

AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC OPINION AND FOREIGN POLICY

by

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Thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Arts
Australian National University
March 1975

This thesis is my own original work

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'G.R. Wiseman'.

G.R. Wiseman

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am indebted to the Australian National University for the provision of a scholarship which brought me to Canberra in 1974, the Department of Political Science (IAS) for the use of their material on which this work is substantially based, and the students and staff of the Department of International Relations, who created a most congenial and stimulating environment in which to work.

I should like to thank Dr Peter Boyce, Professor J.D.B. Miller, and Professor Geoffrey Warner for their assistance.

ABBREVIATIONS

AIIA	Australian Institute of International Affairs
AIPS	Australian Institute of Political Science
ANOP	Australian Nationwide Opinion Polls
ANZUS	Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States
APD	Australian Parliamentary Debates
APON	Australian Public Opinion Newsletter
APOP	Australian Public Opinion Polls (Morgan Gallup)
APSA	Australasian Political Studies Association
ASRB	Australian Sales Research Bureau
CPD	Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates
H. of R.	House of Representatives (Australia)
PRC	People's Republic of China
PRG	Provisional Revolutionary Government (of the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam)
SEATO	South-East Asian Treaty Organisation

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Scope and Purpose of the Thesis

This dissertation is an attempt to measure systematically Australian public opinion as it relates to foreign policy. This measurement is taken over a considerable time span, generally speaking, the post-World War II era, but major emphasis has been given to the years between 1966 and 1972, with one chapter looking at the period after 1972. So, in a sense, the thesis concentrates on the period from the departure from the political scene of Sir Robert Menzies to the Prime Ministership of E.G. Whitlam.

The objectives of the thesis are modest. Perhaps necessarily so, since public opinion is an amorphous entity, the most difficult of all the foreign policy influences to assess. Consequently, the task is simply to measure public opinion as it is presented in survey research material with a view to assessing the changing values over time of both the component parts and aggregate of the Australian people; no attempt will be made to provide causal explanations in the formation of public opinion; nor is it intended to analyze explicitly the interaction of public and policy-makers, for reasons which will become apparent in the chapter on theory. Furthermore, no assessment has been made concerning the separation of opinions about domestic policy and foreign policy, although it is recognized that there are significant differences.

Following this brief Introduction, in which methodology is discussed, paying particular attention to the most salient criticisms made about survey research techniques, a chapter will be devoted to the theory of public

opinion. This chapter has a twofold purpose: firstly, to present in some detail some of the major theoretical contributions to public opinion research; and secondly, to provide the theoretical/methodological basis for the case studies. It ought to be said at this point, that the limited objectives of this work bear a direct relationship to the singular lack of success of public opinion theorists, such as James Rosenau and Gabriel Almond, to adequately describe the opinion-policy relationship in terms of general explanatory theoretical designs and to suggest tenable means of measuring public opinion.

Apart from their intrinsic value to observers of Australian public opinion, the case studies are primarily concerned with proving the inapplicability of the "mood theory": the major theoretical proposition advanced is that Australian public opinion has changed with time, but that this change has been cautious and slow; it has not been cyclical, nor has it been subject to great fluctuations or "moods". The more detailed background information, relating to such variables as respondent's party support, age, sex, income, occupation, religion, and state of residence, will be examined; again, for the two purposes just enumerated: to assay the mood theory, and to attempt to do something about the "lack of research done so far in Australia on [the] relationship between foreign policy attitudes and social location."¹

Chapter Three is an analysis of Australian attitudes to the Vietnam War, and is the first of four case studies, chosen because of their central significance to Australian foreign policy and the availability of survey material. The broad profile of Australian public opinion on Vietnam

1 N. Viviani, "Australian Attitudes and Policies Towards Indonesia, 1950-1965, PhD thesis, ANU, 1973, pp.3-4.

from 1965 to 1972 seeks to find out primarily what Australians felt about the war itself, but also the so-called communist threat and the American alliance. The significant question of the relationship between public opinion and government policy is also looked at, within the narrow confines of this study.

Chapter Four is an attempt to quantify the attitudes of the Australian people to China, in particular, their threat perceptions. It has been found useful to draw on the related questions of recognition, trade, and UN admission. The results cast some doubts on the putative threat perception of the Australian people, especially of China. Because several questions are analyzed, a complex pattern emerges, and to try to make some sense of the multifarious answers in the demographic sub-groups it was found useful to formulate the concept of the higher and lower threat perceivers within those population categories.

Chapter Five examines Australian attitudes to the American alliance, and although the Vietnam case study has much to say about Australian-American relations, this chapter is an attempt to come to a better understanding of the alliance by examination of poll questions relating to the placement of American nuclear weapons bases and communications installations in Australia, the efficacy of the defence treaties with the USA, and diplomatic intercourse with the Soviet Union. Thus, not only will propositions be posited about the public's expressed desirability for the continuation of the alliance *per se*, but also on the more exacting question of the price that should be paid for the alliance. The latter is something which is quite often overlooked in more general analyses of Australian foreign policy.

Another important aspect of Australian foreign policy formulation and opinion formation, which does not seem to have been given its due recognition, is the question of racism. That it constitutes a core element in Australia's foreign relations was clearly spelled out by Mr Whitlam in his 1972 policy speech, and so this chapter endeavours to form a broad picture of Australian racial attitudes and their implications for opinion on foreign policy.

Chapter Seven attempts to relate public opinion to the foreign policy changes of the Whitlam Labor Government which came to office in December 1972. Because of the limited time and data available for such an analysis, it has proven necessary to examine both survey research material and policy transformations and continuities in order to come to conclusions about the state of flux of public opinion. This chapter, more than any other, sheds considerable light on the relationship between public and policy-maker.

Methodology

This thesis does not purport to be riding on the "fourth wave"¹ as Karl Deutsch has metaphorically described the recent advances in quantitative research data for the study of international relations.¹ Rather, it professes to analyze, by systematic examination of public opinion surveys, the attitudes² of the Australian people to some fundamental issues of Australia's international relations. Survey research has attracted widespread academic interest, not only for the conclusions reached, but

1 The other waves have been described by H. Starr, "The Quantitative International Relations Scholar as Surfer Riding the 'Fourth Wave'", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, (June 1974), p.345.

2 The terms, attitudes, perceptions, opinions, and beliefs are used interchangeably throughout. For definitions see N. Viviani, *op.cit.*, pp.5-6.

also for the techniques employed. It is appropriate to refer here to the major criticisms directed against polling techniques, although it is not intended to embark on a deep dissection of the matter, since it has been treated adequately elsewhere.¹

Some of the limitations of survey research include: "sampling error",² wording of questions,³ interviewing techniques,⁴ and the journalistic *modus operandi* of polling organizations.⁵

For the Australian social survey researcher, perhaps the greatest limitation has been the monopoly of the survey market by Australian Gallup Polls (APOP) for a quarter of a century. The competition was a salutary development; as Butler has said: "the existence of competition in the polling industry was one of the most welcome features of 1972".⁶

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- 1 Examples include C.A. Moser, *Survey Methods in Social Investigation* London, Heinemann, 1967; W.J. Crotty, *Public Opinion and Politics*, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970, esp. pp.24-33; B.C. Hennessy, *Public Opinion*, Belmont, Calif., Wadsworth, 1965, esp. Section I. This list is far from exhaustive.
 - 2 F. Hausfeld, "Pitfalls in Sample Survey Research," in H. Mayer (comp.), *The Art of Research*, Sydney, Occasional Monograph no. 7, University of Sydney, [1974], pp.29-30, and M. Goot, *Policies and Partisans*, Australian Electoral Opinion 1941-1968, Sydney, Occasional Monograph no. 1, University of Sydney, 1969, pp.3-4. Appendix A is a description of Gallup's sampling technique.
 - 3 M. Goot, *ibid.*, pp.4-5.
 - 4 *Age*, 31 July 1972; W.A. Collins, "Interviewers Verbal Idiosyncrasies as a Source of Bias", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 34, no. 3 (Fall, 1970).
 - 5 R.H.S. Crossman has said that pollsters "must be judged as members not of the academic fraternity but of the Fleet Street gang". *Encounter*, vol. 41, no. 4 (October, 1973) p.16. For two rebuttals to Crossman and a rejoinder see a subsequent *Encounter*, vol. 42, no. 2 (February 1974), pp.88-91.
 - 6 D. Butler, "Thoughts on the 1972 election", in H. Mayer (ed.), *Labor to Power*, Sydney, Angus and Robertson on behalf of the AIPS, 1973, p.5.

Morgan Gallup Polls was soon contending against ASRB (Australian Sales Research Bureau), although these amalgamated in October 1974, ANOP (Australian Nationwide Opinion Polls), and APOP (McNair), the latter confusing things by adopting Morgan Gallup Polls' former name.¹

Because this thesis also deals with the period well before the 1970's, difficulties of a trend analysis are compounded. Perhaps the major deficiency arising from this is the sparseness of questions,² and, even when many questions are repeated, their wording is changed so that comparability becomes risky. For example, Table 5.3 asks people to give their opinion on American communications - defence installations, but each question refers to a different base. A practical problem arising from this is that tabular presentation becomes awkward. It was felt, however, that tables should be constructed where possible so that the movement and distribution of opinion could be easily read : it is better to draw a map than describe it. One practical difficulty was corresponding the actual Gallup question with a "yes-no" column; thus, some ambiguity is evident in some tables; it was thought preferable to transcribe verbatim Gallup questions rather than have new column heads for each question. Table 5.1 provides examples of this. A small proportion of the questions used, furthermore, are ambiguously worded in that they comprise two parts which are not mutually exclusive, and requiring one affirmative or negative response; but these are rare.

These inconsistencies are more apparent to the trend analyst, who needs to look at questions over a lengthy time span. However there is one considerable advantage: because trends are analyzed, attention has focused on substantial shifts of opinion - certainly more than the three percent sampling error that surveys of Gallup's size allow for. Although

1 Gallup, AGP, and APOP, are used to denote this organization throughout. Reference will be either to summary sheets (eg. APOP, 2175-2188, March-May 1970) or detailed tabulations (eg. APOP, no. 207, 18 October 1969).

2 R. Cooksey "Australian Public Opinion and Vietnam Policy", *Dissent*, no. 22 (August, 1968), p.5.

this is more of a problem for the population sub-groups, which have smaller numbers. The arbitrary method of sub-dividing the population should also be noted, although here we are dealing in such general terms as to reduce the pertinence of this criticism.

Notwithstanding these limitations, opinion polls are still the best major systematic body of evidence we have about shifts in aggregate views expressed by the public at large.¹

Moreover, Gallup's record of electoral predictions in Australian federal elections is sufficiently accurate for us to accept their findings with some confidence.² On questions which cannot be checked for accuracy, we can be less sure. Aitkin, at least, has expressed confidence in Gallup "which" he has said "has been doing an indefatigable and accurate job monitoring Australian public opinion since the early years of World War II."³ To be sure, this dissertation places sanguine trust in Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's dictum: "while the individual man is an insoluble puzzle, in the aggregate he becomes a mathematical certainty."⁴

1 U. Kitzinger, *Diplomacy and Persuasion*, London, Thames and Hudson, 1973, p.353.

2 See D.W. Rawson, *Australian Votes*, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1961, p.112; and "Election Predictions by the Australian Gallup Poll (1946-1972) and Morgan Gallup Poll (1973-1974)", published by the Roy Morgan Research Centre, alias AGP, *APOP*, AGP.

3 *National Times*, 18-23 September 1972. See also his "Political Review", *The Australian Quarterly*, vol. 41, no. 1 (March 1969), p.75.

4 Quoted by T. Hawkins, *National Times*, 22 May 1972.

CHAPTER TWO

PUBLIC OPINION THEORY

In this chapter it is intended to examine critically some of the major aspects of public opinion theory, and in so doing justifying the methodological basis of this dissertation. It should be stated from the outset that little has been written about public opinion theory and foreign policy in Australia, in contrast to the United States where there is a vast and growing body of literature.

I

There have been several attempts to put public opinion into some sort of theoretical perspective, but the resultant explanatory theoretical designs have met with less than limited success; this seems hardly surprising when one considers the amorphous nature of public opinion which involves millions of actors. These attempts have highlighted one question: to what extent does public opinion actually and potentially influence foreign policy formulation? This may be succinctly described as the opinion-policy relationship.¹ The general conclusion reached in this chapter is that the construction of an opinion-policy model is an impossible task, the principal objection being the difficulties of verifying such a model by accurate measurement. Nonetheless, it is hoped that the subsequent case studies will shed some light on the opinion-policy relationship in Australia, and hence, on the process of foreign policy-decision making.

1 J. Rosenau, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy*, New York, Random House, 1961, chapters 3 and 7. Unless otherwise stated, all subsequent references to Rosenau are for this work.

Certain assumptions about democracy underlie public opinion studies,¹ and indeed, many of the conclusions reached by students of public opinion have cast new and often iconoclastic light on old democratic shibboleths. Whatever the academic theorists might be saying about the role of public opinion and policy-making, it can be expected that the politicians will continue, publicly, at least, to proclaim the intrinsic role the public plays in decision-making.² What, then, have some of the major theorists said about foreign policy and public opinion?

The public's role in foreign policy formulation will vary from issue to issue, but, generally speaking, academic commentators accord a peripheral role only to public opinion. Most, it seems, would endorse Waltz's comment that: "it cannot be said that fear of the people's decision or of domestic political consequences noticeably affected the final decision."³ The voters are seen as passive actors in the foreign policy process, where they are presented with a "fait accompli"; thus, they do not actively take part in foreign policy decisions, but tacitly support-or reject-them. While these comments are undoubtedly reasonable statements, they are over-simplified, and so attempts have been made to describe, in more detail, the interaction between the public and policy-makers. The problem is measuring this pattern of relations.

V.O. Key, Jr., was all too aware of the difficulties of measurement when he wrote:

1 For example, G.C. Moodie and G. Studdert-Kennedy, *Opinions, Publics and Pressure Groups*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1970.

2 Examples include statements by H. Kissinger quoted in the *Australian*, 21 September 1971, and W. McMahon and E.G. Whitlam quoted in "Foreign Affairs and the Media", *Current Notes on International Affairs*, vol. 43, no. 9 (September 1972), p.450.

3 K. Waltz, "Electoral Punishment and Foreign Policy Crises", in J.N. Rosenau (ed.), *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy*, New York, Free Press, 1967, p.284.

The sharp definition of the role of public opinion as it affects different kinds of policies under different types of situations presents an analytical problem of extraordinary difficulty.¹

Key was referring to public-policy making in general, and it is clear that these analytical problems will be compounded when we move from the domestic arena to the esoteric world of foreign policy.²

The crux of any opinion-policy theorizing is inexorably bound to the concept of "influence", which has been defined as the "participation in the decision-making process without the power to make a formal decision".³ In *The American People and Foreign Policy*, Gabriel Almond complained that most contemporary writers were ignoring the inherent stratification of influence,⁴ and so he stratified society in order to facilitate the measurement of the public's influence on foreign policy.

He suggested three divisions of the American non-official sector:

One may speak of a 'general public' if one keeps in mind that while it is characterized by a sense of identification and reacts to general stimuli, it also contains a variety of interests and groupings which are affected differentially by both general and specific stimuli. Second, there is an 'attentive public' which is informed and interested in foreign policy problems, and which constitutes the audience for the foreign policy discussions among the elites. Third, one may speak of the 'policy and opinion elites', the articulate policy-bearing stratum of the population which gives structure to the public, and which provides the effective means of access to the various groupings. One might almost say 'who mobilizes elites, mobilizes the public.'⁵

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- 1 V.O. Key, Jr., *Public Opinion and American Democracy*, New York, Knopf, 1961, p.7.
 - 2 K. Younger, "Public Opinion and British Foreign Policy", *International Affairs*, vol. 40, no. 1 (January, 1964), p.22.
 - 3 J. Frankel, *The Making of Foreign Policy*, London, Oxford University Press, 1967, p.5.
 - 4 G. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy*, New York, Praeger, 1965, fifth printing, p.137.
 - 5 *ibid.*, p.138.

Although this schema refers to the United States, its application in other western-democratic countries, such as Australia, has been recognized.¹

Despite this useful classification, however, Almond was unable to construct a model by which influence could be measured. And, writing a decade later, Rosenau lamented that:

for some reason no attempt has been made to construct a systematic formulation of the opinion-policy relationship which draws both upon the more durable features of the Almond scheme and on the more recent developments in communications research.²

Rosenau was aware of the problems associated with the measurement of influence,³ and so he deliberately evades the task of measuring it, and merely attempts "to trace the flow of opinions between citizens and office-holders [and] not to describe how one exercises influence over the other".⁴ Thus, as the author admits:

having removed the causal agent from the opinion-policy relationship by side stepping the influence concept, we have probably deprived ourselves of the wherewithal to theorize about the relationship.⁵

Consequently, Rosenau abandons any attempt to formulate an opinion-policy theory, and aims for the less ambitious task of a 'pre-theory.'

Rosenau's technique, then, is to chart the flow of opinion and not the flow of influence, providing a "...descriptive conceptual framework rather than ... a predictive theoretical one."⁶ He was optimistic that, with more research, a theory was not only possible, but inevitable.

1 W.W. Kulski, *International Politics in a Revolutionary Age*, New York, Lippincott, 1968, 2nd rev. ed., p.474.

2 J. Rosenau, *op.cit.*, p.5.

3 *ibid.*, pp.11-12.

4 *ibid.*, p.17.

5 *ibid.*, p.18

6 *loc.cit.*

Rosenau examines various ways in which opinions form, circulate, and are submitted to and perceived by decision-markers, describing the processes involved in the following way:

It is useful to view the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy as being composed of three distinctly different, but closely related, social processes - that is, as three separate systems of interaction between discrete individuals. One is the *governmental decision-making process* through which foreign policy is formulated and into which existing public opinion is integrated by the officials responsible for the conduct of policy (henceforth designated as the decision-makers or policy-makers). Another is the *opinion-submitting process* that occurs whenever opinions are conveyed to or impressed upon decision-makers by individual members or segments of the public (hereafter called the opinion-submitters). And thirdly, there is the *opinion-making process* whereby ideas about foreign policy issues are formed and circulated in American society (through the interaction of what shall be referred to as opinion-holders and opinion-makers, the former being the entire citizenry and the latter those citizens who introduce opinions into the impersonal channels of the communications system).¹

Almond's threefold classification of the public was used as a basic design by Rosenau in *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy*, although he introduced some new elements into the Almond scheme: viz., a motivation-information scale; the notion of an "opinion-making public"; and "attention groups" such as ethnic minorities, not to be confused with the "attentive public". The purpose of these scales is to demonstrate that people "differ widely in the manner and extent of their participation in the opinion-making process".² An "accessibility scale" is invoked to distinguish between "opinion-makers" (Almond's "policy and opinion elites") and "opinion-holders" (Almond's general and attentive public), and the "motivation-information" scale is used to dichotomize "opinion-holders" into a "mass" and an "attentive public". What are the characteristics of the mass, attentive, and opinion-making publics?

1 *ibid.*, pp.19-20.

2 *ibid.*, p.27.

THE MASS PUBLIC

Rosenau describes public opinion in terms of a hierarchical and pyramidal structure; these divisions will not be static, and their borders will expand and retreat with time and issues.

At the base of the pyramid, and comprising the greater part of its volume, is the *mass public*, composed of opinion-holders who have neither the opportunity nor the inclination to participate in the opinion-making process. Members of the mass public, in other words, fall at the lower end of both the accessibility and the motivation-information scales.¹

Estimates of the proportion of the total population will vary from anything between seventy-five and ninety percent.

The primary characteristic of the mass public is lack of interest in foreign affairs, and most commentators would agree with this. Richard Barnet, writing about America's role in the Vietnam War, for example, has said: "...the public is ill-informed on foreign policy issues and for the most part apathetic."²

The second most distinctive characteristic expounded by Rosenau, Almond and others,³ a concomitant of apathy, is that of moodiness. Almond described the "mood theory" in the following way:

The characteristic response to questions of foreign policy is one of indifference. A foreign policy crisis, short of the immediate threat of war, may transform indifference to vague apprehension, to fatalism, to anger; but the reaction is still a mood, a superficial and fluctuating response.⁴

1 *ibid.*, p.33.

2 R. Barnet, *Roots of War*, New York, Atheneum, 1972, p.243. See too, H.L. Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role*, Princeton, N.J., van Nostrand, 1965, p.317.

3 For example, Barnet, *op.cit.*, p.242, and C.D. MacDougall, *Understanding Public Opinion*, Dubuque, Iowa, Brown, 1966, p.562.

4 G. Almond, *op.cit.*, p.53.

Soon after, Walter Lippman spoke of "...this deadly cycle of pacifism and bellicosity...."¹ The fluid nature of the mass public was again noted by Rosenau ten years later:

On the rare occasions when it does awaken from its slumber, the mass public, being no more informed than previously, is impulsive, unstable, unreasoning, unpredictable, capable of suddenly shifting directions at the same time.²

Almond contended that, despite its potentially unstable nature, it is still possible to assess and foretell shifts of mood, because moods are affected by two variables: 1) changes in the domestic and foreign political-economic situation involving the presence or absence of threat in varying degrees, and 2) the characterological predispositions of the population.³

THE ATTENTIVE PUBLIC

In his pyramidal framework, Rosenau places the attentive public near the top of the peak; this category consists of "...opinion-holders who are inclined to participate but lack the access or opportunity to do so."⁴ It is distinguishable from the mass public: firstly, by its much smaller numbers, and secondly, by its qualitatively more informed and structured opinions. In his attempts to chart the flow of opinion, Rosenau sees the attentive public as a link between the mass public and the opinion-making public and, more importantly, as critical observers of the so-called opinion-makers. This role is seen as crucial on the more technical and obscure issues where the mass public will take a negligible interest.

The attentive public will fill the audiences of public debate on foreign affairs; form the membership - but not the leadership - of civic

1 W. Lippman, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in the United States*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1952, p.28.

2 J. Rosenau, *op.cit.*, p.36.

3 G. Almond, *op.cit.*, p.54.

4 J. Rosenau, *op.cit.*, p.33.

organizations where foreign policy is discussed: business associations, trade unions, and interest groups; and submit opinions - usually by letter - to the decision-makers. The attentive public is seen as reflecting, representing, and reinforcing the opinions of the mass public; it:

introduces a more effective measure of democratic control into the opinion-policy relationship than does the mass public. If the latter sets the outer limits beyond which policy choices cannot be made, then the former can be said to determine the inner limits within which the opinion-policy relationship operates.¹

According to Almond's mood theory, the attentive public is also subject to mood fluctuations, although they do not persist for long. Improved educational facilities at all levels, especially in tertiary and adult fields, and an increase in international interdependence,² particularly modern communications, are factors which are likely to contribute to a growth in the size of the attentive public. These comments are equally applicable to Australia, and at least one academic observer recognized the desirability of such a group some time ago:

In the last resort, a distinctively Australian foreign policy must surely rest on at least a substantial informed minority of the democratic community in whose name the policy is conducted.³

THE ELITE PUBLIC

At the apex of the pyramidal representation of public opinion is the "elite public" or what Rosenau calls the "opinion-making public". It is important that the basic terms are defined precisely as much of my criticism is based on nomenclature. What then is the elite public? Snyder

1 *ibid.*, p.41.

2 O. Young, "Interdependencies in World Politics", *International Journal*, vol. 24, (1968-1969), pp.735 and 738.

3 F. Alexander, "Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, July - December, 1955", *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, vol. 1, no. 2, (May, 1956), p.154.

and Furniss talked of an "effective public" which they saw as:

those individuals and groups who are the nation's opinion leaders because they strongly 'influence', as well as 'articulate' and 'represent', the opinions of the mass public and because they have various types of access to the policy-making process and to policy makers.¹

Rosenau rejects the terms "elite" and "effective"; he prefers the term "opinion-makers". For him opinion-makers are those members of society who:

occupy positions which enable them regularly to transmit, either locally or nationally, opinions about any issue to unknown persons outside of their occupational field or about more than one class of issues to unknown professional colleagues.²

Rosenau does not, however, propose a radically different segment than the one suggested by Snyder and Furniss; only the nomenclature has changed.

As mentioned above, Rosenau eschewed the task of tracing the flow on influence and opted for the less ambitious project of tracing the flow of opinion. His stated paramount aim was to provide a conceptual framework for the description of relations between the public and the policy-makers, describing the interaction between the three publics in the following way:

Both decision-makers and opinion-holders look to the opinion-making public - the latter for guidance on possible attitudes toward broad issues, and the former for cues as to the particular choices upon which their day-to-day deliberations might be based....while the mass and attentive publics set the outer and inner limits of the opinion-policy relationship, the opinion-making public determines its structure and content within these limits.³

Rosenau's discussion is not only concerned with the flow of opinions from the elite public upwards to the decision-makers but also the downward flow

1 R.L. Snyder and E.S. Furniss, Jr., *American Foreign Policy*, New York, Rinehart, 1954, p.525. Emphasis added.

2 J. Rosenau, *op.cit.*, p.45.

3 *ibid.*, p.72.

of opinions to the attentive and mass publics. Does a categorisation of the elite public help us better understand the complexities of public opinion? Two typologies will be presented.

One classification of foreign policy elites distinguishes between four elite groups: the "political elites" are those public officials, usually elected, who play an active part in the decision-making process itself such as Cabinet members and, to a lesser extent, members of the foreign affairs committees of Congress and the parties; the "administrative" or "bureaucratic elites" which consist of those members of the public service departments that have a close or allied interest in foreign policy; the "interest elites" which include the leaders or representatives of the plethora of non-governmental associations, both national and local, which take an active interest, although usually confined to specialized fields of foreign affairs; and finally, the "communications elites" which comprise those people who are specialists in communication, such as the owners and commentators of the media - press, radio, television, and possibly cinema.¹

A more detailed attempt at elite classification is provided by Rosenau. Using the notion of the "accessibility scale", he introduces two dimensions to differentiate four types of opinion-makers: a "geographic" dimension draws a distinction between national and local opinion-makers, a "functional" dimension shows that there are multi- and single-issue opinion-makers. Thus, a four-fold matrix results : national multi-issue opinion-makers, national single-issue opinion-makers, local multi-issue opinion-makers, and local single-issue opinion-makers.

1 G. Almond, *op.cit.*, pp.139-140

By adding a third dimension to these four divisions - occupational type - it is possible to draw up a typology consisting of sixteen different types of opinion-makers. There are four occupational categories: governmental, associational, institutional, individual; the groups are not mutually exclusive, the sub-categorization serving to demonstrate the "diversity and fragmentariness"¹ of the opinion-making public.

TYPOLOGY OF OPINION-MAKERS: AUSTRALIA

OCCUPATIONAL	NATIONAL MULTI-ISSUE	NATIONAL SINGLE-ISSUE	LOCAL MULTI-ISSUE	LOCAL SINGLE-ISSUE
GOVERNMENTAL	Senator	Chairman ABC	State Parliamentarian	Warden of Port Authority
ASSOCIATIONAL	RSL Executive Member	Director, Aust. Inst. Int. Aff.	RSL State Exec. Member	Chairman, farm wholesale co.
INSTITUTIONAL	University Chancellor	Sir Reginald Ansett	President, Chamber of Commerce	Director, city store (large)
INDIVIDUAL	Newspaper Journalist (well known)	Demographer		State Univer- sity Academic

According to this schema,² it is clear that only a very small percentage of the total population is included: approximately one percent. Decision-makers are also seen by Rosenau as opinion-makers:

Of course, the main governmental opinion-makers are the federal officials who are responsible for the formulation and conduct of foreign policy ...and who are therefore able to shift between decision-making and opinion-making roles.³

Having presented the major themes, contentions, and conclusions of Almond and Rosenau, it is now intended to criticize them.

1 J. Rosenau, *op.cit.*, p.71.

2 I am indebted to P.J. Boyce for the examples used in this chart.

3 J. Rosenau, *op.cit.*, p.60.

II

What follows is essentially a critique of some of the research methods and conclusions reached by Almond and Rosenau but it would be doing a disservice to these writers not to preface these criticisms with the comment that they have been stimulating forces in the academic world. More specifically, it should be noted that whatever the deficiencies in his methods, Almond made a significant contribution by recognizing and articulating the fallacy of the Wilsonian ideal whereby all members of the electorate were presumed to be equally interested and informed about foreign policy issues;¹ Almond's segmental division of American society was the result. Before reviewing the postulates propounded by both Almond and Rosenau, especially the pyramidal divisions and the "mood theory", a few general comments should be made.

The search for theoretical explanations of political behaviour is undoubtedly a worthwhile exercise, with potential beneficial repercussions for the foreign policy-making process. But one is left with the feeling that much of the theory-building in the social sciences, which has taken place - especially in the USA - since the 1950's, has been based on the rather dubious notion that if one can find a new way of describing any political phenomena then one has contributed substantially to one's discipline. If this criticism is valid, then James Rosenau would seem to be especially culpable.² Many of his terms are little more than pretentious, sometimes misleading, jargon; for instance, in his use of the word "scale",

1 R. Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, New York, Delta, 1967, p.542.

2 This proclivity is also evident in later works, see his *National Leadership and Foreign Policy*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1963; "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy", in R.B. Farrell (ed.), *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics*, Evanston, North Western University Press, 1966; and *Linkage Politics* (ed.), New York, Free Press, 1969.

Rosenau does not present any measureable gradation, which one would normally expect in the application of that word. Similarly, the "memorandummatic" media is used to describe memoranda as one channel of organisational opinion circulation. Thus, while I think it wholly admirable that political interaction should be categorized so that we might more readily identify and observe such behaviour, one is less impressed when this classification is placed behind the "smoke screen of jargon".¹

Since this dissertation is concerned with the measurement of public opinion in relation to certain issues of foreign policy affecting Australians, the following critique is directed more to what Almond and Rosenau have to say about the structure of public opinion than to the flow of opinion between the decision-makers and the various publics, although it will be necessary to make substantial reference to the latter in order to justify objections concerning the former.

Rosenau's attempt to formulate a 'pre-theory' rather than a 'theory', more particularly, to trace the flow of opinions rather than to describe influence, is clear evidence of the inherent difficulties of measuring the relationship between rulers and ruled. However, even with respect to the less ambitious objective of describing the boundaries and characteristics of the segments of the public, Rosenau's analysis leaves much to be desired. Rosenau's invocation of the "accessibility scale" to distinguish between "opinion-makers" (Almond's "policy and opinion elites") and "opinion holders" (Almond's general and attentive public) is subject to doubt not only because the so-called scale is in fact not a scale in the normal usage of the word, but also because Rosenau seems to be drawing a spurious distinction, as the two groups

¹ S. Andreski, *Social Sciences as Sorcery*, London, Andre Deutsch, 1973, pp.59-88.

are not mutually exclusive. Similar objections can be raised about the "motivation-information" scale, which is used to dichotomize "opinion-holders" into the "mass" and "attentive public". Thus, two questions need to be asked at this point: firstly, to what extent can public opinion be measured on key issues of foreign policy using the pyramidal structure provided by Rosenau, and secondly, how accurately does this compartmentalisation represent the true nature of public opinion?

THE MASS PUBLIC

When Almond says that the mass public's "characteristic response to questions of foreign policy is one of indifference", few in the academic world would wish to dispute the point. Academic opinion in Australia certainly shares this view.

At least one pre-war observer was highly critical of the Australian public, which he found "often bewilderingly confused and hopelessly vague in the conclusions it reaches about foreign countries..."¹ Despite World War II, there persisted a high degree of ignorance among Australian men and women about the New Guinea area.² Opinion polls provide further evidence of a sometimes abysmal lack of interest in foreign affairs; some Gallup surveys, for example, have recorded percentages of 40, and even above, of people with "no opinion" or who are "undecided".³ T.B. Miller has stated more recently that:

tests have shown that in Australia as elsewhere
the great majority of the people know and care

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- 1 E.J.B. Foxcroft, "The Australian Press and the USSR", in W. McMahon Ball (ed.), *Press, Radio and World Affairs*, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1938, p.56.
 - 2 D. Aitkin and E.P. Wolfers, "Australian Attitudes Towards the Papua New Guinea Area Since World War II", *Australian Outlook*, vol. 27, no. 2, (August, 1973), p.204.
 - 3 See also, "Who Cares?", in H. Mayer (ed.), *Australian Politics, A Reader*, Melbourne, Cheshire, 2 ed., 1968, p.177.

very little about the world, about foreign places and peoples, situations and issues.¹

And, although Millar warns against "scientific assessment of public opinions...",² the polls continue to underscore a disturbingly low political awareness in Australia, for both domestic and foreign issues.

Such broad criticisms, however, are misleading to the extent that they fail to appreciate that there will be different areas and levels of interest. Rosenau was right in identifying "attention groups", such as ethnic minorities. Thus, while Croatian immigrants will have little interest in, say, Australia's relations with South Africa, they will follow closely events in the Balkans and, in particular, Yugoslavia. This latent interest manifested itself in 1973 at the time of the ASIO-Croat terrorist episode. More recent examples have been the active interest in government activity of immigrants from Cyprus and the Baltic states of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, which resulted respectively from the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the decision of the Australian Government to grant "de jure" recognition to Moscow's claim to sovereignty over the three Baltic states. Clear evidence of this participation is the increase in the number of public meetings held and the number of letters to the editor of newspapers. Similarly, farmers will take an active interest in tariff policy, but would pay scant attention to events in Cyprus or to Australian policies on Yugoslavia and the Baltic states.

The mood responses of the mass public was the second major characteristic described first by Almond and adhered to by many others. This proposition, however, has many shortcomings, and it is a central concern of the case studies to demonstrate the inapplicability of this

1 T.B. Millar, *Foreign Policy*, Melbourne, Georgian House, 1972, p.77.

2 *loc.cit.*

theory to the Australian public. The theory is, moreover, subject to serious analytical and methodological deficiencies, which will now be examined.

The foremost criticism of the mood theory is that while it recognizes that the 'general public' "contains a variety of interests and groupings which are affected differentially by both general and specific stimuli",¹ these variant responses seem to have been underestimated. But the mood theory assumes too much homogeneity of response to matters of foreign affairs. The multiplicity of sub-groups within a population makes this improbable: young people will have a different view of the world from older people by virtue of their different historical experiences; Catholics will see foreign affairs through different eyes from Protestants; the lower income earner will have different social values and priorities from the upper income earner; the well educated person from the less- or poorly-educated person; the city dweller from the rural dweller and men from women; furthermore, in a country which is spread over three million square miles, regional differences could arise. The differences of opinion within these varied population sub-groups, however, do not presage mood responses to foreign policy issues; they are not inconsistent with stability. Thus, it may be more precise to speak of the "opinions of the public"² or "mass publics"³ rather than "mass public", or indeed, "public opinion". This is not to deny, nonetheless, that there are shared values and such a thing as a predominant public opinion, but this should be described more accurately as "majority opinion."

Almond contends that despite the unstable moods of the mass public, it is nonetheless possible to predict shifts in the public mood. On this

1 G. Almond, *op.cit.*, p.138; see too p.68.

2 D.O. Verrall, "Press Reporting of Foreign News", unpublished B.A. Honours thesis, University of Adelaide, 1968, p.12.

3 My term

point, however, Rosenau is in conflict with Almond, stating that the masses are not only impulsive, unstable, unreasoning, but also unpredictable.¹ Almond's claim, that by examining the "psycho-cultural" characteristics or "characterological predispositions" of the public and the prevailing foreign and domestic political-economic situation it is possible to foretell shifts of mood, is dubious. Thus, it is maintained that the mass public will be less favourably disposed to overseas commitments if the domestic economy is not flourishing.² This conclusion, however, is not at all obvious, since changing economic conditions will have differing degrees of impact on the many socio-economic, demographic, and regional sections of the public.

Almond's mood theory is also suspect because of the research methods employed, but this has not prevented several subsequent writers on public opinion from borrowing the concept.³ A major attack on the theory was made by William R. Caspary in the June 1970 issue of the *American Political Science Review*. Caspary's criticisms focused on the empirical research methods used by Almond. In contrast to Almond, he concluded: "that American public opinion is characterized by a *strong* and *stable* permissive mood toward international involvements."⁴ In other words, Americans have had a steady and generally favourable predisposition to American overseas commitments and not, as Almond suggests, a wavering attitude oscillating between isolationism and interventionism. Almond's mood theory did take account of periods of stability; his concept of the "permissive mood" allowed for

1 J. Rosenau, *op.cit.*, p.36.

2 See also, W.E. Miller, "Socio-Economic Analysis of Political Behaviour," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, vol.11, (1958), pp.239-55, and V.O. Key, *op.cit.*, pp.161-3.

3 Apart from Rosenau, Childs, Kulski, MacDougall, and Barnet, see also M.C. Needler, *Understanding Foreign Policy*, New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1966, p.23; E.S. Furniss, Jr., and R.C. Snyder, *An Introduction to American Foreign Policy*, N.Y., Rinehart, 1955, p.198; B.C. Cohen, *The Political Process and Foreign Policy*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1957, p.55.

4 W.J. Caspary, "The 'Mood Theory': A Study of Public Opinion and Foreign Policy", *American Political Science Review*, vol. 64, no. 2 (June, 1970), p.546.

prolonged internationalist policies if they were accompanied by a strong and determined government. This permissive mood should be seen:

...as a particular characteristic of the Cold War situation in which the threat of the Soviet Union at least temporarily forces Americans to accept international commitments.¹

And underlying this permissive mood was a strong, omnipresent undercurrent of opinion in favour of withdrawal. The permissive mood idea, however, appears as the catch-all phrase. Indeed, the concept seems a partial admission of stability.

The difference in interpretation is explained by the use of poll data which asked dissimilar questions. By analyzing poll data that asked: "Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs, or if we stay out of world affairs?" Caspary was able to show a "remarkable stability for an active US role in world affairs."² Almond, however, rejected this type of question because of its emotional overtones. He based his mood theory on poll data which asked: "what do you regard as the most important problem before the American people today?" Almond argued that the open-ended question is a more reliable indicator than the "yes-no" type which, he felt, could place the respondent under some pressure to give an answer that might be acceptable to the interviewer. This is impossible to tell, of course, although in Almond's defence, the question asked by Caspary does not differentiate between the ways the USA could be active in world affairs: it might be diplomatic, cultural, economic or military.

Caspary's second criticism centres on Almond's use of the "mention-of-international-problems" question as an indicator of "attention" or "interest". Almond bases his notion of instability on the belief that for

1 *ibid.*, p.537.

2 *ibid.*, p.536.

the American people the characteristic response to issues of foreign policy is indifference, and, because of the public's paucity of "intellectual" knowledge, interest will wax and wane according to varying perceptions of external threat and the "extraordinary pulls" of the domestic environment. Caspary finds this presumption invalid. Using poll questionnaires that asked factual questions, a fairly reliable guide to attentiveness, he persuasively demonstrates "...that but for all but the very least attentive respondents an increase in mention of international problems is not likely to be associated with an increase in attentiveness."¹ He shows that even where international problems show a decline in importance on Gallup scales, National Opinion Research data reveals no change of interest in the UN:

This indicates stability of attention to international affairs at a time when domestic events appear to have been exerting a great pull on people's attention.²

An Australian study conducted in 1969 seems to complement Caspary's conclusion:

...the lack of prominence of the Vietnam war as a stated determinant of voting is not due to 'apathy' or to a lack of interest in the war. On the contrary, an AGP poll early in 1968 found that the war was most frequently named as the subject on which [respondents] sought information from news media.³

Thus the evidence from which Almond infers instability is questionable.

Perhaps Caspary's strongest argument is that mention-of-international-problems is not necessarily related to either an isolationist or an interventionist position. Thus, although some respondents may consider, say, Communist aggression in South-east Asia as the most important problem facing Americans, they may consider isolation as the best policy, whereas they may have been coded as internationalist, since it is usually assumed that if one perceives an aggressive force, then one must counter it.

¹ *ibid.*, p.541.

² *loc.cit.*

³ D.W. Rawson, "The Vietnam War and the Australian Party System", *Australian Outlook*, vol. 23, no. 1 (April 1969), p.62.

ATTENTIVE PUBLIC

According to Almond's mood theory, the attentive public is also subject to mood changes, although they do not persist for long. While it seems reasonable to say, as Almond and Rosenau do, that the attentive public will have well-reasoned and well-structured opinions, it does not necessarily follow that those with attentive opinions will change any less than those who hold opinions without "intellectual structure".¹

Indeed,

it may be that individuals within the attentive public, who are more likely to be aware of new information, because of their greater interest, are more likely to change their opinion.²

Thus, it could well be that it is the attentive public which displays mood fluctuations, and not the mass public.

While the existence of such a group is not in dispute, its precise character and composition is so nebulous as to defy any assessment of what the opinions of the attentive public might be on a certain issue over a given period of time. Nonetheless, various attempts have been made to define and identify this public. One index of the quantitative composition of the attentive public might be the readership of the quality press. Rosenau estimates that, on this basis, the attentive public "...is probably no larger than 10 per cent of the population, and possibly much smaller."³ Mayer has estimated that in Australia "rational readers"⁴ - those that read newspapers for their informative and interpretive value - comprise ten to fifteen percent of the total number of newspaper readers.⁵

1 G. Almond, *op.cit.*, p.56.

2 D. Verrall, *op.cit.*, pp.17-18.

3 J. Rosenau, *op.cit.*, p.40.

4 P. Kimball, "People without Papers", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 23, no. 3 (1954), p.394. Rational readers are different from those who seek "non-rational gratifications" from papers.

5 H. Mayer, *The Press in Australia*, Melbourne, Lansdowne, 1964, p.259.

There seems a *prima facie* case for saying that newspaper letter-writers belong to the attentive public group. However, the exceptions to this general comment make one very chary about doing content analyses of letters-to-the-editor columns as a means of determining how the attentive public is thinking on a given issue: these letters might quite conceivably come from people representing the three levels of the public opinion pyramid. Moreover, bias in the selection of letters for publication is not unknown in the Australian press. And, as with the mass public, there will be considerable heterogeneity in this public:

The degree of their interest and involvement does not extend evenly over the whole foreign policy area. The businessman involved in international commerce, the campaigner for human rights, the schoolteacher teaching "world affairs", will focus on concerns which overlap only rarely.¹

One feasible method of measuring the opinion of the attentive public might be through an investigation of interest groups and pressure groups,² and indeed, this approach has been used to good effect by some writers.³ But here again there are analytical problems, such as separating the views of the rank-and-file from the leadership of such organizations, as such discrepancies of opinion are not uncommon; obtaining accurate membership figures, since many of the attentive public protest groups meet only in public places, and there will always be a tendency for the protesting group to exaggerate the number of supporters they have; and measuring these views over an extended period of time, because most public protest movements are short-lived, or spasmodic, in their activities.

It can be seen, then, that there are analytical problems of measurement, both in terms of size and charting changing opinions over a

1 W. Wallace, *Foreign Policy and the Political Process*, London, MacMillan, 1971, p.44.

2 J.E. Mueller, *War, Presidents and Public Opinion*, New York, Wiley, 1973, p.161.

3 H. Albinski, *Politics and Foreign Policy in Australia*, The impact of Vietnam and conscription, Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1970.

lengthy period of time, which preclude, for a dissertation of this kind, assessment of Australia's attentive public.

THE ELITE PUBLIC

The cardinal weakness of this category is the misleading nomenclature, which assumes too much and says too little. The primary objection concerns Rosenau's use of the term "opinion-making public": the term implies that this public is the only determinant of opinion formation and, moreover, disproportionate weighting is given to the significance of the opinion-forming influences that are described.

Apart from its obvious looseness, the major weakness of the typology of opinion-makers shown above is that it fails to accurately portray the role of decision-makers as opinion-makers, although this role is recognized.¹ Indeed, by admitting that governments play an intrinsic part in the so-called opinion-making public, Rosenau has perhaps signed the death-warrant for the term, for, by definition, the government cannot be a component part of public opinion. It appears that Rosenau is too uncritical in his appraisal of governments as opinion-makers. That is to say, the more seamy side of government is overlooked. As an exemplar of this assertion, in an attempt to elicit public support for overseas adventures, the US Government has "...consistently communicated a much more alarmist picture to the public."² Much of the rhetoric of the Cold War might be seen in this light, and the Vietnam War exacerbated the trend. The *Pentagon Papers*,³ for example, spoke of the need to 'educate' the public: democratic government have developed sophisticated and subtle

1 J. Rosenau, *op.cit.*, p.60, quoted above.

2 R. Barnet, *op.cit.*, p.263.

3 Neil Sheehan, et.al., *The Pentagon Papers*, New York, Bantam, 1971.

techniques to 'manipulate' the public and even elite opinion.¹ This ability of a determined government to "lead public opinion, not just to follow it",² should not be underestimated, as Rosenau seems to. One American observer of the Korean and Vietnam wars described this as the "follower mentality".³ This is not to say, however, that public opinion is incapable of moving in different directions to the government.

Concluding this point, Rosenau's opinion-making public loses credibility because he puts decision-makers in a public opinion category - a definitional impossibility, and because the typology misrepresents the activities of the decision-makers in their opinion forming roles.

It is now intended to show that there are opinion forming influences below the "opinion-making public", which not only casts serious doubts on the operational utility of this public opinion category, but also provides further evidence contrary to the mood theory.

As was mentioned above, the term "opinion-making public" suggests that opinion formation is confined to such factors as those illustrated in the typology of opinion-makers presented above. However, the more general literature on the psychological bases of opinion formation⁴ have pointed to other factors; for example, Lane and Sears, in a valuable analysis of public opinion, drawing on psychological and sociological studies, concluded that:

Most opinions seems to be formed from social referents; parents serve as referents for the child, and later on, group norms seem to guide

1 R. Barnet, *op.cit.*, pp.293-6.

2 R. Nixon, quoted in Frankel, *op.cit.*, p.75.

3 J.E. Mueller, *op.cit.*, pp.122-140.

4 See, for example, L. Festinger, S. Schacter, and K. Back, *Social Pressures in Informal Groups*, New York, Harper, 1950; and A. Campbell et.al., *The American Voter*, New York, Wiley, 1960.

many citizens toward the formulation of opinions on unfamiliar issues.¹

According to Herbert Kelman, there is now an "emerging field" called the "social psychology of international relations",² which tends to emphasise stability in international image patterns.³ Lane and Sears, moreover, observed that there is a variety of sources of resistance to opinion change such as individual inflexibility and pride, derived from childhood values,⁴ peer group influences, and other factors. This point has significant implications for the mood theory which says that there will be great instability of opinion on issues of foreign policy, and although it must be conceded that people will rely on governments and media and other opinion makers to a greater extent for foreign affairs than domestic, this does not invalidate the proposition that social reference points will be significant factors in opinion formation. The following cases in fact provide evidence that this is so: the sub-group breakdowns are based on the assumption that social referents are significant determinants of foreign policy behaviour. Thus, the notion of an "opinion-making public" loses much of its acceptability because it neglects the possible influence of social reference points.

It has been shown that it is misleading to describe the elite members of the public as the "opinion-making public", because, by definition,

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- 1 R.E. Lane and D.O. Sears, *Public Opinion*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Prentice-Hall, 1964, p.74.
 - 2 H.C. Kelman, "Social-Psychological Approaches to the Study of International Relations", in H.C. Kelman (ed.), *International Behaviour*, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965, p.14.
 - 3 See especially R.A. Levine, "Socialization, Social Structure, and Inter-societal Images"; and W.A. Scott, "Psychological and Social Correlates of International Images", in H.C. Kelman (ed.), *ibid.* Cf. D. Smith, "Mass Communications and International Image Change", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 17, no. 1 (March, 1973).
 - 4 For an account of a sample of Australian children see R.W. Connell, *The Child's Construction of Politics*, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1971.

it is impossible to classify the decision-makers in a public opinion category. Additionally, Rosenau's opinion-making public inadequately describes the role of government, and overlooks other opinion forming influences, which constitute stabilizing forces in the formation of foreign policy opinions.

Of the three publics, the elite presents the least difficulty in terms of measuring its opinions, but since this sector comprises about one percent of the public, this is of little advantage in an exercise concerned with the measurement of public opinion.

This chapter has been an attempt to describe and appraise some of the major theoretical contributions to the theory of public opinion and foreign policy, and to provide the background to the methods employed and the hypotheses tested in the examination of Australian public opinion which follows. It has been shown that any attempts to measure the relationship between the public and the decision-makers are doomed to analytical failure: the theoretical problems arising from the task of describing, explaining, and predicting the opinion-policy relationship are prohibitive. However, if there is a high degree of compatibility between the foreign policies of successive Australian governments and the opinions of the majority of the Australian people, then this suggests that public opinion is a major influence in foreign policy decision-making, if only in the negative sense of setting the 'outer limits' to government initiative. The paramount concern of this thesis, however, is to measure Australian opinion, and even on this score the literature is unable to provide a highly defensible theoretical framework. The pyramidal representation of public opinion was found to be not only unsuitable as a means of measuring opinion, but also many analytical and methodological weaknesses were uncovered.

The major shortcoming of the works examined was the assumption that, for the general public, foreign policy responses will be effected universally, or nearly so, and that by the very nature of the mass of the people, these responses will be characterised by long periods of apathy interspersed with bouts of tempestuous and capricious mood changes, alternating variously between isolationism and interventionism, idealism and cynicism, pessimism and optimism, superiority and inferiority, tolerance and intolerance. The central theoretical undertaking of the case studies, then, will be to rebut the mood theory as having any valid prescriptive value for Australian public opinion.

The methodological deficiencies of the research method employed in analyzing Australian public opinion were raised in the Introduction. At this point, the obvious theoretical defects of this technique should be mentioned.

