1992

elections revealed that regional voting was largely embedded in the phenomenon of the favourite son effect: that is, the regional attributes may have provided an important cue for the voters' evaluation of the candidates. Regional voting in the National Assembly elections may have been in large part a spill-over effect of the perception of the party leadership, although it may also have been due partly to partisan dispositions that may have varied across the regions, especially between Cholla and Kyongsang, given that one has been the base of the opposition since the 1970s while the other has been the base of the government.

A rather surprising finding is that regional voting was hardly due to the economic evaluations of the voters, which originally had been expected to vary from region to region. These findings lead to a conclusion similar to that of Kim Chin-kuk who argued in his study of regional sentiments that, "the reason why Cholla people put forward regional disparities in economic development or elite recruitment as a cause of their discontent is not because it is a real cause but because it is more persuasive to show the objective and qualitative evidence rather than to show a personal experience of social discrimination as a source of their discontent."[20]

In a country where there are no class oriented political parties of salience, or no parties on the ideological dimension, regionalism may have played a decisive role in providing a cue for voting choice, especially where the past

[20] See Kim, Chin-kuk, op.cit., 1988, p. 238.

pattern of party competition in the authoritarian regimes had little relevance. If the observation made by Pye - that Korea's "cultural instincts for togetherness and group solidarity," which had been exhausted by the leaders of the past, might reappear as "more private forms of solidarity"[21] - is upheld, then regionalism will remain an influence in politics for some time to come.

[21] See Pye, Lucian W., *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985, p.247.

Chapter 6. Parties, Economics, and Candidates

1. Introduction

For Korean voters in 1992, it may have been more difficult to decide for whom to vote than in the past. Unlike previous elections, they faced a choice without the clear cues that they used to have: i.e., that of the pro-democratic versus regime-support dimension of party competition. Let alone the fact that democratic measures taken since the late 1980s may have reduced the viability of the democratisation issue, this cue of the past may have been blurred by the party maneuvers across the ruling and opposition camps. That is, the nomination of Kim Young-sam - a long-time opposition figure who had joined in the formation of the new ruling Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) early in 1990 - as its presidential candidate may have resulted in confusion among the voters who may formerly have relied on this cue. After all, the election was bound to result, one way or the other, in the creation of a "civilian government," ending about 30 years of rule by the military-turned presidents.

However, the evidence provided so far clearly points to the fact that the old cleavages of the pro-democratic dimension had not simply withered away. Kim Young-sam, as a ruling party candidate, shared a common basis of societal support with his predecessors, especially that of his immediate predecessor, Roh

Tae-woo, rather than that of his own in 1987 when he ran as an opposition party candidate. Indeed, Kim Young-sam won more support from the old, the less-educated, rural dwellers and the like, who traditionally provided the electoral basis of the governing party. What this suggests is that some of the voters, at least, may have maintained their views of party politics based coherently on this dimension, and made their voting decisions accordingly, despite the seemingly different nature of the future government and its leader. That is, it may have been the cue of pro-democratic versus regime-support dimension that brought the voters to their final alignment.

Another factor that may have provided the voters with a consistent cue in 1992 was the regional traits of party politics, which had arisen since the elections of 1987 and onwards. This cue of regional traits, which clearly formed a basis for the voters' appraisal of the candidates, seemed to have become a factor in the short-term stability on the part of the voters in 1992, as the two viable candidates, i.e., Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, had also competed in the elections of 1987.[1] Although the ascribed nature of regional traits may have undoubtedly provided the voters with a stable cue when they decided for whom to vote, it may have been the linkage between candidates and regional traits, which had become highly visible in the electoral competitions since 1987, that was crucial. The cue

[1] Kim Young-sam won 28.0 per cent of the total votes, whereas Kim Dae-jung won 27.1 per cent in 1987. In this election, Roh Tae-woo won his presidency with the votes of 36.7 per cent. See Table 1-6.

of regional traits may have provided the voters with an easier, if not dominant, reference in the candidate-centred contest of the presidential election.

Before we proceed further, it may be worth looking at the distributions of voters' self-claimed cues used for their choice. The respondents were asked to nominate the most important factor considered when they made their voting choice among the six items provided - namely, regional backgrounds of the candidates, personal ties with the candidates, policies/promises of the candidates, candidates' career/ability, candidates' personality, and candidates' partisanship, with an additional open-ended item.[2] Table 6-1 reports the distributions broken down by voting choices in 1992. Over a half of the voters said that they considered qualities of a candidate, that is, either personality or career/ability of the candidate as the most important when they decided for whom to vote; about 23 per cent said policies or promises; and about 10 per cent said the party affiliation of a candidate. About 8 per cent of the voters said that the regional attachment of a candidate was the most considered cue.

Although the directions of the cues - i.e., either positive or negative in using the cues for their choice - were not explicitly measured, the cross-tabulation of the data with voting choice may give us some insights regarding the direction of such cues. Kim Young-sam scored first among those who said that the candidate's career/ability was their most obvious concern in making their voting

[2] See Appendix 1 for the wordings of the questionnaire.

decision, and those who designated the party affiliation of a candidate. Kim Dae-jung scored the first, apart from the other minor party candidates (Park Chan-jong especially) who also performed the best, among those who said candidate personality (or personal dignity) were the most important. Regional attachment of a candidate was also more important for the choice of Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam than for the others. Chung Ju-young scored the best among those who said that the policies and promises of a candidate were the most considered for their decision, which was followed by Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam. These results suggest that Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam, to about the same degree, benefited from their personality factors and regional attachments, whereas Chung Ju-young's strength lay with his policies/promises even if this strength was not overwhelming. There is also an indication that Kim Young-sam benefited most among those who considered party affiliation the most important, and the other minor party candidates benefited most among the personality driven voters.

Table 6-1. Voters' Yardstick of their Voting Decision, and Voting Choice in 1992: Column Percentages

	YS	DJ	JY	Other	Total
Candidates' Personality	22.3	36.6	9.3	71.6	29.0%(370)
Candidates' Career	34.6	25.0	20.5	12.3	27.3%(348)
Policies/Promises	15.9	18.8	57.2	7.6	23.0%(294)
Party Affiliation	15.4	6.6	7.8	4.6	10.3%(132)
Regional Backgrounds	8.2	12.3	3.4	0.0	8.2%(105)
Other	3.5	0.6	1.7	3.9	2.3%(29)
Total (N)	41.6%(532)	34.1%(435)	16.4%(209)	7.9%(101)	100%(1277)

Source: The 1992 Post-election Survey.

In short, the cues outlined above may have forged the main paths which conveyed the voters' choice in 1992. What is to be pursued further in this chapter is an examination of the more immediate variables that explicitly measure the process by which those cues are affected, and also a test of the impacts and directions of those cues on individual voting choice. The political tendency variables are considered in the first section with particular attention to partisan orientations. The second section reviews the economic concerns of voters, which may have emerged as a new dimension that guided the voters' choices in the elections of 1992 as a result of economic difficulties encountered, together with the presence of a new political alternative. The third section examines the patterns and the manner in which voters perceive the candidates with reference to their comparative evaluations of the candidates over various issues. The final section summarises the effects of various determinants of voting choice in bringing about the final outcomes of the 1992 presidential election in a causal sequence model.

2. Partisan Orientation, Ideology and Political Attitudes

Of the variables which can measure the pro-democratic versus regime-support dimension, this study collected data on partisan orientation, ideological

leaning, and issue attitudes.[3] The question for partisan orientation was: "Have you usually supported the party in power (*yodang*) or the party out of power (*yadang*) in elections?". The question, "do you consider yourself 'progressive' or 'conservative' for political and social matters?", was asked for ideological leaning. And a battery of questions on such matters as protest marches or demonstrations, the teachers' union movement, US Army withdrawal, and citizens' private-level contact with North Korea were also asked.

Let us begin by deliberating on the meaning of the partisan orientation variable. First of all, are the political parties relevant for Korean voters when they decide for whom to vote? Although it is doubtful, given the frequent changes in the Korean party system, that the voters hold a sense of long-standing socio-psychological attachment toward a specific party (as in most of the Western democracies[4]), however, this does not rule out the possibility of partisan driven forces in electoral choice and their role in evaluating political information. The ruling parties' proximity with the incumbent governments, which had been under the tight control of strong presidential leadership, may have provided the voters with a clear picture regarding the parties, that is, whether the party was for the government or against. Even though the life span of the parties themselves

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[3] See Appendix 1 for the questionnaires.

[4] See, for the concept of party identification, among others, Campbell, Angus, Converse, Philip E., Miller, Warren E., and Stokes, Donald E., *The American Voter*, New York: Wiley, 1960; Converse, Philip E., "Of Time and Partisan Stability," *Comparative Political Studies*, 2, 1969, pp. 139-71; Crewe, Ivor, "Party Identification Theory and Political Change in Britain," in Budge, Ian, Crewe, Ivor, and Farlie, Dennis (eds.), *Party Identification and Beyond*, London: Wiley, 1976; and Niemi, Richard G., and Weisberg, Herbert F., "Is Party Identification Meaningful," in Niemi and Weisberg (eds.), *Controversies in American Voting Behaviour*, 2nd ed., Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1984.

had been short, it is likely that the distinction between *yodang* (party in power) and *yadang* (party or parties out of power) had become a meaningful source of political judgment among the voters.

The images of *yodang* or *yadang* that the voters might have developed are relatively clear cut. The voters could have developed a framework for assessing the political parties and their candidates, as the pervasive pattern of political competitions in the past authoritarian regimes had been between the *yodang* - whose greatest assets lay in the nation's economic achievements under the regime, and thus argued for the maintenance of the regime - and a main *yadang* which used to put the issue of regime legitimacy at the forefront. The voters, therefore, could have held consistent expectations when they expressed their preferences in elections.

The distribution of voting choices based on partisan orientations on various occasions, reported at Table 6-2, show a close association between partisan stance and voting choice. For example, Kim Young-sam in 1992 won far more votes (about 73 per cent) among those who said that they were governing party supporters than his national average (about 37 per cent), but gained about 13 per cent among those who were the opposition party identifiers. By contrast, Kim Dae-jung won about 55 per cent of the votes from the opposition party identifiers, and won a mere 4 per cent among the governing party identifiers in 1992. As a new comer in this election, Chung Ju-young's votes seemed not to be

differentiated by partisan stance, although he had slightly more support from those who were not identified with either *yodang* or *yadang* than the identifiers.

Table 6-2. Partisan Orientations and Voting Choice: Column Percentages

	Governing Party	None	Opposition Party	Total
Total (N)	26.4 (n=387)	31.6 (n=463)	42.0 (n=616)	N=1446
1992 Presidential				
Kim Young-sam	73.2 %	37.8 %	12.6 %	36.5 %
Kim Dae-jung	3.6	17.6	54.5	29.4
Chung Ju-young	12.1	16.6	13.9	14.3
The Others	1.7	10.6	7.4	6.9
Non-voter	9.3	17.5	11.7	12.9
1992 National Assembly				
DLP	69.6 %	38.9 %	11.0 %	35.3%
DP	6.6	17.6	58.4	31.9
UNP	6.9	11.0	12.1	10.4
The Others	3.2	8.8	4.8	5.7
Non-voter	12.7	23.1	13.4	16.3
Not-eligible	1.1	0.6	0.3	0.6
1987 Presidential				
Roh Tae-woo	68.4 %	38.4 %	12.7%	35.5%
Kim Young-sam	10.9	19.6	18.7	16.9
Kim Dae-jung	1.3	12.4	46.0	23.6
Kim Jong-pil	4.9	5.0	2.5	3.9
Non-voter	5.3	13.4	5.4	7.9
Not-eligible	9.1	11.2	14.6	12.1

Source: The 1992 Post-election Survey.

According to this survey data, there were more opposition party identifiers than those of the governing party, and the non-identifiers were in between (see the first line of Table 6-2).[5] An immediate question to be raised is, then, what

[5] Basically similar results were found in the post-election survey of the 14th National Assembly election on March 1992 by the Institute for Korean Election Studies. About 23 per cent of the respondents said that they were close to *yo*, about 34 per cent *ya*, and about 43 per cent on the middle, with the question of: "We are talking about *yodang* or *yadang* in our daily lives. Do you think you are close to *yo* or *ya*?" See Cho, Chung-bin, "Yukwonja-ui Yoya-songhyang-gwa T'up'yohaengt'ae (Voters' Government-Opposition Disposition and Voting Behaviour)," in Lee

would be the reasons for the successive electoral victories of the governing party and its candidates? In looking at the evidence from the table, there are a few possibilities that can be put forward. First, the strength of the partisan orientations may have differed. As shown on the table, the governing party and its candidates had gained a relatively solid degree of support from the governing party identifiers, whereas the support of the opposition party identifiers had not been so. Indeed, the change of its leadership to Kim Young-sam of the governing party had little impact on the preferences of the governing party identifiers. On the contrary, the numerical superiority of the opposition party identifiers nevertheless could not guarantee its success in the elections because of the party fragmentation on the side of the opposition, even if there had been a relatively small portion of cross-votes (about 11 to 13 per cent) among the opposition party identifiers. Perhaps, it is rather the very existence of several opposition parties, that is, those out of power, that had kept some of the voters on the side of opposition. Second, the governing party and its candidates were more successful in winning the votes of the non-identifiers. The non-identifiers lent more support to the governing party and gave far less support to the main opposition party than the national average. They were also far more likely to abstain from voting than the identifiers, and tended to give more support to the minor parties. The ability

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Nam-young (ed.), *Han'guk-ui Son'go (Elections in Korea), I*, Seoul: Nanam, 1993, p. 51. The data collected for the 14th Presidential election by the same Institute were, however, somewhat different. This time with a five scale measure, the survey found the distributions of *yo* 18 per cent, somewhat close to *yo* 21 per cent, middle 27 per cent, somewhat close to *ya* 23 per cent, and *ya* 11 per cent. See ibid., p. 52, footnote 2.

of the governing party to lure the likely floating votes of non-identifiers to its side may have contributed to its successive electoral victories.

Table 6-3. Partisan Orientations and the Flow-of-the-Votes, 1987 - 1992: Column Percentages

1987 1992	Roh Tae-woo	Kim Young-sam	Kim Dae-jung	Kim Jong-pil	Non-voter	Not-eligible
Governing Party (n)	68.4 (265)	10.9 (42)	1.3 (5)	4.9 (19)	5.3 (21)	9.1 (35)
Kim Young-sam	76.3 %	83.8 %	12.9 %	65.1 %	41.7 %	68.6 %
Kim Dae-jung	2.2	5.0	55.0	0.0	11.7	2.8
Chung Ju-young	12.0	3.8	32.1	25.3	7.8	16.0
The Others	1.2	1.7	0.0	0.0	10.0	1.9
Non-voter	8.3	5.7	0.0	9.6	28.9	10.8
None (n)	38.4 (178)	19.6 (91)	12.4 (58)	5.0 (23)	13.4(62)	11.2(52)
Kim Young-sam	51.4 %	53.3 %	4.1 %	34.6 %	23.0 %	20.6 %
Kim Dae-jung	10.1	7.1	72.9	13.5	9.4	12.2
Chung Ju-young	21.5	20.8	2.6	16.2	5.8	20.7
The Others	8.5	9.8	2.9	27.9	9.8	20.6
Non-voter	8.5	9.0	17.5	7.8	52.0	25.9
Opposition Party (n)	12.7 (78)	18.7 (115)	46.0 (283)	2.5 (15)	5.4 (33)	14.6(90)
Kim Young-sam	22.6 %	37.2 %	1.6 %	12.9 %	14.8%	5.7 %
Kim Dae-jung	21.8	16.5	84.9	19.6	28.1	51.3
Chung Ju-young	34.6	22.6	5.2	39.3	6.0	10.7
The Others	10.1	11.4	1.9	12.3	5.5	16.9
Non-voter	10.8	12.3	6.3	15.8	45.7	15.5
Total (n=1446)	36.5 (521)	16.9 (248)	23.6 (346)	3.9 (57)	7.9(116)	12.1(177)
Kim Young-sam	59.7 %	51.0 %	2.2 %	38.9 %	23.9 %	22.6 %
Kim Dae-jung	7.8	11.1	82.5	10.7	15.2	30.2
Chung Ju-young	18.6	18.8	5.2	25.4	6.2	14.7
The Others	5.1	9.2	2.0	14.5	8.6	15.0
Non-voter	8.8	10.0	8.1	10.5	46.1	17.6

Source: The 1992 Post-election Survey.

Table 6-3, which reports the flow-of-the-votes from 1987 to 1992 broken down by the partisan orientation variable, shows how the partisan orientations of the voters mediated the electoral choices that would have been highly volatile as

a result of the party maneuvers between the ruling and the opposition camps. In looking at the table, the natural focus is on the movement of the votes of the DLP segments, as they are likely to be more volatile. Overall, Kim Young-sam in 1992 had the biggest in-flow-votes from the Roh Tae-woo votes of 1987, and managed to hold slightly more than a half of his own votes of 1987 (see the rows of totals at Table 6-3).[6] He also won the biggest share of the former votes of Kim Jong-pil, who also joined in the ruling coalition DLP. Kim Dae-jung retained his former votes virtually intact, but seemed to have failed in attracting the defecting votes of the DLP segments. It was rather Chung Ju-young who gained a fair share of the defecting votes.[7]

The table clearly shows that partisan orientation was one of the factors that mediated the voters' movement in the subsequent elections. For example, Kim Young-sam won the biggest share of in-flow votes among the governing party identifiers, regardless of where the in-flow votes originated from, the second largest share among the non-identifiers, and the third largest share among the opposition party identifiers. On the contrary, Kim Dae-jung, and Chung Ju-young alike, won the most among the opposition party identifiers, the second among the non-identifiers, and the third among the governing party identifiers in due sequence. To be sure, it was Chung Ju-young who accommodated the

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[6] In the survey, Kim Young-sam's votes of 1987 were about 10 per cent under-represented. If this under-representation results from his change of partisan stance in 1990, it is likely that the portion of his own in-flow votes could have been smaller.

[7] See Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion on the meanings of the flow of the votes.

biggest portion of the defecting votes from the former supporters of the DLP segments.

