

# CHINA'S WORLD

The Foreign Policy of a  
Developing State/J.D. Simmonds



Many books have been written about the Communist regime in China and its foreign policy. This is the first to approach the subject from the basis of domestic affairs.

The author, with his special knowledge of contemporary China, has combined a study of the vice-ministerial structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with an examination of fundamental domestic developmental factors during the period 1949 to 1968. The book fills a gap in an understanding of China's foreign policy—the effect that China's basically agrarian nature has on overall development policy and hence on external affairs.

Though primarily of interest to specialists in contemporary Chinese policy, economics, and international relations, this book should also appeal to students of Asian and comparative politics and of international relations, and to all interested in Chinese affairs.


Price in Australia \$6.95

J. D. Simmonds was born in Tientsin and educated at Tientsin Grammar School and is a graduate in Asian Civilisation at the Australian National University. From 1968 to 1969 he held a Public Service Research Fellowship in the Department of International Relations at the same university.

During World War II he was interned in China by the Japanese. After the war he joined the British army and was stationed in Hong Kong and in 1949-50 observed the civil war in Muslim and Tibetan areas of northwest China.

After joining the UK Commissioner General's Office, Singapore, in 1950, he studied Chinese Islam during a six months' stay in Baluchistan. From 1954 to 1957 he worked at the UK Foreign Office. He is now with the Australian Defence Department in Canberra.

Jacket Design by Cathy Akroyd



This book was published by ANU Press between 1965–1991.

This republication is part of the digitisation project being carried out by Scholarly Information Services/Library and ANU Press.

This project aims to make past scholarly works published by The Australian National University available to a global audience under its open-access policy.

---

**China's  
World**

---

**PLEASE RETURN TO:-**  
**EDITORIAL DEPARTMENT**  
**AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY**

Publication date 23/10/70


# **The Foreign Policy of a Developing State**

**Australian  
National  
University  
Press  
Canberra  
1970**



# **China's World**

**J.D. Simmonds**



© J. D. Simmonds 1970

This book is copyright. Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of private study, criticism, or review, as permitted under the Copyright Act, no part may be reproduced by any process without written permission. Inquiries should be made to the publisher.

Printed and manufactured in Australia.

Registered in Australia for transmission by post as a book.

Library of Congress Catalog Card no. 75 - 126932.

National Library of Australia Card no. and  
ISBN 0 7081 0694 3.

To Marie-Jo

---

# Contents

---

Abbreviations, *ix*

Introduction, *1*

**PART 1      Chronology of Institutional Change**

Chapter 1    The Great Consolidation, *11*

Chapter 2    The Leap and the Fall, *43*

Chapter 3    The Great Disharmony, *83*

**PART 2      Policy Themes**

Chapter 4    Background to Policy, *123*

Chapter 5    The Agrarian Base, *129*

Chapter 6    Guerilla Strategy and Tactics, *136*

Chapter 7    The Intermediate Zone, *147*

Chapter 8    The East Wind, *157*

Chapter 9    The Paper Tiger, *165*

Chapter 10   The Anti-Soviet Struggle, *177*

Chapter 11   The United Front, *188*

**PART 3      Conclusion**

Chapter 12   The Strength of Chinese Policy, *201*

Chapter 13   Policy Weakness and External Response, *210*

Chapter 14   Possible Implications, *219*

Appendix 1   Outline of Views on the Question  
                         of Peaceful Transition, *231*

Appendix 2   Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
                         Principal Responsibilities  
                         of Vice-Ministers 1949-68, *235*

Notes, *240*

Index, *251*

---

# Maps

---

## **Front endpapers**

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Geographical Departments, 1949. The boundaries of China have been drawn to include outlying areas which in 1949 had not yet come under the control of the Chinese government.

## **Back endpapers**

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Geographical Departments, 1968. The status of Senegal, Gambia, Chad, and Thailand is unknown. Taiwan is considered by China as one of its provinces.

## **Map I**

The Chinese Hemisphere

---

# Abbreviations

---

|             |                                               |
|-------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| <i>CB</i>   | <i>Current Background</i>                     |
| CCP         | Chinese Communist Party                       |
| CPSU        | Communist Party of the Soviet Union           |
| <i>ECMM</i> | <i>Extracts from China Mainland Magazines</i> |
| FLP         | Foreign Languages Press                       |
| <i>NCNA</i> | <i>New China News Agency</i>                  |
| NPC         | National Peoples' Congress                    |
| PLA         | Peoples' Liberation Army                      |
| <i>SCMM</i> | <i>Survey of China Mainland Magazines</i>     |
| <i>SCMP</i> | <i>Survey of China Mainland Press</i>         |
| SEATO       | South-East Asia Treaty Organisation           |
| <i>SWB</i>  | <i>Summary of World Broadcasts</i>            |

---

# Introduction

---

THERE are basically two reasons for writing this book. The first is the Cultural Revolution. This upheaval not only had a tremendous effect on China, but it also challenged all the preconceptions of those who tried to follow developments in that country. I myself found that so much I thought I knew had to be re-learned. It was soon clear that the institutions of foreign policy were not to escape the violence of the revolution, and it even seemed for a time that some of the fundamentals of policy might not survive. When I started research in mid-1968 it was clear that a turning point in China's overall development had been reached, or was imminent. Consequently it appeared necessary to re-examine the nation's foreign affairs. The general aim in the book has been that of highlighting a number of the essential elements of the pre-Cultural Revolution foreign policy line, setting these in the framework of a developing temporal and geographical world view, and all in the context of the domestic strategic dynamism.

The second reason concerns methodology. I have long been of the opinion that there was a need for a new approach to the subject of Chinese foreign policy, and perhaps to that of all major developing societies. Conventional methods used in the study of international relations are, I believe, fundamentally weak. They assume far greater knowledge of individual nations than is warranted: there is an over-eagerness to generalise on inadequate specialist data. For this reason, largely, I have adopted a research method to suggest interpretations for foreign policy statements primarily based on the analysis of the overall domestic developmental pattern and secondarily on that of specific external developments. This is not to say that I consider foreign policy always to be affected more by what is happening at home than abroad; foreign policy is not merely an artificial function of domestic politics. Rather, I would say, the basic impetus to foreign policy comes from domestic developments; it is its specific and detailed application which is shaped largely by external causes. The strategy is primarily domestically derived, the tactics are more

affected by events outside the country. This is particularly true of China, whose nature has for centuries been self-centred and virtually self-contained.

While the nation remains, as it certainly is today, overwhelmingly agrarian, little of what happens in the world will have very much effect on the real domestic problems. Food, population, education, urbanisation, government—these are matters of more acute and lasting concern to the Peking leadership than foreign relations. At the risk of the grossest oversimplification the only grave problem a major developing society has is that of developmentalism itself. External enemies, if they do not exist, have to be created for internal political purposes. As *People's Daily* put it on 20 February 1966, 'To have a ferocious enemy like U.S. imperialism glowering at us day and night will make us Chinese people always bear in mind the danger of war . . . It will make us work harder to build a strong and prosperous country'.

In addition to this general domestic emphasis I have relied on certain specific research techniques. A more precise chronology of foreign policy development has been sought by means of analysis of institutional change, principally concerning the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In consequence some space is devoted to the question of dating vice-ministerial appointments and the relationship between these and the ministry's geographical departments. In addition the growth of these departments and the reasons for changes affecting both the institutions and their personnel are studied in detail.

I have tried to avoid abuses of 'Pekinology' related to the role of individuals and factions in the Chinese hierarchy. Even before the Cultural Revolution this was of doubtful value, to say the least, and a method which has little application to a study such as this. No doubt individuals in the top leadership had different opinions on foreign policy matters and factions may consequently have been formed, but without the facts it is hard to see what can be gained from such an approach, for the huge ship of state has a momentum of its own and is not always or certainly answerable to the helm.

The sources used are solely of Chinese origin. I have purposely refrained from taking into account any secondary sources relating to the study of Chinese foreign policy in an attempt to avoid what is fast becoming a methodological nightmare for the student of contemporary China. This is the enormous outpouring of both

primary and secondary material, and the attendant almost inescapable risk of stifled creativity or worse.

There are several lesser points concerning method which may need elaboration. Throughout this book I have used the term 'China' in the sense of that part of China, the whole great land mass with its 700 odd million inhabitants, which is currently under the control of Peking. Secondly, as this is a study of China's foreign policy during the twenty years of Mao's rule, I have relied quite often largely on Mao's own writings. I do not thereby mean to imply that I have discounted the relevance of many other factors or the influence of men other than Mao. Furthermore, I have not attempted to examine such matters as Mao's originality or lack of originality. For the purposes of this book it is essential only to determine the acceptability of ideology and the consistency with which it is employed by the régime over the years. It is largely by means of such criteria that the Maoist view has been determined. Quotations from Mao are from the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Volumes I-IV, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1954-1956. This has been abbreviated to *Selected Works* in the text. I have also quoted from his *Selected Works*, Book IV, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1961. This is referred to in the text as *Mao*, Volume IV.


The term 'communist' has been used almost in the sense of its being invented by the Chinese, pertaining only to them, and often as they define it. My usage therefore assumes the quality of a mere convenience. Other terms such as 'peace', 'neutrality', 'democracy', 'aggression', and 'imperialism', to mention only a few, I have usually defined or tried to explain. Where I have not my usage will in most cases be that of the Chinese.

In the final section of the book I have hazarded some guesses as to the basic meaning of traditional foreign policy patterns and its possible relevance to the future. If it is true that any fool can write about foreign policy, and it is after all not difficult to follow the superficialities, it is even more true that anyone can make predictions. In neither case, however, can a fool escape the merciless scorn of history, even when history itself comes inevitably to be re-written. In an attempt to avoid such a calamity I have tried not so much to predict as to describe some of the limitations imposed upon the future development of China's foreign policy. Some thought has also been given to analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of Chinese policy and external reaction to it.

I am fully aware of the fact that my self-imposed restriction to primary sources may have made some of what I have written redundant, and must inevitably have lessened the scope and usefulness of the work. Moreover, in attempting to write both for the general reader and the specialist it is not impossible that neither will be satisfied. The methodology concerning the chronology of institutional change, the data selection criteria employed and the treatment, and the interpretative section with which the book concludes, all these cannot possibly be beyond criticism. I can only quote Mao's concluding words in his essay on Protracted War: 'I hope you will study and discuss it as well as amend and amplify it'.

Since the manuscript of this book was completed a year ago it has been found necessary to up-date it in certain respects. Such has been the intensity and extent of the Cultural Revolution that even today the semi-modernised, urban or institutionalised sector of society is still in turmoil. Some 20 per cent of society consequently is having to be controlled by improvised administrative measures. To compound the problem there is, particularly among the younger elements of this social group, a crisis of indiscipline, bewilderment, and resentment. At the highest levels of government, in Peking as well as in the provincial capitals, the leadership purge has been most extensive. The People's Liberation Army has assumed a place in the hierarchy of considerable importance. The new élite appears, from the available biographic data, to be heavily infiltrated by affiliates of Mao's second-in-command, Lin Biao.

This minor, semi-modernised China, has been upturned and has not yet settled down to a new pattern of existence or to being ruled by its new élite. But the great majority China, the clay-footed giant, did not really participate in the urban revolution. The grass bent as required: new revolutionary organs of power were dutifully created, and the peasants went on their way much as they had always done. China's fundamental problems were not, however, restricted solely to the urban sector. The most intractable of them were to be found in the rural areas. For the Cultural Revolution to succeed in the long term, even partially, its impact had to be made on the peasantry. It is only today that the distant shock is beginning to ripple the turgid village waters. New schemes are being pushed or gingerly experimented with



Map I The Chinese Hemisphere

that could eventually help alleviate rural conditions. The Cultural Revolution has in its positive aspects de-ossified the mammoth Party machine and destructively created constructive possibilities for the government bureaucracy. But there is no proof yet that the results will be either universally good or even partially efficacious. Should management improve, and this would need to be of a high magnitude, there is still no telling whether the central authorities would be able to match the new organisational efficiency at the lower levels with quality leadership from above. Even if substantial improvements follow there is always the possibility, if not probability, that the peasants would wage their own people's war against the innovators and innovations, and absorb all the allegedly beneficial imperial emanations.

'In his endeavour to win a war', wrote Mao in December 1936, 'a military strategist cannot overstep the limitations imposed by the material conditions; within these limitations, however, he can and must strive for victory'. The domestic limitations on the present leadership are, indeed, extreme. The Cultural Revolution has made them acute. The nature of the relationship between internal and external conditions in this respect is not at all clear. It seems probable that the grave escalation in hostility between the Chinese and Russians, which became evident early in 1969 following a severe border clash, can be linked to a nadir in Chinese domestic cohesiveness and security. Although this is not susceptible of proof it is possible that the Peking leadership either panicked and ordered the PLA to attack, or that central control had so degenerated that the local commander attacked without orders. The international situation had altered to such an extent by this time that it would have been logical, according to Maoist precepts, for Peking to have ordered the attack. The ferocious enemy, us imperialism, undoubtedly began to lose credibility after the bombing of North Vietnam stopped and the Paris peace talks started. How better could Peking stress the danger of war and induce national unity than by waging a real if minuscule 'defensive' war on the northern borders?

Chinese diplomacy was particularly hard hit by the upheavals. Red Guard-type extravagances against foreign embassies in Peking, and in and outside Chinese embassies abroad, had done little to enhance the nation's diplomatic stature. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself had been disrupted: from the minister down, official after official was purged or severely criticised.

Ch'en Yi, if he has retained his portfolio, has been removed from the Party's Politburo; he may no longer be minister. The two senior diplomats from pre-Cultural Revolution times, Keng Piao and Huang Chen, have been included in the new Party Central Committee. They are ambassadors, respectively, to Albania and France. Five pre-revolution vice-ministers are today active, though in precisely what posts is not entirely clear. Chi Peng-fei appears to be the senior of the five. His area of responsibility remains that of West Asia and Africa—the two African departments have been re-amalgamated. Lo Kuei-po, second in seniority, seems to have moved from direct control of Indo-Chinese affairs, but to have retained West Europe and to be now responsible for the Americas. Ch'iao Kuan-hua oversees the Soviet and East European Department as he did before. Han Nien-lung, also unchanged, looks after Asia. The last of the previous vice-ministers, Hsu I-hsin, still performs at public functions but his responsibilities are unknown. With the old diplomatic team once more active and presumably freed from excessive restraints, it was to be expected that normal diplomatic processes would be resumed. Now the Chinese are once more negotiating with their two principal enemies. It would, however, be unrealistic to see in these signs of normalisation much more than a reflection of improved stability at home. Maoist theory, and the practice of the last two decades, demands external enmity. The Chinese people must be led to see themselves threatened; invasion must always appear to be a realistic possibility. While Mao rules the peasant-based giant there cannot be meaningful *détente* between China and the Soviet Union or the United States. What room there is for manoeuvre is in the apportioning of enmity to the one or the other, and in trying to set the two super powers against each other.

This book has been researched and written in the course of a year's study leave granted by the Australian Public Service Board and the Department of Defence, for which leave I am deeply appreciative. My particular thanks go to Mr W. H. King, whose perception made this possible. I should also like to express my appreciation to Professor J. D. B. Miller of the Australian National University for having harboured me so tolerantly during these twelve months. I am grateful to Professor A. Doak Barnett and Professor Robert A. Scalapino for their encouragement, but I absolve them from all responsibility for the results. To Mrs A.

Kent and to the cartographers of the Department of Human Geography, Australian National University, respectively, go my thanks for assistance in preparing the maps, and for their drawing. My appreciation also goes to Mrs N. Hickson and Mr J. Lora for their redoubtable cryptographic endeavours on the original manuscript. And, finally, I must apologise to my family for my quite unwarrantable sinocentricity.

Canberra  
February 1970

J.D.S.

---

# **Part 1**

## **Chronology of Institutional Change**

---

---

# **Chapter 1**

## **The Great Consolidation**

---



THE People's Republic of China was formally established on 1 October 1949; before this, while the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders clearly had some generalised notions on the subject of foreign affairs, foreign policy as such cannot be said to have existed. As this book concerns the foreign policy of an established government there is neither the scope nor probably the requirement to examine in detail the views of the CCP leadership on such matters before October 1949, although some mention of them must be made.

The CCP was in large measure modelled on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and in the earlier years to a certain extent influenced and aided by it. Since the Soviet Union was the first and only powerful socialist state to exist, it was only natural that the CCP leaders looked to it as their principal and most reliable support. Thus, long before the CCP was anywhere near a dominant position within China, its leaders unequivocally and consistently preached the necessity of relying on the Soviet Union. This state of affairs was maintained right up to the eve of total victory in the revolutionary war against the Nationalists. Mao Tse-tung laid down the formal basis to this thinking in his report to what might be termed the victory session of the Party's Central Committee in March 1949. Noting that in striving to overcome the semi-colonial and semi-feudal condition of the country,

'even after the country-wide victory of the Chinese revolution and the solution of the land problem, two basic contradictions will still exist in China. The first is internal, that is, the contradiction between the working class and the bourgeoisie. The second is external, that is the contradiction between China and the imperialist countries'.<sup>1</sup>

The latter aspect was the theoretical justification not only for the strengthening of state power under the proletariat, but for the

external policy of reliance, then and in the future, on the Soviet Union. The struggle between the working class and the bourgeoisie was not only a Chinese phenomenon, it was universal. In such a struggle all reactionary forces depended on the United States, whose leaders had drawn up 'a plan for enslaving the world . . . to form an imperialist and anti-democratic camp against all democratic forces headed by the Soviet Union'.<sup>2</sup> As Mao said in another article, since the October Revolution the revolutionary forces of China were no longer isolated but enjoyed international support, a fact, he pointed out, which was well understood by Sun Yat-sen much earlier.<sup>3</sup> Mao stated that the strength of the Soviet Union was so great as to have overtaken that of the United States as long ago as a decade before his similar and oft-quoted evaluation, made at the Moscow meeting of communist parties in 1957.<sup>4</sup> It is no wonder, therefore, that reliance on the Soviet Union was considered to be so vital to China's interests: 'all Chinese without exception must lean either to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism', wrote Mao three months before the communist government was established in Peking, 'Internationally, we belong to the side of the anti-imperialist front headed by the Soviet Union . . .'.<sup>5</sup>

When the government was formed in 1949 amongst the many organisations it established was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; this was headed by Chou En-lai, under whom were three vice-ministers. Two of the three vice-ministerial areas of responsibility are reasonably clear.<sup>6</sup> The first, under Wang Chia-hsiang, concerned the Soviet Union where Wang was stationed until 1951; it probably also included the East European states. Certainly the latter did not appear to come under either of the two remaining vice-ministers. One of these, Chang Han-fu, was responsible for relations with the rest of the world. In this category was not only non-communist Asia, West Europe, and Africa, but also the communist areas of Asia. Thus under Chang's jurisdiction were the Mongolian People's Republic (Outer Mongolia), the Democratic Republic of Korea, and North Vietnamese affairs, in so far as these last involved diplomatic matters as such in these early times. Almost nothing is known of the activities of the third vice-minister, Li K'e-nung. Li's earlier activities are generally accepted as being related to security or intelligence matters. If this analysis is correct, and there is not surprisingly very little hard factual data upon which to go, then it is just possible that his function

in the ministry was one of an intelligence nature. This seems the more likely when it is recalled that shortly after the régime's establishment the Korean war began, and during this time another war was being fought in Indo-China, and that Li left the ministry to take up a military appointment only after peace was restored in varying measures both to Korea and Indo-China.

The division of responsibilities in the ministry conforms neatly with the established theoretical and practical basis of foreign policy. The most senior vice-minister was located in the Soviet Union at the hub of international communist affairs. The Soviet Union was the most powerful socialist nation and the guarantor of socialism in its peripheral states. By October 1950 China was directly involved in the Korean war, and was to become very seriously involved later. There was an urgent and real danger that the United States and its allies would extend the war to China itself. Under such conditions it was natural not only to allocate the most senior vice-minister to the task of supervising Soviet, and probably East-European, affairs but to locate him in Moscow. The rest of the world was very definitely of secondary importance.

Even if the primary task was to consolidate the Sino-Soviet alliance during a period of war, China nevertheless still clung to the historical view of two of its Asian neighbours. Instead of including Mongolia and North Korea in the Soviet area of responsibility, which would from almost every practical consideration have been the natural thing to do in the case of Mongolia, and which might have been natural to do for North Korea, these states were included in Chang Han-fu's area of responsibility, that is, in the rest of the world.

This, perhaps, is not surprising to anyone who has read Edgar Snow's *Red Star Over China*. In two interviews with Snow, over thirty years ago, Mao unequivocally stated: 'when the people's revolution has been victorious in China the Outer Mongolian republic will automatically become part of the Chinese federation, at their own will'.<sup>7</sup> As regards Korea he noted that it had formerly been a Chinese colony but was not in the same category as Manchuria, which had to be regained by China. However, he went on to say 'if the Koreans wish to break away from the chains of Japanese imperialism, we will extend to them our enthusiastic help in their struggle for independence. The same thing applies for Formosa'.<sup>8</sup> There is, therefore, some room for speculation as

to his precise meaning, for either one must interpret this to mean that Mao did not regard Taiwan as historically part of China, or he did and consequently meant that China should help Korea obtain its independence from Japan but not necessarily from China.

The rest of the world, the area under the supervision of Chang Han-fu, thus contained diverse elements. At one extreme, and at that time of lesser importance, was West Europe. This was the area in which were located the minor capitalist and colonialist powers; the appendages and potential antagonists of us imperialism. Africa was attached to West Europe to form one division, the connection between the two being clearly that of the question of colonialism. It was in many ways a logical enough grouping, as it has been through the European colonial societies, the metropolitan countries, that communism has consistently worked to win the colonies. Another great division under Chang was the American and Australian, or Australasian, division. Until comparatively recently China has had little contact with these areas and even today this is restricted in the formal sense to those countries of Latin America that are included in the American section of the geographical division. The third area was that of Asia. This included the communist states, non-communist South-east Asia, the Indian subcontinental group, and West Asia. Chinese activities in these areas grew slowly in importance during this period and were of least priority, it seems, in West Asia.<sup>9</sup>

If the divisions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are easily discernible and logically understandable for this period, this is not to say that all Chinese references to, for example, Asia fitted always the pattern outlined above. In 1950 *People's China* referred to three Asias, which were described as those of the Soviet Central Asian Republics, the People's Democracies (China, Mongolia, North Korea, and the liberated areas of Vietnam), and the rest of non-communist Asia.<sup>10</sup> This does not seem to be merely a passing, isolated reference to a concept that contradicted the Party's views on such matters. What the writer was referring to was the purely geographical Asia, which included the Soviet Central Asian Republics which, in a geo-political sense, would be grouped under the 'European' Soviet Union. This question of the Asian-ness of the Soviet Union was to come up again when Sino-Soviet relations became strained, and we shall refer to it in more detail later.

It is significant that from the very beginning of the régime, and implicit in Mao's writings even earlier, the communist states of Asia, whether or not closely identified politically with the Soviet Union, were regarded as Asian first and foremost. This point is of ideological significance and thus transcends mere politics. Ideology in this sense has a value almost of immutability; it is historical and strategic. Politics consequently become something temporary and tactical. The ideology adopted by the ccr and having its basis in Marxism-Leninism underlines the peculiar nature of the Asian mode.

As not a few of the régime's spokesmen have pointed out, from the very first China has indicated the path for the Asian peoples and, in an ideologically wider sense, for all the colonial and semi-colonial peoples wherever they may be. By assigning and restricting the Soviet state to Europe and by incorporating Mongolia and North Korea into geographical Asia China clearly set the pattern, at the outset, of its future political and ideological role. China's subsequent involvement with Albania was likewise to assume greater ideological significance in that by becoming involved the Chinese were extending the application of their theories from Asia to Europe. In the period we are now concerned with, however, China probably saw little further, apart from the Soviet Union, than Asia. As Mao wrote twenty years ago: China is 'the centre of gravity in Asia, is a large country with a population of 475 million; by seizing China, the United States would possess all of Asia'.<sup>11</sup> By inference Asia's protection and ultimate emancipation could only be guaranteed by China.

China's special role in Asian affairs, and as it was to be extended in African and Latin American affairs, was further emphasised in a different context. China saw at that time the fundamental and long-term strategic clash of interests as being between the socialist states, principally the Soviet Union and its major ally China, and us imperialism. The United States was seen to be in an impossible position: it had insufficient military resources to deal simultaneously with the communist threat in Europe and Asia.<sup>12</sup> In essence, however, the argument ran that United States strategy required it eventually to attack the Soviet Union. Before this could be undertaken the United States would have to try to subjugate a vast zone of peoples and states of varying political hues and human conditions which lay between it and the Soviet Union; if the peoples of this zone united 'the day will

come when the us reactionaries will find themselves opposed by the people of the whole world'.<sup>13</sup>

In brief the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was organised to implement a clearly enunciated strategic line. Socialism in China, being menaced by us imperialism, could only be safeguarded by reliance on the might of the Soviet Union, in the first instance, and by stimulating and uniting the world's revolutionary potential, the principal concentration of which was then located in nearby Asia. While the diplomatic struggle against imperialism was being waged the CCP had to consolidate its political power in the country. To do this meant the recovery of Tibet, the elimination of domestic counter-revolutionaries, the remoulding of the national bourgeoisie, the rebuilding of the war-torn economy and, most important of all in the long run, the political education of the peasantry.

With a view to strengthening China's strategic position, by cementing relations with the Soviet Union and seeking Soviet economic assistance, Mao Tse-tung went to Moscow on 16 December 1949. He was later joined by Chou En-lai and a large group of officials. There was much to be discussed with Stalin and doubtless the negotiations were difficult. Mao provided evidence of his realism in this respect when, on being asked at the beginning of January how long he would be staying, he replied that this was unknown, it depended on the time required to settle questions of interest to the Chinese. In the event he did not leave till 4 March, while others in his party remained even longer. One of the outstanding problems for the régime was the old treaty of friendship between the Soviet Union and Nationalist China. A new one, the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, was signed on 14 February. Its primary concern was the threat of us imperialism in the area of Japan. At the same time agreements were concluded on questions of Soviet economic aid, control of the Manchurian railway system, and the use of Port Arthur and Dairen by the Soviet Union. Just over a month later both sides agreed to form a number of joint stock companies to develop the mineral resources of Sinkiang and also to operate a Sino-Soviet airline. Despite what may be assumed to have been distasteful features to some of these agreements, from the Chinese viewpoint, Soviet aid during 1950 probably considerably assisted Chinese efforts to rehabilitate the economy.

In notes exchanged with Moscow at the time of signing the

new friendship treaty both sides made specific reference to the independence of Mongolia; to its independence, that is, from the historical China. The new régime's diplomatic endeavours, however, were not restricted only to the Soviet Union. A number of countries had from the outset sought to establish formal relations with it. Throughout 1950 there was a gradual and general expansion in diplomatic relations. Of particular interest in this respect is the fact that in January the North Vietnamese communists, as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, officially notified Peking of their desire to establish formal relations; the response was positive. Needless to say the conduct of the régime's foreign affairs was not confined solely to formal diplomacy. From the very beginning the new Asian giant played a prominent role in the international communist movement. When Stalin caused the leadership of the Japanese Communist Party to be severely reprimanded in January 1950 for overly passive policies against the United States occupation, the Chinese followed suit. A few days later the same journal used in the initial attack on the Japanese communists editorialised on the need to step up the world struggle for national liberation.<sup>14</sup> The Chinese victory, it stated, was striking proof of the triumph of the Leninist-Stalinist doctrine concerning armed struggle, which was now becoming the main form of operation for the world national liberation movement. The article quoted approvingly from the speech made the previous year by Liu Shao-ch'i to the Peking conference of Asian and Australasian trade unions. Liu had pointed out that armed struggle had to be the main form of struggle in colonial and semi-colonial countries and that for such people the path traversed by China was mandatory.<sup>15</sup> It is not clear from the differing treatment of the subject whether this indicated Sino-Soviet rivalry for leadership of the world national liberation struggle. Nevertheless there seems to be more than a suggestion that this was so and that Stalin qualified his acknowledgment of China's exemplary role by emphasising its derivative dependence on Leninist-Stalinist doctrine.

Armed struggle was indeed the main feature of 1950. During the year the PLA swept into Hainan, captured a number of small offshore islands, and reconquered Tibet. The most serious armed conflict of the period was, however, the Korean war, which broke out on 25 June. Two days after the North Korean forces had crossed the border Truman committed the United States to active

participation in defence of the South. Simultaneously he ordered the Seventh Fleet to protect Taiwan, and made plans to assist the Philippines and the French effort in Indo-China. Concerning Taiwan he said that the attack on South Korea had made it plain that communism had gone beyond subversion to direct conquest. 'In these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the Pacific area and to U.S. forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area. . . The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the U.N.'<sup>16</sup> It is clear from this statement, and implicitly accepted by subsequent Washington administrations, that the future of the Nationalist-held island was inextricably bound up with the United States' direct defence effort in that part of the Pacific. Truman's statement was echoed and made much more explicit by MacArthur; and promptly disavowed by the administration. As the general put it, Taiwan formed part of the natural US defence line in the Pacific: 'Any predatory attack from Asia must be an amphibious effort . . . should Formosa fall, it would constitute an enemy salient in the very centre of this defensive perimeter'. In so defining the strategic context in which Taiwan was then seen it would seem to follow that, apart from humanistic aspects, there cannot in the missile age be any vital requirement for the retention of Taiwan as a part of the United States defence line in the Pacific.

The régime reacted vigorously to these United States actions, though apart from bombast there was little that could be done. The North Korean armed forces were, in any case, apparently sweeping swiftly to victory in the first weeks. By the late summer the situation had changed, and United States and South Korean forces started holding the invaders. In the middle of September the tide dramatically turned. Shortly afterwards Seoul was re-captured; by late October the Chinese border had been reached. Simultaneously reports were received of the presence of Chinese units on Korean soil, and within a few days China officially declared its involvement in the war. The entry of the Chinese volunteers, as the régime termed them, could not retrospectively be considered surprising. What is not clear to this day is whether or not the Chinese knew of the North Korean intentions before the war started. It is probably reasonable to assume that Moscow was aware of the planned invasion, and it would not be illogical to

argue that Peking was at least informed of the intention if not consulted more fully. There is no proof, on the other hand, that the Chinese were privy to such intentions. One development which may have some bearing on this problem, but which if it has can at best be considered only circumstantial, is the conclusion and widespread publicisation of the Sino-Soviet friendship treaty only a few months before hostilities began. Article I of the treaty had specific relevance to the Korean war, particularly as it escalated. This stated that in the event of one of the contracting parties being attacked by Japan or states allied to it, thus by extension the United States forces in Japan and those later moving through there, the other would come to its assistance. In terms of contingency planning for war in Korea it could be assumed by the communist nations that if it became necessary for China to go to the support of the North Koreans, and if as a consequence the United States attacked China, the Soviet Union would automatically be at war with the United States. It could also be safely assumed that Washington was aware of the implications of Article I and would consequently be that much more cautious. This is far removed from proof of Chinese complicity, but it is suggestive. Moreover, the Korean war began a few months after the clarion call to armed struggle by the leaders of the international communist movement. The war was part of the current violent philosophy, and the Chinese were then loud in the proclamation of this philosophy.

In the meantime the Party surged ahead in its efforts to consolidate state power and revivify and rectify the nation. Very delicately at first, then with a rush, Tibet was reincorporated into the central kingdom. Hainan, too, was occupied by the PLA. Through the length and breadth of the country political opponents, bandits, remnant Nationalist forces, and social enemies such as the rich peasants, were relentlessly hunted out and destroyed. The toll of this great purge cannot be known but by inference from communist sources must have been very extensive. The Party, too, began its own rectification campaign in the spring of 1950. By far the most significant development of that year, and in some ways of the first decade, was the passage of the Agricultural Reform Law in June. The draft of this had probably been thoroughly debated in the higher councils of the Party over the previous months; it figured prominently on the agenda of the Third Plenum in early June. This meeting was the occasion for an eight-

point policy speech by Mao in which he called for large-scale economies, reduction in government spending and in the size of the armed forces, the reform of education, the transformation of industry and commerce, unemployment relief, and a number of important measures relating to political consolidation. On the vital question of agricultural reform Mao seems to have been cautious. He roundly criticised those in the Party who foresaw an early elimination of capitalism and the imminent introduction of socialism. Agricultural reforms he envisaged as being completed in approximately three years, or somewhat longer. In order to assist in the early restoration of agricultural production he advocated the preservation of the rich peasant economy. In the event the merely rich survived the exceedingly rich by not too long a period; even today the term rich peasant is a relative one, being variously interpreted according to fluctuating political criteria. These efforts on the part of the régime were maintained and in part intensified throughout 1950 and the early months of 1951. By the summer of 1951 *NCNA* announced, somewhat optimistically, that the political education of the peasantry was progressing well and that it was expected that, apart from minority areas, land reform would be basically completed by the spring of 1952.<sup>17</sup> Chou En-lai, in October, was less sanguine in setting the date for the expected completion as the end of 1952. In any event the CCP's most difficult problem was being rapidly overcome. As for the re-incorporation of Tibet into the motherland, this too was being accomplished with little apparent hitch and the People's Liberation Army entered Lhasa towards the end of October 1951. All this was occurring during the hard fought battles in Korea. The Chinese had launched five major campaigns to drive the United Nations and South Korean forces south, the fifth of which came in the early summer of the year. According to recent Cultural Revolution sources the Chinese commander, P'eng Te-huai, had personally planned to launch a sixth campaign but had been prevented from so doing by the intervention of Mao, who had directed that holding the region of the 38th parallel and conducting protracted war was to be the strategic guideline.<sup>18</sup>

Whether or not this is true we have no means of telling. One thing is certain, however, and that is that the war was hurting both sides severely. To the extent that a dramatic external threat helped the CCP consolidate its position and was of considerable

benefit in driving through its urgent reforms, the Korean war was worth fighting regardless of any other factors;<sup>19</sup> and these did exist. Nevertheless there was a limit to the régime's ability to pay the price for such an advantage. As we can read in the *People's Daily* in the spring of 1951 the national finances were

'in a difficult position. In the first place, on account of American imperialist aggression on Taiwan and also on account of the threat to our national security following American aggression on Korea, we are obliged to accelerate national defence construction which entails a very heavy financial burden'.<sup>20</sup>

This does not mean necessarily that China could in 1951 find no means whatsoever of continuing the war. It does mean that the cost was becoming prohibitive and that national resources being utilised to fight the principal enemy, us imperialism, in a foreign country were being side-tracked from the more important task of rebuilding the national economy. This suggests that the report of Mao's cancellation of the sixth campaign in Korea in mid-1951 might be true and that one reason for this was that China wished at that time to end the war and accelerate the urgent work of economic rehabilitation. Further weight is given to this argument by an article which appeared in the régime's press at the end of the year entitled 'China Builds a New Democratic Economy'. In this the author states that the achievement of a degree of industrial co-ordination 'has created favourable conditions for China's future planned economy', and that henceforth 'Economic planning must be strengthened and expanded'.<sup>21</sup> The author was clearly referring both to the progress that had already been made in industrial rehabilitation and to the need to intensify efforts with a view, presumably, to launching at some future date and with Soviet assistance the First Five Year Plan.

A few months before this article, on 15 June, it was revealed that the Chinese and Russians had just concluded agreements on trade and the supply of goods between the two countries. Not many days later Malik proposed in the United Nations that the Korean war should be brought to an end; and shortly afterwards the major contestants agreed to negotiate. This is not to suggest that the only motivation for the communist side to strive for an end to hostilities was that of domestic Chinese necessity; quite clearly factors such as replacement of MacArthur by Ridgway,

and the reasons for this, must also have been an important consideration. Nevertheless, the fact remains that if the United States was feeling the strain, so was China; and it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that the pressure for peace was greater in China than in the United States.

It is not completely clear how this general background fits in with the vice-ministerial changes in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the very beginning of the year a new vice-minister was appointed, thus increasing the complement to four. The new man was Wu Hsiu-ch'uan. Chinese procedures in such matters enable one to suggest that if the appointment was announced in January it is likely that the decision to make the change was made late in the previous year. Whether it was also decided at this time to make the two further changes that were announced in March and April 1951 is by no means clear. On balance, as they constituted more important changes, it is possible that the whole reorganisation was planned in late 1950. In the event the spring of 1951 saw the replacement of Wang Chia-hsiang as ambassador to the Soviet Union by Chang Wen-t'ien, and the re-location of the former to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Peking, of which he was already a vice-minister. These changes can probably be interpreted in the following manner. The new ambassador to the Soviet Union was a more senior man than the one he replaced: this, together with other evidence, suggests that Soviet affairs were to be given higher priority. When the old ambassador returned to Peking he became the senior vice-minister and seems to have gradually begun his new role as the supervisor of inter-party relationships. He certainly subsequently became the vice-minister apparently solely concerned with relations with the international communist movement. Wu Hsiu-ch'uan, who had only in January joined the ministry, took over the duties of state relationships between China and the Soviet and East European states. Li K'e-nung, presumably, carried out his original duties. Chang Han-fu remained in charge of the rest-of-the-world desk.

The main trend in the period from the end of 1950 to the close of 1951 was one of overall domestic consolidation coupled with or followed by a move towards peace in Korea. At the same time it seems, though this is less clear, there was renewed Chinese interest in Indo-China, where the Vietnamese Lao Dong Party was intensifying its efforts to consolidate and lead a united front

of all the Indo-Chinese people in the war against the French.<sup>22</sup> China's attitude to the Soviet Union had also undergone a subtle change with, institutionally at least, an upgrading of the task of wooing her powerful supporter. As regards the world communist movement there probably had been an institutional change with the appointment of a senior vice-minister to take care of such matters. The broad ideological basis had, however, but little changed. There was perhaps slightly more stress on Mao's personal theoretical role, not only in relation to the question of revolutionary methods in the colonial and semi-colonial areas but also to its significance to the universal canon of Marxism-Leninism.<sup>23</sup> Domestic political consolidation during the régime's first years was of paramount importance. The ideological purity, political reliability, and organisational efficiency of the whole cumbersome administrative machine required urgent attention. The transfer of PLA cadres to civilian work in 1949 and 1950, and the Party rectification campaign in the latter year, began the unceasing process. The first massive rectification campaigns launched under conditions of near normalcy, however, were those of the Three-antis and Five-antis. Such widespread and devastating movements had as their purpose the control or curtailment of the twin social evils of waste and corruption. Early in the campaigns another was added with the specific and complementary aim of working up hatred of the United States. This concerned germ-warfare and was launched in February. Although creating a worldwide furore at the time, our concern here is to fit it into the domestic political pattern. In this respect its primary purpose seems to have been that of providing a national psychological substitute for more violent and aggressive actions that were in the process of being suppressed in Korea. With the conclusion of the armistice a foreseeable and impending reality, yet with all the fundamental domestic problems remaining and with new policies in the offing, it seems that it may have been imperative to keep the anti-American pot boiling. Together with this externally-derived pressure the internal 'antis' campaign was calculated to do wonders. As the *People's Daily* described it on the occasion of the CCP's anniversary, the campaigns

'have consolidated the people's democratic united front and brought into being a new social morality; they have made possible profound reforms in the work of all government agencies and

organisations; many new plans and new persons have come to the fore, thus providing favourable conditions for the forthcoming large-scale work of national construction'.<sup>24</sup>

It is thus manifestly clear that nation-wide mass campaigns were being used to prepare the way for important new developments. This was a well-established method of the CCP before it came to power, and has continued to be employed to the present. One purpose was to find a psychological substitute for peace in Korea. A national affair that cost little more than the fares of a number of foreign scientific visitors required to testify to the world and to the nation that the United States had used germ warfare against China, plus the price of reams of newsprint and innumerable photographs, was incomparably cheaper than waging a real war in a foreign country. And its impact on the Chinese masses, particularly those directly concerned, was incalculably more positive. The main purpose of the carefully co-ordinated campaign, however, was undoubtedly socio-economic. The peasants had to be stimulated into voluntarily completing the tasks allotted to them in the land reform program.

The same *People's Daily* item referred to above, and thus written in the context of the rectification campaigns, stated that land reform had almost been completed, with the remaining small area to be finished next spring except for some minority districts. Though fairly close to the revised target date given by Chou En-lai the previous October, it may well be that progress had not been considered satisfactory, although there is no evidence to indicate that this was so. Nevertheless the Chinese make it a rule to over-fulfil their targets; consequently even a slightly slower rate of progress in land reform may have been regarded with dissatisfaction by some in the higher councils at Peking.

This is the more likely when, as it is clear, the régime's overall economic planning was about to move into higher gear. There were signs that this was in the offing from the middle of the previous year, and a *People's Daily* article of July 1952 was further evidence of this. In addition, another article of about the same date referred to 1952 as the year of the beginning of 'planned large-scale basic construction in China's north-east'; pointing out that this marked an important stage in the nation's advance to industrialisation.<sup>25</sup> Two and a half months later an editorial in the magazine *People's China* trumpeted that 'Our country has

victoriously fulfilled the tasks of economic rehabilitation and has successfully completed its preparations to undertake industrial and agricultural construction on a large-scale. . . .'<sup>26</sup> Although the details were not released till 1955, it is certain that this was the beginning of the nation's First Five Year Plan, and marked a stage of development of no mean proportions and in addition of considerable ideological importance.

The date of this announcement, 17 September, is significant. It may be pedantic or misleading to emphasise that in the actual published plan itself it was stated that 'By the end of 1952, China had completed restoration of her national economy . . .'.<sup>27</sup> It is possible that the September article had been somewhat optimistic. If this is a correct assumption it is not hard to understand the reasons, for Chou En-lai had just led a strong delegation to Moscow, composed mostly of officials from the economic organisations of the government. Although the ostensible results of this were agreements concerning the handing over of the Ch'angch'un railroad to Chinese control, and the continued use of Port Arthur by Soviet military forces until the Soviet Union had concluded a peace treaty with Japan, purely economic matters were also discussed. Thus the date of the communiqué signed by the two parties is significant, being one day before the September article on the completion of economic rehabilitation.<sup>28</sup> It is also of interest to note that a Sino-Mongolian agreement on economic and cultural affairs was concluded shortly afterwards.<sup>29</sup>

August was a crucial month. In all probability the Party had drawn up the guidelines to its new political and economic policy some weeks previously, as the summer is the traditional time for assessing China's agricultural prospects.<sup>30</sup> In August, too, was revealed the fact that a nation-wide economic planning body had been established: the State Planning Commission. Moreover, quite a number of new economic ministries were announced as having been created at that time. China quite clearly was embarking on a new course of domestic development. In what manner was this new course reflected externally?

Institutionally the effects were not particularly marked. The same four vice-ministers remained in the ministry. Since the middle of the year, however, Wang Chia-hsiang seems to have devoted himself essentially to inter-Party relations, if he was not so doing in 1951. Acting in the capacity of senior vice-minister was Chang Han-fu, who also retained his interest in Asian, West

European-African, and American-Australasian affairs. Wu Hsiu-ch'uan still over-saw Soviet and East European affairs. By August, however, Wu had relinquished his concurrent post as director of what remained in any case his subordinate Soviet and East European division. While in the same month Ch'en Chia-k'ang, who had only been acting in that capacity, took over the directorship of the Asian division. One can only speculate that Wu's apparent restriction was caused by pressure of work and that Sino-Soviet relations had assumed a greater importance. If this is so then the envisaged launching of the First Five Year Plan and the key role the Soviet Union was to play in this was probably the reason. The change of directors of the Asian division may have been made with a view to initiating new Asian policies. Though the Korean armistice agreement was not to be signed till the middle of the next year it was virtually certain that it would be. Moreover, at the beginning of June, only a few months after Ch'en Chia-k'ang became acting director of the Asian division, the preparatory meeting of the Peace Conference of Asian and Pacific Regions was held in Peking, at which it was decided to convene the actual conference in the autumn. At about the same time, that is in July, the World Peace Council decided to call a Congress of the Peoples for Peace. Whether or not these developments had any bearing on the recall of the Soviet ambassador to China, Roschin, at the beginning of July is difficult to tell; despite the lack of data it nevertheless seems likely that Stalin's new policy lines may have necessitated the appointment of an ambassador of a different type. The replacement, Panyushkin, did not officially turn up on the Peking scene until 9 December.

Further evidence of China's new developmental phase is to be seen in the creation of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, which was announced in August. This ministry had a two-fold purpose. If its primary role was purely economic, it also had and has a secondary one, being one of the numerous instrumentalities of the foreign affairs group of the Chinese government. Quite often it may represent Peking in an unofficial capacity in countries where full diplomatic relations have not been established. Its creation in the summer thus represented more than a new domestic economic development; it was one of the first tangible signs of a China's more positive projection abroad.

The leadership was not looking solely to Asia, or to West Europe and Africa; it was still preponderantly orientated towards

the Soviet Union. When Stalin convened the Nineteenth Party Congress in Moscow at the beginning of October much was made of the event by the CCP. Liu Shao-ch'i went to Moscow for the occasion, and remained out of the country for a considerable period. *People's Daily* referred to the congress as being 'of tremendous international significance' and paid high tribute to Stalin.<sup>31</sup> The opportunity was also taken to refer to Mao's statements in 'On New Democracy' and 'On the People's Democratic Dictatorship', wherein he stressed the Party's past dependence on Soviet assistance without which victory would have been impossible and independence inconceivable.<sup>32</sup> Reiteration, in such fulsome and open terms, and so constantly, of the need to lean to one side was not without inherent dangers. The personalisation of this dependency, the implicit equation of reliance on the Soviet Union to dependence on its prestigious leader, had more immediate drawbacks. On 5 March 1953 the personal prop was suddenly withdrawn: the great Stalin died.

The importance of the event transcended mere national interests and was to have a marked impact on the whole international communist movement. In the long term, in part because of the ascendancy of Khrushchev and the Soviet liberalisation process, relations between China and the Soviet Union deteriorated, particularly in the fields of politics and ideology. In the short term, however, the after-effects of Stalin's death merely accelerated trends which were previously apparent. This is to say that, as far as China was concerned, the pattern of domestic development had been set before he died. China had started its preparations for undertaking its First Five Year Plan long before the death of Stalin, and had actually embarked on the new course at the beginning of 1953.

The replacement of the old leader by Malenkov and Khrushchev nevertheless did appear to mark a change in Soviet attitudes to the question of material aid to China's industrialisation program. On the other hand, whether or not these would in any case have occurred had Stalin lived is an open question: improbable though such a development may seem it is not impossible that he too would have followed a policy of active support for China's First Five Year Plan. After all the first fifty major projects were underwritten in 1950. The best guess seems to be that Stalin may have agreed to extend further aid to China during the occasion of Chou En-lai's visit in 1952, but that neither the extent

of this aid nor the conditions attached to it were as generous as those extended by his successors. But this is mere surmise. What is clear, or at least what the Chinese claim, is that it was not until after he died that the major portion of the industrial projects the Soviet Union was helping China to build had been decided upon.<sup>33</sup> On balance it is likely that when Malenkov visited China in the autumn of 1953 to bestow, formally and publicly, on the Chinese some of the benefits of superior Soviet industry and science, the motivation was that of wooing the leaders of the CCP, who may well in the past have not been overjoyed with everything that Stalin had done to them or for them. The reaction of the Chinese was thus probably one of genuine pleasure. They could now go ahead with their program of industrialisation in the knowledge that the Soviets were helping them and would continue to do so with some vigour.

In the sphere of international politics the effect of Stalin's death, if at first marginally important, was almost immediate. The Soviet ambassador, who had only been in Peking for a little over three months, was recalled and replaced by Kuznetsov. Tass announced the new appointment five days after Stalin's death. Kuznetsov's appointment seems to have been in the nature of a makeshift one as he was replaced by Yudin by the beginning of December. Kuznetsov may have been a personal appointee of Malenkov and replaced by Khrushchev after he had reached a position of sufficient power in the struggle with Malenkov.

The Berlin uprising of mid-June and the publicised arrest of the Soviet secret police chief Beria a few weeks later may have been connected in varying degrees with the Malenkov-Khrushchev power struggle. The question of the relationship of these events to the sudden recall of Kuznetsov is far from proven. Stalin's death, in any event, seems to have been the occasion for the Asian communist states to change their ambassadors to China; both Mongolia and North Korea officially appointed new men in June and December respectively. Shortly after Khrushchev became First Secretary, the Soviet Union called for the convening of an international conference in Geneva with a view to easing tension in Asia. It is possible that this was not an entirely new initiative of a new Soviet leadership, as it may well have had its origins in Stalin's changed strategic thinking in late 1952. Nevertheless the new line came to the surface in a positive manner only in September 1953. That it did so then and not at an earlier time is

probably due to a complex of factors, amongst which presumably was the state of thinking in China and developments in Korea and Indo-China. By this time the Korean armistice agreement had been signed. Another factor probably was a domestically-derived requirement in the Soviet Union for a lessening of world tension.