Survey research data are limited in that they are guilty of committing the Wilsonian fallacy, which assumes uniform information and interest levels throughout the voting public, and, as we have already seen, this is not so. This caveat notwithstanding, it is now intended to examine detailed poll findings, dealing firstly with the "general public" or "majority opinion", and secondly with the detailed breakdowns of the socio-demographic¹ sub-groups. The case studies will show, among other things, that the opinions of Australians have not oscillated between opposing poles such as isolation and intervention; indeed, it will be seen that since about 1950 majority opinion has been in favour of a dependent internationalist stance and that there has been considerable stability in the holding of such attitudes. It is inertia and slowness to change which have been

1 This term is used loosely to denote all the variables used in the Gallup detailed tabulations.

criticized by many Australian academics and journalists - not cyclical fluctuations of unstable moods. Nonetheless, Australians have changed certain opinions, although, to repeat, these changes have been slow and steady: they have become more critical of overseas involvements, namely, Vietnam; they have shown a greater readiness to accept China as a political reality; they have moved away from total reliance on a great power protector; and have rejected the goal of a pure 'White Australia'.

CHAPTER THREE

VIETNAM

Vietnam occupies a central place in any analysis of post-war Australian foreign policy, and perhaps no other issue has aroused so much intense public interest and involvement. It therefore provides a fitting take-off point for this quantitative assessment of Australian public opinion.

I THE GENERAL PUBLIC: 1965-1972

Close scrutiny of poll information positively suggests that some conventional wisdoms should be turned on their heads. The primary purpose of the following section is to provide a broad profile of Australian attitudes to Vietnam as reflected by Gallup poll data during the period between the commitment of Australian troops in 1965 to their withdrawal in 1972. In analyzing the broad trends it is intended to show that the mood theory first propounded by Gabriel Almond, and endorsed by successive academic writers, is inapplicable to the Australian situation. Almond's contention was that general trends in public opinion are not discernible, and that public opinion is noted for its highly excitable and inconsistent cyclical fluctuations from support to opposition for international commitments. The conclusion derived from Australian Gallup Poll data suggests almost the antithesis to the mood theory; majority opinion showed a steady diminution of support for the war effort from what has been called, in an American context,

"inattentive tolerance" in the initial stages to a "progressive disillusionment",¹ but it was at all times moderate. Table 3.1 shows the broad trend in majority opinion from 1965 to 1971.

Table 3.1 : Australian Opinion and the Vietnam
Commitment ²

	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
Continue	56	61	62	54*49**	40	50	37
Withdraw	28	27	24	38 37	55	37	48
No opinion	16	12	14	8 14	5	13	15

* October

** December

With some minor changes, the question asked by Gallup was: "Do you think we should continue to fight in Vietnam or should we bring our forces back to Australia?". This question, however, does not take precise account of the "mistake question"; that is to say, respondents may have felt that the war in Vietnam was a mistake, and they were opposed - morally or otherwise - to it, but they may have favoured temporary continuation of the war,³ for such reasons as not wishing to offend the Americans, which

- 1 P.E. Converse and H. Schumann, "'Silent Majorities' and the Vietnam War" *Scientific Journal*, vol. 222, no. 6 (June 1970), p.19. Cf. A. Watt, "Australians at War in Vietnam: Public Unease and Uncertainty", *The Round Table* no. 224 (October, 1966), esp. p.356.
- 2 The most commonly used detailed Gallup tabulations for this chapter are: APOP, no. 179, 24 September 1965; no. 185, 17 September 1966; no. 190, 19 May 1967; no. 200, 19 October 1968; no. 201, 21 December 1968; no. 203, 18 April 1969; no. 210, 4 April 1970; no. 218, 10 April 1971.
- 3 Converse and Schumann found that "among those who viewed the war as a mistake almost as many favored escalation as were for withdrawal!", *op.cit.*, p.20.

might result from a precipitate withdrawal. Thus, the succinct characterization of opponents of the war as "doves" and "hawks" is a misleading one.

There were other questions asked which show in general terms the majority attitudes of Australians, such as approval or disapproval of the troop commitment in 1965, and, as the war became entrenched, attitudes to withdrawal. For many Australians, the conscription debate was juxtaposed to the Vietnam embroilment; but it can be misleading to extrapolate opinions about the war from such questions. This methodological problem notwithstanding, it is hoped that a fairly reliable picture of the evolution of Australian majority opinion towards Vietnam will emerge.

No one can doubt that "Vietnam [was] the biggest single issue in Australian defence and foreign policy", from 1965 to 1972, and was "at the core of the argument in Australia over conscription, forward defence in South-East Asia and the American alliance".¹ The significance of Vietnam vis-à-vis domestic issues is not clear, and it is not my intention to provide any answers, although the poll data do provide some highly suggestive information.² Another reason for choosing Vietnam is that it is possible to gain some insight into the attitudes of Australians to war.

1 B. Grant, "Now the Roles are Reversed", in D. Pettitt (ed.), *Selected Readings in Australian Foreign Policy*, Toorak, Vic., Sorrett, 1973, p.23; Age, 15 November 1972.

2 Gallup findings in 1966 and 1967, suggest that, while Vietnam and conscription were the most contentious foreign policy issues, domestic issues such as education, hospital and medical benefits, housing, and pensions were seen as more important electoral issues by the Australian people. Similar results were found to a different question in 1969; see APOP, no. 185, 17 September 1966, no. 194, 18 November 1967, and no. 204, 21 June 1969.

Australia's large-scale combat involvement in Vietnam commenced with the announcement by the Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies, on 29 April 1965, that Australia would send a battalion of combat troops to assist the American effort, which had been escalated early in 1965 with the bombing of North Vietnam. Menzies justified the comment in the following terms:

The takeover of South Vietnam would be a direct military threat to Australia and all the countries of South and South East Asia. It must be seen as part of a thrust by Communist China between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.¹

This official justification has been vigorously disputed, however. Many critics would agree that the decision was made primarily "...to show our solidarity with the United States."² According to a Gallup poll taken in May 1965, most people approved sending the battalion of 800 Australian troops to Vietnam: 52% of the sample approved the decision, 37% disapproved, and 11% were undecided. Alan Watt wrote in 1966 that the decision:

...was not automatically accepted by the Australian community with the same indifference or lack of serious questioning as many earlier statements on defence issues... [and there was] ... much uneasiness and uncertainty.³

Although the 52% support suggests that Watt has overestimated the extent of public opposition to the enlarged troop commitment, his comment does point to the acrimonious debate which had preceded the announcement; and certainly there was not the "overwhelming majority"⁴ for the escalation that was recorded in the USA. These early Vietnam results

1 CPD, (H.ofR.), 29 April 1965, vol. 45, p.1061.

2 B. Grant, *Labor in Power*, Melbourne, Victorian Fabian Pamphlet, 22 (1972), p.10.

3 Watt, *loc.cit.*

4 W. Rostow, *The Diffusion of Power*, New York, Macmillan, 1972, p.480.

provide some supportive evidence for the "follower mentality"¹, the notion that many people take their foreign policy cues from the nation's leaders - irrespective of party - usually the President, or in Australia's case, the Prime Minister. Evidence of this, although admittedly tenuous, can be found in a poll conducted in April 1961; people were asked:

If American forces go to Laos - a small country in Asia between China and Thailand - to fight the Communists, do you think Australian soldiers and airmen should, or should not, also go there?²

The results of the poll are contained in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2 : The Commitment of Australian Forces to Indochina

	Vietnam (May 1965)	Laos (April 1961)
Approve	52%	41%
Disapprove	37	43
Undecided	11	16

It seems not unreasonable to suggest that since in the world view of most Australians there is little to differentiate between Laos and Vietnam, then a swing of 11 percent in favour of an overseas commitment might perhaps be attributable to the Prime Minister's announcement. This analysis, however, does not give due emphasis to the increased public prominence given to Indochina since 1961. I will come back to the follower mentality below.

1 J. Mueller, *op.cit.*, p.122.

2 APOP, 1515-1530, March-May 1961.

The results of other poll questions asked in May 1965¹ suggest further explanations for the majority opinion at the time. In answer to a question whether American forces should remain in Vietnam, 64% expressed their approval, 20% disapproved, and 16% were undecided. Another question which asked what would happen to Thailand and Malaysia if the United States left Vietnam, 64% thought that they would be taken over by other countries, while only 16% said that they would remain as they were, with 20% undecided. To a final question which asked: Do you think Australia would eventually be in danger from China if the United States pulled out of Asia?, 72% answered yes, 16% no, and 20% were undecided. These findings point to anti-communism as a source of the early pro-war consensus, and the pervasiveness of this attitude was to expand. Anti-communism and the Asian threat mentality were not, however, the only determinants of opinion; a recognition of the desirability for ingratiation with the American allies, a rally-round-the-flag or "help our boys" syndrome are but two of the multifarious ingredients that went in to building up a pro-war majority opinion.

In July 1965, just two months after the first major poll on the commitment, the percentage in favour of the Australian commitment had risen from 52% to 59%.

Table 3.3 : The Commitment of Australian Forces to Vietnam in 1965

	May	July
Right to send	52%	59%
Wrong	37	27
Undecided	11	14

1 APOP, 1820-1835, March-June 1965.

There are at least three feasible explanations for this increase: the first is that the "two-step flow" had taken effect. This process is one whereby media messages reach the majority of the population, not directly from the news media sources themselves, that is, Menzies' initial announcement, but through "opinion leaders" such as friends, relatives, co-workers and so on who, having heard or read the news report first-hand "retail" it to people with whom they have contact. Naturally, this involves time.¹ A second possible explanation for this, and subsequent higher approval ratings, might be the follower effect mentioned above; that is, the mere fact of the Prime Minister announcing that the Vietnam commitment was imperative induced a proportion of the population to adopt a favourable attitude to the sending of the troops. And a third explanation could be that the average Australian, initially uncertain of the prudence of the commitment, may have lost his ambivalence at the sight of anti-war demonstrators, especially when the bulk of them were perceived, even if they may not have been, as militant, perhaps communist, trade unionists, irresponsible university students, and others who were possibly seen as Australia's flotsam and jetsam. Whatever the explanation, it is clear that by late 1965 a substantial and seemingly growing majority of Australians approved the commitment of Australians troops to Vietnam.

In 1966, the federal election provided a focus for the Vietnam War, and election statements by Mr Holt made it clear that the government was not so much concerned with the preservation of the South Vietnamese Government, nor South Vietnam itself, but rather with the continuation of an American presence there. The Liberal leader attempted at every opportunity to present the Labor Party's opposition to the war as

¹ See Lane and Sears, *op.cit.*, pp.38-9.

opposition to the American alliance. He told one Brisbane audience:

I do not think any Australian party will win an election which tells the people it wants to run out on our allies.¹

Gallup did not make this dichotomy a part of any questions, but in two surveys, asking what were the most important election issues, respondents showed unequivocal interest in domestic issues: they did not reflect the interest in Vietnam taken by the party leaders.² Issue-salience, which is mentioned in a later chapter, is too broad an area for further discussion here.³

Approval of Australian involvement appears to have increased in 1966 and 1967, although it emerges during this time that support was somewhat conditional on the level of involvement, and that the sending of national servicemen (the term 'conscripts' was proscribed, apparently at the request of the RSL⁴) added a cautious dimension to many people's attitudes.

In September 1965, Gallup changed their questioning from approval of the commitment to asking whether Australia should continue to fight or withdraw her forces. As was mentioned above, the continue or withdraw question was asked at least once each year from 1965 to 1971; and the responses to this question show a clear and increasing early majority in favour of continuing with the Australian presence, reaching a high point in May 1967 when 62% of a sample approved the commitment. The question, however, does not indicate whether respondents felt the involvement was a mistake; it is clear, nonetheless, that few were

1 *Age*, 22 November 1966.

2 *APOP*, no. 185, 17 September 1966; no. 187, 18 November 1966.

3 Albinski, *op.cit.*, pp.191-3 for a coverage of this.

4 A. Fitzgerald, "Hawks, Doves and Kookaburras", *Punch*, 28 June 1967, p.942.

prepared to "pull the rug" from under the Australians serving there.

Table 3-4 : Continue or Withdraw 1965-1967

	Sept 1965 %	Sept 1966 %	May 1967 %
Continue	56	61	62
Bring back	28	27	24
Undecided	16	12	14

Thus, despite the prolongation of the war, the obvious instability of the South Vietnamese Government¹, and the small but significant number of Australian casualties, majority opinion remained surprisingly favourable to the war - certainly much higher than in the USA where public opinion soured quickly. This can be explained perhaps by the fact that Australian and American attitudes were influenced by different circumstances and societal conditions: firstly, Australians recognized the necessity of maintaining the American alliance and continued American presence in the region, whereas in the USA the history of the "yellow peril" is confined to the West coast; secondly, Australia is much more homogeneous in ethnic origins than the USA and has a more direct transmission of ancestral myths devoted to the country itself; thirdly, there was a higher casualty rate amongst American troops than Australian - on a *pro rata* basis, the USA had more troops in Vietnam than Australia; fourthly, the opposition in the USA was bipartisan, while in Australia it was not; fifthly, the Australian anti-war guru, Arthur Calwell, did not have a massive following; and finally, the Australian

1 In November 1967, a Gallup poll asked whether the South Vietnamese Government had their support; the results were Yes 48%, No 25%, and No opinion 27%. APOP, 2003-2020, November 1967.

press in contrast to the American was generally uncritical of the war and the Australian involvement.¹

The first hint that Australian support for the war had a low threshold, in terms of the number of men committed, came in a Gallup Poll conducted in February 1966.² The respondents were reminded of the Government's proposal to replace the Australian battalion with two battalions in May 1966. In response to the question: "Do you favour, or approve, increasing our Vietnam force from one battalion to two battalions?", 48% favoured the proposal, 35% opposed it, and 17% were undecided. I will return to this point below.

Australian opinion was also chary about the sending of national servicemen to Vietnam. Figures over the period December 1965 to August 1967 show a lack of enthusiasm in sending conscripts to the war.

Table 3.5 : Attitudes to Sending National Servicemen to Vietnam

	Dec 1965	Feb 1966	April 1966	July 1966	Dec 1966	Aug 1967
Send to Vietnam	37	32	38	38	37	42
Keep in Australia	52	57	49	52	52	49
Undecided	11	11	13	10	11	9

By mid-1967, then, majority opinion in support of an Australian commitment reached its zenith. This support, however, was limited in two

1 D. McDougall, "The Australian Press Coverage of the Vietnam War in 1965," *Australian Outlook*, vol. 20, no. 3 (December, 1966).

2 *APOF*, 1884-1899, February-April 1966.

respects: firstly, the Australian level of commitment was too small to have any dramatically adverse effects on friends, and families, and secondly, the number of people favouring the sending of conscripts was never a majority of those questioned.

Unfortunately, Gallup changed the wording of their questions during 1967 which makes it difficult to gauge at what point majority opinion in support of commitment began to diminish. Moreover, the accession of E.G. Whitlam to leadership of the A.L.P. saw a dilution of the Calwellian hard-line of immediate withdrawal.¹ Thus, while someone may have seen the war as a "mistake", he may have opted for the "hold on" viewpoint in his answer to the late 1967 polls.

Table 3.6 : Escalate, Hold on, or Pull Out

	Sept 1967	Dec 1967	Feb 1968
Increase	37 %	38 %	37 %
Hold on	<u>18</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>21</u>
Total for	<u>55</u>	<u>63</u>	<u>58</u>
Get out	29	24	24
Undecided	16	13	18

Question: Do you think America and her allies should increase their war effort in Vietnam for a quick victory, or hold things about as they are, or get out of Vietnam now?

1 In the words of Henry Albinski, "Whitlam did not thunder about conscription as such, and he rapidly - both before and after the 1967 Adelaide Conference - stepped away from urging the rapid removal of forces from Vietnam," *op.cit.*, p.197. Whitlam stressed instead (1) halting the bombing of the North, (2) avoiding further ground escalation, and (3) settling for a compromise formula.

Because of the different questions asked by Gallup in May, September, and December 1967, it is difficult to suggest any event or date when support for a continuation of Australian involvement began its downhill run. A former Australian Prime Minister, W. McMahon, has expressed the opinion that: "from 1967 onwards, sections of the Australian public became increasingly disenchanted with the war in Vietnam and with National Service",¹ and at least one prominent journalist also noted the "growing doubts about the Vietnam war" at the time.²

My proposition, stated above, that there seemed to be reservations concerning the extent of Australian support to be given in Vietnam is strengthened by a Gallup Poll carried out in November 1967. Nearly half of the sample - 46% - said they opposed the recent increase in Australian forces from 6300 to 8000 men, while only 37% favoured it; 17% were undecided. These results were interpreted by one academic observer in the following way:

...Australian involvement may be near the limit of that painless and cheap level which most people were prepared to support.³

The Australian Government obviously had its finger on the pulse of the nation at that time, because when the American envoy, Clark Clifford, arrived in Australia in late 1967 seeking diplomatic support for the war in the form of increased troop commitment, he was told that further reinforcements were not possible. This seemed to underscore the view that Australian support was designed not so much to stop communist aggression, but to pay the lowest possible insurance premium for the

1 Quoted by C.A. Hughes, "The 1972 Australian Federal Elections", *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, vol. 19, no. 1 (April 1973), p.11. Emphasis added.

2 B. Grant, *Age*, 2 November 1967 quoted by D.W. Rawson, *op.cit.*, p.59.

3 D.W. Rawson, *ibid.*, p.64.

continuation of the American alliance for, despite her proximity to Vietnam, Australia was prepared to send only one out of 1,500 of her population to Vietnam whereas one out of every four hundred Americans were fighting there.¹

It seems fairly safe to assume, then, that the Government was more apprehensive about casualties than about the amount of time the war had been going on; indeed, later evidence suggests that the L-CP Government was quite favourably disposed to the continuation of the war - so long as the price was not exorbitant - when it became clear that the war's "conclusion" would signify the withdrawal of American forces from the Asian mainland. One American researcher has since suggested that at least the American Government's fears may have been well-founded: "the relevant measure [is] the amount of pain caused by the war - as reflected in the total casualty figures - rather than simply the amount of time the war has been going on".² To conclude this point. Although 46% of the sample were opposed to increasing the Vietnam commitment - and this apprehension seems to have been noted by the Government - by the end of 1967, a total of 63% (38% for an increase and 25% for "hold on") thought Australia should continue to fight on.

Although signs of disenchantment were apparent in late 1967, it was not until 1968 that the trend manifested itself in *APOP*. At the time, events on the military, diplomatic, and domestic fronts (in both Australia and the USA) undoubtedly had some influence on Australian public

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- 1 R.J. O'Neill, "Australia and Vietnam", in D. Pettit (ed.), *op.cit.*, p.181. Senator William Fulbright, Chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, later criticized the Australian commitment as a "grudging and minimal contribution", adding that Australians do not "take the ostensible threat to their security very seriously, or are content to have the US do the fighting for them." *Canberra Times*, 12 November 1969.
 - 2 J.E. Mueller, *op.cit.*, p.59. For a comment by an Australian observer, see R.J. O'Neill, "Australian Military Problems in Vietnam", *Australian Outlook*, vol. 23, no. 1 (April, 1969), p.56.

opinion. It may be useful to list the major events of 1968: in January, John Gorton became Prime Minister of Australia and the Tet offensive was launched in Vietnam, on March 31, President Johnson announced a partial bombing halt in Vietnam, and that he would not stand for re-election; on May 13, the Paris peace talks between the US and North Vietnamese delegations opened; on October 31, President Johnson announced a total bombing halt of North Vietnam.¹

Table 3.7 : War Support 1967-1968

	May 1967	October 1968
Continue	62%	54%
Bring back	24	38
Undecided	14	8

Between May 1967 and October 1968 Gallup did not ask the "continue - bring back" question; and this gap inevitably causes difficulties. Nonetheless, it can be reasonably inferred from Table 3.7 that while there had been a drop in support for continuation of the Australian commitment, that drop was not as great as one would expect from an impressionistic study of the events of 1968. It is important, however, to note that the rot had set in and from October 1968 there was a reasonably steady, yet undramatic, decline in support for the war commitment. It is possible to posit some hypotheses from these poll results.

¹ *APOP*, 2003-2020, December 1967, shows Vietnam, international affairs, and Australian politics were the most interesting news items for a majority. If this is true, then respondents would most likely have been aware of these events.

Paradoxically, it seems that events during 1968 did not cause "major perturbations"¹ in public responses. This finding casts grave doubts on Almond's theory of mood responses to international, and even domestic, happenings. The explanations for this are far from clear, but it may be worth hazarding some guesses, however tentatively. One writer has suggested that there was an ulterior motive in supporting the Australian involvement:

Considering the extent to which Allied expectations, or at least predictions, of an early and wholly satisfactory end to the war rose and then fell during these years [1965-1968] the most significant thing about these changes is that they are so small. This suggests that most Australians saw their country's role in Vietnam as taking up a stance rather than pursuing an objective. Whether the war went well or badly was almost irrelevant to the ends which, in a vague way, most of them saw as justifying participation, principally the obtaining of American favour and possible future support.²

And, of course, the L-CP Government had long been staunchly defending the American alliance; as Mr Holt had remarked, "the Calwell policy is the first in Australian history 'to promise desertion of Australia's allies in time of desperate fighting'."³ The point to be made from this is that public opinion will often reflect that the Government of the time is saying - more especially, the President or Prime Minister. This is not to say that an inverse relationship is not possible. It is a difficult task measuring precisely this "follower mentality" in Australia, a legacy of a paucity of polling organizations. American researchers have noted the rise and fall in support for many proposals after the President has made a strong initiative - irrespective of whether

1 J.E. Mueller, *op.cit.*, p.57.

2 D.W. Rawson, *op.cit.*, pp.63-64.

3 F. Chamberlain, "Vietnam Worries and Market Fears", *Statist*, 25 November 1966, p.1283.

this meant a reduction or an increase of forces. For example, Gallup in the USA prefaced a question thus: "the North Vietnamese have said that if we agree to stop the bombing of North Vietnam, they will agree to peace negotiations" they then asked: "should we stop the bombing or not?" Shortly after the poll was taken, President Johnson announced the stoppage of the bombing; and a subsequent Gallup poll in April asked the same question. The "volte face" is remarkable.

Table 3-8 : The Follower Mentality

	March 1968	April 1968	Shift
Stop bombing	40%	64%	+24
Don't	51	26	-25

"It is safe to assume that the shift of some 25% in one month was largely due to the President's speech."¹

The follower mentality is unquestionably a condition of Australian political opinion, especially on foreign affairs. Various reasons for the slow changing Australian opinion have been cited above, and it is perhaps true to say that the more slowly changing, possibly inert, conservative, semi-permanent political leadership opinion has been an important determinant. Just five days before President Johnson announced the partial bombing halt on March 31, 1968, Mr Hasluck had vigorously supported the

1 Converse and Schumann, *op.cit.*, p.21. It should be noted, however, that this was a peace initiative, and it is apposite to ask if a President or Prime Minister could account for a similar swing in support of war.

bombing in Parliament. As a further illustration of government thinking at the time, Mr Hasluck again defended the bombing in a speech in Toronto in September - one month before Johnson announced a total bombing halt.¹ The tide had turned, however. A poll conducted in December 1968 clearly illustrates the downward trend of support for the Australian commitment; support fell from 54% in October to 49% in December, while the percentage for bringing back the troops remained stable. (See Table 3.1).

Table 3.9 : War Support 1969

	April 1969 %	August 1969 %	October 1969 %
Continue	48	40	39
Bring back	40	55	51
Undecided	12	5	10

If military victory was ever seen as a desirable and feasible goal, by 1969 it became patently clear that an American victory was out of the question; Nixon's presidency ushered in the "era of negotiation", which meant, more correctly, a compromise settlement for Vietnam: Vietnamization was the euphemism for withdrawal.

The above table gives a slightly distorted picture of public opinion during 1969 for it does not indicate the rate of withdrawal desired by respondents. Generally, while 1969 saw most Australians in opposition to the continuation of the Australian presence, the consensus seemed to include the sentiment of "pull out, but don't rush". In other words the

¹ W. McMahon Ball, book review in *Nation Review*, 14-20 June, 1974, p.1160.

Australian withdrawal from Vietnam should be gradual, and then only after more South Vietnamese troops had been trained.

Table 3.10 : Withdrawal from Vietnam 1969-70

December 1969		April 1970	
Withdraw gradually	65%	Keep all there until end	19%
Ceasefire now	29	Bring back in stages	50
Undecided	6	All back now	25
		No opinion	6

For April 1970, then, 69% did not favour immediate withdrawal. These figures are sobering in that whereas the "continue or withdraw" question presents a sharp division in opinion, the above table suggests that moderation was pervasive in Australian public opinion, proliferating public protests and moratoria notwithstanding.¹ The election campaign for the House of Representatives also serves as a general guide to public sentiments at the time. The leader of the ALP E.G. Whitlam, carefully avoided the Vietnam issue as it "remained an embarrassment to Labor.... But after the 1969 election, as the international climate altered, he felt less inhibited."²

Gallup poll data for the years 1970, 1971, and 1972 are thin on Vietnam, perhaps reflecting a growing public acceptance of the inevitable disengagement of American, and, *ipso facto*, Australian forces. The Australian Government announced in December 1969 that troops would be

1 For an account, see N.E. Lauritz, *The Vietnam Moratorium*, Melbourne, Hawthorn, 1970.

2 L. Oakes, "The Years of Preparation", in *Whitlam and Frost*, London, Sundial, 1974, pp.33-34. Whitlam had, however, promised in his 1969 policy speech that Australian troops would be withdrawn from Vietnam after June 1970.

withdrawn¹, and the withdrawal commenced in November 1970. Thus, by 1970 the issue had lost a lot of public attention, since the questions about the threat of communism, the maintenance of the American alliance, the morality of intervention, and forward defence paled into relative obscurity in the light of troop withdrawal. At the same time, however, the vocal protesting minority grew in vigour and size. Perhaps the major contributing factor to this growing protest was the extension of the Indo-China War into Cambodia after the fall of Prince Sihanouk during March - April 1970. A Gallup poll conducted in June 1970 asked people whether they approved, or disapproved, of United States and South Vietnamese troops going into Cambodia. A small majority of 51% said they approved it. Of the others, 30% disapproved, and 19% were undecided. Each person was also asked: "If the Cambodian Government asks that our troops in Vietnam also be available to fight in Cambodia, should our Government agree or not?" Forty-eight percent said "don't agree to it"; 37% said agree to it, and 15% were undecided.

Table 3.11 : Troops to Cambodia

	American and South Vietnamese troops	Australian troops
Approve	51%	37%
Disapprove	30	48
Undecided	19	15

¹ *Current Notes on International Affairs*, vol. 40, no. 12 (December 1969), p.713 for the text of Mr Gorton's radio and television speech.

These findings provide supportive evidence for the view that Australian attitudes were not altruistic, but pragmatic. That is to say, there was - even in 1970 - a residual fear of communism and its perceived expansionist motives, but a feeling that it would be better if someone else would fight for us.

With the diminution of Vietnam as an issue of general public interest, conscription became the focal point of political debate. As a reflection of this, in 1970, 1971, and 1972 only one question per year was asked by *APOP* concerning the war in Vietnam and Australian troop commitment; national service tended to dominate Gallup polls.

By the end of 1970, it seems that the imminence of Australian troop withdrawal had a fairly substantial impact on public opinion. The total percentages showing support for Australian forces in Vietnam had dropped from 69% in April to 50% in November 1970; this figure was reduced a further 13 points to 37% in April 1971. It should be noted that the wording of the April 1970 question was different from the November 1970 and April 1971 polls.

Table 3.12 : War Support 1970-1971

	November 1970	April 1971
Two battalions	37%	25%
One battalion	<u>13</u>	<u>12</u>
Total keep force in Viet	50	37
No battalions	37	48
Can' t say	13	15

These results are not inconsistent with the "follower mentality", as "the government parties which were responsible for the commitment to Vietnam tried to make the withdrawal appear to be an accomplishment."¹ Yet, there is some truth in the observation that "as the slow process of withdrawal from Vietnam took control, official rhetoric was exposed, and people lost faith in the government and its claims to skill and wisdom."² The statement is, however, too broad and sweeping for there was, as suggested by the polls, a large proportion of the population that believed in and agreed with the coalition government's policies. A poll conducted in December 1971 supports the strong residue of anti-communism mentioned above - so long as the costs in dealing with it were not great. Respondents, after being reminded that it was planned to leave about 50 instructors to train South Vietnamese troops after disengagement, answered in the following way: 59% favoured it, 32% opposed, and 9% were undecided. The figures bear some striking resemblances to figures published by *APOP* almost a decade earlier.

Table 3.13 : Token Forces in Indochina

	June 1962	June 1963	December 1971
Approve	61%	64%	59%
Disapprove	27	16	32
Undecided	12	20	9

The approval percentages are surprising; few would have thought such a figure possible after the traumas of the 1965-1971 era. The most

1 B. Grant, *The Crisis of Loyalty*, Sydney, Angus and Robertson with the AIIA, 1973 rev.ed., p.45.

2 *ibid*, p.16

significant change was the increase in those disapproving the token training force - accounted for by the decline in the "undecideds"; this category in June 1963 was "I've no idea", strongly suggesting a distinct awareness about Indo-China rather than the desire not to express an opinion. These data suggest, therefore, that while the war in Vietnam caused the public to be better informed about Indo-China, and led to a hardening of a no-presence-at-all policy, a substantial majority still saw the need and the desirability of training the South Vietnamese.

The above section has been an attempt to provide a broad profile of "majority" public opinion in relation to Vietnam. The mood theory would seem to gain little support from the evidence presented. The overall trend of opinion was an early consensus, but this started to diminish, albeit in a slow and moderate way, by 1968. The events of 1968 were catalyzing; but they were not apocalyptic. It was perhaps only after "Vietnamization" began and people were presented with the "fait accompli" of withdrawal that Australian opinion dropped to its lowest level of support. Because Australian involvement was not large and casualties not high the decline in support seemed to have followed U.S. and Australian Government policy.

II SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC SUB-GROUPS: 1965-1972

The previous section was an analysis of the way in which general public opinion evolved concerning the Australian war effort in Vietnam. It is instructive to assess the more detailed poll results published by Australian Gallup Poll, viz., the reactions of various demographic sub-groups that are identifiable in Australia: political party preference, sex, state, age, occupation, economic class and religion. The rural-urban dichotomy has only rarely been invoked, and, even more unfortunately,

education never. One question that underlies the following analysis is whether the varying responses of the population subgroups deviate sufficiently from the national average (ie. the general public) responses to warrant the rejection of the term "public opinion." Another question of central concern is whether the behaviour of the sub-groups is unstable, reacting recklessly and inconstantly with events, or steady, displaying moderation in their responses to the Vietnam war.

Academic opinion in the USA has not been conspicuous by its concurrence on the relationship of demographic variables to policy preferences and the war. On one hand, Sidney Verba and others found that opinions on Vietnam were ... "almost totally uncorrelated with the major dimensions of social structure that usually pattern political attitudes",¹ with the important exceptions of sex and race. They went on to look at non-demographic correlates of policy preference; to use the author's words: "...measures deriving from the individual's cognitive and affective position vis-à-vis the war in Vietnam"². Thus the distinction was made between "worriers" and "non-worriers".

A later study concluded that "differences by social status and age....seem more visible, with those of higher status and middle age most in favour of war policies."³ This evidence was supported in 1970 by conclusions reached in an analysis of local referenda results. Drawing on supportive evidence from poll data, Hahn found that "demographic characteristics... appeared to be strongly related to the vote on the Vietnam war."⁴ A more recent analysis of data, however, has shown that

1 Sidney Verba *et.al.*, "Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam". *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 61, no. 2 (June 1967), p.323.

2 *ibid*, p.326.

3 J. Robinson and S. Jacobson, "American Public Opinion about Vietnam", *Peace Research Society (International) Papers*, vol. 10 (1968), p.75.

4 H. Hahn "Correlates of Public Sentiments about War: Local Referenda on the Vietnam Issue, *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 64, no. 4 (Dec. 1970) p.1194.

Table 3-14 : Summary of Opinion Movement of Socio-Demographic Sub-Groups

	continue war			bring back troops		
	1967 %	1971 %	shift Pts	1967 %	1971 %	shift Pts
NATIONAL AVERAGE	62	37	-25	24	48	+24
SEX						
Men	67	38	-29	21	49	+28
Women	57	37	-20	25	47	+22
PARTY SUPPORT						
ALP	46	26	-20	38	63	+25
DLP	66	54	-12	21	34	+13
L-CP	78	49	-29	11	35	+24
AGE						
21-29	71	42	-29	19	46	+27
30-49	64	37	-27	23	49	+26
50-69	57	32	-25	25	49	+24
70+	52	32	-20	26	47	+21
STATES						
Qld	60	38	-22	25	46	+21
NSW	67	36	-31	20	50	+30
Vic	59	37	-22	27	48	+21
Tas	61	37	-24	26	41	+15
SA	58	33	-25	25	54	+29
WA	59	42	-17	23	49	+26
ECONOMIC GROUPS						
Upper	68	37	-31	21	50	+29
Artisans, clerks	63	38	-25	21	47	+26
Lower	36	28	- 8	44	53	+ 9
OCCUPATION						
Professional	59	40	-19	29	54	+25
Managers	73	37	-36	16	47	+31
Small bus. owners	56	36	-20	23	49	+26
White collar clerk	71	43	-28	18	45	+27
Skilled worker	62	32	-30	24	51	+27
Semi-skilled	61	38	-23	26	49	+23
Unskilled	42	28	-14	38	54	+16
Farm owners	64	40	-24	21	38	+17
Farm laborers	48	33	-15	24	50	+26
Other	52	36	-16	29	48	+19

The polls used were *APOP*, 1961-1980, May 1967 (Questions: do you think we should continue to fight in Vietnam - or bring our forces back to Australia?), and *APOP*, 2261-2264, April 1971 (Question: should we keep two battalions in Vietnam, or one battalion, or none?). For the latter question, I have added the one and two battalion answers to give a total percentage which can be equated with 'continue' in the 1967 poll.

the "shift toward disengagement was apparent among all segments of the population, but those twenty-one to twenty-nine years of age, residents of the West, and nonwhites had moved appreciably farther than other groups".¹ What then of Australia?

PARTY.²

Gallup poll data reveals marked differences between the attitudes of ALP and non-ALP voters. Soon after the initial announcement of troop commitment by Menzies in April 1965, a Gallup poll found that only one-third of ALP voters approved the troop commitment whereas seven out of ten Liberal-Country Party voters expressed approval of the Government's action. Only six out of every ten DLP supporters approved. The approval rating of ALP voters, however, increased during 1965, steadying at just below half until 1967, when approval started to fall. Table 3.15 shows the disparity in ALP and L-CP responses; for the first three years of the war L-CP support was constant at around 70% - 75% with a high point of 78% in September 1966. The first point to be made, then, is that between 1965 and 1967 the opinions of party supporters were remarkably stable and consistently divergent. "Probably not since the bank nationalisation campaign of 1947-9 has mass opinion on a 'live' political issue been so clearly divided along party lines."³ The second is that, contrary to what one might have deduced from the "hawkish" pronouncements of their leaders, DLP voters were less hard-line than were L-CP supporters. This is indeed surprising.⁴

1 A. Cantril and C. Roll Jr., *Hopes and Fears of the American People*, New York, Universe Books, 1971, p.38.

2 For good general accounts see M. Goot, *Policies and Partisans*, Australian Electoral Opinion 1941-1968, Sydney, University of Sydney, 1969; and Key, *op.cit.*, especially p.451.

3 Rawson, *op.cit.*, p.61.

4 This may be explained by the socio-economic background of DLP supporters. See below.

The traumatic events of 1968 seems to have made no asymmetrical impact on the two major parties - from May 1967 to October 1968 support for the continuation of Australian participation by ALP voters had dropped seven points while L-CP voters dropped nine. It is interesting, however, that support among DLP voters dropped 17 percentage points. DLP supporters remained less enthusiastic about the war than L-CP voters during 1968 and 1969, and it was not until 1970 that a higher percentage of DLP than L-CP voters supported the Australian involvement - after five years and four elections which were noted for the hard-line utterances of DLP spokesman.¹ As is shown in the table, the general diminution of support for involvement after 1968 was not skewed towards either of the major parties. Nonetheless, attitudes to the war show a strong correlation with party support.

SEX

Male-female differences point to some interesting hypotheses about war attitudes. The finding shown in Table 3.16 tend to confirm the observation that "women have traditionally been unenthusiastic about war involvement, and the largest sex differences in responses emerge when policies involving strong military initiatives are at stake."² This conclusion - especially the first part of it - is borne out by the poll data for 1965-67, not so much by women's comparatively low level of support, but by their lack of willingness to strongly oppose the war effort, although a greater proportion of women wanted to bring back the troops; witness the unusually high level of "undecideds" in the women column in Table 3.16. When the tide of events started to turn against continued involvement after 1968, it is noticeable that the number of

1 See, for example, F.J. Mount, "Vietnam", *News Weekly*, a special supplement, June, 1966.

2 Converse and Schumann, *op.cit.*, p.22.

Table 3.15 : Voter Intent and the Vietnam War

POLL	QUESTION	NAT AV.	ALP	DLP	L-CP
Sept 1965	Continue	45	43	59	68
	Bring back	28	42	25	17
	Undecided	16	15	16	14
Sept 1966	"	60	43	64	75
		27	43	22	15
		13	14	14	10
May 1967	"	62	46	69	78
		24	38	21	11
		14	16	10	11
Oct 1968	"	54	39	52	69
		38	55	37	23
		8	7	11	8
April 1969	"	48	32	53	62
		40	59	39	25
		12	9	8	13
April 1970	All back now	25	39	11	13
	In stages	50	45	53	56
	Same to end	19	12	30	26
	No opinion	6	5	6	5
April 1971	Two battalions	25	17	38	33
	One battalion	13	10	17	16
	None	48	63	34	35
	No opinion	15	11	12	16

Because so many tables are used in this dissertation, I have rounded decimal points to the nearest whole number. This creates, in some cases, minor statistical discrepancies, such as the figures given adding up to 99% or 101%. It was thought preferable to have this anomaly, rather than unfairly adjusting some percentages merely to make up the 100%, although in some circumstances the lowest decimal of a series, say, .5, .7, .9, was rounded to the whole number below, and in others where there have been two .5's, the "undecided" figure has been rounded to the whole number below.

women with no opinion decreases in some polls; the trend is not, however, consistent. The year from May 1967 to October 1968 saw disenchantment with the war increases by roughly the same number of points: men 14% and women 15%. But men remained stronger in support for continuation at least until 1970 when male-female parity was obtained for the first time since 1965 in both opinion concerning continuation and withdrawal, perhaps indicative of the seeming inevitability of the war's conclusion.

The April 1971 poll confirmed the findings of the previous year - with extraordinary similarity. Thus, as can be seen from Table 3.14 men had shifted dramatically since 1967, falling by 29 points in support of the war, whereas women moved by 20 points. I see no reason to quarrel with the explanation that:

The situation in which men are inclined to favour the use of physical force and women to shy away from it presumably is based on society's preferred sex roles in which men are expected to be firm and aggressive, women quiet and demure.¹

The question that immediately arises from this is: what will be the likely result of the changing male-female relationships within Australian society? Women's liberation is not a phenomenon of our times, but its support and influence has certainly proliferated since World War II, and more especially, over the last ten years. A survey conducted in 1953² furnished some suggestive, if less than conclusive, evidence that the more "liberated" a woman became, the more likely she was to manifest male-like attitudes. The survey contained a question on the proposal to use atomic bombs in the Korean War, and one on whether the Kinsey Report (on sexual behaviour) should be widely and openly discussed. Cross tabulations showed that women who were in favour of open discussion of

1 J. Mueller, *op.cit.*, p.146.

2 See Mueller, *ibid.*, pp.146-7.

Table 3.16 : Sex

POLL	QUESTION	NAT AV.	MEN	WOMEN
Sept 1965	Continue	56	65	48
	Bring back	28	25	31
	Undecided	16	10	21
Sept 1966	"	60	66	56
		27	25	28
		13	9	16
May 1967	"	62	67	57
		24	21	25
		14	11	17
Oct 1968	"	54	59	49
		38	35	40
		8	6	10
Dec 1968	"	49	56	42
		37	35	40
		14	10	18
April 1969	"	48	54	42
		40	37	43
		12	9	14
April 1970	All back now	25	25	25
	In stages	50	50	51
	Same to end	19	20	19
	No opinion	6	5	6
April 1971	Two battalions	25	26	23
	One "	13	11	14
	None	48	49	47
	No opinion	15	14	16

the Kinsey Report were more inclined to respond favourably to the use of atomic weapons in Korea. Admittedly the inference should be treated with some circumspection, but nonetheless, it is a hypothesis that could well do with further investigation. Gallup data do not provide information on the motherhood aspect, which, in spite of women's liberation, would have been a useful criterion for opinion evaluation: it was stressed by Calwell in the 1966 election campaign.

AGE

Perhaps the most surprising trend revealed by *APOP* data is that relating to what might be called the "generational paradox". The generation gap¹ - the assumption that young people are more hostile to overseas wars - was quite clearly reversed in the early years of consensus, 1965-67. Table 3.17 shows a convincing and persistent trend for the 21-29 year age group to favour Australian participation, and furthermore, with only minor variations in the final years, there was decreasing support for the war with advanced age. American surveys have shown that after 1968 (Tet, bombing halts and Johnson's decision not to recontest the presidency) and more especially 1970 (the Cambodian invasion, Kent State killings), young people were more inclined to shift to opposition than were older age groups. For example, in 1971 Cantril and Roll wrote:

As might be expected, our data show that those twenty-one to twenty-nine are now more opposed to continuing the US war effort in Vietnam than any other age group. But as recently as 1968, nearly three-fourths (73%) of this group favoured fighting on in Vietnam to ensure survival of a noncommunist government in Saigon.²

1 See, for example, J.T. Jordans (ed.), *The Generational Gap and Australian-Asian Relations*, Melbourne, Seminar held at Latrobe University, 23-25 May, 1969, organized by the Australian-Asian Association of Victoria; and Lewis S. Feuer, *The Conflict of Generations*, the character and significance of student movements, New York, Basic Books, 1969.

2 Cantril and Roll, *loc.cit.* See also J.G. Bachmann & E. Von Duinen, *Youth Look at National Problems*, Institute for Social Research, Survey Research

While it is true that support in Australia among the 21-29 age group dropped dramatically from the May 1967 to the October 1968 poll by 21 points, this age group continued to maintain a higher support level than any other age group until 1971, at least. An even more surprising result was that Australian youth had even higher support for the war. APOP found in April 1968, that 69% of Australians of the 14-21 age-group favoured continuation, and only 25% thought Australia should bring back the forces. As this is the group that was most likely to be concerned with the call-up and, eventually, fighting, this is noteworthy.

Several explanations suggest why young Australians did not make the sharp reversal that had occurred in the USA: one is that there were few charismatic gurus in Australia; another might be that the chance of missing the call-up in Australia were better than in the USA; a third is that there was no equivalent of the Johnson-public "credibility gap" in Australia; fourthly, there was nothing in this country to parallel the Pentagon Papers and the Kent State killings; and finally, a higher proportion of Americans experience tertiary education, and it was here that the protest movement was largely based.

This popular misconception about young people and Vietnam was still being adhered to in 1974. According to a columnist in the *Age* (Melbourne), the Labor Prime Minister, E.G. Whitlam, was directing his new foreign policies to the youth of Australia, as it was this section of the public who opposed most strongly the Australian commitment in Vietnam:

...Mr Whitlam believes his attitude is in line with the thinking of the younger voters, who never knew World War II and have been embittered by the disaster of Vietnam.¹

(contd. from previous page)

Center, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1971; Converse and Schumann, *op.cit.*, and H. Erskine, "The Polls: Is War a Mistake?", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, no. 1, vol. 34 (Spring, 1970).

1 A. Barnes, "Whitlam is betting his future on youth," *Age*, 18 February 1974.

Table 3-17 : Age

POLL	QUESTION	NAT AV.	21-29	30-49	50-69	70+
Sept 1965	Continue	56	60	57	53	57
		28	28	27	31	25
		16	12	16	16	18
Sept 1966	"	60	70	63	55	54
		27	22	26	29	32
		13	8	12	16	14
May 1967	"	62	80	64	57	52
		24	19	23	25	26
		14	10	13	18	22
Oct 1968	"	54	59	55	51	54
		38	37	37	39	38
		8	4	9	10	8
Dec 1968	"	49	55	51	44	41
		37	35	37	38	44
		14	10	12	18	16
April 1969	"	48	54	50	43	46
		40	37	40	42	42
		12	9	11	15	13
April 1970	All back now	25	20	25	28	24
	In stages	50	56	50	49	40
	Same to end	19	21	20	15	23
	No opinion	6	2	4	8	13
April 1971	Two battalions	25	28	23	22	22
	One "	13	14	13	10	10
	None	48	46	49	49	47
	No opinion	15	13	15	19	21

These results suggest that the pronouncements of vocal activists do not necessarily reflect mass attitudes.

ECONOMIC CLASS AND OCCUPATION

Gallup data show a consistent and usually pronounced tendency for higher money-earning people to favour war involvement and oppose it to a lesser degree than the "artisan, clerk" group and, more particularly, the "lower" economic group. The arbitrariness of *APOP*'s classificatory scheme notwithstanding, these data support the hypothesis, put forward by American researchers, that working classes (insofar as one can talk about such things in countries like the USA and Australia) are inclined to oppose foreign commitments much more than middle and upper classes. In the USA those at "the lower end of the economic and social scale opposed the [Vietnam] war as a nuisance and for 'pragmatic' reasons that came to the fore when the war news was bad."¹ Table 3.18 tends to confirm this observation, but it should be pointed out that while the events of 1968 did not noticeably influence "lower" class support dramatically, opposition was much more marked, increasing from 44% in May 1967 to 55% in October 1968. Table 3.14 shows that there was a dramatic shift in opposition to the war in both the "upper" and "artisan, clerk" categories - dropping 31% and 25% respectively - from 1967 to 1971; but the level of opposition was never as high as that found among "lower class" groups.

As was shown in the treatment of party support, voting intention was strongly correlated with attitudes on Vietnam; it follows from this that, since party support in Australia seems to bear a fairly direct relationship to socio-economic factors, it seems safe to say that social

1 Bogart, *op.cit.*, p.95. See also Key's concept of the congruence of foreign and domestic policy, *op.cit.*, pp.154-163. This might explain the anomolous situation of DLP voters being less inclined than L-CP voters to support the war effort, but I hesitate here, because "a complete answer remains elusive". See P.J. Duffy, "The Democratic Labor Party: Profile and Prospects", in H. Mayer (ed.), *Australian Politics*, a second reader, Melbourne, Cheshire, 1969, pp.407-8. For an interesting

Table 3.18 : Socio-Economic Groups

POLL	QUESTION	NAT AV.	UPPER	ARTISAN, CLERK	LOWER
Sept 1966	Continue	60	71	58	46
	Bring back	27	18	30	37
	No opinion	13	11	13	18
May 1967	"	62	68	63	36
		24	21	21	44
		14	11	16	20
Oct 1968	"	54	61	53	33
		38	31	40	55
		8	8	8	12
Dec 1968	"	49	56	46	30
		37	33	39	48
		14	11	15	22
April 1969	"	48	53	46	36
		40	36	42	53
		12	11	13	12
April 1970	All back now	25	22	26	36
	In stages	50	53	50	35
	Same to end	19	19	19	23
	No opinion	6	6	5	6
April 1971	Two battalions	25	25	25	21
	One "	13	13	13	7
	None	48	48	47	53
	No opinion	15	15	15	19

(continued from previous page - footnote 1)

speculative comment on DLP voting habits see D. Aitkin, *National Times*, 11-16 Feb-May 1974.

and economic factors were important determinants of opinion on Vietnam - certainly, at least more important than disagreements based on generation and gender.

These conclusions tend to be confirmed by Gallup findings based on occupational groups, but, of course, this involves substantially more categories, and consequently, less opportunity for broad generalizations. Nonetheless, the occupation findings show that managers and white collar workers were highest of the various groups in support of involvement in 1967, and by 1971 these categories had dropped in support by a massive 38% and 28% respectively. Unskilled workers were consistent in their opposition. Because of the multifarious occupational categorization it is not intended to analyze this material; it suffices to say that these data show support for the assertions made about economic "classes".

RELIGION; STATES, CITY-COUNTRY, EDUCATION

A reviewer of Albinski's book, *Politics and Foreign Policy in Australia*, commented that:

The analysis of Catholic and Protestant attitudes toward Vietnam and conscription is especially valuable in dealing with a country in which religious affiliation is a sensitive political barometer.¹

The table on the Vietnam War attitudes of the various denominations shows, however, that there is little to distinguish between Catholic and Protestant responses to questions about participation; certainly the percentage of Catholics in favour of Australian involvement is somewhat

¹ G.L. Houseman, book review in *The Western Political Quarterly*, vol. 25, no. 1 (March, 1972), p.142. Religious affiliation appears to be a more telling factor in opinion formation in the USA, see Alfred O. Hero, Jr., *American Religious Groups View Foreign Policy*, Trends in Rank-and-File Opinion, 1937-1969, Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1973.

less than one would have thought, in view of the Church's official public line.