What is revealing from the above observation is that the partisan orientations of the voters came into play when they made voting decisions in such a way that the partisan stance of the candidates was counted. It is hard to grasp the nature of Kim Young-sam's successful shifting of electoral bases - that is, that of retaining substantial portions of the former votes of Roh Tae-woo and Kim Jong-pil - without referring to the partisan orientations the voters might hold. It should be also noted, however, that partisan orientations were not all encompassing. Kim Young-sam, for example, still retained the following of a substantial portion of his former supporters who were identified with the opposition. Further, the more successful accommodation of the former supporters of DLP segments by Chung Ju-young as compared to that gained by Kim Dae-jung, especially among the opposition party identifiers, indicates a limitation on the role played by partisan orientations. That is, this result points to the fact that there may have been other factors, such as regional antagonisms for example, which hindered a full realisation of the partisan driven forces of electoral choice.

In short, for some of the Korean voters who were willing to identify their partisan orientations (about 68 per cent of the total), the cue of partisan orientations toward *yodang* or *yadang* may have been a meaningful source in

shaping their voting choices. If we say a voter has a partisan stance of *yo* or *ya*, then what does this mean for his or her political life other than the fact that he or she would be influenced by his or her partisan stance when making voting decisions? Can this be seen as a manifestation of his or her long-term views on politics derived from his or her past political experiences? More specifically, to what extent is the distinction between *yo* or *ya* related with the voters' evaluations on political issues? To shed light on these questions, Table 6-4 explores the relationships between the voters' partisan orientations and their stances on political issues. By looking at these relationships, the nature of the partisan orientation variable can be firmly reiterated.

Table 6-4. Partisan Orientations and Issue Standings: Column Percentages

	Governing Party	None	Opposition Party	Total
Total (N)	26.4 (n=387)	31.6 (n=463)	42.0 (n=616)	N=1446
Demonstrations				
Oppose	81.3%	61.1 %	39.5 %	57.4 %
No Opinion	9.4	19.2	19.4	16.7
Approve	9.3	19.7	41.1	25.9
Teachers' Union				
Oppose	63.1 %	50.3 %	29.8 %	45.1 %
No Opinion	18.5	23.0	16.8	19.2
Approve	18.4	26.7	53.4	35.7
US Army Withdrawal				
Oppose	74.7 %	65.7 %	52.5 %	62.5 %
No Opinion	11.5	20.1	15.9	16.1
Approve	13.8	14.2	31.6	21.4
Private-level Exchanges with North Korea				
Oppose	47.6 %	38.7 %	28.7 %	36.8 %
No Opinion	9.0	17.8	11.6	12.9
Approve	43.4	43.5	59.7	50.3

Source: The 1992 Post-election Survey.

Let us first examine the overall distribution of the responses on each of the issue items (see the column of total). All of the items queried were either activities outlawed by the government or different from those expressly approved by the government. However, they were not election specific issues of contention between the parties, they were rather prepared to measure the voters' attitudinal characteristics in general. Except for the issue of allowing private-level contacts with North Korea, there were more of the responses affirmative to the official positions. About 63 per cent of the respondents were against the withdrawal of American troops residing in Korea, about 57 per cent said that they were opposing the practices of demonstration or protest march, and about 45 per cent were against the activities of the outlawed teachers' union. There were also about 13 to 19 per cent of the respondents who declined to express their standings on the items. Thus, it is fair to say that on the average Korean voters were somewhat inclined to conform with officially endorsed positions on key issues.

Nonetheless, the table exhibits clear differences in the issue positions of the respondents depending on their partisan orientations. That is, the governing party identifiers were far more likely to be concordant with the positions of the government on all of the issue items than the others, while the opposition party identifiers were far less likely to be in agreement with the government positions. The positions of the non-identifiers were quite similar to those of the national

average, but they were slightly more inclined to depress their opinion at the cost of disapproving the official positions. What emerged from this analysis is that the voters' partisan orientations toward *yo* or *ya* differentiated their standings on the issues that were likely to be a manifestation of their basic beliefs and values.

Apart from the partisan orientation variable, which seemed to form a basis for organising the voters' views on politics coherently, an ideological dimension is also considered in Table 6-5. In the survey, the respondents were asked to place themselves in a four scale measurement of ideology, running from 'conservative' to 'progressive'.[8] In general, the self-placed conservative can be said to be against change while the progressives are in favour of change in politics and society.

Overall, most of the respondents assigned themselves to the middle of the range, and their distribution was quite even on this dimension (see the row of overall distribution in Table 6-5). There emerged a clear pattern of associations between self-assigned ideology and their standings on the issues. Those who saw themselves as conservative as opposed to progressive were more likely to disapprove of demonstrations, the activities of the teachers' union movement, and private-level exchanges with North Korea. On the issue of US army withdrawal,

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[8] Although most of the respondents (about 85 per cent of the total) were willing to locate themselves on this ideological continuum, the meanings of it may have varied: some might have viewed this ideological continuum of 'conservative' versus 'progressive' in terms of the 'traditional' versus 'modern' dimension in societal sphere, or others the 'authoritarian' versus 'democratic or liberal' dimension in political sphere, and for some others this dimension may have meant the 'right' versus 'left' dimension.

this pattern was also held by and large. The implications of this evidence are straight forward: that is, Korean voters engaged in ideological thinking in such a way that substantial individual differences in their attitudes on key issues reflected placement along a conservative-progressive ideological continuum.

Table 6-5. Issue Standings and Partisan Orientations Distributed by Self-assigned Ideology: Column Percentages

	Very Conservative	Somewhat Conservative	Somewhat Progressive	Very Progressive	Total
Total (N)	7.0 (n=89)	42.7 (n=549)	43.9(n=561)	6.5 (n=83)	N=1279
Demonstrations					
Oppose	65.7 %	66.6 %	48.4 %	40.7 %	56.8 %
No Opinion	16.4	14.5	17.2	17.6	16.0
Approve	17.9	18.9	34.4	41.7	27.1
Teachers' Union					
Oppose	50.8 %	50.9 %	41.5 %	33.4 %	45.6 %
No Opinion	20.4	18.0	14.6	10.2	16.1
Approve	28.8	31.1	43.9	56.4	38.2
US Army Withdrawal					
Oppose	60.1 %	67.3 %	61.6 %	56.0 %	63.6 %
No Opinion	16.7	13.1	34.4	8.6	14.1
Approve	23.3	19.6	23.0	35.4	22.4
Private-level Exchanges with North Korea					
Oppose	46.8 %	42.5 %	35.9 %	26.9 %	38.9 %
No Opinion	11.3	11.5	10.0	7.1	10.5
Approve	41.9	46.1	54.1	65.9	50.6
Partisan Orientations					n=1254
Governing Party	35.7 %	31.2 %	23.1 %	14.8 %	26.8 %
None	28.2	31.0	29.7	22.4	29.7
Opposition Party	36.2	37.8	47.3	62.8	43.5

Source: The 1992 Post-election Survey.

The association of self-assigned ideology and partisan orientation appeared to be also significant and consistent in that there were more of the opposition

party identifiers toward the progressive end of the ideological spectrum, whereas more of the governing party identifiers saw themselves as conservative (see the bottom rows of the table). No clear patterns emerged for the non-identifiers. The association between ideology and partisan orientation, however, seemed to be asymmetric in that the relationship between them became sharper towards the progressive end of the ideological spectrum.

What, then, does the observed association between partisan orientation and ideology imply? Does this relationship suggest that the distinction between *yo* or *ya* among the voters is being curtailed or modified by their ideological leanings? A prerequisite for the answer to this question is to determine whether the voters perceive the *yodang* or the *yadang* in terms of ideology. A direct test for this cannot be provided here, but it is likely that ideology is less a matter of concern when the voters distinguish *yo* or *ya*, given that ideological confrontation in past electoral competitions had been rare since the 1960s. Thus, for the following analysis, no causal assumptions are made between them. What is suggested though is that there may be a common basis between partisan orientation and ideology. They may share common intervening variables that result in some overlap: for example, those who said they were progressive may have placed more value on 'democratisation' as such, as did the *yadang* identifiers.

Table 6-6. The Impact of Ideology and Partisan Orientations on Issue Attitudes (Betas): Controlling for Social Background

	Ideo	P O	Demo	Union	US	North	Index
Ideology, Self-assigned	–	–	.113**	.061*	.029	.099**	.114**
Partisan Orientations	–	–	-.231**	-.201**	-.137**	-.117**	-.260**
Urban/Rural (Metro)							
City	.053	-.040	.053	.024	-.029	-.027	.008
Rural	.038	.005	.038	.043	-.051	-.028	.002
Gender (Female)							
Male	.140**	-.105**	.031	.033	-.078**	.041	.013
Age (Over 50)							
20s	.121**	-.162**	.322**	.236**	.234**	.040	.310**
30s	.085*	-.130**	.166**	.174**	.128**	.060	.199**
40s	.055	-.017	.008	.026	.017	-.021	.011
Religion (None/Others)							
Buddhist	.014	.032	-.027	-.069*	-.084**	-.025	-.076**
Protestant	.036	.027	-.026	-.015	-.069*	-.043	-.057*
Catholic	.004	-.023	-.009	.006	-.056^	-.014	-.026
Education (Primary)							
Middle School	-.042	-.002	-.028	-.048	-.010	-.005	-.035
High School	-.079	-.054	-.015	.037	-.075	-.077	-.049
University	-.005	-.123**	.077^	.178**	.044	-.023	.104*
Job (Self-employed)							
Farmer	.060	-.001	-.014	-.039	.023	.014	-.007
Manual Worker	.007	.015	-.004	.029	-.012	-.011	.001
Routine Non-manual	.080*	.014	-.016	-.014	-.023	-.001	-.020
Manager/Prof	.040	.065*	-.009	-.020	-.029	-.058^	-.045^
Income (Under 500,000)							
500 - 990,000	.085^	.041	-.087*	-.024	.050	-.051	-.045
1,000 - 1,490,000	.086^	.022	-.025	-.051	.066	-.069	-.033
Over 1,500,000	.050	.018	-.039	-.007	.031	-.034	-.020
Housing (Owner)							
Long-term Lease	.049	-.062*	.023	.020	.005	.055^	.041
Monthly Rent	.033	-.022	-.021	-.016	.006	.024	-.002
Region of Origin (Seoul/Kyonggi)							
Kangwon	.046	-.024	-.004	.014	-.028	-.028	-.028
Ch'ungch'ong	.065	-.019	.048	.025	-.063	-.071^	-.024
Cholla	.173**	-.265**	.066	.045	-.044	-.003	.026
Kyongbuk	.127**	.050	.007	-.001	-.034	-.015	-.016
Kyongnam	.018	.105**	-.062	-.033	-.001	-.006	-.038
The Others	.035	-.004	.021	.018	-.046	-.030	-.014
Residential Region (Seoul)							
Kyonggi	-.050	.079*	-.055	-.023	.047	.072^	.016
Kangwon	-.039	.017	-.001	-.001	.034	.045	.029
Ch'ungch'ong	-.053	.112**	-.020	-.007	.053	.088*	.044
Cholla	-.134**	-.062^	-.016	.018	.145**	.101*	.091*
Kyongbuk	-.051	.058	.018	.052	.054	.051	.066^
Kyongnam	.012	.007	-.029	-.008	-.005	.016	-.009
R-squared	.070	.244	.255	.224	.117	.069	.289

Note: ** - $p < .01$; * - $p < .05$; and ^ - $p < .10$ in a two-tailed test. Dependent Variable Coding: Ideo (1=very progressive, 0.66=somewhat progressive, 0.33=somewhat conservative, 0=very conservative); P O (1=governing party, 0.5=none, 0=opposition party); Demo, Union, US, North (1=approve, 0.5=no opinion, 0=oppose); and Index ([Demo+Union+US+North]/4).

Source: The 1992 Post-election Survey.

So far we have elaborated the relationships among the variables of partisan orientation, ideology, and attitudes on issues, that is, the variables designed to measure those political tendencies of the voters that would be attained for a relatively longer period of time. Now let us examine the input sides of this relationship, that is, the process of the voters' attaining such political tendencies. In Table 6-6, socio-economic indicators were employed to provide some insights on the process by which such political tendencies were attained. The table reports the standardised (beta) estimates of the socio-economic variables in the OLS regression models: that is, the first two columns report the effects of socio-economic indicators on ideology and partisan orientation, and the second five columns the effects on attitudes towards issues with additional controls of ideology and of partisan orientation. By performing this analysis, causal assumptions are made, in that the respondents' self-placed ideology and partisan orientation are prior to the formation of attitudes on issues. The beta coefficients show the relative impacts of the indicator variables on the dependent variables.

The coefficients for the analysis of ideology show that men, the younger and the lower segment of non-manual workers were more likely to place themselves as progressive on the ideological continuum than women, the older and the self-employed, net of other things on the list, and the middle income earners were more likely to be progressive than the lower. The respondents whose origins were other than from the Seoul/Kyonggi region were more likely

to assign themselves as progressive, especially those from Cholla and Kyongbuk, than those from Seoul and Kyonggi. The Cholla residents appeared to be more 'conservative' than the others, which seemed to be somewhat odd given the Cholla origin respondents' progressive leaning: indeed, the directions of all the residential region variables were opposite to those of the origin variable, except for those of Kyongnam. What this may suggest is that Seoul residents are in general more 'progressive' than those in other regional hinterlands; and among them, those who originated from the other regions are more 'progressive' than those from Seoul/Kyonggi. No further explanation for this can be provided here, however.

The coefficients relating to partisan orientation indicate that men, the younger and the more educated were less likely to be governing party identifiers, while managers and professionals and owner occupiers were more likely to be governing party identifiers, independent of other things. Those who originated from Cholla were far less likely to be governing party identifiers, whereas those of Kyongnam origins were more likely to identify with the governing party than those from Seoul and Kyonggi. Residents of Kyonggi and Ch'ungch'ong were more likely to identify with the governing party, while Cholla residents were less likely to be governing party identifiers.

Now let us examine the coefficients relating to attitudes towards issues. First of all, it is apparent that partisan orientation and ideology alike had an

impact in structuring the voters' attitudes on issues, but partisan orientation was stronger than ideology (about twice as strong) in shaping attitudes towards issues. Second, age emerged as having the strongest impact on attitudes towards issues, except for the issue of allowing private-level contacts with North Korea. Third, religious affiliation also resulted in attitude differences, in that Buddhists were somewhat more likely to disapprove of the activities of the teachers' union, and those affiliated with Buddhism and Christianity alike were less likely to favour the withdrawal of the US army than those who had no religion (and those affiliated with other minor religions). Fourth, university graduates were in favour of demonstrations and the teachers' union movement. Fifth, it seemed unlikely that the variable of regional attachment resulted in the attitude differences observed, except for the Cholla residents who substantially favoured the withdrawal of the US army. Finally, the coefficients of the index variable, which measured the consistency of the attitudes towards issues, largely confirm the patterns observed above.

In short, the above analysis indicates that, first, among the variables under study the variables of socialisation, especially that of age difference, are the main factors in determining the individuals' political tendency. Second, differences in regional attributes are more likely to be concerned with ideological self-placement and partisan orientation than standings on issues, suggesting that there are no substantial regional differences in determining the individuals' political attitudes once the individuals' partisan orientations and ideological leanings are

controlled. Finally, it needs to be noted that the relatively low scores of R-squared across the models indicate that there are more factors to be explained than are explained by the variables listed for the formation of the voters' political tendencies. This is particularly so for ideology and attitudes on the issues of the US army withdrawal and of North Korean contact.

3. Economics

In the period leading up to the elections of 1992, there was widespread agreement that the Korean economy needed innovative policies given that it had reached its structural limits in sustaining high growth rates.[9] The sluggishly growing economy, and soaring real-estate values and housing rentals seemed to reflect the economic mismanagement of the Roh government. As a commentator put it, this called for "a president of the economy."[10] If the governments of the past authoritarian regimes claimed credit for economic achievement, then equally they could be blamed for economic failure. Further still the electoral participation of Chung Ju-young, a most successful businessman in Korea, and his party, may have provided the voters with a new alternative in the economic

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[9] See Lee, Hong-yung, "South Korea in 1991: Unprecedented Opportunity, Increasing Challenge," *Asian Survey*, 32(1), 1992, pp. 64-73; also his "South Korea in 1992: A Turning Point in Democratisation," *Asian Survey*, 33(1), 1993, pp. 32-42.

[10] See Ahn, Bu-keun, "6 Kong 4 Nyon'gan-ui Yoronbyonhwa Ch'usebunsok: Yoron-un Kyongje Taet'ongryong-ul Wonhanda (An Analysis of the Public Opinion Trend during the First Four Years of the 6th Republic: Public Opinion Calls for An Economic President)," *Wolgan Choson*, Dec. 1991.

issue space. In addition, the diminishing importance of political issues such as 'democratisation' may have elevated economic issues to occupy a place of importance in partisan choice.

Although these economic difficulties may have been well perceived among the voters and politicians alike, however, this had not resulted in specific economic policies and policy differences among the parties. Rather the point of contention in the 1992 presidential election became who would be the most suitable as a manager of the economy.[11] Nonetheless, this did not necessarily rule out the possibility of economic voting among the voters, especially if the effects of economic conditions upon voting are said to be more related to "incumbency-oriented" evaluations than "policy-oriented" ones.[12] After all, the voters may have been more interested in outcomes than policies. As Fiorina put it, "in order to ascertain whether the incumbents have performed poorly or well, citizens need only calculate the changes in their own welfare."[13]

In this section, the linkages between the economy and the individuals' voting choice are explored by looking at relationships between the voters' evaluations on economic conditions and voting. The variables measured in this study consist of a two sets of six variables. Each set asks about the perceptions

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[11] See Park, Kyong-san, "Han'guk Son'go-ui Chongch'i-gyongjehak (Political Economy of Korean Elections)," in Lee, Nam-young (ed.), *Han'guk-ui Son'go, I (Elections in Korea, I)*, Seoul: Nanam, 1993, p. 393.

[12] See Kiewiet, D. Roderick, *Macro-economics and Micro-politics: The Electoral Effects of Economic Issues*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983.

[13] See Fiorina, Morris P., *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981, p. 5.

of the relative economic conditions of the respondents' household, region, and the country as a whole, with the first set relating the economic conditions "retrospectively" to the past few years and the second set relating "prospectively" to the future few years in a "simple" structure.[14] Thus, collective or "sociotropic" and personal or "pocketbook"[15] motivations are measured in the time horizon, along with a group level of measurement - that is, that of region, which as has been shown became a salient reference category since 1987.