As this was a Presidential election year in the United States there was undoubtedly further reason for both China and the Soviet Union to adopt less rigid and aggressive policies. In the event the Soviet call for a conference in Geneva met with favourable international response and such a conference was held the following spring.

In the meantime events in China were developing at their own pace. A series of high level party conferences was held in the summer and autumn to map out the program of economic development, and in particular to discuss agricultural co-operativisation. The Central Committee of the CCP passed a decision on the latter subject in the middle of December. A short time later, that is on 24 December, the Politburo of the Central Committee was convened to discuss the question of Party solidarity. This probably was the occasion for the criticism and virtual purge of Kao Kang, the powerful regional leader from the relatively highly-industrialised north-east and the head of the State Planning Commission. Though Kao was to continue to make occasional appearances until January the next year, and was not theoretically purged till the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee in February 1954, what we know of such matters strongly suggests that the late December Politburo meeting probably was the occasion for his actual fall.

It is still by no means clear why he was disgraced and mere guess-work is of little value. The timing suggests that, as he appears to have been criticised in the summer of 1953, there might have been some connection with the death of Stalin, Beria's imprisonment, and the Malenkov-Khrushchev struggle. But if this were so we still do not know why he too should have been purged. There may have been serious controversy over the general direction or implementation of the First Five Year Plan, and the role the north-east industrial base which had long been under Kao was to play in the new national economic program. We simply do not know. It may conceivably be that his purge, and that of the others who fell with him, was contrived largely to give a psychological boost to the nation as a whole and to its leading

element, the masses of Party cadres, as an aid to the implementation of the First Five Year Plan.<sup>34</sup>

From all points of view, 1953 was a dramatic and significant year even if many of the developments which occurred in it or were soon to become apparent had their true origins much earlier. China was moving vigorously into its new phase of development at home. Abroad the Korean truce agreement had been signed, a new and apparently more understanding leadership in the Soviet Union was emerging, and participation in an important international conference on Asian problems was promised. There appears to have been no effect at all of all this on China's foreign affairs institutions during the year, except for the gradually expanding role of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. This organisation was divided into three geographical departments. The first was concerned with the Soviet Union and Mongolia, and may well have dealt with North Korea and to a lesser extent North Vietnam. The second supervised trade relations with the European socialist states, while the third looked after the rest of the world. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the other hand, still retained its four vice-ministers, who remained apparently responsible for their original geographical departments. This situation was not to last long, however, as early in the next year, if not at the end of 1953, several important changes were made in the ministry's personnel structure.

This phase of development into which the nation was entering manifested itself in various ways. No longer was it sufficient to describe events merely as equating to national resurgence. More positive and concrete achievements were being made. The régime was in 1954 steadily consolidating its position. This was a year of formalisation. It saw the adoption of a constitution, a central government structure, and the gradual abolition of multi-provincial regional administration. It marked the beginning of the thorough-going regularisation and modernisation of the armed forces. The year also witnessed the formal debut of the state upon the variegated stage of Asian politics. The new phase was evident from other developments. The overall drive towards industrialisation did not abate, but a crucial element emerged. This was the problem of agricultural co-operativisation: the overriding and enduring socio-economic dilemma of the régime.

By the late spring a general upsurge was reported in this field of activity, and it would seem that progress was on the whole

satisfactory. Speaking in July, Teng Tzu-hui, who appears to have been the chief political executor of the co-operativisation program, foresaw the basic completion of the task by 1958 providing there were no untoward developments. The Minister of Agriculture also appears to have been optimistic. The Politburo's principal supervisor of economic affairs, Ch'en Yun, at about the same time, was similarly sanguine. He did note, however, though in what precise context it is not clear, that there were even in the Party a number of critics not all of whom were equally well-motivated. 'Those who make critical statements', he said, 'do not see the achievements in our work, the essential aspects; they only see the mistakes in our work, only the secondary aspects . . .'.<sup>35</sup> Though Ch'en probably was referring to the general economic situation, agricultural work must obviously have also been in his mind. When the first harvests started coming in it was established that there had indeed been cause for anxiety and *People's Daily* revealed on 3 August that there had been major failures.

Though this is not a book about China's economy or its agricultural problems it is nevertheless necessary to underline the importance of these subjects to such a study. It would be no exaggeration to say that, perhaps specially during these early years, there would have been virtually no foreign policy without a solution of sorts of China's agricultural problems. China was and still is fundamentally an agricultural country, and the government that could not solve its agricultural problems would lose its mandate to rule. Once it was accepted that socialisation of the agricultural means of production was a necessity, both ideologically and economically, as the leaders of the CCP clearly did accept, then the policy of co-operativisation had to be implemented and more importantly made to work. No successful foreign policy or impressive industrial rate of growth could possibly compensate for agricultural failure. It does not matter what outside observers think about the correctness of the original premise. Socialisation of the agricultural means of production, if it has innate productivity drawbacks, appears to guarantee three things: overall social control, facilitation of state procurement, and the gradual socialisation of peasant psychology. Concerning this last point the peasant is thereby induced to feel less attachment both to his private property and to his specific household, hamlet or village. When and if this is accomplished the narrow-mindedness and inherent conservatism of the particular plot-based peasant men-

tality will be considerably modified. Co-operativisation, therefore, is a task of considerable importance.

The general economic program, with its strong emphasis on industrialisation, was a demanding one and one which necessarily failed to provide many of the needs of the masses. Consumer goods production obviously was of extremely low priority, but much more important in the long term and a problem which even today is causing headaches was the effect the overall program had on education. The ccp leaders may have been correct in emphasising industrialisation, if one accepts that it was not impossible that the United States or a collective group of imperialist nations could attack China at some stage or another. However improbable this might appear to outside observers, it was clearly a factor that the Chinese had to take into consideration, particularly when given the underlying ideological assumptions. Such a requirement could also be supported on the basis of the need to achieve as rapidly as possible a measure of industrial self-sufficiency and independence. Nevertheless, as *People's Daily* clearly stated on 19 April, economic construction needs made it impossible to provide sufficient educational facilities at the senior primary and junior middle school levels for the foreseeable future.<sup>36</sup> How China expected to achieve a breakthrough in the rural areas is thus impossible to imagine, for, given the intention to provide the peasantry with improved machinery, pesticides, fertilisers and the like, it would remain impossible to achieve an efficient level of utilisation of such benefits without first improving the educational standards of the rural masses.

Important though the adoption of the State Constitution is in the formalistic sense of ushering in a new stage of political development, the date of this event was of greater practical importance, for shortly afterwards a new group of ministries was created. In all probability the decision to establish them and to appoint new ministers to others was taken in the summer of 1954. Significant in the context we have just discussed is the fact that the commission appointed in August 1952 to tackle the problem of illiteracy was disestablished at this time. During the year the regional administrative bodies (both Party and government), which had been utilised to help run the country from 1949, were abolished one by one. It is possible that this had been decided upon at the Politburo meeting the previous December and formally approved by the Fourth Plenum in February. The need

to carry through the program of construction envisaged in the First Five Year Plan clearly demanded a more highly disciplined, streamlined, and centralised machinery of government than had hitherto existed.

While the régime was thus involved in its basic and pressing domestic tasks, developments abroad also demanded attention. On 22 February China made it known that it supported the Four Power agreement to convene the Geneva conference on 26 April. The Chinese ambassador to Moscow, who had arrived back in Peking by 14 February, probably conveyed the last word of the Kremlin on this subject though the Four Power talks in Berlin had not yet concluded. Two months later the conference opened in Geneva, where it was eventually agreed to end the fighting in Indo-China. The Chinese sent a strong delegation; this included Chang Wen-t'ien, the ambassador to Moscow, who shortly before the conference opened was appointed a vice-minister of foreign affairs, and vice-ministers Wang Chia-hsiang and Li K'e-nung. It was possibly at this time or a little later that the new position of assistant minister was created, both in order to take up the added burdens created by the absence of the vice-ministers and to assist in the expected expansion of diplomatic activities. That such an increase in work was predictable in the spring is clear from the fact that, apart from China's new role at Geneva, the Colombo conference was convened in April at which it was suggested that an Afro-Asian conference should be held some time in the future. The actual date for such a conference, April 1955, was announced in December.

Chou En-lai has given a good description of China's overt foreign policy in this pre-Bandung period. Addressing the National People's Congress in July in the general context of the First Five Year Plan he said:

'To attain this goal, it is necessary to mobilise the entire Chinese people . . . we all recognise that socialist construction and socialist transformation are gigantic and arduous tasks. Therefore, at home, we need the strength of a united people, and abroad, we need a peaceful environment'.

Continuing he said:

'In the field of international affairs, we never spare our efforts

in working for the reduction of international tensions and the promotion of peaceful coexistence between nations . . . we welcome peaceful competition among nations with different social systems . . . at present a concrete solution of the question of general disarmament is not yet achieved, the threat of an atomic war is not yet removed. We cannot but take into account the possibility of being suddenly attacked'.<sup>37</sup>

Sino-Soviet relations reached a new height of amicability during this period. At the end of September Khrushchev led a strong delegation on a visit to China. The climax came on 12 October when it was announced that agreement had been reached on a number of significant topics. Soviet military forces, which had clung on to their base rights in Port Arthur supposedly because a peace treaty had not been signed with Japan, were to evacuate the base before 31 May 1955. Another legacy from the Stalin era, the Sino-Soviet joint stock companies, which had been dominated by the Soviet Union, were to become solely Chinese operated. An agreement on scientific and technical co-operation was also signed. In addition the Russians granted China a new loan and promised help to construct another fifteen industrial projects. Khrushchev departed the next day, undoubtedly in a climate of tremendous enthusiasm. The magazine *World Culture* a few days later utilised the occasion to re-emphasise the primacy of the theory of reliance on the Soviet Union. Whereas the Afro-Asians and Latin Americans were merely sympathetic, even though they had interests in common with the Chinese people, the interests of the Soviet Union, and the other socialist states were:

'fully identical with those of China . . . only by further strengthening the forces of peace headed by the Soviet Union, may the international situation be made to produce changes decidedly beneficial to our country, to enable our country to strive for the peaceful environment needed for socialist economic construction'.<sup>38</sup>

The changes that took place in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are simple to interpret, and were the result of the need to conform to the new diplomatic requirements. It must be stressed that these new requirements were themselves largely the result of more fundamental changes that had occurred in China's domestic

situation. There had of course been interaction between domestic and foreign developments, but the single most important factor had been China's compelling objective of comprehensive national rehabilitation and economic advancement. The most significant specific changes related to the new phase of diplomacy concerned the addition of one new vice-minister and the transference of another. The man added was the ambassador to Moscow, Chang Wen-t'ien. Chang occupied himself very largely if not entirely with the Geneva conference, though his role was still probably that of liaison with the Soviet Union. He was not replaced as ambassador until January the following year, though he seems to have returned to Peking to take up his full-time appointment as senior vice-minister in December 1954. The man dropped was Li K'e-nung. When precisely this was decided upon is not known but it was probably in the summer; by the beginning of the autumn in any event Li had relinquished his foreign ministry appointment and was being referred to as a deputy Chief-of-Staff of the People's Liberation Army. The change in Chang's role thus seems to have been brought about by the necessity to maintain very close relations with the Soviet Union, and at a level of higher seniority, over the question principally of bringing about a peace settlement in Indo-China that did not do injustice to China's interests in South-east Asia. The replacement of Li presumably meant that a man of his background was no longer needed in the foreign ministry. If one accepts that his role was of an intelligence nature, which is by no means proven, and in view of his subsequent PLA duties may have been of a military intelligence nature, then his removal probably meant that China no longer regarded the world situation as requiring a military intelligence expert as vice-minister of foreign affairs. By the end of the year, in any case, there were still four vice-ministers. Chang Han-fu, Wu Hsiu-ch'uan, and Wang Chia-hsiang still looked after their traditional interests; and Chang Wen-t'ien became the senior vice-minister. The structure of the subordinate geographical departments remained unaltered, but there were some changes in their staffing. The most important change was the appointment of Wu Hsiu-chu'an's successor to the directorship of the department of Soviet Union and East European affairs as ambassador to Albania in the middle of the year. China's geopolitical view consequently remained unchanged, a fact well illustrated by the manner in which this subject was dealt with in

Chou En-lai's address to the NPC at the end of September. Though this showed evidence of increased stress on Asia, particularly South and South-east Asia, and upon peace, the world was clearly divided into three major groupings: the Soviet Union and East Europe, a communist and non-communist Asia, and the rest.<sup>39</sup>

As noted the newest addition to the vice-ministerial ranks, Chang Wen-t'ien, had returned to Peking before the end of 1954. Early in the new year another new vice-minister was appointed. This was Chi P'eng-fei; his official appointment was made on 31 January. The obvious reason for this was the need to replace Wu Hsiu-ch'uan as supervisor of Soviet Union and East European affairs at the ministry. Wu was officially appointed ambassador to Yugoslavia four weeks later. The other three vice-ministers remained in their old fields of responsibility. January was also the month when quite a number of ambassadorial changes were made. It is likely, therefore, that the decision to effect this wide range of appointments had been made towards the end of the previous year. Though we know nothing about such matters it seems probable that as this general reorganisation involved important policy decisions, for example recognition by Yugoslavia, it had been discussed at a fairly high-level Party meeting. Be that as it may the reorganisation was effected by and large before the end of January.

Within a few months it was revealed that another reorganisation had been carried out. One of the major geographical departments under Chang Han-fu, the Asian Department, had been divided into two: the First and the Second Asian Departments. It is not clear precisely why this had been done, apart from the obvious need to cope with the growing amount of work connected with the forthcoming Bandung Conference and the expansion of Chinese activities in Asia at the time of the Geneva Conference. The main puzzle concerns the division of responsibilities between the two departments. On the analogy of the division that existed in later years it has been assumed that the two departments were responsible for distinct geographical areas of Asia, and that these may have approximated the areas of the later divisions. This may not have been so, however, and their purpose may have been functional rather than geographical, or the geographical principles of division may have been different. There is insufficient evidence to warrant a firm conclusion. On balance it seems that the division of work between the two was

based on geographical principles and that these differed from those applied in later years. As the principles adopted in determining geographical divisions have relevance to the political or ideological view the Chinese have of the world, further examination of the available data on these two Asian departments might be of interest.

Biographical data enable us to make some tentative suggestions concerning the division of work between these two departments. It seems that from the early days of the régime the CCP regarded Asia as being divided naturally into four basic groupings. The first was communist, the second the non-communist south-east, the third the Indian subcontinental states, and the last the western part of the continent. Until somewhere around the end of 1958 it appears that Indonesia may have been included in the 'communist' group. Burma, on the other hand, seems to have been regarded more as part of the Indian subcontinental group than as belonging to non-communist South-east Asia. If this is correct it would indicate that the First Asian Department at the beginning of 1955 may have been concerned with Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam (Indo-Chinese affairs), and Indonesia.<sup>40</sup> The position of the Philippines at that time is unascertainable. The Second Asian Department may consequently have supervised relations with the three remaining non-communist groupings of Asia. If this analysis is correct it is interesting for the light it could throw on the earlier Chinese assessment of the future place of Indonesia in communist Asia. However, it must be stressed that the above is most tentative.

Developments within China during 1955 were of considerable significance, though it will be impossible to do justice to the subject in this book. The main concern by far of the Party leaders was clearly that of agricultural co-operativisation, and the integral problem of maintaining agricultural production and procurement while this was being effected. A better introduction to the subject could not be found than the 3 March State Council statement: 'During the first two years of the Five Year Plan . . . the original production increase plan of the state has not been fulfilled owing to serious natural calamities'.<sup>41</sup> This may have been the régime's indirect way of explaining away its self-inflicted problems; if the weather had not been too kind, it is equally possible that the socio-economic policies of the Party had done little or nothing to ameliorate conditions. There may well be

truth in recent Cultural Revolution allegations that a Central Committee conference in May 1955, presided over by Liu Shao-ch'i, had ruled that 200,000 co-operatives should be abolished, and that this decision had been backed by the Party's principal executor of rural policies, Teng Tzu-hui.<sup>42</sup> But the truth would appear to be twisted, as much that has been revealed during the Cultural Revolution has been, and it is more than likely that the Politburo as a whole (including Mao) realised in the early spring of that year that the seriousness of the rural problems demanded drastic remedial measures.

It would certainly seem to be too sweeping and uncritical to accept that Mao opposed this retreat. In any event the Party held another major conference at the end of July on the subject of co-operatives and, presumably, the agricultural yield.<sup>43</sup> This would, as we have seen, be about the right time for an assessment of the main crop yield. Moreover, since we know that régime spokesmen subsequently stated that the total 1955 grain yield had been very high,<sup>44</sup> it is likely that the Party had obtained enough statistics by the end of July to warrant an attitude of optimism. In sum, the facts indicate that at the end of 1954 and beginning of 1955 the régime felt it had to soft-pedal co-operativisation, even to the point of appearing to agree to the abolition of large numbers of co-operatives, but that this was regarded as a tactical retreat which should be and was reversed as soon as a good national crop was obtained.

The significance of the July meeting seems to be that the Party as a whole made the decision to press on with, if not to accelerate, co-operativisation, rather than that Mao had won a victory over some supposed ultra-conservative faction. This assessment is partially supported by the fact that Mao himself indirectly affirmed that rural affairs were in a mess in the first half of 1955 when he wrote a personal preface to a book on the subject, in which such a sombre evaluation was made.<sup>45</sup> In the event Mao presented a report to the meeting on the question of co-operatives in which the target date for completion of the program was set for 1960. Two months later this draft program was adopted by the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee.<sup>46</sup> By the beginning of November there were signs of considerable acceleration; one province announced plans to complete its tasks in 1956.<sup>47</sup> Within a month *NCNA* stated:

'Judging from the existing situation, if the leadership bodies of various places continue to strengthen leadership and further criticise conservatism and self-complacency, it is expected that the basic completion of the semi-socialist cooperativisation of agriculture on a national scale can be attained in the autumn of 1956'.<sup>48</sup>

Nineteen fifty-five was the third year of the First Five Year Plan and for this reason alone half way through the year was a significant date. It is not surprising that the period that followed was seen as one of a 'general upsurge'. The convening of a national conference of the Party in March and the Fifth Plenum in April, both devoted largely to the question of the Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih purge and its concomitant, Party unity and responsiveness, was designed specifically to accelerate the overall socio-economic program. Both men had been purged a good year earlier. The public revelation of the First Five Year Plan itself followed shortly after the April plenum, at which it was doubtless formally and responsively endorsed by the purge-conscious delegates. It seems to be the case that the Party leaders were in a frame of mind which would tolerate little in the way of conservativeness or opposition. True they had to back-track for a while in rural affairs but this is hardly surprising, for when the peasant blows ideology must bend. The total long-range program nevertheless was not to be slowed down; the mood was optimistic and veering towards urgency. It is important to make this point, as it has considerable relevance to the later discussion on China's foreign policy, particularly regarding the dispute with the Soviet Union.

The total program of development was not something artificial, conjured upon the moment in some immutable form. It had its roots deep in history. But it began in 1955, if not at the end of the previous year, to take on a particular colouring and shape that was to have the utmost significance for the future. As the chairman of the State Planning Commission was to write in 1959:

'In the winter of 1955, when socialist revolution in the ownership of the means of production was about to be completed in our country, Comrade Mao Tse-tung scientifically foresaw the possibility for the national economy to develop at still higher speed and put forward, in time, the slogan of achieving greater, faster, better and more economical results in developing socialist

construction. Afterwards, he put forward a series of programmatic proposals . . .'.<sup>49</sup>

The split of the Asian Department into two at the beginning of the year was not to last long. It is not known exactly when these were re-amalgamated, the earliest certain date for this is September; nor are the reasons clear. It seems possible to argue that the régime, a month or so after the conclusion of the Bandung conference, started to realise that there would not be an immediate and significant expansion of its Asian diplomatic activities. It is also possible that the new domestic offensive, foreshadowed in the spring and firmly launched in the summer, forced a curtailment of foreign activities. If this reasoning is correct the date for the re-amalgamation could have been in July or August. There were no other important organisational changes, and the four vice-ministers still supervised the affairs of their traditional geographical departments. China's overall view of the international scene does not appear to have altered. The enemy still lurked menacingly in the shadows. As the Minister of Defence put it in May 1955, with the founding of the People's Republic of China and its growing strength the socialist states had a favourable balance of forces. Though this was hardly an original conclusion he went on to say: 'if the crazy rulers of imperialism' were to start a war, 'the result would be the utter destruction of the imperialist camp and the complete collapse of the entire capitalist system'.<sup>50</sup> Thus he set the stage for the 'Paper Tiger' and 'East Wind' themes in the subsequent Sino-Soviet polemic. His statements clearly conformed closely to that of Molotov three months earlier, and was echoed in other Chinese statements during the year.<sup>51</sup> According to the Soviet Foreign Minister such achievements had been made in the manufacture of hydrogen weapons that it was now the United States which was lagging behind. Such indeed was the increased power of the Soviet Union that it is no wonder the documents of the First Five Year Plan stressed that economic co-operation with it 'will enable us in the first place to obtain immense aid from the Soviet Union in the form of superb technique and guarantee imports of equipment and materials necessary for our socialist industrialisation'.<sup>52</sup>

International relations could not be reduced to the simple task of warding off military attack by imperialism, or to the hope of relying on the immensity of Soviet altruism. A very significant

and growing task was that of diversifying China's foreign defence systems. If the Soviet Union had outstripped the United States in modern war potential as Molotov claimed and the Chinese reiterated, what was more important in the stated Chinese view was that the 'solidarity of the peace-loving nations' had been further consolidated, and the position had now been reached where without China's participation world problems could not be solved.<sup>53</sup> The régime had, however, to sell these ideas abroad, particularly to its neighbours. The head of the Department of Diplomacy of the People's University, who should have been in a good position to tell, wrote an extremely interesting article for the magazine *People's China* in September. As this is of theoretical value to the study of the problems encountered by Chinese foreign policy makers it is worth quoting fairly extensively. The author says:

'There are people in certain countries who say that the social and political systems of nations in the Socialist camp make it impossible for other countries to have peaceful relations and economic, political, and cultural cooperation with them. They contend that war between capitalist and socialist countries is therefore inevitable. We disagree completely with all such views, and they form no part of our policy.

Marxists have never concealed their convictions . . . They hold it to be scientifically true that, in the course of social development, capitalism will inevitably give way to socialism. But socialist countries do not think of imposing their outlook and social organisation on anyone else. On the contrary, Marxists believe that the change from one social system to another can come only when material conditions are ripe, when people believe that the change is necessary and work actively to bring it about.

We stand for peace, but this does not mean that we will go on our knees for it. We shall certainly not invade any country, but neither shall we tolerate any imperialist invasion of our territory. The development of the world situation clearly shows that lasting peace is not only something the peoples earnestly desire, but something that can in fact be achieved. If the people of the world take the defence of peace into their own hands and carry it forward to the end, peace can be ensured'.<sup>54</sup>

This article was written in the so-called era of the Bandung spirit of the five principles of peaceful coexistence. It was thus

written specifically to allay the historical fears of China's lesser neighbours, and utilised Marxist-Leninist arguments to prove that such fears were groundless. There may have been other than historical reasons for selling peace at that time. With the further consolidation of Khrushchev's personal power in the Soviet Union, and with signs that their great ally had passed through the political doldrums, the Chinese might have felt it necessary to push the Asian-acceptability campaign forward a little. This may be one of those chicken-and-egg problems, for it is difficult to sort out cause from effect; nevertheless there is an interesting coincidence in timing. Nehru during his visit to Moscow in June 1955 had invited Bulganin to pay a visit to India, which invitation had been accepted. Bulganin, together with Khrushchev, went on a grand tour of Asia in November and December. This was the first really dramatic initiative of the Soviet Union in China's area of primary interest; its equivalent counterpart would have been a public tour of West Europe, including Finland, by Mao and Liu Shao-ch'i. It is thus not at all improbable that the Chinese leaders viewed with a certain degree of discomfort the impending and actual visit by the exuberant heir of Stalin through the countries on their periphery. It may have been partly with this in mind that the régime once more re-stated its claim to ideological supremacy in matters relating to Asia, and other parts of the world, late in October. Referring to Mao's agricultural program of 31 July, and seemingly directed at competing Soviet Asian aid projects, a leading Peking newspaper trumpeted:

'For such a gigantic socialist mass movement to be carried out in the rural villages of a country which has a large population, insufficient cultivated acreage, frequent natural calamities and backward methods of tilling, is possessed of very great world significance. It will indicate to the billions of peasants all over the world who are still in a state of slavehood and poverty, as was true in China in the past, the direction for breaking away from oppression and hunger and victoriously marching toward the happy life of Socialism'.<sup>55</sup>

---

## Chapter 2

# The Leap and the Fall

---



FROM 14–20 January 1956 the Party held a high-level meeting on the question of the intellectuals. This concerned the high proportion of intellectuals who had been trained or seriously influenced by non-communists at home or abroad; in fact the Party had probably decided to hold this meeting a month or so previously. The principal report, given by Chou En-lai, revealed among other things that the Party had ‘decided to make opposition to rightist conservative ideology the central question’ for the Eighth National Congress of the CCP which was scheduled for September that year.<sup>1</sup> This revelation is of considerable significance, for it strongly suggests that, though the Party realised the degree of dependence it had on the great mass of bourgeois or non-Party intellectuals, it was determined by about the end of 1955 to brook no nonsense from them. All Party organs were enjoined to develop the struggle in this regard in order to assert correct leadership of this vital but not wholly reliable stratum of society. The general strategy had thus been drawn up. It remained for precise tactical methods and goals to be revised; and as is the established method for the Party no major campaign is undertaken without the issue of draft tentative guidelines which precede, usually by a number of months, the actual tactical battles.<sup>2</sup>

It must be stressed that the tightening up of control over the non-communist intellectuals was not motivated merely by ideological considerations divorced from practical necessity, for the Party was then concerned to push ahead with a long-range plan of developing science. Nevertheless, it is the general climate of political opinion we are most concerned with describing at this stage. It was this general climate which probably led to the attempt to instil a degree of liveliness into intellectual matters and to weed out intractable opposition elements in the ranks of the intellectuals. This was the ‘Hundred Flowers’ or ‘Blooming and Contending’ campaign which unfolded in May.

It was not clear how the Chinese campaign directed at the intellectuals was affected by developments in the Soviet Union.

As soon became evident, Khrushchev launched his program of thawing out the wits of the Soviet peoples, which had been benumbed by Stalin, at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in February. Much has been made of the probable impact this had on the Chinese, and there is no doubt at all that de-Stalinisation came as a shock to the CCP, and that as its effects became discernible the concern reached considerable proportions. There is no doubt, also, that the CCP adjusted its own domestic campaign to the new requirements. It does not follow, however, that the Chinese campaign, which ended in the vigorous struggle against the 'rightists', was directly caused by events in the Soviet Union. Clearly, the guiding principles or general purpose of the Chinese campaign preceded the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU.

Turning now to economic matters, the beginning of 1956 saw the promulgation by the Central Committee of the Party of the draft regulations concerning Mao's program of agricultural development. This became part of the general upsurge of economic activities that the régime consistently claims for the early part of the year. It was obviously a period of considerable national enthusiasm and vigour. In May a significant number of new economic ministries was added to the structure of government, the largest single change of this nature since October 1949. It is probable that this was related to the increase in Soviet assistance which was to be announced on the occasion of Mikoyan's visit in April. The régime's public media were full of optimistic statements during this period. The Minister of Agriculture in mid-June saw the task of agricultural co-operativisation as being 'basically completed in the main', and the great high tide of socialist revolution as leading to an immense expansion of agricultural output.<sup>3</sup> *People's Daily* a fortnight later foresaw that in the coming winter and spring 'in the overwhelming majority of areas in the country', fully socialist co-operativisation would be realised.<sup>4</sup> Yet all had not gone perfectly by any means, as is illustrated by a high-level directive in April. This attacked the type of thinking which seemed to consider that the Twelve Year Plan for agriculture, introduced by Mao in 1955, could be achieved 'with the single stroke of the hand in two or three years'.<sup>5</sup> This refrain had been taken up by the Party's principal spokesman on agricultural affairs in June.<sup>6</sup>

Despite these and other adverse signs, however, the régime as a whole seems to have retained its confidence. It does not neces-

sarily follow that owing to mistakes in implementation or faults in the original plan Mao suffered a personal defeat at the hands of more conservative leaders and was forced to shelve his grandiose agricultural program. It is probable that as the problems mounted political necessity and good sense caused the leaders, as a whole, to switch tactics. In any case, accepted Party dogma in subsequent years referred to the year 1956 as one of upsurge: it was the year of the first little leap forward. It was also the year in which the Soviet Union agreed to help China construct another fifty-five major industrial projects, and the occasion for new thinking on the part of the Chinese leadership concerning de-centralising economic administration. The new Soviet aid was announced when Mikoyan visited Peking in April. Despite the apparent pleasure with which the Chinese greeted this announcement it is likely that this was not entirely unqualified. There was clearly a limit to Soviet assistance; the Russians had their own domestic problems and worldwide aid commitments and plans. It was also obvious that such assistance imposed financial burdens on China; it had to be paid for one way or another. China's fundamental and long-term interests demanded increased efforts at achieving self-sufficiency.<sup>7</sup> As Chou En-lai had put it in his report on the intellectuals in January, though in the context of the national scientific program, China should not 'remain forever in a state of dependence and imitation' nor increase the burden on the Soviet Union.<sup>8</sup>

The problem of de-centralisation is a traditional one. In a country the size of China, and particularly one with a political system as highly centralised and regimented as it was after the abolition of the regional administrations in 1954, local initiative tends to diminish. Too much local initiative, however, could be economically and, more importantly, politically dangerous. The problem was one of balance and of timing. The Party therefore decided to tackle the problem. Chou En-lai, addressing the NPC at the end of June, let it be known that a preliminary system of decentralisation had some time previously been drawn up and disseminated for lower-level views. It was estimated that an overall plan could be drawn up in 1956 and put into practice provisionally the next year.<sup>9</sup> It is likely that de-centralisation had been decided on in principle at the end of 1955, possibly at about the time of the Sixth Plenum in October, as the régime had made a fundamental reassessment of the overall politico-economic situation at about that time.

The period of the first nine months of 1956 seems to have been crucial, witnessing as it did in the beginning the promulgation of Mao's agricultural plan and the initiation of the campaign against the intellectuals. The period closed with the Eighth Congress of the Party. In between these events moves were taken to decentralise the administration of the economy. This seems also to have been part of an overall attempt to induce flexibility and response into the whole machinery of government and into the total fabric of society, as is evident from statements on such matters made at the Eighth Congress. It is important to deal with these exuberant and energetic developments from the point of view of the Party's hopes and expectations at the end of 1955, and during the first nine months of 1956, rather than from the angle of the setbacks which later occurred. It is, of course, not possible to know exactly what the Party thought, but there does seem to be enough evidence to enable a tentative reconstruction to be made.

When the leaders put forward to the Sixth Plenum in October 1955 their decision to convene a Party Congress, and 'had brought forward the policy of socialist construction with the achievement of greater, faster, better and more economical results',<sup>10</sup> this equated to the conclusion that a new stage was being reached and that henceforth fundamental changes could be expected.<sup>11</sup> The speed-up of co-operativisation, the campaigns against the intellectuals and against Party bureaucratism, de-centralisation intentions, the slogan of 'greater, faster, better, more economical': all these pointed to high expectations.

Part of this is explainable by the desire to complete the First Five Year Plan as quickly as possible and get on with a second one. But there can be no doubt that the leaders had their sights set high. Nineteen fifty-six was to be a year of strenuous and total preparation for great things to come. The evidence of that year alone suggests this, and subsequently the régime was to describe the year as one of a 'mighty leap forward'.<sup>12</sup> The general views of the leaders, as expressed in late 1955, had become very much more specific by the time of the enlarged Politburo session in April 1956 when Mao presented his thesis on the 'Ten Sets of Relationships'. This thesis was interpreted by Liu Shao-ch'i two years later as meaning that Mao had called for the general mobilisation of 'all positive factors and available forces for building China into a modern, prosperous and mighty socialist state in the shortest

possible time'.<sup>13</sup> It seems probable that between the end of 1955 and the spring of 1956 the Party leadership drew up plans to launch a leap, and that it was intended that this should begin in the forthcoming winter-spring. The fact that the Eighth Congress was held in September, and that in the event it was its second session in 1958 which officially launched the actual Great Leap Forward, further supports this hypothesis. If this reasoning is correct, what caused the delay?

Quite a number of factors led to this change of plans. In the first place the lower levels of Party leadership acted precipitately and made errors in judgment; consequently doubt set in and the whole program slowed down.<sup>14</sup> Climatic conditions in 1957 and, as was subsequently alleged, in 1956 were also unfavourable to agriculture. These factors alone may have sufficed to slow down the overall effort. However, external developments seem to have been an additional reason, and the combination of the two ruled out any possibility of moving into the new rapid stage of progress.

The first external factor was related to Khrushchev's de-Stalinisation campaign. An initial sign that this was having serious repercussions outside the Soviet Union was the rioting that had occurred in Poland at the end of June 1956. The most important and extremely serious result in the short run was the Hungarian uprising of late October. These dates are significant ones for the study of the evolution of the open polemics between the CCP and the CPSU. In the subsequent Chinese account of this, two dates stand out for the year 1956. The first is April and the second October-November. In April, we are told, Mao voiced his concern over de-Stalinisation to Mikoyan when he visited Peking. The day before he arrived the Chinese published their first evaluation of the question of Stalin, referred to as 'On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat'; this had been drawn up after discussion by the Politburo.<sup>15</sup> The burden of this was the explanation of how Stalin's mistakes had occurred, and it was an attempt to explain that his mistakes were not as important as his achievements. This line was pushed further in June, as other communist parties were openly discussing the question, when a collection of criticisms of Stalin was published in China.

Though there is little doubt that the CCP leaders were concerned at the implications of Khrushchev's attack on Stalin, and Mikoyan indirectly referred to this at the CCP's congress in September,<sup>16</sup> it seems that this concern was largely over the question simply of

the advisability or otherwise of launching the attack in the first place. If the Chinese did allude to the question of the correct attitude to be adopted towards us imperialism, this was overtly at least a secondary issue and one only very indirectly approached. The central theme was that of the incorrectness of Stalin's cult of the personality.<sup>17</sup> In the 1963 Chinese description of the development of this polemic with the CPSU this fact is obscured and the claim is made that they objected to the application of de-Stalinisation to the whole range of international communist strategy against imperialism. However, the evidence adduced in 1963 for this, concerning the Chinese reactions in the early part of 1956, relates for the overwhelming part to the specific question of the cult of personality.<sup>18</sup> In fact the change in Chinese attitude came gradually, and only after the Polish riots. It was marked by late 1956; and overt only at the end of December after the Hungarian uprising, to which specific reference was made as the reason for amplifying the April assessment.<sup>19</sup>

The second external development also assumed its most serious form shortly before the Hungarian uprising. This was Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal in late July. Following this came the Israeli attacks of late October and the military action of the United Kingdom and France at the end of October. For a short time the world situation became exceedingly tense and it might easily have appeared to the Chinese that the cause of international communism was being sacrificed on the altar of domestic political opportunism in Moscow. On the one hand an East European socialist state was in the process of disintegrating, with the further possibility that this was somehow being engineered by us imperialism while the Russians looked on passively. On the other, a natural act of national self-assertion by an ex-colonial nation was being repressed by the armed might of old colonial powers, with nothing being done about it. The implications for China's national strategy were potentially grave. Only after Soviet troops moved into Budapest and the pro-Egypt reaction had set in could the Chinese have felt more comfortable. Nevertheless they must have drawn some rather gloomy conclusions from these events; the kind of leadership that had emerged in the CPSU and that had followed such a course of action, if not caused it, could not presumably be thoroughly relied upon in the future to safeguard China's national interests. In short, the unfavourable world situation, together with the domestic problems, reacted together in such a manner as to

delay all Chinese attempts to launch their proposed Great Leap Forward.

In the general field of international relations it was clearly necessary to take such developments into consideration, for earlier the situation had appeared much more favourable. An institute for the study of international relations was established at the beginning of the year. A few months later Chou En-lai told the NPC that the international situation 'has definitely tended towards relaxation', though he went on to indicate that all would not be that easy, for a powerful newly-emerging nation such as China 'often cannot be fully understood . . . and frequently arouses apprehension'. Nevertheless the fundamental point remained that China had assumed greater international importance and its views on many major world problems could no longer be disregarded.<sup>20</sup> Presumably, however, China's weakness in the field of advanced weapons technology, was not meant to be included in such an evaluation. It is possible that the Chinese leaders had become increasingly aware of the growing might of the USSR and USA in the field of advanced weaponry. *World Culture* in October made reference to the views held in monopolistic-capitalist circles on the question of 'so-called atomic deadlock'; and from the Chinese point of view there may indeed have been some reason to believe that this had occurred.<sup>21</sup> In view of what may have been their opinion of Soviet actions in Hungary and the Middle East, it would not be going too far to suggest that they also feared, at that time, a future us-Soviet nuclear stalemate. In such an eventuality how would the Soviet leaders react to us imperialism, how would this affect the Soviet attitude to China, what were the implications for China's strategic thinking? All these and many more questions probably disturbed the Chinese, and were soon to become apparent as a theme in their overt polemics with the CPSU. The Eighth Congress, while not denying the long-term possibilities in the international situation, nevertheless reminded everyone that if there had been a tendency towards relaxation the imperialists would never give up their efforts and the danger of war thus still existed.<sup>22</sup> In its resolution on the Political Report, the Congress further elaborated on the basic principles governing the Chinese conduct of international relations. Most of this statement was a re-hash of traditional Chinese attitudes. The world was still divided into two principal political segments and the Soviet Union and East Europe still appeared to be regarded as the

main guarantor of socialist security. However, there seems to have been a subtle change in emphasis, with more significance being attached to the anti-colonialist role of Afro-Asia and Latin America.

At the beginning of 1956 a number of new ambassadors were appointed, and moves were afoot to establish diplomatic relations with several Arab countries. The director of the Asian Department of the foreign ministry was appointed ambassador to Egypt in June; the West European and African department, which had hitherto handled relations with countries such as Egypt, became the West European Department; and a department of West Asian and African affairs was also created. It appears likely that the formal reorganisation occurred between 9-16 September, though the decision to effect it had probably been taken some months previously. The foreign ministry still had four vice-ministers. Chang Wen-t'ien and Wang Chia-hsiang continued in their traditional capacities. Chang Han-fu still supervised the same area, though some of his subordinate geographical departments had been reorganised. Chi P'eng-fei appears to have devoted most of his energies to Soviet Union and East European affairs.

In September 1956 it was announced that relations would be established between China and Ceylon. Two months later Chou En-lai left for a tour of seven Asian countries and of several socialist states in Europe, which presumably was necessitated by the general trend of international developments and in particular by the Hungarian uprising. His departure came immediately after the end of the Second Plenum of the Central Committee which probably discussed among other subjects the question of Hungary. In the event Chou suddenly interrupted his tour and hastily returned to Peking, supposedly in order to take a rest, where he remained from 31 December to 6 January. As he then went to the Soviet Union, and as *People's Daily* had on 29 December published its most stringent if still indirect criticism of the CPSU, it is more than probable that his return was a consequence of the need for fuller briefing on the subject before going to Moscow. The end of the year thus marked a turning point in the conduct of China's foreign relations.

Soon after Chou En-lai returned from his visit Mao convoked the Supreme State Conference. This was a select body of men representing a wide range of political interests which met on rare occasions to discuss or be told about important policy trends.

At this meeting, held on 27 February, Mao put forth his much discussed thesis: 'On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People'. This speech was a direct result of Khrushchev's de-Stalinisation campaign and was probably influenced in its overall thinking by Chou's findings in Hungary and the Soviet Union. Yet the seeds of Mao's thoughts were contained in the indigenous campaign against the intellectuals in January the previous year, and were of course in many respects a logical extension of much of his earlier writings. This February speech was not released to the general public till June, by which time it had undergone certain unspecified changes.

As we know nothing about the content of the original speech we can only assume that its published form did not differ too markedly. If this is correct the burden of the speech concerned the proposition that contradictions did not disappear in a socialist society but would, for example, be bound to appear between the leaders and the people. Not all contradictions within such a society would be antagonistic; those between the proletarian leaders and the masses would be non-antagonistic contradictions, while those between these two groups and the small handful of reactionaries and the like would be antagonistic. Thus the re-phrasing of the traditional theory of contradictions seems to have had as its purpose not only the envisaged extension of political struggle in China aimed at preparing the ground for intensified social and political programs; it was also directed towards solving problems in the international communist movement.

Its immediate purpose was the rectification of errors within Chinese society. This was made clear in a Central Committee directive, dated 27 April on the subject of rectifying methods of work, which stipulated that the approach should be based on Mao's speech concerning contradictions and on the decisions of the Party's national conference on propaganda work in March.<sup>23</sup> The great rectification campaign started at the beginning of May: it was described as 'a movement of self-education to raise the Marxist-Leninist ideological level of Party members so that the Party and the masses of people would be united still more closely to win new and greater victories in the country's socialist construction'.<sup>24</sup> This campaign therefore concerned non-antagonistic contradictions; linked with it, however, was the anti-rightist campaign, the antagonistic struggle. Concerning the latter *People's Daily* said that the rightists, that is those who were opposed to the

Party, having kept quiet in 1956, saw their opportunity coming after the Hungarian uprising and Mao's speech on contradictions, and were further influenced by the rectification campaign.<sup>25</sup> The régime thus attempted to connect the opposition with the little leap of 1956. One of the Party's principal regional leaders gave further details in late August on underlying reasons for launching such campaigns. He said:

'It has been borne out by facts in the past half year that a mere socialist revolution in 1956 on the economic front in regard to the ownership of the means of production was not enough and that there must also be a thoroughgoing socialist revolution on the political and ideological fronts. The rectification campaign and the struggle against the rightists comprise such a revolution'.<sup>26</sup>

We are thus made aware of the Party's overt views on the nature and limitations of the little leap in 1956. But it must be emphasised that by so describing the assessment a neat job had been done on making facts fit Marxist theory. Moreover, such expressed views in August 1957, and very much after the events of a year earlier, do nothing to clarify the views and expectations of the leaders at the beginning of the 1956 little leap. It is not impossible that the hope had earlier been of skipping a theoretical stage and moving straight into a new stage of development; such things have happened.

Economic matters were not neglected during the year, indeed they were in both a theoretical and practical sense closely tied in with the mass political campaigns. This is not surprising, of course, but it is even less so when one recalls that 1957 marked the last year of the First Five Year Plan. An article in *Theoretical Study* at the beginning of March well describes, from a highly theoretical point of view, the way the leadership saw the future development of the economy. Despite the indigestibility of its jargon it is worth quoting in detail, as it unequivocally pointed the way to the Great Leap Forward of 1958. It stated:

'With the basic accomplishment of the task of socialist transformation, the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie will be basically settled, and there will be established the advanced socialist system. Under such circumstances, the contradiction between the people's demand for an advanced

industrial country and the actual position of a backward agricultural country will develop into the major contradiction in the country. The real nature of this major contradiction will be the contradiction between the advanced socialist system and the backward socialist productivity. Compared with the situation existing in the past, it will not only have developed into the major contradiction, but will also be reflected in its possession of the realistic conditions for the solution of the contradiction. This will be the advanced socialist system which will have then been established, a system in keeping with the development of productivity, capable of producing colossal effects in pushing forward the development of productivity'.<sup>27</sup>

This theme was repeated by *People's Daily* on 2 March.

Theory aside, however, and despite the régime's optimism, there were naturally imposed limitations to the practical possibilities at that time. It was noted, for example, that there were still insufficient schools and that this was because the state could not provide the necessary material resources or the teachers. Appearing to make a virtue out of necessity, but also adopting a very practical view, a call was made for youth from the primary and middle schools who could not proceed with their education to go to the countryside and participate in agricultural work. Some attempt was also made to improve and make more practical the content of education.<sup>28</sup> There was in addition the question of the general state of the economy and especially that of agriculture in 1957. It is uncertain what the carry-over of grain was from the previous year's harvests. One authoritative Party spokesman said the 1956 grain harvest was 5.4 per cent better than 1955,<sup>29</sup> but Premier Chou En-lai, two months later, said it was necessary to slow down the economic program in view of the fact that the previous year's crop yield had not been so good.<sup>30</sup> In the event 1957 has generally been accepted as having been a poor agricultural year, though whether this was because of the imbalances of the previous year which could have produced shortages at the beginning of 1957 or because of agricultural weaknesses that occurred in 1957 is not clear. Whatever the case, in the version of Mao's speech on contradictions which was publicised in mid-June 1957 he said, 'we'll be doing well enough' if agricultural co-operatives could be set up by the end of that year and not really consolidated until some time in the Second Five Year Plan.<sup>31</sup>

The Third Plenum of the Central Committee was convened on 20 September and sat until 10 October. It probably was preceded by a Politburo meeting which, *inter alia*, discussed the conclusions of the national conference of the State Planning Commission and the State Economic Commission held in August. A few days before the plenum met a Central Committee directive was published on the question of overhauling the agricultural co-operatives. The readjustments called for were not substantial; for example, on the average one co-operative should correspond to one village. The overhaul was to be effected between September and the next spring sowing.<sup>32</sup> *People's Daily* a few days later carried a State Council report on the extent of natural calamities which, though said to be less severe than in previous years, still entailed a heavy program of famine relief work.<sup>33</sup> There were thus signs, if still intangible ones, of underlying unsolved problems. The chief Party spokesman on agricultural affairs indirectly affirmed that all was not well when he pointed out to the plenum that funds for increased agricultural development must come mainly from the agricultural co-operatives themselves.<sup>34</sup>

The plenum also discussed the general program of agricultural development (Mao's Twelve Year Plan), and made some amendments to it; the amended plan was released by the Central Committee on 25 October and circulated three days later. The main aim of the revised plan was to illustrate to the nation the great achievements made in the past two years in the work of co-operativisation and to urge completion of this task by 1962. It was later claimed that this revised program was one of the major instrumentalities of the Great Leap Forward in 1958. That this probably was partly true is indicated in the speech given at the plenum by the Party's General Secretary, interestingly enough in the context of rectification. As he saw it, despite the seriousness of natural calamities and inadequacies in work methods the co-operatives were on the whole stable and grain output had increased. He went on to call for a general debate on Mao's agricultural program in order to promote an upsurge in production during the coming winter months. Alluding to some of the underlying problems that remained and were impeding rapid progress he made a point of singling out what must have been fairly widespread despondency or lack of true enthusiasm for the program, particularly as it had developed in 1956. The achievements in that year he said 'exceeded those of any single year after liberation'.

Then he moved on to the subject that was probably uppermost in his mind: decentralisation and the allied problem of lower-level inexpertise and lethargy. Local initiative must be freed from its trammels but

‘it should be noted that when some authority is shifted to lower levels, new contradictions may emerge and therefore greater attention to strengthening planning and coordination is required . . . There must also be vigorous retrenchment—to overcome subjectivism and bureaucracy [and to create] a whole army of steeled functionaries who are devoted to the cause of Communism and can weather storms . . .’.<sup>35</sup>

This speech quite unequivocally pointed the way to the Great Leap Forward. It showed where the impediments were, it described how they could be overcome, it also pointed out the potential dangers. The line adopted seems to have had considerable relevance to China’s fundamental agricultural problems, and in this respect to have been completely realistic. But it overlooked one basic factor, and for this only idealistic impatience can be an excuse. In a society such as China at that time when there was still illiteracy, when the vast majority of the peasants were very largely uneducated, and more importantly when most of the rural cadres were insufficiently educated, a program such as this was by definition bound to fail. This judgment is of course made with the benefit of hindsight, but the Party leaders seemed oblivious of the fact that once a climate of mass receptiveness had been created, such as they clearly intended, given the basic weaknesses described above a great leap would follow but in an uncontrolled manner and with potentially disastrous results.