The polls present no conclusive trend divergences amongst the six Australian states. The expected Western Australian defence-consciousness¹ was less pronounced than one would have expected from a reading of the newspapers from that state, respondents recording above national average figures in five of the eight survey questions examined. And, even less pronounced, is the "Kokoda complex" in Queensland.² It is difficult to explain why supporters of involvement should be more common in NSW; Victorians and South Australians, perhaps because of their relatively "safe" geographic location vis-à-vis Asia, fairly consistently showed less support for Australian participation in the war; and there were no discernible trends for Tasmania, possibly owing to the very small sample taken. Thus, with the possible exception of Western Australia, there is little to differentiate the states.

As was mentioned above, *APOP* has not used the education variable in their breakdowns; nor has the rural-urban dichotomy been employed consistently enough for us to trace trends.

From the evidence presented, it seems that there were important socio-demographic differences in attitudes to the war in Vietnam, which were apparent even in the early pro-war consensus years and in the slow shift after 1968, party, sex, age, and socio-economic variables being the most divergent.

1 See, for example, J.R. Robertson, "Are Western Australians Worth Defending?", *Australian Outlook*, vol. 28, no. 1 (April, 1974).

2 J.M. van der Kroef, in Pettitt (ed.), *op.cit.*, p.64.

TABLE 3.19 : Australian States

POLL	QUESTION	NAT AV.	QLD	NSW	VIC	TAS	SA	WA
Sept 1965	Continue	56	54	61	53	58	49	59
	Bring back	28	30	26	30	30	32	24
	Undecided	16	17	13	17	13	19	17
Sept 1966	"	60	63	61	61	59	57	62
		27	25	27	26	26	27	28
		13	12	12	13	15	17	10
May 1967	"	62	60	67	59	61	58	59
		24	25	20	27	26	25	23
		14	16	13	14	13	17	18
Oct 1968	"	54	57	59	49	47	46	63
		38	37	35	41	44	43	29
		8	7	7	10	9	11	8
Dec 1968	"	49	51	53	47	52	46	34
		37	35	36	39	37	34	48
		14	15	12	14	11	19	19
April 1969	"	48	52	49	44	41	51	49
		40	37	38	45	41	37	39
		12	11	13	11	18	12	13
April 1970	All back now	25	22	22	30	28	22	25
	In stages	50	51	51	48	47	54	55
	Same to end	19	19	22	17	22	19	16
	No opinion	6	8	5	6	3	5	5
April 1971	Two battalions	25	28	24	23	31	23	29
	One "	13	10	13	15	7	10	13
	None	48	46	48	48	41	54	49
	No opinion	15	16	16	15	21	13	10

Table 3.20 : Religion

POLL	QUESTION	NAT AV.	ROMAN CATH.	ANGLICAN	PRES.	METH	BAPT.	ORTHO- DOX CHRIST- IAN	NON CHR.	NO REL.
Sept 1966	Continue	60	59	63	63	64	67	52	49	51
	Bring back	27	29	24	25	21	21	38	46	37
	Undecided	13	12	13	12	15	12	11	5	12
May 1967	Continue	62	60	68	59	63	54	53	50	38
	Bring back	24	25	21	24	23	13	28	30	45
	Undecided	14	15	12	17	14	33	19	20	16
October 1968	Continue	54	54	58	56	50	67	49	50	44
	Bring back	38	38	35	37	38	31	43	33	50
	Undecided	8	8	8	7	12	2	8	16	5
Dec 1968	Continue	49	52	52	48	47	73	43	24	34
	Bring back	37	35	37	35	36	15	40	47	53
	Undecided	13	11	17	18	12	17	29	13	
April 1969	Continue	48	47	49	55	49	54	41	29	39
	Bring back	40	41	37	36	41	27	52	53	51
	Undecided	12	12	14	10	11	19	7	18	10
April 1970	All back now	25	24	25	18	19	20	25	22	50
	In stages	50	50	53	56	54	55	45	60	27
	Same to end	19	21	17	20	20	25	25	9	17
	No opinion	6	5	5	6	7	-	6	9	7

** The April 1971 poll did not include the breakdown of religion.

Although Indochina has been a troublesome international issue since at least World War II, the region gained prominence in Australian political debate only in the 1960's, gaining full momentum in 1965. For most Australians, Vietnam was not of itself vital; but it was symbolic of several broader ongoing issues which comprised the mainstream of Australian foreign policy attention in the decades since about 1950: the threat from China, the 'domino theory' (although the phrase itself did not become popular until later), Communist world conquest intentions, and reliance on the great power protector as the only viable means of self-defence.

The poll data examined in this chapter reveal a preponderant support for the Vietnam commitment from 1965 to about 1968, when support began to decline, although not nearly to the same extent as in the United States; support did not fall significantly until 1970, after troop withdrawal had been announced. It seems clear that the public was prepared to follow not only the Australian Government's, but also the American Government's reassurances, indicative of a heavy dependence on the USA. Thus, some hypotheses concerning Australian-American relations emerge, another obvious one being that the general public, like the L-CP Government, perceived Vietnam as a deposit in the US Government's "future defence" bank.

While it would be a mistake to under-state the magnitude of the anti-war protest movement, it would equally be mistaken to over-state the degree of, not just disillusionment with the war, but also the extent to which Australians had lost their apprehensions about communism.

The majority opinion poll findings in Australia on the Vietnam War appear to disqualify any valid application of the mood theory. Furthermore, the population sub-group results, while showing sufficient variation from the average general public response for us to question the

use of the ill-defined phrase "public opinion", provide ample supportive evidence for the dismissal of the mood theory, in that recorded shifts of opinion were rarely erratic.

CHAPTER FOUR

CHINA

One of the first foreign policy initiatives of the new Labor Government after the federal election of 2 December 1972 was Mr Whitlam's 'démarche' to the People's Republic of China for diplomatic recognition, and the consequential exchange of diplomatic representatives between Peking and Canberra. The purpose of this chapter is to trace the opinions of the general public and the many population sub-sectors from the time of Mao Tse-tung's accession to power in 1949 to the time of the Labor Government's recognition of the Communist Government in 1972. Recognition, however, was only symbolic of the broader China question, which involved, principally, expanded trade, the involvement of China in regional cooperative schemes, and, most significantly for Australia, the recantation of a foreign policy based on the dual notion of threats and alliances. A more intensive look at Australia and China under Whitlam's Labor Government must wait for a later chapter. The paramount objective here is to determine the extent to which L-CP policy pronouncements and actions encapsulated public opinion during its long period of rule from 1949 to 1972.

The idea of 'threat' is so central to the Australian psyche that it is a major task of responsible government in Australia to release the people from these fears.¹

This statement epitomizes the sort of comments which are often made about Australian's putative "sense of vulnerability to external forces",² and

1 B. Grant, *Labor in Power*, p.16.

2 J. Camilleri, *An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy*, Brisbane, Jacaranda, 1973, p.17. See also D. Horne, "Australia Looks Around", *Foreign Affairs*, vol.44, no.3 (April, 1966), especially p.446.

especially in the 1960's when the "impression of an aggressive and even malevolent force in China was at every opportunity underlined by political leaders for the Australian people".¹ However, it is not at all apparent from the quantitative evidence examined that the threat statements of Australian Government leaders² truly reflected the defence fears of the Australian people - especially with regard to China.

It is not easy to explain why successive Australian Government since 1949, and especially in the 1960's, have been so preoccupied with Chinese containment, and although this is well beyond the scope of the thesis, allusory comments will be made concerning this in what follows.

I THE GENERAL PUBLIC: 1949-1965

In October 1949, a communist government under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung was installed as the effective government of China, ousting the nationalist 'Kuomintang' under Chiang Kai-shek. The Kuomintang was decimated, and fled to the island of Formosa (now Taiwan); subsequently both governments claimed legal authority over the Chinese mainland.

At the time, Australia was approaching a general election, and Chifley, the Prime Minister, decided not to recognize the communist government before the elections, probably because of a vitriolic and potentially damaging campaign against communist influence in trade unions,³

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- 1 B. Grant, *The Crisis of Loyalty*, p.79. See also G. Clark, *In Fear of China*, Melbourne, Lansdowne, 1967, p.188.
 - 2 M. Edwards, "Australia and the 'China Threat'", *Australia's Neighbours*, no. 75, May-June 1971, p.1 contains an impressive catalogue of such statements.
 - 3 According to one of Chifley's Cabinet Ministers, it was thought unethical to make a decision that would bind the successor government. This argument is unconvincing. There was another, however; as Arthur Calwell has remarked: "We weren't going to go as a propaganda Party on behalf of Communist China, particularly when stories were coming through about the atrocities that Mao committed, and most of them were correct. Mao is just as much a mass murderer as Hitler or Stalin." See D. Stephens, "Three Labor Veterans Look Back", *The Australian Quarterly*, vol. 46, no. 3 (September, 1974), pp.86-7.

but the L-CP was swept into office, and so Chifley never had to make the recognition decision. The initial reaction of the new Foreign Minister seemed conciliatory towards the Peking Government, perhaps recognition was contemplated¹:

It is not for us to question the kind of government the Chinese people choose to live under. If they are satisfied with the Communist Government, that is their affair. As I have said before, we do not accept the inevitability of a clash between the democratic and the Communist way of life; ...We should very much dislike seeing the traditional contacts severed between China and the Western world.²

This accomadatory tone, however, was quickly dispelled with the onset of the Korean War in June 1950. As R.G. Casey, the Foreign Minister, told Parliament in November 1953:

The real threat to the peace of Asia and the Pacific today does not come from Japan, but from Communist imperialism based on the mainland of China... which has already been responsible for an aggressive war in Korea and which looms in the background of the fighting in Indo-China.³

The Korean War was seen by the Australian people as a firm indicator of the aggressiveness of the new Communist Government, a view which has since been questioned by various academic writers,⁴ and as one foreign editor has latterly recorded:

1 J. Camilleri, *op.cit.*, p.51.

2 P. Spender, *APD*, (H. of R.), 9 March 1950, vol. 206, p.626.

3 R.G. Casey, *Friends and Neighbours*, Melbourne, Cheshire, 1954, p.85. Nonetheless, the Casey Diaries reveal the former Foreign Minister as an advocate in Cabinet for the recognition of the Peking Government, T.B. Millar (ed.), *Australian Foreign Minister, The Diaries of R.G. Casey 1951-60*, London, Collins, 1972, pp.189, 213-4. Menzies also made some moves towards recognizing Peking, but on both occasions "stopped short", T.B. Millar, "Australia's Defence and the Indian Ocean", The 1974 Sir Robert Menzies Lecture, 15 July 1974, Roneo.

4 See, for example, A.S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu*, The Decision to enter the Korean War, New York, MacMillan, 1960.

In the 1950's the Yellow Peril threat was transferred to the newly-communist Chinese and the Menzies government, which had some knowledge of the Marxist - Leninist theory of world revolution but practically none of Chinese realities, ushered in an era of Sinophobia...¹

Several observers, however, have maintained that the fear of China predated the 1949 communist takeover. The present Australian Ambassador to China, for example, told a conference on China in 1972 that:

The establishment of a Communist government in Peking contributed a new element to the Australian fear, but this fear was still most firmly rooted in the older images.²

The exiguity of survey material renders it impossible to make some quantitative judgements as to whether the Chinese threat replaced the Japanese 'yellow peril' or whether the former subsumed the latter. Nonetheless, Gallup asked questions during the 1950's and early 1960's relating to the issues of trade and recognition, and it is possible to make some tentative comments arising from these data, in order to provide some background to the more intensive examination of the period between 1966 and 1972.

RECOGNITION AND UN ADMISSION

The question of whether Australia should recognize the Peking Government was asked on nine occasions between 1951 and 1964, and it would seem that the numbers who supported recognition rose and fell with international events in which China was seen as the aggressor. For most Australians the events of the early 1950's (the Korean War, the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950, and the Indo-China situation) clearly had a deliterious impact on their images of China. Table 4.1 shows the very low level of support for recognition by respondents in Gallup surveys between

1 R. Duffield, *Australian*, 12 July 1969, in D. Pettitt (ed.), *op.cit.*, p.47.

2 S. Fitzgerald, "China and Australia", in I. Wilson (ed.), *China and the World Community*, Sydney, Angus and Robertson with the AIIA, 1973, p.236.

1951 and 1956, a variation of only six percent. It should also be noted that majority support for Taipeh was shown only once during the whole period from 1951 to 1964. This will be discussed in further depth below. By 1957, however, after a lull in China's external activity, Gallup reported that "Australians [were] inclined to favour recognizing the Peking Communists as China's government",¹ and this figure remained stable until September 1958, too soon to record any possible reaction to the shelling of Quemoy, but by 1962 this support had subsided.

There was a plethora of incidents and crises between 1958 and 1962 in which China was involved, and in which she was presented at the uncompromising aggressor. My task is not to prove the veracity or otherwise of government statements concerning China, but it suffices to say that China was portrayed as the subversive and militant power in the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958, the suppression of the Tibetan uprising in 1959, the Sino-Soviet split after 1960², the formation of the Peking-Djakarta axis after 1960, the Laotian Crisis of 1961-62, turbulence in South Vietnam, and the Sino-Indian war of 1962.³ Thus, by August 1962, Australians were four-to-three against recognition, and by December they were evenly divided; a substantial drop from the 1958 figure. For comparison, a table on China's admission to the UN has also been presented.

1 APOP, 1278-1287, October-November 1957.

2 G. Clark, *op.cit.*, p.168.

3 For a defence of China's part in the war see N. Maxwell, *India's China War*, London, Cape, 1970.

Table 4.1¹: Support for the Recognition of the Legal Government of China 1951-1964

		Recognize Peking	Recognize Taipeh	No opinion
Which do you think Australia should recognize as the official government of China - the Chiang Kai-shek Government in Formosa, or the new Government in Peking?	Feb 1951	22	46	32
	Oct 1954**	28	55	17
	Aug 1955	24	36	40
	Aug 1956	28	35	37
	Sept 1957	42	32	26
Do you think Australia should, or should not, recognize the Communist Government of China?	Sept 1958	41	34	25
	Aug 1962	32	42	26
	Dec 1962	36	36	28
	Feb 1964	35	37	28

** Which should be recognized as the legal government of China - the Chiang Kai-shek Government in Formosa, or the Communist Government in Peking?

Australian policy-makers had shown some independence of thought during the 1950's, such as their call for American restraint over the off-shore islands dispute and their decision - against American requests - to trade with China. By the late 1950's and early 1960's, however, American and Australian policies had converged. Foreign Minister Casey's attempts to persuade Cabinet notwithstanding, "Australia throughout this period was unwilling to take any diplomatic initiatives on the sensitive issue of the recognition of Communist China, which by the late 1950's appeared to have reached complete deadlock".²

1 APOP have not - in some of their published summary sheets - reproduced the precise question, but have paraphrased it; in other questions, which Gallup have prefaced with introductory comments, I have incorporated the preamble into the question, taking care not to alter the meaning.

2 J. Camilleri, *op.cit.*, p.52.

Table 4.2 : Peking's Admission to the United Nations
1953-1964

DATE OF POLL	ADMIT PEKING	DON'T ADMIT PEKING	NO OPINION
Sept 1953	31	49	20
July 1955 ¹	51	28	21
If Formosa expelled	33	39	28
April 1957 ²	46	36	18
"	26	49	25
Sept 1958 ²	48	29	23
"	27	42	31
Aug 1960 ³	39	42	19
"	21		
April 1961 ⁴	43	40	17
"	11		
Nov 1961 ⁴	42	40	18
"	9		
Aug 1962	41	41	18
Dec 1962	42	40	18
Nov 1963 ⁵	38	43	19
"	10		
Nov 1964 ⁶	46	38	16
"	11		

For a comparison with respondent's views in France, West Germany, Italy, and Gt. Britain, see R.L. Merritt and Donald Puchala, *op.cit.*, pp.267-8.

A note on the wording of questions:

Gallup usually asked two separate questions: (1) the first showed little or no discernible variations in the wording of the questions which might have an effect on the respondent's reply, although the word "communist" was usually used to preface the Peking Government; and, as noted elsewhere, this has highly emotive connotations. If the word did affect the responses, it did so consistently. (2) the second question showed some important word variations. (It should also be noted that in some cases, only those who answered in the affirmative for the first part of the question, were asked to give answers to the second).

- 1 If that meant the Chinese Government in Formosa had to resign from the UN, would you favour admitting the *Peking Government* to the UN?
- 2 'resign' became 'leave'
- 3 As above, but "*Chinese Government*" became "*Nationalist Chinese Government*"
- 4 If *Communist China* refuses to join the UN while the *Chinese Government of Formosa* is still a member - would you then end Formosa's membership, or let Communist China stay out of the UN?
- 5 As above, except "*Chinese Govt of Formosa*" - "*the Chinese in Formosa are in UN*"
- 6 "*Chinese Nationalist Government*"
Again, "Communist" prefaced some, but not all, references to the PRC. The essential semantic changes relate to the designation of the Government of Formosa; note especially the legitimacy inherent in the term "Chinese Government in/of Formosa."

TRADE

On the question of trade, Gallup had posed propositions to five population samples prior to 1965, and it is instructive to make some comments about these, however cursorily. Table 4.3 shows the precise wording of each question, save the first, so that readers can see the anomalies and appreciate the difficulties associated with any trend analysis; in particular, the potential for result disparities as a consequence of word changes. The most notable example of this is the use of the emotion-laden and highly charged nomenclature "Communist China" as opposed to the more neutral sounding "Mainland China".

Trading with China has been viewed with considerable favour by Gallup samples since the first wool sales were made to the new regime in the mid-1950's; indeed, support for continued trading has not fallen below 60%, except in September 1965 soon after the commencement of the enlarged Australian troop commitment. Support for trading with China reached a highpoint of 78% in August 1963; an interesting result in view of the damning list of international events presented above in which China was undoubtedly seen as the villain. Take, for example, the August and December 1962 polls¹; despite what was seen in Australia at the time, as the Chinese invasion of India,² the proportion of the samples favourable to the sale of wool and wheat to China remained a substantial majority, falling only three percentage points from August to December. Taking into account the possibility that many of the respondents were not aware of the events taking place to the north,³ this result suggests that most Australians were not conscious of China as an immediate military threat, since they

1 APOP, 1653-1664, January-February 1963.

2 G. Clark, book review in *The Australian Quarterly*, vol. 44, no. 4 (December, 1972), p.109.

3 A survey in the USA found that only 28% of a sample were aware that a communist government controlled China, Survey Research Center, *The American Public's View of U.S. Policy Towards China*, New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1964, p.5.

would not have wished to supply a prospective adversary with essential foodstuffs.

Even in September 1965, when respondents were asked whether they favoured selling wheat and steel to China, a majority (but only just) expressed their approval. This unexpected result was in spite of (particularly for those over 40) persistent memories of "Pig iron Bob", (Menzies) selling steel to Japan before World War II, and Menzies recent announcement that Australian troops were being sent to Vietnam to stop the 'downward thrust' of China. These figures, however, do reflect a more circumspect population in comparison with the results from after the Sino-Indian War of 1962.

Table 4.3 : Trade with China

question	DATE OF POLL	YES	NO	NO DECISION
		%	%	%
Whether or not we should buy (resume buying) goods from Communist China and sell our goods to them.	May 1957	60	28	12
Do you think we should, or should not, trade with Communist China?	September 1958	61	25	14
Are you for, or against, Australia continuing to sell wool and wheat to Communist China?	Aug 1962	72	17	11
	Dec 1962	69	17	14
Do you think Australia should, or should not, continue to sell large quantities of wheat to Communist China?	Aug 1963	78	13	9
Are you for, or against, selling wheat and steel to Communist China?	Sept 1965	51	32	17
Do you think Australia should continue selling wheat and wool to mainland China - or stop selling them?	Nov 1967	69	14	17
In your opinion should Australia continue to sell wheat and wool to mainland China, or stop selling them?	December 1968	73	12	15

To conclude this perfunctory background of Australian attitudes to China as reflected in Gallup Poll results, it is worth comparing the conclusions derived from the recognition and the trade question. It would seem that it is possible to use both the trade and recognition responses of the Gallup samples as fairly crude barometers of the threat perceptions of the Australian people from the early 1950's to the mid-1960's.

It is not at all certain that China was perceived as Australia's chief security threat during the 1950's;¹ China was probably subsumed under the "communist" category, as she formed part of the monolithic "red" camp, of which the USSR was the titular head. Moreover, the Cold War was fought primarily between the USA and the USSR (China was not yet a 'power', in nuclear terms at least), and since Australia was in the western camp, Australia joined in the ideological war against the Soviet Union. The Petrov defection as portrayed in the Royal Commission was most certainly seen by most Australians as evidence of Russian subversion.² Thus, in a poll conducted in 1960, China was not mentioned as a world problem area.³ And, to the extent that China was considered a threat to Australia's security, it is doubtful that such threats were perceived as immediate or serious; Australians were chary of Chinese expansionism as was shown by the diminished support for recognition after the Indo-Chinese War of 1962, but despite this, a majority (and sometimes a large one) was willing to continue trading with Peking.

1 Cf. D. Horne *loc.cit.*

2 Perhaps the best account of the subversion theory is given by the ASIO agent who effected the defection of Petrov, see M. Bialoguski, *The Petrov Story*, Melbourne, Heinemann, 1955.
Cf. the recently published book by N. Whitlam and J. Stubbs, *'Nest of Traitors'*, Brisbane, Jacaranda, 1974; and "Petrov Twenty Years On", 26 May 1974, ABC radio transcript.

3 *APOP*, 1434-1442, January-February 1960.

II THE GENERAL PUBLIC: 1965-1972

The year 1965 provides an arbitrary, yet convenient, dividing line for this study of Australian attitudes to China; Vietnam had been simmering for some years from Australia's point of view, but in 1965 it exploded onto the political arena, bringing with it the forewarnings of the 'downward thrust of China' and the now discredited 'domino theory'.¹ It is intended in this section to provide an overall picture of Australian threat perceptions of China by analyzing Gallup results on questions relating to security threats, recognition, trade, and admission to the United Nations.

AUSTRALIA AND THE CHINESE THREAT PERCEPTION

Whatever were the reasons for the commitment of Australian troops to Vietnam in 1965,² the decision was justified in public as a response to Chinese expansionism; Mr Hasluck, for example, told the House of Representatives:

Behind Vietnam lies a wider conflict that extends from the northern frontiers of India to the dividing line in Korea; that engages the worldwide diplomacy of the Soviet Union no less than the worldwide diplomacy of the United States; and that casts the shadow of fear over millions of people in all lands of southern Asia no less than the shadow of terror over the villagers of the Mekong delta. This is a war that affects the fate of all countries of South East Asia - a war that throws into sharp relief the aim of Communist China to dominate them by force. These are things seen most vividly and felt most painfully by the countries of the region.³

This sort of statement became the rule rather than the exception after 1965, and even in 1972 utterances of a similar 'genre' were still being made by

1 For refutations see J.L.S. Girling, "Vietnam and the Domino Theory", *Australian Outlook*, vol. 21, no. 1 (April, 1967), and J.A.C. Mackie and M. Osborne, "The Domino Fallacy", *Australia's Neighbours*, no. 54-55 (March-April, 1968).

2 About 30 Australian advisers had been stationed in South Vietnam since 1962.

3 CPD, (H. of R.), 10 March 1966, vol. 50, p.174.

L-CP spokesmen. Thus, while it is difficult to dispute the view that Australian foreign policy has been preoccupied with "...security and 'threats from the north'...since 1954",¹ it is not so obvious that public opinion has been a mirror reflection of the Government's stated fears; in particular, it seems that the "China threat" has not been as prevalent as many commentators have suggested.

The 1966 general election gave the L-CP Government "its greatest triumph",² but it is not certain that it was Vietnam, and *ipso facto* the fear of China, or even the emphasis placed on the American alliance, that gave the Government such a resounding victory; but it was a contributing factor.³ As was seen in Chapter Three, a poll conducted after the election concluded that Vietnam was not the chief issue of the election; moreover, four successive surveys commencing in 1967 and finishing in 1970 strongly suggest that China was not perceived as an over-riding threat to Australia's security, although China was quite clearly seen as the pre-dominant threat.

Table 4.4 : Threats to Australia's Security: Countries Named

	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1967-70</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
China	30.8	31.7	30.1	27.1	30.2
Russia	13.0	11.3	16.3	15.0	13.8
North Vietnam	9.4	13.5	9.0	6.9	9.6
Indonesia	7.1	5.9	7.8	10.2	8.0
Japan	4.1	4.9	7.4	7.8	6.1
America	1.9	2.5	2.8	1.0	2.0
Germany	.6	.5	.6	.4	.5

Source: A. Huck, "The Idea of 'China' in Australian Politics, *Australian Outlook*, vol. 24, no. 3 (December, 1970), p.316.

- 1 J.A.C. Mackie, "Australia's Relations with Indonesia : Principles and Policies, II", *Australian Outlook*, vol.28, no.2 (August, 1974), p.169.
- 2 J.D.B. Miller, "Australian Foreign Policy ; Constraints and Opportunities, II", *International Affairs*, vol. 50, no. 3 (July, 1974), p.425.
- 3 For discussions on this point see D. Altman, "Foreign Policy and the Elections", *Politics*, vol. 2, no. 1 (May, 1967), C.A. Hughes, "The Rational Voter and Australian Foreign Policy, 1961-69", *Australian Outlook*, vol. 24 no. 1 (April 1970), D. Warner, "Australia Votes to Stay in Vietnam", *The Reporter*, vol. 35, no. 2 (December, 1966).

Thus, even with China's portrayed role in Vietnam, the 30% average fear of China does not represent a high threat perception.¹ It is often overlooked that in 1966 the Peking-Djakarta axis was severed, and it is not inconceivable that this introduced a more relaxed atmosphere into Australian public opinion. Nonetheless, a majority, albeit a small one, considered that some countries threaten Australia.

Table 4.5 : Threats to Australia's Security

	1967	1968	1969	1970	1967-70
Some countries threaten Australia	51.6	52.4	50.7	53.6	52.6
None threaten Australia	32.0	34.4	36.4	36.1	47.4
Can't say	16.4	13.2	12.9	10.3	

Source: Huck, p.316.

Table 4.5 shows that threat perceptions were stable from 1967 to 1970, and from Table 4.4 it can be seen that the Chinese threat perception was similarly stable, showing a slight fall in 1970; perhaps a sign that

1 Cf. A *Fortune* poll conducted in the USA in 1946 found that 50% of a national sample thought that Russia was out to dominate as much of the world as possible; a year later 66% saw Russia as an aggressive nation "that would start a war to get something she wanted", G. Almond, *op.cit.*, p.95.

Some years later, respondents were asked in four European countries to describe the USSR, and the results show that fairly high percentages perceived Russia as "aggressive":

FRANCE		WEST GERMANY		ITALY		GT. BRITAIN	
Aug. 1955	June 1961	Aug. 1955	July 1961	Aug. 1955	July 1961	Aug. 1955	June 1961
34%	48%	26%	58%	36%	37%	42%	55%

Insofar as "aggressive" can be approximated with "security threat", then these findings confirm the contention that Australia's China threat is not significantly high.

For the entire table see, R.L. Merritt and D.J. Puchala, *Western European Perspectives in International Affairs*, New York, Praeger, 1968, p.262.

the China threat was to diminish. A survey conducted by ANOP in 1971 found that 27% of the sample who thought that Australia would be threatened from outside its borders in the next fifteen years would be in the form of an invasion from China.¹ Unfortunately, Gallup did not ask the threat question after 1970, but by examining the closely related questions of recognition, trade, and UN admission it may be possible to form a fairly comprehensive picture of Australian public opinion, and to quantify the gap which emerged at the turn of the decade between government policy and the public.

RECOGNITION AND UN ADMISSION

The tide of events in international relations in the late 1960's swung in favour of the incorporation of China into world diplomacy; indeed, the *sine qua non* of such a dramatic development was the changing directions of Chinese diplomacy itself, which was occasioned both by the termination of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and the potentially explosive dispute with the Soviet Union on China's northern borders. The 'Nixon Doctrine, announced in 1969, was the harbinger of a new era of power politics in the Asian-Pacific region, and it was in the climate of massive American land-based withdrawal from Indo-China that the American national security managers realized the necessity of making some accommodation with a more extroverted China. The relaxation of American trade and travel restrictions with China in July 1969 were early signs of such a pacificatory policy. But perhaps it was China's new diplomacy which proved the major catalyst: China had courted the Third World with great enthusiasm, and this was to reap its rewards on the international stage, particularly in the General Assembly of the United Nations. As one academic observer

1 *Australian Public Opinion Newsletter*, vol. 1, no. 1 (September 1971), p.24. This was the initial publication of Australian Nationwide Opinion Polls (ANOP).

has written recently, these changing international conditions "...had removed or reduced the sense of danger which the majority of Australians had clearly felt while their country was involved in the Vietnam war."¹

These mutations in the structure of international politics were belatedly perceived by the L-CP leadership in Australia; the most notable example was the failure of the Government to observe the early warning signs of American hopes for 'rapprochement' with China, which resulted in the Australian Government being acutely embarrassed - externally and domestically - by its lack of foresight. The ALP had undoubtedly scored votes from the visit (in July 1971) of a party delegation, headed by Mr Whitlam,² especially since it had pre-empted the announcement (by Henry Kissinger, Nixon's then Special Assistant for National Security Affairs) of the planned Nixon visit.

It is indeed a difficult and dangerous task extrapolating from responses to the question of Australian recognition of the Peking Government in an attempt to cast some light on the overall perception of China held by Australians. For example, while it may sound reasonable to infer that a negative response to the recognition question represents a fear of China in which the withholding of diplomatic recognition is seen as a 'negative' means of constraining an expansionist China, it similarly sounds reasonable to conclude that a positive response to the recognition question represents no less a fear of China, but representing a belief

1 J.D.B. Miller, "Constraints and Opportunities, II", *loc.cit.*

2 For an excellent summary see, S. Fitzgerald, *Talking with China: The Australian Labor Party visit and Peking's Foreign Policy*, Canberra, ANU Press, 1972. Fitzgerald presents a sharp indictment of the Government's tardiness on Chinese recognition and UN admission. He has recorded elsewhere of McMahon's admission that China was a political asset, see "China and Australia", in D. Pettitt (ed.), *op.cit.*, p.188.

in the 'positive' strategic efficacy of granting recognition to Peking, whereby China might feel more compelled to act "responsibly".¹ Mindful of this objection, it is useful to examine the poll results concerning China's admission to the UN and recognition, as Gallup discontinued the threat perception question in 1970, and they are highly suggestive, but, to reiterate, inconclusive.

When Gallup recommenced its questioning of the recognition issue in 1969, after a break of some five years, the percentage of the sample expressing favourable responses to the recognition of the Peking Government was 47%, a rise of 12% since a similar question was asked in 1964; the increase is neither modest nor is it dramatic:

Table 4.6 : Support for the Recognition of the Peking Government

	Yes	No	No Opinion
FEB 1964	35%	37%	28%
APRIL 1969	47%	33%	20%
	<u>+12%</u>	<u>- 4%</u>	<u>- 8%</u>

It should be pointed out that this support was a qualified one; on the occasions that Gallup asked: if that meant not recognizing the Government in Formosa, would you still favour recognizing the Peking Government?, the figure supporting the Peking Government dropped substantially; the 47% fell to 23% when this subsidiary question was asked in April 1969. Thus, sympathy for the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-Shek in Taipeh was strong in Australia; the questions asked by Gallup on the admission of Peking and the expulsion of Taipeh from the UN serves as further

1 This appears to have been Casey's rationale, *Australian Foreign Minister, loc.cit.*

testimony to this.¹

Table 4.7 shows that support for recognition rose steadily, save the March 1971 poll, from 47% in April 1969 to 56% in August 1971. It is difficult to explain why there was a fall of 10% in support for Peking from August 1970 to March 1971 - a period of only some six months. It is equally difficult to account for the upward movement of 17% from March to August 1971. Events were moving at such a fast rate during these years that it is almost impossible to discern the impact of any single episode. The most likely explanation for the decline in support is that, with the pre-occupation of the United Nations in 1970, the Government was forced into the position of defending itself to the public. Thus, in a speech to the UN General Assembly in September 1970, the Australian Prime Minister, Mr W. McMahon, stated categorically that Australia would not be voting for the admission of the PRC. Perhaps for some time at least, the anti-China rhetoric had an impact on 10% of the population which had temporarily been proselytized by China's new diplomacy, President Nixon's hints at a possible amelioration of hostilities, or the recognition of Peking by the Canadian (October 1970) and Italian (November 1970) Governments.² The next intransigent anti-Chinese pronouncements of the Australian Government, however, must have worn thin for many Australians in 1971 with the steady procession of countries affording diplomatic recognition to the Peking Government - by March 1971 seven other countries had joined

1 There is little doubt that Government statements and actions contributed to this public affection for Taiwan. Examples of the former are Hasluck's speech to the House of Representatives on 18 August 1966, see *Current Notes on International Affairs*, vol. 37, no. 8 (August, 1966) especially pp.482-5, and McMahon's address to the National Press Club in April 1971, quoted by S. Fitzgerald, "China and Australia", p.202. Actions which further committed Australia to the Nationalist Government included the decision in 1966 to establish an Australian mission and the visit of the Prime Minister, Mr Holt, in 1967.

2 E.G. Whitlam, the then Leader of the Opposition, has said that Canada's initiative "undoubtedly helped the marked change in public attitude on recognition in Australia." *Age*, 14 June 1971. The "sleeping effect" may

Table 4.7 : Recognition of China 1969-1973

QUESTION	DATE OF POLL	YES	NO	NO OPINION
		%	%	%
Do you think Australia should, or should not recognize the Peking Government?	April 1969	47	32	21
If that meant not recognizing the Govt. in Formosa, would you still favour recognizing the Peking Government?		23	18	6
Do you think Australia should - or should not - recognize the Communist Government of mainland China?	August 1970	49	35	16
Would you favour - or oppose - Australia recognizing the Communist Government in Peking as the Government of mainland China	March 1971	39	39	22
As above	May 1971	49	29	22
Would you favour, or oppose Australia recognizing the Peking Government as the Government of mainland China?	August 1971	56	19	25
People who would recognize the Peking Government (56%) were told that when Canada entered into diplomatic relations with China, Canada agreed to "note" China's claim to Taiwan without actually recognizing that claim. Should Australia also agree to note that claim?		31	14	11
When should Australia recognize the Peking Government as the Government of China? Soon? Not for some time? Never?	December 1971	Soon = 47% Later = 12 Never = 12 No op. = 29	Total 59%	
If Aust does recognize the Peking Government as the Government of China, should the present Government of Taiwan still be recognized, or not?		56	13	32
Do you favour, or oppose, Australia recognizing the Peking Government as the Government of China?	April 1972	53	14	33
Taiwan: as for December 1971		51	14	35
Do you approve, or disapprove, Australia recognizing the Peking Government as the Government of China?	February 1973	56	20	24
Taiwan: as for December 1971 & April 1972		59	13	28

(Contd. from previous page - footnote 2)

have wrought havoc, see N. Capon and J. Hulbert, "The Sleeper Effect - An Awakening", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 37, no. 3 (Fall, 1973).

Canada and Italy. But perhaps the most significant event for Australians was the fortuitous timing of the successful visit of the ALP delegation in July 1971 and the announcement of the impending Nixon visit by Dr Henry Kissinger. It is highly plausible that these events were primarily responsible for the substantial increase in support for Chinese recognition.

Table 4.8 shows a steadily growing acceptance by a majority of the Australian people that China should be admitted to the United Nations - at least this is clear from the polls conducted between 1965 and 1968; thereafter the questions became inconstant, searching for respondents' views on the respective claims of both Taipeh and Peking to membership, but it seems likely that the recognition and admission questions drew comparable responses. As with recognition, the L-CP had successfully built up a strong reservoir of good-will towards Taiwan, and this was reflected in the polls.

Table 4.8 : Admission of China to the United Nations: 1965-71

QUESTION	DATE	YES	NO	NO OPINION
Are you for, or against, admitting Communist China to the United Nations?	Dec. 1965	41	43	16
As above	July 1966	42	39	19
Are you for, or against, admitting <u>mainland</u> China to the UN?	Dec. 1968	54	19	27
Would you favour - or oppose the Peking Government replacing the Taiwan Government in the UN?	Aug. 1970	13	40	47
Should Australia vote for - or against - the Peking Government replacing Taiwan at the UN?	March 1971	19	41	40
As above	May 1971	21	41	38
Which do you think should be in the UN - the Peking Government, the Taiwan Government, or both?	Oct. 1971	Peking 11	Taiwan 9	Both 53
If both, or undecided, - if you had to choose between Peking and Taiwan - which should be in the UN?		23	20	37
Which should be in the Security Council if the Peking Govt. is admitted?		33	27	1 40

To conclude, it seems that after mid-1971 public opinion moved ahead of a tardy and hesitant government on the matter of diplomatic recognition and probably UN admission of the PRC. However, there persisted a strong legacy of concern for Taiwan, whereby the majority of Australians were unwilling to accept the PRC into the world community if it was to be done at the expense of the Taipeh Government, although Table 4.8 suggests that slow erosive forces were at work here.

III SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC SUB-GROUPS

One American study, conducted in the early 1960's, found that opinion on China varied considerably between various segments of the population.¹ A more recent study of Australian images of China concluded that threat perceptions are evenly distributed throughout the demographic sub-groups, although "variations begin to appear more interestingly when particular countries are looked at."² This section is an analysis of segmental attitudes to China, drawing on a wider range of variables than the Australian study mentioned above, and supplementing these findings with Gallup results on the recognition and trade questions.

PARTY

Party identification has provided probably the best cue to opinion on China, as "...the China policies of government and opposition have moved further and further apart since 1955".³ The Labor Party had the recognition of the Peking Government inscribed in their platform in 1955, and they have been much less truculent in their policy statements about China, although

1 Survey Research Center, *op.cit.*, p.51.

2 A. Huck, *op.cit.*, p.317.

3 S. Fitzgerald, "Australia and China", in D. Pettitt (ed.), *op.cit.*, p.188.

the party did support SEATO. Contrary to this, one commentator has said that "...notwithstanding certain differences in emphasis, [both government and opposition share] a similar perception of the Chinese Communist threat..."¹ The findings below, however, illustrate that party supporters differ considerably in their threat perception of China.

Table 4.9 : Party Affiliation-Support and the China Threat

	National Average	ALP %	L-CP %	DLP %
1967	30.8	22.0	38.8	41.0
1968	31.7	22.9	38.9	36.0
1969	30.1	23.0	34.5	44.2
1970	27.1	22.4	33.4	32.7

The ALP is consistently below average, whereas L-CP supporters show a much higher fear of China, reflecting their respective party positions; DLP voters oscillate, alternating from a higher threat consciousness than L-CP respondents for one year to a lower threat consciousness the following year.

The party breakdown on the recognition question suggests that from 1969 to 1972, L-CP supporters were less opposed to the recognition of Peking than were the government leadership - especially the Liberals. The deficiency of the Gallup categorization is that Liberals and Country Party supporters are grouped together, and this necessarily brings more crudity into the analysis; especially since, on this particular issue, the parties bifurcated: Mr McMahon voicing the 'hard-line' and Mr Anthony supporting recognition. Table 4.10 shows that, in the March and May polls of 1971, L-CP supporters were slightly more favourable to recognition than ALP supporters, and, in the March 1971 survey, substantially (12%) less were opposed to recognizing the Peking Government. This result tends to conflict with the 'partisan mentality', as L-CP supporters seemed to be softening

¹ J. Camilleri, *op.cit.*, p.50.

towards recognition, whereas the party leadership seemed to be 'hardening'.

Mr McMahon, for example, said in 1970:

We would ... welcome evidence that the Communist Chinese are prepared to comply with the broad rules of international behaviour and forego their largely self-inflicted isolation. Regrettably there are few genuine signs of this and consequently we still regard Communist China and other Communist regimes as a central obstacle to peace, stability and ordered progress throughout Asia.¹

The Prime Minister faithfully pushed this line, and, at the time of the ALP Visiting Mission in July 1971, he chided Mr Whitlam in the following terms:

What an impertinence to the leader of the US and it is not likely to be forgotten by the American Administration.²

The following day, Dr Kissinger announced the Nixon visit, and Mr McMahon received one of his more embarrassing diplomatic rebuffs. Apart from some half-baked attempts at establishing a 'dialogue' with China³, Mr McMahon generally persisted with this line until his Government's defeat at the general election of December 1972. Several possibilities suggest themselves for this hard-line; viz., (1) DLP pressure, (2) a real fear of China, (3) a desire for ingratiation with the US, (4) commitment to Taiwan, and (5) electoral advantage. Whatever the reason, the policy did not concur with prevailing majority opinion.

DLP voters were more dogmatic in their opposition to recognition than supporters of the two major parties; witness the high percentage of 'nevers' (24%) in the December 1971 poll.

1 *Current Notes on International Affairs*, vol. 41, no. 3 (March 1970), p.96.

2 W. McMahon, quoted by B. Grant, *Labor in Power*, p.11.

3 S. Fitzgerald has suggested that "...China could see little prospect for progress towards normalization of relations with the Liberal-Country Party government!" in D. Pettit (ed.), *op.cit.*, p.186.

Table 4.10 : Recognition of Peking - Party

POLL	QUESTION	NATIONAL AVERAGE	ALP	DLP	L-CP
April 1969	Should recognize	47	50	43	47
	Should not	33	30	37	34
	Undecided	20	20	20	19
August 1970	Yes	49	49	33	51
	No	35	35	49	34
	Undecided	16	17	19	15
March 1971	Favor	39	39	31	40
	Oppose	38	40	43	38
	Undecided	23	21	26	22
May 1971	Favor	49	51	41	52
	Oppose	29	29	40	29
	Undecided	22	20	19	19
August 1971	Favor	56	59	51	56
	Oppose	19	16	23	22
	Undecided	25	26	26	23
December 1971	Recognize soon	47	52	45	46
	later	12	10	15	17
	never	12	11	24	13
	Undecided	29	27	16	25
April 1972	Favor recognition	53	57	52	50
	Oppose	14	11	22	17
	Undecided	33	33	26	33
February 1973	Approve	56	64	57	45
	Disapprove	20	11	25	34
	Undecided	23	25	18	22

For precise wording of questions see Table 4.7, "Recognition of China 1969-73".

On the question of whether Australia should continue to recognize the Taipeh Government if Peking were accorded diplomatic recognition, party responses were fairly closely related to opinions on the Peking question; DLP supporters were found to have a high support for Taiwan, the L-CP followers took a middling position, and the ALP followers showed least concern for the diplomatic fate of the island.

Table 4.11 : Party Support for Continued Recognition of Taiwan

	NATIONAL AVERAGE	ALP	DLP	L-CP
April 1969*	23	26	18	22
Dec. 1971**	55	52	69	65
April 1972**	51	46	67	55
Feb. 1973**	59	52	57	69

* "If that meant not recognizing the Government in Formosa would you still favour recognizing the Peking Government?"

** "If Australia does recognize the Peking Government as the Government of China, should the present Government of Taiwan (Formosa) still be recognized, or not?" [Only the slightest of word variations].

Although all three parties were strongly favourable to trading with China, the L-CP were slightly more so than ALP followers, and significantly more so than DLP supporters.

Table 4.12 : Party Support for Trading with China

	NATIONAL AVERAGE	ALP	DLP	L-CP
Sept. 1965	51	52	39	52
Nov. 1967	69	69	61	74
Dec. 1968	73	73	60	74

SEX

The sex dichotomy reveals that men have stronger fears of China than women. For purposes of cross analysis of the various population sub-sectors it might be useful to coin two phrases: 'higher threat perceivers' and 'lower threat perceivers'. These terms should not be seen as absolute, but relative; that is, they will be used for comparison only, between the generic categories of the demographic sub-groups being examined. Thus, to apply the terms to this schema, men are higher threat perceivers than women; the utility of these terms will become clearer as the remaining sub-groups are tested.

Table 4.13 : Chinese Threat Perceptions of Men and Women

NATIONAL AVERAGE	1967	1968	1969	1970
Men	30.8%	31.7%	30.1%	27.1%
Women	28.2	26.0	28.8	24.7

If these findings are correct, then it may be wrong to say, as was said in the chapter on Vietnam, that women were opposed to the Vietnam war because of their instinctive abhorrence of war; rather, it may be, as these results suggest, that women simply did not perceive a threat to the same extent that men did.

If, as has been stated above, recognition can be seen as a correlate of Chinese threat perceptions, then men should be less inclined to recognize Peking than women. However, the sex dichotomy shows an inverse relationship. Table 4.14 negates the proposition that a high threat perceiver will have as its natural corollary a negative response to Chinese recognition. On the question of support for Taiwan, there is the contradiction of men supporting Peking's recognition, even at the expense of Taiwan (see the April 1969 survey), yet later polls showed men with a higher support for the continued recognition of Taipeh. This is explained by the high percentage of women with no opinion. The trade table (4.16) shows that men - the higher threat perceivers - are more favourable than women to trading with China, perhaps showing that men are more inclined to be internationally active than women.

Table 4.14 : Recognition: Men vs Women

<u>POLL</u>	<u>QUESTION</u>	<u>MEN</u>	<u>WOMEN</u>
April 1969	Should	61	33
August 1971	"	63	36
March 1971	"	51	26
May 1971	"	61	36
August 1971	"	68	44
December 1971	Recognize soon	61	33
April 1972	Favor	67	39
February 1973	Favor	65	47

Table 4.15 : Sex and Support for Taiwan

<u>POLL</u>	<u>QUESTION</u>	<u>MEN</u>	<u>WOMEN</u>
April 1969	Yes	31	15
	No	21	14
	Undecided	8	4
December 1971	Recognize	63	48
	Don't	17	8
	Undecided	20	44
April 1972	Continue to recognize	56	45
	Stop recognition	20	9
	Undecided	24	46
February 1973	Continue	64	54
	Stop	16	9
	Undecided	20	37

Table 4.16 : Trade: Men & Women

<u>POLL</u>	<u>QUESTION</u>	<u>N.A.</u>	<u>MEN</u>	<u>WOMEN</u>
September 1965	For selling wheat & steel to China	51	63	39
	Against	32	24	39
	Other	5	6	4
	Undecided	12	7	18
November 1967	Continue	69	78	61
	Stop	14	14	14
	Undecided	17	8	25
December 1969	Continue	73	82	65
	Stop	12	10	12
	Undecided	15	8	23

AGE

The findings categorized into age groups tend to confirm the relevance of "historical experience", using that phrase to denote the length of time that one has lived.¹ Young respondents generally displayed a higher degree of apprehensiveness about China than the old,² although the over 70's fluctuated somewhat to make this generalisation less valid. This exception notwithstanding, those under 40 were generally more concerned about North Vietnam and China, while the over 40's had greater misgivings about Japan and the Soviet Union - Australia's older "enemies".

That the young are generally more apprehensive about China is evidence that Clark and Fitzgerald are too sweeping in their contention that China has always been seen as a security threat, although this is not to deny a certain amount of validity to their claim. The point to be made from this is that important sectional differences are overlooked when the term 'public opinion' is used. With the exception of the 70 and over age group, the different opinion responses do not appear to be subject to great fluctuation.

Table 4.17 : Age and the Perceived China Threat

	1967	1968	1969	1970
Nat. Av.	30.8%	31.7%	30.1%	27.1%
21-29	34.5	35.9	33.7	26.1
30-49	32.6	31.4	30.7	28.8
50-69	27.8	29.0	28.1	24.5
70+	22.9	34.2	25.9	29.9

The recognition table below tends to confirm, albeit not without inconsistencies: viz., March and May 1971, and April 1972, that those under 40 are more favourable than the older respondents to the proposal to exchange diplomatic recognition with Peking. The pattern that emerged in

1 For a sociological definition by Mannheim see R.E. Zody, "Generations and the Development of Political Behaviour", *Politics*, vol. 5, no. 1 (May, 1970), p.18.

2 A. Huck, *op.cit.*, p.318.

the previous sub-group is apparent here: the higher threat perceivers are more inclined to favour recognition, while the lower threat perceivers (in this case, those over 40) are less favourable to the idea. Similarly, there is the seeming contradiction of those showing the most favourable response to Peking's recognition being more disposed to continuing the Taipeh connection. Although trade with China was supported by an overwhelming majority of Gallup interviewees, the age group classification shows a slight tendency for the younger half to be more favourable, again, the higher threat perceivers showing a marginally more benevolent attitude.

Table 4.18 : Age & Recognition

<u>POLL</u>	<u>QUESTION</u>	<u>21-29</u>	<u>30-49</u>	<u>50-69</u>	<u>70+</u>
April 1969	Recognize	57	50	38	38
August 1970	"	49	54	45	31
March 1971	"	35	42	41	32
May 1971	"	52	49	50	47
August 1971	"	56	58	53	55
December 1971	Recognize soon	44	52	44	39
April 1972	Favor	49	52	54	58
February 1973	"	59	58	52	38

Table 4.19 : Age and Support for Taiwan Over Recognition Dispute

	<u>21-29</u>	<u>30-49</u>	<u>50-69</u>	<u>70+</u>
April 1969	26	24	21	20
December 1971	58	60	51	43
April 1972	50	52	49	44
February 1973	58	58	52	38

Table 4.20 : Trade: Age

<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAT. AV.</u>	<u>21-29</u>	<u>30-49</u>	<u>50-69</u>	<u>70+</u>
September 1965	51	50	52	47	55
November 1967	69	75	72	64	60
December 1968	73	72	75	72	73

ECONOMIC CLASS

The results enumerated in the threat perception table show a considerable difference in the responses of the three groups. Moreover, the disparity was maintained over the four year period from 1967 to 1970, which suggests that all groups were aware of the changing pattern of international relations; for example, the drawing to a close of the Vietnam War, at least for the USA and her allies, the end of the Cultural Revolution in China, and China's entrée into world diplomacy. The upper income group were generally more inclined to express a greater fear of China than the other two groups, while the artisan-clerk group (middle income) group took a middling line, or just below the national average. The lower income group consistently showed a distinct lack of fear of the Chinese, moving even further down the perceived threat scale in 1969 and 1970, which tends to suggest that this group was, to some extent, aware of the changing international conditions.