Table 6-7. Economic Views of Respondents (%): Personal vs Collectives, and Past vs Future

	Far Better	Somewhat Better	About the Same	Somewhat Worse	Far Worse	Total (N) 100 %
Retrospective						
Household	2.7 %	27.0 %	40.0 %	19.9 %	10.4 %	n=1497
Region	3.5	24.9	37.2	24.4	10.0	n=1471
Country	2.6	20.6	21.6	37.3	17.9	n=1470
Prospective						
Household	3.6 %	55.1 %	32.3 %	7.5 %	1.5 %	n=1478
Region	3.7	51.9	34.2	8.4	1.7	n=1464
Country	4.2	55.4	30.5	8.3	1.7	n=1444

Source: The 1992 Post-election Survey.

[14] See, for a discussion about the features of economic voting, Lewis-Beck, Michael S., *Economics and Elections: The Major Western Democracies*, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1988, pp. 34-42.

[15] See Kinder, Donald R., and Kiewiet, D. Roderick, "Economic Discontent and Political Behaviour: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgments in Congressional Voting," *American Journal of Political Science*, 23(3), 1979, pp. 495-527;and "Sociotropic Politics: The American Case," *British Journal of Political Science*, 11(2), 1981, pp. 129-41.

Table 6-7 reports the responses of voters, that is, the way voters assessed economic conditions in the three levels of aggregation both retrospectively and prospectively. At first glance the table indicates that the voters were more critical in judging the past than forecasting the future. The voters were overall highly optimistic (nearly 60 per cent of the total answered) about the future economic conditions of their household, region, and nation. Compared to this, their evaluations of past economic conditions were rather bleak.

In terms of their retrospective evaluations, there emerges a clear pattern that evaluations of the respondents' household situation are less negative than that of the region, and the country, in due sequence. Indeed, about 55 per cent of the respondents evaluated the economic conditions of the country as having deteriorated, whereas about 30 per cent of them responded as such for their household's situation. The retrospective evaluations of their household's economy were rather balanced overall, whereas the evaluations of the regional and national economy were less positive. No such patterns emerge for the prospective evaluations.

On what grounds, then, did the voters evaluate their economic environments? What is the actual process whereby such evaluations are formed? To shed light on this question, the socio-economic characteristics of the voters are considered in relation to these economic evaluations, even if this attempt may

be far from being perfect to disentangle the myriad of such economic considerations. Nonetheless, long-term background factors may help to determine the individual's informational environment: that is, people with a similar background may share a common basis in how they evaluate their economic environment. Table 6-8 report the estimated partial impacts of socio-economic interests upon economic evaluations.

Let us begin by looking at the beta coefficients on the retrospective evaluations. Among the variables listed, the variables of urban/rural, gender, age, occupation, income and residential region appear to be significant. That is, the big city dwellers were less positive in evaluating the past economic conditions of their household, region and the nation as a whole than their counterparts in small cities and rural areas; male voters were less positive in this respect than female voters; the age cohort of over 50 were more positive than its younger counterparts; the self-employed were less positive than the other occupational groups; the lower income earners were less positive than those of higher incomes; and Seoul residents were more positive than the residents of other regions, especially at the levels of household and region. There were no significant differences in the evaluations among the other regions, except that Kyongnam residents were quite distinct in their negative evaluations on the past economic conditions, especially at the regional and the national levels.

Table 6-8. The Impact of Socio-economic Interests on the Economic Evaluations (Betas)

	Retro-House	Retro-Region	Retro-Nation	Pro-House	Pro-Region	Pro-Nation	Retro-Index	Pro-Index
Urban/Rural (Metro)								
City	.049	.075*	.116**	-.036	-.017	-.017	.176**	-.022
Rural	.146**	.179**	-.009	.038	.081^	.066	.046	.074
Gender (Female)								
Male	-.015	-.068*	-.047^	-.016	-.041	-.030	-.050^	-.036
Age (Over 50)								
20s	.026	-.049	-.123**	.051	.010	-.062	-.061	-.002
30s	-.022	-.077*	-.180**	-.010	-.048	-.090*	-.118**	-.058
40s	-.062^	-.057^	-.070*	-.058^	-.051	-.075*	-.075*	-.069*
Religion (None/Others)								
Buddhist	.002	.013	.001	.031	.025	-.015	.008	.012
Protestant	.037	.048^	.005	.052^	.047	.031	.033	.053^
Catholic	-.003	.001	.006	.009	.023	.041	.004	.031
Education (Primary)								
Middle School	-.018	.010	-.041	-.001	-.024	.008	-.026	-.006
High School	-.016	-.043	-.065	.103*	.043	.069	-.057	.080
University	-.080^	-.041	-.069	.009	-.014	-.009	-.083^	-.005
Job (Self-employed)								
Farmer	.017	.054	.106*	-.083^	-.150**	-.081^	.074	-.117*
Manual Worker	.065^	.125**	.107**	-.025	-.040	-.021	.125**	-.036
Routine Non-manual	.127**	.089**	.054	.005	-.026	.027	.112**	-.002
Manager/Prof	.091**	.053^	.069*	-.025	.001	.046	.088**	.007
Income (Under 500,000)								
500 - 990,000	.085*	.057	.055	.039	-.006	-.038	.078^	-.005
1,000 - 1,490,000	.125**	.047	.072	.084^	.066	-.006	.101*	.049
Over 1,500,000	.117**	.092*	.056	.078^	.028	-.024	.108*	.027
Housing (Owner)								
Long-term Lease	-.014	-.030	.020	.046	.026	.024	-.011	.035
Monthly Rent	-.034	.031	.047^	.029	.028	-.001	.025	.023
Region of Origin (Seoul/Kyonggi)								
Kangwon	.052	.101**	.022	.027	.004	-.058^	.071*	-.013
Ch'ungch'ong	.030	.045	.056	-.020	-.074^	-.015	.057	-.046
Cholla	-.046	.002	-.011	-.038	-.066	-.053	-.023	-.067
Kyongbuk	.002	.067	.062	-.011	-.076^	.005	.053	-.034
Kyongnam	-.029	.069	.034	.001	-.039	.023	.038	-.012
The Others	.001	-.018	.003	-.004	-.065*	-.059^	-.004	-.055^
Residential Region(Seoul)								
Kyonggi	-.061	-.078*	-.039	.014	.055	.023	-.074^	.033
Kangwon	-.116**	-.178**	.029	-.012	.002	.095**	-.108**	.030
Ch'ungch'ong	-.112**	-.091*	-.018	-.044	.004	-.001	-.088*	-.014
Cholla	-.074^	-.140**	-.011	-.038	-.090*	-.092*	-.087*	-.087*
Kyongbuk	-.105**	-.180**	-.018	-.006	.070^	.038	-.129**	.039
Kyongnam	-.168**	-.280**	-.169**	.008	.095*	.061	-.260**	.070^
R-squared	.072	.097	.110	.068	.067	.058	.099	.065

Note: ** - p < .01; * - p <.05; and ^ - p <.10 in a two-tailed test.
Dependent Variable Coding: Retro-house, Pro-house, Retro-region, Pro-region, Retro-nation, and Pro-nation (1=far better, 0.25=somewhat better, 0.5=about the same, 0.75=somewhat worse, 0=far worse); Retro-index ([Retro-house+Retro-region+Retro-nation]/3); Pro-index ([Pro-house+Pro-region+Pro-nation]/3).

Source: The 1992 Post-election Survey.

On the prospective evaluations, there are only a few significant variables. First, of all the occupational groups, farmers projected the future economic situation as the most gloomy. Second, higher income earners were more positive in their evaluation of the future economic situation (though only for their households) than their lower income counterparts. Third, the age cohort of over 50 were also more positive in evaluating the future economy than the others, especially at the national level. Finally, Cholla residents postulated the future economy of their region and the nation as being bleaker than the others, whereas the Kyongnam and Kyongbuk residents foresaw brighter futures for their regional economies. Kangwon residents were the most positive in their future economic evaluations for the nation.

From the above analysis, a few points need to be emphasised. First, Kyongnam residents showed an interesting pattern in their evaluation of the economic situation. They were the least positive in their retrospective evaluation, but the most positive in prospect. It seems likely that the electoral victory of Kim Young-sam, who had a regional attachment with Kyongnam, contributed to the switch over economic evaluation on the part of the Kyongnam residents. The most negative evaluation of the prospective economy made by Cholla residents can also be explained as such: they might have no reasons to convert their bleaker views on the economy into a brighter one, given the defeat of Kim Dae-jung, their regional favourite. Second, the effects of income, which seems naturally to

be related with economic evaluation, operated mostly at the micro-level, especially at the level of the individual's household. Third, among the occupational groups, the self-employed were the most negative in their retrospective evaluations, but farmers were the most negative in their prospective evaluations. Finally, the different economic evaluations among the age cohorts were more operative toward the larger levels of the nation or the region.

The next step taken here is to examine the relationships amongst the set of six economic evaluation variables. A correlation matrix is reported in Table 6-9, together with correlations with voting choice in the 1992 presidential election. A clear pattern of relationships amongst the variables emerges from the table: overall, the retrospective items clustered together, whereas those items of the future tied together in another set. The correlation among the prospective items showed higher associations than those of the retrospective. There was also a modest but significant linkage between past evaluation on a particular level and future expectations on that same level (see the correlation scores in bold in the table). The voters views on the economy are, in short, oriented broadly to the past and toward the future with some linkages between them.

There also appeared another interesting pattern of relationships between the levels of evaluations. Both in the retrospective and prospective clusters, the association of the household evaluations with the regional evaluations is higher in its degree than that with the national ones, and the association of the national

evaluations with the regional evaluations is stronger than that with the household ones. This suggests that the voters' evaluations of the regional economy may have played a central role in the economic judgments concerned by linking both the more immediate economic concerns and the more remote ones together.

Table 6-9. Correlations among the Economic Perception Variables, and Voting Choice in 1992

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Retrospective						
(1) Household						
(2) Region	.533**					
(3) Country	.381**	.551**				
Prospective						
(4) Household	**.272****	.197**	.112**			
(5) Region	.182**	**.255****	.162	.625**		
(6) Country	.162**	.185**	**.227****	.551**	.736**	
Voting Choice						
Kim Young-sam	.011	.078**	.068*	.116**	.205**	.243**
Kim Dae-jung	-.030	-.033	-.008	-.106**	-.164**	-.192**
Chung Ju-young	.028	-.069*	-.080**	-.043	-.099**	-.102**

Note: ** - $p < .01$; and * - $p < .05$ in a two-tailed test.

Source: The 1992 Post-election Survey.

Now let us examine the voting effects of economic perceptions, shown in the bottom lines of Table 6-9 by means of simple correlation. (See the final section of this chapter for a multivariate assessment of the effects.) Overall, there appears to be a stronger association between voting behaviour and prospective evaluations than retrospective ones, and evaluations at the national and the regional rather than the household level are more associated with voting behaviour. As could be expected, positive evaluations are associated with the

Kim Young-sam vote, and negative judgments are related to the Kim Dae-jung and Chung Ju-young vote. There is no association between the Kim Dae-jung vote and the retrospective evaluations at any of the levels, however. Korean voters in 1992 seemed to have relied more on future forecasts, which showed a highly optimistic pattern of distribution, than judgments of the past as a guide in making their vote choices, and these choices were guided more by collective concerns than personal concerns. The latter aspect is largely consistent with the findings of studies of Western democracies, that is, personal economic circumstances seldom guide the voting choice of an individual,[16] but Korean voters seem to be guided more by prospective evaluations than their Western counterparts, who may give relatively equal weight to retrospective and prospective evaluations.[17]

Table 6-10 further tests the process of the formation of prospective evaluations, which showed a stronger association with vote, in a causal sequence model. We anticipate, first, that retrospective evaluations of economic conditions

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[16] The studies on economic voting are nearly unanimous in this regard: see, for example, Kinder and Kiewiet, op.cit., 1979; Lewis-Beck, Michael S., "Comparative Economic Voting: Britain, France, Germany, Italy," *American Journal of Political Science*, 30(2), 1986, pp. 315-346; Marcus, Gregory B., "The Impact of Personal and National Economic Conditions on the Presidential Vote: A Pooled Cross-Sectional Analysis," *American Journal of Political Science*, 32(1), 1988, pp. 137-154; and Kinder, Donald R., Adams, Gordon S., and Gronke, Paul W., "Economics and Politics in the 1984 American Presidential Election," *American Journal of Political Science*, 33(2), 1989, pp. 491-515; but also see, for a study posing some reservations on confirmation of the sociotropic economic voting, Gopoian, J. David, and Yantek, Thom, "Cross-pressured Economic Voting in America: The 1984 Election," *Political Behaviour*, 10(1), 1988, pp. 37-52.

[17] See Lewis-beck, Michael S., "Economics and The American Voter: Past, Present, Future," *Political Behaviour* 10(1), 1988, pp. 5-21; and Conover, Pamela Johnston, Feldman, Stanley, and Knight, Kathleen, "The Personal and Political Underpinnings of Economic Forecasts," *American Journal of Political Science*, 31(3), 1987, pp. 559-583.

may have some effect on prospective judgments. Second, individuals' political attitudes and their partisan orientations are also expected to have some effects on prospective evaluations in such a way that they may bias the process of making prospective judgments.[18] The index variables of economic evaluations are used, as the items were highly correlated within the set of the same time frame. Socio-economic background variables, which may influence both retrospective and prospective evaluations, are also controlled. No causal assumptions are made between political variables and retrospective evaluations.

Table 6-10. The Prospective Economic Evaluations: Economy or Politics?
(Betas: Controlling for Social Background)

(Note: The variables not significant are not listed.)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Retrospective Economy Index	.310**	--	.297**
Issue Attitude Index	--	-.112**	-.095**
Partisan Orientations	--	.139**	.123**
Ideology	--	.061*	.055*
Regional/Socio-economic Interests			
Origin the Others	-.054^	-.058^	-.056^
Kangwon Residency	.064^	.033	.064^
Kyongbuk Residency	.079^	.040	.078^
Kyongnam Residency	.150**	.067	.144**
Education High-school	.098*	.088^	.104*
Job Farmer	-.140**	-.121*	-.142**
Job Manual Worker	-.074*	-.039	-.075*
House Long-term Lease	.039	.048	.049^
R-squared	.151	.096	.175

Note: Note: ** - p < .01; * - p <.05; and ^ - p <.10 in a two-tailed test. (1) - With controls of the retrospective economy index; (2) - With controls of Issue Attitude Index, Partisan Orientations, and Ideology; (3) - With controls of (1) plus (2).

Source: The 1992 Post-election Survey.

[18] See Conover, Feldman and Knight, op.cit., 1987.

The first model controls for the retrospective index variable in addition to socio-economic background, and the second model controls for political variables. In the final model, the effects of retrospective and political factors upon prospective evaluations are considered. The final model indicates, first of all, that retrospective evaluations exert the strongest influence on prospective economic judgment, nearly two and half times stronger than that of partisan orientations. Those who judged past economic situations to be gloomy were also more likely to foresee future economic situations as such. The voters' political tendencies are also likely to have an impact on judgments of future economic conditions. For example, governing party identifiers were more likely to foresee a brighter future, and those who had more liberal views on the issues of demonstrations, teacher's union, US army withdrawal and North Korean contact were more critical in making their judgments on the future economy. Those who assigned themselves as progressive were slightly more likely to view the future economy positively. In short, the data in the table show that the economic predictions of the voters (which is likely to be a more complex process than that attempted here), were largely dependent upon their retrospective judgments, but their predictions were also somewhat influenced by their political tendencies and socio-economic backgrounds that thus biased their judgments in a certain direction.

4. Candidate Evaluations

Most studies of Korean voting behaviour have almost unanimously found that candidate qualities are the factor which is most considered by voters when they decide for whom to vote, not only in presidential elections but also in national assembly elections.[19] As shown in Table 6-1, the voters in the 1992 presidential election were no exceptions. These results, however, convey only a limited amount of information about the way in which the concerns regarding the qualities of the candidates crystallise and manifest themselves in voting decisions. It is one thing to know that the voters' perception of candidate qualities becomes an important cue in voting, but it is a quite another matter to ascertain the manner in which this cue takes a particular direction. This section explores the process whereby the voters perceive candidate qualities by examining, first, the distribution of the perceptions of candidate qualities over some immediate political issues, and second by pondering the factors that influence these perceptions. The effects of candidate perceptions will be explicitly assessed in the following section.

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[19] See, for a review of the sample survey results, Cho, Ki-suk, "*Habrijok Yukwonja Model-gwa Han'guk-ui Son'go* (A Model of Rational Voters and Korean Elections)," in Lee, Nam-young (ed.), *Han'guk-ui Son'go (Elections in Korea), I*, Seoul: Nanam, 1993. According to a comparable study by Chung, Chul-soo, voters made about 10 per cent more candidate-oriented choices in presidential elections than in national assembly elections, although candidate-oriented choices were the most scored in both cases. See Chung Chul-soo, "T'up'yohaengdong-ui Sahoeshimrijok Yon'gu (A Socio-psychological Study of Voting)," *Mulli Nonch'ong*, Vol.1, 1973, pp. 15-43, at p. 21.

Table 6-11 reports data on the respondents' assessments of the presidential candidates in 1992. The respondents were asked to designate a candidate who would be the most capable of dealing with seven selected problems. The table, thus, basically measures the candidates' comparative images as perceived by the public, involving an assessment of the relative merits of the alternative candidates.

Table 6-11. Assessments of the Presidential Candidates on Each of the Issue Items: Row Percentages

	Kim Young-sam	Kim Dae-jung	Chung Ju-young	The Others	None of Them	Total (N)
Social Stability	62.5	22.6	3.8	7.6	3.6	100 % (1309)
Political Democracy	39.6	36.5	1.9	19.0	3.1	100 % (1277)
Economic Growth	31.4	24.6	36.3	4.3	3.4	100 % (1259)
National Unification	29.5	36.3	17.9	6.7	9.6	100 % (1123)
Dissolving the Regional Disparities	29.2	32.4	12.3	18.7	7.4	100 % (1198)
Clearing up the Corruption	28.6	33.1	4.0	26.1	8.2	100 % (1179)
Bridging Gap between the wealthy and poor	22.4	38.4	17.4	13.5	8.4	100 % (1203)

Source: The 1992 Post-election Survey.