Internationally 1957 was also a year of tremendous consequences. One of the first indications that this was so was the visit to China of Voroshilov in April and May, during which he is said to have invited Mao to visit the Soviet Union and been accepted. This, as we shall see, was related to the international communist meeting in Moscow in November. Shortly after Voroshilov arrived, Radio Peking broadcast a report extolling Soviet aid to the socialist countries and also referred to the solution of all immediate problems as a result of the recent talks between the Soviet Union and the socialist countries. *NCNA* also referred approvingly to the significance of Soviet aid to China’s industrialisation program, and to

the enormous industrial might of the Soviet Union. *People's Daily*, after the conclusion of Voroshilov's visit, stated that 'Equipped with the most up-to-date weapons in the world, the Soviet defence forces have struck the imperialists with dismay'.<sup>36</sup> It is likely, therefore, that his visit was somehow connected with the Sino-Soviet agreement on new technology for national defence which was signed on 15 October.<sup>37</sup> The Chinese seem to have been concerned by the fact that they would not for some time have a nuclear weapons capability. We do not know how much assistance the Russians promised or the degree of reluctance or apprehension that there may have been on the part of the Soviet leaders in this respect. It would have been good tactics to agree to help the Chinese, just before sitting down to thrash out an international communist strategy which involved differing interpretations and by no means unified specific national interests. In the event Mao went to Moscow with a grand entourage on 2 November. His Minister of Defence was already there, and was to be joined by a military mission a few days later.

The Moscow meeting of communist parties has been dealt with in detail by a large number of writers, so it is not intended to present a full account of it here. In brief it was devoted to the subject of achieving a degree of cohesiveness or unanimity in the international movement: a task in which it failed. The major issues debated were those which very broadly concerned the question of who was to lead revolution, what constituted revolution (was it to be peaceful or otherwise), and the method by which socialism was to be defended against its internal and external foes. Though this was not to be spelled out till later, and even then only in an indirect manner, the crux of the problem was the question of accommodating national interests of socialist states, particularly of China and the Soviet Union, to the theoretical requirements of Marxism-Leninism. At the meeting there was undoubtedly much heated debate between Khrushchev, who had a few months before consolidated his own position of power in the CPSU, and the Chinese. Mao's personal role in all this is not clear, but certainly the Chinese case would have been very strongly influenced by his views. It was during this time in any case that he put forward his assessment that the strength of the world anti-imperialist camp had surpassed that of the imperialists.

This was not a brilliantly new assessment: Mao had said as much many years before.<sup>38</sup> But his turning it into a new eye-catching slogan, the East Wind prevailing over the West Wind, seemed to suggest that in 1957 Mao saw a fundamental change in the international balance of power. He might have done, after hearing of the Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile of August and the earth satellite of October. This indeed was the overt basis of subsequent Chinese statements on the subject; but in fact the Chinese saw these Soviet achievements as indicating that they had surpassed the imperialists only in certain respects. As the *People's Daily* put it on 25 November, it was not so much the Soviet Union alone which had surpassed the imperialists but the whole socialist camp, headed by the Soviet Union, which had overtaken the United States 'in popular support, in population and in a number of most important scientific and technological fields'. Though the latter factor clearly derived from the missile and satellite successes, what gave the socialist camp its overall superiority was the justice of its cause, the people's support, and political strength.

Far from being evidence of having been overwhelmed by the Soviet achievements, the Chinese view was that one should not be swept overboard by these but should put them into perspective; and the perspective suggested was Mao's, it was historical. The atom bomb was a Paper Tiger, he had many years ago said, so presumably must the Soviet achievements be regarded. The dominant East Wind was what one should emphasise; this was the irresistibility of 'the anti-imperialist revolutionary force of the proletariat and oppressed people of Asia, Africa and Latin America: whereas the West Wind represents decayed imperialism and all other reactionary forces'.<sup>39</sup> In a *Ta Kung Pao* article in mid-December Mao was said to have concluded, when talking to Chinese students in Moscow, that 'The Socialist camp must have a head, and this is the Soviet Union. The Communist Parties and Workers Parties of the different countries of the world must also have a head, and this is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union'.<sup>40</sup> Mao was of course speaking in the context of the aftermath of de-Stalinisation and the stresses and strains thereby brought about in the international communist movement. It may not be too much to suggest that he had other things at the back of his mind. It is possible, and later developments certainly indicate that this was so, that Mao was concerned at that time both with the tactical necessity of strengthening socialist unity and with

the strategic importance of establishing in the minds of the leaders of the international communist movement the impossibility of achieving success without strong centralised leadership. Thus the camp of socialist states had to be led by the state of the Soviet Union, and the world parties had to be led by the CPSU. The legitimacy of the two-fold leadership rested upon the single assumption that the CPSU was the foremost true Marxist-Leninist party. When the Chinese re-classified the CPSU as a party falling under the control of revisionists and betrayers of the cause of Marxism-Leninism, and many communists throughout the world accepted this re-classification, it followed logically that the Soviet Union automatically lost its status of the leader of the socialist camp and the CPSU no longer could lead the world parties. Hence the tactics demanded that the Chinese first attack the assumption of ideological purity; the strategic aim was probably at first to challenge the legitimacy of the Soviet Union's party and state leadership roles. China being the next most powerful state in the camp, and the only true Marxist-Leninist party, the legitimacy of the succession was guaranteed. This, then, is the possible explanation for Mao's actions in November 1957.

In the meantime the Chinese took a series of organisational steps to improve their capabilities in regard to Soviet and East European affairs. Principal among these was the appointment of two new vice-ministers of foreign affairs. One of the existing vice-ministers, Chi P'eng-fei, had been in charge of the work of the Soviet Union and East European Department. Some time before the beginning of June, the Foreign Ministry decided to appoint a new ambassador to East Germany. Two months later the retiring ambassador returned to Peking; he was Tseng Yung-ch'uan, and it was he who became one of the new vice-ministers. From what is known of the subsequent activities of both Chi and Tseng they worked in harness until the end of 1958 largely on Soviet and East European affairs, though there was an interesting development of Chinese thinking on such matters early in this period. The other new vice-minister was Lo Kuei-po, who had spent a number of years as ambassador to North Vietnam. This too was a significant change for, despite only fragmentary knowledge of Lo's activities, both earlier and more recently, he seems to have been the foreign ministry's principal specialist on Vietnamese affairs. His new appointment was officially made on 18 October, though it was not announced till 10 December; his replacement

was assistant minister Ho Wei, who had in the past specialised in European communist affairs. The reason for bringing Lo into the ministry in Peking appears to have been the need to adjust to a changed situation in Vietnam. One of the first signs of this was the increased interest being evinced by the United States in Vietnamese affairs, which by the spring of 1957 had led to the visit of Ngo Dinh Diem to America. This had been followed by the establishment of a US military mission in South Vietnam. Earlier, in April, Hanoi seems to have sensed that the situation was changing and probably as a consequence appointed a new ambassador to China. At about the same time new ambassadors were appointed to the Soviet Union and to other communist states. It is clear that all these changes were co-ordinated, and that the appointment of Lo to the foreign ministry was a related move.

Finally it must be pointed out that there is a possibility that Chen Yi may have become the *de facto* Minister of Foreign Affairs as early as April or May 1957. He was officially released from the position he held in the Scientific Planning Commission in May 1957 which, from the evidence we have of such affairs, suggests he was being freed to take up other duties. His actual appointment to the Foreign Ministry came officially only in February 1958 when coincidentally the Scientific Commission in which he had served was also publicly abolished. The significance of this lies in the fact that, if the change did occur early in 1957, it was well timed to fit in with the subsequent vice-ministerial appointments. Ch'en had long played a role in foreign affairs; his formal or full-time replacement of Chou En-lai was affected to release Chou, the Premier, for the onerous task of organising the overall governmental effort in a period of national upsurge. This was the Great Leap Forward, an event as striking in its concept as it was in its failure.<sup>41</sup> As we have seen, there are grounds for suspecting that the Leap was planned originally in 1956, that it should have taken place in 1957, and that its direct antecedents are to be traced to the autumn of 1957.<sup>42</sup> However, Chou En-lai, considerably after the event, implies that the 1956 date was not the beginning and that the Leap could only have taken place after the completion of the First Five Year Plan at the end of 1957.<sup>43</sup> Be that as it may *People's Daily*, in its New Year message to the nation, made it clear that 1958 was to be a memorable year. 'The rectification campaign', it said 'will bring a lively political

situation . . . and stimulate the energetic initiative of the people as never before. It will unleash an immense tide of growth in industry, agriculture and all other constructive work'. This campaign was to be completed before May, which as it turned out saw the convening of the second session of the Eighth Congress and the overt launching of the Leap. The editorial further pointed out significantly that the completion of the building of socialism might be expected in ten to fifteen years time if all went well.<sup>44</sup> A little over a month later the Chairman of the State Economic Commission stated that the rural areas had received adequate education through the rectification and anti-rightist campaigns to make a new forward leap possible.<sup>45</sup> Thus the stage was set, as it probably had been mapped out at high-level Party meetings in the winter,<sup>46</sup> for the great new development.

The second session of the Eighth Party Congress sat from 5-23 May; its main purpose was to unveil the new Leap. In the opening address to the Congress Liu Shao-ch'i spoke of the 'current mighty leap forward' whose ultimate motivation was Mao's call, in December 1955, for speedier results. He noted that despite the tremendous successes of 1956 there had been some marginal errors which had been magnified by the Party's critics, and that this had dampened the enthusiasm of the masses. The Third Plenum in late 1957 had set the course straight again and this had led to the present upsurge. He warned that 1958 was to be the first of three years of hard struggle but that with mass activism and hard work the future was bright. As Lenin had said, quoted Liu, this was 'The actual beginning of Communism'.<sup>47</sup> This reference to the beginnings of communism, one which was repeated later particularly in the context of the communes, and in the light of the views expressed on the subject by the *People's Daily* on 1 January, is of tremendous theoretical significance. If the Russians could have forgiven the Chinese for everything else they could not and did not forgive them for this ideological claim; in the event Khrushchev only announced his own program for building communism some time later.<sup>48</sup>

The enthusiasm was great, but it was not solely confined to somewhat hazy ideological matters. It had concrete effects on the whole of society. What no one had done before in history the Chinese people would now do. The peasants would create their own new farming implements, their own advanced seeds and sowing methods. The lower levels would conjure up finance that the

state could not or would not provide. Eventually great new socio-economic organisations, the people's communes, would sprout communistically over the country, abolishing private property and doing away with all want. Industry too would create its own talent and wealth. The whole country would turn into one backyard furnace fed by myriad backyard coal mines and belching out steel in immeasurable quantities. All this is well enough known and needs no amplification; but the very essence of the program was, for that time at least, impracticable. The theory may have been correct and could in many respects offer a future solution to China's fundamental problems, but applied then there was no hope whatsoever of its succeeding. An example of how this great enthusiasm, this enormous upsurge of nationalistic fervour, was applied to military matters is indicative of both the potentiality and efficacy, and of the limitations, of the underlying theory.

During the Leap the PLA was instructed by Mao to re-write its training manuals; hitherto there had been a 'superstitious' reliance on foreign military experience.<sup>49</sup> The reference here was presumably largely to Soviet experience, as the PLA had from the mid-1950s been modelled on the military lines of the Soviet Union. Why it was felt necessary at this time to emphasise Chinese experience is not certain; it may have been because of the growing ideological struggle with the Soviet Union, or it may have been solely because of the generally more exhilarated climate of the period. There certainly were a large number of articles in the overt Chinese press from early in 1958 on the problem of arriving at the correct military line. In general the theme was that of stressing political control of the armed forces, of discounting the role of nuclear weapons and of building up the militia. One theme that appeared in a number of articles concerned the correct method of learning from the Soviet Union: this had to be selective and based, understandably, on its applicability to Chinese conditions. Central to most of these articles, if only implicitly, was the question of the advisability of relying on the Soviet nuclear deterrent. This also involved the problem of assessing the threat to China from the nuclear capability of the United States. Part of the reason for this debate must have been the knowledge the Chinese had just gained of their own distant ability to produce nuclear weapons and of their nakedness in this respect.<sup>50</sup> It was consequently necessary to create a suitable public opinion, as Mao would have said, to

show that 'the Western countries . . . are backward. True they have something in their hands—some iron and steel and atomic bombs, but politically they are corrupt and backward'.<sup>51</sup> On the one hand, therefore, China should protect itself; on the other she would have to rely on the Soviet Union.

What relation all this had to the Taiwan Straits crisis in the late summer, or on Su Yu's dismissal as Chief of Staff which was announced in October, is by no means clear. Without any of the vital facts concerning the latter it would be misleading to speculate. As to the former it is perhaps sufficient in the present context to point out that the late summer was hardly an appropriate time to launch an attack against the offshore islands in view of the occurrence of typhoons at that time of year. The increase in tension may have been concocted deliberately for some other domestic reason, possibly connected in some as yet unexplainable manner with a Leap Forward-motivated upheaval in the PLA. The problem is further obscured by United States and Soviet reactions to the threat of hostilities in the Taiwan Straits area. Khrushchev rushed to Peking on 3 August where, according to a Cultural Revolution source of unknown reliability, he is alleged to have proposed some sort of Sino-Soviet joint action in order to bring the Peking régime under control. When this was rejected and when the danger had passed he meaninglessly warned the United States not to attack China. In sum it is possible that the great military debate, the removal of Su Yu, the massive militia campaign and the Taiwan Straits 'crisis', were all part of the Great Leap Forward and of the evolving struggle with the CPSU, and were thus but little related to purely military affairs.

By October there were clear signs of severe strain in the economy, and the régime's information media were calling for strict control over the utilisation of manpower resources particularly in agriculture. It was not surprising that the leaders decided that it was time to make a thoroughgoing analysis of the situation. To that effect, in November, two high-level party conferences were held in central China which lasted a fortnight. These were followed, from 28 November to 10 December, by the Sixth Plenum. The main items on the agenda were: a somewhat less optimistic assessment of both the ideological and practical potentialities of the agricultural communes, and their 'consolidation'; a re-examination of the overall plan for economic development, with the ideologically-masked implication that all

had not gone as well as expected; and lastly, Mao's statement that though he would retain his Party chairmanship he would relinquish that of the state in order to be able to devote time to more important matters. The plenum also passed measures to improve finance and trade administration in the rural areas and discussed the international situation. In general, then, the prospects were not too bright. There had been plenty of zeal, but communism was not just round the corner, nor was the solution to all China's practical problems. This plenum clearly marked the beginning of the great retreat and no refutation of the fact at that time could, as it turned out, prove the contrary.<sup>52</sup>

In the plenum's discussion of international affairs there was little of great significance. It noted that, as dogma required, the imperialist camp was gradually disintegrating. It did up-grade, in a sense, the role of peoples' struggles in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, making particular mention of the fact that the unity of these peoples would ultimately force us imperialism to withdraw from the area. Finally it commended the CPSU's 'lofty aspirations' for its program of constructing Communism, and re-affirmed the general correctness of the policy of peaceful coexistence.

Nineteen fifty-eight was a period of considerable change in the institutions of foreign policy. A new foreign minister had been appointed sometime in 1957 or by the beginning of the next year. There was also a change of some ideological significance in the geographical departments. It has been seen that from mid-1957 two vice-ministers acted in parallel concerning the Soviet Union and East European Department. By April the next year it was revealed that this department had been expanded and been renamed the Socialist States Department, and that North Vietnam, North Korea, and Mongolia had been added to it. It thus appears that the reorganisation may have been decided upon in principle when the appointment of the new vice-minister concerned with European communist affairs had been thought of, and that it followed the advocacy by Mao at the time of the international communist meeting in Moscow of the necessity of having the Soviet Union as the head of the socialist camp. The actual date of this reorganisation seems to have come between 21 March and 2 April,<sup>53</sup> though it must be stressed that this is tentative and that in any case it had been decided upon probably in 1957. The other newly appointed vice-minister, Lo Kuei-po, seemed to have a variety of interests. It is likely that the main one concerned

Vietnam and that in addition he started taking over Chang Han-fu's West European responsibilities.<sup>54</sup>

The beginning of the year, moreover, saw the holding of a series of State Council meetings at which a number of institutional measures were finalised; once more it is probable that these had been decided upon in principle by the Party in 1957. Among the most important of these measures was the creation of a State Council Commission for Cultural Relations with foreign countries, and the appointment of its vice-chairmen and members in February and March. The creation of this commission was intended primarily to strengthen the effort of influencing the non-communist world. Together with the Ministry of Foreign Trade, which had by this time set up another department specially orientated to the underdeveloped world, the new cultural commission formed an integral part of the foreign affairs establishment. The general organisational trend was one of expansion and specialisation, with increasing emphasis being given to Asia, Africa and Latin America.

At the end of the year when domestic developments started to slow down there came another important institutional change in the field of foreign relations. This was not a retrenchment, as one might possibly have thought. It constituted a practical reflection of the by then established strategic and ideological re-alignment. Thus in December the Socialist States Department was abolished: the greater part of this became once more the Soviet Union and East European Department. The Asian Department, as in 1955, was split to form the First and Second Departments. The area division between these new Asian Departments became clear almost immediately. The Asian communist states of Vietnam, Korea, and Mongolia, which had for a time been included in the Socialist States Department, now formed the basis of the Second Asian Department, to which was added Cambodia and, later, Laos, indicating that China had reverted to its early view of its Asian communist neighbours and was thinking of Cambodia and Laos in the context of the old French colony of Indo-China. The First Asian Department, for its part, was concerned with the rest of South-east Asia and the Indian subcontinental group of states. Whether or not Japan was included in this department's area of responsibility is not entirely clear though it seems likely that it was. The date of the actual reorganisation is of interest. It appears to have occurred between 8-18 December,<sup>55</sup> although the decision

may have been taken some time previously. Consequently, there seems to have been a close connection between the foreign policy or institutional changes and the Party's changing domestic attitudes which originated in all probability in the high-level meetings of November, and culminated with the close of the Sixth Plenum on 10 December. In sum the view apparently held in the second half of 1957 and through most of 1958, which was of extreme enthusiasm and largely domestically-derived, and which saw possibilities of significantly expanding China's role both in the communist and non-communist world, became much more sober by December 1958. The change in attitude was caused almost wholly by internal Chinese developments; in short by the economic failures of the Great Leap Forward. These failures and the resultant politico-economic crisis were without a doubt the one vital concern of the Chinese leaders for some years to come. It became transparently clear by the time of the Chengchow Party conference in February 1959, very much more obvious than it had been the previous December, that stringent remedial measures were imperative.<sup>56</sup> Overtly the principal remedy at this time was the de-emphasis of the ideological, sociological, and economic pretensions of the Leap Forward agricultural communes. Thus the commune no longer was the organisation which was to own and control everything within its parish; ownership and, to a lesser degree, production control were shared between the three levels of the commune, its production brigades and their teams. In other words, though this may not have been the precise intention at the time, the historical peasant household survived the Maoist cataclysm and for years to come was to be retained as the cornerstone of production.

If the Party was on the retreat not everyone muted his tones. The PLA, which as we shall see was to become involved in the national post-Leap reappraisal, announced at the beginning of February that the vast majority of its cadres would need university or college education in the next ten years because of the requirements of modernisation.<sup>57</sup> Such optimism was not long to last. T'an Chen-lin, who had since the Leap become the Politburo's principal spokesman on rural affairs, wrote a major article in *Red Flag* on 16 February. He said:

'After one year's bitter struggle, which resulted in a great triumph, and following a short period of rest, the peasants

throughout the nation have once again plunged themselves into a new struggle. Another hightide of agricultural production on a scale even greater than in 1958 will soon permeate the whole country'.

He went on to depict in glowing and ideologically acceptable terms the way in which the Party and the masses were to achieve their economic successes. But between the accentuated phrases of triumphant confidence there was still, here and there, a discordant note of warning. He noted, for example, the unexplained inadequacy of farm labour and the consequent need to increase greatly the productivity of the already overworked peasants. He noted, even more significantly as it turned out, that natural disasters in 1958 had struck a quarter of the total cultivated area and that a quarter of the affected land had been 'literally ruined'. Moreover, he continued, 'there are already indications of drought', and in addition warned with extraordinary meteorological foresight: 'It is not unlikely that there will be as serious a flood or drought disaster this year as in the last year'. Finally he referred to the sceptics, tide-watchers, and 'accounting-cliques' who were critical of and were impeding the Great Leap.<sup>58</sup> This last theme was subsequently expounded and expanded upon by the régime's propaganda media when it became finally clear that there was no escaping an economic debacle of frightening proportions.

In the same issue of *Red Flag* another member of the Politburo wrote on the question of taking the country as a single entity, of subordinating partial local interests to the requirements of national interest. The burden of his argument was that of concentrating national resources on tasks of high priority, under centralised leadership, without at the same time dampening local initiative. This article, and others on the same theme, was a direct logical derivative of the philosophy of the Sixth Plenum; despite the ideological trimmings it really had nothing at all to do with leaping forward but was designed to ensure centralised control of a deteriorating situation by the national government. In view of the serious trend of developments the Politburo met once more, probably towards the end of March, to consider its next moves; it may well have been in almost continual session from February to early April. Another plenum of the Party was held from 2-5 April to enact the decisions of the Politburo. What was discussed at both these meetings we do not know except that methods of

work, communal reorganisation, and a short-range economic plan were apparently considered. It is also known that they considered personnel questions; and subsequently, in some cases only after a number of years, it has become clear that a very extensive and highly significant reorganisation of the Party and government must have been decided in the spring.

The Great Leap had also affected the PLA; in proportion to the economic disruption so was it necessary to re-examine the principal weapon of the proletarian dictatorship. When the full effects of the Leap's failures were felt in the nation, particularly in the rural areas, the masses of peasant soldiers were likewise hard hit, though primarily indirectly through parents and relatives. This was to become an acute political problem with potentially grave consequences for the security of the régime. At this time, that is in 1959, the problems were much less acute. During the Leap the armed forces had generally been used by the régime as an economic or labour supplement, with the result that they were exhausted and in low spirits. A further consequence of the Leap had been the low priority given not only to general military matters but in particular to the maintenance and provision of military supplies and equipment. In addition the régime doubtless was aware of Soviet disapproval of the Leap and concern at the underlying motives and future plans of the Chinese. There was therefore reason for the Chinese to believe that it might not perhaps be too long before an adverse reaction set in. Taking all this into consideration it is not surprising that a leading regional officer had some fairly significant things to say on questions of military leadership when he wrote an article in the military magazine in the middle of the year. He said:

'In military training we must consider the possible trend of a future war, and, what is more important, the conditions of our industry as they bear to the equipment of our army . . . we must promote the principle of fighting the war with the equipment we have readily available and according to the kind of enemy, the locality and time. In our present work, we must promote not only relatively long-range planning, but have our task on a practical and sound foundation . . .'.<sup>59</sup>

A month later, on the question of utilising the army for economic work, General Hsiao Hua strongly condemned those

who had opposed such a practice. The army in times of peace had a clear duty to support national construction even if its prime role was that of preparing for war.<sup>60</sup> Hsiao's purpose here is not clear; he seems in fact to be cautioning against excessive use of the military forces in massive civilian construction tasks. On the tenth anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic the newly appointed Minister of Defence, Lin Piao, wrote a long article on the Party's general line and on the military thoughts of Mao. This was published shortly after the Eighth Plenum which officially removed Lin's predecessor from office. Consequently the article was largely concerned with proving how correct the Party had all along been in everything and how wicked had been its justly-punished critics. In addition it strongly attacked fetishes concerning modern weapons and technology, and those who decried the value of man. Such people, said the author, take the view:

'That modern warfare is a war of technique, of steel and machinery, and that in the face of these things, man's role has to be relegated to a secondary place. They attach importance only to machinery and want to turn revolutionary soldiers into robots without revolutionary initiative. Contrary to these people, we believe that although equipment and technique are important, the human factor is even more important . . . What we have to consider constantly is how to mobilise all positive factors still better and bring the initiative of the masses of officers and men into full play'.<sup>61</sup>

The message is quite clear; it is a derivative both of Mao's Paper Tiger thesis, which years earlier had belittled the significance of the United States' nuclear might, and of the East Wind thesis. It also had relevance to the prevailing 1959 view on the need to affirm the correctness of the Great Leap and to underwrite the measures being taken to mitigate its theoretically non-existent harmful effects. It said that, despite the apparent might of the United States, and of the Soviet Union, and despite the apparent weakness of China made even worse by the failure of the Great Leap, the nation as a whole and the PLA in particular must seek beyond transient-seeming fact. Positive factors must be sought. In what manner could China be said to be strong? Surely the answer must be in the largeness of its population and in its

national and revolutionary fervour. The theory that man is the master of techniques and weapons thus provided the sought-for positive factor.

The Eighth Plenum was convened on 2 August and closed a fortnight later. Earlier the Politburo had sat in lengthy session to discuss the failure of the Leap and related problems, among which was the question of dealing with the so-called anti-Party group of P'eng Te-huai, his Chief-of-Staff, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Chang Wen-t'ien, and others. As I have argued elsewhere,<sup>62</sup> it seems likely that the leading members of this group were acted against and, in so far as this was necessary, removed from their *de facto* positions of power a few months before they were dealt with by the Politburo. In any case what concerns us here is the way in which the purge was made to conform to and assist the general trend of thought in the aftermath of the Leap's failure, and the manner in which it was utilised to pursue the dispute with Khrushchev. Both the plenum's Communiqué and its Resolution were largely concerned with putting the case for opposing the Party's critics at home and abroad.<sup>63</sup> In the latter document, and according to many of the more recent Cultural Revolution revelations, it is alleged that efforts were made to influence unfirm elements in the Party's ranks. In this respect P'eng Te-huai was said to have colluded with Khrushchev; which though perhaps not strictly true was probably a useful thing to say. The dismissal of Chang Wen-t'ien, who had until the summer of 1959 been the senior vice-minister of foreign affairs and the principal specialist in Soviet affairs, shows the obvious direction of the CCP's campaign. The reference in *People's Daily* and other publications to the 'spokesmen' of the imperialists who had vilified the Chinese leadership is further evidence of the Chinese intention to point the finger at the Soviet Union, and followed Khrushchev's open attack against the communes in July.

China was clearly on the defensive. This was apparent before the Plenum, made more clear by the Plenum when it revised the economic target figures downwards, and thoroughly documented by the press after it had concluded. When problems of such a magnitude occur the measures taken to deal with them must be commensurately vigorous, and scapegoats must be found. As we have seen P'eng and his group became, though only by implication, the principal examples of the large number of domestic doubters, critics, and reactionaries. The opposition abroad also

played a useful role: nationalism brooks foreign scorn no less well than it does outside interference. But outside events were in any case tending to follow a course displeasing to the Chinese; a course which, though having its independent existence and impetus, nevertheless was only fully understandable to the Chinese leaders in the context of domestic developments. In the first case there was the problem of relations with India and Soviet attitudes to these. China had been faced with an armed uprising in Tibet early in the year which, as it coincided with the political and economic stresses of the post-Leap period, assumed an importance out of all proportion to the number of Tibetans involved. This, together with the relative inaccessibility of the region and its geographical and ethnic ties with its southern neighbours, compounded China's problems. It was not only a question of regaining lost 'face' both in and outside China, what was worse was Indian support for the rebels and exiles, however indirect and humanitarian this may have been.

Even more disturbing to the Chinese were the subsequent clashes between the PLA and the Indian army and the refusal of Khrushchev to apportion the blame entirely to the Indians. This was a sin against Marxist-Leninist ethics for, by such definition, the Chinese cause was totally just. This sin the Chinese never forgave Khrushchev. The second external development that must have very seriously worried the Peking leaders, though it may well have been foreseen in a vague way, was Khrushchev's flirtation with the Americans in September on the occasion of the Camp David talks. The first overt Chinese reaction came in a *People's Daily* commentary on 29 September; this was on the face of it one of pleasure, but beneath the surface it was not hard to discern a more real concern and displeasure. The next day Khrushchev flew into Peking where he is alleged to have criticised Chinese bellicosity and certainly cautioned against testing the strength of us imperialism with force. The Chinese seem to have been thoroughly disturbed by the Camp David talks, and described them in vitriolic terms for many months to come. The talks, whatever they really denoted to Peking, did not equate to a re-assurance in perpetuity of China's ability to rely on its old strategic prop: the fundamental antagonism of the Soviet Union and the United States. Taken together, the materialisation of Sino-Indian hostility, Soviet ambiguity in this regard, the real if distant possibility of a Russo-American détente, and all in the context of the failure of

the Great Leap, this added up to a requirement to conduct a thorough re-examination of China's long-term strategic possibilities as soon as the domestic crisis permitted this to be done.

The institutional arrangements which were made at this time were comparatively sweeping. They can be divided chronologically into two categories. In the first was the dismissal of the senior vice-minister of foreign affairs, Chang Wen-t'ien. Chang had been sent to attend a meeting of the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers in late April. After his return he continued to attend public functions in an apparently unchanged manner throughout May and the beginning of June. He then dropped out of sight and by mid-June or early July was probably under criticism. He was subsequently officially dismissed. The official reason for his dismissal has not been revealed; it is possible that he may have been slow in reacting to the deterioration in Sino-Soviet friendship; he may even have been genuinely pro-Soviet to an unnecessarily high degree. In any case his background of work in Soviet affairs suggests that his dismissal was meant to be a public sign of a change in Chinese policy towards the Soviet Union. He was replaced as senior vice-minister by Chang Han-fu.

In the second category was the dismissal of vice-minister Wang Chia-hsiang and the eventual addition of a new vice-minister, Keng Piao. Wang's case is confused by the fact that he had been acting exclusively in a Party role; that is, he seems to have been the ministry's official liaison man with the international communist movement. His more important post may well have been in the CCP Liaison Department, and as we do not know when he ceased to function in that capacity it is consequently impossible to tell exactly when he was disgraced. As he continued to make public appearances at Party functions for a short time after being relieved of his vice-ministerial post it can be assumed that his fall did not come till about the end of September or beginning of October.

The new vice-minister, Keng Piao, was not officially appointed till 7 January 1960, when he was relieved as ambassador to Pakistan. In fact, however, his replacement was announced at the end of December, and it is likely that the change had been decided some time before that. This supposition is quite a logical one; it is further supported by the fact that as Chang Han-fu had been acting senior vice-minister since the early summer<sup>64</sup> it was necessary to appoint someone to supervise the Asian and African

departments in his place. Initially this was Tseng Yung-ch'uan and Chi P'eng-fei who from about early June acted for Chang in Afro-Asian matters. After Keng Piao's appointment it became clear that he was to be Chang's permanent replacement in this respect. It is therefore likely that the need to make several new appointments was obvious in the summer and that, though this may not have been finalised till some time later, the appointment of Keng was probably arranged in principle by the autumn. At the close of the year there were five vice-ministers: Chang Han-fu, senior; Lo Kuei-po, West European and Vietnam; Chi P'eng-fei, Second Asian; Tseng Yung-ch'uan, Soviet and East European; and Keng Piao, First Asian and West Asia-African.

Widespread though these changes had been they did not constitute part of a strategic re-examination. Foreign policy was as ever the handmaiden of the domestic taskmaster, now more compelling in seeking to protect the nation's interests in these difficult times. Much concerning China's international relationships during this period, and particularly in 1960, is explainable in strictly Chinese domestic terms. The leadership's attitudes to the international conference of communist parties in Moscow, as to the dispute with the Soviet Union itself, must be seen in the context of internal Chinese affairs. Similarly explainable are the series of friendship treaties and border agreements concluded at this time. Much was the result of insecurity, manifesting itself as aggressiveness at times, of a CCP leadership suffering agonies of doubt and indecision. This is not to say that Chinese relationships with the world were solely governed by domestic pressures, obviously this is far from true; nevertheless China's own designs and her reactions to independent foreign developments were largely governed by her internal requirements, particularly during 1960.

I have analysed the principal events in the internal crisis in another study.<sup>65</sup> The details thus need not enter into this one. Broadly, the crisis had been looming for some time and had first been openly though very indirectly acknowledged at the end of 1958. Throughout 1959 the régime, while continuing on the surface to acclaim the wonders of the Great Leap, was endeavouring to control the deteriorating situation in a variety of ways. It seems to have concluded that it could no longer directly administer the whole nation as it had done, and consequently split the country into six tightly controlled regions which were meant to solve their own problems largely by means of their own resources.

The régime also, though very indirectly and only in so far as ideology permitted without extensive loss of face, amended or scrapped many of its more grandiose Leap Forward programs. Certainly 1959 was not another year of great upsurge, regardless of what was said to the contrary. These policy trends continued into 1960 and were significantly reinforced. The city dwellers, who were being badly affected by shortages of food and industrial raw materials, were formed into urban communes for improved social control; or this seems to have been the intention. The PLA reorganisation, which had started with the dismissal of both the Minister of Defence and the Chief of Staff in 1959, was further extended in the autumn and winter, and continued into 1960. The obvious aim of the régime was to ensure in the first place that the armed forces did not turn against it during the national crisis and in the second place to strive to regain more positive support.

Of additional and serious concern was the effectiveness and reliability of the militia, whose para-military role in the rural areas was that of establishing a presence as a reminder of the ultimate imperial authority and power. The militia in the worst-hit rural areas, were, however, unreliable. In some cases not only did they fail to prevent social disturbances but they actually caused them. Moreover, it was necessary to have an effective militia in case of an invasion, a possibility the Chinese leaders certainly did not discount in 1960. This necessity may also have been underlined by the knowledge the régime had of the intensifying Sino-Soviet dispute, and the probable effects this would have on military strategy and the indigenous armaments capability. The industrial and other economic disruptions caused by the failure compounded the problem.

Early in the year, therefore, the régime called a series of national militia conferences at which all such problems were probably aired. In his address to one of these in late April, Lin Piao explained the theoretical and overt position of the militia in relation to the general defence establishment. 'The imperialists are now doing their utmost to prepare for large-scale, guided-missile warfare', he said, making the dogmatic preface necessary, particularly in a period of domestic crisis. 'To deal with such a war, the most important thing for us to do is to mobilise and rely on the people to carry out people's war. We are Marxist-Leninists, we fully realise men are the decisive factor in war'.

Then, to complete the picture, he added, 'we also recognise the important role modern technology plays in war. We must therefore lose no time in vigorously improving the technical equipment of our forces and in strengthening the modernisation of our forces . . .'.<sup>66</sup> His speech clearly stressed the duality of military strategy; China might be attacked; if this happened soon the results would be disastrous unless the militia forces were strong and well organised, and above all respected by the people. In the meantime the régime would concentrate its efforts on shielding the armament and supply system of the PLA from the effects of the Leap Forward failure, and in the future strenuously implement the modernisation program.

Lin Piao's speech and other published references at the time are vividly expanded and precisely interpreted by the PLA's own classified material which later fell into the hands of the United States.<sup>67</sup> Probably the single most important document known to us is that circulated on a restricted basis by the military authorities and then distributed to civil agencies. It concerned the study and application of Mao's thoughts at all levels of society and with great intensity. The aim was to overcome defeatism and revisionism, and in so far as the PLA was concerned to build it into a thoroughly dependable 'red and expert' tool of the proletarian dictatorship. This document was to set the pattern for many subsequent developments of the greatest significance. In many ways it represented the prophetic prime document of the Cultural Revolution, which was to follow some years later.<sup>68</sup>

The Party leaders seem to have spent the better part of the year in touring calamity areas, in analysing both the underlying weaknesses and the specific resultant problems, in inspecting PLA units, and in sitting virtually in permanent session so as to be able to hold the nation together. For the first time since the country had become really consolidated, that is for the first time since 1953, no annual plenum of the Central Committee was held. When it finally sat in January the next year it had little to offer the people apart from vague statements of qualified optimism.

In the field of international relations there were two significant developments, both continuations from the previous year. The intensification of the dispute between the CCP and the CPSU was probably the more significant of the two developments. Once more, however, it must be pointed out that, as much has been written on such matters, only certain aspects not dealt with by

others or which have particular relevance to the present study will be touched on here.

It is probable that the Politburo was convened towards the end of March and that it discussed among other matters new tactics in the dispute with the CPSU. Not long after, Chinese propaganda media, both domestically and internationally, launched a series of articles to mark the occasion of the ninetieth anniversary of Lenin's birth. The Chinese were confined in their selection of the date of publication: the anniversary date could not be changed. But the event is still significant, as had they not considered it necessary in the first place to write the articles they would not have been published. Why they did this in any case is not entirely clear. Though the articles were innocently camouflaged their main purpose seems to have been to demonstrate the revisionist character of the CPSU leadership, particularly as this pertained to the question of opposition to imperialism. This much is clear. However, was their publication merely a logical extension of Chinese reaction to the spirit of Camp David, or did it have some other specific purpose not yet revealed? Perhaps it was prompted by an urgent hidden domestic requirement and related to the consequences of the Leap Forward failure. In any event that it was well-timed for external consumption cannot be doubted, for it preceded by two months an international communist meeting in Bucharest. The result was predictable, and one can well imagine the earthy epithets used by Khrushchev to describe the articles.

The Soviet counter-blast came on 21 June and the battle was joined with vigour at the Bucharest meeting a few days later. Very shortly afterwards the Soviet Union withdrew the large number of experts it had in China and is alleged to have taken this opportunity to remove considerable quantities of technical material and plans in order to sabotage the Chinese industrialisation program. The coincidence in timing is thus unambiguous. As I have suggested elsewhere,<sup>69</sup> however, Chinese industry was at that time, in early 1960, already very seriously disrupted and, though the Soviet withdrawal certainly hampered China's industrial progress, it is not improbable that the Chinese deliberately engineered a predictable Soviet response. They would thus have been able, as they certainly did subsequently, to attribute a large proportion of the blame for the industrial collapse to Soviet actions and thereby escape more thorough criticism from the masses for the original policy weaknesses. A further point must be made:

Soviet aid had already achieved much. When the Russians withdrew they left behind them a fund of knowledge and a large pool of understudies, not all of whom were by any standards incompetent. They also probably left behind, unknowingly, a mine of technical data which it is reasonable to assume the Chinese had in many cases surreptitiously extracted from them and copied.

According to untested Cultural Revolution sources the next stage in the battle occurred in September when China replied to Khrushchev's attacks of June, and when the Chinese vanguard of the November international conference went to Moscow. A good part of October was spent by the delegations from the eighty-one participating parties in drafting the requisite documents for the impending conference; in view of the seriousness of the debate between the CCP and CPSU it is not surprising that the preparatory work took so long. On 5 November Liu Shao-ch'i led a powerful delegation to Moscow. The conference resolved none of the outstanding ideological problems of the international movement: the statement issued by it at its conclusion was little more than an ill-assorted patchwork of, basically, Chinese and Soviet views. The international communist enemy, us imperialism, still lurked menacingly off stage but how to confront it had not been resolved. If revisionism was the main danger at the moment, dogmatism lagged not too far behind. Peaceful coexistence and the national liberation struggle remained a duality of contradictions. The whole yarn of the arduously contrived Statement was frayed before being knit together. This was to be the outstanding programmatic development of the century, and it certainly was. It became the compass by which to chart the course ahead and the fact that it pointed simultaneously both north and south or towards revisionism and dogmatism, depending on one's viewpoint, indicated the difficulty of the journey ahead.

Chinese good-neighbour diplomacy also developed significantly during the year. This was partly an extension of the earlier general trend which had manifested itself in its most acceptable form at Bandung. Throughout 1960 a number of agreements or treaties were concluded between China and Burma, Nepal, Mongolia, and Afghanistan. These vividly portrayed China as a nation to be trusted and relied upon. Their overt purpose was to reverse the state of affairs described above in which the smaller neighbours misunderstood if not feared China's intentions. Late

in 1960, also, the Chinese and Indians conducted a series of negotiations on the question of their mutual boundaries without, however, resolving the outstanding problems. This fact, and the war which was to break out between the two nations in 1962, in the context of the overall solution of border problems in 1960 and 1961, has suggested to some observers that the Chinese were engineering the isolation of India from other Asian states in preparation for the forthcoming war.

While this possibility cannot be dismissed, it fails to take into account several important factors. The most cogent of these is the fact that at the time when the Chinese were adopting their most reasonable attitude to their neighbours they were domestically in a most delicate political and economic position. It is no exaggeration to state that throughout 1960 and the first months of 1961 the Chinese communist system nearly collapsed. It thus seems highly probable that the prime motivation for concluding agreements with their neighbours was the earnest desire of the leadership to ensure as best they could that these neighbours were friendly or at least not hostile. One might also argue that this line of reasoning also applies to the negotiations held with the Indians; at least, at that time, it is probable that the Chinese did not wish to provoke them. This is not to deny that China recognised the need at some time or another to confront India on a range of subjects. Clearly the Chinese knew, as did probably the Indians, that relations between giants do not fall into the same category as relations between a giant and his puny neighbours, and that ultimately a serious clash of interests was possible. It is another thing to argue, though, that China had in 1960 decided to isolate India in the sense of preparing for war; she may have intended her other diplomatic efforts as a means of inducing the Indians to co-operate. The preparations for the military confrontation in 1962 appear to have been undertaken by China only in that year.

The dual nature of Chinese foreign policy in 1960 thus stands out remarkably. On the one hand hostility towards the Soviet Union and all who allied themselves with that country; on the other active friendship with most of neighbouring Asia. The psychological basis for this is classical. Insecurity breeds both aggressiveness and the fear of provoking aggression by others: the Chinese launched an ideological offensive against Soviet revisionism precisely when they were most peaceful towards Asia. In both

cases, however, the contradictory aspects of the external response can, it seems, be explained by the demands of the domestic crisis. Such was the intensity of the dominating influence of internal developments that everything became submerged in it; the institutions of the foreign affairs system, too, were affected and with one or two insignificant exceptions no structural or personnel changes were made during the whole of the year.

This period was characterised by introversion: policy, where this was discernible, seems to have been largely reactive. When in January 1961 the Ninth Plenum was convened, the first for over a year, it was remarkable for the fact that it appears to have originated little in the way of a positive program. According to official accounts the plenum discussed and approved the Moscow statement, felicitated the Chinese delegation led by Liu Shao-ch'i on its work, and called on the whole nation to abide by the decisions reached. It also heard and discussed details of the 1960 economic plan and the proposals for the current year. Understandably, in view of the propaganda nature of plenum statements, the Leap had continued in 1960 with great success. This is despite the fact that the agricultural targets had not been fulfilled 'because the country had suffered the most severe natural calamities in the century, following on the serious natural calamities of 1959'.<sup>70</sup> For a basically agricultural country this was tantamount to admitting to all and sundry that far from being a success the Leap had miserably failed. This is not to deny that the weather had been unfavourable, it had. However, the peasant masses, who are by no means fools and who had at the Party's behest turned themselves into hewers of coal and smelters of steel when they should have been tenders of plots, knew why 1960 had been the most calamitous in a hundred years. Politically, therefore, to the peasants, the admission must have come like a clap of thunder over a parched land. The communiqué of the plenum then passed on to the subject of the overwhelming support and confidence of the masses, noting nevertheless the opposition of the class enemies and the inadequacies of the well-intentioned, and the consequent need for a total rectification campaign. In conclusion, and almost by way of an afterthought, the communiqué stated that the Central Committee had decided to create six Party Bureaux, each comprising three or more provinces, to strengthen control over the lower levels. This was a remarkable statement to make in the

light of the almost certain knowledge that it had already been accomplished some months ago.<sup>71</sup>

Domestic economic policies changed but little from the pattern applied since the failure of the Leap. Both overt and classified information show that the régime was concerned with only one thing: economic rehabilitation, principally of the agricultural sector. The régime was not particularly worried about the niceties of ideological purity providing it obtained the required results. To this end the Party drew up a set of sixty regulations concerning rural work which heavily stressed material incentives, a set of seventy for industry, and another sixty for education. The total effect may not have been particularly pleasing to the doctrinaire communist, but it did get results, and that after two nerve-shattering years was all that counted.

Basically China pursued no new international line in 1961. Holding on to what she had, cementing old relationships and improving them where this was possible, maintaining the old necessary feuds; this seems to have been the main goal of her 1961 foreign policy, much as it had been the previous year. There was a marked improvement in relations with Indonesia, where overseas Chinese problems had in the past made it difficult to subordinate the interests of national ego to those of what probably appeared to be the more significant long-term possibilities of Sukarnoism and the Communist Party of Indonesia. Nepal, Burma, Cambodia, North Korea, and North Vietnam were all treated to continuing doses of friendship during the year. India was the sole Asian exception, though whether this was brought about by Indian actions against China in 1961 or was due to Chinese actions against India is not clear. Ostensibly at least China was reacting to Indian allegations of Chinese incursions into their territory, a charge they hotly denied. As the whole problem was confused by the fact that both sides claimed the same territory as their own, the origins of the border dispute, removed from the context of the aftermath of the Tibetan uprising, are lost in antiquity.

Of greater immediate concern to the Chinese was the problem of Laos, where the various groups had been in turmoil for some time. On 24 April the Soviet Union and United Kingdom had called for a ceasefire in the country and for a conference to discuss its problems. A *de facto* ceasefire was achieved by 3 May, followed in the middle of the month by the opening of an international

conference in Geneva. The Chinese attitude to this conference was made clear in March in a classified document where it was noted that: 'The most important condition for settling the Laotian question lies in the Laotian people themselves. Naturally international help and support are also very important . . . As manifested in military affairs, the enemy still occupies a fairly favourable position'. Translated, this meant that victory could be obtained only after prolonged political and military struggle by the Laotian communists, assisted by China and North Vietnam. Nevertheless, China did not rule out the possibility of holding a conference on the subject.<sup>72</sup>

In another classified document, put out shortly after the conference had started, there was a good description of how the Chinese saw United States strategy in South-east Asia, which thus provides an insight into China's own strategic concepts at that time. Laos occupied a strategic position, its control by the United States, added to South Vietnam and Thailand, would enable pressure to be brought to bear on the neutralist and friendly countries of Burma and Cambodia. Conversely communist control of Laos, or its tactical neutralisation, would have its strategic impact on Burma and Cambodia and thus ultimately on South Vietnam and Thailand. In a sense the Chinese were clearly thinking along the lines of an inverted 'domino theory'.<sup>73</sup> As to the conference itself the document asserted: 'during the first week, it was very obvious that the United States would not easily give up its policy of aggression and interference. Therefore, in the conference, with every step carefully planned in advance and the procuring of every success, a bitter fight must be waged with American imperialism'.<sup>74</sup> In the event the conference dragged on throughout the year and was not concluded to what appears to have been China's relative satisfaction until the next spring.

The struggle against Soviet revisionism also went on unabated throughout the year. As the Ninth Plenum resolution on the 1960 Moscow statement noted, the only really Marxist-Leninist policy to be adopted by the oppressed people was that of armed struggle against imperialism and colonialism. Though the great power of the socialist camp was a necessary element of this grand strategy, presumably as its existence countered the military might of the United States, 'the rise of the national democratic revolution is a great development' which China deemed it its internationalist obligation to support. War between states was not

necessarily the only method of achieving socialist revolution: 'Peace can be effectively safeguarded, provided there is reliance on struggle of the masses of the people and provided a broad united front is established and expanded against the policies of aggression and war of the imperialists, headed by the United States'.<sup>75</sup> Here the underlying polemics surface and become clear. The Soviet Union was showing signs of forsaking its internationalist obligation which the Chinese appear to have seen as being the provision of the principal military deterrent against us imperialism. China for her part was to continue to point the way to national democratic revolution by the oppressed Afro-Asians and Latin Americans and, it was hoped, provide the leadership. The role of the Soviet Union was therefore seen to have been static: it must not give up its deterrent role, but neither should it meddle in the affairs of the international liberation movement. This seems to be the implication of Chinese statements at this time, and later. As to the reference to the United Front, we shall examine this subsequently as a special topic. The broad framework of the great strategic struggle between China and the Soviet Union, which is a struggle of national interests and a projection of history, was clearly discernible. The varied and innumerable tactical details cannot be dealt with here; they do not in any case significantly affect the overall picture.