Table 4-21 : Threat Perception of China by Economic Classification

	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>
Nat. Av.	30.8%	31.7%	30.1%	27.1%
Upper	34.0	35.0	32.8	28.8
Artisan	29.6	30.6	28.9	27.6
Lower	21.2	21.6	22.2	15.2

Table 4-22 : Income (Economic) Classification and Recognition

	<u>Upper</u>	<u>Artisans Clerks</u>	<u>Lower</u>
April 1969	51%	44%	43%
Aug. 1970	58	43	30
March 1971	47	33	27
May 1971	56	43	36
Aug. 1971	62	53	46
Dec. 1971	51	45	31
April 1972	58	50	43
Feb. 1973	57	58	45

Table 4.22 further underscores the seeming paradox of the "higher threat level - greater willingness to recognize" nexus. The upper income group (higher threat perceiver) generally favouring recognition, the middle group adopting the moderate position between the two extremes, and the lower income group (lower threat perceiver) expressing stronger disfavour with the recognition proposal.

As with the sex and age sub-groups, the category showing the highest level of support for the recognition of Peking (upper income) was found to have a concomitant high support level for the continued recognition of Taiwan. The number of undecideds in the lower income group was significantly high. This group, while having a low China threat, opposed the recognition of Peking, and was less sympathetic to the Taiwan regime.

Table 4.23 : Income and Support for Taiwan's Continued Recognition

	Upper	Middle	Lower
April 1969	26	20	24
Dec. 1971	60	54	39
April 1972	55	49	38
Feb. 1973	63	59	40

The income category was provided only twice by Gallup on the trade question. The upper income group (http) was noticeably more disposed to trading with China than the middle and lower income groups in 1967, with the middle and lower threat perceivers showing considerable movement in the space of one year. This result raises the perplexing question as to why those on low incomes would not wish to see Australian wheat and wool sold to China, especially as they do not see China as a threat.

Table 4.24 : Income and Trading with China

	Upper	Middle	Lower
Nov. 1967	75	68	49
Dec. 1968	76	73	59

OCCUPATION

The analysis by breadwinner's occupation presents a more distinct categorization than the one on income classification. The professional group shifted from being above the national average in 1967 and 1968 to being below the average in 1969 and 1970, whereas the managerial 'class' appears to have grown more apprehensive of China in 1968 and 1969, maintaining its above average fear until 1970. Small businessmen were the great fluctuators; clerks, while always above the national average, showed a steady, albeit small, decline from 1967 to 1970; the skilled, semi- and unskilled shows that, on a skill-unskilled continuum, threat perception decreases with skill. The farm owner - farm labourer dichotomy is surprising in that in 1967 labourers recorded the highest threat response, even higher than farm owners, yet by 1970 farm labourers were second only to unskilled workers in their non-fear of China attitudes, representing a drop of 26.3%. While farm owners remained above the national average in 1970, their fears had subsided noticeably since 1967: 41.0% to 30.3%. It seems paradoxical that farm owners should subscribe to the Chinese threat syndrome throughout this time, in view of the substantial wheat and wool trade between Australia and China.

The previous chapter on Vietnam posited the view that unskilled and low paid workers generally opposed the Australian commitment, probably because they were more concerned with their own domestic well - or ill-being; the above analysis shows that these groups did not see any Chinese threats.

Of the occupation groups, those with business interests appear to be more favourable to trading with China: managers, small business owners, farm owners and even farm labourers; the surprising result is the high level of professional support, which finds no obvious explanation in terms of professional interests.

Table 4.25 : Analysis by Breadwinner's Occupation: Perceived China Threat

	1967	1968	1969	1970
Professional	33.3%	35.9%	26.9%	26.1%
Managerial	31.0	39.0	39.2	33.7
Small Business	27.9	39.8	26.7	33.1
Clerk	37.5	34.7	32.2	28.1
Skilled	27.9	29.5	31.7	28.1
Semi-skilled	25.0	27.1	27.3	24.5
Unskilled	18.3	18.1	16.1	15.8
Farm owners	41.0	38.4	34.8	30.3
Farm labourers	44.5	39.1	25.0	18.2
Other	27.5	31.5	23.8	29.7

Table 4.26 : Trade with China: Occupation Groups

	PROF	MANAGERS	SMALL BUS	WHITE COLL.	SKILL	SEMI- SKILL	UN- SKILL	FAR OWN	FAR LAB	OTHER
Nov. '67	88	75	79	73	69	63	61	78	75	57
Dec. '68	87	78	84	72	72	71	65	81	81	64

RELIGION

Multifarious religious denominations were categorized by Gallup, but it is intended to examine only the two predominant faiths: Roman Catholic and Anglican, as little credence can be given to the smaller samples of the lesser known denominations. Nonetheless, it seems wrong to say, as one analyst has, that "...Catholics appear slightly more threat conscious than other denominations".¹ The following table shows that Baptists felt the most security threatened.

¹ *ibid.*, p.317.

Table 4.27 : Security Perceptions of Catholics and Baptists

			<u>Catholics</u>	<u>Baptists</u>
	Some countries threaten		53.7 (762)	52.4(31)
1967	No " "		29.0 (410)	26.6(16)
	Can't say		17.3 (245)	21.0(12)
1968	Some " "		54.0 (757)	58.0(60)
	None " "		33.4 (467)	27.8(29)
	Can't say		12.6 (177)	14.2(15)
1969	Some " "		53.0 (772)	58.1(61)
	None " "		30.8 (450)	21.1(22)
	Can't say		16.2 (236)	20.8(22)

Catholics were consistently more concerned about China than Anglicans:

Table 4.28 : Chinese Threat Perceptions of Catholics and Anglicans

	<u>Catholics</u>	<u>Anglicans</u>
1967	32.7%	29.7%
1968	36.5	29.0
1969	36.5	30.5

It is perhaps wrong to say that the communist nature of the Chinese Government is the only causal factor of the higher threat perception of Catholics, because Catholics were also worried about Indonesia - a non-communist country; moreover, Anglicans expressed greater anxiety about Russia (communist) and Japan (non-communist). So no easy explanation avails itself.

Catholic respondents break the pattern, which emerged after the party breakdown, Catholics are the first of the higher threat perceivers since the of higher threat perceivers displaying a greater level of support than lower threat perceivers parties not to show a correlative higher support level than their 'peer'

group for the recognition of the Peking Government. The table below shows that Roman Catholics, who had a higher threat perception than Anglicans, were slightly less inclined to favour recognition than Anglicans. There was a confluence of opinion by the February 1973 survey; and little differentiated the two in their respective attitudes to Taiwan.

Table 4.29 : Recognition Opinion and Religion :
Catholics and Anglicans

	Catholics	Anglicans
April 1969	42%	45%
Aug. 1970	45	50
Feb. 1973	56	55

Table 4.30 : Support for Taiwan's Continued
Recognition

	Catholics	Anglicans
April 1969	21%	23%
Feb. 1973	58	57

Catholics, as higher threat perceivers, also disrupt the pattern found in the sex, age, and income sub-groups, by being less favourable than the lower threat perceivers to trading with China. Perhaps the Catholics, like the DLP in the party breakdown (these groups will not be mutually inclusive) display an ideological ascetism that makes it more difficult for them to trade with an ideological (and spiritual) adversary.

Table 4.31 : Religion and Trade with China

	Catholics	Anglicans
Nov. 1967	66	71
Dec. 1968	68	72

STATES

It can be seen from Table 4.33 that a state-by-state analysis defies easy explanation; some surprising postulates do, however, suggest themselves from the Gallup findings on security consciousness, recognition of China, and trading.¹ The first of these is that Queensland, a state

1 For a comprehensive account of Southern regionalism in the USA see, Alfred O. Hero, *The Southerner and World Affairs*, Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1965.

which one would expect to feel most vulnerable from an expansionist China, on only one occasion, 1969, registered a threat response of above the national average. NSW oscillated between a below average response to above average each alternate year from 1967-1970; this movement was not dramatic, however. For the first three years of the threat poll, Victoria showed above average fears of China - again defying simple explanation in terms of geographic propinquity, but a below average result was recorded in 1970. This relatively hard-line may perhaps be explained by the presence of a strong DLP, right wing Labor component, and active Catholic Church in that state. Tasmania appears as the great fluctuator in the table, but this result should be treated with circumspection because of the small samples involved. South Australia retained no discernible patterns, moving above and below the national average with little erratic movement.

The most surprising results tabulated are those relating to Western Australia, where respondents of the Gallup surveys were, with the exception of 1968, less concerned about a potential threat than one would have inferred from political pronouncements, editorials (*West Australian*) of newspapers, and some scholarly works.¹ Moreover, these fears were not transferred to another country, especially after the Freeth statement² about the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean in 1969.

Table 4.32 : The Russian Threat Perception with Particular Reference to W.A.

	1967	1968	1969	1970
National Average	13%	11%	16%	15%
Qld	14	11	16	18
NSW	12	13	16	15
Vic	14	8	17	16
Tas	6	8	26	19
SA	15	16	15	10
WA	14	9	17	12

1 See, for example, J.R. Robertson, *op.cit.*

2 Perhaps the best account of the episode is Andrew Farran, "'The Freeth Experiment'", *Australian Outlook*, vol. 26, no. 1 (April 1972).

Table 4.33 : State by State Comparison of the Fear of China

	1967	1968	1969	1970
National Average	30.8%	31.7%	30.1%	27.1%
Queensland	29.9% (n=268)	28.9% (n=260)	30.4% (n=272)	27.6% (n=252)
NSW	27.7 (n=640)	33.1 (n=781)	29.8 (n=700)	28.8 (n=684)
Victoria	36.0 (n=611)	32.5 (n=551)	31.8 (n=540)	26.3 (n=462)
Tasmania	25.4 (n= 50)	32.9 (n= 65)	36.5 (n= 72)	25.1 (n= 51)
South Australia	31.7 (n=186)	27.0 (n=158)	26.1 (n=152)	27.1 (n=165)
Western Australia	29.7 (n=128)	32.9 (n=141)	27.6 (n=118)	20.8 (n= 96)

Moreover, Gallup material on "countries threatening Australia's security" reveals the paradox that even in 1969 - one year after the first intrusion of Soviet ships in the Indian Ocean - Western Australian respondents felt less threatened by foreign countries than respondents from the other five states. From 1967 to 1970, Western Australia's 'threat' response was higher than the national average, albeit by a very small percentage in 1967 and 1968 and made its paradoxical movement to register below the average in 1969-70; their 'no threat' response was always higher than the national average.

Table 4.34 : Countries Threatening Australia's Security

	National Average	Western Australia
1967 Some countries threaten Aust	52	54
No " " "	32	35
Can't say	16	12
1968	52	53
	34	37
	13	11
1969	51	51
	36	40
	13	9
1970	54	50
	36	38
	10	12

It would seem, then, that Western Australians are less sensitive about defence than is commonly presumed. Further investigation of Gallup findings show that it is the non-Perth residents who have a high threat consciousness, whereas Perth respondents have a comparatively low threat awareness, especially of China.

On the matter of recognition, Western Australians are inclined to favour it, and as with the religion breakdown, a lower threat perceiver shows a relative willingness to accord recognition to Peking.

The aim of this chapter has been to identify and trace the main currents of opinion in Australia towards China, leading up to the change of government in 1972. While the idea of 'threat' was central to the analysis, it was found useful to draw on related survey results such as recognition, trade, and the admission of the Peking Government to the United Nations. The conclusion reached supports Huck's earlier work on this subject in which he found that "the idea that all Australians are fearful of China... cannot be sustained."¹

The analysis of majority opinion from 1949 to 1965 suggested that China may not have been seen by all, or even most, Australians as an immediate or serious security threat, because the Soviet Union dominated the world stage and much of the Australian foreign political debate in the 1950's, although China did become more prominent after about 1960, and a growing number of Gallup respondents indicated a willingness to trade with China - hardly the reaction of a perilously threatened peoples. With respect to recognition, problems of interpretation were encountered, and no ready answers seemed to arise from the detailed breakdowns. Thus, while it cannot be stated with much certainty that if a respondent opposed

1 A. Huck, *Age*, 26 July 1971.

recognition he was automatically coded as feeling threatened by China, it can at least be said that the recognition responses displayed a steadily increasing number of Australians in favour of diplomatically recognizing Peking.

In the period 1967-1970 just over a majority of Australians thought Australia was threatened by some country or other, and a smaller but growing number thought that no country posed a threat. Moreover, in the late 1960's at the time of the Vietnam War, when China was clearly presented to the Australian people as a militaristic aggressor, less than one third of those respondents ~~who thought Australia was threatened~~ saw China as the chief threat to Australia's security. From this, three conclusions emerge: firstly, it appears that Australians, as a group, were less threat conscious in the late sixties than many writers have suggested; secondly, the fear of China was less than is commonly thought; and thirdly, by 1970 the general fears about Australia's continental security that persisted seemed to be dissipating, although there was no suggestion of a transmutation. There were even indications at the turn of the decade that the long-standing public attachment to Taiwan, so carefully nurtured by the L-CP Government, was beginning to cleave.

Section III, dealing with the responses of the various population sub-groups, tends to confirm the conclusions reached in the previous chapter on Vietnam; namely, that public opinion, while generally stable, is diffuse. The higher and lower threat perceiver concepts were employed in order to see what correlations could be deduced from comparisons of, for example, recognition and the threat perception question. No consistent pattern emanated from the data: on the one hand, the higher threat perceivers in the party (DLP voters) and religious (Catholics) sub-groups were less inclined to favour the recognition of Peking than the lower threat perceivers in their sub-groups, yet, the higher threat perceivers in the

age (under 40's), sex (men), and income (upper income earners) sub-groups displayed a greater inclination than their respective peer groups to recognize Peking. Thus, it cannot be maintained that a disinclination to recognize the Communist Government in China entails a perceived security threat; indeed, it might well be the case that people with a fear of China might wish to recognize Peking in an effort to draw China into international discourse.

The sub-group breakdowns show ALP voters as less conscious of a Chinese threat than L-CP supporters, women less than men, the young (under 40) less than the old - although the very old showed some fluctuation, lower income earners less than middle and upper income earners, Catholics less than Anglicans, and the states analysis found no reason to suggest that Western Australians feel more vulnerable to Chinese attack than those in other states.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE

The previous chapter on Australian attitudes to China analyzed the threat aspect of the "threat - alliance" syndrome in Australian political attitudes. This chapter will deal with the American alliance¹, in particular, the hypotheses that are generated from questions about American defence installations in Australia.

The decade 1963-1973 saw the development of subtle, but important, transformations in international relations, such as the development of 'detente' between the USA and the Soviet Union following the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, and not so subtle, but equally important, transformations in the international power balance such as China's rise to nuclear-power status in 1964. For Australians, security was becoming increasingly bound up with the United States; the 1963 North West Cape Agreement was perhaps the harbinger of, at least, a decade of ever increasing interaction between the USA and Australia, and the Vietnam War demonstrated the closeness of the relationship. Vietnam was generally seen as the *quid pro quo* for future American protection, and, in many respects, Chapter Three said more about Australia's relationship with her super-power ally than about fears of an insurgent communist peril. And, since Vietnam was the most important foreign policy issue in the period under discussion, what follows suffers from the unreality of removing the discussion of the alliance from the contextual framework of the war. However, Vietnam explains only partially the Australian-American relationship as viewed by Australians.

1 The term is used in a loose generic sense to denote the relationship rather than any formal treaty; its more precise connotations will emerge as the chapter unfolds.

The war was defended by the L-CP Government through invocation of its membership of SEATO, but this formed only part of the formal alliance. Vietnam has now ceased to be the contentious political issue it was in the late 1960's and early 1970's. What has been, and will prove to be, a more enduring test of the alliance is the question of American communications-defence installations based in Australia, and the L-CP's defence of the agreements establishing these facilities was "squarely based on the ANZUS Treaty".¹ As one Liberal member told Parliament: "there is a price to pay for an alliance, and the price we pay takes the form of the facilities provided at Woomera, Pine Gap, and North West Cape."² It is not sufficient, then, to draw all our conclusions concerning the American alliance from the Vietnam experience, for, while the L-CP Government attempted to associate public hostility to the war effort as *ipso facto* rejection of the alliance, opposition to the war should not be seen as necessarily implying antagonism to Australia's defence treaties and their obligations, although this is not to say that the war may not have precipitated some disaffection with the alliance.

It is proposed to look at four Gallup questions: firstly, those relating to nuclear weapons bases; secondly, communications installations; thirdly, the perceived value of the treaties with the USA; and finally, alternative alliances. The results should cast some light on the principal questions underlying this case study - the extent of public support for the continuation of the alliance, and the price seen as worth paying. The treatment will follow similar lines to previous chapters, commencing with a sketch of responses of the general public in war-time Australia through to the early 1960's, to be followed by a more detailed analysis of the last decade.

1 N. Harper, "Australia and the United States", in G. Greenwood and N. Harper (eds.), *Australia and World Affairs 1966-1970*, Melbourne, Cheshire for the AIIA, 1974, p.281.

1 A. Peacock, *CPD*, (H. of R.), 29 April 1969, no. 7, p.1422.

I THE GENERAL PUBLIC AND THE ALLIANCE : 1943-1963

A seminal point in Australia's foreign relations was 26 December 1941, when the Prime Minister, John Curtin, declared that Australia looked to America 'free of any pangs as to our traditional links of kinship with the United Kingdom'. It was not for another ten years, however, that a defence alliance - ANZUS¹ - was signed: the signatories being Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. There seems little doubt that the vast majority of Australians saw the USA as their defender from Japanese invasion, and the ensuing gratitude was to be a dominant theme in the formation of Australia's foreign policy and attitudes for three decades.

The ANZUS Treaty, signed in 1951, was designed primarily against the possibility of a resurgent Japan, although the dangers of "Communist imperialism"² were also recognized by the Australian Government. As a treaty, ANZUS is defensive. The treaty envisages³ military support by co-signatories in the event of an armed attack on any of the three member states, and covers attack on 'armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft', as well as colonial dependencies. It was accepted at the time that Australia was obliged to contribute to the process of strengthening 'the individual and collective capacity' of the ANZUS partners 'to resist armed attack'. But since 1969 the treaty has been given a much wider, global/strategic orientation.⁴

1 R.G. Casey described the treaty as "...the greatest step forward that Australia has made for many years in the field of international relations, and it marks a new era in our Australian history." *Friends and Neighbours*, p.86. The full text of the treaty can be found in C. Clark (ed.), *Australian Foreign Policy*, Melbourne, Cassell, 1973.

2 R.G. Casey, *ibid.*, p.73.

3 The USA insisted on the phrase "in accordance with its constitutional processes" being inserted in the treaty, and this meant that the commitment was not automatic - a point which is often overlooked in Australia. See P. Kelly's interview with Mr. A. Renouf, the present Permanent Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs, in the *Australian*, 4 May 1974.

4 See the full debate on Joint Defence Installations, especially Mr Peacock's speech, in *CPD*, (H. of R.), 19 April 1969, no. 7, pp.1413-1469.

The South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty, commonly referred to by its organizational title, SEATO, was signed in 1954 with more of an offensive intent, against what was seen as communist subversion in the region inspired by the communist governments in the People's Republic of China and in the Soviet Union.

A Gallup poll conducted in 1950¹, before ANZUS was signed, found that nine out of ten Australians were in favour of a defence pact with the USA which would "automatically require" parties "to join the other in the event of a Pacific war". A 1951 survey², however, found that just on 50% of those questioned thought that it would benefit Australia, 18% saw "no benefit" in the treaty, and 6% were undecided.

In 1954, Gallup found an overwhelming majority of electors in favour of Australia "joining an alliance against Communism in South-East Asia".³ Before asked whether they favoured the treaty, respondents were reminded of a proposal for "Britain, America and Australia to form an alliance to stop Communists overrunning South-East Asia". This highly suggestive question evoked a 77% favourable response for joining SEATO, with 9% opposed, and 14% undecided.

In the 1950's, it was assumed by Gallup that Australia's contribution to the alliance would be in the form of permitting American nuclear testing or use of extant or potential naval and other facilities for the housing of nuclear-related equipment of various kinds. The following table shows the options that were being considered at the time.

Table 5.1 shows, that in the two decades between 1943 and 1963, there was considerable public support for American use of Australian land and

1 APOP, 690-699, June-July 1950.

2 APOP, 788-799, August-September 1951. The other 26% had no prior knowledge of the pact, and were not asked.

6 APOP, 1006-1021, May-June 1954.

facilities for conventional naval and air vessels, rocket testing, nuclear missile bases, early warning satellite systems, and nuclear submarines. Only in 1962¹, when respondents were asked whether they were for or against letting America base nuclear weapons here, did support fall below an absolute majority; but still more Australians supported the idea than opposed it.

Table 5.1 : American Military Bases and Use of Facilities
in Australia 1943-1963

QUESTION	SUMMARY SHEET DATE	YES	NO	NO OPINION
		%	%	%
Would you favour - or oppose - letting the US Air Force and Navy use bases in Aust. after the war?	May-June 1943	77	15	8
Do you think America should, or should not, be invited to use the Woomera rocket range in Central Australia, which is used by Britain and Australia to test rockets?	Nov-Dec 1959	64	25	11
If America wanted to set up nuclear missile bases and early-warning radar bases in Nthn Aust., should we allow them, or not?	May-June 1960	62	23	15
If the US asks for bases in Northern Australia, for atomic submarines with hydrogen rockets, like the bases near Glasgow, which Britain has given to America, do you think we should, or should not allow them?	May-Aug 1961	65	24	11
Are you for, or against, letting America base nuclear weapons here?	May-July 1962	47	44	9
Do you favour America stationing scientists here to track space satellites? (Question asked for Brit. and Russia too).	July-Oct 1962	79	15	6
If America asks us for naval bases in Nthn Aust. for its atomic-armed submarines, do you think we should allow America those, or should we keep atomic weapons OUT of this part of the world?	Jan-Feb 1963	59	31	10

1 APOP, 1605-1620, May-July 1962.

II THE GENERAL PUBLIC AND THE ALLIANCE : 1963-1973

It was not until 1963, however, that Australia signed an agreement, handing over 28 square miles of territory at North West Cape in Western Australia to the USA for its exclusive use in communicating, by VLF transmission, with nuclear missile-laden submarines in the Indian Ocean. Clearly, the 'naval communication station' would implicate Australia in the USA's global nuclear strategy, and the L-CP Government welcomed the nuclear submarine tracking station. The ALP, after being critical of Australia's lack of control at the base and the apparent derogation from Australian sovereignty, accepted the North West Cape Agreement as 'a grim and awful necessity'.¹ According to Gallup, the Australian public were overwhelming in their support of the base, although 65% opined that the radio station should be controlled jointly by the Australian and US Governments, for which the agreement did not provide, and that the US

Table 5.2 : North West Cape

QUESTION	SUMMARY SHEET DATE	YES %	NO %	NO OPINION %
Do you favour, or oppose, letting America build a radio station in Australia to keep in touch with submarines carrying atomic or nuclear rockets?	May-June 1963	80	11	9
The US will have exclusive control of 28 sq. mls for its radio station in north-western Aust., do you think that radio station should be controlled by Australia and America together.	Jun-Aug 1963	65	25	10
If a message sent through that radio station might involve Aust. in war, do you think the US should, or should not, have to get the consent of our Government BEFORE sending that message?	Jun-Aug 1963	71	21	8

¹ N. Harper, *loc.cit.*, The agreement was presented to Parliament by the Minister for External Affairs, Sir Garfield Barwick, see CPD, (H. of R.), 3 April 1963, vol. 38, pp.1223-1229.

Government should get the consent of the Australian Government before sending any messages which might involve Australia in a war.¹

Gallup questions concerning American military installations have been sparse over the past few years, and, unfortunately, do not cover all the strategically significant ones, these being the 'naval communication station' at North West Cape, the Pine Gap 'defence space research facility', and the 'joint defence space communication station' at Nurrungar (Woomera).² Table 5.3 shows that public support for American communications stations and the usage of port facilities declined from 1963, with the signing of the North West Cape Agreement, to 1972, with the completion of the Australian naval base at Cockburn Sound in Western Australia only three or four years away.

Table 5.3 : Attitudes to American Communications Bases and Naval Vessels in Australia : 1963-1972

QUESTION	SUMMARY SHEET DATE	YES	NO	NO OPINION
Do you favour, or oppose, letting America build a radio station in Australia to keep in touch with submarines carrying atomic or nuclear rockets?	May-June 1963	80	11	9
Recently, it was announced that Australia and America were to build a \$3 million base at Woomera, in South Australia, to communicate with satellites and collect information of military significance. Do you approve - or disapprove - that?	Aug-Sept 1969	74	16	10
About the suggestion that American naval forces in the Indian Ocean should use the Australian naval base we are building near Perth [Cockburn Sound]. Would you favour, or oppose, this?	April-June 1972	64	19	17

Note: These facilities have disparate functions.

- 1 This question again became an issue of public acrimony in 1973, when North West Cape was put on full military alert without the foreknowledge of the Australian Government during the October (Yom Kippur) War in the Middle-East.
- 2 For detailed descriptions of the operations of these installations see D. Ball, "American Bases in Australia", *Current Affairs Bulletin*, vol. 51, no. 10 (March 1975).

Although the decline was substantial (sixteen percent), a substantial majority still favoured playing host to American naval craft in 1972. This, therefore, provides the first clue. Despite widespread disenchantment with the allied war effort in Vietnam by 1972, Australians seemed to favour continuing military cooperation with the USA, albeit probably of a defensive nature. Surprisingly, a Gallup Poll, conducted in April 1973¹, found that 38% of the survey were prepared to let the purposes of the Pine Gap and Nurrungar bases remain secret; 47% said "make the purposes public". This would tend to suggest a strong residual faith in the benevolence and integrity of the Australian and American governments.

On the question of whether Australia should allow/ask America and England to base nuclear weapons in Australia, three surveys suggest that Australians are not as keen to have these potentially destructive agents on their soil as they are to harbour the seemingly more innocuous communications installations.

Table 5.4 : Nuclear Weapons in Australia

QUESTION	GALLUP DATE	BASE HERE	KEEP OUT	UNDECIDED
Are you for, or against, letting America base nuclear weapons here?	May-July 1962	47	44	9
Should nuclear weapons be kept out of Australia, or should we ask America and England to base nuclear weapons here?	Sept-Dec 1965	51	34	15
Should nuclear weapons be kept out of Australia, or should we ask America and England to base nuclear weapons here?	Nov '66 -Feb '67	58	31	11

Table 5.4 shows an upward support for nuclear weapons in Australia. From being about evenly divided (47% for, 44% against) in 1962, respondents

1 *APOP*, 2393-2396, April 1973. An ANOP survey conducted later in the year found that (in answer to the question: Who do you think should know about the function of the bases?) 27% thought only Government Ministers (and the US Government) should, 16% thought only the Prime Minister, Deputy PM (and the US Government), and 2% thought only the US Government, totalling 45% in support of "secrecy".

showed a greater predisposition (51% for, 34% against) for the storage of nuclear weapons in Australia in September 1965, with a considerable majority (58% for, 31% against) showing support in November 1966. The possible persuading factor for the higher support shown in the 1965 poll might be the explosion of China's first nuclear device in October 1964, and the war in Vietnam, which was depicted by the L-CP Government in Australia as a Chinese war of aggression. This might explain the even higher support for the acquisition of allied nuclear weapons shown in the 1966 poll. Two points of interest emerge from these findings: firstly, fewer Australians supported the presence of nuclear weapons in Australia than supported Australia's participation in America's nuclear communications network, suggesting that, while many believed they were not a likely nuclear target, there had to be some concession to America so as to build up a bank in the event of a non-nuclear, or invasionary attack on the Australian mainland. Secondly, the 1965 and 1966 polls referred to both England and America, perhaps a symbol of the still high trust in Great Britain's interest in the defence of Australia. Britain's refusal to enter into the Vietnam conflict, her interest in joining the European Community, and her proposal to withdraw East of Suez had the effect of driving Australians more and more into greater defence dependence on the USA.

The only Gallup question referring specifically to Australia's defence treaties with the USA was one conducted in February 1970.¹ Despite the traumas of Vietnam, a massive majority felt the treaties of real value. In answer to the question: "In your opinion, are our treaties with America of real value to Australia, or of so little value they should be ended?", 77% said they are of real value, 13% little value, and 10% were undecided.

1 APOP, 2175-2188, March-May 1970.

Thus, the picture that emerges is one of the great majority of Australians seeing the need for a close defence relationship with the western super-power - the USA. But this feeling of dependence has not been immovable: it has generally moved with the tide of international events, or as they were presented by the government at the time. Curtin's appeal to the US in 1941 may be seen as the nadir of this general public dependence, reaching its zenith in the period immediately after the commitment of Australian troops to Vietnam in 1965. But, insofar as defence facilities and their use or control by the US can be seen as the acid test of public opinion, it seems that the decade roughly delineated as the 1960's saw the gradual diminution of this great majority who saw the need to pay unquestioning homage to the great and powerful ally, although three-in-four Australians wanted the connection preserved.

III SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC SUB-GROUPS AND THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE

The previous section concluded that the Australian public, while showing some signs of disenchantment with the American alliance by about 1970, was nonetheless in substantial agreement with the Government that the alliance should be preserved. What follows will be an attempt to test this general hypothesis against the various demographic and socio-economic sub-groups of the Australian public. However, because of the intermittent nature of Gallup questions relating to the American alliance, it will be possible to date changes in attitudes only over a period of two to three years.

It will be shown that there is sufficient variation between these sub-groups to warrant some hesitation in our use of the term 'public opinion', but even in these smaller social groups, the opinions of the various publics are not whimsical and fickle as Almond's 'mood theory' maintains.

It should be noted that what follows is ethnocentric in the sense that all polls referred to are Australian; no reference is made to American attitudes to the alliance or to the amount of trust the Australian people have in the American Government. Indeed, if Australian Governments had taken the time to study the results of polls conducted in America, rather than relying on reassurances from successive Presidents, they may have been less euphoric in their public acclamations of the solidity of the alliance,¹ especially since ANZUS - the quintessence of the alliance - requires that each party act to meet the common danger 'in accordance with its constitutional processes', which means that the President is not the only decision maker.

1 Cantrill and Roll have shown that a minority of Americans favour sending troops to Gt Britain and West Germany in the event of an attack by communist-backed forces. 28% of Americans favoured the despatching of American troops to support an attack against Gt Britain and 37% would support West Germany's defence. This is even more alarming as both these countries are America's NATO allies - the linchpin of the USA's defence arrangements, see A. Cantrill and C. Roll, *op.cit.*, pp.45-46. In President Nixon's *A New Strategy for Peace* statement delivered in 1970, no direct mention of Australia was made, see N. Harper, *op.cit.*, p.279. For an account of the trust held by European countries in the USA as an ally see R. Merritt and D. Puchala, *op.cit.*, pp.226-231.

Table 5.5 : Summary of Opinion Movement Among the Population
Sub-Groups from 1969 to 1972

	Favour			Don't Favour		
	1969	1972	Shift	1969	1972	Shift
	%	%	%	%	%	%
National Average	74	64	-10	16	19	+ 3
SEX						
Men	81	71	-10	14	17	+ 3
Women	68	57	-11	18	20	+ 2
VOTER INTENT						
ALP	68	61	- 7	22	22	-
DLP	82	65	-17	9	23	+14
L-CP	80	72	- 8	12	13	+ 1
STATE						
Qld	73	68	- 5	18	15	- 3
NSW	77	65	-12	14	17	+ 3
Vic	70	63	- 7	19	20	+ 1
Tas	64	51	-13	25	23	- 2
SA	79	62	-17	14	18	+ 4
WA	74	65	- 9	15	26	+11
CITY-COUNTRY						
Capital	72	63	- 9	17	21	+ 4
Non-capital	77	66	-11	16	15	- 1
AGE						
21-29	78	63	-15	14	19	+ 5
30-49	75	68	- 7	16	17	+ 1
50-69	71	66	- 5	17	17	-
70+	69	58	-11	18	19	+ 1
OCCUPATION						
Professional	77	66	-11	16	23	+ 7
Managers, owners	86	75	-11	4	8	+ 4
Small bus. "	84	68	-16	14	17	+ 3
White collar cl.	78	67	-11	14	17	+ 3
Skilled worker	74	60	-14	17	22	+ 5
Semi-skilled	67	64	- 3	22	18	- 4
Unskilled	64	52	-12	21	26	+ 5
Farm owners	82	64	-18	12	16	+ 4
Farm Labourers	63	82	+19	33	13	-20
Others	59	63	+ 4	19	15	- 4
ECONOMIC GROUP						
Upper	79	65	-14	13	18	+ 5
Artisans, clerks	72	65	- 7	18	19	+ 1
Lower	58	53	- 5	26	18	- 8

The 1969 question was: Recently, it was announced that Australia and America were to build a \$3 million base at Woomera, in South Australia, to communicate with satellites and collect information of military significance. Do you approve - or disapprove - that. The 1972 one: Do you favour, or oppose, American naval vessels in the Indian Ocean, using the Australian naval base we are building near Perth?

Table 5.6 : The Population Sub-Groups and Nuclear Weapons in
Australia, 1965-1966

	1965 %	Favour 1966 %	Shift %	1965 %	Don't Favour 1966 %	Shift %
National Average	51	58	+ 7	34	31	- 3
SEX						
Men	61	66	+	28	28	-
Women	40	51	+11	40	34	- 6
VOTING INTENTION						
ALP	46	49	+ 3	41	40	- 1
DLP	50	62	+12	39	29	-10
L-CP	56	66	+10	28	24	- 4
STATE						
Qld	51	56	+ 5	29	32	+ 3
NSW	54	60	+ 6	32	31	- 1
Vic	45	54	+ 9	38	33	- 5
Tas	52	56	+ 4	30	34	+ 4
SA	48	66	+18	36	26	-10
WA	55	64	+ 9	35	29	- 6
AGE						
21-29	48	58	+10	39	32	- 7
30-49	53	57	+ 4	33	31	- 2
50-69	50	61	+11	33	30	- 3
70+	46	50	+ 4	30	34	+ 4

The question was: Should nuclear weapons be kept out of Australia - or should we ask America and England to base nuclear weapons here? *APOP* 1852-1871, September-December 1965; 1947-1960, November 1966-February 1967.

PARTY

It is intended here to examine the extent to which, if at all, party supporters of the three major party groups differed in their allegiance to the American alliance, and, more specifically, to speculate whether there was an appreciable gap between party supporters in the price they were prepared to pay for this defence relationship. Hitherto, the case studies have shown a considerable divergence between the various party groups in certain foreign policy attitudes. The treatment will attempt to be chronological within the framework of the available questions provided by Gallup.

On the question of American radio/communication bases and American use of Australian naval facilities, all party groups display a substantial approval rate. However, fewer Labor voters approved of all three questions than the other party groups.

Table 5.7 : Voter Intent and Support for American Installations

		NATIONAL AVERAGE	ALP	DLP	L-CP
		%	%	%	%
The questions are in Table 5.3	1963	80	74	90	90
	1969	74	68	82	80
	1972	64	61	65	72

This lower approval rating of Labor voters finds correlation in the grudging acceptance of US defence facilities by the party leadership, although this degree of resentment was far from unanimous. Thus, although the ALP Executive described the North West Cape Agreement as "a grim and awful necessity", the Federal Conference had voted only by the narrow margin of 19-17 in support of the base. The moderate resolution demanded greater Australian control, a line the party continued to push for the next decade. This

¹ *Sydney Morning Herald*, 21 March 1963.

equivocation was portrayed by the L-CP Government as anti-American.¹ A hint is given here of the peculiarity mentioned in earlier chapters of DLP voters showing a less strident approach to foreign affairs than the pronouncements of party spokesmen would suggest: the most significant fall in support for an American military presence in Australia was recorded by DLP voters. Table 5.7 shows that between 1969 and 1972, DLP support for the bases fell by 17% from 82% to 65%.

Indeed, this seeming idiosyncratic rejection of the 'partisan mentality' was observable in polls conducted at the outset of the Vietnam War, when DLP spokesmen were most vehement. Table 5.8 shows that, in answer to a question as to whether Australia should invite the USA and Gt Britain to base nuclear weapons in Australia, in both 1965 and 1966, fewer DLP voters were keen to see the invitation issued than were L-CP voters.

Table 5.8 : Voter Intent and Attitude to American and British Nuclear Weapons in Australia

		NATIONAL AVERAGE	ALP	DLP	L-CP
		%	%	%	%
1965	Keep out	34	41	39	28
	Base here	51	46	50	56
	Undecided	15	13	11	17
1966	Keep out	31	40	29	24
	Base here	58	49	62	66
	Undecided	11	11	9	10

Again, the polls show that ALP supporters are significantly less alarmist about events occurring overseas than are supporters of the other two major party groups. Table 5.8 shows that whereas DLP and L-CP voters shifted 12% and 10% respectively in support of bringing British and American nuclear

¹ Sir Robert Menzies, *CPD*, (H. of R.), 3 April 1963, vol. 38, especially pp.344-345.

weapons into Australia, ALP voters shifted only three percent: from 46% favourable to the proposal in 1965 to 49% in 1966. The first survey was conducted in the comparatively halcyon months after the announcement of large-scale involvement in 1965, and the second just prior to the stormy public and political debate which surrounded the 1966 election.

This survey, conducted in February 1970, asking "in your opinion, are our treaties with America of real value to Australia, or of so little value they should be ended", completes the pattern set in the surveys on communications and naval facilities and nuclear weapons. Of the 77% who thought Australia's treaties with the USA were of real value, 86% were L-CP voters, 85% DLP voters, and 70% ALP voters.

Table 5.9 : Attitudes to Australia's Treaties with the USA, 1970

	NATIONAL AVERAGE	ALP	DLP	L-CP
Real value	77	70	85	86
Little value	13	18	7	7
Undecided	10	12	8	7

A consistent pattern has emerged from the three Gallup questions relating to the alliance; although nearly three-in-four ALP voters supported the treaties, fewer Labor supporters saw the treaties to be of any real value than voters of the other major party groups; it will be remembered that ALP voters were less inclined to favour American communications and nuclear weapons bases than DLP and LCP voters. It can also be seen from the above table that there is little to differentiate the views of DLP and L-CP voters.¹

1 It should be noted that the Gallup question did not distinguish between the treaties Australia has - in conjunction with other countries - with the USA, (SEATO and ANZUS), and that the Labor Party recognized a qualitative difference between the two, regarding SEATO as a moribund relic of Dulles' strategy of encircling China and ANZUS as the key to Australia's defence.

The 1960's saw China emerge as the principal perceived threat to Australia's security, replacing the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, as was shown in the chapter on China, the Soviet Union was perceived as the second most threatening country to Australia's security. It is therefore instructive at this point to look briefly at some poll questions relating to the Soviet Union for further clues about party attitudes and the American relationship.

Table 5.10 shows 63% of ALP voters in favour of allowing Russians to attend May Day celebrations in Australia, whereas only 37% of DLP voters expressed approval. A majority (54%) of L-CP voters were in favour of the suggestions.

In 1969, after the Soviet Union had proposed a collective security pact for Asia¹, a Gallup survey² found only three out of ten Australians amenable to the idea. On the party breakdown, however, there was some divergence, with 14% more ALP voters than L-CP and 16% more than DLP voters expressing approval. The most likely explanation is that some ALP voters would trust the USSR in an alliance, or indeed any, relationship, because of the ideological, albeit vague, proximity of all 'socialist' parties, whether they be communist or social democratic. L-CP and DLP voters, therefore, display a greater degree of reliance on the USA, and are less willing to search for alternative security arrangements, especially with communist countries. At the political level, this was demonstrated in 1969 when the Australian Foreign Minister³, Gordon Freeth, departed from previous L-CP anti-Soviet rhetoric in a speech to Parliament. The result

1 For an account of the poor response to the proposal see A.L. Horlick, "The Soviet Union's Asian Collective Security Proposal: A Club in Search of Members", *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 47, no. 3 (Fall, 1974); and I. Clark, "The Indian Subcontinent and Collective Security -Soviet Style", *Australian Outlook*, vol. 26, no. 3 (December, 1972).

2 *APOP*, no. 207, 18 October 1969. The Gallup question referred to South-East Asia, not Asia.

3 Then Minister for "External Affairs".

was that the Foreign Minister's statement was renounced by John Gorton, the Prime Minister, after direct pressure was applied by the DLP. Freeth lost his seat at the subsequent federal election, probably because of a determined DLP campaign in his Western Australian electorate.¹

Table 5.10 : Party Attitudes to Soviet Union

QUESTION	POLL DATE		ALP	DLP	L-CP
Should Russians be allowed to attend May Day in Australia?	July 1965	Allow	63	37	54
		Don't	31	51	39
		Undecided	6	12	7
Should Australia and several countries in South-East Asia join with Russia in a Collective Security Pact?	October 1969	Favor	36	22	24
		Oppose	43	59	57
		Undecided	21	19	20
The USA has three communications bases here, and Russia wants one to photograph space objects and to study the atmosphere; are you for, or against, a scientific base in Australia, operated jointly by Russians and Australians?	April 1974	For	36	22	19
		Against	49	70	72
		Undecided	15	8	9

When, in April 1974, a Gallup survey asked respondents for their views on the stationing of a joint Australian-Soviet scientific space tracking and atmospheric-testing base, the party responses conformed to previous surveys, with three-in-four DLP and L-CP voters opposing the proposal and one-in-two ALP voters expressing opposition.²

Because of the disparate nature of the questions asked, a trend analysis of attitudes towards the Soviet Union could not be attempted with great confidence. The brief analysis was useful, however, in that it has provided some clarifying evidence about party attitudes to the American

1 For an account of the election see D. Aitkin, "The 1969 Federal Election", *Politics*, vol. 5, no. 1 (May 1970).

2 Press opinion was firmly against the base; see, for example, editorials in the *Sydney Morning Herald*, 2 April 1974, the *Australian*, 2 April 1974, and the *Age*, 6 April 1974.

alliance. Thus, a sizeable minority of ALP voters appear to be more open to security arrangements other than those with the USA, as they exhibit less stringent attitudes to the Soviet Union, probably owing to an ideological affinity, whereas L-CP and DLP voters are, with the exception of the 1965 poll, comparable in their strong anti-Soviet attitudes.

From these data, can it be said that a bipartisan attitude exists to the American alliance? It would seem that there is a substantial measure of bipartisanship over the alliance, but it should also be said that ALP voters consistently give less weight than the other party groups to the alliance, and that DLP voters were not as strong in their support for these issues as one might have guessed, judging from the statements of party leaders.

What is less certain, however, is the price which supporters are prepared to pay for the continuation of the alliance. Quite clearly, all party group supporters show a greater reluctance to have nuclear weapons in Australia, and to the extent to which this says something about the price of the alliance, the bipartisanship displayed in the seemingly more innocent issues of communications stations and use of port facilities, seems to diminish sharply.

The only clue to changing party attitudes to the price of the alliance over the 'Vietnam period' is provided in Table 5.7, where it was shown that there was some disenchantment with the bases by 1969 and more so by 1972; this declining support was demonstrated to a similar extent by ALP and L-CP voters, with DLP voters outstripping their conservative 'allies' (the L-CP) in their lower approval rating of American use of Australian facilities.

The positions of the major political party groups seem to reflect their supporters' views of the Soviet Union, with Labor voters showing less rigidity in their opposition to scientific and security relationships with the communist super-power than DLP and L-CP voters. This correlates with Labor's 'socialist' base and its policy of maintaining the American alliance as the cornerstone of Australia's defence, while showing some diplomatic independence and manoeuvrability, and the conservative parties' ideological antipathy to anything 'socialist' and public antagonism to the Soviet Union, resulting in strict, perhaps fawning, adherence to the preservation of the alliance. Thus, the "partisan mentality" seems to find some verification here, although DLP voters have at times failed to record an approval of the alliance and its requirements commensurate with the vehemence of their parliamentary representatives.

SEX

Tables 5.11 to 5.14 show a consistent divergence of attitudes between men and women. In 1965 and 1966 women were more inclined to oppose the stationing of British and American nuclear weapons in Australia. Conversely, men were strongly in favour of such weapons on Australian territory, although it can be seen from Table 5.11 that women made a more dramatic swing in favour of the acquisition of nuclear weaponry in 1966 - one year after the escalated fighting in Vietnam. This is even more significant when a poll conducted in 1962 is considered - at that stage, 52% of women interviewed wanted to see nuclear weapons kept out of Australia.

On the issue of the American communication base at Woomera, and the question of American naval vessels using Cockburn Sound, both men and women are more favourably disposed to this than to nuclear weapons. There again, however, men showed a higher approval rating than women. Both men and women became somewhat less enthused by an American military presence

between 1969 and 1972, falling 10% and 11% respectively.

Despite this reduced enthusiasm - and here it is impossible to pinpoint even an approximate date for a change in opinion - the 1970 poll on the value of the American treaties found that a huge majority of men and women saw "real value" in them, and, as with the first two questions, men revealed a higher propensity for preserving the alliance with the USA. The number of women who have been undecided about the questions put to them has been almost double that of men.

Some interesting speculation arises from the questions on attitudes to the Soviet Union. Table 5.14 shows that men were more inclined than women to permit Russians to attend May Day celebrations in 1965, to join the Soviet Union in a Collective Security Pact, and to establish a joint scientific tracking station with the USSR. While opposition to all these questions was homologous, the higher favourable percentage expressed by men was possible because of the high number of women with no opinion.

The picture that emerges from these data is one of women expressing a greater degree of abhorrence than men to the idea of nuclear weapons in Australia, less kindly disposed than men to bases, which have nuclear strategic implications, and less impressed than men with the utility of treaties with the USA. And, insofar as the Soviet Union is seen as a potential protagonist of the USA and Australia, then one would have thought before examining the poll data that men, with their stronger support for nuclear weapons, bases, and the alliance, would have been less inclined to court Soviet diplomatic gestures. However, the polls show this was not the case. A conjectural conclusion might be that men, their higher threat perception and dependence on the USA notwithstanding, are prepared, indeed willing, to make some attempt to change a perceived precarious international environment. Women, on the other hand, appear to be more fatalistic,

accepting the futility of a country attempting to influence - positively - the actions of a hostile nation.

Table 5.11 : Attitudes of Men and Women to American and British Nuclear Weapons in Australia

		NATIONAL AVERAGE	MEN	WOMEN
1965	Keep out	34	28	40
	Base here	51	61	40
	Undecided	15	11	20
1966	Keep out	31	28	34
	Base here	58	66	51
	Undecided	11	6	15
1962	Keep out	44	37	52
	Base here	47	58	
	Undecided	9	5	

Table 5.12 : American Bases in Australia

		NATIONAL AVERAGE	MEN	WOMEN
1969	Approve	74	81	68
	Disapprove	16	14	18
	Undecided	10	5	14
1972	Favour	64	71	57
	Oppose	19	17	20
	Undecided	17	12	23

Table 5.13 : Value of Australia's Treaties with the USA

		NATIONAL AVERAGE	MEN	WOMEN
1970	Real value	77	83	71
	Little value	13	11	14
	Undecided	10	6	15

Table 5.14 : Attitudes of Men and Women to Soviet Union

QUESTION	POLL DATE		MEN	WOMEN
Russians to attend May Day celebrations in Australia	July 1965	Allow	63	49
		Don't	32	40
		Undecided	5	11
Security Pact with Russia	October 1969	Favour	35	24
		Oppose	50	49
		Undecided	15	27
Joint scientific tracking station with the USSR	April 1974	For	32	22
		Against	59	62
		Undecided	9	16

AGE

Despite the arbitrariness of dividing a population into age groups, the following poll findings suggest that a person's historical experience (that is, the historical time span in which a person has lived), is not necessarily related to foreign policy opinion.

Table 5.15 shows that in 1965, opposition to nuclear weapons in Australia was highest among young people aged between 21 and 29 years, yet most of these people would have been too young to experience the dropping of atomic bombs on Japan in 1945. Moreover, even stronger opposition to British and American nuclear weapons in Australia was found among the under 21's, and this aversion was progressively more fervid with further decrease in age (see Table 5.16) from the 19-21 age group to the 14-16 group in a 1966 poll. By 1968, however, opposition to nuclear weapons, while increasing marginally, evened out between the three sub-21 age categories.

Table 5.15 : Age and Nuclear Weapons in Australia

		NATIONAL AVERAGE	21-29	30-49	50-69	70+
1965	Keep out	34	39	33	33	30
	Base here	51	48	53	50	46
	Undecided	15	12	14	17	24
1966	Keep out	31	32	32	30	34
	Base here	58	58	58	61	50
	Undecided	11	10	11	9	16

Table 5.16 : Youth Surveys on Nuclear Weapons in Australia

		NATIONAL AVERAGE	14-16	17-18	19-21
1966	Keep out	42	46	40	37
	Base here	48	45	50	50
	Undecided	10	9	10	13
1968	Keep out	45	46	45	45
	Base here	50	50	50	49
	Undecided	5	5	5	6

Explanations for this greater repugnance of nuclear weapons in Australia shown by youth must therefore be sought outside the factor of historical experience derived from age. Explanatory factors which suggest themselves for this phenomenon include a greater intellectual awareness of the possible repercussions of nuclear weapons brought about by vastly improved educational facilities, and perhaps a youthful idealism born of a comparatively salubrious economic climate. The 1966 poll, however, shows the oldest age group more opposed to nuclear weapons than the 21-29 group. This suggests the very young and very old are more inclined to idealism in international relations, whereas the middling ages seem more pragmatic. The 70+ age group also recorded a high level of 'undecided' responses. Table 5.6, furthermore, shows that the young age group shifted the most from 1965 to 1966, perhaps shedding more verifying evidence on the observation made above

that young people tend to be more aware of overseas events.