Let us examine the distribution of the responses in detail. Kim Young-sam achieved an outstanding score on the issue of maintaining social stability, and scored first on the political democratisation issue, which scores were closely followed by those of Kim Dae-jung. On the items other than these two, Kim

Young-sam scored the second. Kim Dae-jung scored the best on the items of wealth redistribution, national unification, clearing-up corruption and mitigating regional disparities, on which issues Kim Young-sam scored second with a small (about 3 to 7 per cent) gap. Chung Ju-young scored highest on the economic growth issue, which score was closely followed by Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung in due sequence. Chung Ju-young was also positively evaluated on the items of national unification and wealth redistribution in which he scored third. The other minor candidates also scored well on the items of clearing-up corruption, political democratisation and mitigating regional disparities, on which Chung Ju-young's scores were dismal. It is also noteworthy that there were 7 to 10 per cent of respondents who said none of the candidates would be capable of dealing with such issues as national unification, wealth redistribution, clearing-up corruption and mitigating regional disparities, on which issues Kim Dae-jung scored first.

The above analysis suggests that the three main candidates may have occupied relatively distinct issue spaces, though with some overlap. The general picture that emerges regarding the candidate images perceived by the voters is that Kim Young-sam was accredited for his potential for maintaining stability as a ruling party candidate, with additional credits for his past career as a democratic opposition leader; Kim Dae-jung had the more credentials on the issues of delivering social justice and his potential for dealing with the unification issue; and Chung Ju-young had most credentials in his capacity to

handle the economy. Chung Ju-young, as a new participant in politics, was quite successful in occupying his own issue space, but his success was rather limited to the economic issue; that is, the voters were rather hesitant to render him credits for his unproved areas. As noted, however, the candidate images viewed on these issue spaces are relative rather than absolute in their magnitudes.

The next step is to examine the processes whereby voters assess the qualities of the candidates. The main thrust of the following analysis is to test whether there are systematic biases in the voters' assessments of the candidates, which seemed to have been good predictors of the vote, and to further test the relative impacts of such influences that incline the voters to a certain direction in the formation of candidate perceptions. The effects of voters' socio-economic backgrounds, political tendencies and economic evaluations are estimated on an index of the candidates' perceptions. Three models of OLS regression coefficients are employed to provide estimates of the three index variables, which measure the voters' propensities towards their perceptions of the three main candidates.[20] At Table 6-12, the regression coefficients of statistical significance are reported.

[20] Each of the biasedness or propensity index variables has a maximum of 7 points: the respondents who were the most committed to a particular candidate - i.e., those who chose the candidate all of the seven items - get scores of 1, while those who were the least committed get scores of 0. Then the scores were divided by 7, so that the index ranged from 0 to 1.

Table 6-12. Impact of Ideology, Partisan Orientations, Issue Standings, and Economic Evaluations on Candidate Evaluations: Controlling for Social Background

(Note: The coefficients not significant across the models are not listed.)

	Index of YS		Index of DJ		Index of JY	
	b	beta	b	beta	b	beta
Self-assigned Ideology	.070*	.050	.077*	.051	-.030	-.040
Partisan Orientations	.228**	.279	-.165**	.186	-.006	-.014
Issue Attitude Index	-.161**	-.139	.098**	.078	-.042*	-.066
Retrospective Economy Index	.038	.024	-.007	-.004	-.059*	-.068
Prospective Economy Index	.271**	.136	-.153**	-.071	-.060^	-.055
Region of Origin (Seoul/Kyonggi)						
Kangwon	-.031	-.023	-.069^	-.047	.052^	.070
Ch'ungch'ong	.068*	.080	-.012	-.013	-.006	-.013
Cholla	-.078*	-.101	.311**	.373	-.056**	-.134
Kyongbuk	.089*	.102	-.046	-.049	-.020	-.041
Kyongnam	.069^	.073	-.027	-.026	-.015	-.030
Other	.053	.032	-.025	-.014	.012	.013
Residential Region(Seoul)						
Kyonggi	-.026	-.031	-.014	-.016	-.022	-.048
Kangwon	.006	.003	-.041	-.022	-.057^	-.061
Ch'ungch'ong	.053	.047	-.018	-.015	.015	.024
Cholla	-.050	-.050	.184**	.170	-.049*	-.089
Kyongbuk	-.086*	-.083	-.028	-.025	-.030	-.054
Kyongnam	.109**	.123	-.062^	-.065	-.071**	-.146
Age (Over 50)						
20s	-.124**	-.173	.048^	.061	.068**	.173
30s	-.061*	-.082	.034	.042	.031^	.077
40s	-.024	-.027	.016	.016	.005	.010
Education (Primary)						
Middle School	.063*	.071	.015	.016	.034^	.069
High School	.036	.053	.011	.015	.069**	.188
University	.053	.064	.004	.004	.048*	.108
Religion (None/Others)						
Buddhist	.002	.002	-.022	-.028	.025*	.063
Protestant	.020	.024	-.003	-.003	.010	.022
Catholic	.036	.025	.040	.026	.014	.018
Intercept	.014	--	.258	--	.162	--
R-squared	.350		.507		.146	

Note: ** - p < .01; * - p <.05; and ^ - p <.10 in a two-tailed test. Dependent Variable Coding: YS (1 for the most and 0 for the least committed of Kim Young-sam in a 7 interval scale); DJ (1 for the most and 0 for the least committed of Kim Dae-jung); JY (1 for the most and 0 for the least committed of Chung Ju-young)

Source: The 1992 Post-election Survey.

Let us begin by examining the patterns of the coefficients of the political and economic variables. First, those who assigned themselves as progressive on the ideological dimension were more likely to evaluate both Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung positively, but not Chung Ju-young, net of other things on the list. Second, the governing party identifiers were more likely to evaluate Kim Young-sam positively and less likely to evaluate Kim Dae-jung than the opposition identifiers, but were indifferent towards Chung Ju-young, after taking into account other effects. Third, those who exhibited more liberal stances on the issues of demonstrations, the teachers' union, US army withdrawal and North Korean contact were less likely to have positive evaluations of Kim Young-sam (and Chung Ju-young), but more likely to evaluate Kim Dae-jung positively, independent of other things. Fourth, those who forecast the economic situation more positively were more likely to be favourable in the evaluations of Kim Young-sam, but less likely for the other two candidates. Finally, when the other factors on the list were considered, the respondents' past economic evaluations were not likely to have an impact on candidate evaluations, except for the evaluation of Chung Ju-young.

Some of the social background variables also appeared to be significant regarding candidate evaluations, after taking into account all of the other effects. First, those who had regional ties - i.e., either family origin or residential - with Cholla were more likely to have a positive evaluation of Kim Dae-jung, but were

less likely to be positively inclined towards the other two. The respondents whose origin was Kyongsang (that is, Kyongbuk and Kyongnam) and Ch'ungch'ong were more likely to evaluate Kim Young-sam positively. Similar patterns emerged for the Kyongnam residents, who also evaluated Kim Young-sam more positively, but responded negatively towards the other two candidates. The Kyongbuk residents were not favourable towards Kim Young-sam, indeed, less favourable than the other two; and the Kangwon residents were also not favourable to Chung Ju-young who was most favoured by the Kangwon origins.[21] In short, each of the candidates was the most favoured by those who shared the same regional background; and those who also showed less propensity towards a positive evaluation of the other. Second, age also differentiated the evaluations of the candidates. The younger were less likely to have a positive evaluation of Kim Young-sam, but more likely to be positive towards the other two candidates. Finally, religion and education also had a small but significant impact: Buddhists were more likely to have a positive evaluation of Chung Ju-young; and those who had only primary education were less likely to have a positive evaluation of him (this being the case also with Kim Young-sam to a lesser degree).

In short, the data in the table revealed that the voters were inclined to use their shared social and political perspectives with a candidate when they made judgments on the merits of the alternative candidates. It is not so surprising that the voters resorted to the use of "stereotype-related criteria as a heuristic," as

[21] It seems to be quite odd that there were discrepancies in the estimations between the same pair of regional attributes. No firm explanations, however, can be provided here.

Riggle et al. noted, in making such cognitively demanding judgments.[22] The process of making the judgments may have, however, differed considerably depending on which criterion was in use. Social traits, especially those related to regional attributes, were used most for the evaluation of Kim Dae-jung; and political tendencies, especially that of partisan orientation, issue standing and age, including prospective economic judgments, were more salient for the evaluation of Kim Young-sam. For the evaluation of Chung Ju-young, there was far more to be explained than could be explained by the variables employed here.

5. Candidate, Economic, and Partisan Effects on Voting: On the Meaning of the 1992 Presidential Election

In the earlier sections in this chapter, we have discussed the meaning of various determinants of individual voting choice. This section attempts to overview the relative importance of such determinants in bringing about voting choices in the 1992 presidential election. In doing so, a causal sequence is specified among the groups of determinants. Social background is assumed to be prior to political tendencies; political tendencies are prior to economic evaluations; and economic evaluations are prior to candidate perceptions in a

[22] See Riggle, Ellen D., Ottati, Victor C., Wyer, Robert S., Kuklinski, James, and Schwarz, Norbert, "Bases of Political Judgments: The Role of Stereotypic and Nonstereotypic Information," *Political Behavior*, 14(1), 1992, pp. 67-87.

causal funnel leading toward voting choice. The effects of these determinants are decomposed into direct and indirect components by applying four successive "reduced-form" OLS regression models on the three main candidate choices.[23] The direct effect of a variable is given by its coefficient in the final model, indirect components of effects are given by differences between coefficients of a variable in the two models, and the total effect of a variable is its coefficient in the model in which it first appears. The results are summarised in Tables 6-13 to 6-15 in terms of standardised (beta) coefficients.[24]

Let us examine the tables in turn. At Table 6-13, the various effects of candidate perceptions, economic evaluations, political tendencies and socio-economic backgrounds on the Kim Young-sam vote are reported. The column of direct effects shows the relative importance of the determinants on the vote after taking into account the effects of the others on the list. Not surprisingly, the candidate perception variables, especially those of Kim Young-sam, exerted the strongest impact of all, and the partisan orientation variable provided the second strongest impact. Attitudes towards issues and prospective economic evaluations also had some independent impact. Among the social background variables, magnitudes of the effects of which were drastically reduced by the addition of attitudinal and candidate evaluation variables, age and regional attributes

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[23] See, for a methodological discussion, Alwin, Duane F., and Hauser, Robert M., "The Decomposition of Effects in Path Analysis," *American Sociological Review*, 40, 1975, pp. 37-47.

[24] The logit estimates for the final models are not reported here, because they are almost identical to those in Table 5-8.

remained significant in exerting effects on the vote. Again, relating to social background proper, those who lived in long-term leased houses were less likely to have voted for Kim Young-sam.

Table 6-13. The Effect of Candidates, Economics, Political Tendencies, and Socio-economic Interests on Kim Young-sam Vote in 1992 (Betas):
A Decomposition of Causal Effects from the Four-step Structural Models

(Note: The socio-economic variables not significant in the first-step are not listed.)

	Direct	Indirect Effects via			Total	Zero-order
	beta	(1)	(2)	(3)	beta	r
(1) Candidate Effects						
Favourite, YS	.300**				.300**	.634**
Favourite, DJ	-.137**	--	--	--	-.137**	-.501**
Favourite, JY	-.184**	--	--	--	-.184**	-.220**
(2) Economic Voting						
Prospective	.074**	.061	--	--	.135**	.228**
Retrospective	n.s.	n.s.	--	--	n.s.	.065^
(3) Political Tendencies						
Issue Attitude Index	-.078**	.040	.015	--	-.133**	-.400**
Partisan Orientations	.214**	.112	.018	--	.344**	.553**
Ideology	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	--	n.s.	-.068^
Regional Interests						
Origin Cholla	-.071*	.056	.004	.102	-.233**	-.412**
Origin Kyongbuk	.082*	.045	-.007	.023	.143**	.188**
Origin Kyongnam	.046	.032	-.005	.045	.118**	.262**
Cholla Residency	-.081**	.022	.008	.038	-.149**	-.315**
Kyongnam Residency	.075*	.073	.009	.004	.161**	.291**
Socialisation						
Age 20s	-.120**	.092	-.008	.101	-.305**	-.214**
Age 30s	-.080**	.044	.002	.075	-.201**	-.071*
Age 40s	-.033	.013	.009	.007	-.062*	.094**
Male	-.029	.004	.003	.040	-.076**	-.098**
University Education	-.027	.001	-.003	.060	-.085^	-.114**
Religion Protestant	.027	.004	.005	.019	.055*	.002
Socio-economic Interests						
Job Professional/Manger	.025	.008	-.001	.031	.063*	.079*
House Long-term Lease	-.061**	.014	-.006	.028	-.097**	-.143**

Note: (1) ** - $p < .01$; * - $p < .05$; and ^ - $p < .10$ in a two-tailed test.
(2) The R-squared for the final model is .615.

Source: The 1992 Post-election Survey.

A comparison between the total and the direct effects reveals that there were notable reductions of strength of variables by the introduction of additional controls. The columns of indirect effects display how these differences are distributed to the groups of variables. First, about one third of the total effects of economic and political tendency variables on the Kim Young-sam vote were mediated via candidate evaluations. Second, there was little evidence of the indirect effects of political tendencies and socio-economic interests that were mediated by economic evaluations. Third, of the indirect effects of social background variables - regional attributes, socialisation and socio-economic interests variables alike - there appeared a general indication that the indirect effects were the more mediated by the political tendency variables than candidate evaluations, although a substantial portion of them was also moderated by candidate evaluations. Notable exceptions were found in those cases where the variables were Kyongbuk origin and Kyongnam residency, where the indirect effects were more mediated by candidate evaluations.

Table 6-14 and 6-15, which report the decomposition effects of the determinants on the votes of Kim Dae-jung and Chung Ju-young, respectively, also show a similar pattern to that of Kim Young-sam, in that candidate evaluations predominated in making voting decisions. One notable exception, with regard to their direct effects, is that the prospective economic evaluation variable appeared insignificant for Kim Dae-jung but significant for Chung Ju-

young. It is also noteworthy that more regional attribute variables appeared to be significant for Kim Dae-jung, and far less social background variables were listed as significant in the case of Chung Ju-young. The total variance explained by the determinants was far smaller for Chung Ju-young.

Table 6-14. The Effect of Candidates, Economics, Political Tendencies, and Socio-economic Interests on Kim Dae-jung Vote in 1992 (Betas):
A Decomposition of Causal Effects from the Four-step Structural Models

(Note: The socio-economic variables not significant in the first-step are not listed.)

	Direct	Indirect Effects via			Total	Zero-order
	beta	(1)	(2)	(3)	beta	r
(1) Candidate Effects						
Favourite, DJ	.417**				.417**	.785**
Favourite, YS	-.137**	--	--	--	-.137**	-.503**
Favourite, JY	-.134**	--	--	--	-.134**	-.238**
(2) Economic Voting						
Prospective	-.014	.041	--	--	-.055*	-.182**
Retrospective	n.s.	n.s.	--	--	n.s.	-.025
(3) Political Tendencies						
Issue Attitude Index	.050**	.060	.006	--	.116**	.338**
Partisan Orientations	-.118**	.115	.006	--	-.239**	-.516**
Ideology	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	--	n.s.	.084*
Regional Interests						
Origin Kangwon	-.038^	.026	-.002	.008	-.070*	-.121**
Origin Cholla	.170**	.187	.002	.080	.439**	.666**
Origin Kyongbuk	-.075**	.029	-.004	.011	-.111**	-.226**
Origin Kyongnam	-.051^	.017	-.002	.032	-.098**	-.235**
Kyonggi Residency	-.067**	.004	.003	.011	-.087**	-.067*
Kangwon Residency	-.042*	.002	.003	.003	-.050^	-.101**
Ch'ungch'ong Residency	-.016	.017	.000	.027	-.060*	-.093**
Cholla Residency	.049*	.090	.002	.023	.164**	.529**
Kyongnam Residency	-.076**	.024	.008	.002	-.110**	-.222**
Socialisation						
Male	-.008	.012	.001	.035	.040^	.034
Age 20s	.019	.026	-.004	.084	.125**	.074*
Age 30s	-.004	.019	-.001	.061	.075*	-.010
Religion Buddhist	-.009	.020	.000	.017	-.046^	-.172**
Socio-economic Interests						
Job Professional/Manger	-.016	.016	-.002	.021	-.052*	-.100**
Job Farmer	.027	.030	.008	.001	.066^	.016
House Long-term Lease	.071**	.009	-.003	.023	.100**	.079*

Note: (1) ** - p < .01; * - p <.05; and ^ - p <.10 in a two-tailed test.
(2) The R-squared in the final model is .731.

Source: The 1992 Post-election Survey.

Table 6-15. The Effect of Candidates, Economics, Political Tendencies, and Socio-economic Interests on Chung Ju-young Vote in 1992 (Betas):
A Decomposition of Causal Effects from the Four-step Structural Models

(Note: The socio-economic variables not significant in the first-step are not listed.)

	Direct	Indirect Effects via			Total	Zero-order
	beta	(1)	(2)	(3)	beta	r
(1) Candidate Effects						
Favourite, JY	.558**				.558**	.622**
Favourite, YS	-.080**	--	--	--	-.080**	-.133**
Favourite, DJ	-.108**	--	--	--	-.108**	-.227**
(2) Economic Voting						
Prospective	-.092**	.033	--	--	-.125**	-.100**
Retrospective	n.s.	n.s.	--	--	n.s.	-.053
(3) Political Tendencies						
Issue Attitude Index	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	--	n.s.	.017
Partisan Orientations	-.056*	.010	.019	--	-.085*	-.018
Ideology	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	--	n.s.	-.022
Regional Interests						
Origin Kangwon	.026	.045	.001	-.003	.069^	.117**
Origin Cholla	-.095	.107	-.004	-.016	-.182**	-.216**
Kyonggi Residency	.161**	-.022	-.001	-.005	.133**	.177**
Kyongnam Residency	.006	.085	.000	.001	-.080^	-.104**
Socialisation						
Age 20s	-.006	.103	-.005	.008	.100*	.049
Age 30s	.069*	.044	.006	.007	.126**	.124**
Education High-school	.008	.090	.000	.007	.105*	.128**
Religion Buddhist	.063**	.038	.000	-.003	.098**	.056
Socio-economic Interests						
House Monthly-rent	-.033	.020	.004	-.001	-.056^	-.036

Note: (1) ** - $p < .01$; * - $p < .05$; and ^ - $p < .10$ in a two-tailed test.
(2) The R-squared in the final model is .463.