There were during the year few changes of note in the organisations of the foreign affairs system. The period was, from a methodological viewpoint, a difficult one to study as details concerning a number of the vice-ministers were obscured by the Geneva conference on Laos. The conference was the initial and probably only temporary reason for appointing a new vice-minister, Huang Chen. This man had been the ambassador to Indonesia until his appointment on 22 April; he left there at the end of the first week in May. As the senior vice-minister and Chi P'eng-fei were involved with the Geneva conference throughout its proceedings, much of their normal work fell on the shoulders of the other vice-ministers. Tseng Yung-ch'uan appears to have taken over some of Chang's duties as senior vice-minister from May. He nevertheless continued to oversee Soviet and East European affairs, and the diminished frequency of his public appearances in the latter part of the year and in 1962 are probably accounted for by pressures of work due to the intensification of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Lo Kuei-po also made only rare appear-

ances in 1961; it is likely that this was caused by his heavy involvement in problems related to the war in Vietnam and the Laotian situation. Keng Piao remained basically concerned with non-communist Asian affairs. Huang Chen, following his appointment, seems to have taken over Indonesia, and West Asian and African affairs, from Keng. These then are the principal changes in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1961. In addition, however, one geographical department head was replaced: as this relates to more important subsequent organisational moves it merits attention. Ch'en Shu-liang, who had long headed the Second Asian Department, was replaced by Chou Ch'iu-yeh at some time between 6 May and 22 July.<sup>76</sup> He was officially appointed ambassador to Cambodia in February the next year, when a large number of other ambassadorial appointments were also made.

---

## Chapter 3

# The Great Disharmony

---



THE régime maintained its emphasis on practical economics and general inoffensive politics in the early part of 1962. Ideology, except in the foreign context, was played in a minor key. Nevertheless January did constitute something of a turning point, being the occasion for an enlarged Central Committee conference. The main subject discussed was the manner in which the economy was to develop. It is quite possible that there was considerable controversy at this meeting and in the subsequent months. Party leadership seems to have been in a somewhat fluid state and it is not entirely clear whether Mao's views, in so far as these were coherent and positive, were wholly respected. There is no evidence to suggest that the leaders knew quite what to do about the internal situation, and one Party writer was still saying in June that they were at the crossroads where they should pause awhile and think. It is consequently likely that the leaders were only then beginning to formulate a few tentative ideas on future policy, ranging from moving ahead at a much faster pace to marking time and maintaining the 'low-posture'; they were certainly not in a position to act with resolution until the crop prospects were better known.

Before the Party was provided with this essential information, however, it was confronted with two unexpected and humiliating experiences. Coming together as they did the impact was intensified. In April there were mass exoduses of Chinese across the borders and into unfriendly lands: the first from Sinkiang into Soviet Central Asia, and the second from Kwangtung into Hong Kong. At one stroke revisionism and colonialism had scored a political victory of some magnitude, though by default. This blow could not be covered up, even by the over-used method of referring to natural calamities, and the Chinese people must have wondered accordingly. If the people in these two areas were hungry or, even worse, just did not like conditions in China, was there not cause to wonder? At the level of the leaders themselves the potential political repercussions could not have been overlooked; in addition, there was the question of the international

loss of face. This formed the backdrop to the Party conferences held in July and August, to add up the preliminary agricultural figures and make tentative plans for the future. The evidence suggests that even then the leaders did not know precisely what to do, and it was not until 20 September that the *People's Daily* gingerly let it be known that some increases over the 1961 agricultural yield were expected. It is probable that there was considerable debate at the Party conferences over the correct course to follow; it is furthermore possible that this period marked the beginning of a very tentative move towards the radicalism or heady optimism which was to follow later in the year.

It is odd that the mass exoduses from the north-west and south were not prevented, because surely they must have been largely preventable. Cultural Revolution sources offer some plausible suggestions as to why they were not, but these are not entirely satisfactory and leave the underlying questions unanswered. On balance it seems likely that the government in Peking was caught unawares, even if some local leaders were not. Coming as they did close to the Indian and Taiwan Straits crises, the exoduses are particularly significant. In April, for instance, China started its first-phase propaganda campaign on the subject of the Indian border at the same time as the Sinkiang exodus; it subsequently backdated India's anti-Chinese border activities to late 1961, though it claimed that the real trouble became evident only after April. Coincidentally it linked the Indian activities with those of the Nationalist military authorities in Taiwan: together they constituted, as expressed by Chinese propaganda, a co-ordinated military offensive against China. On the specific question of the threat from Taiwan the Chinese stated in late June that military preparations had begun on the island in March. United States sources make it clear that the Chinese started to rush considerable reinforcements to the southern coastal areas from about 11 June. A fortnight later, having completed their defensive preparations, the Chinese explicitly cautioned the United States not to use the Nationalists to impose war on China. The propaganda offensive against the Indians had not in the meantime slackened; on 9 July *People's Daily* warned them to rein in on the brink and to cease all provocative actions. Just over a week later the Chinese ambassador to Delhi was recalled: war seemed for a while to be not far off.

South-east Asia for its part was not being neglected. China had

been making advances towards some South-east Asian nations in 1961: in fact a large and well publicised military mission was sent to North Vietnam at the close of that year. The upheavals in Laos and the increasingly bitter war in Vietnam were clearly causing the Chinese some concern, and the overt mission to Hanoi was meant to remind everyone that China was not unmindful of her responsibilities and capabilities in that respect. Chinese propaganda media made much of the Baguio conference in mid-March, whose purpose they claimed was to extend us military influence via the mode of special warfare to South Vietnam and Laos. The magazine *Peking Review* during this period strongly emphasised the threat of us imperialism throughout the area and particularly in Vietnam, Thailand and Laos. The Geneva conference on Laos, which had recessed in January, resumed sessions at the beginning of July, by which time the contending Laotian factions had agreed to form a coalition government in order, hopefully, to bring peace to the country.

The Party conferences of July and August must therefore have devoted some time also to the discussion of international affairs, particularly as these concerned Asian developments and, probably by the end of August, the new initiatives of the Soviet Union. We are informed in this latter respect that the Chinese were told by the Soviet Union in August that an agreement would be sought with the United States on the prevention of nuclear proliferation. Though the reliability of this information is unknown it does not seem improbable. It is also of considerable interest to note how, suddenly, from the end of August, Chinese propaganda started to evince a new interest in Cuban affairs. As *Peking Review* put it at the time: 'It is noticeable that us armed provocations against Cuba have become more frequent recently'.<sup>1</sup> Taking everything together, it seems quite possible that the Chinese had decided, by about mid-July, to go onto the offensive in external matters. A reconstruction of the likely course of events would run as follows. The April exoduses had caused a loss of face externally and internally. In May and June the domestic situation was delicate and unhealthy, the prospects appeared grim; there was even genuine fear of being invaded by the Nationalists with the connivance of the United States and India. Immediate action was called for, particularly in the area of greatest concern, the southern coastal provinces. Having taken the necessary precautions there, attention was then turned to India. In mid-July the

Chinese ambassador was recalled and final preparations were made towards either achieving a very notable diplomatic success or if this could not be had then a military victory. While these plans were being implemented the Chinese learned of Soviet long-range intentions on the question of nuclear proliferation and, just possibly, of the beginning of suspicious Soviet military activities in Cuba.<sup>2</sup> In the meantime a solution to the Laotian problem had been found which, if not entirely to China's satisfaction, at least had temporarily removed the threat of US-backed SEATO intervention in Laos. As for Vietnam the people's struggles were being stepped up and the anti-communist tide was slowly being stemmed. By September, therefore, in view of the non-achievement of diplomatic success in relation to India and the concurrence of the other developments, it had become imperative for China to act.

Before the overt military campaign was launched against India, however, the Party had to be absolutely sure of the domestic situation. This would have involved not only the careful assessment of the general economic position and especially the agricultural prospects, but also politics. The proper occasion for such investigations was a plenary session of the Central Committee at which policy, if it is not made, is at least aired. The Tenth Plenum was therefore convened on 24 September and concluded three days later. As, only a few days before, the nation had been told that agricultural production had been better than in 1961, it is probable that the régime knew that the yield was reasonably satisfactory. Thus for Chinese conditions the overall economy was sound enough to permit an external venture.<sup>3</sup> This is an important point; for if the war with India was to turn out to be cheap to wage the régime could by no means have been certain, when the decision was taken to attack, that it would not escalate. Politically the plenum was the testing ground, in all probability, of the nation's ardour and of the Party's solidarity.

In addition, though this is far less certain, it may well have been the occasion for an attempt by Mao to reassert absolute control of the Party. He may not have had the prestige he felt he should have had at this time and consequently may have made an effort to regain this at the plenum. There is certainly no evidence of his absolute authority until after the success of the Indian war. While the plenum sat the régime announced that three Chinese border guards had been killed by the Indians. On 14 October the

Chinese once more and finally warned Nehru to rein in on the brink of disaster: six days later the PLA struck, and within a remarkably short time the Indian army had been routed. At just about the same time Khrushchev's adventure in Cuba collapsed and with considerable humiliation the Russians were forced to back down and withdraw their offensive weapons from the island.

The total impact of these developments on both the Chinese domestic scene and on the nation's international relations was immense. There can be no doubt at all that from that moment on, from the end of October, the Chinese moved very definitely onto the offensive. At home there must have been a general resurgence of national pride. Though we know little of such matters it is fair to assume that, whereas earlier in the year the nation's prestige was low, after the defeat of India the opposite was the case. Politically, in the Party particularly, Mao's personal position must have benefited considerably, for the PLA had been his chosen instrumentality. It is an established fact that the nation was told to emulate its ideological purity and professional competence immediately after the victory against the Indian army. Externally the Chinese had demonstrated an ability to overcome a foreign foe that may previously have appeared to be formidable. Moreover, they had done this at the precise moment when their chief rival for leadership of the international communist movement had failed in Cuba. This fact the Chinese made sure would not be lost on the fraternal community, nor on the world in general, and was a point they specifically made in their subsequent propaganda war against the Soviet Union on the question of Cuba. From November on Chinese propaganda started to become more critical of the Soviet Union, though the attacks remained oblique.

The direct reflection of the autumn's events on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was immediate. Before describing this, however, it is necessary to refer briefly to institutional developments which had taken place at the beginning of the year. As we have seen China had appointed a new ambassador to Cambodia in February, which decision had probably been taken in the latter part of 1961. From March 1962 on there was a considerable changeover of ambassadors in a wide range of countries. In April China established an Asian-African society whose stated aims were to promote academic research into the political and economic affairs, history and general conditions of these countries. Taken together these developments suggest that new initiatives had been

launched at the beginning of 1962, and that their origins can probably be traced at least to the late summer of the previous year. These initiatives do not appear to be in any way connected with the events of the summer and autumn of 1962. Moreover, they occurred at a time when domestic policy was in the doldrums. They are evidence of the régime's ability at that time to conduct some of its foreign affairs in isolation from domestic pressures, even if these initiatives did not constitute major innovations.

The autumn changes were of a different nature. They involved the sending of the recently-relieved ambassador to India to Moscow and the posting of the outgoing Moscow ambassador, Liu Hsiao, to Peking. Thus a man with good knowledge of Indian affairs was available on the spot in Moscow to interpret Chinese attitudes concerning such problems, and a similarly knowledgeable man was in Peking to interpret the Soviet responses. These changes were major ones and formed an integral part of a significant change in Chinese policy. Although Liu Hsiao was not officially replaced till 23 November, and was not publicly appointed vice-minister till the following May, he had temporarily returned to Peking in late September and finally left Moscow on 24 October. His *de facto* appointment was thus made in the early autumn. This requirement for a Soviet specialist as senior vice-minister was a reversion to the pattern which applied from 1949 to the beginning of 1959 and was consequently an indication of a new approach to Soviet problems. With Liu's appointment late in the year there were now seven vice-ministers. The responsibilities of the other six do not seem to have basically altered; Lo and Tseng still participated in practically no publicised activities. Liu's role until his official appointment, though completely unknown, may well have been that of principal diplomatic adviser to the team which almost certainly had been charged with preparing for the next stage in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

The general framework of timing for these marked changes in policy towards the Soviet Union is well illustrated in an indirect manner by the content of one of the régime's principal foreign-language publications, *Peking Review*. During the first half of the year it had devoted much of its attention to the evils of us imperialism. Then, imperceptibly at first but gradually in a more obvious manner, the emphasis shifted to the struggle against Soviet revisionism. The change came in about mid-August, and conforms well with other internal and external changes. In sum

we can say with some certainty that the régime took the decision in principle to move to the offensive in all matters at some time, probably in August, that the first clear sign of this was the call for class struggle at the Tenth Plenum in late September, and that the actual offensive started with the Indian war in late October.

The total national offensive, interrelated on the domestic and foreign fronts, which had begun in late October, surged ahead in 1963. Superficially the intensification of the Sino-Soviet dispute was the most important development of the year; in foreign affairs it certainly was the most dramatic development. In reality, however, the deterioration in relations between the two communist giants was, after Cuba and India, almost a logical necessity. The significance of its progression and resultant side-effects in 1963 therefore has tended to be exaggerated. Of equal or greater significance was the Chinese offensive in Afro-Asia which may be said to have had its immediate antecedents in the Indian war. Basic to everything were Chinese domestic developments.

In the beginning of 1963 and directly stemming from the PLA successes in the previous October came the launching of a campaign to revitalise national morale. Its prime objective was the emulation of the PLA, one of whose heroes was chosen as the personal example to follow. Mao's thoughts were the spiritual medium through which the great national revivification and political rectification was to be achieved. Socialist education, the eradication of domestic revisionism, was to be the main program for the nation. The great campaign absorbed many of the energies of the régime and was to become a virtual obsession. It is not certain to what extent its necessity and therefore its implementation was fully supported by all the leaders; that it was fully supported by Mao and by his Minister of Defence, Lin Piao, is certain. Whether or not it really was necessary at that time to undertake such a program is debatable, and this probably was how some of the leaders saw the question. There are two possible and mutually contradictory lines of argument that could have been put forward, both of which seem to be perfectly valid. One could have opposed its launching on the grounds that the period of crisis which had been brought about largely by the questionable policies of the Great Leap had only recently been passed and that economic, and thus political, recovery had only been achieved through following extremely moderate if not virtually revisionist policies. These policies had been tactically

necessitated; they could and eventually had to be replaced by more ideologically acceptable ones, but that time had not yet arrived. Domestic revisionism was a problem which for the moment could perhaps be kept in check by attacking revisionism outside China.

Such a line of reasoning seems to have been sensible and logical, and may well have been adopted by some of the leaders. The alternative contradictory line, the one apparently advocated by Mao, also had validity. The Great Leap had failed not so much because it had been erroneously conceived but because it had been incorrectly implemented and had run foul of the weather. Precisely because the economic situation had now improved it was urgently necessary to reverse the moderate and revisionist policies of the recent past before the masses came to consider them to be irreversible. The poisonous weeds must be eradicated before all the socialist blooms were killed off. It was not enough to oppose revisionism abroad, it had to be combated both there and at home, at one and the same time. This too seems to have been a valid argument. Thus the decision as to which policy was to be followed must largely have depended on personal inclination or psychological pre-disposition. Outwardly the policy followed after a period of hesitation was the latter, the one which advocated the radical approach. There is some reason to believe that, except in the armed forces, Mao's edicts were not always implemented at the lower levels as he wished; they may on occasion have been deliberately suppressed or seriously modified, in other instances they may not have been understood. In any case, until the summer harvests had been gathered in, the new policy line was regarded as experimental. After this leadership attitudes hardened perceptibly and socialist education was intensified. The campaign was seen as the sole means of protecting and consolidating the nation's socialist gains. That this hardening of attitude coincided with the main harvest period is no accident. With the knowledge the régime then had of good agricultural yields it was clear that it felt it could afford a higher degree of ideological extravagance, or social disruption, than hitherto. The winter agricultural slack season therefore saw the gradual implementation of harsher 'leftist' measures throughout society and particularly in the rural areas.

It is not surprising that there was also an upsurge of activity in external ideological affairs during 1963. The first signs of

Chinese aggressiveness in this respect had come, as we have noted, at the end of the previous year, but 1963 saw a marked stepping-up of the Chinese campaign against foreign revisionism. This campaign unfolded in two distinct phases. The first of these came between January and March, when the CCP very strongly criticised the revisionist policies of a number of European communist parties; this was really a continuation of the late 1962 campaign. There then followed a period of relative calm, which coincided with the beginnings of the domestic upsurge. During this the CCP and CPSU discussed arrangements for a bilateral conference on the subject of the dispute. After several false starts the two parties agreed to come together on 5 July in Moscow. The calm was not long to last. On 14 June an unyielding programmatic letter from the CCP to the CPSU was transmitted which, by its publication in Peking three days later, virtually ensured the collapse of the talks before they began. Why it was necessary to publish the letter at all is not clear for, even if there are no reasons to believe that the two parties could have resolved their differences, its publication must have been calculated to provoke the Russians. The Chinese may have been motivated by a compelling need to demonstrate to their foreign supporters and the undecided that their expressed willingness to confer with the CPSU must not be construed as a fundamental change of attitude to questions of principle. Perhaps too they intended to ensure the collapse of the talks before they started. These and other reasons beside may have caused the Chinese actions. Needless to say, though the CCP sent a strong delegation to Moscow, where it stayed for over two weeks, the talks broke up without achieving any positive results.

Chinese attitudes to the talks were not the sole reason for their collapse. If these have appeared to us to be difficult to comprehend Soviet attitudes were equally strange. At the very time when they were conferring with the Chinese they were also negotiating with the United States on the question of the nuclear test-ban treaty. If one is to accept the possibility that the Chinese were purposely sabotaging the talks one must also presumably accept the possibility that Soviet negotiations with the arch-imperialist nation were equally intended as sabotage. This is probably just another way of saying that neither side could free itself from its national self-interests and domestic political pressures. Needless to say the Chinese were both incensed and deeply worried by the new evidence of Soviet coexistence with United States imperialism.

At a time when China was making every effort to enter the nuclear weapons club, attempts by its leading members to restrict membership were hardly good news. When the treaty was finally signed the Chinese response was vitriolic: the Soviet leaders were worse than merely revisionists, they were actively allying with US imperialism to oppose China.

On 30 August, the CCP leaders appear to have come together in Peking;<sup>4</sup> undoubtedly this was to attend an expanded session of the Politburo, which we know sat in September. The meeting was probably called to discuss several urgent problems; for example, the next phase of socialist education. Certainly it must also have considered what to do about the latest developments in Sino-Soviet relations. This meeting provides a classic example of the concurrence of domestic and foreign developments, and their inter-relationship. Since the leaders were by then aware of the fact that the year had been a good one agriculturally, the socialist education campaign became harsher and more radical. This occurred at the moment when external developments became more serious. Cause and effect are rarely, in such a context, analysable with any degree of certitude. In this case it is possible that domestic factors were somewhat more important: the régime had probably already decided in principle to mount some sort of an offensive within China. Thus the underlying cause was internal. Before it had worked out the details of its program, however, external causes began to have their impact. These may well have impelled the Chinese leaders along a harsher domestic course than they would otherwise have followed. Whatever the specific relationship between these internal and external events, it is certain that from the beginning of September when the Politburo met, policy hardened visibly. In the specific context of Sino-Soviet relations the month marked the beginning of open name-calling; China thereafter very rarely bothered to disguise the target of its polemical attacks. The villain's name was Khrushchev, and this was proclaimed to the world.

Afro-Asian affairs were to play a big part in Chinese diplomacy during 1963. It is significant that the overt Asian part of the new Chinese offensive unfolded during the Sino-Soviet truce and the domestic socialist education campaign. It was certainly no accident that Indonesia and North Vietnam, whose communist parties had worked particularly hard to obtain the truce, were visited by Liu Shao-ch'i so soon after the polemics had stopped. Liu's tour began

on 12 April with Indonesia, took in Burma and Cambodia, and concluded on 16 May with North Vietnam. Throughout the tour the reiterated theme was Chinese amenableness; though this naturally varied, according to the nation visited and the specific occasion, from emphasising peace to stressing struggle. In Indonesia the tendency was more towards Asian unity against colonialism, and China's support for Indonesia's stand on Malaysia and confrontation. In Burma, it appears, the main aim was that of wooing Ne Win and thus of persuading the Burmese communist guerillas to make a tactical accommodation with the government. In Cambodia the theme was eternal friendship and continued Chinese assistance, particularly in the struggle against the United States, Thailand, and South Vietnam.

The visit to North Vietnam, on the other hand, seems to have been specifically tailored to the requirements of the Sino-Soviet dispute and the war in the South.<sup>5</sup> It is possible that both China and the Soviet Union had been putting pressure on Hanoi to conform to their respective views of the world situation and that the Chinese visit was the occasion to attempt to undo some of the work of their rivals in this respect. Consequently it is probably significant that the North Vietnamese had appointed a new Foreign Minister in the spring,<sup>6</sup> and that this man's background suggests that he may have been particularly acceptable to the Chinese. There is some indirect evidence to suggest that the Chinese had been cool towards their southern neighbours from about 18 January till the middle of March, when they gradually became more friendly.<sup>7</sup> This may be a clue to the date of the *de facto* appointment of Hanoi's new Foreign Minister. In any case Liu Shao-ch'i, when he spoke in May, made a point of emphasising the fraternal righteousness of China's Marxist-Leninist foreign policy. Addressing himself indirectly but obviously to Khrushchev's policies he said: 'Peaceful co-existence must not be used to abolish the socialist countries' duty of supporting the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed nations and peoples'.<sup>8</sup>

The next phase of the new Afro-Asian offensive coincided with the Party meeting at the end of August and first few days of September, which launched the domestic and external anti-revisionist campaign. This started with the visit of Liu Shao-ch'i to North Korea on 14 September, during which the reiterated theme differed little from that visible during the tour of North Vietnam; the visit ostensibly returned that of the Koreans to China in June.

During September, too, came the official appointment of new ambassadors to Burma and Mongolia.<sup>9</sup> As to the latter it is clear that the new ambassadorial appointment indicated a change in relationships, for very shortly afterwards Chinese construction workers, who had been aiding the Mongolians, started returning to China. Before long all such workers had left and relations between the two countries became visibly strained. September 25 saw another interesting development: the establishment of the Peking Centre of the World Federation of Scientific Workers, which was to devote considerable energies in the future to uniting under China's revolutionary banner the scientists of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. This seems to have been more than just another 'front' for the Chinese. The creation of the centre, followed a year later by the explosion of China's first nuclear device and the convening of a conference of scientists from these areas, marked the beginning of a campaign to test the political and ideological validity of the Soviet Union's claim to scientific and technological leadership of the non-capitalist world. Its establishment was thus of considerable theoretical importance. The second stage in China's Afro-Asian offensive came to a close in December, when Chou En-lai led a delegation to visit Africa.<sup>10</sup>

The general trend of external events during the year being towards Afro-Asian and international communist affairs, it is to be expected that this would have been reflected in the structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We have already noted the addition of a new vice-minister, Liu Hsiao, probably at the end of 1962. Liu's role was that of senior vice-minister and specialist in Soviet problems. Chang Han-fu seems to have acted as the deputy-senior in the ministry with the broad responsibility of overseeing the affairs of the rest of the world. Chi P'eng-fei still supervised the work of the Second Asian Department. Tseng Yung-ch'uan, after a long period of being out of the public eye, re-emerged at the beginning of April. He appears to have retained his interest in the Soviet Union and East European Department but, in addition, also to have taken over Lo Kuei-po's responsibilities for West European affairs. Thus in 1963 and the first few months of 1964 the whole of Europe was supervised by one vice-minister. Lo remained almost totally out of sight, as he had done since about mid-1961, though he did make one significant appearance at Canton in September. This seems to have been the occasion for some sort of little summit conference of Peking-inclined com-

munist parties, which went on from at least 25–27 September; both Ch'en Yi, the Foreign Minister, and Lo were in Canton at the time. If such a conference had been held, as seems likely, one of the topics would probably have been the Sino-Soviet dispute, and the recent open formation of a number of splinter 'Marxist-Leninist' or pro-Chinese parties. Also on the agenda in all probability would have been Indonesia's confrontation of Malaysia; and developments in South Vietnam and Laos, where by September crisis situations had occurred.

Lo's public unveiling at this time in Canton, not far removed from the southern trouble spots, is a pointed one and further evidence of his special responsibility for Indo-Chinese affairs. As to Keng Piao, he was officially appointed ambassador to Rangoon at the beginning of September. Much earlier in the year there had been a change in the pattern of his overt activities. From about early February to early July he had dropped out of the news, although he surfaced again on a few occasions up to the beginning of August. It is possible that Keng started preparing for his new post in February. The appointment of Keng to Rangoon is of considerable interest as, having specialised in Indian-subcontinental affairs since 1956, it suggests that the Chinese tended to regard Burma in 1963 more as forming a part of the Indian system than the South-east Asian.<sup>11</sup> Finally there is the role of Huang Chen to consider. Huang had been principally involved in West Asian and African matters. When Liu Shao-ch'i had visited South-east Asia in April and May it was Huang who had accompanied him, but this may be explained by Huang's Indonesian interest and background. After about June there was a tendency for him to restrict himself to African affairs, and when Chou En-lai went on his tour of Africa in December it was Huang who accompanied him. It is therefore possible that he was being groomed for a new post, which was to be that of ambassador to Paris, in the summer of 1963.<sup>12</sup>

The general offensive which had begun towards the end of October 1962 and which had developed along definite lines over the months, steadily intensified. Domestically socialist education constituted the major thrust of 1964, while the primary concern abroad was the Afro-Asian and anti-revisionist offensive. Socialist education started very early in the year to unfold along well-defined lines, which almost certainly had been set at the end of 1963. Of considerable importance to the general campaign was

the beginning of the strenuous and wide-ranging attempt to eliminate bourgeois influences in literature and art. The aim was to create in the nation a true ideological basis for socialism. All traces, and these were not few, of revisionist or non-socialist thinking had to be eradicated. Mao seems to have been convinced that were this not to be done, eventually the Party and state would degenerate and be overthrown. No amount of superficial control could prevent this from happening; the root of the problem lay in the thought and art forms of the people. If this was the fundamental task, it was a long-term one. More urgent, it appears, was the need to improve the working methods and political reliability of the armed forces. As we have seen, efforts along these lines had been made since Lin Piao had taken over control of the PLA in 1959, and more particularly from the time of the great emulation campaign after the Sino-Indian war. The renewed stress on military work seems to have come at the end of 1963 and was probably motivated in part by developments in South-east Asia, particularly the stepping-up of the war in South Vietnam and the increased United States involvement there. Its obvious domestic purpose was, however, to make the whole nation emulate the PLA. The significance of this move was not immediately clear, but before long it became obvious that this was to be no ordinary emulation drive. It was to be the beginning of a significant change of stature for the armed forces: not only were they to be theoretical political models but they were to intrude actively into every aspect of state activity. This was consequently the start of the creation of the PLA-led Political Department structure which gradually came to be implanted on or wedded to all civilian party and government organisations.<sup>13</sup> The extension of the socialist education movement to the rural areas also was vigorously pushed during the first few months of the year, as had been clearly indicated would be the case in the autumn of 1963. In addition, youth work gradually assumed more importance, and it is likely that this period saw the origin of the drive to create from the masses of uninspired youths a hard core of ideologically trustworthy successors to the ageing generation of rulers.

The first half of the year was a period in which the leadership advocated and implemented a number of radical policies at home. It was a period of revolutionary upsurge. By about August, however, it is possible that either statistical reports were indicating general economic imbalances or specific agricultural problems,

or that the domestic and foreign political situations were starting to have dampening effects on the leaders' optimism. Following what may have been a meeting of the Politburo either in late August or the beginning of September the Party circulated another highly important directive on socialist education. This was more sombre in tone than the earlier ones. It called for strenuous efforts against erring cadres regardless of seniority. The phraseology used suggested that there might be some fairly high-level purges in the offing. The régime was obviously entering a difficult period. December, in particular, seems to have been a time of very serious debate. Twice in the month the rarely-convoked Supreme State Conference met, and there was a session of the National People's Congress.

The Politburo, too, was convened once or possibly twice during this time; it certainly was in session at some time during the last ten days of the month. Although the state of the economy was described as being healthy, it was also revealed that there was a tendency towards pessimism and inertia. In addition, many previously acceptable policies of moderation and realism were attacked. As these new inflexible attitudes were made public for the whole nation to take note of it must be presumed that, whatever policy debate there had previously been in the higher councils of the Party, the period of indecision had now come to a close. The new line, which in all probability had been broadly agreed upon in late December, promised a harsher future. Socialist education had not previously achieved its aims. Henceforward the campaign would have to be geared to the requirements of contemporary Marxism-Leninism; those who had opposed socialist education in the past, from Central Committee members downwards, were to be rectified. Thus the year closed with the promise of political radicalism and turmoil for 1965.

In foreign affairs the year was notable for the considerable number of institutional changes which occurred during it; Afro-Asian and Sino-Soviet affairs continued on the courses which had been set in 1963. Chou En-lai returned from his long visit to Africa on 5 February. From the middle of the month to the beginning of March he toured a number of countries in the Indian subcontinental group. On both occasions he took vice-minister Huang Chen with him. Huang then went to Djakarta for about two weeks in April. Apart from the special desire to obtain first-hand knowledge of Africa, the purpose of all three

visits was the preparation for the forthcoming Second Asian and African Conference. Thus the first half of the year was essentially devoted, at least in its overt aspects, to Afro-Asian affairs. Related to these, however, was the question of Soviet representation at the Asian and African Conference. In view of the considerable progress made by the Chinese in Asia and Africa since the Bandung Conference it is not surprising that the Russians strove hard to be invited to the second conference. They argued that they were entitled to attend on the grounds that over two-thirds of the Soviet Union was in Asia and a number of its constituent parts and peoples were Asian. This stand was strongly opposed by the Chinese. As neither the Soviet Union nor its Asian republics had been invited to Bandung and as nothing had altered since, said the Chinese, Soviet participation could not be permitted. This was a question of principle, they averred: their stand was quite logical; their case irrefutable. But beneath it all, it seems, lay the desire to establish or preserve for themselves a position of pre-eminence in the underdeveloped world. If the Soviet Union had been permitted to participate in the Second Asian and African Conference this would have hampered Chinese efforts to influence or dominate it.

The exclusion of the Soviet Union from the conference was made the more necessary by the fact that the CPSU still clearly dominated the international communist movement; despite Chinese erosion of the Soviet position, by the autumn of 1964 they could only count on the support of six fully-fledged parties. Albania amongst these was probably the sole thoroughly reliable ally, though the growing number of Chinese-inspired Marxist-Leninist splinter parties which had recently been formed could always be counted upon to parrot Peking and annoy the CPSU. It is probable that China's generally successful foreign policy line from the autumn of 1962 and the relatively unsuccessful one of the Soviet Union, particularly in respect of underdeveloped nations, contributed to the fall of Khrushchev. Almost immediately after it was announced that he had 'resigned', the Chinese exploded their first nuclear device. The middle of October must consequently have been a time of great rejoicing in Peking, for if Mao had longed for anything it is virtually certain that it would have been Khrushchev's disgrace. One of the motivating forces of the Sino-Soviet dispute, and probably an important one, must have been the personal antipathy of the two communist leaders.

Khrushchev's fall would therefore have been interpreted in Peking and in a number of other places as a personal triumph for Mao, as vindication of the CCP line and of the success of Chinese state policies. The nuclear explosion, which was an achievement of no mean proportions for a nation which had only recently emerged from a state of oppression, was undoubtedly taken as further evidence of the wisdom of Mao's leadership.

In South-east Asia, however, other developments were taking place which needed close attention on the part of the Chinese. The war in Vietnam was escalating seriously. China's attitude to this cannot be assessed with complete confidence, for there were contradictory aspects to the situation. There was first the question of the ultimate possibility of its escalation into China; there was also the question of its value as a means of dissipating the strength of US imperialism. How did the Chinese see the problem? We cannot, of course, tell. Nor can we say with any confidence that all the Chinese leaders assessed the situation in the same light; probably they did not. By this time, however, there cannot be much doubt that, whatever may previously have been the case, Mao's leadership could not have been in serious doubt; consequently it is Mao's view we must try to understand. To Mao, it seems, the principal contradiction must have been between US imperialism and the desire for independence of the Vietnamese people. This being so it was the bounden duty of all progressive forces to support the struggle in the south. The chief support, in theory and practice, must come from Hanoi; and Hanoi must be supported by China. There was a further theoretical consideration. This was the value of the war of national liberation in the south as education for the world movement of national liberation, and as an example of the correctness of China's policies on such matters. The question probably remained of assessing the danger such aid entailed for China. In 1964 this danger could not have appeared to be very real. Providing China remained only indirectly involved there should have been no real risk of sudden attack by the United States. Nevertheless, the risk, remote though it may have been, was there and had to be taken into account. The problem was one of balance: encourage the Vietnamese, help them, abuse the United States and the Soviet Union, but ensure that provocation remained within bounds. As Mao undoubtedly saw it, the situation was a classical and practical example of despising the enemy strategically while respecting him tactically.

The organisation of the foreign affairs system in 1964, the ministry and its related institutions, closely conformed to the new policy requirements. For some years previously the complement of vice-ministers had been kept to six. In 1964 it was increased to nine, at which level it remained until the next phase of development in late 1965. The roles of Liu Hsiao and Chang Han-fu were unchanged from 1963. Huang Chen had been occupied with general Afro-Asian affairs, which had taken him out of the country for lengthy periods from the end of 1963; in the event he was officially relieved of his vice-ministerial responsibilities and sent as ambassador to France only in April. His task in France, according to Marxist theory and in view of his previous experience, was probably largely that of supervising the penetration of French Africa. Chi P'eng-fei appears to have taken over much of the work of Huang, and of the earlier-replaced Keng Piao, during the first few months of the year; in addition he continued to oversee the affairs of Communist Asia. It is possible that Huang's original responsibilities for Africa were shared, until about late September, by Chi and Tseng Yung-ch'uan. The latter also probably maintained his interests in Soviet and East European matters, and continued to look after Lo Kuei-po's West European area during the first few months. Lo, for his part, remained submerged until September, when he started to make frequent appearances at Indo-Chinese functions. Prior to this, therefore, and in view of what has been concluded above, one may assume that he was very heavily involved in matters relating to the intensifying war in the south and its related developments in Laos and Cambodia.

It is clear from all this that the work load on the vice-ministers had increased very considerably from the end of 1963. In the first three months of the next year not only had the overall pressures increased but in addition the number of vice-ministers had in effect been reduced from the normal complement of six to five. Such a situation could not last. In April, therefore, four new men were appointed, to bring the total number to nine. The two senior men remained Liu and Chang. The responsibilities of the others were probably as follows: Lo, Indo-China; Chi, Africa; and Tseng, West Asia and North Africa.<sup>14</sup> Those of the four new men were not entirely clear and could have varied according to circumstances. They may have been: Wang Ping-nan, all of Europe; Ch'iao Kuan-hua, some sort of functional task possibly related to

Afro-Asian affairs; Han Nien-lung, Asia excluding the Arab world; and Liu Hsiu-ch'uan, uncertain, possibly *ad hoc* replacement work for the other vice-ministers.

This constituted the greatest reorganisation of the vice-ministerial appointments since the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been established in 1949. Also rearranged at this time were some of the subordinate geographical departments and their staffs. The principal change in this respect affected the old West Asian and African Department. This had been officially divided into African, and West Asian and North African departments only in September; the latter sub-division equating to the Arab world.<sup>15</sup> It is likely that the decision to effect the departmental reorganisation had been made by February, when the director of the old West Asian and African Department, Wang Yu-t'ien, was posted as ambassador to Kenya. The directors of both Asian Departments were also replaced early in the year: one going to the Congo as ambassador, and the other into the Foreign Ministry as a special adviser. These were not the only changes effected in the organisations of the foreign affairs system in early 1964. Additionally, a Commission for Economic Relations with Foreign Countries was established.<sup>16</sup> The Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, moreover, had several new vice-chairmen appointed to it. Finally, the Ministry of Foreign Trade increased its complement of vice-ministers by three in the same period; it is likely also that it similarly increased its subordinate geographic bureaux from four to five at this time, though this did not become evident until the following year.

These developments can be best summarised by emphasising two major aspects; chronology and policy. The end of 1963 seems to have been the time for taking broad policy decisions which were to have considerable impact on the subsequent course of events. Chou En-lai's African and Asian tours are an example of this. From about January to March 1964 not much in the way of concrete measures appears to have been taken to adjust to the new requirements, though quite clearly the need was then apparent. It was not long before a large range of institutional changes was effected, and by the autumn or early winter the reorganisation seems to have been completed. Foreign affairs during this period, the end of 1963 and beginning of winter 1964, conformed closely with domestic political developments, which progressed from a still largely experimental phase of upheaval and innova-

tion to a first consolidation in September and a more or less final consolidation in December. The broad outline of foreign policy was set before Chou left on his trips abroad. This was the desire to carry the offensive against us imperialism and Soviet revisionism into the far corners of the world and, more particularly at that stage, into Africa.

The next year was to be even more expansive and ardent. 'As our country grows stronger day by day', *People's Daily* said on New Year's Day 1965, 'our international duty becomes greater. We must actively support the people's revolutionary struggle all over the world . . . We should realize that the revolutionary struggles of the people in any country are a powerful support and assistance for us'.<sup>17</sup> This well summarises the Chinese theoretical view of the world. They might have added, however, the words: 'Above all we must not provoke the us imperialists to the point where they launch a nuclear attack against us'.

The year was to be one of enormous importance to the Chinese leadership, and one whose effects are still visible today. During it domestic developments completely overshadowed external ones, though whether this would have been the case had certain events in South-east Asia not occurred is by no means certain. Domestically 1965 can be divided into two main periods: from the beginning of January to late September, and from this date until the end of December. In the first period the major stress was on carrying forward the work of the party meeting held in late December 1964. This was the intensified drive for socialist education, as witnessed particularly by Mao's program for the elimination of 'capitalist-roaders' from positions of power in the Party. Very soon after the beginning of the year the highest military authority of the ccr, the Military Affairs Committee, appears to have met in plenary session and ruled that the prevailing system of ranks and insignias should be abolished.<sup>18</sup> Clearly it would have been inappropriate, in view of the thorough revolutionisation of the whole of society, to have permitted the military arm of the nation to have continued with its bourgeois practices. This requirement was underlined by the desire to launch a new campaign against military formalism, and to prove to the world and to the Chinese people that the nation had no fear of nuclear-armed us imperialism. Whatever internal political motivations there may also have been it was probably thought necessary to instil into the Chinese people and the PLA rank and file a new

Yenan-type guerilla fearlessness. In addition there was an unmistakable message in all this for the Vietnamese people and for those whose bounden internationalist duty it was to support them in the war against us imperialism.

During the first half of the year it became evident that the PLA had considerably extended its political influence and practical control to a very large number of State Council organisations and subordinate agencies throughout the country. It consequently was in a position to interfere directly in civilian matters normally outside its province. The assumption of this new role, at a time when its guerilla past was being resurrected and when it was being turned into an apparently thoroughly revolutionised arm of the state apparatus, was not accidental. Nor was it fortuitous that this should happen when the régime's propaganda media were starting to devote much of their output to questions concerning war. Indirectly, too, this revolutionary guerilla-type thinking must have been the driving force of the new and harsher phase of the socialist education campaign in the countryside. Whatever the deeper motives, whatever the possible connection between the new upsurge and the Cultural Revolution which was shortly to come, this new rectification drive was also alleged by the régime to be part of a great movement to prepare the country for war.<sup>19</sup>

The next phase in internal developments came in September. Acting on the knowledge the leaders then had of the results of the socialist education campaign, and of the state of the national exchequer, the decision appears to have been taken to start the work of purging certain key elements of the state. This task seems to have been discussed at a high-level meeting of the Party which probably opened around 27 September.<sup>20</sup> It is not certain exactly when the meeting started or when it ended, but it might have gone on until early October. Certainly the key leaders must have conferred together on the question of the Indonesian coup, which they doubtless knew about by 1 October. It is conventional to ascribe to this meeting the decision to launch the Cultural Revolution and it is likely that at it Mao called for an attack against bourgeois reactionary thinking. We do know that the opening shots of this new campaign were fired at the first victim of the Cultural Revolution on 10 November, and that he had been sent on an extended visit to North Korea in late October. Thus by early October the régime appears to have embarked on

a new and highly significant course. From this time on, high official after high official was to be put to the test and purged. The whole nation was gradually but surely thrown into utter confusion.

The main foreign developments are divisible into the same two periods, with September-October being the dividing line. In early February mass campaigns were launched throughout the country to protest against United States' bombing of North Vietnam. A month later Chinese propaganda media attacked the use of American ground forces in South Vietnam. On 8 June Washington itself revealed that President Johnson had authorised the employment of United States ground forces in combat operations in the south, which a few days later Peking equated to an acceleration towards a Korea-type war. Vietnam thus loomed large in Chinese propaganda during this period. There had been a considerable escalation of the war by the principal contestants, and the Chinese leaders could have begun to wonder whether this might not lead eventually to a direct confrontation between China and the United States. This goes some way towards explaining the domestic propaganda on the war; step by step with the external escalation progressed the internal campaign. Vietnam was not, however, the only problem about which the Chinese thought. At the beginning of March Pakistan received renewed attentions, and Ayub Khan himself paid a visit to China. Towards the end of the month Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi went to Afghanistan and to Pakistan, allegedly in order to sign boundary treaties with these two countries. Whether or not the treaties were other than ostensible reasons for his visits is an open question. It is just possible that the Pakistan visit was occasioned by the need to consult with the Pakistanis on their future plans regarding India and Kashmir. This is mere speculation and quite unsupported by facts. In the event it was not long before Pakistani irregulars or Azad-Kashmiri guerillas started probing the Indian positions in Kashmir; four months later the two nations were involved in a bitter war in which China supported Pakistan to the extent, finally, of delivering an ultimatum to India to desist. It is quite beside the point that, as with the case of Khrushchev's technique over the Taiwan Straits crises, the ultimatum or warning came when there was little danger of having to translate it into action; the real point is that China had openly interfered.

This period also saw a remarkable growth in relations between

China and Indonesia, and more particularly with the Communist Party of Indonesia. Several important Chinese leaders made prolonged visits to that country in May and June, and in August, on the occasions of the forty-fifth anniversary of the Communist Party of Indonesia and the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the republic. These visits were returned by the Indonesian communists in June and July, and in August. There were, again, ostensibly legitimate reasons for all these visits which may have had no more sinister purpose than that of discussing the question of revisionism or the war in Vietnam. On the other hand, they did constitute a change in tempo, and the last Chinese delegation to Indonesia left just over a week before the coup. It would be going too far to conclude from this that the Chinese engineered the coup, but it remains a distinct possibility that the Indonesian communists knew that something was afoot and that they were consulting with the Chinese on the subject. Thus it can be suggested that Peking expected a crisis to be reached in the struggle for power between the Indonesian communists and right-wing elements in the army, possibly in the form of a coup, and hoped for an outright communist victory. Similarly it could be argued that the Chinese knew of and saw merit in Pakistan intentions relating to Kashmir. It is equally possible that they knew of and supported the planned offensive by Hanoi and the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam in late 1965. Although the Chinese may well have known about all these developments before they occurred, may well have been consulted about them, and may even have wished them, it is unlikely that they had sufficient influence on the internal dynamics of these areas to have been in a position to bring them about. In sum there is a strong presumption of close co-ordination between China and North Vietnam, Pakistan, and the Communist Party of Indonesia during the period just considered.

Preparations for the Second Asian and African Conference to be held in Algiers also absorbed Chinese energies in the first half of the year. These preparations had begun in earnest in 1964 and involved amongst other questions that of the possible participation of the Soviet Union. Partly because of the impending conference, vice-minister Chi P'eng-fei made a tour of African states in May and June, which was followed by the visits of the Foreign Minister and Chou En-lai. The latter headed a large delegation which included several vice-ministers of foreign affairs, and the

ambassadors to the United Arab Republic, Pakistan, Ghana, Indonesia, and Tanzania, together with the responsible officials of all the Asian and African geographical departments. Clearly the Chinese expected that the conference would take place as scheduled and judged that the coup which had taken place in Algiers in mid-June would not prevent it.<sup>21</sup> In the event, before the end of June it became clear that the theory of Afro-Asian unity would have to yield to the practice of antagonistic national interests, and the conference was postponed to November; it has yet to be held. Conferences of disharmony were not, however, solely restricted to the Afro-Asians; the international communist movement had clearly set the pattern in 1957 and 1960. In the March of 1965, too, Moscow was the venue of yet another. This time the polemics at the conference table were muted, because of the non-participation of the CCP and a number of like-minded Asian and other parties, if they were nevertheless vociferously pursued by the Chinese elsewhere.

From the end of September a new, less sanguine phase began. During the meeting of the Party leaders, in the first few days of October, it was learned that a coup had been staged in Indonesia which had affected the status of Sukarno and embarrassed if not threatened the existence of the Indonesian communists. Presumably it was not long after that the Chinese learned of the virtual decimation of their powerful friends in Indonesia. Whatever the origins of the coup, there can be no doubt that the destruction of the Communist Party of Indonesia, if only temporary, must have been regarded by the CCP as a setback of inestimable proportions. This probably coloured the view of the Chinese leaders on an extensive range of subjects. Its effect on thinking related to Vietnam cannot be documented, but at a time when there was much publicly-expressed concern in China over the growing threat of an escalation of the war across her borders and on the need to rely on waging people's wars against imperialism, it is probable that the events in Indonesia caused misgivings in Peking.

In whatever manner the Chinese regarded the ultimate usefulness of Sukarno it is certain that their strategic thinking before his fall must have assumed at the least the neutrality of Indonesia in the event of a major conflagration in Asia. They may even have hoped for active support from Sukarno in certain limited respects. They could, for example, have hoped not unrealistically for his

assistance in absorbing some of the SEATO potential in Malaysia. With the fall of Sukarno and the collapse of the Communist Party of Indonesia, and the emergence of a right-wing military government, one of the probable props for Chinese strategy was removed. The ultimate threat from US imperialist actions in Vietnam, which must have appeared real enough to Peking, surely thereby assumed more serious proportions. It would not appear to be correct, however, that the Chinese believed that invasion of their territory was either a foregone conclusion or imminent.<sup>22</sup> The evidence, if only fragmentary and indirect, suggests rather that they probably hoped that the United States would confine its attentions to Vietnam so long as China did not provoke them by rash actions of support. Nevertheless, the war had by then seriously escalated, the threat to China had increased, and the events in Indonesia had weakened China's overall capability.

The main changes in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs came at the end of the year. Superficially it appeared that the complement of vice-ministers remained unchanged and that the same nine men who saw in the year saw it out. In fact, however, it is more than probable that this was not so and that the decision to reorganise the ministry may have been made very early in the year and put into practice some time after mid-August. Six of the vice-ministers do not seem to have been affected by the changes: the three who were affected were Tseng Yung-ch'uan, Lo Kuei-po, and Wang Ping-nan. Tseng's case is the most interesting of the three. In January the next year he was appointed ambassador to Rumania; but for the first five months of 1965 he was not recorded as having attended any public function concerning his area of interest, West Asia and North Africa, and for the rest of the year he made only very rare appearances at such functions. There would seem to be two possible explanations for this. The first is that he was too busy with the practical politics of his area, the Algerian coup, the projected Asian and African conference and such matters, to have the time left to participate in public affairs of a protocol nature. The second possibility is that, certainly after July, he was already preparing for his Rumanian assignment. It may be that the answer is a combination of the two: he was completely involved in practical matters concerning his area until, if Lo Kuei-po's case is any pointer, some time after August when he started to prepare for Rumania. Lo appears to have remained in Indo-Chinese affairs throughout the year and

to have shared with Wang Ping-nan the West European Department until mid-August. After this date, and probably because of the growing seriousness of the Vietnamese situation, Lo dropped once more out of the news.

From the beginning of November until just over a year later, Wang seems to have taken over all West European affairs in addition to those concerning East Europe. The lack of publicity about Wang during the first five months of the year may have been caused principally by the Moscow Consultative Conference of Soviet-inspired communist parties. The changes observed in the public activities of these three men indicate that they occurred after July and mid-August, and by November. As we know that a very important Party meeting was held at the end of September and early October, at which time serious developments had affected both internal and external affairs, it is fair to conclude that these changes were decided upon in October. That this is probable is further suggested by the fact that the ambassadors to Rumania, to which post Tseng was later officially appointed, and to the United Arab Republic, were recalled in late December. The latter, Ch'en Chia-k'ang, was then made a vice-minister of foreign affairs, as was also the retiring ambassador to Rumania, Hsu I-hsin. Moreover, early in November a new ambassador had been appointed to North Korea.<sup>23</sup>

If all these changes came shortly after the autumn Party meeting it is not entirely clear what motivated them. This meeting was the beginning of the Cultural Revolution and it is consequently possible that this was the reason for making a fairly sweeping reorganisation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, as the Cultural Revolution proper did not really start to unfold until the beginning of 1966, it seems too early for it to have affected the ministry, though one cannot of course preclude the possibility of forward planning in this respect. On balance the motivation for the reorganisation was externally derived in the first instance but was then fortified and made more real by the prevailing domestic circumstances. The Chinese leaders in the autumn of 1965 were more or less aware of the changing world situation, particularly as this related to Afro-Asia. What we cannot be sure of, however, is the accuracy of the reporting they received from their embassies and intelligence services or, equally importantly, of the objectivity of the leaders themselves, at a time when all concerned were starting to come under the influence of the Cultural Revolution.