In 1969, support for the American communication bases remained high among the four age groups questioned, but by 1972 this had fallen. The decline in support is most observable in the 21-29 and 70+ age groups (see also Table 5.5), perhaps they were the pragmatic ones.

Table 5.17 : Age and American Bases in Australia

		NATIONAL AVERAGE	16-20	21-29	30-49	50-69	70+
1969	Approve	74		78	75	71	69
	Disapprove	16		14	16	17	18
	Undecided	10		8	8	12	13
1972	Favour	64	56	63	68	66	58
	Oppose	19	25	19	17	17	19
	Undecided	17	19	18	15	17	24

From these findings it might be concluded that both young and old were prepared to pay a price for the alliance in the 1960's, as long as the risks of nuclear involvement were not too high. It was not until 1972 that doubts began to be recorded even about this, which seems to complement the conclusion reached in the Vietnam chapter, that young people in Australia were slower to register - in the polls - their discontent with the war than their American counterparts; a subsidiary implication is the disaffection with the Vietnam war had ramifications for other aspects of the alliance: in this case, provision of facilities for American military-strategic use. Table 5.17 also shows that by 1972, the very young were the least favourably disposed of all age groups to the bases. An ASRB (Age) poll conducted in April 1974 found that young people "were rather more inclined than the average to see [Americans] as aggressive, arrogant, and to despise them", and fewer said Americans were trustworthy.¹

¹ M. Grattan, "The generation gap", *Age*, 19 April 1971.

With respect to the question of the value of Australia's treaties with the USA, Gallup found highest support among the 50-69 age group, the generation perhaps most involved in fighting in World War II, and consequently more aware of, among other things, the assistance given by American forces in stopping Japan's southward advance.

Comparing the 1970 question, on the value of Australia's treaties, with one asked in 1966, on whether Australia should have Britain and/or the USA as defence partners, it is possible to speculate on a new trend in Australian foreign policy thinking. Although this is highly speculative, it can be seen from the wording of the questions asked by Gallup that a new option was presenting itself in Australian political debate : that defence treaties may not be the *sine qua non* for Australia's security. Thus, the 1966 poll shows 97% expressing support for some sort of treaty arrangement, and by 1970, with a variation range of only seven percent, the different age groups contained a small, but potentially significant, number who saw the treaties with the USA of so little value that they should be ended. With British plans for withdrawal East of Suez, it is unlikely that she was seen by respondents as a viable alternative. One could surmise from this that other defence possibilities were becoming manifest, of which neutrality and continental defence are but two examples.

Table 5-18 : Age and Value of Treaties with the USA and Gt Britain and/or the USA as Australia's Defence Partner

		NATIONAL AVERAGE	14-16	17-18	19-21	
1966	Britain	5	5	5	4	
	America	19	17	19	22	
	Equal	73	76	73	70	
	No opinion	3	2	3	5	
			21-29	30-49	50-69	70+
1970	Real value	77	77	75	81	75
	Little value	13	12	15	9	13
	Undecided	10	11	10	10	12

Attitudes to the Soviet Union, as illustrated in Table 5.19, confirm the observation about communism in general that "...intolerance increases with age but within the framework of a highly condemnatory attitude all round".¹ It might be concluded, therefore, that, for Australians, increasing age proportionally diminishes the predisposition for befriending perceived adversaries of an alliance system.

Table 5.19 : Age and Attitudes to the Soviet Union

QUESTION	POLL DATE		21-29	30-49	50-69	70+
Russians to attend May Day in Australia	July 1965	Allow	57	61	52	
		Don't	38	31	40	
		Undecided	6	8	8	
Security pact with the USSR	October 1969	Favour	31	32	26	19
		Oppose	47	46	55	60
		Undecided	22	22	19	20
Joint scientific tracking station	April 1974		(14-19)			
		For	40	30	28	20
		Against	48	54	60	70
		Undecided	12	16	12	10

ECONOMIC GROUPS

The Gallup breakdowns into economic groups tabulated in Table 5.20 show a consistent pattern of significant differences in attitudes of people in the three loosely defined economic groups : upper, artisans and clerks (middle), and lower.

Table 5.20 : Bases

		NATIONAL AVERAGE	UPPER INCOME	ARTISANS, CLERKS	LOWER INCOME
1969	Approve	74	79	72	58
	Disapprove	16	13	18	26
	Undecided	10	8	10	16
1972	Favour	64	65	65	53
	Oppose	19	18	19	18
	Undecided	17	17	16	29

1 *ibid.*

Approval of the communication base at Woomera increased from the lower income group respondents (58%) to the middle (72%) to the upper group (79%), and in 1972 this pattern remained essentially the same with all groups showing decidedly less support for American use of the Cockburn naval base, the obvious exception being the rather dramatic drop shown by the upper income group to approximate the attitude of the middle income group. This finding concurs with the observation made in the Vietnam chapter, where, between 1967 and 1971, the upper income respondents showed the most significant degree of disillusionment with the Vietnam War. This is the best suggestive evidence thus far of spin-off from the war to the alliance. Nonetheless, the upper income group was overwhelmingly sanguine - as late as 1970 - about the value of the alliance.

Table 5.21 : Treaties

		NATIONAL AVERAGE	UPPER	MIDDLE	LOWER
1970	Real value	77	83	74	62
	Little value	13	9	14	21
	Undecided	10	7	12	17

Thus, while the upper income group still saw value in adherence to the alliance, there developed stronger misgivings by the early 1970's about the price that should be paid. Gallup detailed findings for the nuclear weapons questions asked in 1965 and 1966 unfortunately did not include economic and occupational breakdowns, so it is impossible to trace the trend from an earlier point.

A paradox arises from the results on the proposed collective security pact and Soviet tracking station. The lower income respondents display an enigmatic characteristic in that they are less disposed to both Soviet diplomatic initiatives, yet they were less inclined to favour the presence of American bases. Two points emerge from this finding: firstly, it tends

to cast some doubt on the proposition that lower income people are *ipso facto* Labor Party supporters, since, as the party analysis showed, ALP voters (purportedly working class) were more favourable to cooperation with the Soviet Union; and secondly, in contradiction to findings about L-CP voters, the upper income group (presumed L-CP voters) displays a proclivity to greater internationalism with both ally and adversary.

Table 5.22 : Soviet Union

			NATIONAL AVERAGE	UPPER	MIDDLE	LOWER
Pact with Russia	1969	Favour	36	29	30	23
		Oppose	43	51	48	50
Russian station	1974	For	36	29	27	16
		Against	49	62	58	66

OCCUPATION

On the more specific occupational breakdowns, Gallup is rich in detail. Too detailed, perhaps, for a comprehensive analysis in a dissertation such as this. It will be useful, nevertheless, to comment on some of the more evident findings. Table 5.23 shows that, in 1969, support for the Woomera base decreased almost perfectly down the list of occupations, professional people and farm owners the only ones out of sequence on this crude 'skill' scale. By 1972, however, this sequential neatness was greatly disrupted, demonstrating that time and events can have differing effects on different sub-sections of the population. Of the occupations named, only farm labourers went against the general trend: from 63% support in 1969 to 82% in 1972.

In 1970, managers and owners gave almost unanimous support to the alliance (92%). At the other end of the scale, unskilled workers were the least attracted by the utility of Australia's defence treaties with the

Table 5.23 : Bases

Approval	Profess ional	Manag erial	Small bus.	White collar	Skill	Semi- Skill	Un- skill	Farm owner	Farm Lab.	Others
1969	77	86	84	78	74	67	64	82	63	59
1972	66	75	68	67	60	64	52	64	82	63
Shift	-11	-11	-16	-11	-14	- 3	-12	-18	+19	+ 4

USA (63%). Interestingly, farm owners and farm labourers were highly favourably to the treaties, strongly suggesting that (in Australia, at least) the rural environment can be a more significant determinant of foreign policy opinions than is the dichotomy between the landed *bourgeoisie* and the landed *proletariat*; on the question of both American and Russian bases, however, these groups recorded an inexplicable and contradictory shift of opinion between 1969 and 1972. Moreover, whereas both farm labourers and owners were in agreement on Australia's treaties with the USA, Table 5.25 shows farm owners the least amenable to the proposed security pact with the Soviet Union, and farm labourers showing least opposition of all groups, but both reached concord on the proposed tracking station. Professionals were the most acceptable to the pact and station.

Table 5.24 : Treaties

	Profess ional	Manag erial	Small bus.	White collar	Skill	Semi- Skill	Un- skill	Farm owner	Farm lab.	Others
1970										
Real value	79	92	79	82	74	73	63	84	83	72
Little "	17	3	6	11	17	14	19	3	5	14
Undecided	4	5	16	7	9	13	18	12	12	14

Table 5.25 : Soviet Union

	Profess ional	Manag erial	Small bus.	White coll	Skill	Semi- Skill	Un- skill	Farm owner	Farm lab	Others
Security Pact										
1969										
For	39	33	28	32	30	27	23	20	27	20
Against	46	48	48	49	45	55	50	61	39	59
Tracking base										
1974										
For	45	26	9	35	26	29	21	11	14	13
Against	48	62	88	55	63	54	57	79	82	75

STATES

The Australian population does not differ on regional lines to anywhere near the same extent as comparable western countries such as Great Britain and the USA. With the exception of Tasmania, and possibly Western Australia, state boundaries were not drawn on distinct geographic criteria. A conundrum raised in the previous case studies was the putative defence consciousness of Western Australians¹: the Vietnam chapter found this to be less pronounced than expected and the China questions evoked a threat response below the national average. Emphasis will be given to this in what follows.

The four questions examined in the context of the American alliance, however, are almost conclusive in showing - considering the size of the continent - a unique homogeneity of opinion on the state breakdowns. Tables 5.26 to 5.29 provide tangible evidence of this. This general comment notwithstanding, it is useful to look at the slight variations that are manifest.

1 Good examples of press acceptance of this notion see "Clancy", *National Times*, March 18-23, 1974, and the *Australian*, 16 May 1974.

Table 5.26 : Nuclear Weapons

		NATIONAL AVERAGE	QLD	NSW	VIC	TAS	SA	WA
1965	Keep out	34	29	32	38	30	36	35
	Base here	51	51	54	45	52	48	55
	Undecided	15	20	14	16	18	15	10
1966	Keep out	31	32	31	33	34	26	29
	Base here	58	56	60	54	56	66	64
	Undecided	11	12	9	14	10	8	7

State differences of opinion on nuclear weapons are barely perceptible, and where they are, they are inconsistent. Despite South Australia's vast territorial buffer zone to the north, respondents from that state paradoxically showed most alarm on this question between 1965 and 1966, shifting 18% from minority approval of 48% to a high majority support of 66%. Perhaps South Australians, who live predominantly near the coast, were aware that a nuclear attack on Australia would involve submarines, in which case the great land mass would be irrelevant, although this does not explain why they felt more threatened than Western Australians. This attitude was again revealed in the 1969 poll concerning the establishment of the base at Woomera, but was not obvious on the question of the American naval use of Cockburn Sound.

Table 5.27 : Bases

		NATIONAL AVERAGE	QLD	NSW	VIC	TAS	SA	WA
WOOMERA								
1969	Approve	74	73	77	70	64	79	74
	Disapprove	16	18	14	19	25	14	15
	Undecided	10	8	9	11	11	8	11
COCKBURN SOUND								
1972	Favour	64	68	65	63	51	62	65
	Oppose	19	15	17	20	23	18	26
	Undecided	17	17	18	17	26	20	9

Western Australians reveal the highest negative response to American forces using Cockburn Sound, and support was only one percent above the national average, adding some weight to the proposition that the state is not as sensitive about defence as is commonly assumed. It is the shift in the disapproval columns which reveals the paradox already mentioned in the China chapter : despite the build-up of the Soviet navy in the Indian Ocean after 1968, and the furore over the Freeth statement in 1969, a growing number of respondents in Western Australia viewed an American military presence with disfavour. Perhaps they were apprehensive about the possible reciprocity of an even larger Soviet naval presence if the American navy were welcomed. Indeed, this catalytic impact has since been noted in a similar context; a UN sub-committee report on the Indian Ocean concluded that the establishment of the communications base at North West Cape directly provoked the Soviet Indian Ocean naval proliferation¹. The veracity of this need not concern us here, but suffice it to say that such thinking may have been prevalent among sections of the Western Australian public.

The question on the value of the treaties, however, shows Western Australia above average in supporting them. (See Table 5.28). Again, this suggestive of a certain disjunction in opinion between the alliance *per se* and the price it entails.

Table 5.28 : Treaties

		NATIONAL AVERAGE	QLD	NSW	VIC	TAS	SA	WA
1970	Real value	77	79	77	77	74	73	81
	Little value	13	11	12	14	12	13	11
	Undecided	10	10	11	9	13	15	8

1 *Canberra Times*, 28 May 1974, *Australian* 16 May 1974. The sub-committee of the UN ad hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean "Zone of Peace" proposal consisted of three experts: one from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the Indian Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, and a retired Iranian navy admiral.

The results of the question relating to the Soviet Union are amazing for their similarity of response from the six states; the only significant variation was Tasmania in 1969, but one should be chary here because of the small sample involved.

Table 5.29 : Soviet Union

QUESTION	POLL DATE		QLD	NSW	VIC	TAS	SA	WA
May Day	July 1965	Allow	57	56	56	53	56	56
		Don't	37	36	36	38	34	33
		Undecided	6	8	8	9	10	9
Security Pact	Oct. 1969	Favour	29	29	27	34	32	29
		Oppose	50	48	54	41	51	48
		Undecided	21	23	19	25	17	23
Tracking Station	April 1974	For	21	32	28	21	27	23
		Against	70	57	57	56	62	67
		Undecided	9	11	15	23	11	10

This chapter has been an attempt to complete the pattern of opinion on the American alliance which has emerged from the previous two chapters. The index used to depict Australian opinion from the end of the Second World War to the early 1970's, again concentrating on the last decade or so, was the question of the establishment and continuation of American defence installations on Australian soil, which might directly or indirectly involve Australia in US nuclear and conventional embroilments. Poll findings were examined in relation to two principal themes: firstly, whether the alliance was worth preserving, and secondly, if so, what price was worth paying. It was seen that by the early 1960's the American connection was thought of by the vast majority of Australians as the defence imperative, and that almost no price was too high for its maintenance. By the late 1960's and early 1970's, however, in the context of a changing international environment, especially the 'local' regional one where Vietnam was the catalytic agent, Australians exhibited through the surveys an increased disenchantment with the alliance, not so much *in toto* (although there was

some evidence of this), but with the contribution Australia had to make for its preservation, in the form of the provision of defence facilities. This trend, however, was a steady one - never erratic or moody, and should not overlook the accumulated goodwill towards the United States, which had built up over nearly three decades.

The socio-demographic breakdowns reveal significant opinion differences among the economic and occupational sub-groups, party divisions, and the sex dichotomy, age and state determinants appear less decisive. Responses of ALP and L-CP supporters fairly reflect the position of their respective party platforms, with the former showing less confidence in the alliance. Again, DLP voters were not as favourably disposed to American defence installations as the positions of normally obstreperous party spokesmen would suggest. Women, while less inclined to give an opinion, were not as reliant on the USA as men; the age sub-divisions show that young and very old Australians are slightly less enthused by Americans using Australian land and facilities for defence purposes; the economic groups recorded a progressive acceptance of the American alliance the higher one's income; and the occupational categories generally conformed to this observation. Finally, the state-by-state analysis added supportive evidence to the contention that Western Australians are not significantly, if indeed at all, more dependent on a great and powerful ally for defending their territory than residents in the other states.

CHAPTER SIX

RACIAL ISSUES

Racism has been a persistent theme in Australian foreign policy debate, stretching well back into the colonial Australia of the mid-1850's.¹ The purpose of the present case study, however, is to trace the movement of opinion on what might be called 'race' from the post World War II period to 1966, at a high level of generality, and, more particularly, from 1966 to 1972. Australian Gallup Polls reflect well this continued interest in racial attitudes: they provide abundant survey material for the past 30 years. Many attempts have been made to capture the parts of the Australian psyche that relate to race, but, as a rule, these attempts have been the impressionistic accounts of historians, political scientists and others.² This should not be taken as criticism of the conclusions reached by such people, but rather a comment on the methods used to reach those conclusions. What follows is an attempt to analyze the racial attitudes of the Australian people by recourse to the answers of respondents to, mainly, Gallup interviewers. At this point, it is not intended to embark on a debate concerning the respective merits of these two competing methodologies, but suffice it to say that here is another approach.

1 R.N. Ebbels, *The Australian Labor Movement 1851-1900*, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1955, 2 ed, especially pp.74 and 78. See also A. Yarwood, *Asian Migration to Australia, the Background to Exclusion 1896-1913*, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1964.

2 Examples are F.S. Stevens (ed.), *Racism: The Australian Experience*, vol. 3, Sydney, Australia and New Zealand Book Company, 1972; and L. Lippman, *To Achieve Our Country*, Australia and the Aborigines, Melbourne, Cheshire, 1970. Research which has drawn extensively on survey findings includes H.I. London, *Non-White Immigration and the White Australia Policy*, Sydney, Sydney University Press, 1970; M. Goot, "Red, White and Brown: Australian Attitudes to the World Since the Thirties," *Australian Outlook*, vol. 24, no. 2 (August, 1970), pp.188-200; A. Richardson and R. Taft, "Australian Attitudes Towards Immigrants" A Review of Social Survey Findings", *International Migration Review*, vol. 2, no. 3 (Summer, 1968), pp.46-55.

Main emphasis has been given to Gallup material on attitudes to Australia's immigration policies, because "...the history and practice of racial discrimination, witnessed in the development of the 'White Australia' policy, is the keystone to understanding Australian racial attitudes and the country's foreign relationships."¹ Nonetheless, Gallup findings on related issues of Southern Africa and the Australian aborigines generate further hypotheses about Australian racial attitudes, and will be presented.

I RACIAL ATTITUDES OF THE AUSTRALIAN GENERAL PUBLIC : WORLD WAR II - 1966

The image of Australia as a racist country lingers today;² but, there can be no doubt that there has been an improvement since the turbulent days of the late 1940's, when Arthur Calwell, as Minister for Immigration, ruthlessly administered the Australian Government's policy of a 'White Australia', taking expression in several infamous deportation cases.³ Therein, perhaps, lies the explanation for the voluminous invective which was heaped on Australia by at least one South-East Asian Government and other non-governmental critics: "they were not questioning our Government's right to decide the composition of the Australian population, but only the heartless way it was administering its policy..."⁴ The anti-Australian sentiment was clearly demonstrated in 1948, when W. McMahon

1 F.S. Stevens, "Introduction", *op.cit.*, p.1.

2 See, for example, "Australia called racist", *Canberra Times*, 27 November 1974, and "Australia 'has racist image'", *Canberra Times*, 7 January 1975.

3 Filipino reaction was sharp; indicative of this was a bill, providing for the expulsion of all resident Australians from the Philippines, was passed by the Filipino lower house, but was rejected by the Senate.

4 W. McMahon Ball, "Is White Australia Alive and Well?", *Age*, 18 March 1974.

Ball, then Ambassador-Extraordinary for the Chifley Labor Government, led a goodwill mission to South-East Asia, to be met by demonstrations and a censorious press. In a vain attempt to defend his Government's migration policy, Ball told a press conference, at which he bore the brunt of some "ruthlessly critical" questions, that "there was likely to be some change in Australian public opinion on immigration in the coming decades."¹ The comment caused a furore, both in Australia and South-East Asia. How far, then, have Australia's racial attitudes - and policies - come since the hapless Ball mission of 1948?

Labor's post-war mass immigration policy was unapologetically racist. Calwell was adamant about the preservation of a homogeneous population, and was never reluctant to proclaim the racial bias inherent in the immigration laws.² In one vehement and defiant statement he said:

No matter how violent the criticism, no matter how fierce and unrelenting the attacks upon me personally may be, I am determined that the flag of 'White Australia' will not be lowered.³

The 'kiss of death' for any lowering of the flag was probably provided by the Communist Party, the only party actively opposing 'White Australia' in the 1930's and 1940's. Thus, anyone who opposed it ran the risk of being branded a Communist sympathiser.

However, while it seems indisputable that the Australian people were in whole-hearted agreement with Calwell's policy of mass European migration,⁴ Gallup findings suggest that Australians were not committed absolutely to a white Australia: their views appear to have been temporized - at variance with the Immigration Minister - by a small, but symbolic, issue.

1 *ibid.* Emphasis added.

2 A. Calwell, *Australian Tradition in Migration*, Canberra, 1949, *passim*, pp.1-10.

3 *Sydney Morning Herald*, 24 March 1949, quoted in H. London, *op.cit.*, p.82.

4 *APOP*, 345-354, May-June, 1946.

The issue was war-time refugees and inter-racial marriages, the most notable cases being those of Gamboa, O'Keefe, and 14 Malay seamen.¹

Table 6.1 shows the public opposed to the uncompromising deportation orders of Mr Calwell.

Table 6.1 : Asian Wives and Husbands

QUESTION	GALLUP DATE	YES	NO	UNDECIDED
If an Australian man marries an Asiatic woman, do you think she should, or should not, be allowed to live in Australia?	May, June 1948	63	26	11
Should the 14 Malay seamen who married Australian women be allowed to remain here?	May, June 1948	57	30	13
If an Australian soldier in Japan marries a Japanese girl, would you favour, or oppose, allowing her into Australia?	Feb.-Mar. 1952	60	33	7
Similar to above	Feb.-Mar. 1953	68	25	7

The presence of Asians in Australia in such modest proportions was made even more palatable because Australians had inter-married, and assimilation was likely.²

1 About 1000 Asian refugees were admitted into Australia during the war, C. Price, "Immigration: 1949-1970", in G. Greenwood and N. Harper (eds.), *op.cit.*, p.195. The effects of WW II have been well described by J. Mackie, "The Generational Differences in Australian notions of our Asian neighbours", in J. Jordens (ed.), *op.cit.*, pp.51-54.

2 M. Goot, *op.cit.*, p.189. Subsequent references to Goot in this chapter are to the 1970 *Australian Outlook* article.

But seen in the context of even small-scale Asian migration to Australia, the public seemed reluctant, at least, in the early to mid-1950's. Table 6.2, however, shows the "slow demise"¹ of white Australia in the 1950's and 1960's; Gallup findings on this question have been presented in two tables: one in skeletal form for a ready appreciation of the trend, the other (Table 6.3) in more detailed form to allow for scrutiny of question discrepancies.

Table 6.2 : Non-European Migrants

QUESTION	YEAR OF POLL	YES %	NO %	UNDECIDED %
All questions varied to some extent; roughly the spirit of the questions was: should Australia allow a small number of non-European migrants to come to Australia each year?	1954	31	61	8
	1956	42	51	7
	1957	36	55	9
	1958	44	45	11
	1960	59	33	8
	1961	51	39	10
	1961	57	32	11
	1962	64	30	6
	1963	58	34	8
	1964	78	22	5
	1965	77	16	7

Tables 6.2 and 6.3 show opinion opposed to token migration, that is, 50 people a year from every country, in 1954 and 1956, although opposition fell in the time that elapsed between these two polls. The Liberal Party in opposition had opposed Calwell's rigidity on deportation, and with their accession to power, seemed to adopt a more liberal policy - but only for Asians living in Australia. Thus, during the 1950's, some

1 C. Price, *op.cit.*, p.194.

Table 6.3 : Non-European Migrants

QUESTION	GALLUP SHEET DATE	YES	NO	UNDECIDED
Do you favour allowing, say, 50 people a year from each and every country into Australia?	March 1954	31	61	8
Similar to above.	Feb.-Mar.1956	42	51	7
Do you favour, or oppose, allowing a certain number of Asians to settle here?	? 1957	36	55	9
Similar to above.	? 1958	44	45	11
Similar to above.	Jan.-Feb.1960	55	34	11
Do you favour, or oppose a change in our migration policy to allow a reasonable number of Asians with skilled occupations to come and live here permanently?	Aug.-Sept.1960	59	33	8
Similar to above, but <u>Africans</u> were added.	May-Aug. 1961	51	39	10
Africans deleted from above question.	Nov. 1961-Jan. 1962	57	32	11
As above.	July-Oct. 1962	64	30	6
As above.	Sept.-Oct.1963	58	34	8
Do you think Asian migration should be prohibited altogether, or allowed in small numbers, or allowed without restriction?	July-Sept.1964	73	22	5 unrestricted = 5% small numbers = 73% Total = 78%
Should migrants from Asia be allowed here without restriction, or on a selective basis, or not at all?	Sept.-Dec.1965	71	16	7 unrestricted = 6% selective = 71% Total = 77%

discriminating regulations, such as those relating to citizenship for non-European spouses, and naturalization for non-Europeans, were abrogated;¹ these changes were executed by Harold Holt, who served as Minister for Immigration from 1950-1958. However, "though internal discrimination gradually died away, Australia remained very cautious about admitting non-European settlers,"² but, to return to the polls, it seems that, whatever the apprehensions held by the L-CP Government, the public seemed to shift in favour of the suggestion that a small number of Asians should be allowed to migrate to Australia.

Majority approval (55%) was first recorded after a poll conducted in December 1959 (*APOP*, January and February, 1960), and a further noticeable positive response (59%) was found in August 1960 (*APOP*, August-September, 1960), when the phrase "with skilled occupations" was inserted. In one poll, when people were asked about Africans as well as Asians coming to settle in Australia, only a bare majority (51%) was favourable.³ Nevertheless, by the time Gallup changed the wording of their question in 1964, about 60% of those interviewed expressed approval of the suggested quota system. Quite clearly, public opinion had moved ahead of government policy. And, despite reports that Australia's immigration policy remained a thorn in the side of good relations with Asian Governments,⁴ the Australian Government remained adamant in its

1 For full details see H. London, *op.cit.*, p.82.

2 C. Price, *op.cit.*, p.197.

3 Cf. conclusion reached by M. Goot, *op.cit.*, p.189. The June 1961 census showed that 9,368 Asian people were living in Australia, the *Age*, 14 June 1963.

4 "White Australia Policy 'A Bad Spot'" *Straits Times*, 7 January 1963; "White Australia Policy Criticized", *Age*, 7 August 1963; "Strong feeling on Australian racial policy", *Age*, 22 August 1963.

rejection of any requests to relax the 'White Australia' policy,¹ thus falling behind developments in comparable western countries.

Asian immigration became an issue of some public debate during 1964 and 1965, and it was observable that more and more Australians were becoming publicly sympathetic to some Asian migration. In 1963, 555 Lebanese migrants settled in Australia, and investigations into a similar scheme with Turkey followed,² perhaps this helped blurr the distinction between Europeans and Asians. International criticism (some constructive) continued to be levelled at Australia,³ but possibly of greater influence was the domestic debate. The Immigration Reform Association called on the Government to establish a special committee of inquiry to investigate Asian immigration⁴ in September 1964, and earlier in the year, it was disclosed that the 11th International Students Conference had rejected Australia as host because of its 'White Australia' policy and the poor conditions of its aborigines.⁵ In 1965, the debate was intensified by the deportation cases of Nancy Prasad and Cheung Chek-To. Letters to the editor columns showed a widening public debate,⁶ with organisations such as the Junior Chamber of Commerce advocating increased Asian migration. And, indicative of the extent of public discussion, was the "unanimous decision" of the ALP, White Australia's most ardent proponent, "to wipe

1 "Quota for Asian Immigrants urged", *Dawn*, 3 September 1963.

2 *Age*, 24 July 1964.

3 *Straits Times*, 25 January 1964; T. Durbin, *New York Times*, 12 January 1965; and *Japanese Times*, 12 August 1965.

4 *Age*, 7 September, 1964.

5 *Age*, 20 April 1964.

6 The *Australian* provoked many letters by running editorials sympathetic to some Asian migration, and presenting numerous analytical pieces on the subject. The paper commenced publication in 1964.

the words White Australia from its official statement of policy".¹ At that time, there were about 30,000 non-Europeans living in Australia.²

Against this background of growing public interest, Gallup shows, as evidenced in Table 6.3, that in 1964 and 1965, three out of four respondents favoured selective Asian immigration of about 1250 a year, a substantial increase of those in favour to previous years. Moreover, Gallup found that in February 1966,³ most Australians (63%) agreed that Asians, as with Europeans, should wait only five years before being eligible for naturalisation; a 15 year rule had applied since 1956.

Finally, in five polls conducted between 1950 and 1962, respondents showed strong dissatisfaction with the nomenclature: 'White Australia'.

Before continuing the discussion of "majority public opinion", it might be useful to look at some of the Gallup findings on the related questions of Southern Africa and Australia's aborigines asked in the 1950's and 1960's. This should provide a clearer picture of Australia's racial attitudes.

In a damning indictment on Australia's racist attitudes towards aborigines, a lecturer in race relations at Durham University, recently said, *inter alia*, :

The Aboriginal in Australia cannot walk around his country as a human being. Historically and culturally, he is treated as a sub-human. This culture has been broken up and destroyed. His belief system has been distorted and exploited. Even his labour, especially in Queensland and [the] Northern Territory, is exploited.⁴

1 Age, 3 August 1965.

2 Australian, 8 May 1965.

3 APOP, 1884-1899, February-April, 1966.

4 C. Mullard, quoted in the Canberra Times, 27 November 1974.

Most contemporary observers of the Australian aboriginal are critical of Government policies, the significant advances of the past decade notwithstanding. Some have also said that Government policies accurately reflect the prevailing Australian sentiments. Aborigines are under-privileged citizens, it is sometimes said, not just because governments have been singularly apathetic, but also because the Australian people would not tolerate similar treatment of a comparable number of non-aborigines.¹ This line of reasoning assumes that if one abhors a certain policy, one acts to change that policy, but experience tells us that that is a false assumption.

Gallup findings do not reveal a pervasive aboriginal antipathy among white Australians. Indeed, the polls display a strong current of sympathy and support for aborigines. Of course, racial prejudice may be more prevalent among minority sub-groups of the population, but this must wait for the detailed breakdowns.

In the 1950's, much discriminatory legislation existed in Commonwealth, State and Northern Territory statute books.² On a national scale, a majority of Australians thought this to be unwarranted. Only six per cent of a Gallup survey conducted in 1954³ would have agreed with the comment above that aborigines were "sub-human." Ninety per cent of the sample - one of the biggest majorities ever found by *APOP* - regarded aborigines as having equal intelligence with whites. And, since perceived intellectual superiority is normally fundamental to any racial prejudices, this result is telling, and is suggestive of paternalistic rather than

1 A.B. Pittock, "Towards a Multi-Racial Society", in F.S. Stevens (ed.), *op.cit.*, pp.245.

2 A.B. Pittock and L. Lippman, "Aborigines", in R. Forward (ed.) *Public Policy in Australia*, Melbourne, Cheshire, 1974, pp.56-57.

3 *APOP*, 1056-1069, December 1954 and January 1955.

racially superior attitudes, although the line between these two is not easily discernible. Other polls conducted in the 1950's show a bare majority in favour of aborigines consuming alcohol, indecision on their optimal mode of living, and substantial (77%) support for their right to vote. For full details, see Table 6.4.

Aboriginal advancement organisations, increased academic and journalistic interest, and the explosiveness of race as a public issue, especially in the United States, were all factors which "...combined to increase public awareness of the extremely low socio-economic position of Aborigines"¹ in the 1960's. Thus, after extensive media coverage was given in 1963 to the high infant mortality rate among aborigines, an astounding 92% of a survey conducted in November 1963,² approved mining royalty payments to aborigines. That only 64% of the previous survey (see Table 6.4) favoured giving aboriginals the right to vote, further underscores the observation made above that attitudes are based on a high degree of paternalism. Only 16%, in 1964, considered enough was being done to educate and house aborigines. But this paternalism might well be less than laudable, since it is a relative condition, especially if it is true that: "Australia, for the Aborigines (and they are the prime measure of racism here) is worse than either South Africa or Rhodesia for the Africans".³

As Goot has said: "what relationship exists between attitudes to White Australia and attitudes to South Africa and Rhodesia is difficult to say."⁴ Nonetheless, it might be fruitful to search the data for clues.

1 A. Pittock and L. Lippman, *op.cit.*, pp.57-58. They did not begin to lobby Parliament, however, until 1965. *The Times*, 1 December 1965.

2 APOP, 1729-1744, December 1963 - April 1964.

3 S. Holland, "Australia, Rhodesia and South Africa: A Comparison, in F. Stevens (ed.), *op.cit.*, p.187.

4 M. Goot, *op.cit.*, p.190.

In 1960, most Australians (59-22-19) disapproved of the South African policy of apartheid (separate development), and a larger majority (67-9-24) disapproved of the methods of enforcement used to instigate separate settlements. These questions were posed in June, three months after the Sharpville "massacre", and the reactions of the political parties were markedly different: The Labor Party expressed "abhorrence" at the shootings, and regret that earlier statements by the Prime Minister, Mr Menzies, "gave the impression of Australian condonation of them."¹ This criticism was based on Menzies diplomatic support for South Africa, which appears to have been supported, in large part, by the Australian public. It can be seen from Table 6.5, that, on the question of South Africa's expulsion from the British Commonwealth, majority opinion showed considerable support for South Africa. In late 1960,² only 11% of a sample would not have allowed South Africa to remain in the Commonwealth; four months later, 20% thought that Menzies' defence of South Africa at the Prime Ministers' Conference in London³ was wrong; and in June 1961,⁴ after South Africa's expulsion, 47% thought the Commonwealth had 'lost', 15% thought it had gained, and 28% were of the opinion that it would make no difference. Concerning trade, Australians reveal a pragmatism that was evident in previous case studies; three-in-four respondents thought

1 *Keessing's Contemporary Archives*, July 16-23, 1960, p.17529. For a succinct analysis of why the Government gave diplomatic support to South Africa in the early 1960's see, W.J. Hudson, "Australian Diplomacy and South Africa," in F.S. Stevens (ed.), *op.cit.*, p.173; and, for an example of Australia's diplomatic style on the South African issue, see the *Age*, 7 May 1964, for a report of comments by Paul Hasluck, the Minister for External Affairs.

2 *APOP*, 1504-1514, January-February, 1961.

3 *APOP*, 1531-1546, May-August, 1961.

4 The South African Prime Minister, Dr Verwoerd, later wrote to Menzies: "You are seen by all shades of opinion as perhaps the best friend South Africa has, and the feeling of comradeship with Australia has never been better." R.G. Menzies, *Afternoon Light*, London, Cassell, 1967, p.202.

Table 6.4 : Aborigines

QUESTION	GALLUP SHEET DATE	YES	NO	UNDECIDED	
Suppose an aborigine had the same kind of upbringing as you, do you think he could have learnt to do your work, or not?	Dec.1954- Jan.1955	90	6	4	
Do you think aborigines should, or should not, have the right to vote at Federal elections?	Dec.1954- Jan.1955	77	15	8	
Should we help the aboriginals in Central Australia live their tribal lives, or educate them to live like white men?	Feb.-Mar. 1957	Tribal 47	Whites 45	Undecided 8	
Do you think full blooded aboriginals should, or should not, be allowed to buy beer and other alcoholic drinks, the same as other people?	Jan.-Feb. 1961	Let them 51	don't 35	My opinion 14	
Do you think all Australian aboriginals should, or should not, be given the right to vote at Federal elections?	Nov.1961- Jan.1962	64	30	6	
Do you favour, or oppose, the suggestion that the first £150,000 of royalties from mining bauxite in an aboriginal reserve in the Northern Territory should be spent on the capital needs of the local aboriginals?	Dec.1963- April 1964	92	4	4	
Do you think we are doing enough to educate and house aboriginals - or should more be spent on them?	Sept.-Oct. 1964	Lot more 56	Little more 19	Enough now 16	No op. 9

Australia should continue trading with South Africa (only 14% thought it should be stopped), despite a high degree of repugnance for the apartheid policies of that Government.

Thus, the polls suggest that Australians in the early 1960's were uncertain of themselves in their attitudes to South Africa: opposing

Table 6.5 : Southern Africa

QUESTION	GALLUP SHEET DATE			
Quite apart from the question of enforcement, do you approve making natives live in separate areas [ie. South Africa] or should they be allowed to live with white people?	Jun.-Aug. 1960	White whites	Separate	Undecided
		59	22	19
Do you approve, or disapprove of the policy of forcing natives to live either in their own tribal villages or in separate settlements on the edge of cities and towns?	Jun.-Aug. 1960	Approve	Disapprove	No opinion
		9	67	24
Since South Africa is now to become a republic, should the Republic of South Africa be allowed to remain in the British Commonwealth?	Jan.-Feb. 1961	Remain	No	Undecided
		69	11	20
Do you think Mr Menzies was right, or wrong, in doing all that he could at the Prime Ministers' Conference in London to keep South Africa in the British Commonwealth?	March-May, 1961	Right	Wrong	Undecided
		58	21	21
Considering everything, do you think the British Commonwealth has gained, or lost, by South Africa's withdrawal [because of its apartheid policy]?	May-Aug. 1961	Lost	Gained	No difference
		47	15	28
				No opinion
				10
If the United Nations vote on whether all countries should stop trading with South Africa, because of the way coloured people are separated there, do you think Australia should vote to stop world trade with South Africa, or vote to continue trading?	Oct.-Nov. 1964	Continue	Stop	No opinion
		73	14	13

'apartheid' in principle, but supporting the South African Government internationally, and desirous of trade.

Soon after Rhodesia announced its Unilateral Declaration of Independence, on 11 November 1965, Sir Robert Menzies told the House of Representatives (November 16) that Australia regarded Mr Smith's regime as illegal and would not recognize it. At the same time he made it clear that Australia totally rejected the use of force in Rhodesia, would not contribute 'either physically or financially' to the use of force, and had 'very great reservations' regarding sanctions.¹

Gallup findings show that Rhodesia's UDI was opposed - in December 1965² - by 51% of Gallup respondents, but only nine percent would send a force to fight the white Rhodesians. And, while 29% favoured the UN oil embargo, Australians were inclined to favour trading with the rebel government (see Table 6.6), although not to the same extent as with South Africa. Quite clearly, the Rhodesian case was viewed by the Australian Government and people with more opprobrium than the South African.

Table 6.6 : Rhodesia

Do you think the Rhodesian Government should, or should not, have declared itself independent?	Dec.1965 Jan.1966	Approve 16	Oppose 51	Undecided 33
Do you think we should continue to trade with Rhodesia or not?	"	50	28	22
As above	May-July 1966	45	22	33
Is the UN right, or wrong, in trying to stop the flow of oil to Rhodesia?	"	29	20	51

1 *Keesings Contemporary Archives*, 18-25 December 1965, p.21131.

2 *APOP*, 1872-1883, December 1965 - January 1966.

To conclude this section, a Table (6.7) has been included on attitudes to European migration between 1951 and 1964, the object of which is to show that immigration *per se* has not been received with anywhere near universal endorsement in Australia.

The data examined thus far provides some useful background to the detailed breakdowns which follow. It has been shown that opinion shifted slowly, albeit significantly, from the early 1950's to the mid-1960's, when three-in-four Australians supported some Asian migration: the seeds had been sown in the deportation cases of the 1940's. This might be seen as a reasonable indicator of a degree of racial tolerance. The polls reveal a paternalistic concern for the socio-economic condition of the aborigines, as well as for their civil rights, this interest appearing to be on the upsurge in the early 1960's. On South Africa, Australians display moral disapproval of apartheid and its methods, but were more reticent in condemning South Africa internationally, perhaps because of the ramifications for Australia's domestic jurisdiction over its administration of 'White Australia', the aborigines, and even Papua New Guinea. Moreover, Australians were not keen to sever trade with South Africa. The questions relating to Rhodesia seem to confirm these observations.

Table 6.7 : European Migration

GALLUP DATE	Increase	No change	Maintain	Reduce	No opinion
April, May, June, 1951	22	33	55	41	4
July, Aug, 1952	14	29	43	52	5
Sept-Oct, 1953	21	32	53	42	5
July-Aug, 1954	9	40	49	44	7
July-Aug, 1955	10	39	49	45	6
July, 1956	8	40	48	45	7
Dec, 1958 & Jan, 1959	26	33	59	34	7
Feb-Mar, 1962	15	37	52	44	4
Sept-Oct, 1963	28	43	71	27	2
Sept-Oct, 1964	29	43	72	21	7

II RACIAL ATTITUDES OF THE AUSTRALIAN GENERAL PUBLIC : 1966 - 1972

There can be little doubt that from the mid-1960's there was greater governmental and public interest in the idea of "race", especially as its related to the treatment of Australia's aboriginal community and to non-white immigration. Australia was, moreover, not immune to the growing international interest in Southern Africa.

Fortuitously, Gallup's policy of publishing detailed survey breakdowns coincided with an event which was of great significance, both for Australian policies and - insofar as they are separate entities - opinion: the retirement of Sir Robert Menzies as Prime Minister, at the age of 71, on 20 January 1966. Undoubtedly, this was the end of an era, for Menzies' racial intolerance had not been completely disguised,¹ and it must surely

¹ G. Greenwood, "Australian Foreign Policy in Action", in G. Greenwood and N. Harper (eds.), *Australia in World Affairs 1961-1965*, Melbourne, Cheshire for the AIIA, 1968, pp.25 & 26; and J. Camilleri, *An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy*, pp.26-27.

be more than coincidence that, just two months after his replacement by Harold Holt, wide-ranging changes were made in Australia's immigration laws. "Not until then could it be said that the pillars of the sixty-five year old White Australia policy began to be undermined."¹ As was seen in the previous section, the Government had fallen behind prevailing public opinion on the matter of selective immigration : Gallup recorded in 1965 that 77% of Australians were likely to favour some Asian migration, and only 16% were opposed to any 'coloured' migrants. There were also signs at about this time of changing attitudes in the Labor Party, hitherto the bastion of White Australia. Progressive elements in the party become more outspoken. E.G. Whitlam, then Deputy Leader of the ALP, was critical of the exclusion of skilled Asians,² and he was supported by Dr Cairns, Don Dunstan, and Clyde Cameron. These party heretics, however, had not yet gained the ascendancy. The old brigade was still prominent; Fred Daley, for example, warned that the Government's liberalized immigration policy might "fan the flames of racial discrimination in Australia."³ And, of course, Arthur Calwell still lead the party, but more of this later.

In March 1966, the Minister for Immigration, Hubert Opperman, announced changes in Australia's immigration laws. The changes were of symbolic significance: they provided for some selective non-European migration; the 15-year citizenship rule, in operation since 1956, was modified to allow for European and non-European citizenship after five years residence in Australia; and the list of acceptable occupational categories was expanded to include persons with technical and professional

1 A.C. Palfreeman, "Non-White Immigration to Australia", *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 47 no. 3 (Fall, 1974), p.347.

2 Reported in the *Age*, 19 January 1966; *Straits Times*, 25 January 1966.

3 *Age*, 25 March 1966. Cf. J.F. Cairns, *Living with Asia*, Melbourne, Lansdowne, 1965, p.107.

skills.¹ The changes were progressive and, generally, well-received.

The *Age*, for example, editorialized:

The liberalisation of the old rules deserves hearty applause as a step in the right direction, and those who regard it as inadequate should look back a few years and see how far we have already travelled from what was once a fixed official attitude.²

Overseas, the reforms were well-publicized,³ and were particularly welcomed in South-East Asia.⁴ While the "racial slur"⁵ was eliminated, the new laws were not the harbinger of any multi-racial society. As Opperman's successor to the Immigration portfolio, B.M. Snedden, was to tell Parliament later:

The Government's policy on this matter [coloured immigration] has been made clear on a number of occasions. Specifically in March 1966 a statement was made in which it was made clear that our policy would be to accept non-European migrants, based on their capacity to settle, their capacity to integrate into our community and their possession of skills of positive value to the Australian community. *The purpose of this policy is to maintain the homogeneity of the Australian people and to avoid the creation of enclaves of bitterness or dissension which have bedevilled so many other countries. I am sure I can say that the mainstream of thought in Australia would support that policy. I am quite sure that the Australian people would not wish the Government's policy to be aimed at creating a multi-racial society. It certainly does not do this.*⁶

1 C. Price, *op.cit.*, p.198.

2 *Age*, 10 March 1966. Earlier the Victorian Association for Immigration Reform declared that the proposed changes "did not go far enough", *Age*, 22 February 1966.

3 *The Times* (London), 22 February 1966, *New York Times*, 10 March, 1966.

4 *Straits Times*, 10 March 1966. For an antagonistic statement on Australia's immigration laws see the *Indonesian Herald*, 15 April 1966.

5 H. London, *op.cit.*, p.46.

6 CPD, (H. of R.), 24 September 1968, no. 16, pp.1359-1360. Emphasis added.

Gallup findings in 1966 tend to confirm Mr Snedden's later assessment of prevailing public opinion. A November 1966 sample found 18% of those with an opinion were opposed to any Asian migrants whatsoever, 62% favoured some migration, with most support for between 500 and 1,000. Counterbalancing the 18% who opposed any Asian migrants, was another 18%, who thought that Australia should allow over 5,000 yearly. (See Table 6.8). Thus, J.C. Watson's fears of "racial contamination"¹ seems to have - in the main - disappeared as an argument against coloured migration. New arguments were now debated;² these need no elaboration here, however.

Thus, by 1966, policy and public opinion displayed a fairly high degree of congruence. Between 1966 and 1971, Gallup did not ask any questions relating to Asian immigration. This is indicative of the comparative lack of public interest in the issue over the period: at none of the House elections (1966, 1969, 1972) held was the issue of Asian immigration, or, indeed, European immigration, in political contention. It will not be possible, therefore, to trace majority opinion on a yearly basis between 1966 and 1971. Before any analysis of the available poll data can be attempted, however, it might be useful to sketch the public and political debate over these years so as to provide some background information, leading up to the 'revival' of non-European migration as a contentious issue.

The changes to the immigration restrictions, in March 1966, seemed to dampen public discussion somewhat. In December, however, Australia's High Commissioner to Gt Britain, Sir Alexander Downer (himself a former

1 A. Yarwood, *op.cit.*, p.25.

2 Good summaries of the opposing arguments can be found in J. Ray, "In Defence of Australia's Policy towards Non-White Immigration", in F.S. Stevens (ed.), *op.cit.*, pp.233-239; and A. Palfreeman, *op.cit.*, pp.352-355.

Table 6.8 : Non-European Migration 1966-1972

QUESTION	POLL DATE			
Should migrants from Asia be allowed here without restriction or on a selective basis, or not at all?	Sept. 1965	Unrestricted	= 6%	
		Selective	= 71%	
		None at all	= 16%	
		No opinion	= 7%	
Last year (1966) 500 Asians were allowed to remain here permanently; this year about 1000 will probably become permanent residents, about how many Asians should be given permanent residential status each year?	Nov. 1966	More than 20,000	= 5%	
		20,000 a year	= 2	
		10,000 a year	= 2	
		5,000 a year	= 9	
		1,000 a year	= 25	43%
		500 a year	= 19	
		Admit none	= 18	37%
		No idea	= 20	
About how many non-white Asians and Africans should be given permanent residential status each year?	May 1971	Less than 1,000	= 6%	
		1,000 - 1,999	= 6	12%
		2,000 - 4,999	= 2	
		5,000 - 9,999	= 2	
		10,000 or more	= 4	8%
		No limit	= 4	
		None	= 20	
		No idea	= 57	
Last year 3,500 non-European people were given permanent residential status, how many do you favour?	July 1971	More than 3,500	= 10%	
		3,500 as last year	= 27	
		Fewer than 3,500	= 13	
		None	= 13	
		Couldn't say	= 37	
Each year about 3,000 non-Europeans and about 7,000 people of mixed blood are given permanent residential status in Australia, would you favour - or oppose - increasing migration from Asia to Australia to 25,000 a year?	Aug 1971	Favour	= 30%	
		Oppose	= 60	
		Undecided	= 10	
Recently, Mr Chipp made statements on the immigration policy supporting the prospect of a multi-racial society, while the former Labor Leader, Mr Calwell, opposed the prospect of a multi-racial society. Do you approve or disapprove an immigration policy supporting a multi-racial society?	June 1972	Approve	= 37%	
		Disapprove	= 49	
		Undecided	= 14	
Of the 140,000 people who came here last year, about 3,000 were Asians and 7,000 had mixed blood. They were given permanent residential status in Australia. Is that annual intake of 10,000 Asians and people of mixed blood too few, too many or about right. If too few or too many - how many do you favour each year?	Oct 1972	10,000 is too few	= 8%	
		10,000 is about right	= 40	48%
		10,000 is too many	= 24	
		and gave figures averaging about 4,000)		
		No coloured migrants	= 16	40%
		No opinion	= 12	

Immigration Minister), delivering the 1966 Sir Thomas Holland Memorial Lecture at the Royal Society of Arts in London, suggested that the new laws did not go far enough; the first influential dissentient voice had been raised. He told his audience that:

Australia could afford to relax her restrictive policy - not to the extent of changing its Anglo-European base - but to a point where an annual influx of non-Europeans would be admitted as a matter of course.¹

Thereafter, the issue received intermittent public interest.