Source: The 1992 Post-election Survey.

There also emerged a few notable exceptions in the patterns of the indirect effect of social background. Both for Kim Dae-jung and Chung Ju-young, the indirect effects of regional attributes tended to be more mediated by candidate evaluations than political tendencies, unlike in the case of Kim Young-sam. By contrast, socialisation variables showed quite a similar pattern to those of Kim Young-sam in that they were the more mediated by political tendencies than was the case of candidate evaluations regarding Kim Dae-jung. In the case of Chung Ju-young, however, these were far more likely to be mediated by candidate

evaluations. These patterns indicate that the choice of Chung Ju-young was the most likely to be based on the personality factor, the choice of Kim Young-sam was the least likely to be thus based, and the choice of Kim Dae-jung was in between them.

From the above analysis, a few conclusions can be drawn about the reasons why people chose to vote for a particular candidate (or conversely not to vote for the candidate) in the 1992 presidential election. First of all, this analysis confirms that personality factors are the foremost of those under consideration in making voting decisions. Nonetheless, it also provides evidence that the voters relied on various sources when they made judgments on the candidate. Not only their shared regional proximity with a candidate, which may have been a highly charged emotional factor, but also their shared political tendencies resulted in the voters coming to different judgments over the candidates. Second, the voters' political tendencies, especially partisan orientations, had quite an impact on their voting decisions. The voters may have firmly developed a coherent cue of viewing political competitions in terms of *yo* or *ya* (party in power or out of power), regardless of the frequent changes in the party system, and this cue was used for choosing one candidate rather than the others. Indeed, the past career of Kim Young-sam as an opposition party leader withered away in the voters' perceptions as he changed his partisan stance. Finally, it also provided evidence for the phenomenon of economic voting. Here, however, the voters used their future economic forecasts, which were inevitably more likely to be contaminated

by their hopes and politicised guesses rather than their retrospective judgments, in making their voting decisions. The limited one-term presidency could have been a major factor that posed a structural limitation on the voters utilising retrospective evaluations for their choice. In addition, the governing party candidate, Kim Young-sam's great efforts to distance himself from the foregoing Roh Tae-woo government during the election campaigns may also have imposed a similar limitation.

Given these results, how can we interpret the electoral victory of Kim Young-sam? What is significant in the victory of the opposition-turned-governing party candidate? Above all the question needs to be posed, on what grounds was this election, which represented a watershed event for democracy in Korea as it brought the first genuinely civilian-controlled government in some 30 years, fought, and how was this election different from those of the past? If viewed in terms of the basis of his support, Kim Young-sam's electoral victory signifies 'continuity' rather than 'change.' He won more support from those who were the less inclined towards change, that is, from the older, female, the less educated, the governing party identifiers, the 'conservative' issue standees, and from those who foresaw the future economy positively. Although these traditional sectors of the population were in decline in their relative size, however, Kim Dae-jung's limited ability, or perhaps that of the opposition as a whole, to solidify the tendency of anti-government voting behind his candidacy may have reduced his chances of winning. The voting patterns based on

regionalism also depict a significant 'continuity': that is, given Kim young-sam's regional background that was similar to that of his predecessors - Kyongsang - he could also easily expand his regional basis of support, which was once limited to the southern part of it, to the northern part of the region which formerly provided the governing party with solid support. In this regard, he enjoyed an enormous advantage over the main opposition candidate Kim Dae-jung, whose regional basis was limited to Cholla, a regional rival of Kyongsang. Furthermore, while Kim Dae-jung suffered most in the other 'neutral' regions, except in Seoul, Kim Young-sam was somewhat successful in nullifying negative voting based on regionalism. There was also further evidence of 'continuity' reflected in the candidate evaluations, which exerted the strongest impact on voting choice: Kim Young-sam was perceived as far better in delivering 'social stability,' and somewhat better on the issues of 'economic growth' (Chung scored the first on this issue) and 'political democracy,' than was Kim Dae-jung, whereas Kim Dae-jung scored somewhat better on the items that represented 'change' - that is, 'unification,' 'regional disparity mitigation' and 'distribution equality,' and 'corruption liquidation.'

Even though Kim Young-sam's victory signifies 'continuity', the new president introduced several reforms which have generated great popularity since the inauguration of his presidency in February 1993. Various opinion polls were undertaken regarding his performance, and the support for his performance

reached 70 to 90 per cent after one hundred days of his presidency.[25] One of the most important contributing factors for this high popularity was the clean-up campaign - that is, the disclosure of the personal assets of the president, and high ranking civil servants, ministers, and members of parliament, which forced many of them, who had unexplainable assets, to resign. More consequential reform measures, such as adopting the real-name financial transaction system, were later introduced again with wide popularity among the public. Within this context, the discussions, which revealed continuity rather than change in the meanings of the 1992 presidential election, may operate only within a limited time frame. Future elections, and the voters' responses to his reforms in the meantime may affect the extent to which voters are still inclined to favour 'continuity' over 'change.'

[25] See Ahn, Bu-keun, "San-i Nop'umyon Kol-i Kipta (The Higher the Mountains, the Deeper the Valley)," *Wolgan Choson*, July 1993, pp.100-107.

PART 3. KOREAN VOTERS IN THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY

Chapter 7. Democratisation, Elections, and the Voters

1. Introduction

More than four decades have passed since the first government of South Korea was created by a popular election in 1948. With the introduction of democratic institutions, which were implanted after the second World War as in most of the new-born nations,[1] the ordinary Koreans of the southern half were empowered to choose who would run the country for the first time in the nation's 13 century old history as a single political entity.[2] Until recently, however, the democratic experiments in Korea have failed to provide a sustained system of workable democracy.[3]

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[1] See, for a review on the process of transplanting democratic institutions during the period 1945-48, Oh, Byung-hun, "Trial of Liberal Democracy in Korea," *Koreana Quarterly*, 9(1), 1967, pp. 21-40; and Gordenker, Leon, "The United Nations, the United States Occupation and the 1948 Election in Korea," *Political Science Quarterly*, 73(3), 1958, pp. 426-450.

[2] See, for a discussion on the historical significance of Unified *Silla*, whose territory and people formed the mainstream of subsequent Korean history, Eckert, Carter J., Lee, Ki-baik, Lew, Young-ick, Robinson, Michael, and Wagner, Edward W., *Korea Old and New: A History*, Seoul: Ilchokak, 1990, pp. 42-44. Also see Lee, Chong-uk, "*Han' guk Ch' ogigukka-ui Chongch' ibaljon-dan' gye-wa Chongch' ihyongt' ae* (Stage of Political Development of the Korean Early States and Their Political Forms)," in Lee, Chong-uk, Lee, Ki-baik, Shin, Ho-chol, Chung, Man-jo, and Yu Young-yol, *Han' guksa-sang-ui Chongch' ihyongt' ae (Political Forms in Korean History)*, Seoul: Ilchokak, 1993.

[3] A minimal or "realistic" definition of democracy was given by Schumpeter, who said that "the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote (p.269)," in such a way that "the reins of government should be handed to those who command more support than do any of the competing individuals or teams (p.273)." Dahl also defined political democracies as a system in which public are "entitled to participate on a more or less equal plane in controlling and contesting the conduct of government: to participate, so to speak, in

The first experiment under the Rhee Syngman government (1948-60), which was born with a democratic constitution, ended in failure, often marred by election riggings, irregularities in constitutional changes, and coercive repression of the opposition. The Rhee government, which became increasingly dictatorial by resorting to the police and its bureaucratic apparatus for its perpetuation of power, was at last toppled by the student uprisings in April 1960, which was prompted by massive-scale election fraud in March. The second experiment by the Chang Myon government (1960-61), which adopted a parliamentary system of government under the Democratic Party leadership, failed in consolidating its liberal democracy only nine months after its inauguration as a result of the

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the system of public contestation (p.4)." In a democracy, as Przeworski put it, "no one can win once for all: even if successful at one time, victors immediately face the prospect for having to struggle in the future (p.57)," and therefore, described democratisation as "a process of institutionalising uncertainty (p.58)." Huntington went on to argue that "the sustained failure of the major opposition political party to win office necessarily raises questions concerning the degree of competition permitted by the system (p.8)," with his procedural definition of democracy, viewing "the central procedure of democracy is the selection of leaders through competitive elections by the people they govern (p.6)." See Schumpeter, Joseph A., *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (5th ed.), London: Allen and Unwin, 1976; Dahl, Robert A., *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971; Przeworski, Adam, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," in O'Donnell, Guillermo, Schmitter, Philippe C., Whitehead, Laurence (eds.), *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986; and Huntington, Samuel P., *The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. Also see , for a review of models of competitive democracy, Storm, Karre, "Democracy as Political Competition," in Marks, Gary, and Diamond, Larry (eds.), *Reexamining Democracy*, Newbury Park: Sage, 1992.

See, for a historical review of Korean democratic experiments, Han, Sung-joo, "South Korea: Politics in Transition," in Diamond, Larry, Linz, Juan J., and Lipset, Seymour Martin (eds.), *Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989. Also see Park, Sang-sop, "The Failure of Liberal Democracy in Korea, 1945-79," in Kim, Kyong-dong (ed.), *Dependency Issues in Korean Development: Comparative Perspectives*, Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1987.

military coup led by Major General Park Chung-hee in May 1961.[4] The military junta, which came to power by the coup, eventually transformed itself into a political machine seeking popular support and legitimacy by means of competitive elections. From 1963 to 1972, i.e., during the period before it adopted the *Yushin* Constitution that abolished popular elections for the presidency along with several measures that strengthened presidential power,[5] Park Chung-hee and his Democratic Republican Party had been successful in securing three consecutive terms in office through competitive elections, albeit making use of the so-called "*yodang* (party in power) premium" such as mobilising administrative networks, and monopolising the absentee votes mainly from the army, for example. The later years of rule under Park (1972-79) soon deteriorated into "Korean-style democracy," a euphemism for authoritarian government under the *Yushin* system, and ended with the violent death of Park at the hand of his chief intelligence aide.

The collapse of the Park regime seemed to open a renewed chance for restoring democracy, but it eventually echoed the observation made by Pastor in

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[4] See Kim, Se-jin, *The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971. Also see Han, Sung-joo, *The Failure of Democracy in South Korea*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974.

[5] Under the *Yushin* (revitalising reform) Constitution - which was adopted in a national referendum allegedly to promote national unification and effective socioeconomic development in the changing international situation - the president, for example, was to be indirectly elected by an easily manipulable electoral college, without restrictions on the presidential terms - the fixed-term presidency used have been a major legal obstacle in prolonging one-man rule, and thus become a main cause for constitutional amendments - and to appoint one-third of the National Assembly members. See Kim, Ki-bom, "Revisions of the Korean Constitution (II)," *Korea Journal*, 14(8), 1974, pp. 18-25. Also see, for a discussion on regime characteristics of the *Yushin* system, Lee, Kang-ro, "Bureaucratic-Mobilisation Regime: The *Yushin* System in South Korea, 1972-1979," *Asian Perspective*, 14(2), 1990, pp. 195-230.

the Latin American context: "People then were mistaken in equating the fall of tyrants with the rise of democracy. They were separate events, and the second did not always follow from the first."[6] The new military junta led by Major General Chun Doo-hwan staged a "coup-like incident" in December 1979 in the course of the investigation of Park's assassination, and Chun briskly ascended to the presidency in August 1980 through the rubber stamp electoral college set up under the *Yushin* system, purging all the established politicians and banning all the parties of the past, forcing dismissal of the interim government under then President Choi Kyu-hah (who had reaffirmed a new constitution and a fair general election) and violently suppressing civil unrest heightened by the Kwangju massacre.[7] In February 1981, Chun reassumed his 7 year one-term presidency by a new electoral college set up under the new constitution, and his Democratic Justice Party (DJP) secured a simple majority in the National Assembly elections held in March that year.[8]

In short, since the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948 up until the early 1980s, there had been two critical moments of regime transition toward competitive democracy. That is, during the period of authoritarianism, there were two instances of regime collapse: one followed the student uprising in 1960, and the other the sudden death of Park Chung-hee in 1979. Both chances were,

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[6] See Pastor, Robert A., "Introduction: The Swing of the Pendulum," in his (ed.), *Democracy in the Americas: Stopping the Pendulum*, New York: Holmes and Meier, 1989, p.6.
[7] See Lee, Chong-sik, "South Korea in 1980: The Emergence of A New Authoritarian Order," *Asian Survey*, 21(1), 1981, pp. 125-143.
[8] See Suh, Dae-sook, "South Korea in 1981: The First Year of the Fifth Republic," *Asian Survey*, 22(1), 1982, pp. 107-115.

however, nullified by the interventions of the military, which had grown rapidly as an indispensable institution in response to apparent external threats exemplified by the Korean War. There are, nonetheless, two aspects that may sharply differentiate the two cases of military intervention if viewed in terms of their processes. First, when initially staging the coups, Park eradicated a democratically launched government, while Chun simply took over the government in a power vacuum created by Park's assassination. Second, in respectively projecting their rule, Park sought popular support through validation by electoral contests (although later Park also resorted to an indirect electoral method), whereas Chun made little effort in becoming a popularly elected leader - "even if he had," Han Sung-joo judges, he "probably would not have succeeded."[9] The society of the 1980s may have been substantially different from that of the 1960s, given the social and economic changes that had taken place, and thus had difficulty accepting "the objective institutional needs" of the military.[10]

A test for the Chun government - which was scheduled to step-down by February 1988 at the latest - was given in the 1985 National Assembly elections, where the newly formed New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP) consisting mainly of once banned opposition politicians emerged as the number one opposition party, attracting little fewer votes than that gained by the ruling DJP,

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[9] See Han, Sung-joo, op.cit., p.283.

[10] See Graham, Norman A., "The Role of The Military in the Political and Economic Development of the Republic of Korea," *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 26(1-2), 1991, pp. 114-131.

in effect repudiating the established opposition parties under the early years of the Chun regime and challenging the regime with its phenomenal success at the polls.[11] Soon after the new opposition led a campaign pushing for a constitutional revision which allowed for direct elections of the president. The campaign met with a deadlock in negotiating constitutional revision with the ruling party, which at last decided to defend the existing constitution, thus deviating from its initial position of preferring, if any revision had to take place, a parliamentary system of government. The deadlock, subsequently accompanied by civil unrest which reached its peak in June 1987, was finally resolved as Roh Tae-woo, the DJP's presidential nominee designated by President Chun and a former member of the new military junta, acceded to the opposition's demands for restoring popular elections of the president along with several other democratisation measures.[12] By "convoking" direct presidential elections, the deadlock, which had compelled the government to a choice between violent repression or co-optation, was quickly resolved, and the initial process of democratic transition, which began with the emergence of a structured opposition demanding a more representative form of government, was settled into a '*reforma-pactada*,' in which the rules of the authoritarian regime - the rules of

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[11] See Koh, B.C., "The 1985 Parliamentary Election in South Korea," *Asian Survey*, 25(9), 1985, pp. 883-897. Also see Kim, C.I. Eugene, "South Korea in 1985: An Eventful Year Amidst Uncertainty," *Asian Survey*, 26(1), 1986, pp. 66-77.

[12] See, for a discussion on the events leading up to the June 29 declaration, Lee, Man-woo, *The Odyssey of Korean Democracy: Korean Politics*, 1987-1990, New York: Praeger, 1990, pp. 19-44. Also see Cotton, James, "From Authoritarianism to Democracy in South Korea," *Political Studies*, 37(2), 1989, pp. 244-259; and West, James M., and Baker, Edward J., "The 1987 Constitutional Reforms in South Korea: Electoral Processes and Judicial Independence," *Human Rights Yearbook*, 1, 1988, pp. 135-177.

electoral competition in particular - were abandoned without immediately removing the incumbents from power.[13]

With the reemergence of the electoral process at the centre stage of politics, the democratisation process soon moved to competition between those parties seeking institutionalised support. As Colomer noted, however, "electoral results tend to change the delimitation of the actors and formulate new relevant issues, so that the outcome obtained by way of interactions by agreement may then be more or less dramatically altered."[14] In the following sections, the role played by political cleavages - the old and the new - in the "founding" elections, and in the aftermath of those elections, will be discussed with particular attention to its implications for the party system and the future of Korean democracy.

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[13] See, for an application of O'Donnell and Schmitter's model on democratic transition to Korea, Im, Hyuk-baek, "Han'gug-eso-ui Minjuhwa Kwajong Punsok: Chonryak-chok Sont'aekiron-ul Chungshim-uro (An Analysis of the Democratisation Process in Korea: From the Perspective of Strategic Choice Model)," *Han'guk Chongch'i Hakhoebo(Korean Political Science Review)*, 24(1), 1990, pp. 51-78. Also see O'Donnell, Guillermo, and Schmitter, Philippe C., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986; Linz, Juan J., "Transitions to Democracy," *The Washington Quarterly*, 13(3), 1990, pp. 143-164; and Colomer, Josep M., "Transitions by Agreement: Modeling the Spanish Way," *American Political Science Review*, 85(4), 1991, pp. 1283-1302.

[14] See Colomer, op.cit., 1991, p.1299.