This phenomenal event, publicly unveiled as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966, marked a phase in which China was to become more introverted than it had been for a long time. From early in the year till at least late 1968 the régime appears to have been remarkably little concerned with foreign policy, though this does not mean that there were no changes in such policy. Although the present study is not centred on the question of the Cultural Revolution nor indeed solely on domestic developments, it is necessary to describe the impact of the Cultural Revolution on the vice-ministerial structure of the foreign ministry.

In the period following the conclusion of the high-level Party meeting in October 1965 a number of changes were made in the foreign affairs establishment. One vice-minister thereafter appears to have devoted all his attentions to Vietnamese affairs; another was preparing for an ambassadorial appointment; and two new vice-ministers had been appointed. By the time the Cultural Revolution really broke on the country the complement of vice-ministers had exceeded by one the level of nine at which it had been held since the beginning of 1964. Thus, after Tseng Yung-chuan's appointment to Rumania in January, there were ten vice-ministers. As there did not appear to be a new external requirement for yet another man the increase therefore seems to have entailed a subtraction of one. This in fact did occur by late April for, though no dismissal was officially announced, from that time on Chang Han-fu disappeared from public view. Whether or not Chang was actually dismissed, or had only been relieved of his normal duties to take up others or to undergo political retraining, is not yet certain. As he had been the deputy senior vice-minister concerned primarily with Afro-Asian affairs, his *de facto* removal may have been caused by the Chinese setbacks in Indonesia and Africa. He may merely have been a scapegoat for the ministry's failure to come up to the leadership's expectations; there may have been no direct Cultural Revolution cause for his apparent fall from grace. Lo Kuei-po remained out of sight until the beginning of September, when he resumed public activities connected chiefly with Vietnamese and West European affairs.

Wang Ping-nan continued to be concerned with Europe, both East and West, until about the middle of July. Thereafter he too dropped from sight and his duties relating to East Europe were

taken over by Ch'iao Kuan-hua.<sup>24</sup> Wang's dismissal or at any rate failure to appear in public does not seem to have been occasioned by Chinese lack of success in Europe, for there is no evidence to suggest that the régime should have regarded this as the case. His change of status consequently may have been caused by the Cultural Revolution; perhaps he was a protégé of one of the top 'capitalist-roaders', or he may have been seen to have been tainted by long service in revisionist countries. We can only speculate as to the real reasons. Chi P'eng-fei remained active in African and Arab World affairs. Thus if the Chinese were concerned at their relatively poor showings in Africa this was not immediately laid at the door of Chi, and in any case he had only for a short time been involved in such matters. Han Nien-lung's position throughout 1966 and in subsequent years remained unaffected. Why this was so is not known: it may have been because the Chinese were satisfied with the results they had obtained in Asia, or it may merely have been due to Han's connections with the right people.

The roles of the remaining three vice-ministers, Liu Hsin-ch'uan, Hsu I-hsin, and Ch'en Chia-k'ang, during this period cannot be assessed; they do not appear to have fallen foul of the Cultural Revolution. The case of Liu Hsiao, the senior vice-minister, comes into a different category from those discussed above. In the first place Liu appears to have retained his position until at least late October; secondly he was not appointed as ambassador to Albania till the next year. However, it is likely that the decision to remove him was taken somewhere between the conclusion of the Eleventh Plenum in August and his fortnight's visit to Albania which started on 28 October. From this latter date Liu's activities were concerned with Albanian affairs, except for a short visit made to Africa at the beginning of 1967. It was in any event announced towards the end of December that the man he was to replace in Tirana was shortly to leave for home. By the end of the year, therefore, the complement of vice-ministers had in effect been reduced to seven.

The date of the Eleventh Plenum seems to have had some relevance to the time when it was decided to remove the senior vice-minister, Liu Hsiao.<sup>25</sup> An indication of the connection between these two events, and some of the reasons for Liu's replacement, can perhaps be obtained from the documents of the plenum. In the official communiqué which was adopted on 12 August there is the following statement:

'In order to isolate us imperialism to the maximum and deal it blows, the broadest possible united front must be established against us imperialism and its lackeys. The Soviet revisionist leading group is pursuing a policy of Soviet-us collaboration for world domination and has been actively serving us imperialism by conducting splittist, disruptive and subversive activities within the international communist movement and the national liberation movement. They cannot of course be included in this united front'.<sup>26</sup>

This statement, which is the clearest and most authoritative exposition of earlier, if only implicit, views,<sup>27</sup> was immediately taken up by Chinese-inclined parties elsewhere. It formally and unequivocally announced the organisational exclusion of the Soviet Union from the world's United Front. It was followed shortly after by the statement by Mao on the role of Albania as the 'great beacon of socialism in Europe'.<sup>28</sup> This can be regarded as China's official and public backing for Albanian 'leadership' of both the East and West European communist parties: the beacon to guide the lost craft to the course set by the great helmsman Mao. Taken together these two statements could have had relevance to Liu Hsiao's appointment. If the Soviet Union was to be isolated from the world United Front led by China, it was necessary above all to effect this in Europe. As the Chinese appeal would have been a limited one to Europeans they seem to have concluded that the Albanians should act for them in the area. Soviet and East European affairs, it could consequently have been argued, would be more effectively managed from Albania. There were thus, apparently, good reasons for the transfer of Liu Hsiao from Peking to Tirana. With this change the Ministry of Foreign Affairs lost at one stroke its senior vice-minister and its principal adviser on European communist affairs; nevertheless it still had, in Ch'iao Kuan-hua, a vice-minister for the Soviet and East European Department. This man's more recent background suggests greater expertise in covert United Front type activities in the underdeveloped world than in formal diplomatic relations with the European communist countries; his appointment at the end of 1965 seems to indicate that the Chinese had been preparing their stepped-up United Front effort against the Soviet Union for a long time.

By the end of the year China's view of the world, in so far

as domestic pressures permitted such a luxury, had apparently undergone a qualitative change. How real this change was, however, is a moot point. The world United Front, composed principally of Asian, African, and Latin American peoples, was being formed to confront the imperialists and their lackeys, and it was the duty of all true Marxist-Leninists to join this United Front under Chinese leadership. There could be no middle road for as the Peking-backed Brazilian communists had stated:

'In so far as the Socialist camp as a whole is concerned, it can no longer be regarded as a base for the revolutionary struggles of the peoples of various countries. Only that part of the camp headed by People's China is playing such a role'.<sup>29</sup>

To make the point doubly clear the Chinese shortly after quoted the Albanian definition of the duty of true Marxist-Leninists not only to exclude the revisionists from this United Front but to go one step further and direct it against both the imperialists and the revisionists. Such a definition logically entailed a more significant conclusion, and one reminiscent of Stalin's reasoning many years before:

'To support Peoples China and safeguard her against invasion by the imperialists and their lackeys, the revisionists, are the historical task and a matter of life and death for all revolutionary and freedom-loving forces and peoples'.<sup>30</sup>

Why the Chinese view had changed on such matters is not easy to understand.<sup>31</sup> It is not certain, for example, whether a new policy line had been consciously created, whether it was intended as a strategic concept or as a temporary tactical move, or whether it was meant more for internal consumption than as an expression of a firm change in foreign policy. Whatever the precise motivation, it seems clear enough that the new line was but one relatively insignificant visible aspect of the general psychology of the Cultural Revolution, and its enunciation closely followed a very definite climax in domestic developments.

Indeed, internal developments occupied the attention of the leaders, to the virtual exclusion of all else, for most of 1966 and 1967. The overall foreign attitude was a distinct reflection of the domestic upheavals. If there was conscious positive policy govern-

ing the conduct of foreign affairs it was designed to pin-prick, to insult and annoy, to demonstrate a revolutionary external presence or the ever-presence of foreign hostility. But the evidence does not support the contention that there was central government direction in such matters; when Peking's hand showed, as occasionally it did, it was with very rare exceptions to confirm or applaud what had happened, not to direct that it should happen. The innumerable examples of Cultural Revolution extremism consequently merit little attention, constituting as they did no part of foreign policy even though at times they appeared to. However, the revolutionary struggles did have their impact on the government's foreign affairs organisations, considerably diminishing for a period their normally high degree of professional competence. Furthermore, as Ch'en Yi is alleged by Cultural Revolution sources to have warned, turmoil in China's embassies abroad affecting the status of senior diplomats could be interpreted as evidence of a change in foreign policy. This implication Ch'en appears to have been at pains to refute.<sup>32</sup>

Despite the domestic troubles the major underlying concepts do not appear to have significantly altered during the period. The world United Front was still talked about; China's role remained that of supporting world revolution; the Soviet revisionists were still collaborating with us imperialism. The Cultural Revolution, in its external aspects, was designed to rid China of revisionism and to consolidate the proletarian dictatorship so as to 'push forward the development of the cause of socialist construction and thus powerfully augment China's strength to support and aid the revolutionary struggle of the world's people'.<sup>33</sup> This was all the more necessary according to Chinese propaganda in view of the increase in the neo-colonialist activities of the Soviet Union and the consequent danger of losing to the Russians what they had managed to deny to the classical colonialists and imperialists.

The Cultural Revolution had affected the whole of the foreign affairs system by the beginning of 1967. A number of changes had been made in the ranks of vice-ministers, there had been a virtually complete withdrawal of ambassadors, and it is almost certain that the commissions for economic and for cultural relations with foreign countries and the Ministry of Foreign Trade had also been considerably affected. It is evident from one source that Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi, who had his own personal problems, was attempting to limit the impact of the revolutionary upheaval

on his subordinate organisations and bring the struggle to an end as soon as possible.<sup>34</sup> If this source is correct, vice-minister Hsu I-hsin seems to have been partly responsible for conducting the revolution in the foreign affairs system.<sup>35</sup> It further states that Lo Kuei-po had made certain unspecified mistakes and had recently gone to the Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. There is no way of testing the accuracy of these statements. It is just possible that Hsu I-hsin was so employed during the first half of the year, and that his revolutionary role may have been the reason for appointing him vice-minister at the end of 1965; he certainly remained out of the public view during this period, without any known functions. The meaning of the statement about Lo Kuei-po is not clear. In view of the fact that he appears to have been retained at that time not only as vice-minister but as the senior vice-minister, and to have carried out his normal public duties, it possibly means that he had been temporarily given added responsibilities for conducting the revolution in the cultural commission, where, not surprisingly for those difficult times, he had made a number of mistakes.

The case of Chi P'eng-fei is illustrative of how the Cultural Revolution was affecting certain vice-ministers. Chi, who was responsible for African affairs, dropped out of the news in mid-March and was not recorded as having attended any public functions concerned with Africa until mid-October. During part of this time, however, Hsu I-hsin and Han Nien-lung seem to have acted in his place on such occasions; that is, from June. It is consequently possible that Chi was being struggled against by the revolutionaries during this time. After his reappearance in October he continued in his normal African role till the end of the year. Han Nien-lung was prominent throughout 1967 in his old role concerning Asia; Ch'iao Kuan-hua, less prominently, continued to make public appearances primarily at Soviet and East European functions. It has not been possible to discover anything about the activities of Liu Hsin-ch'uan or Ch'en Chia-k'ang to indicate their vice-ministerial functions, if indeed they still had any. During 1967, therefore, the complement of vice-ministers remained apparently unchanged at seven. However, as the active geographical areas of responsibility were limited to four, West Europe, Africa and West Asia, the Soviet Union and East Europe, and Asia, it is not known what the full-time responsibilities of three of the vice-ministers actually were.

The Chinese view of the world in 1967 did not vary much from the traditional pattern, if a joint editorial of the *People's Daily*, *Red Flag*, and *Liberation Army Daily* is any indication.<sup>36</sup> China was still the giant of the east. Albania was raising the red banner of socialism in what was basically a revisionist Europe.<sup>37</sup> North Vietnam was the outstanding example of anti-us armed revolutionary struggle; and the peoples in most of the rest of Asia were also embarking upon or already engaged in such struggles. In Africa and Latin America the national-democratic revolutionary movement was gathering momentum. Even the proletariat of West Europe, North America and Australasia was awakening and plunging into the struggle against us imperialism and monopoly capital. That, at least, was the published view of the régime in early November. Before the month was out Chou En-lai was to emphasise further the special role of the Albanians regarding the whole of Europe when he said that 'Albania is a great beacon of socialism, which constantly shines and illuminates the road of advance for the European people in their struggle for liberation'.<sup>38</sup>

If the Cultural Revolution was in theory designed domestically to eliminate revisionism, externally it was expected to strengthen China's revolutionary attitudes to the world struggle. With the formal conclusion in 1968 of the most important phase of this revolution, if not its end as a centrally motivated and partially organised effort, there would theoretically be reason to expect intensified and more radical foreign efforts on the part of the Chinese. But theory has a habit of being restructured or scrapped when unable to accommodate itself to fact, and it is possible that the new external revolutionary effort will not materialise or if it does will pale into insignificance by comparison with domestic developments.

From the viewpoint of this chronological analysis, 1968 is a crucial year. Whether or not there will be a continuation of high-level purges and mass upheavals it is clear that the public dismissal of Liu Shao-ch'i at the Twelfth Plenum in October was the ritualistic ending of a vital stage. In the words of the plenum's communiqué on 31 October, 'hundreds of millions of people . . . have finally smashed the bourgeois headquarters represented by Liu Shao-ch'i . . .'.<sup>39</sup> The year saw the achievement of much that Mao had been dreaming of for a number of years. If the Cultural Revolution had not been as successful as he had hoped, it had

nevertheless brought about the downfall of a number of leaders he had wished to depose and the removal of an ossified or insufficiently responsive stratum of leaders. It had certainly created temporary social mobility and stirred the nation up as it had seldom been stirred before. During this time, partly as an unintentional by-product of the domestic revolution but partly by design, China's foreign policy had undergone a certain degree of crystallisation. Whereas originally China had been a junior partner of the Soviet Union in the world struggle against imperialism, and then had graduated to a position of parity with the Soviet Union, it had now reached the stage where it was claiming sole leadership of a world United Front. Moreover, having done so, in its own view at least, it had demanded that this United Front should be directed at both imperialism and revisionism. On the level of ideology it was claiming doctrinal superiority over everyone and in all matters. Such a role, one may add, is not at variance with China's historical tradition if one allows that the Chinese, except for the last one hundred years, ever attributed to the world's barbarians any ideological capability at all.

At the level of state relationships, on the other hand, China had, by its declared expulsion of the Soviet Union from the world United Front of states and peoples, achieved for itself the position of most powerful state in the Marxist-Leninist international system. The Russian intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was of course grist to the Chinese mill. From this date on they could claim with some justification that a small European socialist state could not realistically hope for independence from the Soviet Union. As Chou En-lai later said, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia served as a profound lesson for all who harboured illusions about imperialism and revisionism. From this date, too, the Chinese used what is very nearly the ultimate communist epithet against the Soviet Union: 'social-imperialism'. Here we have a glimpse of the underlying meaning of China's campaign against Soviet revisionism and against us imperialism. Shorn of the ideological wrappings, whose form is more impressive than their content, the Chinese have in effect said that national interest or chauvinism is the real threat. Imperialism equates to the power of the American state; revisionism to that of the Soviet Russian state. Between these two great nation states lies China, powerful yet weak and vulnerable. Though not to be compared with tiny Czechoslovakia, if the national interests of one socialist state could

be trampled under, if another such as Mongolia could be made into a socialist colony, was not there a danger that China's sovereignty might also be violated?

This fear was of course nothing new: it probably was real enough at the time of the Soviet occupation of Manchuria, and still there when the Russians maintained their special privileges in Sinkiang and Port Arthur. It certainly always has been present in the régime's thinking concerning the United States. Yet Marxism-Leninism denies the possibility of aggression by a socialist state. It therefore becomes necessary to explain away the demands of the national interests of the Soviet Union, the protection of its sphere of influence in East Europe, by recourse to the argument that it was a revisionist party which followed such chauvinistic, social-imperialistic policies in Czechoslovakia.

In the international affairs section of the Twelfth Plenum's communiqué there was, quite naturally, specific reference to Czechoslovakia. This was in the context of the attempted re-division of the world between the United States and the Soviet Union: thus the invasion of Czechoslovakia had been tacitly agreed upon by Washington. The new unholy alliance between China's two enemies would not be able to isolate China from the vast majority of the world's revolutionary masses; the wheel of history could never be turned back. The communiqué repeated the call to form a world United Front against its two enemies who, because they were both colluding and struggling with each other and were opposed by the masses everywhere, were bound to be defeated.

With the convening of the October plenum, at which it was announced that the much-delayed Ninth Congress of the ccr would eventually be held, China was once more in a position to consider foreign policy. It is as yet still too early to tell what will eventuate, but that it has been found necessary to re-examine earlier policies cannot be doubted. The Chinese have laid considerable stress on the new role of Albania as the example of Maoism under 'Western' or European conditions. This role, if it is to be continued, must be further underwritten by China. When Liu Hsiao started to devote all his attentions to Albanian affairs in late 1966, and then was released from the foreign ministry to become the new ambassador at Tirana, this seemed to be strong indication of China's intentions and high expectations regarding Albania and the European communist movement. But by late

September 1967 Liu had returned to China where, at the time of writing, he still remains. Very probably his recall was caused by the Cultural Revolution.

Then there is the question of Vietnam. Apparently surviving the revolutionary struggles is Lo Kuei-po. Quite clearly he was one of the régime's chief architects or at any rate chief executors of Indo-Chinese policy and has probably been intimately connected with China's support for the North Vietnamese war effort since at least the early 1950s. Developments in Vietnam, and at the Paris peace conference, will have a considerable impact on China. Whatever happens the essential truth of the overall Maoist concept of revolutionary armed struggle cannot be permitted to be doubted, nor can the communist cause in South-east Asia be allowed to appear to have been adversely affected. On present indications, however, neither of these possibilities seems likely: nevertheless, it does not necessarily follow that Chinese and North Vietnamese aims are at present free of contradictions or will remain so in the future. The subsequent role of Lo Kuei-po, and the overall composition of the vice-ministerial structure, may be a pointer to Chinese policies towards Indo-China and the neighbouring states.

The three remaining active vice-ministers have been concerned basically with Africa and the Arab world, the Soviet Union and East Europe, and Asia. All seem to have survived the Cultural Revolution. In the case of Chi P'eng-fei and Han Nien-lung this may indicate that Chinese policies towards Africa and the Arab world, and Asia, are to be continued very much as they have been in the past years, excluding the period of Cultural Revolution extravagance and turmoil. On the other hand there may well be no connection between the survival of these men and the correctness or otherwise of the previous external line. They may only have been well-connected at the top, and policy towards these areas after the revolutionary struggles in the ministry may significantly change. The position of Ch'iao Kuan-hua is not clear. He too apparently survived the internal struggle and could be retained as supervisor of Soviet and East European affairs. As to Liu Hsin-ch'uan, Ch'en Chia-k'ang, and Hsu I-hsin, nothing is known of their current activities; it is possible that the first two are no longer vice-ministers. If Hsu did have some Cultural Revolution role in the ministry, and if he accomplished his tasks to the satisfaction of the leadership, he should emerge with added

status. It may not be till the majority of China's ambassadors are once more functioning abroad that we learn more of Hsu's standing and role; until then further speculation is pointless.

In sum the conclusion of the dramatic vital phase of the Cultural Revolution in 1968, entailing as it does the eventual necessity to unveil a new overall program, probably means that new foreign initiatives are soon to become apparent. The structure of the ministry today does not appear to be designed to cope with new initiatives or an expansion of activities. As this chronological survey has shown, it has not been a permanent feature of the vice-ministerial system to load on to one man more than one geographical area of responsibility. Moreover, it is clear that the complement of vice-ministers has, quite naturally, been increased partly in proportion to the requirements of expanding diplomatic contacts and also in conjunction with changes in policy emphasis. The number of vice-ministers has grown progressively: three (1949), four (end 1950 or beginning 1951), six (1957), nine (end 1963 or beginning 1964). Its apparent increase to ten at the end of 1965 was in fact the beginning of the process of retraction, which coincided with the Cultural Revolution and left the ministry with seven, only four of which have recently been publicly active. It is likely, therefore, that the complement of active vice-ministers will be increased to somewhere between six and nine, although the régime's stress on organisational retrenchment throughout society may delay the process for some time. There would also seem to be a requirement for the creation of a separate Latin American geographical department in the not too distant future. This would be added reason for increasing the number of active vice-ministers from the present very low level of four. In conclusion, we may subsequently expect with some certainty fairly widespread changes in the institutions of foreign policy. These changes may coincide with evidence of certain new foreign policy lines, but if past developments are anything to go by they may well precede such evidence.

---

## **Part 2**

### **Policy Themes**

---

---

## Chapter 4

### Background to Policy

---



'OLD China was a semi-colonial country under imperialist domination', said Mao Tse-tung twenty years ago.<sup>1</sup> As China had indeed been under partial foreign domination or even occupation long before the Japanese invasion of the twentieth century, Mao's description was not far off the mark. If the masses of Chinese had not been much troubled by this lack of independence, as undoubtedly they had not, many of the more sensitive and politically aware among the intellectuals were gravely perturbed and incensed. When the Japanese military forces began their wholesale aggression against China this added several new dimensions to the Chinese view of the foreign threat. For such aggression had been perpetrated by an Asian nation, not long since feudal, and one traditionally a relatively insignificant appendage of the Chinese Empire; whereas the most distasteful and serious inroads of the past had been made by western or European 'barbarians', particularly the Russians and British. How was it that so soon after embarking on modernisation the Japanese had been able to humble the apparently mighty Russian Empire and then, within a generation and unprovoked, successfully invade China? How was it that the Japanese were able to overrun the Chinese defences with such ease, without seemingly arousing mass opposition and nationalistic fervour? What was wrong with China, how sick was the sick man of Asia? These were questions many asked themselves, and answered differently. However skilfully the Chinese communists juggled with the national strengths and weaknesses, and by this means gradually assumed dominance in the dual struggle against the Japanese and the Nationalists, they remained acutely aware of the nation's vulnerability. It is probable that it was not only colonial or imperialist degradation, or feudal and reactionary oppression, which had so influenced the thinking of the Party leaders. In addition to this, and to an extent because of this, the CCP had been reliant on advice from foreign communists. What must have been much worse was external interference. When Mao spoke of China's semi-colonial past he must have had

some of this in mind: the nation had been downtrodden, the people cowed, the ethos humble and unsure. Inherently, however, the Chinese people were a great people. They would stand up; they must be made to stand up and achieve the greatness that was the national heritage.

The mere defeat of the Nationalists was seen in 1949 to be an easy task, but not the consolidation of victory.

'The bourgeoisie doubts our ability to construct [said Mao]. The imperialists reckon that eventually we will beg alms from them in order to live . . . To win country-wide victory is only the first step in a long march of ten thousand li. Even if this step is worthy of pride, it is comparatively tiny; what will be more worthy of pride is yet to come . . . We can learn what we did not know. We are not only good at destroying the old world, we are also good at building the new. Not only can the Chinese people live without begging alms from the imperialists, they will live a better life than that in the imperialist countries'.<sup>2</sup>

Mao was here addressing the plenary session of the Central Committee as it sat not far from Peking on the eve of nationwide victory against the Nationalists. He was clearly concerned very largely with the problem of party discipline and motivation during the new relatively peaceful phase ahead. In addition, though, the theme of national insecurity, docility, or lack of assuredness, can be clearly discerned. Mao was not referring to the Nationalist threat, which theoretically remained while the rump government existed in southern China, or even in Taiwan. This was not his real concern. He was specifically connecting the bad old days and the good expectations with the question of opposition from the imperialists.

Mao was not thinking of the Japanese, the British or the Tzarist Russians; he was obviously referring to us imperialism. His stress on the Americans' evil intentions would not have sounded implausible to the Chinese masses. He could quote abundantly from public United States' sources to bolster his argument, and these were as copious as they were apparently hostile. As Congress told the world in 1949:

*'It has become increasingly clear both that the United States cannot afford to write off North China as a loss, and that there is less reason to*

*do so . . .* The United States is the only source that possibly has the capabilities to make up the [Nationalist] Chinese lack. It also has other commitments, and must husband its resources to balance all commitments. But the balance of commitments and resources will improve if China is salvaged, and decline if China is lost'.<sup>3</sup>

The whole text of this long report, which contained some serious misconceptions, emphasised the complete subordination of Chinese communism to the strategic requirements of the Kremlin, and the necessity for the United States to defeat the Chinese communists.<sup>4</sup> Knowing as the Chinese did how the Americans had helped the Nationalists, to what extent they were opposed both in principle and in practice to world communism, how powerful was the United States and how deep-rooted seemed to be American antagonism to Chinese communism, it is not surprising that they emphasised the new imperialist threat. Yet such is the irony of history that China's very fear of us imperialism was in some ways but a by-product of the American fear of communism. One has only to read the writings of the Marxist apostles, not to mention study the historical deeds of the international movement, to understand the unambiguousness of the revolutionary threat. Whether or not the promised world revolution and overthrow of capitalism and the like is merely ideological froth is of little consequence; what is important is that communist ideology has from the beginning proclaimed its intention of overthrowing the established order. Moreover, in 1948 practical communism, as witnessed in the pages of the Congress report just quoted,<sup>5</sup> and for very good reason, equated to aggressive expansion of the state power of the Soviet Union under Stalin. When the United States supported the Nationalists in their war against the ccr they were acting in conformity with an understandable view of the threat of world communism, but there was an additional reason: this support was being provided to the recognised government of China.

There was consequently a need for the Chinese leaders to emphasise the threat of us imperialism both as a practical possibility and as an ideological necessity. Mao himself employed both types of argument.<sup>6</sup> As he explained in June 1949: 'The whole world, except the imperialists and reactionaries in various countries, is elated and inspired by this great victory of the

Chinese people'. China's struggle formed an integral part of the long-term world struggle against imperialism. Consequently the Chinese people would have to maintain their guard:

'The imperialists and their running dogs, the Chinese reactionaries, will not resign themselves to defeat in this land of China. They will continue to gang up against the Chinese people in every possible way . . . we must never relax our vigilance . . . China must be independent, China must be liberated . . . no further interference, not even the slightest, will be tolerated from any imperialist country'.

Theory thus demanded, as practice no less required, that China co-ordinate its efforts with the international communist movement, and make reliance on the Soviet Union a cardinal rule of its foreign policy. The policy of 'leaning to one side', as this was expressed, must be understood in a wide context. Ideology is an important consideration in this respect: to the CCP it was a logical necessity to rely on the physical might and depth of experience of the world's oldest and most powerful socialist state and communist party. Apart from the ideological consideration, however, such reliance also had considerable relevance in a purely domestic psychological sense. The national mood of insecurity, if not pessimism, had to be overcome. The backing of the Soviet Union was consequently a psychological necessity, and formed part of the paraphernalia of optimism which was concocted by the Chinese leaders. It was mandatory, therefore, to stress the strategy of despising the enemy, of belittling the threat of nuclear weapons, and of emphasising the might of the socialist camp.<sup>7</sup> There were also practical material considerations.

As China saw the international situation in 1949 there were two great world systems in opposition to each other, socialism, and imperialism or capitalism. In other words, the main contradiction was, in state terms, that between the Soviet Union and the United States. This antagonism was of such intensity that in whatever other way Stalin regarded the Chinese leaders, the fact that they called themselves communist and that they supported the socialist camp entitled them to political and material support. China's aim of achieving complete independence and of building a powerful industrialised state could not, under the prevailing conditions, be realised without Soviet aid. Leaning

to one side was therefore a practical necessity. As Mao said at the time:

'In the epoch in which imperialism exists, it is impossible for a genuine people's revolution to win victory in any country without various forms of help from the international revolutionary forces, and even if victory were won, it could not be consolidated . . . Internationally we belong to the side of the anti-imperialist front headed by the Soviet Union, and so we can turn only to this side for genuine and friendly help . . .'.<sup>8</sup>

The overall national policy was not solely designed to project China's image abroad; the image of a great nation standing once more on its own feet in the world family of nations. The Chinese leaders were not only leaning to one side for a combination of ideological and, probably more importantly, practical considerations in international affairs. There can be no doubt that an equally potent motivating force in this respect was the compulsion to socialise the nation. The Chinese leaders may have been genuine and total converts to communism, or to the revolutionary philosophy of a lost generation of European bourgeois revolutionaries. In this respect they may have been communist first and nationalist second; but this seems an unnecessarily restricted and unreal definition. In all probability communism to the Chinese equated to the practical or applied method of revolution and government, which was proclaimed by Lenin and Stalin. Suitably modified it was the most effective instrumentality then available to the Chinese leaders for capturing and holding state power in their country. If imperialism could be held at bay by relying on the strength of the Soviet Union, communism could chart the distant ideological goal and in the meantime provide the organisational means by which this goal could be reached. By combining both the external and internal benefits of reliance on the Soviet Union with those derived from communist methods of government and the promise of an eventual earthly paradise, the Chinese hoped and probably believed that the nation could once more be made to achieve greatness. It would be unreal and totally misleading to think of the Chinese motivations entirely in terms of ideology. China was once without parallel: there is therefore no reason at all for rejecting or denying nationalism as a factor in Chinese thinking. To strive for national greatness, in the context

of communist internationalism, is not only historically logical but also inevitable. The contradiction between nationalism and internationalism did not manifest itself until the question arose of leading the international movement.

This, then, forms the background against which we must study the evolution of specific strategic and tactical concepts of China's foreign policy. The Chinese leaders saw the emergent state threatened from without by imperialism and from within by reaction. External reliance on the Soviet Union and domestic consolidation of state power were, in 1949, the only matters of consequence, and yet today the régime is struggling not only against us imperialism but also against what was twenty years ago its principal ally and supporter, the Soviet Union. Not that the latter struggle is so described, far from it. The Soviet Union is not the enemy; it is the revisionist leadership of its communist party that is the enemy. Beneath this ideologically acceptable explanation, however, it is not difficult to discern deeper motivations. Chinese policy as it is now revealed, and under the prevailing conditions of Maoist adulation, indicates an emergent xenophobia that is but poorly camouflaged by an ideology of internationalism or communistic altruism. It suggests that underlying everything there still remains a basic national insecurity, bred largely perhaps by a realisation of fundamental domestic weakness. It is possible that the régime sees something ludicrous or inherently wrong in, to use its own metaphor, a people without pants brandishing nuclear weapons. It is possible that someone in Peking is seriously perturbed by the contradiction between the endemic if latent national fragility and the great-power posture abroad. Whether or not this is so it is clear that the program of domestic development has had, not unnaturally, a significant impact on the nation's foreign policy. An examination of the domestic basis would therefore be of value as a means of bridging the gap between the general historical background and the specific foreign policy lines of the present régime.

---

## Chapter 5

# The Agrarian Base

---



No state in this modern world exists in complete isolation from other states. Its view of its position and role, its capacity to operate either domestically or externally, is governed both by the outer environment and by the inner dynamic. That there is a close relationship between the two, between a nation's real self and its image and actions abroad, goes without saying. The problem is always one of relating the two forces causally. China's history suggests that domestic pressures and concerns were normally of greater weight than those derived externally; this is probably true of other great societies. There is thus good reason to expect such conditions to apply to contemporary China, and indeed this does seem largely to be the case. It is almost as though the overall strategic motivation is domestic, whereas external factors have only tactical impact. Whatever the case it is clear that beneath the surface of transient diplomacy there lies the enormous weight of the historical China, which, though affected by developments abroad, exists in many respects in isolation from the world about it. If one discounts such factors as political or ideological motivations, being relatively unimportant and impermanent, one is forced into recognising the dominant role of native socio-economic factors quite distinct from outside pressures.

China is today, as she was when the régime was founded and will be for some time to come, basically an agrarian state. Mao recognised this fact from the very first. If he can be said to have creatively developed Marxism-Leninism it must surely be in his perception of the rural peculiarities of the Chinese nation and his adaptation of foreign theory to Chinese practice. He was not only concerned with evolving a national revolutionary technique. Even before final victory against the Nationalists he was undoubtedly concerned with applying revolutionary theory to the consolidation of state control in an almost exclusively agrarian society, and in the task of modernisation and industrialisation. As he said on the eve of victory: 'The serious problem is the peasantry'.<sup>1</sup> By this he meant that building a socialist industrial base in China would be

easy by comparison with the task of solving the land problem and inducing the peasants not only to accept drastic reforms but even more importantly to support the régime genuinely and positively.

It was not enough that the rural masses should be made passively responsive. They must, with education and the passage of time, be led to the position of instinctive acceptance and committal. It would not be going too far to state that in this task Mao has failed. Responsiveness he has achieved, and at times this has been made to appear instinctively fervent, but the peasant masses seem still to be only negatively reacting to the government rather than positively integrating themselves and their interests with it. Mao's failure in this respect may have been inevitable, one cannot tell; but it is certain that the régime's rural policies have been deficient in certain important respects. Depending on one's political viewpoint, it can be said either that the régime should not have socialised agriculture or that in doing so it was correct. However, this is not entirely the point. Where Mao failed was in aiming for the relatively easy target of industrialisation at the expense of the rural sector of the economy. For every great industrial complex completed, for every nuclear explosion, the peasants must have asked themselves how this contributed to their overall and very personal requirements. Agricultural calamities such as those which occurred for a complex of reasons in 1960 and 1961 are probably over-played themes. What is important in the long run is whether or not the régime is seen to be one which can alleviate the effects of such calamities, even if on some occasions it was itself partly responsible for them. This the régime has done to an extent no other has done in living memory.

Nevertheless, the Chinese peasant is more than a specialised human machine; he has human emotions and expectations. If he may on occasion rather see his son with little education than removed by schooling from the family labour force, he still hopes that conditions will eventually improve. He probably hopes that his son will not have to work as hard as he or be so dependent on the whims of nature. He certainly hopes for a general improvement in living conditions while he himself is alive. But this he has not obtained to his complete satisfaction or in accordance with his expectations. The régime has seriously neglected rural affairs: it has not done enough to provide consumer goods, fertilisers, pesticides, and improved agricultural implements; it has done

very little in the way of improving rural education or general cultural facilities; it has not done enough for the health of the peasants. This state of affairs is quite evident from the régime's own statements over the years and today. The rural areas have not been totally neglected. Indeed one can point to some remarkable achievements, particularly in the fields of electrification, communications, and conservancy. The point is, however, that much more could have been done and should have been done for the peasant masses than was; and the primary reason for this was the stress on industrialisation for national defence purposes. Whether or not the régime was correct, from the viewpoint of strategic necessity, to follow the path it did is really beside the point: human nature being what it is the peasant must have considered that his own special and vital requirements were being overlooked.

This problem is central to an understanding of the régime's domestic policies. It is clear that the country's new communist leaders laid heavy emphasis on industrial construction and political transformation: the drive for tangible material benefits was to be confined primarily to the industrial sector. The intention was to commit a large part of the nation's resources, particularly those of agriculture, to the task of paying for future industrial self-sufficiency. To this end the régime began its preparations for launching its First Five Year Plan. These preparations were obliquely referred to in the middle of 1951 and were further mentioned a year later. By the autumn of 1952 it was announced that the task of national economic rehabilitation had been completed and that the stage had been reached at which large-scale economic planning could be undertaken. This marked the actual beginning of the First Five Year Plan, though this continued to be amended and redesigned until its final publication in 1955.

The autumn announcement is of particular interest: it came just after Chou En-lai had returned from a visit to the Soviet Union, where in all probability he had negotiated with Stalin for the extension of Soviet aid to the industrialisation program. It is significant that these developments had taken place in the autumn. China is primarily an agrarian society; even a régime which appears to be obsessed by industrialisation has to tailor its designs to the agricultural limitations. Its hopes can only materialise and be financed through agricultural production. For this reason major CCP policy meetings have generally been held in the summer, when it is possible to make a fairly accurate assessment

of the national crop potential. It is at this time that the leaders appear to draw up general guidelines for policy; often, however, the leaders then wait until the great bulk of the harvests is actually in before extending and amplifying or restricting the scope of the early policy outlines. One may perhaps expect this to be so for the essential economic policies and for many domestic political activities; but because of the notable Chinese successes in recent years in the fields of industry and science the overwhelmingly agrarian nature of Chinese society is sometimes overlooked. These summer and autumn Party conferences do not restrict themselves to domestic matters, however crucial and directly linked to agriculture these may be; foreign policy is also discussed.

The very fact that the régime was officially established on 1 October, when it could well have been established much earlier or even later, seems to be clear evidence of the leaders' agrarian background and awareness. The first day of any month would have been a propitious date; the first of October was more significant, for by this time most of the nation's harvests have been gathered. In an earlier work I have attempted to show the relationship between the summer agricultural season and Party meetings that had a specific and direct bearing on domestic politics.<sup>2</sup> The underlying importance of agriculture to the origination of significant foreign policy changes, though less easily demonstrated and of more limited applicability, can also be suggested. Quite clearly the fact that there had or had not been a bumper harvest would have no effect on, for example, the question of establishing diplomatic relations with the Yemen or of resuming talks with the United States. Nor would fluctuations in the agricultural economy have significant effect on overall strategy. Nevertheless, there appears to be some correlation between the summer harvest stock-taking and major periods of change in foreign policy. Although purely military factors were of immediate importance to the timing of the strike against the Americans in Korea in 1950, the general state of the politico-economic situation must have been the deciding factor. The decision to attack in 1950 probably coincided with the drawing up of plans to reorganise the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and to strengthen state and Party relations with the Soviet Union and the East Europeans: these moves became clear the following spring.

Of less significance was the establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Trade in the late summer of 1952. Between the summer and the end of 1954, and extending into the spring of the next year, there were a number of vice-ministerial and ambassadorial changes, and the ministry's Asian Department was divided into two. In late 1955 a series of new ambassadorial appointments was made. A year later the West European and African Department was reorganised into the West European and West Asian and African Departments. From September to December that year, 1956, several important new foreign initiatives became apparent. These included an extensive foreign tour by Chou En-lai and the beginnings of the Sino-Soviet dispute, though both were directly related in large measure to external causes. This period also saw the initiation of a variety of moves which were only effected in the summer and autumn of 1957. It also led to the appointment of a new Foreign Minister and, by means of vice-ministerial appointments, to the emphasising of Soviet and East European and of Indo-Chinese affairs. This was the time when the Great Leap Forward was probably designed in broad outlines: in addition it saw a number of institutional changes, such as the establishment of a Socialist States Department and a Commission for Cultural Relations with foreign countries.

Late in 1958, with the beginning of the Great Leap failure, came the abolition of the Socialist States Department and the re-establishment of two Asian departments. Towards the end of the next summer a high-level purge was carried out which was explained to the Party in terms of the Sino-Soviet dispute; a vice-minister of foreign affairs was dismissed and his replacement was then probably selected. At the end of 1961 and carried forward into the next year a number of ambassadors were changed. This seems to be evidence of an ability to effect certain minor diplomatic changes in isolation from domestic developments, as China was at that time clearly not in a position to conduct major external innovations. The period of the Tenth Plenum, that is from about August to September, was highly significant. It was then that the régime seems to have become aware of a significant improvement in the national agricultural yield. It was then that it withdrew its ambassador to India and probably decided to send him to Moscow. It was also then in all probability that Peking decided to bring its Moscow ambassador back to the ministry. It may also have been at that time that the decision was made to attack India: in the event,

as in Korea, military operations against the Indians commenced in October. This Tenth Plenum period was the start of a series of highly significant developments in foreign policy which extended up to the summer of 1965. In September and October of that year the Cultural Revolution began, although only in a tentative manner. From this period on there have consequently been numerous personnel changes, though little real attention seems to have been paid to the overall direction of foreign policy.

Over the whole period from 1949 to the present there have been three major phases of reorganisation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 1950, 1956, and 1962.<sup>3</sup> In all cases the start of these phases of change can be traced to the late autumn or beginning of winter. Considered in conjunction with what has just been described there appear to be fairly good reasons for suggesting a connection between the assessment of national harvest prospects and the initiation of new foreign policy lines. It may be going too far to suggest that these three major phases be employed as a basis for a comprehensive system of periodisation for contemporary Chinese developments. It is not at all clear whether efforts to establish historical periods, whether they span hundreds of years or only a few, are ever of great value; perhaps they are of some benefit to the researchers who create them and use them in systematising their own thoughts. They may be of little more value than as aids to subject presentation. Nevertheless, there would appear to be some marginal value in amplifying the remarks made above on the major phases of institutional change, for they seem to be coincident with more far-reaching and fundamental shifts in domestic and foreign policy. They may be described as periods which marked the launching of general offensives. The national dynamism seems to have undergone a wave-like pattern of development from one qualitative change to another. The first phase of development after the establishment of the régime appears to have started in the summer of 1950. The Party conference that seems to have formally introduced the new period was the Third Plenum of June; but undoubtedly there were more crucial unpublicised meetings in the late summer and early autumn to consider the Korean war and China's military and economic capability in this respect.

The whole period was marked by reliance on Soviet support in nearly all fields of activity. The single great enemy was United States imperialism. Throughout the period the main internal

economic thrust was directed at industrialisation, political consolidation, and socialisation; much was achieved in this respect by the end of 1955. The second qualitative change seems to have come in 1956, and was first evidenced by the meetings of the Politburo and Seventh Plenum which extended from July to September. From this time on reliance on Soviet material aid diminished; the stress came to be more and more on native capabilities and high expectations. The period saw the beginning of the move away from the Soviet Union in Party matters. The United States, however, remained the obvious major threat. The third phase was ushered in by the Party conferences held from July to September 1962. The period of retrenchment which followed the failure of the Great Leap was over; the primary domestic emphasis was on economic consolidation and progress in conjunction with ideological remoulding. The military and political victory against the Indians served as the curtain-raiser, the nuclear explosion in 1964 in some ways marked a climax. The shift away from the Soviet Union reached the point at which Party and state relations between the two nations became severely strained. Overtly and in formal terms, however, the United States was still described as the greater of the two enemies.

The period of the Cultural Revolution which followed the Politburo meeting in late September and early October 1965 formed an integral part of this third phase. The main domestic stress was on ideology. Though the economy continued to make progress, particularly in certain restricted fields, it is doubtful whether much attention was paid to it by the leaders. International relations similarly were not given undue attention, except for the war in Vietnam. Nevertheless, it was during this phase that the Soviet Union came formally to be excluded from the Chinese-led world United Front which was now directed at both the United States and the Soviet Union. In conclusion, it can be stated that, within the limitations imposed by the nature of the problem, the evidence suggests that the three major phases examined all share two common factors. The first is that they began in the summer and became firmly fixed in their fundamental characteristics by the beginning of the autumn. The second is that the primary stress or motivating force observable throughout each phase was domestically derived.

---

## **Chapter 6**

# **Guerilla Strategy and Tactics**

---



It is not always easy to differentiate between the terms strategy and tactics when they are used by the Chinese to describe foreign policy. I have further confused the picture by writing of domestic strategy and foreign tactics. In general, however, the Chinese usage is standard. Strategy applies to the method of manoeuvring the enemy, actual or potential, into a position from which it would be difficult to counter the Chinese foreign policy offensive. The term tactics concerns the actual way in which the enemy is attacked after he is placed in such a disadvantageous position. On the other hand, a too rigid separation of the terms can be misleading as they are complementary, and tactical methods are certainly employed to assist the overall strategic drive.

Mao Tse-tung has written extensively on the subject of strategy and tactics. If his selected works demonstrate anything at all it is the frequency with which he discusses strategic and tactical problems, particularly in the period of the war against Japan. These references not only provide insight into the nature of the anti-Japanese struggle, they offer a clue to his personal character and indeed to his fundamental approach to international affairs. In Maoist terms strategy concerns the long-term overall plan whereas tactics relate to short-term and specific methods. The speeches contained in his selected works were, however, not merely socio-political or military analyses, though they certainly were strongly of such a nature. Mao was, during those days, speaking and acting very largely in a messianic capacity. All he said and did was designed not only to show people how to act but to prove to them the necessity for acting. Optimism was the underlying characteristic of much of his thinking. In part this may well have been little more than a true reflection of his inner self, but it was more; Mao had to galvanise the Chinese people into action. He had to make them believe in the possibility, however remote, of defeating an enemy that in many respects appeared invincible. Consequently his message was that from the long-term or strategic viewpoint imperialism inevitably would be defeated

by the masses. Without faith in this the Chinese people would be defeatist; imperialist aggression would triumph and the revolution fail. Tactically, however, the enemy's power was real enough and called for earnest consideration. Conviction, enthusiasm, and courage were strategic necessities, but they could not and must not be allowed to replace level-headedness and caution in the short-term tactical struggles.

A major Maoist strategic concept is that of gaining time. As Mao wrote, just over thirty years ago, on the subject of waging war against the Japanese: 'Strategic protractedness . . . means gaining time to increase our capacity to resist while hastening or awaiting changes in the international situation and the internal collapse of the enemy, in order that we can launch a strategic counter-offensive . . .'.<sup>1</sup> When Mao spoke of trying to gain time and when he said 'make wiping out the enemy's effective strength our main objective; do not make holding or seizing a city or place our main objective',<sup>2</sup> it is clear that he was thinking along traditional military lines and advocating the trading of space for time. The contexts of these statements were strictly military, but the concepts can be applied to the conduct of foreign policy in later times. Indeed, as General Li Tso-p'eng wrote in 1965, military methods of thought are applicable to political and economic struggles.<sup>3</sup>

China, up to the mid-1950s, seems to have directed its main efforts in three directions: building up the economy, ensuring support from the Soviet Union, and maintaining world-wide pressure against the United States. In the first instance the régime's propaganda media contain much evidence of an apparent desire for world peace. As the National People's Congress was told in 1954, 'Everyone can see that all our efforts are directed towards building our country into a prosperous and happy socialist industrialised state. We are going ahead with our peaceful work and we want a peaceful environment and a peaceful world'.<sup>4</sup> Thus at a time when China was vigorously embarking on its First Five Year Plan and had not long before participated in the task of concluding the wars in Korea and Indo-China, she was publicly stressing the need for a peaceful environment in which to pursue her domestic program of construction and socialisation. The second course of action stressed in propaganda was that of reliance on the Soviet Union. This concept was emphasised in Mao's speeches and writings for many

years. In 1954 reliance on the Soviet Union, and on the world forces of peace and democracy headed by it, was said to be the only way in which the international situation could 'be made to produce changes decidedly beneficial to our country'.<sup>5</sup> The third course was that of struggling against us imperialism. The broad strategic concept was quite clear. China required time in which to consolidate itself politically and create the basis of a modernised industrial structure. The former task it could do without outside help and in fact had done in large measure by the end of 1955. The second required assistance from the European socialist states, and primarily from the Soviet Union. By the end of 1955 China was well on the way towards industrialisation, though much of the aid which was to come from abroad was not due to arrive until subsequent years. Still, the results had been encouraging and the leaders probably felt that the long-term plan would be successfully implemented.