In December 1966, the task of executing the 'new' immigration rules was handed over to B.M. Snedden, and from then on, it seems the L-CP Government wanted to "...liberalize the policy gradually while maintaining the rhetoric of restriction."² Thus, in August 1967, Mr Snedden told the Constitutional club that:

the number of non-European migrants admitted would increase, but it would be a relatively small number pitched to the maintenance of social homogeneity.³

The policy remained, in essence, highly discriminatory, despite the humanity⁴ displayed by the Government in allowing Vietnamese war orphans to be adopted by Australians. Portraying well the policy at the time, Melbourne *Age* cartoonist, Tanner, depicted two Vietnamese orphans standing outside the 'White Australia' performance, with one orphan saying to the other: "We're lucky we're orphans - we'd never get in with our parents."⁵ The "Great White Walls"⁶ stood firm. The Labor Opposition had changed its leadership in February 1967, E.G. Whitlam replacing A.A. Calwell,

1 *Age*, 8 December 1966.

2 H. London, *op.cit.*, p.46.

3 *Age*, 8 August 1967.

4 *Age*, editorial, 6 December 1967.

5 *Age*, 6 December 1967.

6 C.A. Price, *The Great White Walls are Built*, Restrictive Immigration to North America and Australasia 1836-1888, Canberra, ANU Press in association with the AIIA, 1974.

and this proved to be significant, as the two leaders had little in common in their attitudes to race.

In 1968, probably because of Australia's inability to attract enough migrants in keeping with economic growth, informed public interest was aroused. Professor Gustav Nossal, director of Melbourne's Walter and Eliza Hall Institute, provided the momentum by suggesting that an annual quota of Asian immigrants, initially 5,000, should be introduced. Mr Snedden, however, was unimpressed with the proposal,¹ pointing out that, since the immigration laws had been relaxed two years earlier, 3000 Asians with the right to become citizens had taken up residence in Australia. Mr Snedden continued to defend the Government's restrictions, using the "tension risk"² argument to good advantage; multi-racialism or social pluralism would amount to "social masochism",³ he told a Monash University meeting. As was quoted above, Mr Snedden invoked public opinion, but there is no statistical way of checking for this time. A growing number of people in the ALP were increasingly critical of the Government's tight restrictions on Asian migration,⁴ while Fred Daly continued his rearguard fight against such migration in the House of Representatives.⁵ Occasional reports in overseas newspapers were generally sympathetic with the Government's apparent willingness to reform, however slowly.⁶

1 *Age*, 19 January 1968.

2 *Age*, 16 July 1969.

3 *Age*, 1 October 1968.

4 For example, D. Dunstan, *Age*, 9 September 1968, and 17 December 1968, and E.G. Whitlam, reported in *Straits Times*, 8 March 1968.

5 *Age*, 21 March 1968. For a collection of Parliamentarians' views see CPD, (H. of R.), 24 September 1968, no. 16, pp.1393-1419.

6 *New York Times*, 7 January 1968; *Japan Times*, 4 February 1968.

Insofar as the *Age* (Melbourne) is an adequate reflection of a national political debate, and the quality of the newspaper suggests this to be a reasonable inference,¹ it seems that the Asian versus European migration debate became subdued in 1969. A significant clue to Australia's slowly changing orientations was when the Minister for the Interior (Mr Nixon) suggested that European languages should be jettisoned from Australian schools, and replaced by Asian languages. The suggestion was seen as too radical at least by the *Age*,² and as "ridiculous" by the Federal president of the Australian Natives' Association.³ Although the suggestion was probably more a reflection of Australia's increasing trade and foreign policy interests in the region than with any desire for more Asian immigrants, it is nonetheless a sign of a greater preoccupation with Asia. And it is not inconceivable that the changes in immigration laws were related to a "political" need to improve Australia's international image.

Mr Snedden continued to rebut suggestions that the 'White Australia' policy should be abolished, reiterating, in Parliament, that while "...our policy is not an exclusionist policy", it was certainly not "...directed towards the creation of a multi-racial society".⁴ The restrictions were indeed exclusionist to quote the Minister: "As a rule of thumb they [acceptable non-Europeans] would have to be university graduates."⁵ On the Labor side, the small number of dissident proponents of Asian immigration grew. Mr Lewis Kent, for example, chairman of the

1 T.B. Millar, "The Making of Australian Foreign Policy," paper delivered at AIIA Conference, 'Advance Australia - where? Foreign Policy in the 1970's', Adelaide, June 15-17, 1974, mimeo, p.17.

2 *Age*, 27 January 1969.

3 *ibid.*

4 B.M. Snedden, *CPD*, (H. of R.), 22 May 1969, no. 9, p.2100.

5 M. Richardson, *Age*, 25 July 1970.

Victorian ALP branch's New Australian Committee admonished his own party:

Whenever immigration is debated in the House of Representatives most Opposition members suddenly become indistinguishable from their conservative counterparts. They all merge into a happy white man's club.¹

In November 1969, Phillip Lynch assumed the ministerial portfolio for Immigration; no fundamental changes appeared likely, and Lynch was quick to describe future migration policy as "evolutionary rather than revolutionary."²

The L-CP Government continued to refer to Australia's "selective" immigration policy, but for many this heralded a change in nomenclature only: racial criteria were still largely employed at the onset of the decade, one in which racism promised to be of greater prominence than hitherto. Accordingly, 'White Australia' continued to generate strong interest overseas.³ Informed impressionistic opinion in Australia, moreover, speculated that the racial bias in the Government's immigration policy was endorsed by "the vast majority of Australians."⁴ An academic seemed to capture well the predominant public feeling at the time:

Australian immigration policies in the 1970's will have to continue to steer delicately between internal disorders and external condemnation. We need to let enough coloured immigrants in to show that we are not racially prejudiced, yet not so many as to reveal that we are.⁵

It was of some significance that Mr Lynch failed to mention the question of "selective" migration when, in July 1970, the first full-scale

1 *Age*, 12 May 1969.

2 *Age*, 3 December 1969. See a booklet distributed by the Department of Immigration, *The Evolution of a Policy*, by the Hon. Phillip Lynch, Canberra, 1971.

3 For example, *The Times* (London), 28 February; *Pakistan Times*, 23 June; *Straits Times*, 24 June, 6 August; *New York Times*, 13 December.

4 M. Richardson, *Age*, 25 July 1970.

5 R. O'Neill, "New Attitudes for a new Decade: Some Conclusions for Australian Foreign Policy Towards Asia in the 1970's," *Australian Outlook*, vol. 24, no. 2 (August, 1970), p.123.

review of Australia's immigration program was announced:¹ the policy remained Euro-centric. It was not surprising, therefore, that Australia's restrictive policy came under heavy criticism at the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association conference, held in Canberra, in October 1970, prompting Mr Lynch to reply that "Australia would continue to adopt an attitude of prudent caution toward admission of coloured settlers, but it would not exclude them."² At this time, about 3,000 non-Europeans were being admitted each year, with the possibility of a further increase to 3,500 in 1971; in addition, about 7,000 settlers of mixed descent were admitted.

The Government's recalcitrance³ forced reformers to try a new tactic, and consequently turned to countenancing the Government to provide assisted passage to non-Europeans. No favourable response was forthcoming, however.⁴

Thus, by the end of 1970, a strong racial element remained in Australia's immigration policies. Such an isolated case as the approval of an American negro for citizenship provoked *The New York Times* to run a story.⁵ But certainly there had been some movement since 1966; and, more especially, since these far-off days in World War II, when the Curtin Government objected to American coloured troops being stationed in Australia, because - as Eisenhower wrote - "their Constitution would

1 *Age*, 27 July 1970.

2 *Age*, 9 October 1970.

3 See the Prime Minister's (J.G. Gorton) reply to a question by Mr Daly CPD, (H. of R.), 20 October 1970, no.19, pp.2455-2456.

4 C. Price, *op.cit.*, pp.198-199; *Age*, 3 November 1970.

5 R. Trumbull, *New York Times*, 13 December 1970.

not allow Negroes to enter their nation."¹ According to some smaller surveys reported in the *Age*, 26 July 1971, Australian attitudes to Negro migration became steadily more liberal over the 23 year period from 1948 to 1971. "The proportion of people who took the tough total-exclusion line against the Negroes fell from more than three people in four in 1948 to less than one in two in 1964, and then to just over one in three this year."²

That the stigma of 'White Australia' remained, in 1971, was made clear at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Conference held in Singapore, and, although Mr Gorton showed himself to be "very sensitive"³ to foreign criticism,⁴ the L-CP Government persisted with its policies by: deciding not to relax the five year residence required for coloured Commonwealth migrants before they can become Australian citizens,⁵ carrying out several well-publicized deportation orders,⁶ offending, at least, the Philippines' Government, and steadfastly refusing to grant assisted passages to non-European migrants.⁷ This was sufficient ammunition for South Australian Premier, Don Dunstan. In one of several outspoken attacks on the immigration restrictions, he said:

It is true that we still have a number of ponderous troglodytes shuffling through our nation's corridors of power to whom the idea of racial and cultural equality are anathema ... Times were

1 B. Jones, book review of *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years*, *Age*, 14 November 1970.

2 M. Grattan, *Age*, 26 July 1971.

3 C. Price, *op.cit.*, p.202.

4 *Straits Times*, 9 January 1971.

5 S. Nisbet, *Age*, 21 April 1971.

6 *Age*, 26 June 1971.

7 S. Nisbet, *Age*, 14 April 1971.

changing, however, and the troglodytes were dying out. ...I believe a great majority reject the [immigration] policy's assumptions outright.¹

Dr A.J. Forbes, the new Immigration Minister, defended his Government's stance, declaring that the valid social objective of the immigration policy was to avoid the creation of permanent minority groups which could cause social tension and problems presently tormenting many other countries.²

How, then, did public opinion emerge from this sporadic debate after nearly five years in the polling wilderness?

The 1966 reforms had been the death-knell of a "lily-white Australia",³ and by the early 1970's it seems the question had changed from "whether non-Europeans should be admitted as settlers" to "how many"?

Demonstrative of the lack of public interest in non-European migration was the extraordinarily high number of respondents with "no idea" in answer to a question asked by Gallup in May 1971;⁴ 57% - about 6 out of ten - had no idea on how many non-white Asian and African (the inclusion of the latter might have been confusing to respondents) migrants should be given permanent residential status in Australia each year. Nonetheless, this result would seem to suggest, as hypothesized above, that Australians, by 1971, tacitly endorsed some non-European migration, although they were unsure of the quantity; indeed, it is possible that the high proportion with "no idea" was more indicative of the inherent difficulty of the question than any lack of interest in the issue.

1 *Age*, 19 July 1971.

2 *Straits Times*, 24 July 1971.

3 J.A.C. Mackie, book review, *H. London, op.cit.*, *Age*, 8 May 1971.

4 *APOP*, 2268-2271, June 1971.

There is, however, some evidence to suggest that those who favoured non-white migration would prefer Asians, or whoever, to be of an acceptable living standard.¹ One point which clearly emanates from the 1966 and 1971 polls is that a solid core of people remained opposed to any non-white immigration.

Table 6.9 : Opposition to Non-White Immigration 1966-1971

		% age opposed to any coloured migration
November	1966	18%
May	1971	20
July	1971	13
October	1972	16

Table 6.9 would seem to justify J.A.C. Mackie's comment, made in 1971, that:

it [the L-CP Government] has done little to change the old attitudes which sustained and were sustained by the white-Australia policy. In 1966, it even denied that any significant change had occurred, so that the Dalys and Calwells in our midst are still able to claim that they represent the wisdom embodied in 'our traditional policy' on non-white immigration.²

From Gallup poll data it is difficult to discern what changes had occurred between 1966 and 1971 with respect to the number of welcome non-Europeans, because of changes in the numerical categories. However, insofar as Table 6.8 allows for comparison, public opinion seemed to move marginally with the Government's gradual relaxation of restrictions. In 1966, 44% approved 500-1000 a year, and 43% at least 1,000. By July 1971, 37% were in favour of giving permanent residential status to at least 3,500 non-

¹ See sample comments made by respondents in *ibid.*, and APOP, 2282-2285, August-September, 1971.

² J.A.C. Mackie, *op.cit.*

Europeans, although to this figure should be added 11% who favoured an intake of between 1,000 and 3,500. Asked, in August 1971, whether migration from Asia should be increased to 25,000 a year, 30% of the respondents approved, a dramatic increase since November 1966, when only five percent of respondents expressed a willingness to accept more than 20,000 each year. Nonetheless, a firm majority (60%) opposed such an increase.

Age Poll findings, published in July 1971, complement the foregoing analysis, adding clarity to some of the broader generalizations. The paper's analyst concluded from three surveys, conducted in 1948, 1964 and 1971, that:

while Australians have become rather more tolerant of certain clearly "different" groups, they cling to a hierarchy of migration preferences that centres on the familiar English, and gradually moves outwards to embrace northern Europeans, then other Europeans, and finally looks very hesitantly at the groups perceived as the most 'foreign' and different in race and culture.¹

Commenting on these results, sociologist F.E. Emery has said:

Even though the figures show a consistent, albeit slow, reduction in hostility to coloured immigrants, the level of hostility is such that we could not hope to move beyond a policy of selected coloured immigration (such as Canada has) ...But they could live with more coloured immigrants than Australia takes at present.²

These data also serve to remind us of the dangers of classifying so many diverse ethnic and racial groups into a single category such as non-European, non-white, or Asian. For example, it was found that Australian attitudes to Chinese migrants hardened between the advent of Mao Tse-tung's communist government in 1949 and 1971 when the *Age* conducted its survey. By contrast, attitudes softened appreciably towards the overseas

1 M. Grattan, *Age*, 26 July 1971. The survey samples were not as representative as Gallups.

2 *Age*, 26 July 1971.

Chinese, suggesting that Australia's racial attitudes are not easily distinguishable from her political attitudes.¹ This would seem to further underscore the proposition that, as a 'group', Australians are not unabashed racists, their cautious attitude to non-European migration notwithstanding.

1972 was an election year, and it appeared that for the first time since 1949 immigration might be a significant electoral issue. The Labor Party altered its overall immigration platform, the basis of which was to reduce the total intake of immigrants and would, contrary to Liberal Party forebodings,² result in fewer Asian migrants.³ In practice, there was not much to differentiate the major parties.

When Mr Don Chipp, the Minister for Customs and Excise, told a television audience in May 1972 that: "I would like to see a stage in the 1980's where Australia is becoming the only true multi-racial country in the world",⁴ he unwittingly sparked off an intense public debate. Victorian Premier, Sir Henry Bolte, and Arthur Calwell voiced their disapproval, the latter with characteristic racist offensiveness, but these "troglodytes" were in turn admonished by Senator Willesee and Mr Enderby on the Labor side, and Mr Gorton for the Liberals.⁵ Dr Forbes, apparently with Cabinet approval, disowned Chipp's statement, reaffirming the Government's commitment to maintain a "predominantly homogeneous society."⁶

1 See A. Huck, *op.cit.*, p.315.

2 Dr Forbes, *Age*, 28 January 1972.

3 *Age*, 24 April 1972.

4 Quoted by A. Barnes, *Age*, 3 May 1972.

5 A. Barnes, *Age*, 5 May 1972.

6 *ibid.*

In June 1972, in answer to a Gallup question on the desirability of a multi-racial society, 49% of the respondents gave negative responses, while 37% were in the affirmative, the remainder (14%) were undecided. Any comparison with earlier Gallup questions should be treated circumspectly; however, insofar as "multi-racial" was equated with an annual non-European intake of 25,000 by interviewees, then a considerable change in public opinion took place between August 1971 and June 1972.

Table 6.10 : Non-White Immigration 1971-1972

(25,000 Asian migrants a year) August 1971		(A multi-racial Australia) June 1972
Favour	30	37
Oppose	60	49
Undecided	10	14

For the exact wording of questions see Table 6.8.

Certainly, by October 1972, Gallup respondents revealed a high degree of support for a substantial intake - by Australian standards - of Asian and mixed migrants. While numbers supporting an annual intake of over 10,000 had changed imperceptibly since 1966 and 1971, those supporting around the 10,000 a year mark had increased appreciably (40%), with a further 24% giving figures averaging around 4,000.¹ Moreover, in July, an *Age* poll had found "...a surprisingly high level of professed tolerance"² in a Sydney and Melbourne survey. Seventy-five percent answered that colored migrants were just as acceptable as any other kind. These results, however, conflict with the *Age* poll conducted one year earlier, and documented above, which showed that Australians do have preferences in

¹ *APOP*, 2362-2365, November 1972.

² L. Radic, *Age*, 31 July 1972.

the type of migrant coming to Australia. The question seems to have been put at too high a level of generality, perhaps inducing a higher tolerance response than was deserved. As the *Age* analyst soberly asks:

...is this liberalism [found in the 1972 poll] largely a mask worn in society because racial tolerance is currently fashionable and because overt prejudice is bad form?¹

However, that racial tolerance is seen as fashionable is a clear sign of change, whatever its magnitude.

Public opinion, then, moved towards a more tolerant position after 1966. The public seemed to accept the Government's gradual increase in non-European migration giving some credence to the "follower mentality", mentioned above. To say, however, as the editor of one Asian magazine did, that "individual Australians are in fact colour blind while the official Australian Government policy is one of colour discrimination",² is to be too charitable to the Australian public - notwithstanding the change in opinion that has occurred since World War II in general, and 1966, in particular. It is impossible, of course, to quantify the racial basis of any questions concerned with Asian immigration - people might object to it, for example, on social and economic grounds - but it seems reasonable to suggest that this issue is the best indicator of racial tolerance available.

Several considerations preclude comparable analyses of attitudes and policies to mass migration, aborigines, and Southern Africa: first, with the exception of mass migration, Gallup asked neither consistent nor closely related questions to facilitate reliable trend analyses; second, space is in short supply; third, and most importantly, it is doubtful that these questions are accurate indications of racial prejudice

1 *ibid.*

2 Mr Tarzie Vittachi, reported in the *Age*, 12 April 1972.

since, unlike non-European migration, many variables in opinion formation are possible; for example, a survey respondent might oppose South Africa's expulsion from the UN, but still be as vehemently opposed to apartheid as the respondent who favours expulsion. Consequently, it is intended to trace only major developments in these issue areas, suggesting tentative conclusions.

The analysis of public opinion between 1966 and 1972 has thus far been presented in a void, in the sense that it is somewhat unreal to look at non-white immigration with scant reference to Australia's total immigration program. Indeed, it is possible that such investigation would highlight less obvious forms of racial intolerance. However, the bases of opinion formation on this issue are far less clear than for those on non-European migration, and it is therefore intended merely to present, in tabulated form, Gallup questions asked over the period, making two pertinent comments. As Table 6.13 shows, support for migration of all sorts declined from December 1967, when support was the highest since 1951, to October 1972. The steady fall in numbers in favour of increasing the migrant intake, and the fairly steady increase in numbers for reducing the intake are not wholly reliable, because of the significant change in figures posed in the questions. Nonetheless, where the two questions are almost identical, 1967 and 1972, the results tend to confirm the downward trend in support for new immigrants, the percentage for reducing the intake leaping from 18-46%. An *Age* poll told 1,000 people in Melbourne and Sydney in mid-1971¹ "that over the past four years Australia's intake of migrants had averaged about 160,000 per year and the target for the next financial year was 140,000", and then asked for an opinion. The poll found the following:

1 M. Grattan, *Age*, 12 July 1971.

Table 6.11 : Attitudes of Sydney and Melbourne Respondents
to Migrant Intake, 1971

For too many	32%
Somewhat too many	21
About right	34
Somewhat too few	8
Far too few	3
Not Stated	2

Source: *Age*, 12 July 1971.

Now, if these replies are "translated" into Gallup wording, the results become:

<u>Table 6.12 :</u>	<i>Age</i> (July 1971)	Gallup (July 1971)
Increase	11%	14%
No change	34	21
Reduce	53	31
No idea	2	34

The above table, then, confirms strong resistance to increased immigration by 1971. Moreover, the higher percentage in favour of reduction recorded by the *Age* poll provokes a tentative hypothesis: Australians, living in Sydney and Melbourne where migrant communities are prevalent, display a higher resentment to such peoples. Admittedly, this greater desire for reduced immigration in the two major cities may not have been "racially" inspired - objections may have been raised, for example, on purely economic grounds; however, these findings are suggestive of latent prejudices in the Australian character, which become manifest when contact is made with people of a different language, habits, culture, and background - especially in large numbers. Thus, while Australians

were showing more tolerance in 1972 than hitherto, as illustrated by the previous section on Asian immigration, it does appear that there existed a numerical threshold on such tolerance.

Table 6.13 : Migration 1966-1972

QUESTION	POLL DATE	Increase	No change	Reduce	No Idea
	1961	15	37	44	4
	1964	29	43	21	7
Do you think the number who come here each year [140,000] should be increased, maintained, or reduced?	December 1967	36	36	18	10
In your opinion, are 160,000 migrants a year too many, too few or about right?	October 1968	19	45	26	10
Last year about 180,000 migrants came to Australia to live permanently - and this year another 180,000 may come here. Are 180,000 a year too many - too few - or about right?	August 1970	12	45	38	5
Last year 170,000 people came to Australia to live here permanently, and next year the planned intake is 140,000. Do you favour more, less, or the same number this year?	July 1971	14	21	31	34
This year about 140,000 migrants will come to Australia to live permanently. How many migrants do you favour coming here in future?	October 1972	4	17	46	33

Between 1966 and 1972, Gallup saw fit on only one occasion to ask questions on aborigines, despite the proliferation of various aboriginal activist groups, and increased public debate. This lack of survey questions makes it impossible to follow public opinion from the first attempt to lobby Parliament in 1965 to the establishment of the "Aboriginal Embassy" on the lawns in front of Parliament House (Canberra) in 1972. Gallup asked questions concerning aborigines in a survey conducted in May 1967, prior to what was perhaps, for aborigines, the event of most political significance in the period under review - the 1967 national referendum. In December 1965, 87% of Gallup respondents were in favour of including aboriginals in the census, 8% opposed the suggestion, while 5% were undecided. Under the constitution, aboriginals were excluded from the census. This survey was held one month after Sir Robert Menzies introduced legislation in the House of Representatives to allow for a referendum on two matters relating to aborigines¹: one was to change the federal constitution (section 127) which excluded them from being counted in national census counts, and the other was the alteration of section 51 (xxvi) allowing the Commonwealth to pass laws relating to aborigines. Section 127, Sir Robert told the House, was "...completely out of harmony with our national attitudes and with the elevation of the Aborigines into the ranks of citizenship which we all wish to see".² He explained that "the principal reason" why section 127 was initially put in the Constitution was "...the practical difficulties that would be encountered in satisfactorily enumerating the Aboriginal population."³ At the second reading stage, the three major parties supported the referendum bill; it was opposed by the DLP. However, on 16 February 1966

1 The referendum was also to include a proposal for the rejection of the numerical link, or nexus, between the two houses of Parliament.

2 CPD, (H. of R.), 11 November 1965, no. 19, p.2639.

3 *ibid*, p.2638.

Harold Holt, as the new Prime Minister, deferred the referendum date from May 1966 to 1967 explaining that the decision had been taken because he had assumed office at a time when the Government found itself heavily occupied with a great many important and pressing matters both at home and abroad.¹ This perhaps testifies to the lack of a sense of urgency held by the Government at the time.

When the referendum was held, in May 1967, an overwhelming majority (89%) of voters in all states supported the constitutional change as regards aborigines; a Gallup survey predicted approval would be 94%.² That international image-building played a not inconsiderable part in the Government's delayed action was demonstrated by Mr Holt after the announcement of the results, when he said that it would now be possible for the Federal Government to play a useful part in ensuring justice and social acceptance for aborigines, and would contribute to Australia's international standing by demonstrating to the outside world an overwhelming desire to give full acceptance to the aborigines.³

Public opinion, it seems, both from the referendum results and a survey conducted by Gallup in May 1967, was favourably disposed to aborigines and their material advancement. Table 6.14 shows that, at the time, 88% of respondents were either fairly favourable or very favourable in their feelings about aboriginals. Of people who voted "yes" at the referendum, 88% said they were favourable to aboriginals. So did 89% of the small minority who voted "No".⁴ Only 5% said they were fairly

1 *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 24 June - 1 July 1967, p.22106.

2 *APOP*, 1961-1980, February-June 1967.

3 *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 24 June - 1 July 1967, p.22107.

4 *APOP*, 1961-1980, February-June 1967.

Table 6.14 : Aborigines

		<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Undecided</u>
Under the constitution aboriginals are excluded from the census, at a referendum would you vote 'Yes' or 'No' to include them in the census?	December 1965	87	8	5
What are your feelings about aboriginals in general - favourable or unfavourable? Are you fairly or very favourable (or unfavourable)?	May 1967	Very favourable Fairly favourable Fairly unfavourable Very unfavourable No opinion	35% <u>53</u> 4% <u>1</u> 7	88% 5%
How much actual contact have you had with aboriginals?	May 1967	None A little A fair amount A lot	37% 39 16 8	

unfavourable or very unfavourable in their feelings towards aboriginals.

In answer to the question: "how much actual contact have you had with aboriginals," 37% of respondents said "none", 39% "a little", 16% "a fair amount", 8% "a lot". It is difficult from the available data to correlate racial intolerance with racial contact as was tentatively attempted in the treatment of migrants in general, but this finding does suggest that there are fewer with unfavourable attitudes than there are who have had a lot or a fair amount of contact with aboriginals. A different impression is gained, however, when the detailed results of the referendum are examined. There were higher anti-aborigine votes in all the country areas where aborigines lived.¹ Moreover, *APOP* occupation breakdowns show the highest percentages unfavourable to aborigines were registered in the farm owner (7%) and farm labourer (10%) categories.

¹ Australian Electoral Office, *Statistical Returns of the 1967 Referendums*, Canberra, 1967.

Since 1967, this contact pattern has altered somewhat, with the proportion of the aboriginal population living in cities increasing: from 32.6% in 1966 to 43.6% in 1971.¹ Unfortunately, a lack of polling data prohibits any analysis of the impact of this trend on public opinion in general, as well as the many sub-groups. Nonetheless, the point that should be stressed is that the urbanisation of aborigines constitutes, by the early 1970's, another contributory element to an increasing heterogeneity of the Australian community.

It was concluded above that Australian reactions to Rhodesia's UDI were indecisive, although not the extent that trade should be disrupted; but disapproval was stronger than for South Africa. Again, it should be pointed out that it is possible for someone to object to the Smith regime, yet support trade with Rhodesia because to do otherwise would incur hardship on the blacks of the country. This 'humanitarian' line was pushed by the L-CP Government. The table below shows that, in February 1966, only 27% of a sample favoured enforcing sanctions, 35% thought independence should be allowed, and 38% were undecided. Four years later, when Gallup asked whether the Australian Government should recognize the Government of Rhodesia, 53% of the respondents answered in the affirmative, in contrast to 35% in 1966 who thought Rhodesia should be allowed their independence. Similarly, the percentage in favour of Australia trading with Rhodesia rose from 50% (see Table 6.6) to 60% in April 1970. Thus, Australians appear to have become more amenable to the white minority regime in Rhodesia by 1970.

By 1970, sport with South Africa became a matter of some public controversy, superseding the prominence given hitherto to Rhodesia. Table 6.16 shows that Australians were not keen to have their cricket

1 A. Pittock and L. Lippman, *op.cit.*, p.59.

Table 6.15 : Rhodesia

QUESTION	POLL DATE			
Do you think Rhodesia should be allowed independence, without trading restrictions, or should trading sanctions be enforced, in an effort to make Rhodesia agree to Britain's plans for self-government?	February 1966	Allow indep.	Enforce sanctions	No opinion
		35	27	38
Should the Australian Government recognise the Government of Rhodesia or treat it as illegal?	April 1970	Recognise	Treat as illegal	Undecided
		53	24	23
The UN is trying to stop trade with Rhodesia. Do you think Australia should - or should not - trade with Rhodesia?	April 1970	Trade	Don't	Undecided
		60	22	18

interrupted with South Africa, despite that country's apartheid policy, although it should be noted that support fell, in a comparatively short space in time, from a high of 85% in March 1971 to 63% in August. This decline, which in no way amounts to a "mood change", is perhaps explained by the considerable - usually acrimonious - public debate which arose from the tour of Australia by the South African Rugby Union tour, the "highlights" of which included the Queensland Premier's (Mr Bjelke-Peterson) declaration of a state of emergency when the team played in Brisbane, and Mr McMahon's (then Prime Minister) offer to transport the team in RAAF aircraft, after unions placed a black ban on planes carrying the South Africans. At least one newspaper thought Mr McMahon's decision would "...help spread the bad news" about Australia's racist image, confirming "...the idea foreigners have of us as racists ... Already our sympathy with South Africa, our immigration policy and the way we

repress our Aboriginal minority are well known overseas."¹

On the question of Great Britain selling arms and ammunition to South Africa, however, Australians showed considerably less approval; indeed, only 35% and 33%, in March and May 1971 respectively, approved the action, with a similar number disapproving, 34% and 36% respectively. Unlike the other questions relating to South Africa, these questions elicited a high number of undecided respondents.

By the early 1970s, then, it appears Australians were prepared to accept the *status quo*: racial minority governments in both South Africa and Rhodesia. To a large extent, the identity of interests so noticeable at the time of Menzies' defence of South Africa in the early 1960s had not dissipated, at least where sport and trade were concerned. Thus, while a majority of Australians were prepared to accept small quantities of non-European migrants by the start of the new decade, only a very small minority were prepared to sacrifice certain material benefits in order to put pressure on South African and Rhodesian leaders to moderate, if not abrogate, their racialist policies.

Table 6.16 : South Africa

The Australian Board of Cricket Control has agreed to send a cricket team to South Africa in 1975. Do you approve, or disapprove, that decision?	April 1970	Approve 73	Disapprove 16	Undecided 11
An all-white team of South Africans is due to play test cricket here next Summer.	March 1971	85	9	6
Do you approve - or disapprove - those South Africans playing cricket here?	May 1971	76	13	11
	August 1971	63	23	14
Do you approve - or disapprove - Britain selling arms and ammunition to South Africa?	March 1971	35	34	30
	May 1971	33	36	31

¹ *Australian*, 26 June 1971.

III RACIAL ATTITUDES AMONG SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC SUB-GROUPS

The detailed breakdowns provided by Gallup on questions relating to Australian racial attitudes reveal differences, some expected, others not, of opinion among the various strata of the population. Tables 6.17 and 6.18 are presented as overviews of the variables under analysis; only brief mention will be made of those sub-groups which were not categorized over an examinable time span. The variables used - party, sex, age, state, religion and economic group - are adequate, but one can only lament the absence of the education variable, indisputably an important determinant of opinion formation. Nonetheless, the six sub-groups mentioned above will be analyzed with respect to six survey questions: One, whether non-European migration should be allowed or not; two, of those who approve some non-European migration, how many approve such migration to be greater or lesser than 10,000 per year; three, support for migration of any sort, irrespective of the source; four, attitudes to aborigines; five, approval or otherwise of the Smith rebel minority regime in Rhodesia; and six, support for South Africa, as gauged from the question of sport, namely, cricket, and the sale of British arms to South Africa.

PARTY SUPPORT

Traditionally, the ALP has opposed coloured immigration on the ground that cheap labour would lead to unemployment: "...the 'White Australia' policy was intended to protect Australian workmen."¹ By the mid-1960's, however, the official ALP platform had discarded any mention of the phrase, and even with Arthur Calwell as leader of the party, as Table 6.17 shows, 60% of ALP voters supported the admission of some

1 I. Bedford, "White Australia: The Fear of Others", *Politics*, vol. 5, no. 2 (November, 1970), p.226.

Table 6.17 : Population Sub-Group Attitudes to Non-European Migration: Shift of Opinion 1966-1972

	ALLOW NON-EUROPEANS			DON'T ALLOW		
	1966 %	1972 %	Shift %	1966 %	1972 %	Shift %
National Average	63	72	+ 9	17	16	- 1
PARTY						
ALP	60	71	+11	21	18	- 3
DLP	65	76	+11	17	11	- 6
L-CP	66	75	+ 9	16	15	- 1
SEX						
Men	64	72	+ 8	20	18	- 2
Women	62	73	+11	15	13	- 2
AGE						
21-29	65	73	+ 8	16	15	- 1
30-49	63	73	+10	18	14	- 4
50-69	63	64	+ 1	18	21	+ 3
70+	59	67	+ 8	19	22	+ 3
STATES						
Qld	62	72	+10	19	14	- 5
NSW	63	72	+ 9	10	16	+ 6
Vic	66	73	+ 7	13	15	+ 2
Tas	58	83	+25	21	8	-13
SA	54	71	+17	22	16	- 6
WA	63	67	+ 4	21	23	+ 2
RELIGION						
R.C.	64	76	+12	17	11	- 6
Angl.	63	69	+ 6	18	18	-
Pres.	67	72	+ 5	15	19	+ 4
Meth.	63	72	+ 9	20	20	-
Bapt.	59	73	+14	8	12	+ 4
Other x-ian	62	71	+ 9	16	15	- 1
Non x-ian	75	87	+12	9	8	- 1
No Relig.	44	71	+27	20	13	- 7
ECONOMIC GROUP ¹						
Upper	82	76		6	15	
Artisan	79	70		7	15	
Lower	80	67		7	23	

1 In 1966 Gallup did not record responses to economic sub-groups. Thus, for this part of the analysis the results provided are in answer to the question: "How many years do you think an Asian should have to live here before becoming eligible for Australian citizenship?" The results have been tabulated to show only the percentage in favour of naturalisation (the approved time period will not be shown) and those against it. This makes the analysis somewhat crude, but, since interest here is on the relative attitudes of the three groups, it is possible to make valid observations. The 1972 question is the same as for the others.

Table 6.18 : Number of Non-European Migrants Preferred by Sub-Groups: 1966-1972

	LESS THAN 10,000			10,000 plus		
	1966 %	1972 %	Shift %	1966 %	1972 %	Shift %
National Average	54	24	-30	9	48	39
PARTY						
ALP	52	23	-29	8	48	+40
DLP	53	20	-33	12	56	+44
L-CP	56	26	-30	10	49	+39
SEX						
Men	52	23	-29	12	51	+39
Women	55	25	-30	7	48	+41
AGE						
21-29	51	24	-27	14	49	+35
30-49	53	20	-33	10	53	+43
50-69	56	28	-28	7	37	+30
70+	52	30	-22	7	37	+30
STATES						
Qld	55	26	-29	7	46	+39
NSW	52	24	-28	11	48	+37
Vic	57	20	-37	10	53	+43
Tas	48	39	- 9	10	44	+34
SA	47	24	-23	7	47	+40
WA	56	26	-30	7	41	+34
RELIGION						
R.C.	54	26	-28	10	51	+41
Angl.	55	26	-29	9	43	+34
Pres.	59	26	-33	8	46	+38
Meth.	56	24	-32	6	48	+42
Bapt.	57	18	-39	2	56	+54
Other x-ian	49	16	-33	14	55	+41
Non x-ian	62	10	-52	14	76	+62
No Relig.	31	19	-12	14	53	+39
ECONOMIC GROUPS ¹						
Upper	18	20		64	56	
Artisan	14	28		65	42	
Lower	12	26		68	42	

1 As with the previous table the question asked by Gallup in February 1966 has been used here as a surrogate. In the 1966 column under 'less than 10,000' the results are the percentages of the three economic sub-groups in favour of naturalisation for Asians after at least five years residence in Australia: this might be equated with a less tolerant view of non-European migrants; while in the 'more than 10,000' column for 1966 the percentage is derived from Gallup results of those who think naturalisation should be granted in five years or less: equated with a more tolerant view of non-Europeans.

coloured immigrants in 1966, compared with 65% of DLP voters and 66% of L-CP supporters. Moreover, only 21% of Labor respondents opposed coloured immigration; only 5% more than L-CP voters.

In the years following 1966, the leadership of both parties moved cautiously towards permitting an increased number of coloured migrants into Australia. But it was the changing attitudes within the Labor Party that was of most significance, and with Calwell's resignation, in 1967, the party's contingent of radical intellectuals - Whitlam, Cairns, Cameron, Dunstan - became more influential. Thus, in comparison with 8% of party respondents in 1966 favourable to more than 10,000 coloured immigrants annually, 48% expressed approval in 1972, a shift of 40% (see Table 6.18). This should not be seen as a willingness to "open the floodgates." Far from it. But there was a considerable "softening" of opinion. Supporters of the two other major party groups showed comparable movement in support of coloured immigration between 1966 and 1972.

The overall immigration program became decidedly less popular among L-CP and ALP voters between December 1967 and October 1972, with the DLP maintaining avid support. These results fairly reflect

Table 6.19 : Voter Intent and Attitudes to 140,000 Migrants P.A.

POLL DATE	QUESTION	NATIONAL AVERAGE	ALP	DLP	L-CP
December 1967	Increase	36	29	37	42
	Maintain	36	37	30	36
	Reduce	19	24	27	14
	Undecided	10	10	6	8
October 1972	More than 140,000	4	5	6	4
	140,000 or same	17	15	26	17
	Less than 140,000	46	50	32	45
	Can't say	33	30	36	35

respective party attitudes by 1972, which had, despite their leader's claims to the contrary, very largely converged on this issue.

Apart from the almost universal partiality of the three party groups, the most significant finding of the 1967 question on attitudes to aborigines is the marginally higher support level of ALP respondents. It seems likely that the "partisan mentality" was set in flow here. As Pittock and Lippman have said:

ALP policy ... on all Aboriginal and racial matters, had gradually evolved away from older racist attitudes. The long-term efforts of a number of individuals, for example Don Dunstan, Kim Beazley, Gordon Bryant and Jim Keefe, preceded and indeed stimulated this change.¹

Table 6.20 : Aborigines

POLL DATE	QUESTION	NATIONAL AVERAGE	ALP	DLP	L-CP
May 1967	Very favourable	35	40	34	32
	Fairly favourable	52	49	53	55
	Favourable	88	90	87	87
	Fairly unfavourable	4	3	2	4
	Very unfavourable	1	1	2	2
	Unfavourable	5	4	4	6
	No opinion	7	6	9	7

* Decimal placings account for discrepancies of addition.
See explanation Table 3.15.

Very little differentiates the three major party group supporters on the Rhodesian dispute. There was, however, one noticeable, but minor, change in attitudes between 1966 and 1970: whereas, in 1966, ALP voters

¹ A. Pittock and L. Lippman, *op.cit.*, p.80.

displayed a higher degree of acceptance of the Smith regime (24% would have enforced sanctions, compared with 30% of L-CP voters), by 1970, they were less inclined than both DLP and L-CP voters to support recognition and trade with Rhodesia. Nonetheless, majorities in all three party groups were favourable to the minority government by 1970, representing an increased acceptance of the minority regime.

Table 6.21 : Rhodesia

POLL DATE	QUESTION	NATIONAL AVERAGE	ALP	DLP	L-CP
February, 1966#	Allow independence without trade sanctions	34	35	38	35
	Enforce trade sanctions	27	24	23	30
	No opinion	38	40	40	34
April 1970	Recognise	54	51	59	54
	Illegal	24	28	24	22
	Undivided	23	21	17	23
	Should trade	60	59	63	62
	Should not	22	23	19	21
	Undecided	18	18	18	17

A miscellaneous category of responses has been excluded, as the results were miniscule.

In 1971, Gallup focused on South African sport, in particular cricket and its implications for apartheid, and the sale of British arms. Table 6.22 illustrates the fairly dramatic drop in support - in the space of only five months - for South African cricketers coming to Australia. Unionists were active in the campaign to disrupt the visit of the South African rugby union team at the time, and, significantly, support for the cricket tour fell most markedly among ALP respondents - 27%, in contrast to a fall of 22% among DLP voters, and 15% for the L-CP. In March 1971,

only 26% of L-CP voters opposed the sale of British arms to South Africa, whereas 39% of DLP and 42% of ALP voters expressed disapproval.

L-CP voters, then, would appear more receptive to the preservation of white rule in South Africa, and, moreover, even if this meant the use of military force. Although this sentiment is not a majority in the party, it is nevertheless a sizeable minority. This finding adds further evidence to the observation made above that L-CP voters have often been more 'hardline' than DLP voters.

Table 6.22 : South Africa

POLL DATE	QUESTION	NATIONAL AVERAGE	ALP	DLP	L-CP
<u>South African Cricketers here</u>					
March 1971	Approve	85	82	86	89
	Disapprove	9	12	7	6
	Undecided	6	6	7	5
August 1971	Approve	63	55	64	74
	Disapprove	23	31	25	15
	Undecided	14	14	11	11
<u>Britain selling arms to South Africa</u>					
March 1971	Approve	35	31	30	42
	Disapprove	34	42	39	26
	Undecided	30	27	30	32

SEX

In response to Gallup questions on Asian immigration, men and women do not appear to differ to the same extent as for the case studies on Vietnam, China, and the American alliance. Table 6.17 shows that only two percent separated the favourable responses of men and women to coloured immigration in 1966, and only one percent in 1972, although opposition was

marginally (5%) stronger among men. Similarly, on the question of how many non-Europeans should be admitted, little seems to distinguish the opinions of men and women. Both showed almost identical movement in favour of more coloured immigrants between 1966 and 1972. (See Table 6.18).

In 1967, men showed a higher predisposition (44%) to increasing the overall intake of migrants than women (28%), and perhaps this ties in with other opinions held by men at the time, such as a greater willingness to support Australia's Vietnam involvement, their higher threat perceptions of China, and greater dependence on the USA. For men, then, more migrants may have been seen as a panacea for Australia's perceived insecure international position. If this defence rationale were true for men in 1967, it had largely dissipated by 1972, when only 6% of male respondents and 3% of females favoured increased migration.

Table 6.23 : Total Migration

POLL DATE	QUESTION	NATIONAL AVERAGE	MEN	WOMEN
December 1967	Increase	36	44	28
	Maintain	36	32	39
	Reduce	18	16	21
	Undecided	10	7	12
October 1972	More than 140,000	4	6	3
	140,000 or same	17	19	15
	Less than 140,000	46	47	46
	Can't say	33	29	37

Men and women were almost equally favourable in their attitudes towards aborigines in 1967, 87% and 88% respectively. While men recorded an unfavourable attitude level of seven percent, three percent more than women, this result in no way correlates with the disproportionately greater

contact with aborigines made by men than women, tending to disconfirm the proposition that racial intolerance is a natural corollary of contact with non-whites in Australia.

Table 6.24 : Aborigines

POLL DATE	QUESTION	NATIONAL AVERAGE	MEN	WOMEN
May 1967	Very favourable	35	34	36
	Fairly favourable	52	53	52
	Favourable	88	87	88
	Fairly unfavourable	4	5	3
	Very unfavourable	1	2	1
	Unfavourable	5	7	4
	No opinion	7	6	8
<u>Contact with aborigines</u>				
	None	37	24	49
	Little	39	43	35
	Fair amount	16	23	9
	A lot	8	10	6

Table 6.25 shows men more kindly disposed than women to Rhodesian independence, but at the same time more inclined to enforce trade sanctions and treat the Smith regime as illegal. These dispositions were again revealed in 1970, when men and women responded more favourably to trade between Australia and Rhodesia. This apparent hypocrisy of men being at once more and less favourable towards Rhodesia is explained by the high number of women with no opinion: a consistent theme in the cases examined thus far.

In 1971, when men and women were asked about the proposed South African cricket tour, men registered a higher shift in opposition to the tour than their opposite numbers, support among men fell by 24%, and women 19%. Furthermore, disapproval of the tour was higher among men (27%) than women (19%) by August 1971. On the other hand, the March 1971 poll found men substantially more propitious to the sale of British arms to South Africa than women, confirming the observation made earlier that men are more inclined than women to use force in international problem solving. But perhaps the only safe conclusion to be derived from these data is that men show a greater predilection than women to act internationally.

Table 6.25 : Rhodesia

POLL DATE	QUESTION	NATIONAL AVERAGE	MEN	WOMEN
<u>Rhodesian Independence</u>				
February 1966	Allow independence without trade sanctions	35	40	30
	Enforce trade sanctions	27	32	22
	No opinion	38	28	48
April 1970	Recognise	53	57	49
	Treat as illegal	24	28	21
	Undecided	23	15	30
April 1970	Should trade	60	64	57
	Should not	22	25	18
	Undecided	18	12	25

Table 6.26 : South Africa

POLL DATE	QUESTION	NATIONAL AVERAGE	MEN	WOMEN
March 1971	Approve	85	84	85
	Disapprove	9	11	7
	Undecided	6	5	7
August 1971	Approve	63	60	66
	Disapprove	23	27	19
	Undecided	14	13	14
<u>Sale of British arms to South Africa</u>				
March 1971	Approve	35	45	26
	Disapprove	34	32	36
	Undecided	30	23	38

AGE

The age factor appears to have no great impact on racial opinion, and where it does, it is not what one would have expected. In 1966, young Gallup respondents, between 21 and 29 years, showed themselves to be "a little more liberal in their views about letting non-Europeans enter Australia, but not very much so,"¹ 65% favoured such a policy,² as opposed to 63% of those aged 30-49 and 50-69, and 59% over 70. In the years that followed, three age groups (see Table 6.17) moved in favour of coloured immigration, while the 50-69 category remained almost static. Respondents under 50, especially those between 30 and 49, displayed greater acceptance of larger numbers of coloured migrants (over 10,000 - see Table 6.18) by 1972. Thus, while perceptible differences existed in age responses, the

1 J. Mackie, in J. Jordens (ed.), *op.cit.*, p.65.

2 An ASRB (*Age*) poll in a three-city survey of Sydney, Melbourne, and Brisbane found that 70% of respondents in the 16 to 25 age group favoured Asian immigration. See J. Webb, *Australian*, 3 August 1966.

polls deny the existence of a "generational gap" (that is, the proposition that young people, say, under 30, are considerably more favourably disposed to coloured immigration than those older than 30).¹

No clear trends emerge from the findings presented in Table 6.18, although it does appear that in 1967 the young (21-29) and the old (over 70) were least disposed to increasing the annual migrant intake. By 1972, within a climate of growing disapproval of large-scale immigration, the 21-29 age group was joined at a 50% response for a reduction of the annual intake by the 50-69 group; the latter, it will be remembered, had barely moved since 1966 in their attitudes to non-European migrants.

Table 6.27 : Total Migration

POLL DATE	QUESTION	NATIONAL AVERAGE	21-29	30-49	50-69	70+
December 1967	Increase	36	33	37	38	33
	Maintain	36	37	36	34	42
	Reduce	18	23	18	17	24
	Undecided	10	8	9	12	10
		(16-20)				
October 1972	More than 140,000	4	5	4	5	2
	140,000 or same	17	18	16	18	15
	Less than 140,000	46	46	50	42	50
	Can't say	33	31	30	36	32

The various age groups display a remarkable similarity of opinion about aborigines; as the following table shows, the 70+ age group was the only one to diverge from the national average of 88%, albeit by only 5%. Again, the percentages unfavourable to aborigines were slightly less than for the results of those who had "a lot" of contact with aborigines - the

1 Cf. conclusion reached by B. Grant, "The Generational Gap and Australian-Asian Relation", in J. Jordens (ed.), *op.cit.*, pp.42-43.

obvious exception being the over 70's - and substantially less than those who had a "fair amount" of contact.

Table 6.28 : Aborigines

POLL DATE	QUESTION	NATIONAL AVERAGE	21-29	30-49	50-69	70+
May 1967	Very favourable	35	36	35	36	33
	Fairly favourable	52	52	53	52	50
	Favourable	88	88	88	87	83
	Very unfavourable	4	4	3	4	7
	Fairly unfavourable	1	2	1	1	3
	Unfavourable	5	6	4	5	10
	No opinion	7	7	7	7	7
<u>Contact with aborigines</u>						
	None	37	33	38	36	41
	Little	39	44	39	37	35
	Fair amount	16	17	15	17	16
	A lot	8	7	7	10	9

The Rhodesian findings show a much higher degree of decisiveness among the younger generations; indeed, as the "undecided" columns show, reticence increases with age. Consequently, in 1966, the paradoxical situation presents itself in which some age groups, for example the 21-29 year olds, display both a high disapproval and a high approval rating of the Rhodesian Government. With this anomaly in mind, it appears that all age groups moved considerably in support of the rebel regime between 1966 and 1972, with this support most manifest in the 21-29 group (the shift was 22%, gradually declining with increased age: the 30-69 double category moved 18%, and the over 70's, 12%. Opposition to Australian recognition was strongest among the over 70's (33%), falling away with decreased age - only 21% of

the 21-29's thought the regime should be treated as illegal. And, insofar as wanting to trade with the Rhodesian Government can be seen as tacit support, then the April 1970 trade question adds substantiation to these findings. These results, then, cast doubt on the assumption that Australia's young are most vehement in their opposition to this form of racism.

Table 6.29 : Rhodesia

POLL DATE	QUESTION	NATIONAL AVERAGE	21-29	30-49	50-69	70+
February 1966	Allow independence without trade sanctions	35	37	38	31	22
	Enforce trade sanctions	27	30	24	38	31
	No opinion	38	32	37	40	46
April 1970	Recognise	53	59	56	49	34
	Treat as illegal	24	21	24	26	33
	Undecided	23	20	20	25	33
April 1970	Should trade	60	62	61	61	51
	Should not	22	21	21	22	25
	Undecided	18	17	18	17	24

Only 5% separated Australians between the ages of 16 and 70+ in the level of disapproval registered between March and August 1971 of the proposed South African cricket tour. Significantly, the highest disapproval in August 1971 was recorded by the 16-20 group, and, although 60% of this age grouping approved the tour, it seems that it is the very young - the youth - which contains a higher proportion of either anti-cricketers or strong anti-racists, more so than young adults. On the question of British arms sales, however, those findings seem to be reversed, with

approval highest among the 21-29's (38%) followed closely by the 16-20's (36%), the 30-49's (36%), 50-69's (33%), and the over 70's (30%). Disapproval differed marginally, but the 21-29 group showed least opposition to the selling of arms. From these - admittedly inconclusive - figures, then, it appears that popular notions of youthful idealism might in fact be somewhat of a myth.