2. Democratic Founding Elections and the Voters

The "first postauthoritarian" elections in 1987 shared some of the characteristics of "founding" elections suggested by O'Donnell and Schmitter:[15]

> Founding elections are ... moments of great drama. Turnout is very high. Parties advocating cancellation, postponement, or abstention are swept aside by the civic enthusiasm that attends such moments.... Moreover, founding elections seem to have a sort of freezing effect upon subsequent political developments. Where they are followed by successive iterations of the electoral process, few new parties get into the game, and many minor ones are likely to drop out.[16]

The turnout in the 1987 presidential election was the highest since the 1960s, reaching 89.2 per cent, about 10 per cent higher than that of the last 1971 presidential election (79.8 per cent).[17] Another extraordinarily high turnout, that

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[15] The term "first postauthoritarian elections," used by Turner, is interchangeable with "founding elections." The term "transition elections," "the first national electoral contests which follow the restoration of political freedoms," used by Bermeo is also similar to founding elections. But writing in the East European context, Bogdanor cautioned that "it is probably not until there have been at least two further free elections held under normal conditions that one will be in a position to make meaningful generalisations about the electoral process." It seems more logical to expect more uncertainty or to emphasise the transitional nature of the elections in the regimes that experienced sudden collapse. See Turner, Arthur W., "Postauthoritarian Elections: Testing Expectations about 'First' Elections," *Comparative Political Studies*, 26(3), 1993, pp.330-349; Bermeo, Nancy, "Redemocratisation and Transition Elections: A Comparison of Spain and Portugal," *Comparative Politics*, 19(2), 1987, pp.213-231; and Bogdanor, Vernon, "Founding Elections and Regime Change," *Electoral Studies*, 9(4), 1990, pp.288-294.

[16] O'Donnell and Schmitter, *op.cit.*, 1986, p.62.

[17] See Chungang-son'go-kwalli-wiwonhoe (Central Election Management Committee), *Che 13 Dae Taet'ongryong Son'go Ch'ongram (The 13th Presidential Election Proceedings)*, Seoul: Central Election Management Committee, 1987; and *Taehanmin'guk Son'go Sa (Election History of the Republic of Korea)*, Vol.1, 1973.

of the 1985 National Assembly elections (84.6 per cent) heralded that of 1987.[18] More importantly, however, the pattern in turnout deviated from those of the past, where the *tojo-ch'on'go* (urban low - rural high) phenomenon had prevailed. For example, the Seoul voters, who had been most notorious for their lower turnout, abandoned this tendency, achieving a turnout of 88.1 per cent, far above their turnout in 1971 of 71.3 per cent.[19] The voters also enthusiastically participated in the election campaign, which was restored after 16 years of suspension: for example, on some occasions, each of the three main candidates - Roh Tae-woo, Kim Young-sam, and Kim Dae-jung - attracted over a million people to their election rallies.[20]

The grounds for electoral competition - which would result in the five-year one-term limited presidency by simple plurality votes - were, however, largely drawn from the past. That is, Roh Tae-woo of the ruling DJP was the successor of the Chun regime, thus representing the governing side of the past authoritarian regimes; Kim Young-sam of the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) and Kim Dae-jung of the Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD), whose careers as freedom fighters went back to the era of the Park Chung-hee regime, represented the

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[18] See *Chungang-son'go-kwalli-wiwonhoe* (Central Election Management Committee), *Che 12 Dae Kukhoeuiwon Son'go Ch'ongram (The 12th National Assembly Election Proceedings)*, Seoul: Central Election Management Committee, 1985.

[19] The Seoul voters' turnout was once again lower by 6.5 per cent than that of the national, 75.8 per cent, in the 1988 National Assembly election, but in the 1992 National Assembly (the gap of 2.7 per cent) and the 1992 presidential (the gap of 0.5 per cent) elections no such tendency clearly appeared.

[20] See *Choson-ilbo-sa* (Choson Daily Newspapers Co.), *Che 13 Dae Taet'ongryong Son'go Charyojip (A Collection of Materials in the 13th Presidential Election)*, Seoul: Choson Daily Newspapers Co., 1988, p.25.

forces of the opposition even though they failed to agree upon a single candidacy. Kim Jong-pil of the New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP), a former Prime Minister under Park, and his revitalised party of the defunct Park's DRP (1963-80), joined the three-way race of Roh and the two Kims although he had little chance of winning since he represented the governing side from the rather remote past. No other parties representing new interests burgeoned in the competition, resulting in Roh and the three Kims polling a total of 99.8 per cent of the formal votes.

If there was a new factor - more precisely, a renewed one as candidates in the past presidential elections had also enjoyed "home region advantages" - that came into play, it was the regional cleavages that the political actors actively sought to mobilise. By mobilising their relative popularity in the regions where they had personal ties, the four candidates sought to secure that firm support from their regions that seemed critical in uplifting their chance of winning in the simple plurality race of the "three big and one small." Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam, who were unable to compromise to represent the democratic opposition, made strong appeals to the voters in the regions where they had ties - that is, in Cholla (Kwangju) and South Kyongsang (Pusan), respectively - during the campaign, which may have been for them a strategy easier than for the other candidates because of their renowned political careers. For Roh Tae-woo, a son of North Kyongsang (Taegu), where Park Chung-hee had also been strong, a similar regional appeal may have posed few difficulties. The election campaign,

thus, became increasingly regionalistic, and as the campaign became a race of regional appeal, Kim Jong-pil also began to solidify his regional basis in South Ch'ungch'ong (Taejon).

In this election, the regime successor Roh won the presidency with 36.6 per cent of the votes.[21] Roh's victory was, however, by no means a mandate for the past authoritarianism. It simply proved how hard it was for the opposition forces to gain political power, especially when they were badly divided. Equally, as Lee Man-woo put it, "there was no particular reason why the achievement of democracy had to be equated with the victory of one of the two Kims."[22] What marked this election was that the issue of regime legitimacy, which used to sharply divide the opposition from the government, became increasingly less of political significance. The apparent inheritor of the past legacy of Park and Chun's authoritarian regimes, Roh Tae-woo had been successful, at least partly, in turning aside the thorny issue of legitimacy both by actively promoting his stunning concessions of the June 29 declaration on democratisation while maintaining the issues of political stability and continued economic growth on his side, and by engaging in the emotion-charged regionalistic electoral contests pursued by his opponents. The critical decision of the two Kims to split at the precise moment of optimum opportunity for victory the democratic opposition had enjoyed in decades may have turned their public images as freedom fighters into those of self-interested politicians, thus making it even harder to put the

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[21] See Table 1-6.

[22] Lee, Man-woo, *op.cit.*, 1990, p.52.

issue of legitimacy - perhaps the only issue where the opposition had overwhelming appeal - in the forefront.

Nonetheless, it was a combination of the old and the new cleavages that determined the individual voters' choice and ultimately the election outcomes: for some (and obviously a larger portion of the voters), the regional cleavage - which became highly visible during the election campaign - was the most important grounds of their decision, while for others, judgments on the past were still important. As a result, Roh won his victory on the support of the older and the less educated segments of the voters - who could go along with the positive side of his past - and on his regional strongholds of North Kyongsang; Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung shared the votes of the younger and the more educated segments,[23] who had long been societal bases of the opposition, on top of the votes of their respective regional strongholds; and the support of Kim Jong-pil was largely limited to his regional strongholds. The role played by the regional cleavage in this democratic "founding" election was thus certainly far-reaching, in that each of the candidates clearly dominated over the others, rather than enjoying only relative advantages, in their respective regional strongholds.

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[23] Looking at from the bivariate level associations of socio-economic characteristics and voting, it seemed as if Kim young-sam, rather than Kim Dae-jung who had drawn his support the most heavily from the Cholla voters, neatly counter-balanced the societal support of Roh Tae-woo. But once the effects of regional voting were taken into account, the two Kims shared a similar pattern of societal support. See Chapter 4 of this account.

3. Aftermath of the Founding Elections: The Voters and Political Actors

The outcome of the 1988 National Assembly election, held a few months after the 1987 presidential election, on the basis of the first-past-the-post electoral system for the 224 contested seats was a virtual replication of that of 1987. [24] The turnout was, however, far lower, amounting to 75.8 per cent. Moreover, the forces of regional cleavage "spilled-over" into this election, expanding to an even greater scale. This was particularly so for the PPD: all of its members in Cholla (North and South) and Kwangju - a special city in the Cholla region - were elected, but in all other regions none of its members were elected, and even its share of the votes was decimated, except in Seoul, where it was the strongest of all, and in Kyonggi, where only one of its members was elected. In this regard, the other parties fared much the same, winning roughly ~~than~~ 80 per cent of the seats in their respective regional strongholds. This pattern of region-party alliance was unprecedented in past National Assembly elections, where the *yoch'on-yado* (government rural - opposition urban) phenomenon prevailed, being predominant over the urban-rural cleavage, which also exerted relatively small but significant effects upon voting choice in the 1988 election.

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[24] There were also the 75 uncontested (the national-list) seats, making the total of 299 seats, to be allocated by the portion of the seats, not by the votes, gained by each party. With the revision of the election law in 1994, the national-list seats, constituting one-third of the total, will be allocated by the portion of the votes gained by a party in the forthcoming National Assembly elections of April 1996. See Table 1-6 for the election outcomes.

What was distinct in the 1988 election was that the ruling DJP failed to gain a simple majority although it won the biggest share of the National Assembly seats. It was the first time in the history of Korean electoral politics that the ruling party lost its majority status. Unlike the presidential elections, in which a pluralist winner takes all, the pluralist position of the DJP in the Assembly simply meant that the president and his government needed support from the opposition parties to ratify the executive's program, which in previous assemblies was carried through largely by invoking the ruling party's dominant position. Notwithstanding the achievements of the *yoso-yadae* (small government party, big opposition) Assembly exemplified by the assembly hearings on "the Fifth Republic irregularities," including the 1980 Kwangju massacre,[25] the four-party system of stalemate lasted for less than two years, and ended in January 1990 in the creation of the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP), a grand alliance of parties across the ruling (the DJP of Roh) and the opposition (the RDP of Kim Young-sam) camps including the NDRP led by Kim Jong-pil, which was generally considered to have been the most likely to be involved in such a pact with the ruling party.[26] The potentially hegemonic ruling DLP emerged as a result of decisions in higher level political circles, which was obviously incongruent with the electoral verdict of the Korean voters who had "refused to allow the emergence of a 'too-strong' government."[27] The voters' perception was thus at variance with the DLP view that: "the merger would bring political stability and

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[25] See Han, Sung-joo, "South Korea in 1988: A Revolution in the Making," *Asian Survey*, 29(1), 1989, pp. 29-38. Also see Lee, Man-woo, *op.cit.*, 1990, pp. 110-115.

[26] See Park, Jin, "Political Change in South Korea: The Challenge of the Conservative Alliance," *Asian Survey*, 30(12), 1990. Also see Lee, Man-woo, *op.cit.*, 1990, pp. 127-134.

economic growth to the nation, which had been afflicted by unrest and instability in the course of democratisation in recent years."[28] Later the same year, the party led by Kim Dae-jung - which was left alone in opposition - and the "small" Democratic Party formed by a few of the former members of the RDP who declined to join the new ruling DLP were merged, naming their party as the Democratic Party (DP).

On the assumption that the 1987/1988 elections were fought on the basis of the two main electoral cleavages of region and pro-government versus pro-democratic reform, it seemed likely that the new ruling DLP would have a far more advantageous position in oncoming electoral contests than its immediate predecessor, the DJP, not to mention its current competitor, the DP. That is, the DLP would have a wider regional basis as a result of the merger of the three parties which each once had strong regional appeal, and it could also have been expected to broaden the societal basis of its support by the inclusion of Kim Young-sam and his party, who had shared the societal basis of the opposition. The electoral fortune of the DP may have lain in its advancing, as the sole opposition party, into the gaps in the societal basis of traditional opposition support which Kim Young-sam's actions had created. In this way, it could have hoped to overcome its solid but numerically limited regional basis of electoral support.

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[27] See Park, Jin, ibid., p. 1156.
[28] See Lee, Man-woo, *op.cit.*, p. 127.

The patterns of the outcomes in the National Assembly and the subsequent presidential elections in April and December 1992, however, indicated that the DLP only had modest success in maintaining the widened regional basis, particularly in the regions where Roh and Kim Jong-pil had been strong, but virtually failed in broadening its societal basis of electoral support. Indeed, the DLP and Kim Young-sam won more support from those social segments which used to support the ruling parties, despite efforts to distance themselves from the outgoing government and Kim's background as a long-time opposition leader. As expected, Kim Young-sam and his DLP performed best in his regional strongholds. Kim Dae-jung and his DP again failed to gain substantial support beyond his regional strongholds (including Seoul), and this was reflected in his modest success in winning support from the former opposition supporters. The new-comer Chung Ju-young, former chairman of the Hyundai conglomerate, and his Unification National Party (UNP) reaped the biggest reward, attracting the floating or cross-pressured voters from both opposition and government sides,[29] not to mention their relative success in Kangwon, where Chung claimed personal regional ties, and where the ruling parties' dominance had previously been a norm. Overall, the DLP succeeded in securing its rule by winning the assembly majority, albeit barely, and by electing its presidential candidate. The election turnout in the Assembly election at 71.9 per cent was the lowest ever, while the 81.9 per cent turnout in the presidential election was also far down from that of 1987.

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[29] See Chapter 3 of this account.

If there was a single most important variable in shaping the voters' choice in the 1992 elections after the democratic founding election, it appears to have been the regional factor rather than the cue of pro-government versus pro-democratic political alignment. This proves that the DLP merger, despite its rhetoric, was nothing more than a grand *regional* coalition. In this sense, the parties in the opposition were no exception: their sustained existence may have owed much more to their ability to occupy a geographical space than to their pro-democratic (or liberal) stance in the political sphere.

4. Regionalism and Presidentialism: Towards Coalition Politics?

Few would disagree that it is essential to acknowledge the importance of regionalism in voting to understand Korean electoral politics since 1987. Given the limited ideological space - i.e., that within the Right - in the political system, including the general voting public, no parties of significance had either the mandate or the capability to make a specific class appeal. This may have left the regional cleavage - always a latent resource for political exploitation even though variance of regional attributes is subtle in a society relatively homogeneous in race, language and culture - as a central source of partisan mobilisation in the wake of electoral uncertainties. Once it assumed a central place, the regional

cleavage continues to prevail in the electoral contests, and the region-party alliance has become an enduring pattern.

So far, the region-party alliance, crafted on the basis of the regional traits of party leaders as well as those of voters, seems to have promoted electoral stability rather than volatility among the voters. This was particularly so for the voters of Cholla and Kyongsang, renowned for their regional rivalry, as each of the regions produced viable presidential candidates both in the 1987 and 1992 elections.[30] However, this seemingly 'frozen' pattern of region-party alliance, which has resulted in a electoral stability, may yet have two potential sources of volatility. First, given that the regional effects on voting consisted largely in the voters' evaluations of the political leaders, it is likely that sudden changes in party leadership may result in a redistribution of partisan support in a relatively short period. If one takes into account the current electoral arrangement, in which the presidential term is fixed for five years, the potential for electoral volatility seems to be increasing. That is, as a change of leadership is predicated within the given timetable and with relative frequency, it is more likely that a redistribution of partisan support will occur along regional lines unless the oncoming party leader shares regional traits with the outgoing one.

[30] In 1987, there were two candidates in Kyongsang, i.e., in the North, Roh Tae-woo and in the South, Kim Young-sam, but in 1992 Kim Young-sam was the only viable candidate in the region gaining as much strong support in the North as that Roh had once enjoyed.

Second, once mobilised as a source of political support, the forces of regionalism are likely to maintain a central place in political contests, which were formerly highly personalised. As voters are regionally conscious and increasingly view party politics as a regional contest, it is likely that regional voting would spill over to those regions which formerly showed little tendency towards regional voting if provided with a viable candidate, and that consequently the unit of region-party alliance would reduce in size, from the region to the administrative province as such, thus providing a favourable atmosphere for a burgeoning of minor parties that would claim regional interests. The relative success of the UNP in 1992 (and the NDRP in 1988) may have been partly due to the fact that they could draw solid support from their home regions and a small but significant degree of support from the other 'neutral' regions.

The latter aspect deserves more attention in relation to Korea's presidential system of government. The pattern of region-party alliance, as the regional cleavage looms larger, has a centrifugal tendency that may result in a multi-party system. The relative success of Kim Jong-pil and his NDRP in 1987 and 1988, and Chung Ju-young and his UNP in 1992, can not be fully understood without referring to the ever increasing regionalistic nature of the electoral contests. A multi-party electoral contest may be unlikely to produce a simple majority for any party, as the election outcomes since 1987 have shown, thus imposing a limit upon the ability of the president (who may have received far less than a simple majority vote) to claim a popular mandate, and inviting executive/legislative

deadlock whenever the ruling party fails to garner a majority status in the Assembly. In such cases, Mainwaring argues that "immobilism and sharp conflict between the executive and the legislature, with potentially deleterious consequences for democratic stability and/or effective governance, often result.... If, in addition to being highly fragmented, the party system is also polarised, the difficulties of governing will be compounded."[31]

The experiment of the DLP coalition, which arbitrarily reshaped the four party system (or more precisely the three and one-half system) into a two party system so as to overcome the difficulties of governing as well as to project its rule by electoral means, seems to have achieved its immediate goals. That is, the DLP with nearly two-thirds of members in the Assembly successfully supported the last years' rule of the Roh government and it yielded a simple majority - though its numerical strength was far reduced if compared to the former Assembly - in the new Assembly as well as electing its presidential candidate. It is fortunate for the new 'civilian' government of Kim Young-sam that it commands a majority in the National Assembly, maintained by, on the one hand, recruiting new members and on the other by selectively curtailing potential splintering within the DLP in the course of its popular clean-up campaign, thus enabling its implementation of various (and rather aggressive) reform measures.[32]

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[31] See Mainwaring, Scott, "Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination," *Comparative Political Studies*, 26(2), 1993, pp. 198-228, at pp. 215-216.

[32] See, for a discussion of the new government's reforms, Lee, Chong-sik, and Sohn, Hyuk-sang, "South Korea in 1993: The Year of the Great Reform," *Asian Survey*, 34(1), 1994, pp. 1-9.

However, the grounds for the DLP coalition are by no means solid. As an odd coalition of the former ruling elements - the DJP and the New DRP - and Kim's followers who were once in opposition, the common, perhaps the only, interests that kept the coalition partners in a party may have been their reluctance "to see the PPD led by Kim Dae Jung monopolise power through direct presidential elections."[33] Once past election day, difficulties inevitably arose in keeping the coalition partners together.[34] Apart from the pushing factor, that is, the lack of a power sharing mechanism against presidential autonomy, which could be exemplified by the purges of leading figures of former regimes - inevitably involving many politicians from Taegu/Kyongbuk - in the course of Kim's ever popular anti-corruption drive, the centrifugal tendency of regionalism may provide a major pulling cause of electoral incentives for the coalition partners to break up. The fact that the DLP failed in filling the three vacant assembly seats of Taegu/Kyongbuk, regional strongholds of the former DJP, in the by-elections held in August 1993 and August 1994 may contribute to this tendency unless new incentives for keeping the coalition together are provided for President Kim's coalition partners.