The strategy of buying time by relying on the Soviet Union and striving for a peaceful international environment can be said to have been linked with that of trading space. The space traded, however, was of a very particular nature: there was no suggestion at all that the régime would have been willing to alienate what it considered to be Chinese territory. The strategy employed was that of trading non-Chinese space abroad; of supporting armed struggle against us imperialism here, waging diplomatic offensives against it there, and of gradually extending Chinese influence throughout the world; but never, after Korea, of confronting imperialism directly and inflexibly. In this sense, the Geneva Accords on Indo-China, at a time when to outside observers continuation of armed struggle by the communists would appear to have led to swift victory throughout the area, equated to trading space. Territory which could have been taken militarily was given up for overriding political reasons. Although the concept of trading space has been universally employed throughout history, it is also peculiarly Chinese. Mao himself has used the analogy of the Chinese chess game to illustrate the technique of dominating space in order to encircle the enemy.<sup>6</sup>

Throughout the early years of the régime one of the major aims was that of encouraging and maintaining the world struggle against us imperialism. Reliance on the Soviet Union and the conclusion of an alliance between the two states was part of the greater strategy of opposing imperialism. It was interpreted in

Peking, and probably in Moscow, as ensuring that the United States would be kept off balance with its forces concentrated at opposite ends of the world. In a curiously worded article on the subject not long after the régime had been established it was stated that us imperialism was facing an insoluble dilemma: 'If it places its main strength in Europe, the Asian peoples will win even greater victories; if it divides its strength equally between Europe and Asia, both the European and Asian peoples will win . . .'.<sup>7</sup> There was of course a third possibility: the United States could place its main strength in Asia. The failure to mention this provides an interesting insight into Chinese thinking, or at least into thinking that was reflected in propaganda. Its omission may only have been for morale purposes. The people of China were not particularly interested in seeing even greater victories in Europe if this increased the threat to themselves; furthermore the leaders were aware that there were people in China who would welcome such a threat to the régime. It could be, however, that the failure to mention the third possibility was due to the fact that the régime considered this to be an unlikely development. The Sino-Soviet alliance had forced us imperialism to divide its attentions between Europe and Asia, but as the Soviet Union was by far the more powerful of the two states in conventional terms the attention of Washington was bound to be fixed primarily on Europe. This state of affairs was maintained from the conclusion of the Korean war until the time when the Vietnamese war had seriously escalated, in the 1960s.

The basic strategy of relying on Soviet strength to counteract us imperialism and thus create the necessary peaceful environment for China's program of consolidation and industrialisation was founded on the belief in the implacable hostility of the two super powers, or at least on the credibility of such hostility. It is still by no means certain whether the apparent change in Chinese strategy which became visible in 1956 was due to genuine belief in a fundamental change in Soviet attitudes to the United States or whether it originated in the changed conditions within China. Certainly there was interplay between Soviet and Chinese attitudes, and the change in one was not necessarily wholly motivated by the change in the other. The evidence, though tenuous, suggests that the Chinese had decided in late 1955 to go onto the offensive domestically and that by coincidence the Russians had decided to launch their liberalisation campaign at about the same time.

Because these policies were not complementary their coincidence eventually created tensions between the two countries. It is possible nevertheless that even in 1956 the CPSU leaders had already decided in principle to strive for a *détente* with the United States and that they were largely driven to adopt this course because of their appreciation of the horrifying prospects of nuclear war. Whatever the case, from the end of 1955 or beginning of the next year the strategic policies of the two communist giants gradually and perceptibly diverged until they became diametrically opposed.

There would seem to be some value in attempting to define, in Maoist terminology, these strategic shifts. Mao states that there are three developmental phases in strategy: defensive, stalemate, and offensive. The first concerns the policy to be adopted when the enemy attacks; the second relates to the period after the attack has been smashed; and the third occurs when the enemy himself is attacked.<sup>8</sup> In our examination of the major phases of change in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs it was suggested that the dates on which they began were 1950, 1956, and 1962, and that they coincided with fundamental changes in both foreign and, more particularly, domestic policy. The first period equates to Mao's strategic defensive against the main enemy, us imperialism. Domestic policies were marked by orthodoxy: considerable efforts were made to achieve political consolidation and material well-being. Industrialisation, along conventional lines, was the key task. The natural enmity between the Soviet Union and the United States guaranteed Chinese security and support for the domestic economic program.

The second period was more complex. Strategically, the United States was still the main enemy. China was stronger but not yet in a position to go onto the offensive. Domestically the régime's policies stressed acceleration of economic construction; the orthodoxy of the earlier period gave way to innovation and unorthodoxy particularly in rural affairs. During the period the support of the Soviet Union became doubtful: though there was still hostility and suspicion between it and the United States the climate was generally one of *détente*. Strategically, therefore, a new potential enemy had to be taken into account. In relation to the Soviet Union China was on the defensive, while the strategy towards the main enemy was that of stalemate. In the third period, from 1962 on, the régime conducted a massive ideological re-tooling campaign, which reached its culmination during the Cultural

Revolution. Strategically it went onto the offensive against the main enemy, us imperialism; towards the secondary enemy, the Soviet Union, the strategy was that of stalemate.<sup>9</sup>

The fundamental thought governing Chinese tactics is that of discovering and utilising the inherent contradictions of the enemy. The assumption is that however strong the enemy may be, in some discoverable respect there is a weakness which must be exploited. Mao has pointed out, for example, that if the enemy's contradictions are taken advantage of the majority can be isolated from the hard core, thus enabling their separate destruction. As he said:

'Though the Communist Party is against all imperialists, yet we must on the one hand distinguish Japanese imperialism which is invading China from other imperialist powers which are not invading China . . . Our tactical principle remains one of exploiting the contradictions among them in order to . . . crush the enemies separately'.<sup>10</sup>

In effect he was saying, as he did in his work 'On Contradiction', that at various times and in various circumstances the enemy and the conditions in which he operates change. The task is to assess the principal danger at any one point in time and to make every effort to combat it. Mao's thoughts on contradictions are perhaps not entirely original; when divested of jargon they appear to be little more than the advocacy of tactical flexibility and opportunism. On the other hand, by elevating them to the level of theory we have been presented with a description of precise guidelines to action which are clearly those used by the Chinese in international politics. Liu Shao-ch'i excellently portrayed the methods to be employed in the world struggle when he criticised those

'who do not know how to utilize contradictions within the enemy camp, how to take advantage of these contradictions to precipitate an open conflict, how to establish temporary alliances with elements within the enemy camp who may cooperate with us, or with those who are today not yet our main enemies, so as to oppose the present main enemies, and to sap the forces the enemy has against us and destroy alliances hostile to us'.<sup>11</sup>

During the period of the strategic defensive the tactics employed

by the Chinese were of a specific, non-aggressive nature. It was important to emphasise that the nation was preoccupied with its great tasks of political consolidation and economic construction; this was the period of uniting the Chinese people and relying on foreign friends. In this context it was necessary, for domestic consumption, to underline the permanency of the imperialist threat and, internationally, the absolute necessity for peace. Relative to the neighbouring Asian countries China was a powerful giant, respected and feared, consequently the external tactical line during that period required that suspicion should be allayed. Considerable effort was put into the task of explaining away the potential threat and of proving China's peaceful intentions. Revolution was not exportable: unless conditions in the neighbouring countries demanded it and unless the people themselves created it there could be no revolution. In any case it was not China's intention to interfere. The overall requirement during this defensive period was thus that of buying time. The world's people should unite to oppose imperialism; nationalism at such a stage of development was an important weapon in the struggle. China was powerful but had no designs, either direct or otherwise, on neighbouring countries; on the contrary, she was their reliable support. The major tactical weapons were peace, non-interference, and unity against imperialism.

In the second and third strategic periods, from late 1956 to 1968, tactics changed. While the emphasis on non-interference and unity against imperialism was maintained the new domestic aggressiveness had its inevitable impact abroad. Mao has provided the theoretical explanation for the unfolding of the new international line. In the first place, as things are by nature temporary and relative, the terms people or friends and enemies are variable. Under certain conditions friends become enemies and enemies can be considered as allies. Classes too have differing characteristics according to the circumstances: even those which are basically unfirm or even opposed to the proletariat can be utilised to oppose imperialism. Patriotism, of a spurious bourgeois nature or otherwise, is a legitimately utilisable tactical tool if properly directed. When this concept came to be wedded to that of racialism, of the 'coloured' people against the 'whites', as it was in the late 1950s, it was efficacious in uniting the interests of China and the Afro-Asians.

Mao has also shown the necessity of creating a climate of public

opinion to prepare the way for the overthrow of political power: polemics are the locomotive of history. The ideological contest between the Chinese and the CPSU leaders, which began in 1956, thus assumes particular significance. It was necessary in the Chinese context as a tactic used to accelerate domestic development, and internationally it was the prerequisite to the challenge of Soviet supremacy. One of China's major problems was that of countering the attractiveness of Soviet material successes at home and of its greater capability to provide economic aid abroad. To compete materially was not feasible; consequently the tactic adopted was initially that of contesting the Soviet claim to ideological supremacy. If it could be established that the CCP, guided by the brilliance and uniqueness of Mao's thoughts, was the supreme arbiter of Marxist-Leninist purity, the international communist movement would be bound to follow its sole leadership. At the worst such an approach would weaken the CPSU hold over the movement and increase Chinese influence.

The application of this thinking to countries in which the ideological polemic would have had little meaning took the form, principally, of the tactic of armed struggle. In contrast to the Soviet stress on parliamentary methods, on peaceful coexistence and the support of nationalist governments, the Chinese called for the violent overthrow of oppressor classes and armed struggle against imperialism and colonialism. At least these were the black and white terms in which the Chinese described the tactical alternatives. Mao's theory of people's war was said not only to show how armed struggle was to be waged but, more importantly when others were arguing against these ideas, the feasibility and necessity of waging such struggles. The world's people, including those in the socialist countries, had to be taught fearlessness. Armed struggle and even nuclear war had to be despised if the positivism of the masses was to be fostered and maintained. In this respect it was a tactical necessity to achieve success by such methods. As one Chinese document put it:

'Among the independent countries in Africa, if only one or two of them complete a real national revolution, solving their own problem of resisting imperialism . . . the effect will be very great, the time ripe for action, the revolutionary wave will be able to swallow the whole African continent . . .'.<sup>13</sup>

This is also undoubtedly how China saw the Vietnamese war, and is further evidence of their belief in the tactical necessity of making the first domino fall.

China's two-pronged offensive against Soviet revisionism and us imperialism has made it necessary to employ a wide range of tactics and to employ them with ruthless flexibility. Two examples of this will suffice to illustrate the point. The first concerns the tactical requirement to rely on international support. During the early years of the régime, and in fact before it was established, the reiterated theme was that of relying on the support of the Soviet Union. Mao himself said that without such support the Party could not have led the nation to victory: 'aid from the Soviet Union is an absolutely indispensable condition for China's final victory in the War of Resistance. Refuse Soviet aid and the revolution will fail'.<sup>14</sup> He also said that 'international support is necessary for the revolutionary struggle today in any country or of any nation'.<sup>15</sup> Yet at the same time there was the underlying theme of self-reliance; a theme which was to become dominant over the years in the domestic context and drown out all sound of relying on the support of the Soviet Union. International support nevertheless had another meaning: the struggles of the world proletariat and oppressed masses supported the socialist nations. This particular interpretation has not been rejected by the Chinese. On the contrary, it has been used to good effect by them in their attack on what they see to be the one-sided emphasis by the Soviet Union of its support of the world struggle against imperialism. But if the Chinese have now conveniently forgotten one interpretation and are adroitly twisting the other they still use the general theory when they project themselves abroad. Thus the régime's propaganda is full of reports concerning the value of China's material and ideological support of the world struggle.

The main problem for the Chinese seems to be that of balancing the need for the world revolutionaries to rely on China with the requirement for self-reliance. Up to the point where reliance on China is ideological or political, and certainly only minimally material, there is no difficulty; but there is clearly no intention or current capability to underwrite this insubstantial support by extensive material or practical measures. It is almost as though the Chinese are saying: think as we thought, do as we did, and if as a consequence you get into a mess then rely on yourselves. The second example of flexible interpretation of tactical concepts

concerns the theory of the United Front. This will be discussed more fully later. Consequently it is probably sufficient to point out here that where the Chinese once told the world that the international United Front was headed by the Soviet Union, it is now directed against the Soviet Union and headed by China.

Strategy and tactics, as employed by the Chinese, share a common psychology which can be traced to the guerilla experiences of the present leadership. The conduct of diplomacy is very similar to the conduct of people's war. The material might of China is inadequate, therefore she employs indirect means externally. It is man and not material that counts. The nation's cause is a just one, therefore it can and must be fought for, and will succeed. China is the guerilla base for the world revolutionary struggles; the loosely co-ordinated forces of Asia, Africa, and Latin America are encircling and diverting the enemy. The purpose is not to hold territory but to annihilate the opposition. The world revolutionary forces are to be formed into a United Front, which may utilise for tactical purposes even the most improbable and unstable of elements in the campaign against revisionism and imperialism. While strategically despising the enemy, tactically China pits 'ten against one'. Where the task is too difficult the offensive is called off. There must be a balance between centralised command and local initiative, with China co-ordinating the overall campaign and leaving the specific details to the individual forces of the world revolutionary movement.

The force of Chinese thinking is not in its stress on conducting guerilla warfare against us imperialism, but in the comprehensiveness of the conceptual mould. The Chinese do not conduct their foreign policy along lines of direct confrontation. They see the international situation, wherein China is weak in conventional terms relative to the United States and the Soviet Union, as requiring the adoption of flexible and cautious tactics. The contemporary world is not one in which foreign policy is conducted in the mode of positional warfare, it is one which requires the use of guerilla tactics of a protracted nature. The employment of guerilla terminology or analogy by the Chinese, however indirect this may be, is natural for leaders who have been brought up under such conditions. It could therefore be argued that one should go no further than to conclude that the use of such descriptive techniques is merely propaganda colouring without real content. It could be argued in addition that the Chinese consider such terminology to

be eye-catching, evocative and consequently consumable abroad. One could also say that if the jargon is reinterpreted it would equate to a policy of cautious flexibility and of adroitness, and would thus differ but little from the diplomacy of other states. All this is probably true, so far as it goes. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the present Chinese leaders have been greatly influenced by the guerilla experiences of their younger days, have systematised a body of thought concerning these experiences, and have apparently employed tactics in international relations that are wholly derivable from this system of guerilla thinking.

---

## Chapter 7

# The Intermediate Zone

---



ONE reads in the poems of Mao of the five continents and the four seas, but as he has a predilection for classical or historical allusions it does not necessarily follow that the régime has always seen the world as comprising five continents. Even so, in the earlier days of the régime there certainly was a tendency to divide the world into five continents: these were Asia, Europe, Africa, the Americas, and Australasia or Oceania. With the rise of a new near-socialist star on the horizon, Cuba, and the increased interest in Latin American affairs it became more common to refer to six continents: thus a political view of geography was asserted. This becomes more apparent when one considers that Latin America, which is itself a non-geographical term, includes parts of the North American continent.

The Peking régime inherited from the Nationalists, with some minor subsequent alterations, the boundaries set by modern history. Korea, Mongolia, and Vietnam consequently fall outside the present limits of China. Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Burma have concluded agreements with China to delimit their borders. On the other hand major problems remain concerning the boundaries with the Soviet Union, Mongolia, and India. Taiwan and its associated islands off the province of Fukien are considered to be part of China. In addition, China also claims the Paracel (Sisha) and Spratly (Nanwei) islands, largely on the basis of mention in historical records and occasional visits by Chinese fishermen. An interesting glimpse into Chinese thinking is provided by their description of the strategic position of the main island in the Spratly group, which is important 'in communications as well as in a military sense, as it is located in a central position between the Philippines, Borneo, Malaya and Indo-China'.<sup>1</sup> Similarly the areas of Macao, Hong Kong, and Kowloon are thought of as belonging to China, and only awaiting the proper time to revert to its legitimate ownership.

Traditionally China has regarded itself as occupying the centre of the world, and while this subject will be further discussed in a

subsequent chapter, it can be stated here that there is no apparent reason for concluding that this view has changed. Indeed, it is implicit in Mao's thinking in 1949 and in much of the régime's propaganda ever since. China being, as Mao has said, the centre of gravity of Asia, it is appropriate that we first define the term Asia.<sup>2</sup> In the earlier days of the régime Asia equated to the one mass of land that extended from the Mediterranean to the northern Pacific and from the Arctic Ocean to the Timor Sea. Later on various attempts were made to differentiate between the particular areas of the continent. Today Asia has several meanings. In its widest application, and possibly for future political reasons, it includes all the Soviet Central Asian Republics, the European part of Turkey, and Cyprus. For practical political purposes, however, the parts lying within the Soviet Union are not generally referred to as Asian. Then there are the Asian sub-divisions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (see endpaper maps). According to these West Asia lies to the west of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to the south of the Soviet Union, up to and including the island of Socotra. The eastern segment of this area is linked politically with the northern Islamic countries of Africa to form the West Asian and North African Department. There is also the Asia of the Indian subcontinental group, which includes Afghanistan in the west and parts of South-east Asia in the east. South-east Asia is variously described. The term often equates to normal international usage, but in varying contexts excludes Burma and the Indo-China areas. Burma seems in many respects to be regarded by the Chinese as being an extension of the Indian subcontinental system. Cambodia, Laos, and the two parts of Vietnam, while being properly part of South-east Asia, are also given a separate identity and are included with Mongolia and the two sectors of Korea in a special category of Asia. Japan too belongs to Asia, but whether it is thought of as a continuation of the north Asian communist system, or as part of a maritime system which would include the Philippines, is unclear. In 1959, at least, it came under the First Asian Department.

Africa has been divided into two sections. The northern one is based on geographical and religious criteria. It is not known whether Malta is included in this grouping. Cyprus, on the other hand, is included in West Asia. The Canary Islands form the westernmost boundary of northern Africa, which division stretches in the south to Mauritania, Niger, the Sudan, and Ethiopia, inclu-

sively. Gambia, Senegal, and Chad may form part of northern Africa, but may equally well be included in the 'African' division; the facts are presently unavailable. With such qualifications, Africa proper lies to the south of approximately 10° and includes on the west the Cape Verde Islands and on the east Mauritius.

Europe can have a variety of meanings. In the strictest geographical sense it is that 'continent' which lies to the west of the Urals, being bordered on the other three sides by the Arctic, Atlantic, and Mediterranean. It is presumed, however, that for practical purposes Iceland and Greenland have also been incorporated into the concept of Europe, though this is uncertain. Politics tend to obscure the simple picture, and depending on the context the geographical confines can be extended or contracted at will. Thus the Chinese describe the portion of the Soviet Union east of the Urals as Asian, as do the Soviets, but in the last decade or so deny the Eurasian character of the Soviet state and politically extend Europe to the Pacific Ocean. In general, the Chinese, both geographically and politically, include the Soviet Union in 'Europe'; though what they mean by this term is not always clear. A classic example of loose terminology has been provided by Mao himself when he wrote:

'the attention of the United States has largely been absorbed by the awakening peoples of Europe, by the rise of the People's Democracies in Eastern Europe, and particularly by the towering presence of the Soviet Union, this unprecedentedly powerful bulwark of peace bestriding Europe and Asia'.<sup>3</sup>

In recent years the Chinese have tended to employ the terms Europe, West Europe, and East Europe almost interchangeably, particularly since the Czechoslovak incident in 1968. As they have nevertheless taken pains to distinguish between the two political divisions of Europe in certain contexts the blurring over of the differences has probably been deliberate and designed to support a specific tactical diplomatic manoeuvre.

The remaining continents of the world are Oceania, and North and South America. The confines of Oceania are not altogether clear: they certainly take in Australia and New Zealand. In addition they probably include the west Pacific islands and, at present, Papua and New Guinea. How far to the east Oceania extends is unknown. North America comprises the United States and Canada,

and presumably a number of Pacific islands. The South American continent is referred to as Latin America and extends from the borders of the United States to Cape Horn. In what manner the Chinese regard Antarctica is quite unknown. The same qualification which has been applied to Europe is applicable to Oceania and North America. Politically these two continental groups form one division of work in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition, however, there has been a tendency in recent years to lump together Western Europe, North America, and Oceania into one geo-political division.

'The United States and the Soviet Union are separated by a vast zone', wrote Mao over twenty years ago, 'which includes many capitalist, colonial and semi-colonial countries in Europe, Asia and Africa'.<sup>4</sup> This was the intermediate zone between the two great world forces of imperialism and socialism, and the battleground of the future. As Mao saw it in 1946, or at least as he described it, before us imperialism could attack its ultimate enemy it had first to subjugate the countries of the intermediate zone. Many of these countries were already under its influence, but its position there was far from consolidated; furthermore, it had yet to control West Europe and the British Empire. In two respects this analysis of Mao's is of particular interest. Firstly, his division of the world conformed exactly with that which necessitated China's leaning to one side. Against us imperialism, only the support of the mighty Soviet Union guaranteed safety. However, it did not conform with the geographical department divisions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when the régime was first established. In matters of the practical execution of foreign policy, although China leaned to one side only for protection against us imperialism, there was apparently no vice-minister in charge of relations with the intermediate zone. The world appears to have been divided into only two great areas: the European socialist group and the rest. The second aspect of Mao's analysis which is of interest is the implicit sub-division of the intermediate zone into capitalist and colonial or semi-colonial portions. It took, as we shall see, some seventeen years for this thinking to be realised in the formal sub-division of the intermediate zone.

This division of the world into two major antagonistic political groups separated by an extensive zone of peoples committed to neither is a concept not far removed from that employed by non-Communist theoreticians concerning the so-called Third World.

This concept is very well illustrated by the United States Congress report referred to earlier, where it was said that:

'The future of the world lies between two great systems of life, each represented by one predominant protagonist. What we often forget is that the whole of the number of people who actually live definitely in one or the other of these two systems is only about 600,000,000 people . . . There remain one and a half billions of peoples . . .'<sup>5</sup>

These latter equated to the population of Mao's intermediate zone. Mao's division of the world appears to have had nothing in common with traditional or non-communist Chinese thought. Mao's expressed view saw China forming part of a great socialist system. If the concept of a sinocentric world played any part at all in Mao's earlier writings it related to the importance of China's Asian position, not to its world role. China may have been the centre of Asia or the greatest power in the region but in every other respect it was merely a segment, if the second in importance, of the larger socialist world. Eventually, however, the régime's propaganda on such matters veered away from this view. China is now clearly, if still implicitly, thought of and described as the centre of the world. It may well be that Mao all along considered this to be the case, but that owing to the nation's weakness and need to rely on the Soviet Union the view was suppressed.

The intermediate zone has been referred to often in the régime's propaganda, though by no means always directly. According to Marxist-Leninist principles the zone comprises the markets and raw material producing areas of the whole capitalist world, without which the capitalist system must collapse. Thus when Mao talked of the military necessity for the United States to subjugate the area before it attacked the Soviet Union, he was dealing with only one aspect of the problem. This zone equates to the capitalist world, excluding the United States, and is divided into two: the developed and the underdeveloped countries. Though the Chinese have criticised the term underdeveloped as smacking of European colonial and racist bias, it is clear that they too think along such lines. To them a nation can be underdeveloped in two ways. Industrial underdevelopment can only be overcome after political underdevelopment has been overcome; if the latter is not effected and Marxism-Leninism does not

become the motivating political philosophy, then true economic independence cannot be achieved. Without such independence, they argue, the peoples' interests cannot be served or safeguarded. The underdeveloped world to the Chinese comprises the great majority of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The developed part of the capitalist intermediate zone is composed of such countries as Japan, Australia, Canada, and the states of West Europe.

In 1957 Mao revealed one of his neat arithmetical descriptions of the world situation. Very much along such traditional epigrammatic lines as 'ninety per cent of the world's population', he divided up the people of the world into political categories. The socialist camp contained 1,000 million, well over half of whom were Chinese. The imperialist camp had only 400 million. The independent former colonies and countries struggling for independence composed 700 million; while another 600 million were in capitalist countries outside the imperialist camp. This well-known statement, made to Chinese students in Moscow, is interesting not for its statistical method but for its political revelation. Nothing new is learned of the socialist camp; but the description of the imperialist camp is quite specific. This seems to be the United States and Canada; Britain, France, and the other West European nations; and Australia and New Zealand. How Mao arrived at his figures for the other two categories or what criteria he used for the distinction made is anyone's guess. The important thing is that he appears to have had some idea of an intermediate zone in mind when he conjured up his vision of 1,300 million people mid-way between the two political camps.

This intermediate zone of 1957, if it may be called such, differs from the one defined earlier. The original intermediate zone comprised the entire capitalist world except for the United States; in 1957, however, all the non-communist 'European' nations had been lumped together in the imperialist camp. The lack of agreement between the two systems of classification seems to be explainable only in one manner. The original intermediate zone separated the two great powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, and it included all the remaining capitalist nations. The 1957 zone lay between two great camps, the socialist and the imperialist; it included only those capitalist nations which lay outside the imperialist camp. Thus a differentiation had been made between imperialistic and non-imperialistic capitalism.

In January 1964 Mao's original intermediate zone was formally

re-defined and amplified.<sup>6</sup> It now consisted of two clearly distinguished parts. The first comprised 'the independent countries and those striving for independence in Asia, Africa and Latin America'. The second took in 'the whole of Western Europe, Oceania, Canada, and other capitalist countries'. The political character of this second group was said to be of a dual nature. In one respect it was antagonistic, being ruled by an oppressor class. But as the group comprised nations which were themselves struggling against us imperialism, it shared this characteristic with the world masses. This formal re-definition did not jar with the original 1946 meaning, in that the intermediate zone still contained capitalist, colonial, and semi-colonial countries. Nevertheless it did differ in one respect; the Soviet Union was now merely part of the great socialist camp, and of course Latin America was included in the intermediate zone. There was also, probably, a tendency to approach the definition made by Mao in 1957. The reliable first intermediate zone of 1964 was clearly distinguished from the second intermediate zone. This latter was unreliable: its rulers were imperialistic, but the countries they ruled were potentially anti-American. Whereas in 1957 capitalism was seen to be of two kinds, imperialistic and non-imperialistic, in 1964 it had further been divided into three. The added category was anti-American capitalism.

The re-definition at the beginning of 1964 coincided with the launching of the major Chinese offensive against the Soviet Union. It is consequently probable that it formed part of the overall offensive. The aim at that time, at the end of 1963, was twofold: to attack us imperialism and Soviet revisionism. However, different tactics were called for in different areas. The first intermediate zone, Afro-Asia and Latin America, would have been considered to be naturally responsive to certain Chinese ideas. The stress on armed struggle against imperialism, vestiges of colonialism and against neo-colonialism, was additionally advantageous. When Moscow was either dampening down the flames of armed struggle, or at least doing comparatively little to encourage it, and when the Soviet-United States détente was becoming more of a reality, Chinese advocacy of violent measures was also intended to set the struggling masses against the Soviet Union.

The second intermediate zone was composed of nations with a high standard of living, between whose peoples and the Russians

there were certain traditional affinities. This has been, and probably always will be, a difficult target for the Chinese. The 1964 line therefore stressed the need for mass struggle against the oppressor ruling classes, and for national struggles against us imperialism. The Chinese probably argued that as the rulers of these countries were either allied with the United States or under its control, and as the Soviet Union was colluding with the United States, struggle against the rulers was the same as struggle against Soviet revisionism. Such tactics consequently promised double success: against both the Soviet Union and the United States.

The formal division of the intermediate zone in 1964 was not a startling innovation; it was implied in the original Maoist definition and clearly retained in such thinking throughout the intervening years. It was in any case probably necessitated by Marxist-Leninist theory, which pictured the world as being divided between oppressive metropolitan countries and their colonial possessions overseas. Theoretical considerations are, however, of little value to an examination of foreign policy if they are not applied to practice. In our earlier assessment of the single intermediate zone it was seen that there was no apparent relationship between this concept and the organisation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thus the whole non-communist world, the intermediate zone plus the United States, was supervised by one vice-minister. This state of affairs seems to have been maintained until after the strategic shift in policy in 1956, although it was not until the following year that the complement of vice-ministers was increased from four to six. Consequently, the evidence suggests that the régime made some alterations to its view of the world between late 1956 and early 1957. This new world view nevertheless did not conform to the theoretical guidelines of the intermediate zone. The United States was not made into a separate geographical department, but remained joined to Latin America and Australasia. On the other hand West Europe certainly was detached from its Marxist colonial dependencies with the establishment of the West Asian and African Department. At that time, therefore, the theory of the intermediate zone and the practice of the Foreign Ministry cannot be said to have related closely to each other; this state of affairs still applies today.

In standard diplomatic practice or in foreign policy strategy it is difficult to see how Mao's concept can be made to serve a useful

purpose. As a particularly phrased cliché it helps dramatise the need to win over those countries of the world which are not yet committed, but it achieves little more and is hardly novel. One can with some effort fit publicised Chinese geo-political views into this conceptual mould. For example, the real and only vital part of the first intermediate zone could be reduced to Asia, in which area China sees itself as playing the dominant role. One could, again quoting the Chinese, illustrate their need to assert themselves in the Middle East, as this area was considered to be the hub of the two intermediate zones. The recent emphasis on opposing European revisionism and on the particular significance of Albania in this respect could also be analysed in terms of the 1964 definition of the second intermediate zone. But very little in the way of positive results would be obtained by adopting such an approach. Is the concept therefore devoid of all practical meaning?

In 1965, when it became fashionable in Peking to speak of the rural areas of the world encircling the cities, considerable note was taken of this by outside observers. The interpretation most frequently put on this was that it foreshadowed increased efforts on the part of the Chinese to encourage armed struggle throughout the world, particularly by means of guerilla warfare. As this subject will be dealt with at greater length later it is probably sufficient to say that this conclusion was partly correct. In addition, however, the new slogan, or its re-definition at that time, must be seen in the light of the overall Maoist guerilla view. It is in this context, it seems, that the concept of the intermediate zone has some usefulness. Guerilla warfare is a method of conducting armed struggle in an integrated political and military manner. The guerilla concept is thus applicable to the diplomatic struggle. In one of Mao's best-known works on guerilla warfare, written in 1938, he describes the war against the Japanese as being one of encirclement and of manoeuvring for base areas.<sup>7</sup> These bases were of three kinds. The first were the areas held by the communist military forces. The second were located in enemy-held areas. The third were the 'intermediate zones contested by both sides, namely guerilla zones'. Mao's world intermediate zone is thus a direct extension of the 1938 guerilla concept: the first base area equating to the socialist camp, and the second to the United States. The intermediate zone is therefore the area in which the political and military struggles are conjoined: the guerilla zone into which the enemy is lured, outmanoeuvred, and finally annihili-

lated. But the fundamental technique employed to achieve the ultimate military victory is political. Guerilla methods, if they are to succeed at all, can only do so if the people can be convinced by one means or another that it is in their interests to protect and support the guerilla fighters. Seen in this light Mao's world intermediate zone has little if any geographical substance. It is a shifting, fluid area; the ideological and political battleground for the struggle against all forces inimical to China's national interests. It need bear no resemblance to the reality of international affairs, indeed it very rarely does. The conduct of Chinese relations with the nations of the world is quite distinct from the overall guerilla strategy. The intermediate zone must by definition exclude us imperialism, the main enemy. It must include all those who are well-disposed towards China or who can be relied upon to oppose the enemy for varying reasons and periods of time. Nevertheless, this does not preclude the establishment of diplomatic relations with the enemy or with its allies. The overall guerilla strategy governs everything: subsidiary to it and supplementary to it is diplomacy.<sup>8</sup>

---

## Chapter 8

# The East Wind

---



IN the winter of 1957 Moscow was the venue for a world conference of communist parties. An occasion such as this, highly dramatic and significant as it was, called for the presence of Mao Tse-tung. It was during his visit to Moscow, we are told, that Mao made his famous statement concerning the East Wind prevailing over the West Wind. What precisely he meant by this is not entirely clear: it has been contradictorily defined by the régime's own propaganda media, and has been variously interpreted abroad. Nevertheless, everyone can perhaps agree on a minimum definition. Mao was speaking on a great occasion and he was concerned to give triumphant expression to such an occasion. The general meaning of his message was that the strength of the world system of socialism had surpassed that of imperialism.

This was not an altogether novel deduction. Exactly ten years before, Mao had said: 'The strength of the world anti-imperialist camp has surpassed that of the imperialist camp'.<sup>1</sup> With the victory of the ccp in 1949, the Chinese have consistently pointed out, the socialist camp became the most powerful political system in the world. Minister of Defence P'eng Te-huai put this into a military context in 1955 when he averred that the balance of forces was such that it ensured the utter destruction of the imperialist camp should a world war break out.<sup>2</sup> Chou En-lai, for his part, has spoken of the long-standing superiority of the socialist forces. Thus if the Chinese had always believed that with the addition of China to the socialist camp in 1949 its strength had surpassed that of imperialism, Mao probably had something else in mind when he spoke in 1957.

*People's Daily* stated a few months before Mao's visit to Moscow that 'Soviet industry is in the process of catching up with the leading capitalist country . . . Equipped with the most up-to-date weapons in the world, the Soviet defence forces have struck the imperialists with dismay'.<sup>3</sup> Just before Mao's visit the Soviet Union successfully fired an intercontinental ballistic missile and launched two satellites. There was thus sufficient cause for jubi-

lation, and Mao must undoubtedly have been tremendously impressed by these developments. However, this alone does not appear to be the reason for repeating the 1947 assessment in the guise of a new slogan. The Chinese did not say in 1957 that the Soviet Union had overtaken the United States in all respects: this achievement had only been made in selected if important fields of scientific and industrial activity. The force of the East Wind did not derive solely from material successes. As *People's Daily* put it at the time, the superiority of the socialist camp was due, in addition, to the size of its population and to the extent of its popular support; what gave it its overall superiority was the justice of its cause and its political strength.<sup>4</sup> This explanatory amplification provides the key to Mao's thinking at that time. It suggests that his ideas had not fundamentally changed in the intervening ten years. The East Wind slogan in some respects was consequently little more than exhortatory optimism. It was another way of urging people to despise the enemy strategically. But in addition it seems to have been much more than that.

Mao appears to be a man who is obsessed by the power of numbers, by the size of populations. When he spoke in Moscow of the prevailing East Wind he did so, furthermore, in a detailed numerical context. The total world population, he said, was about 2,700 million. Of this the socialist camp, together with the Afro-Asians and Latin Americans, numbered 2,300 million. At its face value this arithmetical approach shows that Mao was following his traditional approach of stressing majority power. The socialist camp was overwhelmingly larger than the imperialist camp, and could count on the support of the majority of the Afro-Asian and Latin American masses. It is further possible that beneath the surface Mao was hinting at other reasons for optimism; that is, optimism by the Chinese. In the first place, when *People's Daily* ascribed the superiority of the socialist camp to political and ideological strength, it was thereby relating this assessment to the Moscow conference of communist parties. The purpose of this conference was the strengthening of unity on the basis of Marxist-Leninist purity. As the Chinese may even then have been questioning the validity of Soviet claims in this respect, and were certainly soon to do so, it is probable that Mao's East Wind thesis was partly designed for this purpose. If the entire balance of forces was in the socialist camp's favour, the factor which stressed Soviet technological and military might had to be

de-emphasised in relation to that which concerned the Chinese role. Anti-revisionism thus became a counterbalancing factor: the East Wind slogan portrayed the purity of Chinese ideology, and portended its dominance.

In addition there is the question of China's own contradictory definition of the slogan. The conventional description has best been illustrated by the journal *Red Flag*: the terms East and West in the slogan

'are not geographical conceptions, but are borrowed from the vocabulary of the Western politicians. They lump together the imperialist countries and describe themselves as the "Western countries" or the "civilized countries" and call the socialist countries, the nationalist countries, in Asia, Africa and Latin America and all the oppressed nations the "Eastern countries" or "backward countries". It is very clear that idolizing the West is a sort of historically evolved superstition which is gradually being overcome. It is also a sort of superstition to say that the Western countries are advanced. On the contrary they are backward. True they have something in their hands—some iron and steel and atomic bombs, but politically they are corrupt and backward'.<sup>5</sup>

It is not difficult to see from this that much of what was said applies to the Soviet Union as well as it does to the anti-communist world. But even so, superficially the statement is directed at the superiority complex of the so-called West. If it could have been interpreted as also attacking the Soviet Union, such an attack was indirect. In 1966, however, when no question remained of China's attitude to Soviet revisionism, the slogan was very differently interpreted:

'The East Wind is the anti-imperialistic revolutionary force of the proletariat and the oppressed people of Asia, Africa, and Latin America: whereas the West Wind represents decayed imperialism and all other reactionary forces'.<sup>6</sup>

In view of the more recent Chinese inclusion of Soviet revisionism in the category of reaction it is manifest that this 1966 definition is specifically anti-Soviet. Considered together these two statements very strongly suggest that Mao's East Wind in late 1957 excluded from the socialist camp Soviet and East European revisionist par-

ties. The prevailing wind from the East came predominantly from China and its natural allies in the rest of Asia, and in Africa and Latin America.

The terms East and West have not, of course, only been used by non-communists; they are to be found also in Mao's works and in the régime's normal propaganda material. In a discussion on the overall European impact on countries such as China Mao has said that 'the Western bourgeoisie created two categories of people in the East, a small minority, the flunkies of imperialism, and a majority which is opposed to imperialism'.<sup>7</sup> In 1947 he said that the Chinese revolution was momentous because it was occurring in the east wherein resided half of mankind.<sup>8</sup> He has written in his essay, 'On Coalition Government', that China would play a decisive role in safeguarding peace in the east.<sup>9</sup> Other Chinese spokesmen have similarly referred to the east, and to China's particular relationship to the area. From all these references it is clear that east normally equates to Asia. West, likewise, usually has one particular meaning, though this has perhaps become more apparent only in the last few years. It normally means the non-communist 'European' nations, and the Chinese have been to some pains to point out how the Europeans regard themselves as superior and civilised in comparison with the Afro-Asian and Latin American masses. As one Politburo member put it when he visited Djakarta in 1965:

'Taking over the racial superiority complex of the European and American bourgeoisie and the imperialists, the Khrushchev revisionists shout in tune with the imperialists about "coloured people opposing white people" . . . There is not an iota of Marxism-Leninism in this view, which is a betrayal of the socialist countries and the revolutionary cause of the proletariat of the West'.<sup>10</sup>

However, both terms, east and west, can be used in a conventional non-geographical sense.<sup>11</sup>

The Soviet Union has charged that China has employed racist propaganda in its anti-Russian campaign. In its March 1963 letter to the CCP the CPSU alleged that at a recent international meeting the Chinese told them that 'the whites have nothing to do here'. Subsequent Soviet statements have reiterated this theme, and it has been taken up by various foreign newsagencies. Allegations of such a nature would be only natural to make regardless of the

factual basis, and should therefore be treated with the utmost caution. There are two completely contradictory aspects to Chinese thinking on such questions. In the first place history would suggest that there is, not far beneath the surface of traditional Chinese thought, an inherent bias against all things foreign; a bias which has often enough found expression in hatred and violence. The Chinese, like most other peoples, have not only hated foreigners; they have feared the unknown quality of all things foreign. But the Chinese have almost instinctively, and for very good reason, felt that they were innately superior beings.

This feeling of superiority is complex. Chinese culture, the age-long traditions of a truly great civilisation, has been a fundamental factor in the make-up of this attitude. In addition, however, there can be no denying that this has led them to regard themselves as being racially superior as well. Anyone who has lived among the Chinese, removed from the artificialities of the Westernised treaty ports, could testify to this feeling of racial superiority. The Chinese language is not without its racist epithets, even if these are now seldom publicly voiced. Terms such as 'big nose' or 'black devil' denote an attitude of racial superiority: they have nothing whatsoever to do with feelings of cultural superiority. Together they provide the Chinese with an in-built sense of superiority that is more formidable and more ineradicable than that possessed by almost any other peoples.

The second aspect to Chinese thinking on ethno-cultural superiority concerns communist theory. In theory no communist is or can be an advocate of racism. It is never race which oppresses, but class, though reactionary classes may utilise racist tactics to oppress the masses. Communist practice nevertheless leaves something to be desired not only in, say, the Soviet Union but also in China. In the pre-Cultural Revolution Politburo, for example, there was only one non-Han Chinese, and even he was a thoroughly sinicised Mongol with little apparent authority or power except in the parochial affairs of Inner Mongolia. China's public attitude to questions of ethno-cultural superiority has therefore been generally correct since 1949. But there is evidence that it has, since 1957, not been entirely faultless. Thus in the late 1950s Chinese propaganda media devoted attention to the views expressed by visiting Africans, Afro-Americans and the like, on the iniquities of European racism.<sup>12</sup> Through the mouths of these people Peking told the so-called coloured world of the sins of the so-called white

oppressors, and of China's sympathy and support for the struggle against racial oppression. The Chinese did not themselves, directly or openly, attack the 'white' people as such, but they went as far in this direction as Marxist-Leninist ethics would permit.

The CPSU charge in 1963 that the Chinese were racist has been kept up over the years. The Soviet Union has been concerned to make three specific, if related points. The first is that the Chinese have divided the peoples of the world into two antagonistic groups. One of these comprises the non-communist European peoples, to whom are naturally attracted for reasons of race and culture the communist nations of East Europe and the Soviet Union. This 'white' world, the minority, is inherently opposed to the majority 'coloured' world which is led by China. The second Soviet point is the allegation of Chinese incitement of nationalism, bourgeois or otherwise. And, lastly, the charge is made that China is attempting to establish the historical political affinity of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, in order to separate the peoples of these areas from the Europeans.

Despite Chinese refutations and counter-charges, and in some ways because of them, it would appear that the Soviet Union has been able to make a good case. General Chinese attitudes to race we have already discussed, but it is interesting to see how the régime has countered the Soviet charges. For example, they accused the Soviet Union in 1963 of packing the international women's organisation with Europeans. They have said of the CPSU leaders that 'When they peddle the "theory of racism", describing the national-liberation movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America as one of the coloured against the white race, the leaders of the CPSU are clearly aiming at inciting racial hatred among the white people in Europe and North America'.<sup>13</sup> They have accused the Soviet Union of imposing disarmament on the oppressed nations for reasons of European and North American chauvinism.<sup>14</sup> The Chinese should have been able to make a more positive refutation of Soviet charges: that they have not done so is revealing. China's attitude to patriotism and nationalism has never differed in fundamentals from that of the Soviet Union. Bourgeois nationalism, provided it is positive and can be utilised against colonialism and imperialism, is a necessary tactical weapon: 'patriotism is simply an application of internationalism in the war of national liberation'.<sup>15</sup> Chinese policy towards nationalist countries has, as they have said, always been that of encouragement and support.<sup>16</sup> This

has not extended to nationalist countries whose interests have clashed with those of China, as the case of India makes clear, though the Chinese would argue that such nationalism was false and reactionary. The Soviet criticism probably derives from the fear that the Chinese have been more adept at utilising nationalistic sentiments in the underdeveloped world than have they. The last Soviet charge relating to the historical political affinity of Asia, Africa, and Latin America has perhaps the greatest validity.

The theoretical basis for the Chinese assertion of special affinity to the underdeveloped world, and China's exemplary role in this respect, can be traced to Mao's essay 'On New Democracy'. In this he states that in the era which followed the October Revolution, the revolutions of the colonies or semi-colonies were, like the Chinese revolution, part of the proletarian-socialist world revolution. Universal forms of government could be divided into three basic categories: bourgeois dictatorships; proletarian dictatorships, such as the Soviet Union; and governments under the joint direction of several revolutionary classes. The latter form was that advocated and adopted by Mao for China. It was 'the traditional form of state to be adopted by revolutions in colonial and semi-colonial countries'.<sup>17</sup> Thus it was China which indicated the path to the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and not the Soviet Union; Soviet experiences in this respect were inapplicable. This traditional line has never been abandoned. In 1962, for example, the Chinese stated that they shared 'a common historic destiny' with the peoples of the underdeveloped world whose desire to win and preserve independence set them apart from other peoples.<sup>18</sup> The quality that united the Chinese with the underdeveloped peoples was the fate they had shared in the past of being suppressed by colonialism. It was therefore the duty of all such oppressed peoples to unite with China, to deny raw materials and markets to capitalism, and to co-ordinate the struggle against imperialism. In short the Soviet Union has understandably taken particular exception to the Chinese definition of the respective roles of the revolutions in Russia and China. This in effect limited the applicability of Soviet experience to modernised European societies. The October Revolution, said the Chinese, 'served as an example for revolution in the oppressor nations . . . while the Chinese revolution set an example for revolution in the oppressed nations'.<sup>19</sup> But it seems to have gone further, for if the October Revolution had opened up the way for

the world, the Chinese revolution, being a continuation of it, also had validity for oppressor nations.<sup>20</sup> Indeed, current Chinese practice stresses the universal role of China 'as the mainstay and indestructible revolutionary bulwark for the struggle of the whole world against imperialism'.<sup>21</sup>

---

## Chapter 9

# The Paper Tiger

---



SWIFT described the Paper Tiger almost two and a half centuries before Mao. Of Lord Peter's bulls, he said:

'the terrible roaring peculiar to their lineage was preserved; as likewise the faculty of breathing out fire from their nostrils; which notwithstanding many of their detractors took to be a feat of art, and to be nothing so terrible as it appeared'.

But the Paper Tiger is not genetically derived from Swift's bulls; it is, according to Mao, a descendant of the T'ang dynasty Kweichow donkey.<sup>1</sup> The moral in all these stories is the same: things are not always as fearsome as they appear. The Kweichow donkey brayed and kicked ferociously, and as the tiger which confronted it had never seen such a creature before he was at first terrified. Then he discovered that it could only bray and kick, so he devoured it. Mao later developed this thought into a philosophy of strategic optimism: 'the atom bomb is a paper tiger which the us reactionaries use to scare people. It looks terrible, but in fact it isn't'.<sup>2</sup> This vein of contrived optimism runs through all of Mao's thinking. It is probably a true reflection of his real self, but in addition it was necessitated and nurtured by the overall conditions of Chinese society. When everything appeared to be gloomy, when the enemy appeared to be frighteningly overwhelming, one had to seek beyond appearance for reassurance. This domestic requirement Mao fully appreciated long before the atom bomb, and long before the Sino-Soviet dispute. The sedulous cultivation of national optimism exacerbated Sino-Soviet relations; one may almost say that it made the ultimate dispute inevitable. In other words the national interests of both states were bound to clash and create antagonism. If the Paper Tiger thesis was but a slogan of optimism which was necessitated by domestic circumstances and designed principally for internal consumption, it was in addition a motivating force in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Much that has been said since the autumn of 1956

on the three major issues of war, nuclear weapons, and armed struggle, related in reality directly to the Paper Tiger thesis. When the Chinese chose to despise us imperialism strategically, to emphasise its Paper Tiger nature and to de-emphasise the nuclear threat, they were partly making a virtue out of necessity. The Soviet Union had other criteria, however: necessity demanded courses diametrically opposed to those of the Chinese.

Mao has explained in conventional Marxist terms the meaning of war. He has rephrased Lenin's definition and said: 'war is the politics of bloodshed'.<sup>3</sup> Wars are of course of two kinds, just and unjust.

'All progressive wars are just and all wars impeding progress are unjust. We Communists are opposed to all unjust wars that impede progress . . . the way to oppose a war of this kind is to prevent it by all means before it breaks out and, after it has broken out, to oppose war with war, to oppose unjust war with just war, wherever possible.'<sup>4</sup>

Thus an unjust war from the Chinese viewpoint would be one which threatened China either imminently or eventually. Strategy demands the creation of external conditions designed to prevent or make more difficult an attack on China. There is a suggestion in Mao's work 'On Contradiction' as to how such external conditions are to be categorised, particularly in the countries near China.<sup>5</sup> Imperialist aggression against countries of this kind, according to Mao, ensures the temporary unity against the aggressor of all but a handful of traitors. Consequently such outright aggression is not necessarily wholly detrimental to China's interests; there is a distinct revolutionary benefit to be derived from it. This is one form of war: a national effort against foreign invasion.

There is another form, however, which is not the result of direct aggression. This occurs when there is collusion between imperialism and the indigenous reactionary ruling classes, resulting in civil war. Conditions of this nature are clearly advantageous to China. In sum, Chinese tactics are designed to emphasise the danger of imperialism and by this means encourage civil war between the classes. In cases of outright imperialist aggression China's task would be to support the united national effort against such aggression. The intention would be, as Mao said, to oppose

the unjust imperialist war with a just war fought preferably by others but supported by China. If the direct threat to China could not be averted, that is to say if war could not be prevented from breaking out, it would have to be opposed with war. But such a dire eventuality is to be avoided at all costs, and it has been the aim of the total strategic and tactical effort since the Korean war to ensure that China is not involved in direct confrontation of a super power.