Table 6.30 : South Africa

POLL DATE	QUESTION	NATIONAL AVERAGE	16-20	21-29	30-49	50-69	70+
<u>South African cricket tour</u>							
March 1971	Approve	85	85	83	84	88	85
	Disapprove	9	9	12	10	6	6
	Undecided	6	5	5	6	6	9
August 1971	Approve	63	60	63	64	64	63
	Disapprove	23	29	22	21	23	25
	Undecided	14	11	15	15	13	12
<u>Sale of British arms to South Africa</u>							
March 1971	Approve	35	36	38	36	33	30
	Disapprove	34	34	30	35	36	34
	Undecided	30	29	31	28	31	36

ECONOMIC CLASS

As Gallup did not use the economic classification in the 1966 survey on coloured migration, it is not possible to do a proper trend analysis. However, attitudes to the naturalisation laws have been substituted. The three economic groups scarcely differed in their positive response levels to naturalisation in 1966: Table 6.17 shows 82% of the upper income bracket in favour, the artisan (middle) group 79%, and the lower group 80%. On the more exacting question of how long before non-Europeans should be granted citizenship, however, the lower economic group reveal themselves as slightly

more tolerant; that is, they were more prepared to see naturalisation granted after residency of five years or less. (See footnote to Table 6.18).

By 1972, the pattern of increasing racial acceptance - in the form of coloured immigration - from the lower group (67%) to the middle group (70%) to a figure of 76% for the upper income group, re-emerged. These findings were complemented by the question on the desired numbers of coloureds, so that by 1972 the upper group showed a clear majority in favour of 10,000 and more annual coloured immigrants, whereas the artisan and lower groups displayed minority support at 42% each.

Economic group attitudes showed a higher degree of divergence on the optimal number of immigrants; the pattern established above seems to have been amplified. As Table 6.17 shows, the upper group was, in 1967, highly favourable to European, or whatever, migrants, while this appreciation diminished substantially in the middle income group and fell further among the lower income respondents. All groups showed a spectacular decline in support for large numbers of immigrants in 1972, and, like previous case studies, it was the upper income group which showed most change.

Table 6.31 : Total Immigration

POLL DATE	QUESTION	NATIONAL AVERAGE	UPPER	MIDDLE	LOWER
December 1967	Increase	36	45	31	21
	Maintain	36	36	37	32
	Reduce	18	12	21	34
	Undecided	10	7	11	13
October 1972	More than 140,000	4	6	3	1
	140,000 or same	17	20	14	13
	Less than 140,000	46	42	49	56
	Can't say	33	33	33	30

As with the party, age, and sex sub-divisions, the economic sub-categories reveal an extraordinary equalitarian and benevolent attitude towards aborigines. The differences that do arise are so minute as to prohibit even tentative conclusions, although, as was noted in section II, country residents¹ were less favourably disposed to aborigines than urban dwellers. Available survey material is inadequate in suggesting the ferocity of this antipathy, however.

Table 6.32 : Aborigines

POLL DATE	QUESTION	NATIONAL AVERAGE	UPPER	MIDDLE	LOWER
May 1967	Very favourable	35	33	36	43
	Fairly favourable	52	54	52	44
	Favourable	88	87	88	87
	Very unfavourable	4	3	4	4
	Fairly unfavourable	1	2	1	3
	Unfavourable	5	5	5	7
	No opinion	7	8	7	6
<u>Contact with aborigines</u>					
	None	37	36	37	38
	Little	39	40	40	33
	Fair amount	16	17	15	17
	A lot	8	7	8	12

Available findings on Rhodesia again point to the intriguing paradox mentioned earlier: where a certain population sub-category expresses both the highest degree of approval and disapproval for an issue. Table 6.33 illustrates the enigma of the upper economic group at once showing higher, but only marginally, support for recognizing and trading with Rhodesia, and at the same time recording higher negative responses.

¹ Australia does not have a clearly defined equivalent of the US Southern poor white.

This is because upper income respondents were more prepared to give an opinion than respondents categorized in the other groups, with lower income interviewees the most taciturn.

Table 6.33 : Rhodesia

POLL DATE	QUESTION	NATIONAL AVERAGE	UPPER	MIDDLE	LOWER
April 1970	Recognise	53	54	52	51
	Treat as illegal	24	25	24	23
	Undecided	23	21	24	26
April 1970	Should trade	60	60	61	59
	Should not	22	24	20	18
	Undecided	18	16	19	23

This reserve was again manifest with respect to the South African cricket tour, but disapproval was similar in all three groups. Support for the tour was highest, for both the March and August surveys, in the upper income group. The sale of British arms to South Africa similarly received highest support from upper income respondents, and comparatively low support from lower income people; the middle group completes the picture by taking a median point between the two poles. Thus, while upper income people display more tolerance on Asian immigration to Australia, they maintained a strong proclivity to the use of force, even when it is clear that such arms will be used to perpetuate what can be called, and not unjustly, a racist regime. The slightly more racist tendencies (with respect to coloured immigration, at least) of lower income earners tempts a tantalizing hypothesis concerning opinion on Vietnam: namely, that the high level of opposition to the war expressed in this group through Gallup and other surveys was not based on the putative abhorrence of the racist implications of American-Australian involvement, as several commentators have suggested.

Table 6.34 : South Africa

POLL DATE	QUESTION	NATIONAL AVERAGE	UPPER	MIDDLE	LOWER
<u>South African cricket tour</u>					
March 1971	Approve	85	86	86	78
	Disapprove	9	10	9	9
	Undecided	6	5	6	13
August 1971	Approve	63	66	62	58
	Disapprove	23	24	23	24
	Undecided	14	10	15	18
<u>Sale of British arms to South Africa</u>					
March 1971	Approve	35	39	34	26
	Disapprove	34	32	35	43
	Undecided	30	29	32	31

STATES

Differences of opinion according to the state criterion form neither consistent nor highly deviational trends, although there were several substantial departures deserving of comment. Table 6.17 shows, *inter alia*, Tasmanian respondents moving 25 percentage points between 1966 and 1972 in favour of coloured immigration, South Australians moving 17% (perhaps largely due to the attitudes of the present Premier, Don Dunstan), Western Australians moving only slightly in favour (63% - 67%), with Queenslanders - where the Premier projects somewhat of a racist image - taking a middling position. Numerically, Western Australia registered the lowest support level for more than 10,000 coloureds per year (41%, see Table 6.18), with Victoria showing the highest approval rating in a shift from 10% in 1966 to 43% in 1972.

Table 6.35 on attitudes to total migration reveal that, in both 1967 and 1972, Western Australians and South Australians were less favourable to increasing the intake than respondents in other states.

Table 6.35 : Total Migration

POLL DATE	QUESTION	NATIONAL AVERAGE	QLD	NSW	VIC	TAS	S.A.	W.A.
December 1967	Increase	36	37	39	35	38	27	31
	Maintain	36	29	35	37	33	37	52
	Reduce	19	21	17	20	20	24	11
	Undecided	10	13	9	8	9	12	7
October 1972	More than 140,000	4	5	3	5	10	1	2
	140,000 or same	17	20	15	16	17	20	16
	Less than 140,000	46	43	47	47	43	49	44
	Can't say	33	31	34	32	30	30	39

The aboriginal results show that, within the general context of overwhelming acceptance of black Australians, Queenslanders, Tasmanians, and South Australians are slightly less favourable. The Tasmanian response adding some weight to the proposition that contact is not a necessary precondition for racial prejudice.

Table 6.36 : Aborigines

POLL DATE	QUESTION	NATIONAL AVERAGE	QLD	NSW	VIC	TAS	S.A.	W.A.
May 1967	Very favourable	35	29	37	40	32	35	26
	Fairly favourable	52	56	52	49	53	49	61
	Favourable	88	85	89	89	85	84	87
	Very unfavourable	4	5	3	4	4	5	7
	Fairly unfavourable	1	2	1	1	3	3	-
	Unfavourable	5	6	4	5	7	8	7
	No opinion	7	9	8	6	8	8	6
<u>Contact with aborigines</u>								
	None	37	28	35	44	58	38	24
	Little	39	39	42	38	31	35	41
	Fair amount	16	19	18	11	10	18	20
	A lot	8	15	6	6	2	8	15

The Rhodesian results show Queenslanders to be more favourably disposed than others to Rhodesian independence, and respondents from S.A. and W.A., in contrast to their higher degree of opposition to more annual migrants, were most opposed to the Smith regime. By 1972, however, these states registered above national average support for recognition and trade.

Table 6.37 : Rhodesia

POLL DATE	QUESTION	NATIONAL AVERAGE	QLD	NSW	VIC	TAS	S.A.	W.A.
February 1966	Allow independence without trade sanctions	35	45	38	30	19	25	32
	Enforce trade sanctions	27	20	28	26	24	35	31
	No opinion	38	34	34	43	57	40	31
April 1970	Recognise	53	55	54	49	40	56	62
	Don't	24	16	26	26	28	25	22
	Undecided	23	29	20	25	32	19	16
April 1970	Trade	60	66	61	55	60	60	67
	Don't	22	14	22	24	27	22	19
	Undecided	18	20	17	21	13	18	14

The arms question evoked a comparatively higher support level in Queensland and a lower level of endorsement in Tasmania.

Perhaps the only conclusion that can be stated with any confidence, from this quagmire of findings, is that the geographically peripheral states, viz., Queensland, Western Australia, and Tasmania, show the greatest deviations from the national average; but often in inexplicable and conflicting directions.

Table 6.38 : South Africa

POLL DATE	QUESTION	NATIONAL AVERAGE	QLD	NSW	VIC	TAS	S.A.	W.A.
<u>South African cricket tour</u>								
March 1971	Approve	85	87	83	85	79	86	91
	Disapprove	9	9	11	8	13	8	5
	Undecided	6	4	6	7	7	6	5
August 1971	Approve	63	73	61	60	60	63	69
	Disapprove	23	18	23	28	21	24	18
	Undecided	14	9	16	12	19	13	13
<u>Sale of British arms to South Africa</u>								
March 1971	Approve	35	42	37	32	29	31	35
	Disapprove	34	29	34	35	47	37	33
	Undecided	30	29	29	33	24	32	32

RELIGION

The religion variable enunciated in Tables 6.17 and 6.18 show that Catholics became more tolerant than Anglicans of coloured immigration after 1966, both as regards the general principle and the acceptable numbers. Non-Christians were considerably more disposed to non-European migration, while those with no religion shifted 27% in favour of some coloured migrants from 1966 to 1972.

On migration, irrespective of colour, Catholics were more kindly disposed than Anglicans in both 1967 and 1972. Non-Christians again displayed a well-above average desire for more migrants, as did those respondents with no religion. Slightly more favourable attitudes towards aborigines, however, were recorded by Anglicans than Catholics, and to complete this reversal of opinion, non-Christians and those with no religion were even less favourably disposed. The non-Christian response adds further

emphasis to the perplexing question asked above concerning the correlation between propinquity and tolerance: non-Christians recorded the highest (59%) level of no contact with aborigines. Baptists were the most unfavourable, recording a record low - for all demographic sub-groups - of 62% with favourable attitudes towards Australia's blacks.

The religious dimension, then, shows Catholics, non-Christians, and respondents with no religion as more favourable to immigration of any colour, but these groups showed less enthusiasm for Australia's own racial minority.

Table 6.40 : Total Migration

POLL DATE	QUESTION	NATIONAL AVERAGE	RC	Angl	Pres	Meth	Bapt	Other x- ian	Non x- ian	No Religion
December 1967	Increase	36	38	32	34	32	43	40	59	51
	Maintain	36	36	37	33	42	26	38	31	25
	Reduce	19	18	20	23	19	20	12	6	10
	Undecided	10	8	10	10	7	12	10	4	14
October 1972	More than 140,000	4	6	2	2	3	5	7	8	10
	140,000; same	17	20	15	18	17	8	18	23	12
	Less than 140,000	46	40	53	52	56	35	32	27	40
	Can't say	33	34	31	29	24	52	43	42	39

The primary purpose of this chapter has been to trace attitudes of the Australian people in relation to matters of race. The measurement of such attitudes can only be relative to the questions asked by Gallup, and the data presented here can in no way be considered anything like a definitive statement. Nonetheless, Gallup and other survey findings generate certain hypotheses about the racial opinions of the Australian public.

Table 6.39 : Aborigines

POLL DATE	QUESTION	NATIONAL AVERAGE	RC	Angl	Pres	Meth	Bapt	Other x- ian	Non x- ian	No Religion
May 1967	Very favourable	35	38	34	37	31	17	37	31	37
	Fairly favourable	52	49	56	50	55	45	49	49	41
	Favourable	88	87	90	87	86	62	86	80	78
	Very unfavourable	4	4	3	4	5	5	5	-	7
	Fairly unfavour- able	1	2	1	2	3	5	1	-	2
	Unfavourable	5	6	4	6	8	10	6	-	9
	No opinion	7	7	6	7	6	28	8	20	14
<u>Contact with Aborigines</u>										
	None	37	35	35	43	35	49	40	59	34
	Little	39	40	40	36	35	47	42	30	45
	Fair Amount	16	17	16	17	21	-	12	3	14
	A lot	8	8	9	4	9	5	6	8	7

The major conclusion to be drawn from this case-study is that Australians, in general, have become progressively but gradually more tolerant of a small number of non-European migrants since the immediate post-war period. The infamous deportation cases may be seen as the thin edge of a very, very long wedge. The immigration reforms of 1966 were undeniably significant, but they did not represent a radically new policy, nor a radical change in public opinion. After 1966, policy and opinion conjoined and thereafter both followed almost identical paths: a cautious acceptance of larger numbers of coloured immigrants. However, it would be wrong to conclude from this that by 1972 Australians were on the brink of accepting the idea of a multi-racial society. They weren't. The numbers involved amount to a minute proportion of the population, a proportion which was less than the coloured component of the population at the turn of the century. Moreover, the questions relating to Southern Africa reveal that Australians, in the main, are prepared to accept the perpetuation of racial injustice,

in the sense that they are not eager to sever trade, diplomatic, and sporting relations in an attempt to bring majority rule to Rhodesia and South Africa. Attitudes to Australia's own indigenous non-whites is strongly favourable, however, supported by a concern for their material well-being: but this does not take cognizance of minority enmity.

Although differences among the socio-demographic sub-group categories were less pronounced than in the previous cases, there was sufficient variation for us to be cautious in the blanket use of the term 'public opinion'. Opinion moved more in some sub-sections than in others, but even where those registered changes were more pronounced, the movement was not dramatic, and never amounted to a reversal of opinion. Perhaps the most significant recorded opinion change was that of Labor Party supporters, who now seem undeserving of a blatant racialist tag. L-CP voters, while more tolerant of coloured immigrants, again displayed a greater predisposition to the use of arms in solving international issues, even more so than DLP followers. There were no significant differences between the responses of men and women to coloured immigration, and, consistent with other cases, women were less prepared to give opinions than men, thus, paradoxically, allowing men to be both more internationally aggressive and appeasing. The findings on age again demonstrated the myth of the "generation gap", both in respect of coloured immigration and Southern Africa, and the older one gets, the less likely one is to have or proffer an opinion on foreign policy matters concerned with racial issues. Respondents belonging to the lower economic classification were similarly less disposed to giving an opinion. Support for coloured immigration decreased consistently from the upper income group to the lower, although the former showed a greater acceptability of the white minority governments of Southern Africa. While state difference were generally ones of nuance, the few disparities that did occur demonstrate

the prudence of not treating public opinion as a monolith. Religious differences were most notable between Christian and non-Christian groups, although Catholics appeared to become more tolerant than Anglicans.

There was conflicting evidence as to whether contact is a precondition of greater racial intolerance. Thus, people in country areas recorded less favourable attitudes to aborigines, and it is in these areas where contact is high, but so too did Tasmanians and non-Christians, who recorded the lowest contact levels among their respective sub-sections.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE WHITLAM LABOR GOVERNMENT'S FOREIGN POLICY

The change of government after the December 2nd federal elections of 1972 has provoked considerable debate in Australian academic circles concerning the extent to which Australia's foreign relations have been changed. The following is an attempt to answer the dual question:

(1) was there a substantial break in the way Australia conducted her foreign affairs, and what does the answer to this suggest about Australian public opinion, and (2) what were the reactions of the public to the Labor Government's foreign policy as manifested in survey data?

The overwhelming weight of Australian academic opinion has sided with the argument that the changes initiated by Mr Whitlam have been more of style than substance, and, on reaching this conclusion, some have proceeded to argue that the new government has not gone far enough in its foreign policy changes. The merits of this line of argument are well beyond the scope of this work, but it will be contended that the Labor Government has acted generally in concert with public opinion in moving to change only its image or the more obvious of the L-CP anachronisms and not the fundamental priorities of Australia's role in the world.

It will be shown that the arrival of the Labor Government in 1972 did not usher in a period of diplomacy that outstripped the fears, hopes and aspirations of the general mass of Australian people; rather, it brought government policy into line with "the stolid conservatism of the mass of the people",¹ which in some cases, had managed to jump ahead of a painfully conservative L-CP Government.

¹ P. King, "Whither Whitlam", *International Journal*, vol. 29, no. 3 (Summer, 1974), p.437.

Commentators are generally agreed that foreign policy was not a primary determinant in the outcome of the 1972 elections,¹ although at least one observer has arrived at a quite different conclusion.² But this is not a matter of great relevance to this dissertation. What is of some relevance is whether the Whitlam Government acted in accordance with its 'mandate'. It is quite clear that a government can receive a mandate to do certain things without those issues being hotly disputed in the election campaign, but the traditions of our Parliamentary system require, in most cases, a party to present its legislative programme to the people, usually in the form of the policy speech - a distinctive Australian device.³ Of course, foreign policies generally require executive rather than legislative action, but, despite this, aspiring governments are expected to spell out their foreign policy intentions. In accordance with these generalized ground rules of Australia's democratic system, the new Labor Government could justifiably claim a mandate for its foreign policy,⁴ since international matters were adequately publicized in the party's campaign and policy speech, although foreign affairs were not central to the result. As Mr Whitlam declared later: "...we have received clear endorsement from the Australian people for the new directions we have given our foreign

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- 1 See, for example, J.D.B. Miller, "Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, July to December 1972", *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, vol. 19, no. 1 (April 1973), p.6.
 - 2 Nigel S. Roberts, "Foreign Policy and Australian General Elections", *World Review*, vol. 12, no. 2 (July 1973). Roberts argues that the traditional methods of analyzing voting determinants are inadequate in that they do not take account of 'non-issues' such as the feeling that it is time for a change; moreover, he contends, issues are not easily categorized as either 'domestic' or 'external'. Roberts asks whether it was a mere coincidence that incumbent governments have fallen after periods of great international change in both 1949 and 1972.
 - 3 R. Barrett, *Promises and Performances in Australian Politics 1928-1959*, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1959, p.1.
 - 4 C. Clark, "Some International Options and Domestic Constraints", in C. Clark (ed.), *op.cit.*, p.161.

relations".¹ An ANOP² survey found nearly 17 in every 20 people considered the Government was carrying out its election pledges.

The first few months of the Whitlam Government saw a profusion of foreign policy initiatives; one source counted 82 decisions in this period.³ In general, the new directions followed along the lines prescribed in the Labor Party platform and in Mr Whitlam's policy speech. Nonetheless, some sections of the press⁴ and, of course, the new opposition expressed disquiet over the precipitate haste with which the new government was moving.

Mr Whitlam, acting as his own Foreign Minister, moved decisively and with a style that set himself apart from the conservative and discreet style of his predecessors.⁵ *Inter alia*, the new government: abolished conscription; removed the last remaining troops serving in South Vietnam (about 150 advisors); recognized the Peking Government as the legitimate government of China; upvalued the Australian dollars; initiated steps to bring France before the International Court of Justice over French nuclear tests in the Pacific; recognized East Germany and North Vietnam and indicated its intention to exchange diplomatic relations with the Vatican; terminated all military, but not economic, aid to South Vietnam and Cambodia; ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; voted at the United Nations in support of

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- 1 E.G. Whitlam, "Australia's Foreign Policy : New Directions, New Definitions", Brisbane, Twenty-Fourth Roy Milne Memorial Lecture, for the AIIA 1973, p.14.
 - 2 Australian Nationwide Opinion Polls (ANOP), *Australian Public Opinion Newsletter (APON)*, vol. 3, no. 1 (February 1973), p.11.
 - 3 Cited by Bruce Grant, *The Crisis of Loyalty*, p.107; for a list of government decisions made at this time see, *Australian Government Digest*, vol. 1, no. 1 (5 December 1972-31 March 1973), pp.1-14. I am mindful here of the difficulties inherent in defining a 'decision'.
 - 4 *The Age*, 9 December 1972; Denis Warner, the *Sydney Morning Herald*, 18 December 1972; and the *Examiner*, 8 December 1972.
 - 5 For an account of the diplomatic style of the L-CP see, F.A. Mediansky, "The Conservative Style in Australian Foreign Policy", *Australian Outlook*, vol. 28, no. 1 (April 1974); a succinct and accurate appraisal of ALP and L-CP approaches to diplomatic practice is made by W.J. Hudson in the introduction to his "Foreign Policy Review" in *The Australian Quarterly*, vol. 45, no. 2 (June 1973), p.120; and Owen Harries has made comparisons and contrasts of the personal diplomatic styles of Evatt, Menzies and Whitlam in "Mr Whitlam and Australian Foreign Policy", *Quadrant*, vol. 17, no. 84 (July-August 1974).

condemnatory resolutions against racialism in general, and against Rhodesia in particular; rejoined the UN Committee of 24; expressed support for the Sri Lankan proposal for a 'Zone of Peace' in the Indian Ocean; sought to end certain relics of the relationship with Great Britain; criticized President Nixon for the resumption of bombing over the Hanoi-Haiphong area of North Vietnam in December 1972; and announced changes in immigration policy.

Although incomplete, this is an impressive list of foreign policy decisions. But the quantitative change should not induce us to conclude a concomitant qualitative change has taken place in Australia's foreign relations. Certainly, the Labor government should be seen as a reformer in its introduction of new initiatives, but it would be an interesting speculative exercise considering whether Australia's foreign policy would be very different today if the L-CP Government had retained office after December 1972. As noted above, most academic observers of Australian foreign affairs maintain that the Whitlam era has not seen Australia take any radical paths on the world arena, but, rather, that the policies of the present government differ only in style and emphasis from those of its predecessors, reflecting only a marginal adaptation to changes in the international environment and a fundamental acceptance of the basic objectives and priorities on which Australian foreign policy has been based for two decades. Notwithstanding these comments, it is apposite to ask to what extent does style and image become 'policy'. What, then, have the academics said about these questions?

To a country unused to changes of government (the Treasury benches had not changed hands between 1949 and 1972), the flurry of diplomatic activity after 2 December 1972 came as somewhat of a shock to some and a relief to others. It is not surprising that there was an over-reaction. Whatever the magnitude of the new foreign policy moves, it seems clear that

without a change of government the adjustments could not have been made with anything like the alacrity shown by Mr Whitlam. The L-CP Government found itself hamstrung in the early 1970's by its previous position. One commentator has summed up the situation in the following way:

Some recasting of the central assumptions of Australian policy was no doubt inevitable whichever party had been returned to office. By the beginning of the 1970's the logic and language of the Cold War had become so manifestly at variance with external developments and the changing climate of opinion at home that even the Liberals had begun, albeit cautiously, to set policy flowing along new channels. Outwardly, however, there was little sign of adjustment; as a variety of party political considerations made them reluctant to advertise that any such process was in train.¹

Thus, there were strong political disincentives for the L-CP to make any major policy adjustments in 1972 - an election year; indeed, there are differing opportunities and constraints operating on both government and opposition in a period of international flux. As one commentator has noted:

Established, incumbent governments...are often unable to adapt to radically new situations.... Oppositions, on the other hand, by their very nature, are often on the lookout for new successful policies.²

The Whitlam Government, then, was able to move after December 1972 unburdened by the straitjacket in which the L-CP Government found itself. The new government moved rapidly; but there were signs well before 1972 that the conservative government was beginning to accept that world politics no longer revolved around two protagonist superpowers, and that a multipolar balance of power was emerging.³ Undoubtedly, it was the speed and vigour

1 P. Darby, "Australia's changing perspective of the world", *The World Today*, vol. 29, no. 3 (March 1973), p.119.

2 N. Roberts, *op.cit.*, p.25. See too, W. Wallace, *op.cit.*, p.36.

3 H. Albinski, "Foreign Policy", in R. Forward (ed.), *op.cit.*, pp.28-29; W. McMahon Ball, "The Foreign Policy of the Whitlam Government", *Australia's Neighbours*, Fourth Series, no. 90 (April-June 1974), pp.1 and 2. For a description of the changing international environment, see H. Bull, 'The New Balance of Power in Asia and the Pacific', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 49, no. 4 (July 1971), and A. Buchan, *Change Without War*, London, Chatto and Windus, 1974, especially ch. 4.

with which the new foreign policies were introduced that inspired the *Sydney Morning Herald's* leader writer to say that "...Australia enters the new year [1973] with a complete turnabout in foreign policy",¹ and the *Guardian* to describe Australia's place in the world as "greatly changed" and Mr Whitlam's policy as "about as different as he can make it from that of his predecessors".² But after the dust had settled, it was arguable how much had changed.

It now seems clear that "much of what it [the Labor Government] did in its early days was rhetorical rather than substantial".³ There had been change, but "continuity is most striking with respect to the highest priority goals of foreign policy in the traditional sense (concerning diplomacy and national security)".⁴ In particular, the American alliance remained intact, the acerbic remarks by three Cabinet members on the renewed bombing of North Vietnam notwithstanding. A more detailed analysis of the major areas of Australian foreign policy will follow, in which these assertions will be more closely scrutinized.

Before engaging in this detailed examination, however, it might be appropriate to raise the following question: given that the Whitlam Government ushered in a period in foreign policy more notable for its new style and changing emphases than for any radically new policy directions,

1 *Sydney Morning Herald*, 1 January 1973.

2 *Guardian*, 27 July 1973, quoted in J.L. Richardson, "Australian Foreign Policy under the Labor Government", *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. 9, no. 1 (1974), p.11.

3 J.D.B. Miller, "Australian Foreign Policy : Constraints and Opportunities, II", pp.434-5.

4 J.L. Richardson, *op.cit.*, p.16. Similar conclusions were reached by at least two scholars who have examined the effects of the change of government in 1949 on Australian foreign policy; see G. Greenwood, "The Commonwealth", in G. Greenwood and N. Harper (eds.) *Australia in World Affairs, 1950-55*, Melbourne, Cheshire, 1957, p.36, and S. Eggins, "The 1949 Elections and Australian Foreign Policy", *ANU Historical Journal*, no. 5 (November 1968), pp.62-68.

then at what point does the 'style' become the 'policy'?¹ It seems clear the changes in Australia's foreign policy have dealt "...chiefly...with Australia's image, including its self-image".²

It is not at all easy to differentiate between substance and style. In a paper which is highly critical of Mr Whitlam's preoccupation "with posture to the neglect of substance",³ Professor Hedley Bull has said that: "image-making is part of the content of a foreign policy, but it is not the whole of it".⁴ Bull argues that there is a disparity between the image of Australia Mr Whitlam is presenting and the sort of people Australians really are.⁵ The Prime Minister, however, sees nothing inconsistent in this use of gesture and substance. In his 1973 Roy Milne Lecture, Mr Whitlam said:

[The] association between gesture and substance is the hallmark of Australia's new foreign policy. It is idealistic yet realistic. I believe that this is how the great majority of Australians wish to see the Government conduct its foreign affairs.⁶

My general proposition, then, is that the basic priorities of Australia's foreign policy remained unaltered after December 1972. The

1 O. Harries, *op.cit.*, p.62.

2 P. King, *op.cit.*, p.422. For a criticism of the 'image concept' in international relations see L.P. Crespi, "Some Observations on the Concept of Image", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 25, no. 1 (Spring 1961), pp.115-120.

3 H. Bull, "Australian perceptions of our role in the world", paper delivered at AIIA Conference 'Advance Australia - Where? Foreign Policy in the 1970's', Adelaide, June 15-17, 1974, mimeo, p.5.

4 *ibid.*, p.6.

5 Bull goes on to say: "But while a country's role in the world has to have some relationship to what the aspirations of its people actually are, it seems to me a quite proper use of foreign policy, within limits, to attempt to reform them", *loc.cit.*

6 E.G. Whitlam, "Australia's Foreign Policy...", *loc.cit.*

changes made were magnified by the advent of the first new government for 23 years, a critical 'loyal opposition', and Whitlam's personal style. The changes were, generally speaking, a fulfilment of electoral promises.¹ For the most part, however, these changes were of posture and style, reflecting the necessary superficial adjustment by a new unencumbered government to a changing international system, although these modifications could not have been made with the same boldness by the L-CP. Moreover, it would be wrong to divorce foreign policy issues from the 1972 election; foreign policy was not a predominant election issue because both parties agreed on the fundamental tenet of our foreign and defence policy - the American alliance - and of course, both were aware of the electoral significance of this issue. Thus, the changes were only concerned with modalities.

If this line of reasoning is valid, then the thesis I am presenting about Australian public opinion and foreign policy seems to gain some more credence, since, in the main, the new Government was reflecting the prevailing opinions of the public. Australians are not subject to alternate moods, they are by nature conservative, yet not immune to change. This 'characterological predisposition' - to borrow Almond's phrase - has been described in the following way:

...Australian perceptions of our basic interests and obligations are subject to a slow and more or less permanent process of change....Australia's aims in the world are inevitably and overwhelmingly conservative....Under the Labor Government our aims have been no less fundamentally conservative than they were before; nor is it conceivable that any government could be elected in contemporary Australia whose aims were otherwise.²

1 Labor did backpedal, however, on some issues; e.g. SEATO and ANZUK.

2 H. Bull, "Australian perceptions of our role in the world", *op.cit.*, pp.5 & 14.

The remainder of this chapter will be an attempt to answer the key questions raised concerning the extent to which Australia's role in the world has changed under Labor, and to measure the reaction of the Australian people to Mr Whitlam's conduct of foreign relations, be it style or policy.

VIETNAM

One of the major findings of the chapter on Vietnam was that, even after seven years of large-scale Australian involvement in the war, there were strong residual sentiments in public opinion regarding communism. Bearing this in mind, it will be fruitful now to consider how much the new Labor Government altered Australia's previous policies towards Indo-China in general and Vietnam in particular. It is proposed to look at four aspects of Australia's Vietnam policy: troop withdrawal, aid, bombing of North Vietnam, and recognition questions.

Troop Withdrawal

The Whitlam - Barnard duumvirate of December 1972 withdrew the remaining Australian troops from South Vietnam, 150 advisers belonging to the Australian Army Assistance Group, but, as one prominent journalist has commented: "it was generally accepted that a re-elected Liberal and Country Party Government would have eventually done the same thing, the DLP notwithstanding".¹ It was, moreover, the Gorton and McMahon Governments which had withdrawn the bulk of the Australian combat force.

It cannot be said, then, at least on the question of troop withdrawal, that Labor had introduced a fundamentally different Vietnam policy. The clean up was rendered easier by the imminence of a ceasefire and peace

¹ Creighton Burns, *Age*, 11 July 1973.

settlement, despite the recalcitrance of South Vietnam's President Thieu. One cannot, therefore, help being cynical of Mr Whitlam, when he said in New York on 1 August 1973:

It's a great thing for me and my colleagues just not to have to waste time pushing against the wind on matters like China and Vietnam. Had my political fortunes been otherwise, had the party I lead come into power at any time in the last seven years, I should have made basically the same decisions.¹

Immediate withdrawal had never been one of Mr Whitlam's policy preferences as Leader of the Opposition; indeed, this was perhaps the most obvious difference between Mr Calwell and his successor, and it was disingenuous of Whitlam to imply that it had. It is doubtful whether Mr Whitlam, as Prime Minister before 1972, would have withdrawn Australian troops much earlier than was undertaken by the L-CP Government.

Aid

As a corollary to the withdrawal of the remnants of the Australian force "...from the military and political quagmire in Indo-China",² it was announced that all defence aid to South Vietnam would be cut and replaced by non-military financial assistance³ to be used for 'reconstruction' in both North and South Vietnam, going directly against US policy. This policy, however, was not the monopoly of the ALP; as Albinski has recorded: "Labor's promise to aid in the reconstruction of all of Vietnam was an idea reaching back to the Johnson administration, and seconded at the time by Harold Holt".⁴

1 E.G. Whitlam quoted in J.D.B. Miller, "Australian Foreign Policy: Constraints and Opportunities, II", p.425.

2 *West Australian*, 29 December 1972.

3 This meant South Vietnam would not receive \$9.5 million promised by the L-CP, Hugh Armfield, *Age*, 28 December 1972. The 1973-4 Budget allowed for \$3 million aid program for the whole of Indochina, *Canberra Times*, 5 December 1973.

4 H. Albinski, "Foreign Policy", *op.cit.*, p.51.

Bombing of North Vietnam

The US 'Christmas' bombing of North Vietnam, in December 1972, caused widespread reaction in Australia: Mr Whitlam communicated his displeasure to President Nixon by letter, and maritime unions imposed a ban on American shipping. As forms of protest, both are moderate, but relations between the Australian Government and the Nixon Administration were further strained when three Cabinet members, speaking outside their ministerial briefs, denounced the bombings in the strongest terms.¹ While it is inconceivable that this could have happened under a L-CP Government, it appears that US-Australian relations were not irrevocably damaged.² (If called upon to justify the bombings, a L-CP regime perhaps might have used the 'Hiroshima' argument: the bombings are necessary to force our enemies into a peace settlement.)

Mr Whitlam's letter to Nixon, his tacit endorsement of the sentiments underlying the maritime unions ban, and the ministerial outbursts represented a different style of foreign policy, which was interpreted in Australia and the USA at the time as a new policy; especially since one of the constant elements in L-CP policy was that the US should not be criticized publicly on matters relating to security, because of possible damage to the alliance. However, these events proved to be *sui generis*, and, as will be shown below, their diplomatic impact was ephemeral.

1 Mr Cameron (Minister for Labour) accused the US Government for being 'maniacs', *Age*, 30 December 1972; and Dr Cairns (Minister for Overseas Trade and Secondary Industry) described the bombing as "the most brutal, indiscriminate slaughter of defenceless men, women and children in living memory", *Age*, 29 December 1972. Leaked cables from the Department of Foreign Affairs in January 1974, show that the US Government was more than 'concerned' and 'irked' - as *New York Times* correspondent Robert Trumbull put it, 4 January 1973; the 'normally tranquil' (*NYT*) US-Australian relations may indeed have been, to quote Mungo MacCullum who first published the cables, "in a state of chaos", *Nation Review*, 11-17 January 1974.

2 See *Age*, editorial "The alliance will survive", 5 January 1973.

Recognition

The new Labor Government's decision to recognize and exchange diplomatic relations with Hanoi is another example of what some people saw at the time as a clear break with the past, representing a further example of Whitlam's flirtation with the 'Communist orbit'.¹ But the announcement in late February 1973 was made after the Paris Peace Agreement of 23 January 1973, and at least one journalist thought "it made good diplomatic and political sense".² The move was consistent with Mr Whitlam's style; as the *Age* editorialized: "The initiative has involved certain risks, but the calculated risk is inevitable in any forward diplomacy".³ Thus, this aspect of Labor's foreign policy can be seen as a clear response to changing international circumstances; namely, the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement, and the withdrawal of American ground forces. A L-CP decision would probably have differed only in timing.

In March 1973, a Gallup survey⁴ found only 38% in favour of the Government's recognition of the Government of North Vietnam, 29% said they opposed it, and 33% were undecided. This lack of support for what was described by many as one of the Government's more radical initiatives underlies how cautious public opinion was: the general public did not hold out open arms for governments of every kind as did the Labor Government.

Analysis of the socio-demographic groups generally provides evidence supporting contentions made in previous chapters. The party breakdowns

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- 1 Mr D. Anthony, leader of the Country Party, quoted in B. Grant, *The Crisis of Loyalty*, p.108. See too, statement by former Liberal Foreign Minister, Mr Leslie Bury, at AIPS Summer School, January 1973 in G. McCarthy (ed.), *Foreign Policy for Australia*, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1973, p.32.
 - 2 Creighton Burns, *Age*, 11 July 1973.
 - 3 *Age*, 21 February 1973.
 - 4 *APOP*, 2383,4,5,7, February and March 1973. ANOP found 57% of their respondents in favour of recognition, with 34% opposed, and 9% undecided, *APON*, vol. 3, no. 1 (February 1973), p.22.

show 47% of ALP voters, 21% of DLP, and 30% of L-CP voters, approving recognition. Of the women interviewed, 33% favoured recognition, with men 44% in favour. Women respondents contained a high proportion of undecideds, thus allowing men to be at once more favourable and more opposed to recognition than women. The age group categories reveal a gradual decline in support for recognition with increased age, 44% of those aged 16-20 expressed approval, 42% of those 21-29, 40% of those 30-49, falling to 34% of those 50-69, to only 23% of the 70+ group. The difficulties of extrapolating from recognition questions have been well-covered in Chapter Four, but this result does suggest that the young are more inclined to want the Australian Government to be internationally active, this activity could be either peaceful or military, however.

The analysis of income class in Chapter Three found that opposition to the Vietnam War was strongest among the lower income earners and least in the upper income bracket. The recognition of the North Vietnamese Government, however, evoked responses almost to the contrary: upper income respondents were more inclined to recognize their erstwhile "enemy" than were respondents from the other categories, in descending order. Table 7.1 also shows a gradation on undecided responses from the upper group, who were more likely to give an opinion, to the middle and lower groups, which were progressively more disinclined to offer an opinion. The occupational categories show professionals and managers as the most favourable to the recognition of Hanoi; the latter were among the most "hawkish" in the debate over troop commitment to South Vietnam. There was little variation in the state breakdowns, although Queenslanders appear slightly more opposed to recognition, and South Australians slightly more favourable.

The non-recognition of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the National Liberation Front, moreover, further illustrates the desire of the Whitlam Government not to rock the boat too much, notwithstanding Dr Cairns' (then Minister for Overseas Trade) trenchant criticism (while

Table 7.1 : Population sub-groups and the recognition
of North Vietnam

	FAVOUR	OPPOSE	NO OPINION
NATIONAL AVERAGE	38	29	33
PARTY			
ALP	47	20	33
DLP	21	39	40
L-CP	30	42	28
SEX			
Men	44	32	24
Women	33	26	41
AGE			
16-20	44	23	33
21-29	42	29	30
30-49	40	27	33
50-69	34	34	32
70+	23	36	40
INCOME			
Upper	42	31	28
Middle	37	28	35
Lower	31	28	42
OCCUPATION			
Professional	47	32	21
Managers	47	25	28
Small business owners	30	28	42
White collar clerks	44	31	25
Skilled worker	38	27	35
Semi-skilled	37	25	38
Unskilled	32	28	40
Farm owners	21	47	32
Farm labourers	38	15	47
Others, none	30	30	40
STATES			
Qld	30	34	36
NSW	38	29	33
Vic	41	28	31
Tas	36	32	32
SA	44	26	30
WA	40	32	28

on a visit to Hanoi) of the American and Australian involvement in the war to the south, and his more recent urgings to recognize and assist the PRG.

Thus, Mr Whitlam's Vietnam initiatives were 'symbolic gestures rather than elements in a general re-orientation of Australian diplomacy';¹ they should be seen as a combination of several things: a finalization of the L-CP withdrawal program; the adjustment to new international circumstances; and a new style of diplomacy which was the product of a well-informed, confident, and busy Prime Minister, an undisciplined Cabinet born of 23 years in the political wilderness and seven years of ideological and political antipathy to the Vietnam War. Public opinion, however, was showing signs of wariness, and this feeling was widespread, as the following cases testify.

CHINA

With regard to Labor's China policy, it appears at first glance that Australia's foreign relations had undergone considerable, indeed spectacular, change. After only three weeks in office, Peking had been recognized and plans for an exchange of diplomatic missions announced; this was followed by the announcement that a trade mission would go to China in May 1973 and that Mr Whitlam would fulfill his promise made to Chou En-Lai in July 1971 by visiting Peking - the first Australian Prime Minister to do so. However, by looking at three principal areas of Australian - Chinese relations, viz., UN admission, recognition, and trade, it will be seen that Whitlam's initiatives signified "...a new relationship with Asia only in terms of timing and style. Whereas the long period of Liberal rule had made a virtue of caution and dependence, the Whitlam government is eager to emphasize boldness and independence. The differences in approach, however, appear to be related more to the form than the

1 J. Camilleri, "A New Australian Foreign Policy?", *Arena*, no. 31 (1973), p.12.

substance of Australian foreign policy".¹ Three essential questions underlie the following analysis: (1) what decisions were made? (2) how significant were they?, (3) would the L-CP have made the same decision, and if so, when?

Chinese admission to the United Nations

By the time Labor came to power, the PRC had been in the UN for just over a year. Nonetheless, it is instructive to look back to the policies of the two competing party groups.

From 1970 it appeared that it was only a matter of time before China was admitted to the UN General Assembly and Security Council. The resolution gaining most support from member nations was the one which provided for the replacement of Chiang Kai-shek's representatives by those of Mao Tse-tung. The Australian Government (L-CP) supported a US-backed "two Chinas" policy, which would permit both Peking and Taipeh to sit in the world body; this resolution failed to gain acceptance, however. On 26 October 1971, the UN General Assembly voted to admit the PRC, and "once again Australia could be seen on the world stage following the lead of the US in a way which appeared to be out of touch with reality".² However, despite this unrealistic clinging to Taiwan's continued representation, the fact that the L-CP was prepared to see Peking sit in the Assembly and Council,³ was a not inconsiderable advancement from the attitudes which were embodied in the Menzies-Hasluck anti-Chinese diatribes of the mid-60's.

1 J. Camilleri, "A New Australian Foreign Policy?", *loc. cit.*

2 R. O'Neill, "Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, July to December, 1971, *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, vol. 18, no. 1 (April 1972), p.7.

3 The McMahon Government was reportedly 'pleased' with the PRC's placement on the Security Council, although it was 'disappointed' with the virtual expulsion of Taiwan from the General Assembly, *Australian Financial Review*, 27 October 1971, quoted in *ibid.*

It was observable at the time of China's admission, moreover, that the Australian Government began referring to the "People's Republic of China", a distinct change from the days of "Red China" and "Communist China".

Recognition

Negotiations for the recognition of Mao Tse-tung's China were conducted by the then Australian Ambassador to France, Mr Alan Renouf, and the Chinese Ambassador to Paris, Mr Huang Chen. On 22 December 1972, a joint communique was issued declaring that mutual recognition had been accorded, and that diplomatic missions were to be exchanged between Peking and Canberra. The initiative was decisive and long overdue, although there were mutterings of discontent in sections of the press concerning the speed of the agreement, especially after it was claimed by Professor Marchant that Australia had acquiesced to many Chinese demands,¹ compelling the *Advertiser*, at least, to state that: "it is an extraordinary state of affairs, tantamount to having given another country undue influence in the determination of Australian foreign policy".² Analysis since has shown that these criticisms were groundless,³ as most of the so-called Chinese 'demands' were established Labor policy.

The major contentious issue was over Taiwan: the L-CP had fought hard to maintain Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist regime in the UN, and it was loathe to accept Peking's terms for recognition, which meant - if the Canadian formula were followed - "taking note" of Chinese territorial claims to Taiwan and withdrawing the Australian embassy from Taipeh; the ALP, on

1 *West Australian*, 15 January 1973.

2 *Advertiser*, 15 January 1973.

3 D.J. Murphy, "Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, January to June, 1973", *AJPH*, vol. 19, no. 3 (December 1973), p.339; S. Fitzgerald, "Australia's China Policy", *Australian Foreign Affairs Record*, vol. 44, no. 3 (March 1973), p.177.

the other hand, who had "... utterly abandoned the Chinese KMT remnant on Taiwan",¹ saw relations with Peking as being of more significance, not only for Australia's immediate environs, but for the entire Asia-Pacific region. The Labor position was in fact stronger than Canada's; Australia "acknowledged" Chinese claims that Taiwan was a province of China.

The L-CP's policy was influenced by at least three factors:

(1) the DLP connection, (2) the reluctance of South-East Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines) to accord recognition to Peking, and (3) the American alliance. It had pursued almost a shadow of the US Government's China policy, whereas the ALP was prepared to show some independence: Whitlam's 1971 visit, for example. Mr McMahon and his colleagues, by contrast, towed the US line, justifying their China policy in terms of the commitment to Taiwan. For instance, the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Nigel Bowen, spoke of the government of Taiwan as: "... not only a friend but also a responsible member of the Asian community and, indeed, the wider world community", and that "Australia is naturally and quite properly reluctant and indeed, unwilling, to submit to Peking's stipulation that it should abandon its friend".² The L-CP's great error of judgement was that it thought the American alliance was contingent upon an uncritical, compliant "loyalty to the protector",³ which, in this case, meant supporting Taiwan. Mr Whitlam was well aware that the recognition of China would not disrupt the alliance with America - the central element of Australian foreign and defence policy: several of America's NATO allies had recognized China (France, Gt Britain, Canada) as had Japan.

1 W.J. Hudson, "Foreign Policy Review", June, 1973, *op. cit.*, p.122.

2 *Australian*, 29 February 1972, quoted in J.A.A. Stockwin, "Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, January to June, 1972, *AJPH*, vol. 18, no. 3 (December 1972), p.340.

3 B. Grant, *The Crisis of Loyalty*, especially chapter one.

Thus, while the Labor Government rejected the "obsequious satellitism"¹ inherent in such public inanities as "All the way with LBJ", it was not about to reject the alliance, as will be shown below; nor was it about to "kowtow to Chairman Mao", the muted comments concerning China's nuclear tests notwithstanding.²

Thus, while Mr Whitlam demonstrated considerable diplomatic boldness in deciding to exchange quick recognition with the PRC, it would be a mistake to say that this paved the way for a radically different policy. If it is true that a L-CP Government after 1972 would have followed the USA's China policy, then it is most likely that Australia would not have recognized the PRC until about 1975.³ However, for at least three reasons it seems that recognition may have been granted even before that time: firstly, Australia's formal commitments to Taiwan were considerably less than the USA's⁴; secondly, the County Party Leader, Mr Anthony, had advocated recognition in his 1972 policy speech, and his party's influence should not be underestimated; and thirdly, it seems clear from the statements of some former Liberal ministers during 1973 that an electoral victory would have provided the impetus for recognition - it was this fear of electoral repercussions which had prevented the Chifley Government from recognizing

1 The term is R. O'Neill's, "Foreign Policy and Defence", paper delivered at AIIA Conference, 1974, "Advance Australia - Where?", mimeo, p.16.

2 In 1973, there was a perceptible disparity in the "gently demurred" Australian protests to the Chinese Government over their nuclear blasts in Lop Nor, and the "invective and ridicule" which the Australian Government "hurled at the French" over their atmospheric tests on Mururoa Atoll in the Pacific, Douglas Wilkie, *Sun News Pictorial*, 20 June 1974; see also Alan Reid, *Bulletin*, 30 May 1973, and H. Bull, "Australian perceptions of our role in the world", p.7. Criticism appeared to be more balanced in 1974.

3 Informed diplomatic and journalistic comment suggest formal US recognition of Peking might be agreed upon sometime in 1975 as the next stage in the "normalisation" process between the two countries, see Roy Macartney, *Age*, 2 December 1974.

4 The USA currently has about 4000 troops on Taiwan as part of a defence treaty with the Nationalist Government.

the communist Government in 1949. Furthermore, as will be shown below, recognition brought only a superficial, albeit useful, change to Australia's relations with China.

An increased majority of Gallup respondents approved the Government's expeditious recognition of Peking: 56% approved the decision in a February 1973 poll,¹ an increase of 3% from April 1972.² In spite of, or perhaps because of, the new government's unceremonious dumping of Taiwan, public support for the continued recognition of the island "province" grew from 51% to 59% over the same period. Neither response was dramatic, and both can be explained in terms of the trends that were evident before 1972.

Table 7.2 : Recognition of the legal government of China:
Peking vs Taipeh

	<u>Recognize Peking</u>	<u>Don't</u>	<u>No opinion</u>
April 1972	53%	14%	33%
February 1973	56	20	24
	<u>Continue recognizing Taiwan</u>	<u>Don't</u>	<u>No opinion</u>
April 1972	51	14	35
February 1973	59	13	28

Table 7.3 shows ALP supporters more favourably disposed to recognizing Peking than L-CP voters, with the DLP taking a median position. The 45% support shown by the L-CP respondents was five percent below the support level recorded in April 1972, suggesting that the Government's speedy recognition was counter-productive in some quarters. By contrast,

1 APOP, no. 238, February 1973.

2 APOP, no. 229, April 1972.

support among ALP voters increased from 57% to 64% (see Table 4.10). Men continued to show strong support (65%) for recognition, while women were uncertain (47%); teenagers were the most ardent supporters among the age groups, assent falling with increased age, so that of the over 70's only 38% approved.