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[33] See Park, Jin, op.cit., 1990, p.1158.

[34] For example, Mainwaring points out three factors that pose difficulties in building a stable coalition in presidential systems in comparison to parliamentary systems: i.e., lack of binding mechanism in the post-election period of the coalition that often takes place before the election, given the autonomous executive power; the less propensity of individual legislatures' commitment to the party line; and the more electoral incentives of parties to break coalitions, as some remain as a silent partner in the coalition without enjoying the benefits but bearing the costs. See his op.cit., 1993, pp. 220-222.

If regionalism prevails in the forthcoming elections - which is highly likely - then one could expect the emergence of a multi-party system either by a breaking up of the existing parties or by the emergence of new parties. This may again necessitate coalition building, as the presidential system is more likely to be compatible with a two-party system.[35] As Han Sung-joo pointed out, the presidential system of government indeed facilitated survival of the two-party system in Korea due to "the proclivity of the politicians to gather around two major parties - one for and the other against government."[36] A coalition based on the regional cleavage may not be advisable, as it provides shaky ground for a stable coalition because of its centrifugal tendency, but it also endangers (if it results in significant regional minorities being permanently excluded from power) competition by rendering it a merely formal and empty process.[37] Notwithstanding the points made by Kim and Koh over two decades ago, that "in a society that is otherwise homogeneous, regional pride and identity may provide necessary safeguards against growing mobilisation by the centralised government, and against the possible dangers of totalitarian manipulation of the masses,"[38] the highly personalised and emotion-charged regionalism hinders, in the long-run, the formation of a more responsive political system.

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[35] See ibid., p.200.
[36] See Han, Sung-joo, "South Korea: Politics in Transition," op.cit., 1989, p.296.
[37] See Mainwaring, op.cit., 1993, p.223.
[38] See Kim, Jae-on, and Koh, B.C., "Electoral Behavior and Social Development in South Korea: An Aggregate Data Analysis of Presidential Elections," *The Journal of Politics*, 34(3), 1972, pp. 825-859, at p.854.

In this regard, more care is needed for the political actors and the voters alike in crafting a democratic society from the institutionalised democratic political system. Given the ideological rigidity of the society on the Right-Left continuum, the converting of the old pro-government versus pro-democratic cleavage into a conservative versus liberal framework,[39] and, further, the rendering of the converted cleavage to a central place in electoral competition, can be a viable option in the foreseeable future. This conversion is feasible, as those voters who have opted for 'change' have remained on the side of the opposition,[40] and further strengthening of this converted cleavage may also negate the forces that compel electoral choice to be made on the basis of regional sentiment, although the positioning of it into a central electoral concern may still be difficult to implement.

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[39] A similar point was made by Lee Kap-yun in forecasting the political configuration of partisan alignment soon after the 1985 National Assembly election. See Lee, Kap-yun, "Electoral Connection of an Authoritarian Political System: Republic of Korea (1948-85)," in *Political Leadership in a Changing Society*, Proceedings of the Second Asian-Pacific Political Science Association, Seoul, 1986, pp. 151-163, at p.163.

[40] See Chapter 6 for an account of this.

CONCLUSION

This thesis has examined the process by which Korean voters come to their voting decision, one of the most neglected topics in the studies of Korean voting behaviour, especially in the era of democratisation from 1987. As Korean elections, which used to play a secondary role in the political process, merely providing the government in power with its needed legitimacy, became meaningful contests, the question of how Korean voters made their voting decision carried more weight than before, especially given the democratic transition of the political system. Nonetheless, this is not to say that there had been no meaning to past elections. Past elections also 'mattered': in that they had been "crucial" on some occasions by producing a viable opposition party (as Ahn Byung-man argued);[1] in that many contending issues had been reviewed, especially that of questioning the authoritarian characteristics of the regime; in that the parties had engaged in heated competitions to garner political support; and in that the voters had shown an enduring tendency of alignment on the line of regime support versus pro-democratic politics.

Thus, the main focus of this study has been on the political cleavage structures that have led Korean voters to behave as such in making their voting

[1] See Ahn, Byong-man, "The Process of Political Changes in Korea: An Analysis of Crucial Elections and Party Politics," *Korea & World Affairs*, 9(4), 1985, pp. 625-646.

choice. By analysing two sets of sample survey data, which cover the elections in the period of democratic transition, i.e., from 1985 to 1992, it has attempted to unravel the nature of the two main dimensions of political cleavage, that is, the urban-rural and regional differences in electoral support, which are in essence descriptions of vote distribution at the aggregate level.

To have an overall view of the electoral importance of these two political cleavages, the impact of changes in the party system on the voters during the period are discussed. Two major changes in the party system were witnessed, namely, the opposition party split immediately before the election of 1987 and the unprecedented party merger across the ruling and the opposition camps in 1990. Their impacts were discussed with reference first to the patterns of movement of voters across the subsequent elections and second to the patterns of 'changing' voter alignment on the two main dimensions. The movements of voters were in general quite stable along the line of government versus opposition: the movement of voters from 1985 to 1987/1988 was the most stable for the government party and its candidate, and the split opposition shared their former support, as one could expect; however, the stability in the movement of voters between 1987 and 1992 was remarkable, given the leadership change in the ruling party to a once renowned opposition leader, Kim Young-sam. There had also been a similar pattern in electoral support along the urban-rural dimension across the elections, which suggests that the past cleavage of regime support versus pro-democratic played an important role. If there had been a

source of volatility in the movement of voters between 1987 and 1992, it may have been the regionalism that had provided the political actors with room to maneuver. Kim Young-sam, for example, had been successful in maintaining or further mobilising his former regional stronghold, and somewhat successful in taking up the former regional strongholds of the new ruling party coalition partners; Kim Dae-jung had a limited opportunity to expand the regional basis of his support beyond Cholla, however; and the new-comer Chung Ju-young may have benefited from the floating voters along the regional lines drawn between the two Kims. Having appeared in 1987, regionalism has prevailed in electoral contests since, although the lines drawn by regional traits have differed from time to time.

To unravel the nature of the two main political cleavages, this thesis has closely examined the cleavage structures by identifying factors that brought about the observed patterns of voter alignment along urban-rural and regional lines. The past cleavage of regime versus pro-democratic support, which was often reflected in urban-rural differences in electoral support, was found to consist more of differences in socialisation. The different composition of age cohorts, who exhibit different voting propensities as well as different views on politics partly because of their differences in educational attainment or experience in societal life, between urban and rural areas, accounts for the *yoch'on yado* (government-rural, opposition-urban) phenomenon.

More research may be needed for the explanation of difference in voting propensity among the age cohorts. A research project specifically designed for age-related factors could be rewarding: although some of the difference in voting among the age cohorts were the consequence of their differences in political attitudes, it remains to be determined whether these differences are due to "generation" effects or "life-cycle" effects - which may have different political implications for the future. There was evidence that the younger age cohorts practised anti-regime voting both in 1987/1988 and 1992. The younger age cohorts, with less experience of war, poverty or social disorder than their older counterparts, may have preferred "change" to "stability." Perhaps, given that Korea has gone through rapid, large-scale socio-economic changes in the last few decades, there may exist "inter-generational cultural discrepancy," as Ahn Chung-si suggested.[2] But search for intervening variables that specifically link the younger age cohorts' electoral propensity toward the opposition with its sources needs to be continued.

The regional differences in voting, which appeared as a new political cleavage in the elections considered in this thesis, are mainly due to 'personalism.' The voters, who heavily rely on personality factors for their voting decision, seem to have used the regional traits of the candidates and their parties for their candidate evaluations most importantly. This thesis also showed that there is some additional evidence that regional voting is partly due to

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[2] See Ahn, Chung-si, "Political Culture and Political Socialisation of the Post-war Generation in South Korea," *Korea Journal*, 28(5), 1988, pp. 4-20.

differences in the political orientations of voters between regions. This may be particularly so for the voters of Cholla, who had long been on the side of opposition. It is noteworthy, however, that the variables of socialisation, especially that of age, are the main factors in determining an individual's political tendencies that exert more immediate impacts on voting choice. There was little evidence, however, of regional voting based on "economic interest," although there was some evidence of regional variations on economic evaluations and evidence of economic voting, especially based on the future forecast. This suggests that regionalism may have been more deeply seated among the voters - deriving, perhaps, from their personal experience in societal life or from a valuing of personal ties which might result in favouritism to in-groups or antagonism to out-groups - than can be accounted for by a functional approach.

Given these empirical findings, the final chapter discussed the political implications of the two main political cleavages for the process of democratisation in Korea. It has been argued that voter alignment along regional lines - lines which are vertically drawn rather than cross-cutting; highly personalised and emotion-charged rather than interest oriented; and which exhibit a centrifugal tendency - may hinder democratic stability based on presidentialism. Presidentialism may be more likely to be compatible with a two-party system.[3] Moreover, it would be unfortunate if the current pattern of voter alignment along regional lines entails the permanent exclusion of some

[3] See Mainwaring, Scott, "Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination," *Comparative Political Studies*, 26(2), 1993, pp. 198-228.

populations from political power. The rendering of the past cleavage of regime support versus pro-democratic dimension into a conservative versus liberal framework - which would be not only feasible, but also one of the compelling options in the near future given the ideological rigidity of Korean society - and further positioning it into a central electoral concern, could contribute to the development of a stable democratic political system if the presidential system in Korea continues to prosper.

Appendix 1. About the Survey

1. Survey Design, Financial Support and Fieldwork

The 1991 survey was designed by Professor James Cotton, and the 1992 post-election survey was designed by the author with advice of the author's Ph.D. course supervisory panel. The latter survey was conducted as part of a research project organised by Prof. James Cotton, with the financial support of the Australian National University, and the Asia Research Centre of Murdoch University, Western Australia. The fieldwork for both of the survey was carried out by the Korea Gallup Polls (Ltd.), and the data were collected by person to person interviews.

2. Fieldwork Period

The fieldwork for the 1991 survey was implemented during the period of 1 November to 10 November 1991, i.e., after the formation of the ruling Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) and the main opposition Democratic Party (DP). The 1992 survey was conducted just after the 14th Presidential election of 18 December 1992, i.e., during the period of 22 December to 30 December 1992.

3. Population, Sampling Method and Sample Size

The surveys were based on a nationwide sample of the voting population of age 20 and over (excluding the Cheju province), which resulted in a total sample size of 1,250 and 1,500, respectively, with a three-stage stratified random sampling method. The data in this analysis is weighted by age and sex to reflect the general population of the provinces at the time of the survey. Cases are also weighted so that they respond to the official election returns in the 1987 and the 1992 presidential elections, respectively.

4. Variables Used in the Analysis: Coding and Means

A: Voting Choice and Socio-economic Background Variables: 1991 and 1992

Variables	Coding	Means	
		1991	1992
Voting Choice **1985 (n=809)**			
DJP 85	Vote for the DJP in 1985=1, Other=0, Nonvoter=.	.426	--

NKDP 85	Vote for the NKDP in 1985=1, Other=0, Nonvoter=.	.462	--
DKP 85	Vote for the DKP in 1985=1, Other=0, Nonvoter=.	.077	--
1987 (n=1007/1191)			
Roh 87	Vote for Roh Tae-woo in 1987=1, Other=0, Nonvoter=.	.367	.445
YS 87	Vote for Kim Young-sam in 1987=1, Other=0, Nonvoter=.	.281	.211
DJ 87	Vote for Kim Dae-jung in 1987=1, Other=0, Nonvoter=.	.271	.296
1988 (n=1002)			
DJP 88	Vote for the DJP in 1988=1, Other=0, Nonvoter=.	.333	--
RDP 88	Vote for the RDP in 1988=1, Other=0, Nonvoter=.	.292	--
PPD 88	Vote for the PPD in 1988=1, Other=0, Nonvoter=.	.266	--
1992 (n=1237)			
DLP 92	Vote for the DLP in 1992 NA Election=1, Other=0, Nonvoter=.	--	.425
DP 92	Vote for the DP in 1992 NA Election=1, Other=0, Nonvoter=.	--	.384
UNP 92	Vote for the UNP in 1992 NA Election=1, Other=0, Nonvoter=.	--	.123
1992 (n=1293)			
YS 92	Vote for Kim Young-sam in 1992=1, Other=0, Nonvoter=.	--	.420
DJ 92	Vote for Kim Dae-jung in 1992=1, Other=0, Nonvoter=.	--	.338
JY 92	Vote for Chung Ju-young in 1992=1, Other=0, Nonvoter=.	--	.163
Location (Metro)			
City	Small/Medium City Dweller=1, Other=0	.231	.265
Rural	Rural Dweller=1, Other=0	.257	.250
Region (Seoul)			
Kyonggi	Kyonggi Resident=1, Other=0	.166	.196
Kangwon	Kangwon Resident=1, Other=0	.040	.039
Ch'ungch'ong	Ch'ungch'ong Resident=1, Other=0	.102	.095
Cholla	Cholla Resident=1, Other=0	.115	.126
Kyongbuk	Kyongbuk Resident=1, Other=0	.123	.118
Kyongnam	Kyongnam Resident=1, Other=0	.186	.169
Origin (Seoul/ Kyonggi)			
Kangwon	Kangwon Origin=1, Other=0	.060	.064
Ch'ungch'ong	Ch'ungch'ong Origin=1, Other=0	.168	.187
Cholla	Cholla Origin=1, Other=0	.245	.247
Kyongbuk	Kyongbuk Origin=1, Other=0	.175	.178
Kyongnam	Kyongnam Origin=1, Other=0	.177	.147
Other	North Korea/Cheju/Overseas Origin=1, Other=0	.062	.043
Socialisation			
Age (50 +)			
20's	Age 20 to 29=1, Other=0	.322	.306
30's	Age 30 to 39=1, Other=0	.269	.278
40's	Age 40 to 49=1, Other=0	.175	.170
Gender(Female)			
Male	Male=1, Female=0	.501	.497
Rel (No/Other)			
Buddhist	Religious Affiliation, Buddhism=1, Other=0	.286	.286
Protestant	Religious Affiliation, Protestant=1, Other=0	.205	.206
Catholic	Religious Affiliation, Catholic=1, Other=0	.094	.057
Edu (Primary)			
Middle	Education, Middle School=1, Other=0	.171	.166
High	Education, High School=1, Other=0	.397	.406
University	Education, College and Over=1, Other=0	.212	.210
SE Interests			
Job (Self-employed) (n=1203)	Respondent's job + Head of household's job for those who are not engaged in a paid work=1, Neither Head of household's nor Respondent engaged in a paid work=.		
Farmer	Farmer=1, Other=0	.204	.187
Manual Worker	Manual Worker=1, Other=0	.195	.226
Non-manual	Routine Non-manual(Service/Sales/Clerical)=1, Other=0	.341	.330

Manager/Prof	Managerial/Professional=1, Other=0	.058	.032
Income(- 500)	unit=1,000 won		
500 to 990	Household Monthly Income 500 to 990=1, Other=0	.379	.346
1,000 to 1,490	Household Monthly Income 1,000 to 1,490=1, Other=0	.259	.301
1,500 & over	Household Monthly Income 1,500 and over=1, Other=0	.099	.183
Status (Low)			
Lower-middle	Subjective Status Lower-middle=1, Other=0	.336	--
Middle	Subjective Status Middle=1, Other=0	.334	--
Upper-middle +	Subjective Status Upper-middle/Upper=1, Other=0	.069	--
Housing(Owner)			
Long-term Lease	Housing, Long-term Leased=1, Other=0	--	.322
Monthly Rent	Housing, Monthly Rented=1, Other=0	--	.061

B: Attitudinal Variables: 1991

Variables	Coding	Means	Cases
Regime Support Index	(Fair+Democratised+Party Politics+No Changes)/4	**.391**	**1141**
Fair, Past Elections?	5 point scale: 1=Very Fair to 0=Very Unfair	.354	1248
Democratised, How Far?	4 point scale: 1=Very Democratised to 0=Not at all	.576	1241
Democratic, Parties?	4 point scale: 1=Very Democratic to 0=Not at all	.386	1150
Society, Need a Change?	3 point scale: 1=No Need to 0=Need Radical Change	.260	1223
Awareness Index	(Regionalism+Opposition Merger+Vote Buying)/3	**.719**	**1246**
Regionalism, Serious?	4 point scale: 1=Very Serious to 0=Not at all	.806	1249
Opposition Merger?	1=Desirable, 0=Not Desirable	.700	1250
Influence of Vote-buying?	1=Negative Influence, 0.5=None, 0=Positive Influence	.651	1248
Political Interest Index	(Campaign Rally+Political Interest)/2	**.558**	**1250**
Been in Campaign Rally?	1=Yes, 0=No	.592	1250
Interested in Politics?	5 point scale: 1=Very Interested to 0=Not at all	.523	1250
Morality Index	(Political Corruption+Personal Experience)/2	**.777**	**1247**
Political Corruption	3 point scale: 1=Not Acceptable to 0=Inevitable	.843	1248
Experience of Vote-buying?	1=No, 0=Yes	.712	1249
Anti-gov't Group Index	Contribution to Democratisation (Chaeya+Labour Activists+Students+Religious Inst.)/4	**.527**	**1044**
Chaeya(Opposition)	4 point scale: 1=Very Much to 0=Not at all	.523	1110
Labour Activists	As above	.543	1138
Student Movement	As above	.592	1183
Religious Institutions	As above	.440	1126
Pro-gov't Group Index	Contribution to Democratisation (Big Business+Military+America)/3	**.270**	**1040**
Chaebol(Big Business)	As above	.222	1136
The Military	As above	.247	1119
America	As above	.358	1104

C: Attitudinal Variables: 1992

Variables	Coding	Means	Cases
Political Attitudes			
Subjective Tendency	4 point scale: 1=Very Progressive to 0=Very Conservative	.495	1279
Efficacy of Elections	4 point scale: 1=Very Much to 0=Not at all	.637	1449
Issue Standing Index	(Demonstration+Union+US Army+North Korea)/4	**.413**	**1500**
Demonstrations?	1=Approve, 0.5=No Opinion, 0=Oppose	.339	1500
Teacher's Union?	As above	.450	1500
US Army Withdrawal?	As above	.296	1500
Contact North Korea?	As above	.567	1500

Party Disposition(None)			
Governing Party	1=Governing Party Identifier, 0=Other	.258	1500
Opposition Party	1=Opposition Party Identifier, 0=Other	.411	1500
Economic Attitudes			
Retrospective Index	(Household+Region+Nation)/3 in retrospective	**.443**	**1446**
Household's Economy?	5 point scale: 1=Much Better to 0=Much Worse	.479	1497
Regional Economy?	As above	.469	1471
National Economy?	As above	.382	1471
Prospective Index	(Household+Region+Nation)/3 in prospective	**.627**	**1424**
Household's Economy?	5 point scale: 1=Much Better to 0=Much Worse	.629	1478
Regional Economy?	As above	.619	1464
National Economy?	As above	.630	1444
Candidate Evaluations	The most capable candidate of delivering the followings: Democratisation, Wealth Redistribution, Social Stability, Economic Growth, Mitigating the Regional Disparities, National Unification, and Clearing up the Corruption		
Kim Young-sam Index	7 point scale: 1=All of the 7 Issues for YS to 0=None	**.286**	**1500**
Kim Dae-jung Index	7 point scale: 1=All of the 7 Issues for DJ to 0=None	**.259**	**1500**
Chung Ju-young Index	7 point scale: 1=All of the 7 Issues for JY to 0=None	**.108**	**1500**

5. The Questionnaire

A: The 1991 Survey (English Translation)

SQ.1. Residential Region
1.Seoul 2.Pusan 3.Taegu 4.Inchon 5.Kwangju 6.Taejon 7.Kyonggi 8.Kangwon 9.Ch'ungbuk 10.Ch'ungnam 11.Chonbuk 12.Chonnam 13.Kyongbuk 14.Kyongnam

SQ.2. Residential Type
1.Metropolis 2.Small/Medium City 3.Up/Myon (Rural)

SQ.3. Gender
1.Male 2.Female

SQ.4. Excuse me, but how old are you?
( ) year old

Q.1. How much are you interested in politics ordinarily?
1.Very interested 2.Somewhat interested 3.On the average 4.Not much interested 5.Not at all interested

Q.2. There are three basic attitudes toward the society we live in. Which one do you think is the closest to your opinion among the followings?
1.Our society now needs a fundamental change as it has many faults.
2.Even though our society now has many faults, they can be solved within our current system.
3.Overall, our society now doesn't need a big change.