The risk of invasion or nuclear attack is theoretically diminished by the fact that the Chinese claim they will never launch 'wars of expansion' or 'wars as a substitute for revolutionary struggles by the peoples of other countries'.<sup>6</sup> It is further diminished in theory by the fact that all wars waged by reactionaries are anti-popular: that is, they are not supported by the masses in the aggressor nations.<sup>7</sup> For this reason they are somewhat unlikely and, should they nevertheless occur, certainly not very effective. The Chinese are perfectly aware that the risk of being attacked cannot be thoroughly discounted. They seem to fear that the United States leaders, in particular, may 'lose their reason and insanely take a risk' and launch a sudden attack.<sup>8</sup> They have not infrequently referred to the possibility of a third world war being started by the imperialists, but note that should this eventuate it would lead to the total collapse of imperialism.<sup>9</sup> The domestic requirement to discuss war in positive and optimistic terms is only too obvious. It is in many respects merely another aspect of the Paper Tiger thesis. While the régime should strive to the fullest to prevent an invasion of China it should not permit the growth of pacifist or defeatist ideas among the Chinese people. War should be neither courted nor feared. This deliberate de-emphasis of the dangers and horrors of war has left the Chinese open to criticism from many quarters of insane bellicosity. It is not only recently that the Chinese have been charged with this inhuman crime; they have long been sensitive to the charge. Mao himself many years ago said:

'Some people have ridiculed us as advocates of the omnipotence of war; yes, we are, we are the advocates of the omnipotence of revolutionary war, which is not bad at all, but is good and Marxist'.<sup>10</sup>

He went on to note, however, that if the whole world could be

remoulded only with the gun, the Party did not desire war, it wanted solely to abolish war. Mao was of course trying to explain the apparent contradiction, to non-Marxists, of the bellicose pursuit of peace. He was repeating the classical incantation: the prerequisite to the abolition of war is the eradication of imperialism. Thus, as he said, 'in order to get rid of the gun, we must first grasp it in our hand'.<sup>11</sup>

The objective has been to expand the area of peace, to increase the power of the world's peace forces. But peace can mean different things to different people. If philosophically Mao seems to have denied to himself the possibility of ever achieving a state of perfect and permanent peace, he nevertheless has not eschewed this objective in concrete tactics.

'We aim at peace not only in one country but also throughout the world [he has said], and we not only aim at temporary peace but at permanent peace. In order to achieve this objective we must wage a life-and-death war, must be prepared to sacrifice anything, and must fight to the last until our aim is achieved'.<sup>12</sup>

As the context in which he said this concerned the question of preventing war from breaking out in the first place, it suggests that Chinese peace was to be obtained where necessary by foreign war. Indeed, as we have seen in earlier chapters, China's main strategic aim has clearly been that of buying time and of creating a peaceful environment to enable the nation to grow strong. One should not attempt to draw from this the conclusion that China is irreconcilably wedded to the export of revolution or that it has itself created conditions of armed struggle and warfare throughout the world; this would be an untenable proposition in the main. But it is obvious from the viewpoint of common sense, and from the words and actions of the Chinese, that strenuous efforts have been made, apart from brief periods of apparent passivity, to encourage and maintain armed struggle across the globe.

It is also obvious that under such conditions all must eventually be committed to one side or the other in the fray. Mao has in the past been quite specific in defining the term neutrality. Referring to the struggle between socialism and imperialism he said: 'All the countries in the world would be swept into one or the other of these two camps, and in the world today "neutrality" is becoming merely a deceptive phrase'.<sup>13</sup> How deceptive the term can be

is perhaps well illustrated by the joint Chinese-North Vietnamese communiqué on South Vietnam, which called for the achievement of neutrality in the sense of rejoining the neutral southern part of the country to the committed régime in the north.<sup>14</sup>

The Chinese definition of both peace and neutrality gives to these terms very special qualities. Their principal use is as tactical conveniences. They neither prove nor disprove aggressive intentions on the part of China: they have, in fact, nothing at all to do with this question. The terms do, however, explicitly relate to the concept of peaceful coexistence, which has been hotly debated throughout the international communist movement. The Chinese have never abjured the advocacy of peaceful coexistence but in the last decade they have been markedly less enthusiastic about it than has the Soviet Union. The Chinese view is well summed up in the following statement:

'the foreign policy of socialist countries must not be reduced to the single aspect of peaceful-coexistence. Peaceful-coexistence refers to relations between socialist countries and capitalist countries. It must not be interpreted at will, or stretched to apply to relations between the oppressed and oppressor nations, or between oppressed or oppressor classes. Peaceful-coexistence must not be used to abolish the socialist countries' duty of supporting the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed nations and peoples'.<sup>15</sup>

This and other Chinese statements on the subject strongly suggest that peaceful coexistence is merely a convenient tactic. Socialism can negotiate with capitalism, it can compromise with imperialism, but it can never coexist eternally with the enemy. The nations of the world cannot be neutral in this historical battle to the death; they must wage revolutionary warfare against imperialism, so as to weaken it and give China the opportunity to grow strong.

The concept of the strategic long-term weakness of us imperialism, its Paper Tiger nature, is never so evident as it is in the debate on the respective merits of men and weapons, or on the role of nuclear weapons. The basic Maoist position on the former question is stated in the essay, 'On the Protracted War': 'Weapons are an important factor in war but not the decisive one; it is man and not material that counts'.<sup>16</sup> There can be no doubt that this conclusion was propagandised and ever since reiterated in order to bolster morale. This is not to say that the observation was

unique to Mao: history has yet to show us the society whose material might can endure the degeneration of will. Nor must we assume, given the propaganda necessity, that Mao was not in any case naturally inclined to stress spiritual factors. But essentially he realised that China could not escape the bondage of its past and of foreign domination without freeing the people from their servile fetishes.

The Kweichow donkey and the Paper Tiger, mounted on the roaring East Wind: these were the visions needed to set free the mass imagination. It was the spirit of Chinese man which would, with empty hands if needs be, conquer the past. For the last twenty years, therefore, the régime has consistently hidden the nation's weakness, derided the motivational inadequacies of the enemy, and de-emphasised the destructiveness of nuclear weapons. Thus there has been constant stress on the need for a massive and effective militia system. In turning the asset of a large population into a military weapon the Chinese have demonstrated more than a formidable defensive capability, they have shown the world a will to resist. But they have not remained content with this. As Lin Piao said in 1960:

'We are Marxist-Leninists, we fully realize men are the decisive factor in war; we also recognize the important role modern technology plays in war. We must therefore lose no time in vigorously improving the technical equipment of our forces and in strengthening the modernisation of our forces'.<sup>17</sup>

In 1955 various statements were made in China, and in the Soviet Union, concerning the relative balance of nuclear power between the United States and the Soviet Union.<sup>18</sup> The assessment made in propaganda was that not only had the Americans lost their monopoly of atomic weapons, they had now been outstripped in the manufacture of hydrogen weapons. It was the belief in Soviet might, if not in its absolute military superiority, that provided the Chinese with some assurance of ultimate protection from us nuclear attack. This assurance is implicit in much of the régime's propaganda on the subject during that period. It has been referred to in an unauthenticated Cultural Revolution description of a statement made by the Party's General Secretary in January 1957.<sup>19</sup> It is probable that, between 1956 and 1957, the Chinese concluded that something like parity had been

reached in the nuclear armaments race between the United States and the Soviet Union. Such a situation, they must have assessed, seemed to indicate a strategic stalemate between the two super powers. Although we have no concrete evidence of Chinese opinions on this subject, their actions after 1957 suggest that they believed this to be the case. There is certainly a claim made in Cultural Revolution material that Liu Shao-ch'i propagated the theory of 'atom dead-lock' between the two great powers, and other Chinese sources have referred to bourgeois Western views concerning this.<sup>20</sup>

In the meantime the Chinese were themselves embarking on a nuclear weapons program. If we are to believe their own statements this began in earnest with the conclusion of an 'agreement on new technology for national defence' between the Soviet Union and China on 15 October 1957.<sup>21</sup> There was certainly considerable debate in China during 1957 and 1958 on the whole question of nuclear armaments. The régime seems to have been particularly concerned over what may in military circles have appeared to be a grave theoretical contradiction. If man was so important, why undertake an expensive nuclear weapons program? If the atom bomb was a Paper Tiger, why try to build one? The two strands in thinking were evident in much of the public discussion. In June 1958, we are told, Mao predicted that the country would produce atomic and hydrogen weapons in ten years.<sup>22</sup> From the evidence of 1958 it is not improbable that he had been told by his advisers that atomic weapons could be produced over such a period, but the inclusion of hydrogen weapons is less credible. Nevertheless, the régime was clearly thinking about such developments at that time. As the *Liberation Army Daily* put it:

'the equipment and technical standards of our army have been raised to a considerable extent under modern conditions of atomic and chemical development; for this reason we must attach importance to the role of technology to develop and apply new technology to meet the requirements of modern warfare'.<sup>23</sup>

The reference to new technology was obviously related to the nuclear weapons program. Yet it was still necessary, as the next sentence in this article shows, to make technology conform to the theoretical requirements of the ideology of man's supremacy. In fact the overt evidence suggests that the more the Chinese

became committed to producing their own nuclear weapons the harder they had to try to prove that they still believed men to be superior to weapons. Reliance on conventionally equipped massive land armies would in any case have been both natural and necessary under conditions where alternative forms of defence were still a distant possibility.<sup>24</sup>

In 1959, according to the Chinese, the Soviet Union revoked its decision to support their nuclear weapons program. That this charge is probably correct is suggested by the general deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations in 1959; in any case 1960 saw the withdrawal of Soviet technicians from China. In view of this and the collapse of the Great Leap Forward, it is likely that the Chinese nuclear weapons program suffered a set-back. If it faltered, however, it certainly did not collapse; and within a few years Peking was able to announce with justifiable pride that it had at last joined the international nuclear club. Such an achievement had not come cheaply, and one could question the necessity of having nuclear weapons at all, as some Chinese leaders may have done. What was to be achieved by producing nuclear weapons when, as the Military Affairs Committee put it in 1960,

'the spiritual atomic bomb is more important. Only we have such an atomic bomb made of spiritual stuff, and imperialism and all reactionary cliques for this very reason can by no means compete with us'.<sup>25</sup>

It is possible that the possession of nuclear weapons is to the Chinese a necessary outward sign of greatness, a status symbol which for lesser nations takes the form of jet aeroplanes or cruisers. It is possible that an indigenous nuclear capacity leads a nation to believe that it has reached the stage of completeness and independence. All this may be true and, according to the essential needs of national ego, may be much more significant than we can hope to comprehend. Just one material atom bomb may be worth a thousand spiritual atom bombs. If this is so then it helps in the understanding of China's deeper motivations, and it assists in explaining Chinese hostility to the Soviet Union on such matters.

Even today when China could credibly threaten neighbouring states with nuclear attack, it realises that its capability is very limited. In terms of competing with the super powers China is

in these respects severely handicapped. It is even possible that, given the nation's long-term problems, China will never reach the position where it can support a gigantic comprehensive modern weapons program and that it will therefore curtail some of its related endeavours. Despite the notable successes today, China is still to an extent reliant on the Soviet nuclear umbrella while at the same time being threatened by the Soviet Union. This reliance is, however, altogether different in nature from what it was up to the mid or late 1950s. Previously China knew it could rely on the hostility of the Soviet Union to the United States; now it is unsure of this. Nevertheless, it can probably count on a degree of neutralisation of the super powers' strength, as it is difficult to see how they can thoroughly trust each other for many years to come. Thus there is protection of a sort to be obtained from the Soviet Union. But this appears to be less than the Chinese want; and, on the other hand, to be the very reason for animosity towards the Soviet Union. This attitudinal ambivalence is evident from Chinese statements in 1962 and 1963. They accused the Americans of opposing agreement on the suspension of nuclear testing and the prohibition of nuclear weapons and yet said that

'the socialist countries to ensure the security of the socialist camp and to defend world peace, naturally must possess nuclear weapons, and, moreover, nuclear weapons of better quality than those of us imperialism'.<sup>26</sup>

The clear implication was that China wanted Soviet protection. A year later, when the Russians and Americans had signed the nuclear test ban treaty, the Chinese stated that nuclear weapons were not really wanted by socialist countries as they could not be eaten. However, they continued, 'Whether or not nuclear weapons help peace depends on who possesses them . . . it helps peace if they are in the hands of socialist countries'.<sup>27</sup> So far so good; and there is nothing un-Marxist or surprising in such a view. But the Chinese clearly had more in mind. The Soviet leaders were over-estimating the destructive power of the United States' nuclear arsenal; they had blind faith in the reasonableness of us imperialism; they were capitulationists. As Peking said in August 1963: 'the Soviet leaders seek only to preserve themselves and would leave other people to sink or swim . . . so long as they

themselves survive and develop the people of the world will be saved'.<sup>28</sup> To the Chinese, therefore, the prime duty of the Soviet Union was not to safeguard its own legitimate national interests but to protect China and anyone else who may fall foul of us imperialism.

Chinese attitudes to the United States and to nuclear weapons thus appear to have emphasised in unmistakable terms the reality of the threat. It is not to be wondered at that new stress was placed on the need of the world's peoples to undertake armed struggle. China had not, of course, ever abandoned advocacy of this doctrine. Mao had himself laid down the guidelines to dogma long before the régime had been established. His writings contain many references to armed struggle. There can be no leap in social development, no overthrow of reactionary classes, no mass attainment of power without such struggle: 'in a class society revolutions and revolutionary wars are inevitable'.<sup>29</sup> There are three basic revolutionary modes, he has said:

'the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is solved by the method of socialist revolution; the contradiction between the great masses of the people and the feudal system is solved by the method of democratic revolution; the contradiction between the colonies and imperialism is solved by the method of national revolutionary war'.<sup>30</sup>

Although all these forms emphasised the use of armed force, Mao explicitly stated that such struggle cannot succeed in isolation from other forms. Nevertheless, after the establishment of the régime the tendency has been to stress armed struggle; and in this decade to stress it almost to the point where it becomes virtually the sole avenue to success.

The question of the adoption of the correct methods in the world struggle has been central to the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Soviet Union has tended to emphasise less direct or violent methods, and certainly less offensive or alarming methods from the viewpoint of those who may feel they are threatened by Soviet-sponsored activities. The Chinese position is much more obviously aggressive; therein probably lies both its strength and its weakness. To China the situation is extraordinarily simple. While violent upheaval is applicable to the so-called Western societies, its greatest application is to the two Maoist categories of feudal

and colonial societies referred to above. More than two-thirds of the population of the capitalist world lives in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. These are the focal points of contradictions and the weakest links in the chain of imperialist rule. As these contradictions are irreconcilable, armed struggle is inevitable. 'There is no alternative.'<sup>31</sup> The Chinese roundly denounce the Soviet leaders for advocating peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism without smashing the bourgeois state machine. They also criticise them for substituting 'bourgeois pacifism for anti-imperialist struggle, reformism for proletarian revolution', and for similar errors.<sup>32</sup> The full Chinese viewpoint is excellently presented by a document they released in 1963 as part of their case against the CPSU. This document has been included in the present study as an appendix because it explains as no one else can do, and with an extraordinarily frank cynicism, the manner in which capitalism should be overthrown.

If the Chinese quarrel with the Russians had only concerned differing methods to be employed against the common enemy it would have amounted to very little. The dispute was much deeper and far more significant. It was a dispute not over tactical methods but over strategic interests. There is no convincing evidence of either side's altruism. The question is largely that of assessing the best method of guaranteeing the individual state's own national interests. Soviet influence is more naturally extendable to European or developed societies; its relevance, if it has any, is certainly more apparent to such societies than to the underdeveloped world. Conversely, Chinese experience has little applicability to European nations; but such experience, and hence influence, has relevance to many underdeveloped societies. The Chinese, however, go further:

'It must be emphasized that Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of the establishment of rural revolutionary base areas and the encirclement of the cities from the countryside is of outstanding and universal practical importance for the present revolutionary struggles of *all* the oppressed nations and peoples'.<sup>33</sup>

Thus the theory is also applicable to the oppressed European societies. Nevertheless, the Chinese see its particular relevance as being to Asia, Africa, and Latin America, which have little to

learn from the experience of the Soviet Union and nothing from Soviet revisionism.

The question of the method by which the Paper Tiger of colonialism and imperialism is to be overthrown has been debated for a number of years. In 1962 and 1963 the debate became intense, and assumed a particular form. Much of this relates to the concept of the world United Front which will be discussed more fully in a later chapter, but as it closely concerns the method of marshalling forces against the enemy it rightly also forms part of this discussion. The two fundamental forces available to the socialist camp were the international working-class movement and the national liberation movement. China and the Soviet Union formed the core of the socialist camp. The CPSU view, simplified, was that the international working-class movement was historically a European phenomenon. Although it had now spread over the world its main forces and most reliable elements were European. The world socialist system was the offspring of the international working-class movement: all the socialist states, including China, owed their very existence to this fact. A subsidiary though important additional international revolutionary force was the national liberation movement. By so de-emphasising this movement the CPSU was commensurately under-rating Chinese experience and calling into question Chinese claims to leadership of the total world movement. The CCP for its part completely reversed the roles of these two revolutionary forces. The socialist camp was dependent on the national liberation movement, which for its part depended on the support of China. The role of the international working-class movement, which the Chinese have tended to describe as European, was of secondary importance on the world scale. Under certain conditions, however, the contradictions in Western Europe and North America, for example, could in the future lead to such areas becoming the centre of the world struggle. Thus the two communist giants have utilised and are utilising theories of struggle against imperialism as major weapons in their own internecine struggle of competing national interests.

---

## Chapter 10

# The Anti-Soviet Struggle

---



In February 1963 *People's Daily* launched a vigorous attack against the leadership of the Communist Party of France, or so it appeared on the surface. In reality the target was much wider and more important: it was the CPSU and all who supported it. Illustrating the nature and intensity of the international communist conflict, *People's Daily* said: 'you are making the fight against the CCP and other Marxist-Leninist Parties, rather than the fight against US imperialism, your prime concern'.<sup>1</sup> This charge, of course, could equally well have been levelled at the Chinese and their supporters. Imperialism had indeed lost its magical quality as a cohesive force. It was a far cry from the days when Mao had called on the nation to lean to the side of the Soviet Union. It was far, too, from the days when he had said: 'The interests of the Soviet Union will never conflict with the interests of China's national liberation and there will always be unity between them. I regard this point as absolutely beyond doubt'.<sup>2</sup> A Maoist apologist could nevertheless point out that his choice of words had been careful and not subject to query today. After all, it could be said, the true interests of the respective peoples are and always will be identical: what has changed is not the interests but the CPSU leadership. A revisionist leadership could not by definition represent the real interests of the Soviet peoples. In fact, however, and in non-fictional terms of human relationships or international politics, the Sino-Soviet divergence seems to have been well nigh inevitable.

To consider just one factor, if a crucial one, the state interests of the relatively highly developed and Europeanised Soviet Union could never have completely coincided with those of the essentially agrarian and Asian China. This is precisely the point made in a classified military discussion paper on international affairs in 1961: 'As there is no exact identification between the circumstances of China and the Soviet Union, it is impossible for the two countries to have an exactly identical point of view on every problem'.<sup>3</sup> But the theoretical basis for the split between the two

nations is contained in Mao's own writings. In his work 'On Contradiction' he has stated that contradictory things, according to certain conditions, are characterised by identity, and consequently can coexist in an entity. Thus the apparent identity of interests between the Soviet Union and China is but a temporary phenomenon: the contradiction may be masked but not resolved. Moreover, in practical terms, Mao's early works are illustrative of thinking that has been applied in recent years.

'Since Japan's armed invasion of China [he has said], the principal enemies of the Chinese revolution have been Japanese imperialism and all the collaborators and reactionaries who are in collusion with it, who have either openly capitulated or are prepared to capitulate'.<sup>4</sup>

Speaking of the renunciation of unequal treaties, the move for which had been led by the Soviet Union, he noted that 'The Chinese people can never depend solely on the favour of foreign governments for such actual and genuine equality, but should win it chiefly through their own efforts'.<sup>5</sup> In brief, Mao's view of China's fundamental interests and the methods by which these are to be fulfilled has no place for other than temporary or tactical support from outside. His overall view suggests that on the levels of both theory and practice he regarded Sino-Soviet unity as an inherently contradictory characteristic of relations between two vastly dissimilar societies. When he said that polemics are the locomotive of history, it adds perspective to one's view of the origins of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Ideological struggle is merely an extension or instrumentality of the clash of national interests.

China maintained its stand of strong commitment to the Soviet Union until late 1956. Outwardly at least the Chinese supported their ally's positions on peaceful coexistence throughout 1955 and into the first half of the next year. The Soviet Union remained, in overt Chinese pronouncements, the head of the socialist camp until the end of 1957 or beginning of 1958. Soviet economic and technical aid to the underdeveloped countries was approvingly referred to in Chinese statements in 1955, though there is some reason to believe that the Chinese were beginning to have serious doubts about the efficacy of such Soviet aid from the standpoint of China's national interests at about that time. In June 1957 Yugoslavia, which was shortly to be described as revisionist, was

still being referred to as a socialist country and remained in good odour with Peking. But at the beginning of 1956 Khrushchev convened the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU. One of the principal purposes of this congress was the denunciation of the errors and crimes of Stalin. The effect of the de-Stalinisation campaign on the international communist movement was very nearly instantaneous; it certainly was dramatic and far reaching. Nevertheless it is more than likely that the Chinese did not immediately react particularly strongly to de-Stalinisation and to some of the wider implications of Khrushchev's Twentieth Congress policies. China, at the beginning of 1956, was involved in its own program of development which had little or nothing to do with external events. Moreover, Chinese policies, whose origins anteceded Soviet policies, were being implemented. When the two unrelated national programs converged and interacted, and when the full impact of de-Stalinisation was felt on the international movement, the effect on Sino-Soviet relations was marked. Thus, if the dispute was as historically inevitable as such things can be it was made more so by the Twentieth Congress. In addition the pace of its development was undoubtedly hastened by Khrushchev's domestically necessitated actions.

By late 1956 or at the latest the beginning of 1957 the dispute between the two parties, or between Khrushchev and Mao, had become serious. The Soviet campaign against the cult of personality, though motivated by the need to denigrate Stalin, had indirect application to the then much lesser cult of Mao. The Polish riots and Hungarian uprising in 1956 gravely perturbed the Chinese, as indeed they worried other communist leaders. In February 1957 an article in the magazine *Theoretical Study* addressed itself to the question of Marxism-Leninism and revisionism. It noted that

'the special characteristics of revisionism are: on the pretext of opposition to doctrinairism, on the pretext of opposition to the mistakes of Stalin . . . the significance of Marxism-Leninism as a universal truth is denied'.<sup>6</sup>

The context of this clearly demonstrates the nature of the problems set by de-Stalinisation. Once Stalin's overall methods and achievements were called into question, the value and external applicability of everything Soviet could be doubted. Consequently the

Chinese people could be encouraged to question the very basis of Chinese communism. Three months later, in May 1957, another magazine discussed the fact of there being contradictions in the socialist camp. Noting that some people had been shocked to learn this it said there was nothing strange about it. Contradictions were in everything, they were the mother of progress, they could be resolved by criticism and self-criticism.<sup>7</sup> What the Chinese really seemed to be incensed over was the indirect slap in the face they had been given by the Twentieth Congress. They were worried by the implications of de-Stalinisation both for China and the international movement; they were apprehensive at Khrushchev's move towards the United States, and at the stress on peaceful transition as opposed to violent revolution. But they seemed also to have been piqued by the fact that they had not been consulted before Khrushchev unveiled his new program. They had been treated as junior partners, they had not been confided in. In short, they had, or Mao had, lost face.

When the ccp held its own congress in September 1956 the most honoured foreign speaker was Mikoyan. The address made by this senior representative of the world's foremost communist party included several remarks that could have been construed as being critical of the Chinese. One remark, however, was particularly indelicate in view of China's innate sensitivity and the problems she was then having over co-operativisation. Mikoyan told the fraternal audience:

'The Soviet Union is the fatherland of collectivisation. Therefore, the road we have traversed, our success and failure on this road and the tremendous development of our collective farms and state farms acquire particularly important significance'.<sup>8</sup>

If the leaders of the ccp are inherently over-sensitive, if the nation is unsure of itself, the Soviet leaders have for their part always seemed to have been unable to accommodate to this. Stalin was capable of grand oriental gestures of politeness, but seems to have failed miserably in the more mundane and tiresome task of perpetuating delicacy. Khrushchev was too impatient and outspoken, for the requirements of Chinese face, ever to succeed in this respect. When he criticised the Chinese communes in 1958 he not only derided the ccp's efforts, or the personal creativity of Mao, he said in effect that as the cpsu had found this method

wanting no one else should try it. On the occasion of the Twenty-first Congress similar offence was given to the Chinese by referring to the future stage of development when the USSR would become the world's foremost industrial power and China would merely become a mighty one. Intentional or otherwise, it is clear that Soviet statements have often appeared to be patronising towards the Chinese. Not infrequently there was the clear implication that they should abide by the decision or follow the example of the senior party, and the Chinese have indeed objected to this 'patriarchal father and son' attitude.<sup>9</sup> Chinese stress on the uniqueness of their own endeavours and ways during the Great Leap Forward, and their umbrage over reliance on the Soviet nuclear umbrella or over its manipulation, are consequently partly reaction to Soviet insensitivity. It is no wonder that Liu Shao-ch'i boasted to the Eighth Congress of the CCP in 1958 that 'In history, it is always the new-comers who outstrip the old, always the new-born things, which for a time appear weak and small but represent what is progressive'.<sup>10</sup>

The new-comer, China, was certainly intent on outstripping the old. Though weak by comparison with the Soviet Union, it represented to itself the acme of progressiveness in the international movement. The politico-military victory against India and Khrushchev's Cuban defeat in the autumn of 1962 gave the Chinese the necessary boost to their morale. In late 1962 they were ready to take their quarrel with the CPSU a stage further. The magazine *Red Flag* put out a list of revisionist crimes as a guideline to international action against the CPSU. The revisionists, said the Chinese,

'deny that the Communist and workers' Parties are the vanguard of the proletariat. They renounce proletarian revolution and the proletarian dictatorship. They hold that capitalism can pass into socialism by relying on bourgeois democracy and by taking the peaceful parliamentary road without smashing the bourgeois state machine . . . They substitute bourgeois pacifism for anti-imperialist struggle, reformism for proletarian revolution, bourgeois nationalism for proletarian internationalism, and humanitarianism for the Marxist-Leninist theory of class struggle'.<sup>11</sup>

The criteria for Marxist-Leninist attitudes to imperialism were leadership of the international struggle, active support for wars

of national liberation, and advocacy of proletarian revolution. The Chinese were clearly telling the world that revolutionary and national liberation struggles were the sole methods to be followed by new-born progressive forces, and that only China could be relied upon to support such action. Shortly after, they amplified these views and made them more specific. The international communist movement was at a critical juncture. Communist parties had to decide whether or not to strengthen genuine unity against imperialism and revisionism, or merely pay lip service to such unity while in fact creating a split.<sup>12</sup> 'The attempt to decide major problems of the world and to manipulate the destiny of mankind by one or two countries', said the Chinese, 'runs counter to the trend of our times and is against the interests of the peoples'.<sup>13</sup> They described the Soviet Union as talking only of its support to the national liberation movement, not of the support it obtained from the movement. In any case, they went on, the CPSU and other metropolitan or European proletarian parties neither respected the experience and feelings of the national liberation movement nor supported this movement; all they did was to flaunt their seniority.<sup>14</sup> It was erroneous, said the Chinese, and harmful to the cause of true revolution to assert, as did the CPSU, that world disarmament would result in a massive saving of resources in the developed countries which could then be channelled into developmental projects in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.<sup>15</sup> The Chinese argument, simplified, called for a step-up of armed struggle against imperialism, a rejection of revisionist assistance and advice, and unification of the world's new-born forces around China. In fact this was the beginning of the active creation of a Chinese-led bloc of Marxist-Leninist parties to oppose both revisionism and imperialism. Such an organisation had been openly foreshadowed by one of China's staunchest supporters, Mehmet Shehu of Albania, at the end of 1962.

During the Cultural Revolution a number of allegations were made concerning the attitude adopted by Liu Shao-ch'i to Khrushchev and to the Soviet Union. It is not known whether these allegations are true in all respects; they probably are not. Nevertheless, they would appear to indicate reservation on the part of some senior CCP officials to the general development of the Sino-Soviet dispute. If there is any truth in such allegations it would probably concern not so much the need for the polemic as the

degree to which it should be pursued. Thus it might have been argued that China's national interests could be best served by maintaining a degree of co-operation with the Soviet Union, to obtain, for example, material aid. Liu is alleged among other things to have advocated seeking common ground with Khrushchev because the Soviet Union was fundamentally an anti-imperialist state. However revisionist the leaders might appear to be, the nation was still socialist. The speeches made by Liu in North Vietnam in 1963 could perhaps be used to support the allegations made against him. He did, for instance, speak of the need for socialist unity, though it was unity of the camp with the oppressed nations he was referring to not unity with revisionism. He did not appear to see the power and influence of the socialist camp as replacing in importance the world revolutionary struggle. In all probability the statements made by Liu in 1963, when he visited South-east Asia and North Korea, did not markedly depart from the adopted public line of the Chinese leadership at that time. This line called for a strengthening of socialist unity between the socialist states, and between the parties of these states and the peoples of the world who were struggling for freedom.

The Chinese leadership, not unreasonably, may well have debated the degree of political and ideological struggle required to effect such unity, but there is nothing to suggest that they were at odds on the fundamental issues at stake. China's national interests were to be served by promoting unity around the CCP in the world struggle against imperialism. As Liu Shao-ch'i himself said 'to combat imperialism, it is often necessary to combat at the same time modern revisionism which serves imperialism'.<sup>16</sup> Thus in 1963 China's main thrust against revisionism was in the underdeveloped world. The target was Soviet aid with political strings, Soviet influence over revolutionary parties and nationalistic governments in these areas, and the doctrine of peaceful coexistence with us imperialism. In this last respect, the Chinese charged that the Soviet Union was attempting to placate the Americans by diminishing its aid to the socialist states and curtailing its support for the oppressed nations.

Nineteen sixty-four witnessed the public launching of a polemic within China on the theory of 'uniting two into one'.<sup>17</sup> The régime has traced the origins of this theory to 1961 when its creator, Yang Hsien-chen, is alleged to have stressed the necessity for students of

dialectic to learn how to connect two thoughts which are opposite to each other. From this innocent beginning Yang is supposed, in November 1963, to have openly propagated the idea of reconciling contradictions, at a time when the régime was busily endeavouring to demonstrate the irreconcilability of contradictions. Yang subsequently is said to have systematised his theory of uniting contradictions and applying it outside the normal field of philosophy. If Yang did in fact pursue such a line of action after November 1963, he would certainly have been running counter to the régime's views at that time. The Chinese Academy of Sciences held a forum in November, which expressly condemned the revisionist advocacy of 'theories of reconciling and dissolving contradictions, so as to fabricate the theoretical foundations for their political lines of "peaceful co-existence", "peaceful emulation", "peaceful transition"', and the like.<sup>18</sup> During the Cultural Revolution the régime specifically charged Yang Hsien-chên with providing philosophical grounds for the political line of liquidating the struggle against imperialism and revisionism, and reducing support to the international revolutionary struggle.<sup>19</sup> This domestic polemic was consequently no mere debate between philosophers. It was vitally related to the much larger and more significant question of the political struggle in the international communist movement. As the ccr had pointed out, all things in the world divide into two; the international working-class movement being no exception. 'The process of development of the communist movement will inevitably give rise . . . to splitting activities of opportunism against Marxism-Leninism', said the Chinese.<sup>20</sup>

In the chapter on the intermediate zone we have seen how the zone was formally divided into two at the beginning of 1964. However, merely re-classifying in formal terms divisions which had from the beginning been implicit in the concept of the intermediate zone was not of much practical value. In its original form the zone lay between the two great antagonists: the Soviet Union and the United States. Somewhat later, place had to be found for the insertion of China. Thus the zone lay between the socialist camp and imperialism. But when the Chinese decided to re-classify the Soviet Union, and call its leadership revisionist, in practical terms the simple original concept no longer sufficed. Instead of forming part of a socialist camp which was diametrically opposed to imperialism, China found itself in opposition

both to imperialism and revisionism. Consequently the formal re-classification of the intermediate zone, which came probably at the end of 1963, and the division of the working-class movement into two at about the same time, formed part of the Chinese attempt to make theory conform to practice. The new Chinese concept of the world forces was less aesthetically or intellectually simple and pleasing, but it probably still retained some value as a descriptive idea. At one extreme there was us imperialism and at the other Soviet revisionism. Occupying the central position between the two was China, the Marxist-Leninist nucleus. Integral to China, though on its periphery, was the first intermediate zone of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Appended to this reliable group of countries was the second intermediate zone of European societies, which tended to oscillate between the three conflicting nuclear forces. In sum, China had for all practical purposes moved out of the socialist camp and into the feudal and colonial under-developed world.

In moving theoretically into the first intermediate zone, China had served notice on the international communist movement that it regarded the main force of revolution as being the national liberation struggles of the oppressed peoples of the so-called coloured world. China's tactics were logical: seek always the support of the majority; if the majority is 'coloured' then it should be manoeuvred on racist grounds. The tactical requirements of the European parties and peoples, consequently, were of less urgency. But such an attitude left the Chinese open to charges of racism, which do them no good when they work against the CPSU in European societies. The Chinese nevertheless either were not particularly concerned about this or they were but could do little to refute the charges. As we have seen they seem to have restricted themselves to attempting to rebut Soviet charges by counter-charging that it was they who were racists. By means of the Albanians and various European splinter groups the Chinese sought, in 1965 and 1966, to prove that the European revisionists as a whole had aligned themselves with the imperialists and colonialists against the forces of national liberation in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. As the Albanians explained at the time, the national liberation movement had great significance not only to the oppressed peoples in underdeveloped countries but also for the destiny of the European peoples.<sup>21</sup> Moreover, the Chinese seem to have been arguing theoretically that their own specific

experience was not restricted solely to application by the oppressed nations. It also had validity for the struggle of the peoples in European oppressor societies.

In 1967 Chinese propaganda developed these ideas, and embroidered upon them. Soviet revisionism was adopting colonialist policies: 'they are flaunting the banner of "socialism" and "communism" and are using the state power they control to push ahead with neo-colonialism'.<sup>22</sup> In addition, and far worse from the strictly Chinese viewpoint, the Soviet Union was treacherously colluding with imperialism to rig up 'an anti-China, anti-communist, anti-people and counter-revolutionary alliance . . . They have been directing their main thrust against China'.<sup>23</sup> As the Chinese said in relation to Soviet activities at the Third Afro-Asian Writers' Conference, the Soviet revisionists loved the Western free world and the moribund capitalist system; they had collaborated with imperialism and had betrayed the interests of the world's peoples: 'Our goal is to eliminate all these things'.<sup>24</sup>

It was not until 1968 that the Chinese were to be given the opportunity they required to make more than loud noises against the imperialistic-colonialist activities of the Soviet Union in Europe. The Chinese response to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was completely predictable. In the fight for spheres of influence between imperialism and revisionism, satellites tend to attach and detach themselves to the super powers according to the prevailing pressures. Encouraged by the United States the Czechoslovak leaders tried to free themselves from Soviet control; the invasion was just another manifestation of socialist imperialism. Chou En-lai put this in the following words: 'That a big nation should have so wilfully trampled a small nation underfoot serves as a most profound lesson for those harbouring illusions about us imperialism and Soviet revisionism'.<sup>25</sup> Albania's formal withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, a gesture related to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, met with vociferous Chinese approval.<sup>26</sup> This action was seen as having made a tremendous contribution to the struggle of the peoples of East Europe and the rest of the world against the twin enemies, us imperialism and Soviet revisionism. To win national liberation throughout the world all military alliances and treaties of aggression should be scrapped. Albania consequently moved up from being merely China's staunchest supporter in Europe to the status of a great beacon of socialism

illuminating the road of advance for the European people in their struggle for liberation.<sup>27</sup> The Chinese had thus moved on to the offensive against the Soviet Union in the backyard of revisionism; but they had not, by doing this, forgotten their primary targets in the rest of the world. These they had worked against and continued to work against with assiduity; and there was at the end of 1968 apparently little reason to complain at the results. According to two Cultural Revolution sources Politburo Member K'ang Sheng assessed these results in the following manner:

'In 1964 only 20-30 countries throughout the world formed Marxist-Leninist party organizations. The number has now gone up to 79 such party organisations in 55 countries, with some countries boasting two or three such groups. Of the 26 countries which have formed Marxist-Leninist political parties, three are socialist states, namely: China, Albania and North Vietnam. On the other hand, altogether 53 Marxist-Leninist party organizations have been formed in socialist countries while nationalistic leftist organizations have been set up in 25 countries'.<sup>28</sup>

K'ang Sheng's evaluation is noteworthy for its optimistic imprecision, for its differentiation between parties and party organisations, and for the inclusion of the category of nationalistic leftist organisations. It nevertheless illustrates the general advance made by the Chinese since the struggle for organisational control of the world revolutionary forces came to the fore at the end of 1962. It also suggests that the aim of the Chinese in this respect was more the erosion of CPSU influence over the world movement than the establishment of a cohesive and tightly controlled Chinese counterpart. This does not mean that China will remain satisfied with such relatively negative results: as Mao has said, first comes destruction then construction.

---

## Chapter 11

# The United Front

---



MAO has been a consistent advocate and practitioner of United Front tactics throughout his revolutionary career. He has, as he himself might have said, applied this orthodox Marxist-Leninist practice to the Chinese revolution and creatively amplified it. The two principal weapons of the CCP, in the years before the régime was established, were said by the Chinese to have been armed struggle by the masses, expressed by the Paper Tiger thesis, and the United Front. The latter had two basic applications. Domestically, it related to the leadership by the Party of all utilisable forces against internal oppression—the Nationalists and their allies. Externally it concerned the world struggle against imperialism. The concept of the United Front today is central to most Chinese propaganda on foreign affairs. It has retained much of the original meaning, but in addition has been considerably amplified and sophisticated for contemporary requirements. Thus today it is in many respects the summation of all Mao's strategic thinking. It is essentially a reflection of guerilla ideas and methods. The concept of the intermediate zone forms an integral part of it. The ideology of the East Wind and of the Paper Tiger is utilised by it and is a necessary concomitant. It now also encompasses the idea of struggle against revisionism and against the Soviet Union.

Scattered throughout Mao's writings are a number of references to the United Front, some of which are both extensive and detailed. They refer, of course, to the period of the struggle against the Japanese and the Nationalists. Mao clearly regarded the United Front as a specific organisational weapon; almost as tangible a thing as, for example, the armed forces. It was a method of organising mass power, of leading and controlling this power, and of applying it against the enemy. The United Front of all revolutionary classes was the result of the New Democratic Revolution; it was to be controlled by the proletariat and aimed at imperialism and its domestic supporters.<sup>1</sup> Its purpose, at that stage, was not the overthrow of the capitalist classes. These were utilisable in the

struggle against Japan, and against the domestic forces of feudalism. In addition, the United Front was not to be employed against all the imperialist powers. At that time it was only Japanese imperialism which was invading China; the remaining imperialists should be utilised where possible against Japan.<sup>2</sup>

Mao made this point several times. He was careful to emphasise the necessity always of including the maximum usable forces in this organisation. The enemy, in principle, should be narrowed down to a distinguishable and manageable category in order to involve the greatest number of people in the fight against it. Opposition to the enemy, however, was seen to be insufficient motivation for thoroughly dependable results.<sup>3</sup> To obtain whole-hearted support, the leading elements of the front must in the first place show evidence of an ability to guarantee victory in the struggle against the enemy. Secondly, material benefits must be obtained by the front participants; or at least their narrow interests had to be protected. Lastly, all must undergo political education, in order presumably to ensure their appreciation of the fact that victories had indeed been achieved and that their interests were being furthered. Although the front was to be led by the proletariat the organisational independence of the participating groups was to be preserved.<sup>4</sup> Independence entailed freedom; such freedom was not to be unlimited and uncontrolled, as this would determine the unity of the front against the enemy. During the war against Japan, for instance, the class struggle would have to be subordinated to the war effort.

The basic document on the United Front is Mao's essay entitled 'Problems of Political Power in the Anti-Japanese Base Areas'.<sup>5</sup> As the principles enunciated in this study provide the key to an understanding of the role of the contemporary world United Front they can be best illustrated by extensive quotations from the actual document. Mao starts by defining the front. It should comprise three political groups, each having one-third of the total membership. They were the communists, the non-Party left progressives, and the middle-of-the-roaders. Numbers apart, and regardless of appearances, Mao unambiguously stipulates that the communists should play the leading role. It was to be a united organisation not of all against the enemy, but of all under the Party against the enemy. Nevertheless, the leadership methods of the Party were not to be obviously or inflexibly dictatorial:

'We must not think that *because we have the army and the political power*, everything should unconditionally be done in strict accordance with our decisions, and consequently neglect to make any effort to convince people outside the Party of our views and to induce them to carry them out willingly and whole-heartedly'.<sup>6</sup>

Thus, if real power was in their hands it was not to be flaunted or misused. As he wrote in another essay, concessionary or defensive policies should be adopted to ensure unity. The Party and army should be expanded, but so should the political and military organisations of the Party's allies.<sup>7</sup> In short, providing the essential control of the front by the Party was not threatened, its other constituent elements could exercise a certain degree of power on its behalf.

This, then, was the Maoist prerequisite to United Front work. Once such conditions were established, however, there then came the question of methods to be employed to strengthen and enlarge the organisation of the front.

'To attain this end [Mao said] we must adopt the tactics of developing the progressive forces, winning over the middle-of-the-road forces and opposing the die-hard forces—these are the three inseparable links—and wage struggles as the means to attain solidarity among all the anti-Japanese forces . . . solidarity is realized through struggles and destroyed through concessions'.<sup>8</sup>

What are these three forces Mao talks about? The progressives comprise the proletariat, peasants, and urban petty-bourgeoisie. To develop these it was necessary to expand the army, establish democratic anti-Japanese base areas, extend Party control over the country, increase the scope of mass movements, and win over the intellectuals. As to the middle-road forces, they were composed of the middle or national bourgeoisie, the enlightened gentry or left-wing landlords, and provincial political or military élites having a vested interest in maintaining themselves against encroachment by the Japanese or the Nationalists. These forces could be won over only if the Party was strong enough and could protect their interests and effectively struggle against the die-hard reactionaries. Without this they would 'vacillate or even become allies of the die-hards in their attack on us, because the die-hards are also exerting their utmost to win over the

middle-of-the-roaders in order to land us in isolation'.<sup>9</sup> And who were the die-hards? They were the big landlords and big bourgeoisie whose nature it was both to capitulate to the Japanese and resist them. According to Mao they had to be struggled against to protect the progressive forces and to prolong the resistance of the die-hards against the Japanese and their co-operation with the Party.

'Without waging struggles, the progressive forces will be exterminated by the die-hard forces, the united front can no longer exist and there will be nothing to prevent the die-hards' capitulation to the enemy, and civil war will break out'.<sup>10</sup>

The tactics to be employed by the Party to deal with these three groups varied considerably. The progressives, the peasants, and urban petty-bourgeoisie, should be won over as basic allies. The other bourgeois elements and progressive landowners, for example, composing the middle forces, could only be utilised against imperialism. They could not be relied upon to promote total revolution. Unity with such forces could only be regarded as auxiliary or temporary.<sup>11</sup> The struggle against the die-hards was regarded as an indispensable method of uniting all the anti-imperialist forces. It was governed by the three principles of justifiability, expediency and restraint. Communists should not attack such forces without provocation, but once attacked should resolutely counter-attack. They should not attack, either, unless sure of victory: 'we should know how to utilise the contradictions among the die-hards and must not deal blows to many sections of them at the same time; *we must pick out the most reactionary section to strike at first*'. The third principle concerned restraint:

'After we have repulsed the attack of the die-hards and before they launch a new one, we should stop at the proper moment and bring that particular fight to a close. In the period that follows we should make a truce with them . . . We must on no account fight on daily and hourly without stopping, nor become dizzy with success'.<sup>12</sup>

Maoist theory, in brief, sees the United Front as a particular organisational form designed to concentrate and control potential forces of opposition to the enemy. It is to be led by the communist

party and can utilise virtually anyone; even a member of a political party dedicated to its overthrow, providing his views are progressive.<sup>13</sup> The front is a weapon employed in the strategic task of outmanoeuvring the enemy. It is, as Mao said in 1948, a joint command of the world revolutionary forces against world reaction: a United Front for carrying out armed struggle on a world scale.

If the concept of the United Front is applicable to the field of international politics there must presumably be some means of classifying the world forces that conforms to the domestic political categorisation. According to Mao, in 1947 the four major anti-imperialist world forces were the Soviet Union, the European People's Democracies, the workers' movements in the capitalist countries, and China.<sup>14</sup> After the régime was established Mao spoke of three principal forces: the world front of peace and democracy headed by the Soviet Union, the people's movement for peace and against war, and the national liberation movements.<sup>15</sup> He had thus combined the three previous socialist categories into one, and added a third somewhat vague or spiritual force: the peace movement. For the present purposes we may exclude this new category. Although it has been referred to from time to time in communist sources as a useful weapon in the anti-imperialist armoury, its nature and significance are entirely different from the other categories mentioned. With the exception of the earlier reference to China, in both instances quoted above, the last-mentioned world force was that of the national liberation movement. By 1954, however, the Chinese had reversed the order. Initially this may not have been in the specific context of the world United Front, but the implication was clear. The national liberation movement in Asia, Africa, and Latin America took precedence over the workers' movements in the capitalist countries. Mao himself, in February 1957, spoke of the necessity of uniting with the socialist countries, with the Afro-Asian countries, and finally with all the peace-loving countries and peoples.<sup>16</sup> Although the terminology and classifications employed in these earlier years lacks a certain degree of precision or uniformity, the day was not far off when the opposite was to obtain. The standard approach thereupon became that of describing the world forces of anti-imperialism as threefold: the socialist camp, the national liberation movement of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and the people's struggle in capitalist and imperialist countries.

The Chinese mind is renowned for its predilection for categor-

isation, and the type of thinking that led to the concept of the domestic United Front may logically be expected to have led also to the extension of the idea to international politics. If domestically there were three major groupings, one might expect there to be three in the world United Front. This, indeed, is the case. In the first instance the groups were the communists, progressives, and middle-of-the-roaders. In the second there were three movements: the communist, the national-liberation, and the workers in the capitalist-imperialist nations. The world United Front, as in the case of the domestic counterpart, is led by the communists. Its main support or major weapon is the progressive forces. These are found in their highest form in the national-liberation movement of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The masses in these areas equate to the peasantry in the original domestic front, and to a lesser degree to the proletariat and petty-bourgeoisie. These progressive forces, the national-liberation movement, are what the Chinese have more recently referred to as the villages of the world whose task it is to encircle the world cities. Again, in the original domestic terminology, Asia, Africa, and Latin America are the regions in which the CCP must expand the Marxist-Leninist political and military forces, develop mass movements, and establish base areas for the struggle against imperialism and its allies.

The progressive forces occupy the first intermediate zone between China, the Marxist-Leninist bastion of the socialist camp, and United States imperialism. The main Chinese tactic to be used in relation to the progressive forces is described by Mao as being that of developing their potential for armed struggle. The working-class movement of the capitalist-imperialist countries constitutes the international and contemporary equivalent of the middle-of-the-roaders in the original domestic concept. Although the two categories are not identical they do bear a resemblance to each other and are obviously logically connected in the minds of the Chinese. The domestic groups include various relatively enlightened classes, such as a stratum of the bourgeoisie and landed gentry. They also include vested-interest élitist groups which control political and military power in various areas of the country. In the international arena these would equate to certain exploitable categories of nationalist governments,<sup>17</sup> to various comparatively enlightened classes in a number of societies, and probably to the working-class movement in capitalist-imperialist nations. In Maoist

terms such elements are to be won over; but this can only be effected when China, or the world United Front, is strong enough to support their interests effectively. These intermediate groups being by nature unreliable, the policy

'of both uniting with them and struggling against them should be adopted, so that they are at least neutralized; and as circumstances permit, efforts should be made to shift them from their position of neutrality, to one of alliance with us'.<sup>18</sup>

Their main use is in weakening the imperialist hold over their countries and in combating or preventing imperialist aggression. As Mao has said, 'they are to be won over only as our allies against imperialism'.<sup>19</sup> These middle-road forces occupy the second intermediate zone.