Recognition continued to be most popular in the upper income group, while in the occupation groups professionals were overwhelming in their support, registering 81% approval, in surprising contrast to managers (61%), who would be the most likely material benefactors of closer ties with China; and, despite Mr Anthony's *imprimatur*, farm owners and farm labourers were least favourable - although they recorded among the highest responses to trading. Although the religion variable revealed a negligible difference between denominations, Catholics showed most movement of opinion: support increasing from 45% in August 1970 to 56% in the 1973 survey, with Anglicans moving only five percent (see Table 4.29). Western Australians, who were inclined to favour recognition before 1972, appeared less enthusiastic in 1973; they recorded the lowest response of all states.

Trade

Oil diplomacy in the post-Yom Kippur international environment has made the dichotomy between trade and foreign policy even more antiquated than it was before October 1973. Consequently, trade relations might be seen as a fairly reliable index to Australia's foreign policy towards China, although it should be noted that there was an unfortunate disjunction between trade and foreign relations in the mid-1960's, when the L-CP Government was sending Australian troops to South Vietnam to stop the downward "thrust by Communist China"¹ - to quote Menzies - and trading

1 CPD, (H. of R.), 29 April 1965, vol. 45, p.1061.

Table 7.3 : Recognition of Peking Government

	APPROVE	DISAPPROVE	UNDECIDED
NATIONAL AVERAGE	56	20	24
PARTY			
ALP	64	11	25
DLP	57	25	18
L-CP	45	34	21
SEX			
Men	65	17	18
Women	47	23	30
AGE			
16-20	64	16	20
21-29	59	19	27
30-49	58	19	23
50-69	52	24	25
70+	38	27	35
INCOME			
Upper	58	20	23
Middle	57	20	22
Lower	45	22	33
OCCUPATION			
Professional	81	11	8
Managers	61	18	21
Small business owners	53	20	27
White collar clerks	65	21	14
Skilled worker	53	19	28
Semi-skilled	46	20	34
Unskilled	50	15	35
Farm owners	46	27	27
Farm labourers	45	34	21
Others, none	44	28	28
RELIGION			
Catholics	56	20	24
Anglicans	55	21	24
STATES			
Qld	55	19	26
NSW	58	20	22
Vic	58	21	29
Tas	50	19	31
SA	56	19	25
WA	47	23	29

with the PRC to the tune of \$100 million a year. Despite this episode and the years leading up to it, it seems that today's world of international economic interdependence¹ makes the trade-diplomacy nexus even more relevant. Thus, since "trade is not the overriding preoccupation in our relations with China",² as the present Australian Ambassador to China has said, then it seems reasonable to conclude that at a broader level of foreign policy generality, Australia's China policy has not altered substantially.

The level of trade conducted before the instigation of the Labor Government was high: about \$100 million per annum since 1960, the sale of wheat and wool to China commencing in the mid-1950's; but in 1970 the Chinese decided not to renew a contract with the Australian Wheat Board, and this was seen as a reaction to the Australian Government's tardiness over the recognition of Peking. The L-CP Government, however, denied that Australia's trading relations were dependent upon diplomatic recognition and representation.³ The increase in bilateral trade between China and Canada after the two had agreed on recognition terms in October 1970 seemed to confirm the political connection with trade, although West Germany and Japan had "... both been trading extensively with China without the benefit of recognition".⁴ The matter was further complicated when, in September 1972, on the one hand, Japan recognized Peking, and, on the other, the Australian Wheat Board announced the sale of one million tons of wheat to China, worth \$60 million.⁵ The Country Party, at least, saw the value of recognizing

1 For a number of articles on this concept see *International Journal*, vol. 29, no. 4 (Autumn 1974).

2 S. Fitzgerald, "Australia's China Policy", p.178.

3 See Nigel Bowen's opening address to the 1972 AIIA Conference "China and the World Community", especially p.6, in I. Wilson (ed.), *op. cit.*

4 R. O'Neill, "Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, July to December, 1971", p.4.

5 W.J. Hudson, "Foreign Policy Review", December 1972, p.113.

Peking, as was mentioned above. Did the new Labor Government portend an era of flourishing trade with China?

The announcement, early in 1973, of an Australian trade mission to China, for May 1973, to be headed by the Minister for Overseas Trade and Manufacturing Industry, Dr Cairns, and which was to include "... some of the aristocrats of Australian capitalism",¹ was "widely acclaimed by the press as being a further step toward cementing relations between Australia and China".² The *Age*, for example, while warning against any expectations of an "instant bonanza" said in an editorial: "... In a sense this mission is the culmination of Mr Whitlam's China policy".³ If this is so, then one is left with the conclusion that Australia's relations with China have only changed in appearance, as the Cairns' mission served only to extend marginally previous L-CP trade deals; there were some gains, but, as journalist Gregory Clark has observed, the sanguine press reports and government commentaries at the time failed to take cognizance of Chinese intentions.⁴ Moreover, the optimists should have heeded the caveat of the Australian Ambassador:

...[the] somewhat euphoric view of the potential of the Chinese market...must be tempered with a little realism. It is simply not true that there are 800 million potential customers for everything we produce.⁵

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- 1 D.J. Murphy, "Problems...", December 1973, *loc. cit.* The mission included chief executives of BHP, the National Bank, G.J. Coles, CSR, and Myer Emporium.
 - 2 Department of Foreign Affairs, *Digest of Press Opinion*, 12/73, 20 March 1973, pp.2-3.
 - 3 *Age*, 15 March 1973.
 - 4 Clark suggested that trade with Australia was not uppermost in the minds of the men who formulated Chinese policy, *Australian*, 7 June 1973.
 - 5 S. Fitzgerald, "Australia's China Policy", *loc. cit.*

Mr Whitlam's visit to China in October - November 1973, resulted, *inter alia*, in the signing of new long-term agreements for the sale of Australian wheat and sugar. However, most emphasis had been placed on the negotiations with Japanese leaders that had preceded the China visit,¹ and it seems the tumultuous welcome given by the Chinese for Mr Whitlam's party was misinterpreted by the media in Australia. "The most important thing to emerge from the red carpet treatment given to Mr Whitlam", commented the *Sydney Morning Herald*, "is the clear evidence that Peking recognizes Australia's regional importance."² This inference seems to have been drawn too early, however. As a more acute observer of the event has noted:

...it [the visit] did not signify any special relationship between China and Australia, or any special treatment for Mr Whitlam. What he got was the standard welcome accorded by the Chinese to visiting heads of government from countries with which China has diplomatic relations...³

The Congolese President, Major Marien N'Gouabi, received an airport reception of the same magnitude as Mr Whitlam - Zaire could hardly be considered of regional importance.

To further underscore the essential continuity in Australia's foreign policy while still displaying stylistic differences, Mr Whitlam, while in Peking, met with the deposed Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia, an act which was considered undiplomatic, indeed radical, by many. The meeting seemingly augured for recognition of the prince's government-in-exile. But recognition was not withdrawn from the Lon Nol Government in Phnom Penh;

1 C. Clark, "Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, July to December, 1973, *AJPH*, vol. 20, no. 1 (April 1974), p.6, *Sun News Pictorial*, 20 October 1973; for a full report of speeches etc. see *Australian Foreign Affairs Record*, vol. 44, no. 11 (November 1973), pp.750-778.

2 *Sydney Morning Herald*, 6 November 1973.

3 *Sun News Pictorial*, 3 November 1973.

nor did Australia vote for the deposition of the Lon Nol delegation and the installation of Sihanouk's at the UN.

The Age has summed up well the Whitlam Government's relations with China:

While it has been neither a disastrous nor a discreditable initiative it will not supplant Australia's connections with the United States, Britain, Western Europe or Japan... The culmination of the Government's China policy is not a world-shaking event, but it is useful for the present and potentially valuable for the future.¹

AMERICAN ALLIANCE

To what extent has the Labor Government disrupted relations with Australia's principal ally: the USA? The answer to this would seem to be that relations have undergone a stylistic transformation, but the fundamental association, which takes shape in the form of the ANZUS Treaty, has remained unaltered.

The L-CP view of the world saw the American relationship as indispensable in an international environment dominated by power politics; the globe was seen through a Cold War ideological filter (with one eye on the electorate), which meant deferential treatment to the USA. The L-CP's defence fears centred mainly, but not only, on China, and as the 1960's wore on, it became clear that Gt Britain's imperial role had had its day, and so, in a perceived hostile Asian environment greater reliance was put on America, with the concomitant "loyalty". In the words of one Liberal Minister:

...how can the downward thrust of Communist China be prevented except by the might of the United States coupled with the will and determination of those countries on the periphery of China.²

1 *Age*, 26 April 1973.

2 M. Fraser, "Australian Government Policy", in M. Teichmann (ed.), *Aspects of Australia's Defence*, Melbourne, Monash University, 1966, p.35, quoted in J. Camilleri, *An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy*, p.32.

Labor's accession to office in 1972 seemed to cast off the shibboleths of the conservative parties. In contradistinction to previous practice and, it appeared at the time, policy, the Whitlam Government brought home the remaining Australian forces from Vietnam, in ostensible disregard to the American withdrawal program; recognized the PRC, with seeming unconcern for the US Government, which was unable to find a workable diplomatic solution over Taiwan in the former's "rapprochement" with Peking; voted against the US and with Third World countries - many of which were vociferous critics of the USA - on resolutions condemning southern African racism; criticized, by various means already mentioned, the American resumption of bombing over North Vietnam in late December 1972; and displayed, in the words of one newspaper, "... apparent total indifference to the preservation of good relations with the United States"¹ over the maritime unions' ban on US shipping in January 1973. On the 'credit' side, the new Government's decision to ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty - another of Whitlam's policy speech promises - was well received in Washington, but this hardly acted as a counter-balance to the above 'negative' policies in the Austral-American relationship. Fears expressed after only a few months of Labor rule that the American alliance was being eroded have proven to be premature. Indeed, it is possible to argue - as moderate Labor spokesmen quite understandably have - that the alliance has been strengthened.

The general public, however, was not at all convinced that the relationship with the USA had been strengthened. An ANOP poll in February 1973 found that 43% thought US-Australian relations would get weaker under Labor and only 22% thought they would get stronger. The following table shows 57% wanted relations to get stronger, 28% unchanged, and 13% wanted relations to get weaker.

1 *Sydney Morning Herald*, 6 January 1973.

Table 7.4 : Relations perceived and desired with the USA
under Labor

	<u>Stronger</u>	<u>Weaker</u>	<u>Unchanged</u>	<u>Unsure</u>
	%	%	%	%
Relations will get	22	43	31	4
Would like relations to get	57	13	28	2

Source: *APON*, vol. 3, no. 1 (February 1973).

Despite a left-wing element within the Government, which often gave vent to anti-American comment, Mr Whitlam's Government "...took office as committed to the American alliance as its conservative predecessors".¹ A resolution of A Special Labor Party Conference held in March 1963 asserted: "Labor believes that the defence alliance with the United States of America and New Zealand referred to as ANZUS is essential and must continue."² Mr Whitlam's comment in 1972 that SEATO was 'moribund' created some apprehensions, especially in view of the USA's continued support of the Pact.³ It was SEATO, moreover, which had been invoked by the L-CP Government to justify its intervention in South Vietnam. But ANZUS remained, for both the L-CP and the ALP, the cornerstone of Australia's foreign and defence policy. The Whitlam view of the alliance, nonetheless, added a more flexible dimension; as he said before elected to office:

It cannot, however, be emphasized too strongly or too often that ANZUS by itself and of itself does not constitute a foreign policy; it does not, by itself or of itself, constitute a defence policy. ANZUS is a crucial part of both our defence and foreign policies; but it is an intolerable stultification of the policy making process to make its mere existence a policy in itself.⁴

1 W.J. Hudson, "Foreign Policy Reivew", June 1973, p.120.

2 Quoted in J. Camilleri, *An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy*, *loc.cit.*

3 "SEATO was important as the only treaty ratified by the US Senate by which the Administration could aid Thailand." Roy Macartney, *Age*, 4 January 1974.

4 *CPD*, (H.ofR.), 22 May 1969, vol. 63, p.2163.

Concern that Labor's diplomatic abrasiveness had done irreparable damage to the alliance were dispelled during Mr Whitlam's visit to Washington, en route to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Conference in Ottawa, in July-August 1973. It became clear that Mr Whitlam, his independent initiatives notwithstanding, placed a high premium on the preservation of the American connection, even if not in the pristine form the L-CP would have liked. He told Parliament:

I can assure the House that, following my talks in Washington, I believe those basic matters on which we agree are much more numerous, important and lasting than those few issues on which our views might differ. That is certainly the view of the American Administration. I believe, in fact, that the Australian-American relationship will be seen to rest now on firmer foundations than it did in the past. We have brought it to a new maturity... I believe that America respects and welcomes the less compliant and more independent, though equally friendly, approach which the Australian Government now adopts towards the United States.¹

The Prime Minister, then, has been careful not to tread too heavily on the toes of "our great ally"; indeed, he has sought to actively obviate fears in Australia that he intended to renounce the alliance: he is all too aware of the possible electoral ramifications of taking such a daring step as well he might judging from the above survey findings.

Australia's continued adherence to ANZUS takes tangible expression in the presence of American military-communications installations on Australian soil. The rationale behind these bases seems to be one of Australia's remaining a non-nuclear power, while making "... as credible as it can be the American guarantee of nuclear protection."² There are over thirty such installations, although only three are known to be of any real strategic significance: Pine Gap, North West Cape, and Nurrungar.

1 E.G. Whitlam, *APD* (H.ofR.), 22 August 1973, no. 12, pp.200-201.

2 B. Grant, *The Crisis of Loyalty*, p.24.

Mr Whitlam, however, while stating publicly his opposition to the bases, has defended their continuation on 'legal' grounds:

The Australian Government takes the attitude that there should not be foreign military bases, stations, installations in Australia. We honour agreements covering existing stations. We do not favour the extension or prolongation of any of those existing ones. The agreements stand, but there will not be extensions or proliferations.¹

As part of this declared antagonism to the bases, the Government, in January 1974, renegotiated the 1963 North West Cape Agreement. Mr Barnard's (The Defence Minister) new agreement, however, was largely window-dressing. The American concessions seemed impressive: an Australian would become second-in-command, thirty-five Australians would be appointed to key positions, Australia would establish its own naval communications facility on the site, and the Australian Government was to receive warning in the event of future American alerts that involve North West Cape.² However, the concessions were illusory, since the Australian Government would have no authority over Americans on the base, nor would Australia have access to the American communications building.³ Thus, "in essence, America had conceded responsibility but not power".⁴ The renegotiation was a politically judicious balancing act, careful not to alarm moderates in the Government, but mindful of the growing pressures of left-wing calls for the removal of the bases. Furthermore, the imminent acceptance of the Omega navigational system by the Government⁵, with its potential for use by nuclear missile-laden

1 E.G. Whitlam, *APD* (H.ofR.), 3 April 1973, no. 4, p.905.

2 The base had been put on full alert without the Government's prior knowledge during the Yom Kippur War in the Middle-East, October 1973. This provoked public anxiety over Australia's lack of control at the base.

3 D. Goldsworthy, "Foreign Policy Review", *The Australian Quarterly*, vol. 46, no. 1 (March 1974), pp.107-108.

4 *ibid.*, p.108. Moreover, "remote control from a master station could override any change in control," *Australian Defence Reporter*, vol.1, no. 6 (April 1973), p.3.

5 See Andrew Clark, *National Times*, December 9-14, 1974.

'hunter-killer' American submarines¹, seems to be contrary to Mr Whitlam's commitment that "there will not be extensions or proliferations". Therefore, insofar as the American bases reflect a continued perpetration of the alliance, it seems that Labor has made changes of a non-substantive nature only.

While a majority (54%) of Australians in 1973 wanted to see the bases maintained,² in contrast to the declamatory statements of Mr Whitlam, but in conformity with the actual practice, there nonetheless seems to be a trend away from the massive public support which was prevalent at the time of the North West Cape Agreement ten years earlier.

Table 7.5 : US strategic/nuclear - related installations in Australia 1963-1973

	FAVOUR	OPPOSE	NO OPINION
	%	%	%
1963 (North West Cape) *	80	11	9
1969 (Woomera) *	74	16	10
1973 (Pine Gap and North West Cape) **	54	38	8

* APOP, questions are in Table 5.3.

* APON, question in footnote below.

On the question of whether the purposes of the installations should be made public or kept secret, more Australians were for making the purposes

1 *ibid.* Clark also suggested that equipment for the Omega system is already transmitting from North West Cape, which, one might speculate, is why the Americans were not prepared to allow Australian access to the central communications building, despite the renegotiated agreement.

2 APON, vol. 3, no. 3 (July/August, 1973): "If Pine Gap and North West Cape were shown to be connected with nuclear defence, would you be in favour, or not in favour, of allowing the bases to remain in Australia?"

public than were not. A Gallup survey, in April 1973¹, found 47% of those interviewed in favour of making the purposes public, with 38% saying that they should be kept secret. Thus, while the Government's renegotiation for joint control, or something that would pass for it, finds some correlation with prevailing majority opinion, the left wing of the party and Mr Whitlam's prospects for dismantling the installations, or even for preventing the introduction of Omega, find little comfort in the views of a solid majority. And if this thesis is correct in its assessment of Australian public opinion it will be some time before any government could rely on majority support in any attempt to abrogate the defence installations agreements.

ANOP found less support for the bases among young people (18-24) and females, with L-CP voters, at 64% approval, markedly more disposed towards the bases than ALP voters, thus continuing trends noted in Chapter Five. Similarly young people, females, and ALP supporters were more frequently quoted as saying that "anyone who wants to" should know the function of the bases. Gallup breakdowns confirm these findings, concluding that upper income earners (especially managers, professionals, and small business owners - in that order), Queenslanders and South Australians were more inclined to approve the secrecy of the installations.

The Labor Government introduced new elements into the alliance with the United States: apprehension, flexibility, maturity, and independence. It cannot be said, however, that the foundations of the relationship were shaken. After the first stormy "One Hundred Days", the smoke had cleared sufficiently to see that no fundamental changes had been made, and indeed, relations appeared to become progressively more tranquil. As one reviewer said of the relationship in 1974: "in general, Australian-American relations

1 *APOP*, 2393-6, April 1973. This compares with an ANOP poll which found that 48% wanted the functions of the bases made known to "anyone who wants to know".

were conducted with scrupulous public courtesy"¹ in the first seven months of the year. It is more than likely that the assiduous cultivation of the US, which followed the storm, placated many of the Australians who had, or expressed, misgivings about US-Australian relations in 1973, but as yet it is too early to comment.

RACIAL ISSUES

Shortly after assuming the Prime Ministership, Mr Whitlam said his thinking had been "towards a more independent Australian stance in international affairs and towards an Australia that will be less militarily oriented and less open to suggestions of racism".² Prior to the election, Australia was seen by many countries as sympathising with the 'colonialist - racist' regimes in South Africa, Rhodesia, and Portugal. Many of Mr Whitlam's foreign policy initiatives have been directed towards the shedding of Australia's racist mantle, and it is this area that the question of 'image' perhaps becomes most prominent.

Mr Whitlam saw Australia's racist tag deriving from three inter-related sources: aborigines; the 'White Australia' immigration policy; and on colonial issues, such as Australia's role in Papua New Guinea and apparent endorsement of the white regimes in southern Africa through its legalistic approach to United Nations' resolutions. It is difficult, of course, to tell whether Mr Whitlam's announced new 'policies' in the above areas were designed to rid Australia of an image which it did not deserve, or whether they were intended to give Australia an admirable image which,

1 D. Goldsworthy, "Foreign Policy Review", September, 1974, p.109. There was one blemish, however. Senator Bill Brown made a vitriolic attack on the US Ambassador, Mr Marshall Green, *Australian*, 2 July 1974.

2 Reported in the *Australian*, 6 December 1972. Emphasis added.

may not have been a true reflection of the Australian people. As with the foregoing, the policies will be examined, followed by an analysis of opinion.

Aboriginal Advancement

In his 1972 policy speech under the section entitled 'International Affairs and Defence' Mr Whitlam declared:

Let us never forget this: Australia's real test so far as the rest of the world, and particularly our region, is concerned is the role we create for our aborigines. ...Australia's treatment of her Aboriginal people will be the thing upon which the rest of the world will judge Australia and Australians.... The Aborigines are a responsibility we cannot escape, cannot share, cannot shuffle off; the world will not let us forget that.¹

Although the Labor Government's aboriginal policy has been fraught with inconsistencies, discrepancies, and embarrassments, it would be doing the Government an injustice to deny that good intent was not behind the many cases of maladministration; this is not to suggest that competent administration was absent, however. The Labor Government increased expenditure on aboriginal affairs from \$44 million in the 1972-3 budget to \$117 million for 1973-4², but concern has not been limited to financial assistance. The Government has shown respect, and, in most cases, acted for Aboriginal land rights, education, culture, and economic improvement; a separate Department of Aboriginal Affairs, under its own Minister, was created; and an embryonic Aboriginal 'Parliament' has been established, but meeting with only limited success: the National Aborigines Consultative Council.

1 ALP policy speech given by the Leader of the Labor Party, Mr E.G. Whitlam, on 13 November 1972, at Blacktown Civic Centre, NSW. Extracts in C. Clark (ed.), *Australian Foreign Policy*, p.203.

2 A.B. Pittock and L. Lippman, "Aborigines", in R. Forward (ed.), *op.cit.*, p.86.

No one can doubt the substantially increased concern for the Aborigines shown by the present government. Nonetheless, it should be pointed out that the L-CP had secured - by national referendum - the rights of the federal government to legislate for aboriginal welfare,¹ and had introduced, after the 1967 referendum, a Ministry for Aboriginal Affairs, albeit a shared one.² Moreover, in late 1967, the then Prime Minister, Mr Harold Holt, established The Council for Aboriginal Affairs, to be headed by Dr H.C. Coombs, and designed to make policy recommendations to the Government. Furthermore, Mr Whitlam seems to have over-estimated the possible impact that Australia's treatment of her aborigines will have on her reputation on the world stage. Australia's reputation has been, and will continue to be, to a much larger extent, conditional on the handling of colonial questions and immigration policy. This will be discussed, after a brief look at the sole question on aborigines since 1972.

In spite of the new government's initiatives, the Australian people, according to an ANOP survey in 1973,³ saw many problems still besetting the aborigines. They gave the following responses in answer to the question: "which one of these do you think is the greatest problem facing Aborigines in Australia today?"

Table 7.6 : Aborigines

	%
Acceptance by the community	34
Health	10
Loss of cultural heritage	10
Job discrimination	9
Land rights	7
Housing	7
Relations with police	2
Some other problem	9
All problems equal	10
No problems	1
Unsure	1

1 H. Bull, "Australian perceptions of our role in the world", p.2.

2 Mr W.C. Wentworth first held the portfolio of Social Services and Aboriginal Affairs.

3 APON, vol. 3, no. 3 (July, August), 1973, p.22.

Although this poll cannot provide any basis for comparability with the 1967 Gallup survey, these findings do suggest that the very great majority of Australians consider there is an aboriginal "problem". As to whether the public supports the Labor Governments efforts to alleviate the condition of aborigines, this poll provides no clues. Young people aged between 18 and 24 were more inclined (43%) than older people to see "acceptance by the community" as the most difficult problem confronting aborigines, the 25-44 year olds recording a 38% response, and the over 45's 27%. ALP and L-CP voters scarcely differed in their views.

Colonialism - Southern Africa

Concerning preparations for an independent Papua New Guinea, there is little doubt that the methods of the L-CP Government, especially under the capable and enlightened guidance of Andrew Peacock (Minister for External Territories), and the Labor Government differ to an almost imperceptible extent; the variations that have arisen perhaps reflecting only the inevitable dissimilarity in ministerial personality.

There were a spate of publicity-gaining announcements which followed the 2 December 1972 elections: the banning of racially-selected sporting teams from visiting and passing through Australia, the support for UN resolutions condemning Rhodesia, the attempted closure of the Rhodesian Information Centre, the ban on wheat exports to Rhodesia. Later, when Mr Whitlam made some acid remarks about South African leaders being "worse than Hitler", attracting reciprocal opprobrium, he had apparently established his anti-racist credentials. That Mr Whitlam's anti-racism is sincere is not in doubt;¹ nor is that of his surrogate Foreign Minister,

¹ This aspect of the Prime Minister's character is well documented by his biographer, see L. Oakes, *Whitlam PM*, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1973.

Senator Willesee. Writing on the issue of South Africa's expulsion from the UN in 1974, T.B. Millar has said:

The decision to vote to exclude South Africa has obviously not been lightly taken. It reflects essentially the strong personal feelings of the Prime Minister [Whitlam] and the Minister of Foreign Affairs [Willesee] against policies of racial discrimination.¹

The Government's decision to vote in the Security Council for the expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations was not supported by the Australian public: 56% of a Morgan Gallup Poll² said that South Africa should remain in the world body, 19% thought she should be expelled, and 25% were undecided. At first sight this is clear instance of the Government acting in discord with prevailing public opinion. However, it is quite conceivable that Mr Whitlam supported the move in the Security Council so as not to lose credibility and a big store of diplomatic good-will with Third World countries, knowing full well that the veto power of one or more of the permanent members would be used³ - thus preventing expulsion, and dampening a possible public reaction in Australia. Respondents were more likely to favour expulsion if they were ALP voters, aged between 14 and 29, earned a low income, or had a tertiary education.⁴

There are other reasons for suggesting that there is a considerable gap between the rhetoric and substance of Labor's policies, not unlike the expulsion issue. There have been several symbolic attempts to displace an unwanted, but perhaps justifiable, image, and these have lead almost inevitably to contradictions. One commentator has described this well:

1 T.B. Millar, "The apartheid issue - not so black and white", *Canberra Times*, 30 October 1974.

2 *APOP*, no. 49, November 1974.

3 In fact, there was a triple veto, which would seem to add weight to this argument.

4 Gallup introduced this variable in 1974.

The inconsistencies - or discrepancy between practice and principle - inherent in Whitlam's African policy might be explained by the possible electoral disadvantages of adopting a consistent policy : trade with South Africa; arms to liberation movements; enforcing Rhodesian sanctions by domestic legislation...¹

The Australian Labor Government has not been prepared to relinquish its lucrative trading partnership with South Africa², nor has it been forthcoming in the sending of arms to African liberation movements - the \$150,000 humanitarian aid provided in the 1974-5 budget can only be described as a token, as Australia's annual export trade with South Africa is worth \$90 million.

Thus, changes in Australian foreign policy towards South Africa have been significant only in a stylistic sense: they could only be so because of "...the presumed unpopularity of such initiatives among the electorate at large."³

It would indeed have been a brave, and perhaps suicidal, government to sever trade relations with South Africa, as public opinion was unquestionably in favour of its continuance. In August 1973, Gallup respondents, after being reminded that "it had been suggested Australia should stop trading with South Africa, because of the way coloured people were separated there"⁴ were asked whether they were in favour, or opposed, to this; 60% said they favoured continued trade, 23% were opposed, and 17%

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- 1 D. Goldsworthy, "Australia and Africa : New Relationship?", *The Australian Quarterly*, vol. 45, no. 4 (December 1973).
 - 2 A good account of this relationship is R. Witton, "Australia and Apartheid: The Ties that Bind", *The Australian Quarterly*, vol. 45, no. 2 (June 1973).
 - 3 D. Goldsworthy, "Australia and Africa: New Relationship?", p.71. Fear of electoral unpopularity probably compelled Sen. Willesee to delay the announcement of Australia's 'de facto' recognition of Guinea - Bissau until after the 18 May election in 1974, see D. Goldsworthy, "Foreign Policy Review", *The Australian Quarterly*, vol. 46, no. 3 (September 1974) p.110.
 - 4 *APOP*, no. 6, September 1973.

were undecided. A similar question was asked for Rhodesia in the same survey, finding 57% in favour, with 24% opposed, and 19% undecided. Thus, opposition to trading with Rhodesia fell by only 3% in the period from April 1970 (see Table 6.15) to September 1974, indicating that, for trading purposes, Australian were seeing less and less to differentiate the Rhodesian from the South African case. L-CP voters were 68% in favour of trading with South Africa, DLP 59%, and ALP 54%, and while age seemed to be inconsequential, the 14-19 age group expressed a high favourable response of 72%. These results were almost duplicated for the Rhodesian question.

On the broader question of relations in general, the majority of Australians wanted to maintain or have closer relations with both South Africa and Rhodesia.

Table 7.7 : Relations with South Africa and Rhodesia
1973-4

	<u>Stronger</u>	<u>Unchanged</u>	<u>Weaker</u>	<u>Unsure</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
Rhodesia (1973)*	27	36	23	14
South Africa (1974)**	41	36	12	11

Sources:* *APON*, vol. 3, no. 1 (February 1973)

** *Australian*, 25 March 1974. Report of *APOP* poll.

Question: "Would you personally like to see Australia's relations with [Rhodesia, South Africa] become stronger, weaker, or remain unchanged?"

Thus, public support for closer ties with Rhodesia and South Africa was both high and comparable, in contrast to the early years after UDI. Policy, however, corresponded with opinion on South Africa (by continuing trade), but not Rhodesia, where the Government's policy was more truculent.

The 'White Australia' Policy

During his visit to the Philippines, in 1974, Mr Whitlam declared that the 'White Australia' policy was "dead and buried". The statement, however, reflects only a personal disposition, political opportunism, and a superficial change in Australia's immigration laws; the statement does not portend a change in Australia's social composition. The conclusion that there has not been a momentous change is derived from two premises: non-European immigration was first introduced by the L-CP, and changes made by the Labor Government have not resulted in any dramatic break with past policies.

In 1966, the L-CP Government moved towards the easing of Australia's restrictive immigration regulations for non-whites. Essentially, the modifications provided for the entry of a small number of non-Europeans on temporary entry permits, with the right to gain Australian citizenship after five years residence, instead of the previous 15 year requirement. The new policy, while scrupulously cautious, was nonetheless the forerunner of successive relaxations of the policy. Two administrative decisions made in 1967 further liberalized entry regulations for non-Europeans. As a result, 13,742 non-Europeans settled in Australia between 1966 and 1970.¹ When compared with a total intake of well over a half a million, however, this figure represents only a miniscule proportion.

Labor's Immigration Minister, Al Grassby, abolished all discriminatory regulations, so that, technically, Australia's immigration requirements no longer differentiated between people on grounds of race or colour of skin or nationality. However, since "the highest priority is being given to the

1 G. Greenwood, "The Political Debate in Australia", in G. Greenwood and N. Harper (eds.), *Australia and World Affairs 1966-1970*, p.86.

the reunion of immediate family members,"¹ the proportion of coloured migrants is likely to remain minimal, despite the fact that non-assisted immigration is freer.

By 1974, Gallup data show Australians had moved to an even more tolerant position concerning coloured immigration than was apparent where Chapter Six left off in 1972. In October 1972, 40% thought 10,000 annual coloured immigrants was "about right", and 8% "too few" (a total of 48%); by April 1974,² however, 53% said 10,000 was about right, and 7% too few (total 60%). This marks a significant movement of opinion.

Table 7.8 : Public Opinion and Coloured Migrants 1972-1974

	<u>October 1972</u>		<u>April 1974</u>	
	%		%	
10,000 is too few	8		7	
10,000 is about right	<u>40</u>	48%	<u>53</u>	60%
10,000 is too many	24		32	
No coloured migrants	<u>16</u>	40%	<u>0</u>	32%
No opinion	12		8	

The 1974 survey found only three respondents in the total sample of 1776 who said that there should be no coloured migration to Australia; compared with the 16% registered in the October 1972 sample, this is an amazing reduction.

The political significance of small numbers should not be overlooked, however. In the campaign leading up to the May federal election of 1974, a campaign of racist invective was promoted by the Immigration Control Association and the White Australia Policy League in Al Grassby's Riverina electorate, these organizations subsequently claiming the credit for the

1 A.J. Grassby, "Australia's Immigration Policy", *Australian Foreign Affairs Record*, vol. 44, no. 10 (October, 1974), p.712.

1 Morgan Gallup Poll, no. 26, March-April 1974. In mid-1973, Australian Gallup Polls changed its name. For convenience I will continue to refer to the publication of this organization as *APOP*.

former Minister's defeat. Whatever the reasons for Grassby's electoral demise, this example provides another instance of a small, vocal activist minority creating an impression of public opinion which may be quite distant from the actual opinions of the majority. Notwithstanding the trend elicited from the above questions, a Morgan Gallup Survey, in March 1974,¹ indicates the fundamental caution inherent in Australian racial opinion, a reflection of Government policy perhaps. In response to the proposal for 1,000 workers from the Philippines to come and work at the Leyland car assembly plant in Sydney, 42% said they opposed it, 41% favoured it, and 17% were undecided. The most likely explanation for this more circumspect response may have been the impression of bulk (rather than mass) migration, thus provoking, in the minds of some, images of a discontented, suburban, ethnic minority. The same poll, asking for views on total migrant intake, found 14% in favour of 130,000 or more annual migrants, compared with 21% who favoured 140,000 or more in October 1972: the pre-Labor trend therefore continued.

Sub-group variations on both the question of the annual coloured intake and the 1,000 Filipino workers were not nearly as pronounced as for the other issues of foreign policy examined. The party breakdown showed only marginal differences on the question of the number of Asian immigrants wanted each year, with one significant development: opposition was highest among L-CP voters at 35%, compared with 30% for both ALP and DLP voters. The latter, however, were most resistant to the Filipinos, followed by L-CP and then ALP voters. Thus, with the advent of the Labor Government, ALP voters moved slightly ahead of L-CP supporters in their acceptance of coloured migrants.

1 *APOP*, no. 24, March 1974.

Men and women differed imperceptibly on both questions, although age seems to be directly related to tolerance of non-white immigrants; on both questions tolerance seems to be retrogressive with increased age, but to cite the Filipino responses only: 47% of those aged 14-19 would welcome them, compared with 45% of those 21-29, 42% of those 30-49, 33% of those 50-69, falling to a low of 28% of those over 70. While little differentiated respondents from the income groups on the first of these related questions, sharper reactions were registered in relation to the Filipino workers, with only 26% of lower income earners approving, increasing to 37% for the artisan/clerk category, and 47% for upper income respondents. Western Australians maintained their stronger antipathy to coloured migrants mentioned in the previous chapter (57% thought 10,000 a year was too many, the national average was 32%); they were less favourable to the Filipino workers proposal as well (54% were opposed, the national average was 32%). South Australians appear to be slightly more benevolent in their racial acceptance.

This analysis of policy and opinion has attempted to demonstrate that in Australia we have seen some considerable movement in both areas, but "the White Australia Policy is not dead, and cannot be buried alive".¹

It can be seen, then, that Labor's immigration policy, as with its aboriginal and colonial policies, do not indicate any marked change with the policies of its predecessors. Both L-CP and Labor Governments have moved, albeit cautiously, to adjust policies which smack of racial discrimination, but neither have moved too far for fear of provoking public resentment.

The theme of this chapter has been that only the modalities of Australia's foreign relations have changed since the arrival of the Labor

1 A.C. Palfreeman, *op.cit.*, p.356.

Government in December 1972, reflecting the slowly changing predispositions of the Australian public. An attempt has been made to catalogue the major policy areas: namely, Vietnam, China, the USA, and racism, and to show that the extent of policy modification has been amplified by magniloquent government rhetoric and an over-reactive opposition. Where changes have been more than declamatory - as necessary readjustments to changing international conditions - the Labor Government merely pre-empted likely L-CP decisions, and, furthermore, these alterations were not crucial to Australia's foreign and defence policy.

Inspection of intermittent survey data seems to confirm the basic propositions posited in the case studies dealing with the period prior to the changeover of government. The polls suggest that the opinion trends observable before 1972 in relation to China, coloured immigration, trade with South Africa and Rhodesia, and American defence installations continued with the advent of the Labor Government, but that where the Government made significant departures, or, as I have argued, presented an image of change, the public was unimpressed. Thus, majority opinion was probably against the recognition of the Hanoi Government, definitely against the Governments disingenuous attempt to expel South Africa from the UN, and had forebodings about a perceived deterioration of the American alliance. The stability of Australian public opinion would seem to be substantiated by this analysis.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

Two principal characteristics of the Australian public as it relates to foreign policy have clearly emerged from this study: change and continuity. Although major attention was paid to the decade from the mid-1960's, the foregoing also contains a catalogue of Australian foreign policy perspectives for the past quarter of a century.

Menzies and Hasluck had little difficulty in finding public support for their Vietnam commitment, embodying, as it did, attitudes and policies to China and the US alliance. But since then there is little doubt that the prevailing public orthodoxy has undergone a transformation, prompting the following rebuke from Sir Robert Menzies:

The phrase "great and powerful friends" is now a matter of ridicule among half-baked political commentators... I know it is not fashionable now to attack communists. To attack communists is to demonstrate that you are an "old square", that you are an old conservative, or some other rubbish of that kind.¹

The press has reflected these changing values.² For example, the former Primate of Hungary, Cardinal Jozef Mindszenty, complained during a tour of Australia in 1974 that newspapers were cutting or omitting from reports his statements criticizing communism.³ What did the case studies reveal about community attitudes towards communism and other foreign policy issues?

Vietnam provided the main foreign policy focus for the Australian public in the latter half of the 1960's, and the polls provided clear

1 Sir Robert Menzies, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 16 December 1974.

2 *Australian*, 25 November 1974, *Age*, 11 March 1975.

3 *Age*, 30 November 1974.

evidence of its declining popularity, from a strong early pro-involvement consensus, which started to sour, but only marginally, after the traumas of 1968. In varying degrees, Vietnam encapsulated all the key foreign policy issues of the period, but analysis of that issue only fails to provide the full profile of public opinion. Thus, while the generally high degree of public support for the Vietnam commitment may have lead one to think that the pattern of opinions on that issue was directly related to a fear of the Chinese or some other variety of communist aggression, the chapter dealing with the public's perceptions of China as a security threat denies such a correlation. (The polls also traced a steadily growing willingness to recognize diplomatically the PRC.) That more people supported the Vietnam involvement than perceived a security threat suggests other motives, the most obvious being the desire to satisfy the requirements of the American alliance. These motives will not be mutually exclusive, however. But in as much as a sizeable minority saw Vietnam as the insurance cover, then the two would stand and fall together, and indeed, disillusionment with Vietnam was accompanied by a diminution of support for the price that was seen as necessary for the alliance, although with the disengagement from Vietnam the price tag for the alliance was moved to a different hanger: the communications - defence installations.

Results to questions on these installations clearly illustrated that Australians became more parsimonious in the late 1960's - the alliance was becoming too expensive and, although there emerged a nascent resentment concerning the futility of the alliance at any price, the 1970's still saw a majority of Australians wishing to preserve some sort of formal relationship with the USA, but without the sycophantic loyalty to the protector which had epitomized earlier days for both the Government¹ and the public.

1 The blandiloquence of former L-CP governments was recently criticized by the US Ambassador to Australia, Marshall Green; see the *Australian*, 13 March 1975.

Outside of this three-pronged focus of Vietnam, China, and the American alliance lies racial opinion. The survey data strongly suggests a current of opinion in favour of increasing the annual intake of coloured immigrants.

But it would be wrong to infer that these changing perspectives in Australian public opinion were unbridled: in all issues presented, there were elements of restraint. Thus, while Sir Robert Menzies was right in saying that communism had become unfashionable in media circles, and while it is true that the polls confirmed a "decline of anti-communism"¹ in public sentiment, there persisted a strong residual antipathy to communism well into the 1970's.² The majority of Australians certainly lost their enthusiasm for involvement in Vietnam, but this did not mean they were prepared to recognize the PRG or to see the liquidation of the Thieu Government and to see it replaced by a communist one.

China may have been seen as a security threat by less than one third of Australians, but even so, by 1970, that percentage had not fallen by more than a few points. Moreover, in late 1972 at the time of mutual recognition by Canberra and Peking, the solid majority support for the decision notwithstanding, an even more solid majority did not wish to desert Taiwan.

Despite Vietnam and its polarising effects on the Australian public, the American alliance stood firm - although its pillars were modified. For example, in the decade from 1963 to 1973, support for American nuclear-

1 For a symposium on this topic see *Quadrant*, no. 85-86, vol. 17, no. 5-6 (September-December, 1973).

2 As one journalist put it: "The communist 'bogey' is still fertile - albeit not virgin - territory for the conspiracy-minded politician to tap", M. Grattan, *Age*, 27 March 1971.

related installations fell from 84% to 54%, which clearly represents both change and continuity.

The data on Australian racial attitudes generate images of a Janus-faced Australian: prepared to accept, in ever-increasing numbers, coloured immigrants, but not to the extent that the country's preponderant homogeneity would be undermined; eager to see the material well-being of the aborigine improved, while recognizing the persistent difficulties of acceptance by the community, among other problems, which were likely to contribute to this; ready to cast critical comment - when asked - on white minority rule in South Africa and Rhodesia, but most unwilling to cut trade, diplomatic links, or sport as a gesture of their expressed contempt. Australian pragmatism (as opposed to idealism), more often asserted than documented, would seem to be substantiated by these findings.

Although not within the prescribed ambit of this study, it nonetheless seems appropriate to mention several conclusions relating to the opinion-policy relationship, which emanate from this exercise in measuring public opinion. The first is that public opinion is a determinant in foreign policy decision-making in the sense that it sets the perimeters for government action. Second, within these circumscribed boundaries, a government has considerable manipulative leverage, if it chooses to use this power, which it normally does. Thus, on some issues, a sufficient proportion of a generally recalcitrant or tardy public might be swayed by the government to accept its policy, thus achieving majority support; but there are limits to this. Indeed, if this follower mentality were a significant ingredient in Australian opinion formation, then much of the stability of Australian opinion could well be attributed to the fact that one Government remained in office for so long. Third, and taking cognizance of the chicken-and-egg puzzle, opinion and policy have shown a good deal of congruence. Goot was substantially correct when he said in 1970 that:

... if most of Australia's foreign and defence policies over the last three decades had been decided by snap referenda, they might not have been very different from those the Government actually pursued.¹

There were points at which policy and majority opinion bifurcated, however, and Goot's summation lost some of its validity after 1970 when the public showed its adaptability in a changing world, whereas the L-CP Government did not.

A major part of this thesis has been devoted to examination of the responses of the socio-demographic sub-group, and this was found to be most fruitful. Whereas the analysis of "majority opinion" showed unmitigated support for the initial contention of the thesis that the Australian public would be slow in its foreign policy opinion movement, the investigation of social and political reference points found that unqualified use of the term "public opinion" can lead to overgeneralizations: it is simply not accurate enough for someone to say that "the public" wavered between this opinion or that, or, as it has been argued here, that public opinion was circumspect in its movement. The data examined show that, on certain issues, differences of opinion have emerged between party supporters, men and women, different generations, upper, middle and lower income earners, occupational categories, religions, and states. Despite these differences, however, opinion movement has been similar to that of the aggregation of opinion: gradual, if not considered.

The sub-group breakdown dealt another severe body blow to that part of the mood theory which maintained that prolonged periods of apathy cause violent and emotional mood reactions to crisis situations. A consistent finding in all cases was the high number of "don't know" or "undecided" responses recorded by women, the elderly, and lower income earners. Now, insofar as this can be interpreted as an index of apathy in foreign affairs, according to Almond's principle, these respondents would have shown greater

1 M. Goot "Australian Attitudes to the World", p.200.

fluctuation of opinion over time. This was not the case, however. Certainly, substantial shifts were recorded by these sub-categories on occasion, but no more than upper income and young respondents, who demonstrated greater inclination to give answers to survey interviewers.

The population breakdowns had much to say about the Australian people and foreign policy, and because each chapter has concluded with a summary of findings, it is intended here to draw a broad outline of the principal characteristics of each sub-group.

Men were more inclined to support Australia's international involvement than women, and, paradoxically, this activity could be either of a belligerent or peaceful nature. Men were more likely to perceive a threat or threats to Australia's security, suggesting perhaps that women opposed the Vietnam war commitment for reasons other than their reputed non-aggressiveness, or "femininity". The intriguing question to arise here was whether women will acquire the aggressive international attitudes of men as they progress towards "liberation". Women felt less dependent on the United States than men, while racial attitudes of both sexes were almost identical.

On the three related issues of Vietnam, China, and the alliance, the analysis of party respondents shows a clear difference between the two major party groups. L-CP voters were more favourable to the Vietnam War, more apprehensive about China and other "threats", and more dependent on the USA than ALP supporters - fairly supportive of the "partisan mentality". Two rather interesting findings emerged: the first was the growing acceptance of coloured workers as migrants by ALP voters; and the second was the almost consistent paradox of DLP voters being less bellicose than L-CP supporters.

Another popular conception to be questioned by this study is the "generation gap". Contrary to popular journalistic, academic, and other

opinion, young people were not opposed to the Vietnam War, indeed, they were the most enthusiastic about Australian involvement - a reflection of a higher threat perception of China. The very young and very old were less likely to support American defence installations, suggesting, for the young at least, that Vietnam was seen as a confrontation between the democratic and communist forces, not just a deposit with the American future defence bank. Mannheim's observation, that the young are more susceptible to the course of events,¹ would seem to be verified by the findings presented.

The questions relating to coloured immigration and Southern Africa, moreover, failed to promote any impression of youthful idealism, tolerance, or humanity, although this did begin to appear after 1972.

People who earned a high income were much more likely to favour the Vietnam entanglement and other international commitments, feel threatened by China, and more reliant on the USA than those earning lesser incomes. On racial issues, upper income earners showed the contradictory tendencies of being more inclined to support South Africa and Rhodesia, which was interpreted as tacit endorsement of those governments, yet they were more disposed to coloured immigration, which was viewed as a benign attitude.

Religion seems to play a small part in the determination of attitudes towards foreign affairs; interestingly, Catholics were no different from other major denominations over the Vietnam issue.

State differences were of the smallest magnitude, and the most significant conclusion to be derived from this was that Western Australians do not feel any more threatened than residents of other states - as is commonly assumed. This is the last of the many myths about Australian public opinion in relation to socio-political location which this thesis has suggested are in need of re-examination.

1 See R.E. Zody, *op. cit.*, p.19.

Australian attitudes towards Vietnam, China, the USA, and racial issues, therefore, underwent mutations during the period under investigation, adjusting to what was seen as practical in an international milieu that had seen détente between the super-powers, the Nixon Doctrine, a pacific Indonesia, and a diplomatically amenable China. The Australian public's response to this transient global structure was characteristically cautious.

The conclusions reached in this thesis were constructed from one research method, and I make no claims to its infallibility. Moreover, the study has been too broad-ranging for anything more than tentative hypothesizing; indeed, the central purpose was a presentation and examination of the data, rather than any detailed explanation. A function will have been fulfilled, however, if it provokes others into testing the hypotheses presented.

APPENDIX A

Morgan Gallup Poll (APOP): Self-description of Survey Methodology

Methodology: Morgan Gallup Polls are conducted continuously every weekend from mid-January to mid-December. The method is as follows:

- . Each weekend 110 trained interviewers are sent to different randomly-selected "clusters" of 10 dwellings in 110 districts.
- . Thus, each weekend 1100 different people are interviewed face-to-face in 110 districts, "spread" in proportion to population over the cities and country areas of all six States.
- . 110 different districts are surveyed in each of two consecutive weekends, so that each fortnight an Australia-wide cross-section of 2,200 different people is interviewed in 220 districts.
- . Each of those 2,200 men and women is asked a number of public opinion questions. Their answers are tabulated on a computer.
- . Before each survey, interviewers are carefully briefed and required to conduct practice interviews, for which we pay.
- . Interviews are conducted on Saturdays and Sundays between 9 am and 2 pm, when most people are at home.
- . People are selected for interviewing at the pre-selected dwellings by a method which produces accurate cross-sections of each sex by age, and which allows no "choice" on the part of the interviewer.
- . As an assurance of authenticity, we require our interviewers to record the names, addresses and phone numbers (if any) of the people interviewed. Immediately after each survey we write or phone between 20% to 100% of the people interviewed in each district, and ask them to confirm some of their answers.
- . These methods are the world's best. They are exactly the same as used by us for our published predictions of Federal and State elections and referendums. Our record of accuracy is the world's best.

APPENDIX B

Description of Population sub-group categories used by Gallup

Economic Classification: Determined by the interviewers after considering telephone ownership, occupation, home, and apparent education and demeanor.

UPPER INCOME CLASS	Well-to-do (Definitely above middle class), and Better-off (Down to those who must save for costly luxuries).
ARTISANS, CLERKS	Artisans, clerks, etc. (Relatively few luxuries).
LOWER INCOME CLASS	Lowest income (Poorest group locally).

Occupation of Breadwinner:

PROFESSIONAL MANAGERS	Professional, lecturers, doctors, lawyers, engineers etc. Owners and managers of comparatively big businesses, accountants, senior executives and officers in the services.
SMALL BUSINESS OWNERS	Owners and managers of small factories and shops, taxi proprietors.
WHITE COLLAR CLERKS	Clerks and other white collar workers, such as teachers, policemen, ministers, salesmen, shop assistants, typists, nurses.
SKILLED WORKER	Skilled workers, tradesmen, linesmen, foremen.
SEMI-SKILLED	Semi-skilled workers, truck drivers, storemen, painters, process and factory workers.
UN-SKILLED	Unskilled workers, laborers, waiters, waitresses, porters, cleaners, watchmen.
FARM LABORERS	Farm laborers, shearers, farmhands and gardeners.
OTHERS NONE	Housewives, no occupation, pensioners, servicemen and others who cannot be classified according to their previous occupation.

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