Q.3. How far do you think our country has been democratised?
1.Very democratised 2.Somewhat democratised 3.Not so democratised 4.Not at all democratised

Q.4. How much do you think the following political parties, leaders and groups contributed to the democratisation of our society? Or not contributed?

First, how much do you think the DLP has contributed to the democratisation?
1.Contributed very much 2.Contributed somewhat 3.Not contributed much 4.Not at all contributed

Q.4-2. Then, how about the DP?
Q.4-3. How about Roh Tae-woo?
Q.4-4. How about Kim Young-sam?
Q.4-5. How about Kim Dae-jung?
Q.4-6. How about Kim Jong-pil?
Q.4-7. How about the student movement circles?
Q.4-8. How about the *Chaeya* (the opposition forces)?
Q.4-9. How about the labour movement activists?
Q.4-10. How about the religious associations?
Q.4-11. How about the military (senior officers)?
Q.4-12. How about the *Chaebol* (big business) owners?
Q.4-13. How about America?

Q.5. Which system of government do you think is more suitable to our country between "presidential system" and "parliamentary system"?
1.Presidential system 2.Parliamentary system

Q.6. How much do you think the Korean political parties - the DLP and the DP, ect. - are democratic/not democratic in their internal management?
1.Very democratic 2.Somewhat democratic 3.Not so democratic 4.Not at all democratic

Q.7. Recently the PPD and the (small) DP has been merged. Do you think the merger is a right thing to do or wrong?
1.Right 2.Wrong

Q.8. There often appears reports about bribery-taking or corruption of politicians on the newspapers and TV. What do you think of these corruption by politicians? Please tell me the closest one of your own among the following statements.
1. It is inevitable for a politician.
2. It is unfortunate, but not a big deal as long as it doesn't obstruct the democratic political order.
3. It shouldn't be permitted as it obstruct the democratic political order.
4. It should be only viewed as an example of individual corruption.

Q.9. How serious/not serious do you think the matter of regionalism is now in our country?
1.Very serious 2.Somewhat serious 3.Not so serious 4.Not at all serious

Q.10. Which one do you think among the followings is the biggest cause for the regionalism?
1.Disparities in industrial and regional development 2.Regionally biased personnel management in the political and administrative field 3.Excessive regional/region of origin consciousness 4.Regional link system in sports 5.Mal-use by politicians 6.Influence of mass media 7.Other(specify:)

Q.11. Have you voted in the 12th National Assembly election of 1985? (If yes) Which party candidate did you vote for?

1.The DJP (Leader Chun Doo-hwan) 2.The NKDP (Leader Lee Min-woo) 3.The DKP (Leader Yu Chi-song) 4.Other (specify:) 5.Don't know/Can't say 6.Abstained 7.No voting right

Q.12. Have you voted in the last presidential election of 1987? (If yes) Who did you vote for?
1.Roh Tae-woo 2.Kim Young-sam 3.Kim Dae-jung 4.Kim Jong-pil 5.Other (specify:) 6.Don't know/Can't say 7.Abstained 8.No voting right

Q.13. Then, have you voted in the 13th National Assembly election of 1988? (If yes) Which party candidate did you vote for?
1.The DJP (Leader Roh Tae-woo) 2.The RDP (Leader Kim Young-sam) 3.The PPD (Leader Kim Dae-jung) 4.The NDRP (Leader Kim Jong-pil) 5.Other (specify:) 6.Don't know/Can't say 7.Abstained 8.No voting right

Q.14. (If abstained in Q.13) What was the reason for not voting?
( )

Q.15. Has your current party of support been changed if compared to that in the last 13th National Assembly election of 1988? (Consider the DJP/the DLP, and the PPD/the DP as the same)
1.Changed 2.Not changed [Go to Q.18]

Q.16. (If changed in Q.15) If so, how have you changed? (Consider the DJP/the DLP, and the PPD/the DP as the same)
1. From the DJP to the DP
2. From the RDP to the DLP
3. From the RDP to the DP
4. From the PPD to the DLP
5. From the NDRP to the DLP
6. From the NDRP to the DP
7. From other (specify:) to other (specify:)

Q.17. Then, what caused this change in your support?
( )

Q.18. Then, why do you still support the party?
( )

Q.19. Have you voted in the (provincial-level) Local Assembly election of last June? (If yes) Which party candidate did you vote for?
1.The DLP 2.The NDP 3.The (small) DP 4.Other (specify:) 5.Abstained 6.Don't know/Can't say

Q.20. (If abstained in Q.19) What was the reason for not voting?
( )

Q.21. Which party candidate will you vote for in the 14th National Assembly election next year?
1.The DLP 2.The DP 3.Other(specify:) 4.Independents 5.Don't know/Can't say 6.Will abstain

Q.22. Who do you think is most desirable to be elected in the presidential election next year?
( )

Q.23. Who would you like to be the winner if Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung are the only two to run for the next presidential election?
1.Kim Young-sam 2.Kim Dae-jung 3.Don't know/Can't say

Q.24. Then, who would you like to be the winner if Park Tae-jun and Kim Dae-jung are the only two to run for the next presidential election?
1.Park Tae-jun 2.Kim Dae-jung 3.Don't know/Can't say

Q.25. What is the most important thing, you consider, when you decide the candidate to vote for in the National Assembly or Presidential elections?
1.Party 2.Policies/Promises 3.Personality/Career/Regional background 4.Other (specify:)

Q.26. Then, to which do you refer most when you decide the candidate to vote for?
1.Newspaper/TV/Radio 2.Poster/Pamphlet 3.Election information board 4.Campaign speech 5.People around 6.Party workers 7.Family members' opinion 8.Other (specify:) 9.Nothing particular

Q.27. Do you think the past elections in our country had been fair or not in overall?
1.Very fair 2.Somewhat fair 3.On the average/So so 4.Somewhat unfair 5.Very unfair

Q.28. Have you ever been a campaign rally to listen to candidates' speeches?
1.Yes 2.No

Q.29. Have you ever received gifts or money from candidates, or been treated by them?
1.Yes 2.No

Q.30. Do you think the gifts, money or the treats provided by a candidate will influence the voter's attitude toward the candidate for better, for worse, or no influence?
1.For better influence 2.For worse influence 3.No influence

Q.31. Which country do you feel is the closest with Korea among the followings? Then, please tell me other two countries that you feel the next closest.
1.USSR 2.USA 3.Japan 4.Indonesia 5.North Korea 6.China 7.Taiwan

Q.32. How far do you think our domestic market is currently opened for the foreign countries/imports?
1.Very open 2.Somewhat open 3.Not so open 4. Not at all open

Q.33. In general, do you approve or oppose liberalisation for the import of foreign agricultural products?
1.Strongly approve 2.Somewhat approve 3.Somwhat oppose 4.Strongly oppose
Then, how about the Japanese movies?

Q.34. What do you think of the pace of our country's unification policy? Do you think it is too fast, too slow, or it is about right?
1.Too fast 2.Too slow 3.About right

Q.35. Which one do you think has priority in pursuing unification of two Koreas between the following two policies?
1. Free trade, communication, and travel, etc. - such non-political exchanges should come first.

2. Non-aggression, and nuclear pacts, etc. - such political and military agreements should come first.

Q.36. Here are some thinks people say are obstacles to unification. Among these, which two do you think are the biggest obstacles to the unification of two Koreas?

1. Ideological difference between South and North 2.Mutual distrust 3.South Korean domestic politics 4.North Korean dictatorship 5.Difference in unification policies between South and North 6.USA 7.USSR 8.Difference in economic development between South and North

Q.37. Do you think international exchanges as follows are advantageous to our country or disadvantageous?

First, do you think it is advantageous for our country to participate in the international trade organisations?

1.Advantageous 2.Disadvantageous 3.Don't Know

Q.37-1. Then, how about the trade with China?

Q.37-2. How about the trade with the USSR?

Q.37-3. How about the trade with North Korea

Q.37-4. How about the formation of an Asia-Pacific economic group?

Q.37-5. How about the entry to the UN?

Q.38. What do you associated with Australia? Pleas tell me anything that comes to your mind.

( )

Q.39. Do you think the relationship between Korea and Australia is good or bad?

1.Very good 2.Somewhat good 3.Somewhat bad 4.Very bad

Q.40. Would you intend to travel to Australia if you can spare money and time?

1.Yes 2.No

<u>Finally, I am going to ask some questions for the classification of the data.</u>

1. What is your occupation?

1.Farming, Fishing, Forest 2.Self-employed 3.Sales/Service 4.Skilled work 5.Simple manual work 6.Clerical/Engineering work 7.Managerial/Administarive work 8.Professional work 9.Houswife 10.Student 11.Unemployed 12.Other(specify:)

2. Where is your grandfather's hometown?

1.Seoul 2.Kyonggi 3.Kangwon 4.Ch'ungchong 5.Pusan 6.Kyongnam 7.Taegu/Kyongbuk 8.Kwangju/Chonnam 9.Chongbuk 10.North Korea 11.Other(specify:)

3. How far have you certified for a formal education?

1.Primary school and under 2.Middle school 3.High school 4.College and over

4. How much is your family's average total monthly income?

( ) 10 thousand won

5. Which class do you think you are belonged to?

1.Lower class 2.Lower-middle class 3.Middle class 4.Upper-middle class 5.Upper class

6. Do you have a religion? (If yes) What is your religious faith?
1.Buddhism 2.Protestant 3.Catholic 4.Other (specify:) 5.No

B: The 1992 Post-election Survey (English Translation)

SQ.1. Address to the district level
( )
SQ.2. Residential Region
1.Seoul 2.Pusan 3.Taegu 4.Inchon 5.Kwangju 6.Taejon 7.Kyonggi 8.Kangwon 9.Ch'ungbuk 10.Ch'ungnam 11.Chonbuk 12.Chonnam 13.Kyongbuk 14.Kyongnam
SQ.3. Residential Type
1.Metropolis 2.Small/Medium City 3.Up/Myon (Rural)
SQ.4. Gender
1.Male 2.Female
SQ.5. Excuse me, but did you have voting right in this presidential election? (If yes) How old are you?
( ) year old

Q.1. How long have you been living in this area?
1.Less than a year 2.Two to three years 3.Four to five years 4.Six to nine years 5.More than 10 years
Q.2. How much are you interested in what's happening in the area you are living?
1.Very much interested in 2.Somewhat interested in 3.Not so interested in 4.Not at all interested in
Q.3. Do you think the "financial situation of your household" now is better-off compared with what was 2 to 3 years ago or worse-off?
1.Much better 2.Somewhat better 3.About the same 4.Somewhat worse 5.Much worse

Q.3-2. Then, how about the "economic situation of your area"?
Q.3-3. How about the "economic situation of our country as a whole"?
Q.4. Do you think the "financial situation of your household" will be better-off in 2 to 3 year time or worse off?
1.Much better 2.Somewhat better 3.About the same 4.Somewhat worse 5.Much worse

Q.4-2. Then, how about the "economic situation of your area"?
Q.4-3. How about the "economic situation of our country as a whole"?
Q.5. Do you think yourself "progressive" in political and social matters or "conservative"?
1.Very progressive 2.Somewhat progressive 3.Somewhat conservative 4.Very conservative 5.Can't say either

Q.6. Do you usually approve "protest marches or demonstrations" or oppose?
1.Approve 2.Oppose 3.Can't say either

Q.6-2. Then, how about the "activities of the Teacher's Union"?
Q.6-3. How about the "withdrawal of the US troops"?
Q.6-4. How about the "private-level contact with North Korea"?

Q.7. Have you voted in this presidential election?
1.Yes 2.No [Go to Q.11]

Q.8. (If yes in Q.7) Who did you vote for in this presidential election?
1.Kim Young-sam 2.Kim Dae-jung 3.Chung Ju-young 4.Park Chan-jong 5.Paek Ki-wan 6.Lee Byong-ho 7.Kim Ok-son 8.Can't say

Q.9. Then, what was the most important point you considered when you voted for the candidate?
1.Regional origin of the candidate 2.Personal connections with the candidate 3.Policies/Promises of the candidate 4.Career/Ability of the candidate 5.Personality of the candidate 6.Party affiliation of the candidate 7. Nothing particular 8.Other(specify:)

Q.10. When did you decide to vote for the candidate - how many days/weeks from the election day?
1.On the election day/At the voting booth 2.One day before 3.Two to three days before 4.Four to six days before 5.One week before 6.Two weeks before 7.Three weeks before 8.One month before 9.More than 2 months before

Q.11. Then, who did you think would handle the following problems the most appropriately among the presidential candidates?
First, who would handle "political democratisation" the most appropriately?
1.Kim Young-sam 2.Kim Dae-jung 3.Chung Ju-young 4.Park Chan-jong 5.Other 6.None of the candidates

Q.11-2. How about "bridging the gap between the rich and the poor"?
Q.11-3. How about "maintaining social stability"?
Q.11-4. How about "economic development"?
Q.11-5. How about "mitigating the disparities in regional development"?
Q.11-6. How about "national unification"?
Q.11-7. How about "clearing up the corruption"?

Q.12. Kim Dae-jung, the DP's candidate, declared his retirement from politics along with resignation from his National Assembly membership on last 19 December. Do you think this is a right thing to do or not?
1.Right thing to do 2.Wrong thing to do 3.Can't say either

Q.13. How much do you think people's opinion influences the politics of our country through elections?
1.Very much 2.Somewhat 3.Not so much 4.Not at all

Q.14. Have you usually supported "*Yodang* (party in power)" or "*Yadang* (party in opposition)" in various elections?
1.Yodang 2.Yadang 3.Haven't cared for Yodang or Yadang

Q.15. Have you voted in the National Assembly election this year on 24 March? (If yes) Which party candidate did you vote for?

1.The DLP 2.The DP 3.The UNP 4.The *Shinjongdang* 5.The *Minjungdang* 6.The *Kongmyongdang* 7.Independents 8.Abstained 9.Don't know/Can't say 10.No voting right

Q.16. Who did you vote for in the last presidential election in 1987?

1.Roh Tae-woo 2.Kim Young-sam 3.Kim Dae-jung 4.Kim Jong-pil 5.Other 6.Abstained 7.No voting right 8.Can't say/Don't know

Classification questions

1. What is your occupation?

1.Farming, Fishing, Forest 2.Self-employed 3.Sales/Service 4.Skilled work 5.Simple manual work 6.Clerical/Engineering work 7.Managerial/Administarive work 8.Professional work 9.Houswife 10.Student 11.Unemployed 12.Other(specify:)

2. How far have you certified for a formal education?

1.Primary school and under 2.Middle school 3.High school 4.College and over

3. What is your religious faith?

1.Buddhism 2.Protestant 3.Catholic 4.Other (specify:) 5.No

4. Where is your grandfather's hometown?

1.Seoul 2.Pusan 3.Taegu 4.Inchon 5.Kwangju 6.Taejon 7.Kyonggi 8.Kangwon 9.Ch'ungbuk 10.Ch'ungnam 11.Chonbuk 12.Chonnam 13.Kyongbuk 14.Kyongnam 15.North Korea 16.Other

5. How much is your family's average total monthly income?

1. 490,000 won and under 2. 500,000 to 590,000 won 3. 600,000 to 690,000 won 4. 700,000 to 790,000 won 5. 800,000 to 890,000 won 6. 900,000 to 990,000 won 7. 1,000,000 to 1,190,000 won 8. 1,200,000 to 1,490,000 won 9. 1,500,000 to 1,990,000 won 10. 2,000,000 won and over

6. Excuse me, but this house you live in is your "own", "long-term leased," or "monthly rented"?

1.Owner occupier 2.Long-term leased 3.Monthly rented

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