Such, then, seems to be the method adopted by the Chinese in equating the three forces of the domestic and international fronts. The main purpose of the original United Front was to unify all available potential under the control of the Party against imperialism. In order to do this the Front's efforts had principally to be utilised in struggling with the die-hards. The task of the world United Front, therefore, should also be that of struggling with such elements. In the original concept die-hards were defined as big landlords and big bourgeoisie; according to Mao they had to be opposed. However, as they had a dual nature and were inclined both to capitulate to imperialism and resist it, opposition to them had to be flexible and intelligent. They had to be struggled against to protect the progressive forces and to force the die-hards to resist imperialism. If these dangerously unreliable forces were not so dealt with the progressive forces would be exterminated and the United Front would collapse. Nevertheless, they were not to be attacked without provocation; they were not to be fought against unless victory was assured; they were to be alternately combated and wooed. Mao summed up these three tactics with the words 'justifiability', 'expediency', and 'restraint'. The die-hards, from the viewpoint of the world United Front, would certainly have comprised unregenerate reactionary social elements who opposed communist reform and revolution. As such they could have been found in all societies and in every nation. It was not, however, until probably the late 1950s or even the beginning of the 1960s that the classification of die-hard seems to have included revisionists.

In 1961 it was still fashionable in China to refer to the United Front as being directed against the one real enemy, us imperialism. The three major components of the front were the socialist camp, and the national-liberation and capitalist-imperialist workers' movements. This conflicted to a certain extent with the Soviet definition of the major world forces, which placed the working-class movement in capitalist countries before the national liberation movement. According to this view the former movement was represented by the world system of socialism and the communist parties of the capitalist world. In other words the Soviet Union chose to stress that part of the international United Front which was under its control or amenable to its influence. The Chinese, quite naturally, emphasised the national liberation movement of Asia, Africa and Latin America. By 1962 the Chinese on occasions referred merely to two great world currents: the socialist system; and the national liberation movement, which had led to the emergence of a number of independent countries. In the following year the Chinese made two important additions to their theory of the world United Front. Firstly they said that when only one socialist country had existed it had been the duty of all proletarians, the world over, to defend it. Now, however, there were thirteen socialist countries. It was consequently the duty of all to defend the whole camp, not just one part of it, and this defence was to be conducted on the basis of Marxism-Leninism.<sup>20</sup> As the CCP was by that time claiming to be the principal Marxist-Leninist party, the inference was that the world United Front should concern itself with defending China and opposing the enemy along Chinese lines. The second addition to the policy line concerned the relationship of the workers' movement in oppressor states to the national liberation movement. History shows, said the Chinese, that for the former movement in Western Europe and North America to achieve complete victory

'it must form a close alliance with the national liberation movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America, draw a clear line of demarcation between itself and the revisionists, and firmly eradicate their influence'.<sup>21</sup>

Together these two changes in the United Front line constituted a call to re-define and re-orientate the world front organisation. It was time to confront the die-hards.

When the Sino-Soviet polemic started to unfold in its indirect and obscure fashion in 1956, one of the main questions was the selection of the United Front's chief target. Although this debate overtly related to the discussion of Stalin's errors, it had wider implications. The Chinese pointed out, possibly with an eye to Khrushchev, that Stalin's tactical theory called for directing the main blow at isolating those middle-of-the-road social and political forces which existed at any given time. 'Our experience teaches us', they pointed out, 'that the main blow of the revolution should be directed at the chief enemy to isolate him'.<sup>22</sup> The Chinese were thereby strongly emphasising the struggle against imperialism and hinting that the Soviet Union was more concerned with struggling against the emergent forces in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

In later years the chief enemy, in Chinese parlance, was us imperialism and its lackeys or allies. Gradually and by indirect means, such as referring not so much to the international proletariat as to its Marxist-Leninist vanguard, they came round to the position of equating the revisionists to the die-hards. In addition they spoke generally of the national-democratic revolutionary movement of Asia, Africa, and Latin America in preference to the term national liberation movement. Chinese policy consequently was to commend themselves to a narrower group in the international communist movement and to a broader group in the underdeveloped world. In the terminology of the domestic United Front, they were striving to isolate the die-hards, develop the progressive forces, and win over the middle-of-the-roaders. The die-hards, or revisionists, were by definition passive against us imperialism or even capitulationist; against the Chinese and all other true Marxist-Leninists they were extremely active. Thus by the end of 1965 the ground had been prepared for the formal re-definition of the world United Front. One of the first hints of this came from the Chinese press coverage, in early 1966, of the fifth Congress of the Peru Communist Party. According to this the congress had reported that the centre propelling Marxism-Leninism had shifted from the Soviet Union to China.<sup>23</sup> Shortly after, the CCP had its Eleventh Plenum. In the words of the concluding communiqué,

'u.s. imperialism is the most ferocious enemy of the peoples of the whole world. In order to isolate u.s. imperialism to the maxi-

num and deal it blows, the broadest possible united front must be established against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys . . . [the Soviet revisionist leading group] cannot of course be included in this united front . . . to oppose imperialism it is imperative to oppose modern revisionism. There is no middle road whatsoever in the struggle between Marxism-Leninism and modern revisionism'.<sup>24</sup>

This refrain was taken up by pro-Chinese groups throughout the world. The Communist Party of Brazil, for example, pointed out that the socialist camp as a whole could no longer be regarded as the base for the world revolutionary struggle; only that part of the camp headed by China was playing such a role.<sup>25</sup> The ultimate re-definition of the world United Front, and logical conclusion of the shift that had been occurring for some years, came late in 1968 following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Chinese no longer restricted themselves to the struggle against imperialism. It was the whole world which was now aflame with revolutionary ardour. The proletariat of the non-communist European nations was up in arms; national-democratic armed struggle was engulfing Asia, Africa, and Latin America; the revolutionary struggle of all the countries under the rule of modern revisionism was on the increase. And at the head of all, standing 'like a giant in the East', was China.<sup>26</sup>

---

## **Part 3**

## **Conclusion**

---

---

## **Chapter 12**

# **The Strength of Chinese Policy**

---



THEORY, Mao has said, is the guide to action. Without it action is often purposeless and very seldom efficiently directed. However, theory can at best provide little more than the broadest guideline to action. Any examination of Chinese policy must distinguish between two levels of theory. The first concerns what might be termed applied theory, and includes such concepts as the intermediate zone and anti-revisionism. The second may be termed pure theory; it comprises basic Marxist-Leninist doctrine on socialism and communism. The Chinese, as do all communists, preach the overthrow of oppressor classes by the oppressed masses. They preach the eventual attainment of a classless society on a world basis free from oppression, want, and war. Whether they truly believe in what they preach is impossible to determine, but in a world so manifestly imperfect as is ours only the foolish or false would deny the possibility of communist altruism. In addition to the basic tenets of faith Mao has utilised the Leninist theory of dialectic and applied it with some vigour to world affairs.

Dialectic, according to Lenin, is the study of the contradiction in things. If things are composed of contradictions so must be the interrelationship of things; so, too, must be the interrelationship of political societies. The problem, as Mao saw it, was the abstraction of the principal contradiction from the many. In world affairs there were four fundamental contradictions: between the socialist camp and the imperialist camp; between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in capitalist countries; between the oppressed nations and imperialism; and finally, among the imperialist and monopoly capitalist groups. If these four contradictions were fundamental how was the principal contradiction to be discerned? It was thus necessary to establish the principle of impermanence or variability of contradictions. As these were not fixed, but could vary in time and location, it became possible to abstract the one principal contradiction demanded by theory. For example, let us take the case of the contradiction between the oppressed nations and imperialism. Today this is the principal contradiction in the

world; but it need not always remain so theoretically. In tomorrow's world the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in West Europe and North America could, according to the Chinese, become the principal contradiction. Then, again, how does one define imperialism? Mao has said that one should distinguish between imperialists: in effect there are principal and subsidiary imperialists. It is therefore necessary to distinguish the major imperialist threat at any given time, isolate it from subsidiary imperialism, and set the one against the other. Whatever the contradiction and however many there may be there is never, in any circumstances, more than one principal one.

As Mao sees it, contradictions within society are primarily due to an inner necessity. It is the contradictions between the productive forces and the relations of production, between classes, and between the old and the new, which inevitably cause change. These contradictions exist; they are irreconcilable; they must lead to struggle. In any one society, or in a group of societies, this struggle takes the form of socialist or democratic revolution, or national revolutionary warfare. In whatever manner struggle manifests itself, theory requires a fixed progression of events. There are three inevitable stages in the resolution of contradictions which, borrowed out of context from Mao, equate to the defensive, stalemate, and offensive. Contradictions in international politics can be resolved in only one manner: by struggle. The result of such struggle can, in the long term, only be victorious.

Such, in the very briefest way, is the essential pure theory of Mao. Contradictions exist; they must be sought out and exploited until the inevitable victory is attained. The theory has much to commend itself, even though it may be a glimpse of the obvious, and because it is theory provides a powerful backing to Chinese policy. Pure theory alone, however, is near meaningless without application. What then are the principal applied theories of the Chinese, and wherein lies their strength?

The first of these theories is partly related to the foreign policy concept of guerilla thought. The régime has armed itself, as have all communist régimes, with an extremely potent weapon: secrecy. Chinese secretiveness probably surpasses that of any other nation today. Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi has described how this weapon was used in preparing for the war with India. Where the Indians talked for months of their apparently aggressive intentions *vis-à-vis* their northern neighbour, the Chinese kept quiet and prepared.

The Chinese blow was utterly unexpected, and that much the more effective militarily. Moreover, its political effectiveness was increased by the Indian revelations, which enabled the Chinese to put a case for self-defence. Under such a veil of secrecy the régime can prepare securely for direct measures against the enemy; it can also, the more effectively, prepare related indirect campaigns. For example, it advocates strategic daring for the world and for the Chinese people. It calls on all to despise the enemy in the long run, though to take it seriously in the day-to-day struggle. Emphasis is placed on strength, not on weakness. If the world movement is to struggle against better-armed adversaries then it should utilise the one weapon imperialism does not have and is the least equipped to counter: the masses. In fighting the enemy the tactical ground should be meticulously prepared. He is not to be confronted where he is strong, but only where the odds against him are overwhelming. Secrecy and skill are thus wedded to optimism, to make a formidable weapon.

In such a battle, though, more is yet required. If reliance on the people is an essential element, then the people must be defined. Doctrine demands that they compose over 90 per cent: the righteous cause is supported by the great masses. Furthermore, classes and people by definition must polarise. Neutrality being a deceptive phrase, intermediate groups will eventually disappear and be absorbed into the major conflicting world forces. The concept of 'the people' has to be flexible enough to allow for such polarisation, and for erstwhile neutrals and enemies to be reclassified as temporary friends. Chinese theory thereby reinforces belief in the inevitable cohesion of the overwhelmingly righteous majority over a despicable minority, and in the certain victory of the just cause. All nations, big and small, must be treated as equal, though in actuality they may not be so regarded by China. All nations and peoples must support the whole socialist camp, as defined by the Chinese and on the basis of their principles. All must seek the expansion and consolidation of this special form of socialism, and the eventual establishment of world communism. Practical theory of such a nature is extraordinarily powerful. It provides a means of identifying oppression and expectation, and of identifying the support of People's China with the cause of the world's peoples. It kindles the flame and fans the fire. It offers the uncommitted, commitment; the unrepentant, eventual redemption.

In this fight to the death with imperialism the Chinese have carefully avoided antagonising or confronting all the enemies at one time. Imperialism has existed more as an underlying malaise than as a specific disease. In international politics there have been abiding imperialistic tendencies and attitudes, but no eternal enemies. The imperialist nations existed not as a unified whole but as separate anti-Chinese forces, which could be turned one against the other or at least manoeuvred temporarily into neutral positions. The important thing, however, was the actual existence of the malaise, without which no illness could be pronounced, no remedy sought or offered. Imperialism, the Chinese have more than once said, looms as a spectre over the people. Undoubtedly the threat is real; the possibility of aggression, direct or indirect, can never be completely discounted. Nevertheless, there are positive benefits to be derived from such a situation, and the régime has constantly sought to demonstrate to its people the danger of US aggression, thereby providing them with an unremitting goad. Imperialism is the aggravated manifestation of the still vaguer malaise of capitalism, without the eradication of which permanent tranquility or lasting well-being can never be attained. Socialist states are permitted the temporary luxury of coexisting non-antagonistically with capitalism, but not with its imperialistic manifestation. As for the masses in the rest of the world, they are denied all major tactical conveniences: under no circumstances whatsoever are they to desist from struggling against capitalism and imperialism. It was and is permissible for China to arrive at compromises with the enemy. The Chinese had to safeguard their territory from imperialist aggression, but not only for historical national reasons. This was also China's internationalist duty. Thus practical theory permits it to conduct relations with non-friendly governments at two distinct and contradictory levels. It can, according to acceptable and explicit Leninist doctrine, peacefully coexist with a capitalist government. At the same time it can maintain friendly relations with and actively support the communist party of that state, or any dissident group, whose purpose it is to overthrow the government. Never has history witnessed such an extraordinary state of affairs.

As imperialism represents all that is bad in the world, and actively fights to retain domination of the struggling masses, it must be ruthlessly combated. Imperialism and peace are contradictory. Nuclear weapons in the hands of imperialist powers

threaten peace; in the hands of socialist powers they guarantee it. Everything done by the bastion of Marxism-Leninism, the people's government of China, is correct and in the interests of world peace. Everything done by all else, be they revisionist or imperialist, is against peace and must be opposed. All who are for peace can be united with in this struggle. They may only be temporary allies; they may be unreliable; they may have ulterior motives, but together they constitute the theoretically necessary vast majority of the world's peoples, the 95 per cent, which with scientific certitude ensures the final victory. To drive home the point the Chinese further equate imperialism to the so-called West. The civilised, developed, and European parts of the world despise us, they say; but Asia, Africa, and Latin America are not to be despised. Thus is hatred engendered or intensified, thus is the newly-emerged colonial and feudal China projected into world leadership. Anti-capitalistic-imperialism, with or without the contemporary revisionist refinement, is practical theory of a high degree. In a world where injustice, inequality, and oppression have far from been abolished, the call for liberation and social revolution cannot but have tremendous appeal. Until the day when the Chinese themselves pass from the category of poor to rich, or from oppressed to oppressor, and these terms are relative, the practical theory of anti-capitalistic-imperialism should stand them in good stead.

Mao many years ago saw virtue in what he described as the poor and blank condition of China. On a blank piece of paper one can write with ease and effect. Poverty breeds discontent: poor people want change. If the desires of the poor are repressed, if reform is denied, then the conditions become ripe for revolution. Beneath the surface calm of all impoverished societies there consequently exists latent antagonism. This must be discovered and manipulated. The oppressed masses must be awakened. The inherent revolutionary demands must be stimulated and translated into action. This revolutionary potential is integral to a given society: it has a specific form or dynamic applicable only to that society. It can be stimulated from outside, and normally is, but its real force can only be unleashed and controlled domestically. Revolution is not for export is the constant cry. Nor is it. But its primary theory, cadre training, and material support, all can and often do come substantially from the outside. In stressing as the Chinese do the non-exportability of revolution, they there-

by attempt to absolve themselves from blame for interfering in the affairs of another state or of a foreign revolutionary movement, and to escape criticism if the revolution should founder. Revolutionary movements cannot and do not fail, according to theory, if the conditions are ripe. If they are ripe, if the theoretical guidelines are available and correct, and if the masses struggle hard, the revolution must succeed. In sum, revolutions which succeed are successful. The concomitant of the theory of the non-exportability of revolution is the non-exportability of counter-revolution. If it requires, as surely it does, the will of the masses to overthrow a repressive class or government, then just as surely does it require such will to counter subversion. No amount of foreign aid or outside effort can make up for the lack of a people's will, though it can sometimes provide marginal stimulation or stiffening.

The Chinese preach a simple doctrine. The poor want change; revolution produces change. This is understandable anywhere, and gains for them easy popularity. Armed struggle is the key, the principal weapon. Grasp it and success is guaranteed. Mao has said that he believes in the omnipotence of revolutionary war, by which means the oppressed will be freed and unjust war banished forever from the world. Thus revolutionaries who wage armed struggle under the banner of Marxism-Leninism do so legitimately. Theirs is the just cause: all others are unjust. The patriot is he who fights for the just cause, who wages war against class oppression and imperialistic aggression. True patriotism is internationalist. In the anti-imperialist war revolution plays a subordinate role: the task is unification and direction of all the potential force of a given society against the foreign oppressor. Class struggle in such a period assumes the form of national struggle. This is a temporary transmutation, required by tactical necessity. By its means society is galvanised into action against the foreign enemy. And when that struggle is over the new social force that has been created is utilisable as an effective weapon for domestic revolution. Thus the practical theory of armed struggle, of national and democratic liberation, becomes one of the two principal currents of our times. The other is socialism. Together they work against social reaction and against imperialism. China, claiming to be the foremost example, advocate, and supporter of both national liberation and socialism, therefore assumes a double significance. Moreover, because the national liberation

struggle in Asia, Africa, and Latin America weakens imperialism, it commensurately aids the cause of the oppressed peoples of the capitalist states and those under revisionist control.

The national liberation struggle is concentrated in the under-developed, poverty-stricken areas of the world. These are the areas upon which the Chinese have focused their attention. Asia, Africa, and Latin America are, according to theory, the weakest links in the capitalistic-imperialist system. They are the markets of monopoly capital, they produce the raw material. Their denial consequently undermines the capitalist system. In addition the Chinese see these areas as providing the best conditions for the application of their own experience. Principal in this regard is the peasant question. The so-called Western world has little to offer in the way of valid theory concerning the solution of peasant problems; the European communist parties have little more to offer. China defeated imperialist aggression, freed itself from colonial oppression and successfully carried out its revolution, as an agrarian society. China is therefore the living example for similar agrarian societies and peoples, with whom it shares a common destiny. In this kaleidoscopic world the Chinese are 'coloured'. The oppressed masses of Asia, Africa, and Latin America are likewise of a darker pigmentation than the Europeans. Economic underdevelopment and poverty go hand in hand with artificially imposed racist inferiority. The two conjoined result in strength. They impel the masses in these areas forward, demanding change, and violently struggling for improvement.

China's success is emulatable; its experience and leadership mandatory. Mao has provided these peoples with a complete practical theory, according to the Chinese. He has redefined the original concept of the intermediate zone, and separated the so-called coloureds from the so-called whites. He has united the first intermediate zone peoples with the staunch Marxist-Leninist Chinese nucleus. He has shown how the rural revolutionary base areas of the world can surround and annihilate the cities. He has provided the peasant masses of Asia, Africa, and Latin America with the theoretical weapon with which to defeat European capitalistic-imperialism and revisionism. He has denied the charge of Chinese racism while at the same time he has opportunely employed racist tactics to increase world tension and further China's national interests. Obsessed as he seems to be by the power of numbers, he has thrown Chinese support behind the world majority.

In their endeavours to win the majority and pit it against the anti-China minority, the Chinese have stressed the practical theory of the world United Front. There must be a principal enemy somewhere in the world, for the Front, by definition, is united against something or someone. The enemy, in its original and most obvious form, is imperialism. However, it need not always be imperialism. In one part of the world the enemy could be West European imperialism at one given time, and later Soviet neo-colonialism. At one and the same time the world's peoples could be struggling against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, bourgeois nationalism, and revisionism—jointly or separately. The theory of the United Front nevertheless demands a degree of co-operation between the constituent elements of the front. All except the enemy may participate in its activities. So flexible are the criteria for participation that some enemies may be re-classified and used as allies against other more dangerous enemies. So apparently realistic are the conditions for membership that a degree of autonomy is granted selected categories of peoples working with the front: necessity demands that this should be so at times.

As the front operates under guerilla conditions, whether in a military or political sense, guerilla-ism is an unavoidable phenomenon. The United Front cannot hope, nor does it theoretically endeavour, to control all its parts with rigidity. But with the progress of time and the consolidation of power comes the inevitable centralisation of controls. Even in the crudest early form the front is led by communists. Political and military power, though they may in some ways be shared by non-communists, are vested unequivocally in the central communist leadership. Those who think as do the communists and who are progressive, that is, the impoverished masses, are their reliable allies. With time they become absorbed into the Party apparatus. On the other hand the large numbers of intermediate elements, those who have little strong ideological motivation, are generally utilised only as temporary allies. In the long process of struggle which follows the middle-of-the-roaders either desert the front, are in one way or another liquidated, or wholly identify themselves with the progressives. Neutrality is a state of political consciousness between two extremes of polarisation: it is not a permanent state. In short, the concept of the United Front is a priceless weapon. As practical theory it is probably without parallel for the adroit manner in

which it unifies and controls diverse political elements in China's world struggle.

Today, the international United Front is directed not only against imperialism but also against revisionism. China, we are told, submits only to the truth of Marxism-Leninism. The fact that the CPSU controls or is supported by the majority of the world's communists is irrelevant. Such communists are not true; or they are, but are oppressed by their own revisionist leaders. Soviet revisionism cannot in any case be taken as representative of the desires or requirements of 95 per cent of the world population. Soviet revisionism exaggerates the strength of imperialism and underrates the power of the masses; it advocates peaceful transformation and denies the need for smashing the bourgeois state machine. Soviet revisionists are pacifist, reformist, and nationalistic. They are racists, superiorly European; seeing little good in Asians, Africans, and Latin Americans; fearful of the great tide of anger swelling up in the 'coloured' world. Soviet revisionism is, like imperialism with which it is colluding, a Paper Tiger. It might appear powerful, but by comparison with Marxist-Leninist China it is really weak.

The strong points of China's foreign policy are incontrovertible. That is to say the Chinese have armed themselves with a theory which, if by no means flawless, is extremely potent. It is a comforting and optimistic theory; explaining as it does how the world's contradictions are to be analysed and exploited, and indicating the inevitability of the ultimate victory. By means of it the underprivileged nations and people can be drawn together like a protective shield around China. They can be urged into violent struggle against oppressive conditions in their own societies and against the world interests of nations which threaten or are in competition with China. The theory is sufficiently flexible and broad enough in its applicability to guarantee considerable success under present conditions, providing it is intelligently manipulated and not abused. Given such a qualification the Chinese can be assured of substantial advantages over their contemporary rivals and enemies.

---

## **Chapter 13**

# **Policy Weakness and External Response**

---



THE strength of a nation is the sum of its spiritual and material forces. However rich is China in the former, it is limited in the latter. After twenty years of endeavour it remains a predominantly agrarian society. If, as one high official is reputed to have said, the Chinese donkey is reliable, it is above all slow. If here and there a sky-scraper of technological achievement punctuates the horizon, its base is planted in the good earth of China. Lenin might almost have been describing China when he pictured imperialism as the giant with feet of clay. Until the régime solves its fundamental problems, until it balances leadership goals with peasant expectations, just so long will it be politically and economically insecure. All talk by foreign observers of insecurity bred by external threat seems wide of the mark. China is insecure, it does over-react to world developments; but the genesis of such insecurity is domestic. Mao Tse-tung clearly recognised this fact twenty years ago when he wrote of the difficulties to be expected in educating the peasantry. Without socialisation of agriculture there could, he told us, be no completion or consolidation of socialism; yet the very fact that it was socialised brought in its train untold problems. Mao has still not solved the basic agrarian problems in conformity with Marxist-Leninist doctrine, and it may well be that no Chinese régime ever will. Much more could have been done in this regard, it would seem, than has been. Thus there are endemic weaknesses in China of potentially grave proportions. The nation is not in fact by any means as strong as it appears. In addition to the inherent frailty, there are other marginal material weaknesses. Compared with the United States and the Soviet Union, China's advanced weapons capability is severely limited. It is not impossible that its national resources may never prove sufficient to enable it to catch up with the two super powers. To compound the basic physical weaknesses, Chinese strategy has turned one principal enemy into two. The nation now confronts both the United States and the Soviet Union, and though there are some tactical advantages to be gained from this these benefits would

seem on the whole to be outweighed by the disadvantages.

Chinese theory, if it is generally a vital and successful weapon, is by no means perfect. The United Front cannot be split by the enemy, we are told. Yet by definition the front is composed of diverse elements, at least one-third of which are not wholly reliable. The very flexibility and breadth of the conceptual basis underlines the probability of a split. Thus any attempt to make the practical theory of the United Front over-comprehensive and perfect detracts from its credibility and utility. The erosion of capitalist control of world markets and raw materials by the national liberation struggle is a theoretical requirement which fails totally to take into account many aspects of contemporary international economics. Over-simplification of such a nature is as valuable for sloganeering as it is useless for scientific reasoning.

Linked with this theory is the concept of the interest-identity of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The nations of these areas may indeed have more in common with each other than they have with the European nations, communist and non-communist, but that they share a common historical destiny is an untenable proposition. The theory of contradictions, though useful, is certainly imperfect. True, contradictions do exist and can be exploited. It is, however, fallacious to seek them only in non-socialist societies, or to force the theory into an over-rigid mould as is sometimes done. The Chinese view of the collusion of imperialism in its milder forms with local reaction, and the inevitable resultant civil war, is unrealistic. Civil war may follow, but it is far from inevitable. Nor is it an objective law that people's war will spread and develop throughout the world. Equally contentious is the theory of the certitude of 95 per cent of the masses waging revolutionary struggle against both imperialism and revisionism. Chinese views notwithstanding, violent revolution in capitalist countries is not the only road to socialist success. The overthrow of an entrenched bourgeois ruling class, backed by military force, is an extreme case; there are others in which parliamentary methods can be effective. In any event political developments are rarely so simple and non-evolutionary as to require the use of one method to the exclusion of any others.

Chinese cultivation and utilisation of nationalism is a double-edged weapon. It is tactically beneficial to the Chinese cause in various societies and at different times. It provides short-term advantages. In the long term, however, it could turn against

China's interests, particularly in neighbouring countries. The theory which pictures, for example, the inevitable transformation of African nationalistic revolution into people's or socialist revolutions is manifestly doubtful. It totally denies the possibility of evolutionary progress within society. It fails to take into account the tremendous force of nationalism which, wedded to socialism or otherwise, can and probably will be directed to specific local goals as often as not diametrically opposed to Chinese interests. Moscow has attacked China for forcing India into the arms of imperialism by the invasion of 1962. Though this is an over-simplified allegation there is some truth in it. Certainly the Chinese invasion resulted in a strong anti-Chinese reaction in India. China has also, apparently, found great difficulty in understanding the natural nationalistic sentiments of other countries and political parties. The Chinese were deeply hurt and annoyed by the fact that the Soviet Union remained neutral over the Indian stand on Tibet in 1959. Neutrality was impermissible, said China: as a socialist nation she could not have aggressed against India. The Chinese could not or would not understand the national requirements of the French communist party regarding the Algerian revolutionary movement. Nor, apparently, did they comprehend the attitudes of a great many other parties. In short they have adopted a flagrantly boastful and chauvinistic attitude towards the world in recent years, and this inevitably has operated against them.

There are external developments over which the Chinese cannot realistically hope to have very much influence. Of considerable importance in this respect is the question of material and financial aid to the underdeveloped world. China could not, in the early 1950s, as it cannot now, aid other nations to the same extent as the Soviet Union or the United States. As a consequence of this, probably, the Chinese made every effort over the years to belittle the endeavours of their rivals or to prove that aid can be dispensed with and is in most cases an evil. China has not, however, gone so far as to terminate its own aid programs abroad. Imperialist and revisionist aid has political strings attached, say the Chinese, and is designed to strengthen existing bourgeois nationalist governments. The Soviet theory about the channelling of resources from domestic military to foreign aid programs is, according to China, merely a trick to promote friendship with the imperialists and to turn the people away from armed struggle.

Chinese aid, on the contrary, is truly fraternal and altruistic; its purpose is to help the people. The only real help, however, is self-help. Thus is virtue made from necessity.

In other fields of endeavour China is likewise under a handicap. Mao's thoughts are said to be universally applicable; China's example of international validity. Modification is not ruled out by the Chinese; but in so stressing their own way they tend to try to force the multifariousness of the world into a single rigid pattern. The result is often erroneous implementation or total rejection of the Chinese way. The Maoist theory of the rural world surrounding the urban, the Maoist guerilla foreign policy tactics, have definite disadvantages. To be effective the world political guerilla units must operate semi-autonomously, with flexibility and in accordance with local conditions. Guerilla-ism, the concomitant organisational weakness, traditionally sets one allied force against another or leads to serious lack of co-ordination. On the international plane, consequently, China must attempt to centralise command procedures. If this is not done the world struggle will not necessarily result in China's gain; if it is too ruthlessly attempted it may actually turn the world forces against China. In any event there is already considerable latent apprehension in neighbouring states over the strength and the designs of the Chinese giant.

There is, moreover, another handicap to Chinese efforts abroad. In reality, solidarity between the Asian, African, and Latin American peoples is a transient unreliable phenomenon. At the worst it is non-existent. Even if the majority could think together on some specific issue, it is altogether another thing to translate the thought into action. China needs a belief in such solidarity. It needs it for the theory of the United Front and for Chinese leadership of the world struggle against imperialism and revisionism. Finally, China's stand against revisionism is not entirely to its advantage. No one likes the holier-than-thou. What supreme arbitrator is there for the rival claims to Marxist-Leninist purity? The split in the socialist camp, whoever caused it, weakens it as a world force. In addition, China now has two powerful enemies where it once had one. Revisionism may be useful as a negative example; it may be imperative for domestic Chinese purposes. But no one could say that it is a wholly advantageous phenomenon. The Chinese leaders are handicapped in another way. Like everyone else they tend to see the world not so much as it is but as they

think it should be. In this respect authoritarian governments are perhaps at a greater disadvantage than other types. The Chinese leaders are probably worse off at the moment than most communist rulers. To a certain extent, and belatedly, they appear to have recognised their disability and created, for example, special institutions to study other societies. One thing we can be certain of in this respect: the making of foreign policy is not without error. The Chinese are not infallible. They suffer most of the disabilities of other policy-makers and a few more of their own in addition.

The Chinese view of the international reaction to the new socialist giant in the east falls into two categories. In the first they see the great strength of the support of the world masses; in the second the tremendous weakness of the imperialist and revisionist reaction. The first category has by implication largely been described in the preceding chapter; it is the second which concerns us here. The principal rivals of China, or its main external enemies, are the United States and the Soviet Union. For this reason the following discussion will generally relate to the policies of these two nations.

Try as one may it is virtually impossible to discover anything very coherent or cogent in the policy of these nations towards China. The United States has partially limited itself to resisting or preventing Chinese aggression against neighbouring countries. The weaknesses of such a policy are self-evident. In the first place it is entirely negative. The general non-communist attitude has little altered from that expressed by the United States Congress twenty years ago: democracy poses no threat to communism, but communism threatens democracy. The catch cry is anti-communism, anti-China. Very little positive is professed. Secondly, to be effective such a policy must demonstrate Chinese aggression. The Chinese involvement in Korea in 1950 cannot come into this category. The Chinese invasion of India is different. Clearly the Chinese penetrated deep into Indian territory, whereas the reverse was not the case; but the Chinese withdrew after a very short time. Indian propaganda before the war makes it difficult for them to escape the charge of provocation. China, for its part, was discreet and apparently restrained. In any case, no one could say that the Chinese had launched a war of territorial expansion. China's support for the North Vietnamese can under no circumstances be described as aggression. Thus a policy which is centred

on Chinese aggression is palpably weak. Indirect aggression or subversion is difficult to prove; and being masked by its class nature is even less credible to many.

Chinese aggressiveness, as opposed to aggression, is another matter. In this respect China has recently acted with flagrant aggressiveness, and where this has affected neighbouring societies inherently fearful of China, the results have been detrimental to her interests. Nevertheless, none of this has come about by the design of the United States, the Soviet Union, or any other country. The anti-communist line is particularly susceptible to criticism. Anti-communism in Asia, Africa, and Latin America has strictly limited appeal. The Chinese claim it to be a hackneyed phrase out of tune with the wishes of people; and to a certain degree they are right. Communism in most of the societies of these areas threatens only the minority upper strata; the majority are in a different category. For the people of some societies there would be losses caused by the overthrow of the existing system of government. In other societies such a change would not greatly affect the condition of the people. Others still, and these may constitute the majority, could reasonably hope for an amelioration of material conditions. It is pointless preaching, as the non-communist world does, the benefits of freedom and democracy to the empty-bellied. If these benefits are ever completely meaningful, they are so to certain peoples only. They are the spiritual washing machine and television set of a certain way of life. Democracy and freedom are dispensable luxuries or unknown necessities to millions upon millions of the people of this world.

The non-communist or so-called Western nations lack anything in the way of convincing theory with which to counter the Chinese. Apart from a few political slogans and incomprehensible philosophies, which do not amount to cogent reasoning or effective and positive policy, the non-communist world is devoid of ideological appeal to the masses of the underdeveloped world. On the other hand the communist response to China is not without theory. Their ideological weapons are varied and powerful. For this reason the Chinese have concentrated upon the task of smearing other communists as revisionists, neo-colonialists, bourgeois nationalists, social imperialists and the like. Such has been the intensity of the Chinese onslaught that many now doubt the validity of Soviet experience, the reliability of Soviet support, and the nature of the ultimate Soviet designs. Essentially, the

Soviet Union is European; it is, furthermore, advanced and relatively prosperous. It is not totally guiltless over racial matters. It is certainly more open to the charge of aggression than is China. Its policies are less violently revolutionary than are Chinese policies. It is a major participant with the United States in the United Nations; which organisation, according to the Chinese, manipulates the affairs of the underdeveloped nations. Although the Chinese case in this respect is exaggerated it is not entirely groundless, for the United Nations may be as little representative of the interests of the newly-emerged underprivileged states as it is a completely effective international body.

Both the Soviet Union and the United States, due to their foreign aid programs, are deeply committed on the ground in widely scattered areas of the world. Russian and American technicians, advisers and the like, have gone abroad in large numbers. There is, however, nothing more foreign than the foreigner: his appearance is different, his ways are different, he even smells different. His presence inevitably creates misunderstanding, jealousy, and hostility. The more the presence, the greater the stress. This applies also to the Chinese, though for a number of reasons to a slightly lesser degree. For one thing they are not so numerous throughout the world; for another they have been until very recently less obtrusive or gauche. Furthermore many Chinese programs have been relatively easy to absorb by the recipient society, and have consequently resulted in less socio-economic disruption and therefore friction.

It is the military strategy of the non-communist nations, and particularly of the only great nation among these, which is open to the severest criticism. It is all the fashion today to criticise United States military strategy; Americans do it, their allies do it, and so of course do their enemies. Given the prevalent accepted universal political amorality, the only possible criterion there can be over such matters is that of success. Has the United States succeeded in defending its national interests and in protecting the multitude of squabbling little nations which alternately hang on to or tug at its apron strings? Let us first examine the Chinese answer to this. Mao has said that us imperialism has itself fashioned the noose by which it will eventually be hung. The United States has used opposition to China as the excuse to set up military bases all over the world, part of whose purpose is to support indigenous oppression and to grab new colonies. These bases, being locally

directed against the interests of the masses, are bound to provoke their wrath. The Maoist analysis of the weaknesses of imperialism, in this case of the historical Japanese variety, is applicable to us imperialism. The basic documents are found in Mao's *Selected Works*, Volume II. He lists the five major flaws of the imperialists. The first is piecemeal reinforcement, which is due to underestimation of the enemy and inherent insufficiency of military forces. The other four are: dispersion of main forces, lack of strategic co-ordination, missing strategic opportunities, and frequent encirclement but little annihilation. Further on he re-phrases this and points out that there are in fact two principal weaknesses. Imperialism lacks sufficient troops, and it fights on foreign soil. Because imperialists are alien invaders the guerilla defenders can enlist the support of the vast masses of the local people. In Lin Piao's version of the same, in 1965, it was said that

'u.s. imperialism can only employ part of its forces, which are sent to fight an unjust war far from their native land and therefore have a low morale . . . The people subject to its aggression are having a trial of strength with u.s. imperialism neither in Washington nor New York . . . but are fighting for independence and freedom on their own soil'.<sup>1</sup>

A year later came the statement concerning the anti-popular nature of wars waged by us imperialism: the Americans cannot depend on their own people and thus have to place undue reliance on the role of weapons. Even the most advanced weapons are of limited use in jungle warfare against guerilla units supported by the masses.

Is this Chinese analysis of the weaknesses of anti-communist military strategy accurate, or is it merely plausible propaganda? On balance, and divested of its more colourful adjectives, it would seem to contain much truth. People's wars, or guerilla wars, if they are supported adequately by the indigenous population, have not to date been successfully combated by external powers. It is not easy to convince the alien soldier that he is really wanted by the common people of the country, and it is only too easy to convince the common people that the aliens should not be there. Very rarely is it possible to overcome these problems by weight of numbers and to deploy such a preponderance of force that all resistance by the local guerillas is brought to an end. Even in the odd case where

a purely military solution could be found, and victory obtained, as often as not the underlying social and economic defects are either not remedied at all or are only partially remedied.

There is a further and far graver problem to be taken into consideration. Just possibly the world has entered a new phase of development, in which major wars of cataclysmic proportions are no longer inevitable. Under such conditions, it seems, there may be a very much greater need for the mass expression of violence. It may be that this psychological urge will become a universal phenomenon; at the moment, however, it is more apparent in the loosely disciplined societies of the so-called West than in the regimented communist societies. The civil disturbances of the non-communist world may well be a manifestation of this basic and now more aggravated urge. It could be this need for violence which underlies the spread of armed struggle throughout the world. Whereas in the past many of these energies were absorbed, in the underdeveloped world, by internecine conflict, village disputes, tribal or national wars, such conditions apply less today. It is consequently not improbable that the communists are utilising these energies and directing them into United Front activities against domestic oppression and foreign interference. If this is the case, then we may expect an increase both in scope and intensity of armed struggle, together possibly with a similar stepping up of civil disturbances in non-communist developed societies. Whatever happens it seems likely that the Chinese stand to gain more, in the short term, from a universal intensification of violent upheaval than do their two contemporary enemies. Such an increase in world violence would not, however, by any means be always the result of Chinese endeavours nor ultimately to their benefit.

---

## Chapter 14

### Possible Implications

---



CHINA has fascinated the world for hundreds of years. A veritable giant of a nation in more than one respect, it is nevertheless only very recently that it has been studied seriously by outside observers. From such a vantage it often appears to be extraordinarily strong, both actually and potentially. True it has little in the way of advanced weaponry by comparison with the two super powers, but in other respects it seems to be incomparably stronger than most nations. This certainly would be the view of its Asian neighbours, and of many other countries. In reality, however, its strength is limited; possibly severely so. Its economy remains primarily agrarian; sociologically and politically it is still rural-based. The peasant millions still constitute its greatest problem. It is they who must produce the food for the whole of society. The better they perform this task the wealthier will be the nation, and the stronger it will be in the community of nations. But it is not simply a question of production and procurement: there must be a balance between material wellbeing and spiritual fulfilment. The peasants, and the whole of society, should be both free and controlled for the nation to achieve real stability and happiness.

It has often been pointed out, particularly recently, that the régime is fundamentally insecure, and that because of this insecurity it should be treated with restraint. There are certainly grounds for such a view. The present Chinese state is only just now passing from its adolescence and into maturity. It has no reasons for complacency; none for conviction of inviolability. The world about it must make it feel unsure. It is its real inner self, however, that causes the greatest concern; it is the Chinese masses that gravely concern the leadership. This insecurity is a curious phenomenon. The character of the nation's leader, for example, suggests nothing in the nature of insecurity or timidity. The leader who galvanised the people into fighting the Japanese and the nationalists was far from timid. The man who launched the nation into the Korean and Indian wars; into collectivisation, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution; and into the

Sino-Soviet polemic: such a man had boundless courage and faith in himself. Yet for all this, perhaps because of this, the régime seems to be fundamentally unsure of itself. Like all else insecure, China has been aggressive. The régime has over-reacted to everything that appears threatening. If the Chinese have succeeded in no other respect they have certainly convinced the world of their aggressiveness.

The evolutionary phases of China's foreign policy, indeed of its total policy, suggest that the key to an understanding of the régime should be found in the years 1954 and 1955, and in the present. The leadership's antagonism to the United States, or its fear, existed before the present régime was established. It is far too simple a view to attribute all the blame for Sino-American hostility to United States' interference in Chinese affairs in the 1940s. Fundamentally, United States' opposition was to communism, as described by Marx and Lenin. The Marxian concept of proletarian international revolution pre-dated the world role of the United States; the October Revolution came before Washington became the centre of the non-communist world. The United States was opposed ideologically to an ideology which preached the end of liberal democracy. It was opposed politically to any government or movement that had as its public aim the overthrow of the United States government and the violation of its national interests. The movement led by Mao subscribed to such concepts; it was therefore opposed by the United States. Morality, class interests and the like, are irrelevant criteria in this respect. When the régime was established in 1949 it had one major enemy, the United States, and one major friend, the Soviet Union.

In the mid-1950s, however, Chinese policy started to undergo major changes. The causes of this were two-fold. In the first case China's total domestic developmental program had reached a stage of qualitative change. In the second a power stalemate between the Soviet Union and the United States was apparently looming. The first factor had no relationship whatever to the foreign threat; it was caused by purely domestic developments. The second factor was not related to a sudden change in United States policy—the old enemy remained the old enemy—but was due to an alteration in the balance of power between the Soviet Union and the old enemy. Thus the sharp increase in Chinese aggressiveness which was shortly to follow cannot be attributed

to an intensification of American hostility. It did not, either, have all that much to do initially with Soviet hostility to China. The major cause of the change in Chinese policy seems to have been the compelling nature of domestic developments; however, these were made more acute by the impact of external developments. To a certain extent this applies today, although it is still too early to seek an understanding of China from current events. The régime's attitudes to the world at the moment are difficult to discern. Aggressiveness is a dominant feature, though whether this still cloaks a fundamental insecurity is uncertain. It may well do; but if it does it is probably a different kind of insecurity. The basic Chinese problems remain unresolved, the Party is in the process of being thoroughly reorganised, the highest echelons of leadership are ageing. In addition, where there was one powerful enemy there are now two.

Anti-imperialism and anti-revisionism are, however, exceedingly useful weapons in the domestic battle for survival. Under the impulse of the ever-present Soviet and American threats much can be accomplished at home, and somewhat less abroad. But it is not solely a question of insecurity. There is today a universal crisis of faith: not only the theist doubts, but the atheist also. Ironically it is easier to maintain faith in a distant heaven than in one on earth. The very intangible remoteness of the former gives it greater credibility. In the Soviet Union faith seems to be little more than a historical quality appertaining to priests, peasants, and politicians; something unattainable today, though desirable. Mao, for his part, appears to have recognised at an early date, as he still does today, that a people without faith is a people doomed. However much he is criticised for his idealist endeavours, if Mao can maintain national faith at a higher level than in other societies the cost in economic terms for this will be worth it.

Any account of China's world view must first of all take into consideration its view of itself. What, in effect, constitutes the Chinese state in the minds of the current leadership? The answer to this is, of course, unknown; and if it were known could be an inaccurate guide to the future. Nevertheless there are some indications. Mao said, during the period of the anti-Japanese war, that China must recover its lost territories; without a doubt he was speaking chiefly in the context of recovering those territories lost to the Japanese. But he was also thinking in those days of the unequal treaties which had been imposed upon China by the

European nations and Japan. Moreover, in his talks with Edgar Snow, he clearly referred to the return to China of Mongolia. These facts, together with more recent references to the unequal treaties and Chinese territorial problems, suggest that Mao regarded and regards the present confines of China as minimal. The great Chinese state should undoubtedly incorporate the colonialist enclaves of Hong Kong and Macao, and also Taiwan. Beyond this is uncertain, but the Maoist view could well extend to Chinese sovereignty over Mongolia, areas of the Soviet Far East and Central Asian Republics, and some trans-Himalayan regions.

However, the greater China view may only be a wish at the back of Mao's mind. It would not be unnatural for the Chinese to think of neighbouring countries as falling within their sphere of influence. There are universal precedents for this, and reasons enough from China's own history. There is no doubt at all, in any event, of the Chinese view of their special position in Asia. Mao has said several times that China has a decisive role to play in the East; that it is the centre of gravity of Asia. More recent statements by the régime confirm that this is still the view, though China is now seen to be of special importance to the whole world as well. But the Chinese are unquestionably and very naturally interested primarily in Asia. From all the evidence this Asia may be divided into five categories. The first is the area covered by the Second Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This can be best illustrated by reference to the 1968 map of these area divisions: it comprises Mongolia, Korea, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. To this area may also be added Thailand, though this is uncertain; Thailand may belong to the next group. The second area is composed of Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, and also possibly Burma. The inclusion of Burma in this group is not certain; it may form part of the third category, the Indian subcontinental system. The fourth is Japan. The last is West Asia. It is probable that Japan and India are the principal long-term targets, being the major states of Asia, though there is no direct evidence to support such an assumption.

The non-communist South-east Asian group would seem to be an area of low priority. The Second Asian group would appear to be the highest priority area for the immediate future. The régime's attitudes to it in the past have varied according to circumstances. Mao, before 1949, singled out Mongolia and Korea for attention. In 1950 pointed differentiation was made between

the European socialist nations and the people's democracies of Mongolia, Korea, Vietnam, and China. These three countries have since then consistently been regarded as having a special relationship to China. With the conclusion of the Korean war the emphasis has shifted to the southern part of this area and since the 1960s Laos and Vietnam have occupied most of China's attention. It seems probable, from all the evidence, that this Second Asian area is regarded by the Chinese as being within their sphere of influence: the area corresponds closely to the confines of the historical greater China.

The present régime clearly considers that China has a highly significant role to play in Asia and in the world. The basis of such thinking is in Mao's earlier writings, though it is possible that this can largely be attributed to the need to boost morale at that time. To a certain extent this is also necessary today, but less so. Chinese propaganda on the great role the nation is playing and will play in world affairs can be divided into three main types. Firstly there is what may be said to be the historical line. China, according to Mao in 1956, should have made a greater contribution to humanity than it had done: the Chinese people composed one quarter of humanity. As Liu Shao-ch'i told the Eighth Congress during the great nationalistic period of the Leap Forward: 'Some people criticize us for "craving greatness and success" . . . And shouldn't we crave greatness for our 600 million people and the success of socialism?' Later in the same speech he said that in history it was always the newcomers who outstrip the old. No one, the Chinese have said, can prevent the nation from playing its great role. In the second case there is the adulation of Mao's thoughts. These thoughts are applicable throughout the world. His concrete program for socialisation of agriculture, for example, has universal significance. So too have his general theories on colonial and semi-colonial societies. Under the thought of Mao China will be ever victorious, and the world will respond:

'The sun shines all over the great earth. Mao Tse-tung's thought illuminates the whole globe with its brilliant rays. The people of China obey Chairman Mao. The revolutionary people of the whole world also obey Chairman Mao'.<sup>1</sup>

The third category concerns China's world revolutionary role. China is the great revolutionary example, the bulwark and only

reliable base for the world revolution. Its 700 million people, under Mao, are the guarantors of the liberation of mankind. The Cultural Revolution is bound to have its impact on the world, as it will reinforce the nation's revolutionary will and promote its ability to support the international struggle. The stronger China becomes, the more powerful will be its internationalist role. In sum the total Chinese propaganda line makes perfectly clear to the world masses China's intention not only to continue support of armed struggle but to intensify such support.

If China sees itself as having a highly significant world role, then presumably it must also have commensurate goals. Mao, in his *Selected Works*, refers to the Party's ultimate domestic goal in a number of places: in essence it is the establishment of a socialist and finally a communist society. But as the latter stage cannot be reached in isolation from the world it is necessary for the Chinese not to confine their view solely to China. They must look at the whole world. Consequently the ultimate theoretical goal is that of creating a state of perfect and permanent peace; that is, of eliminating capitalism and imperialism and establishing in its place a world system of communism. This theoretical goal has been stated so many times and in so many ways that it would be superfluous to mention it but for the fact that it is today not infrequently overlooked. The contemporary internationalist effort, however, is severely handicapped by the struggle between the two socialist giants. For this reason, and on the basis of the evidence cited in earlier chapters, we may assume the Chinese to have modified the original internationalist theoretical goal. The present aim, therefore, would be that of liquidating imperialism and revisionism and on their ruins building a world system of Marxism-Leninism under the leadership of the ccr. In order to do this, wrote Mao in a different context many years ago, it is necessary for China to gain time, build up its strength, and conceal its crack forces. Under the direction of the Chinese a world United Front must be created to launch armed struggle against imperialism and ideological struggle against revisionism. The next fifty to one hundred years, said Mao in 1962,

'will be a great era of thorough-going change in the social system of the world, an earth-shaking era without comparison in all previous history. Living in such an era, we must be ready to

engage in great struggles whose forms will have many features different from those of the past'.<sup>2</sup>

What these forms will be not even Mao can tell. Nevertheless the course he apparently charted for the greater part of this period seems reasonably clear. The domestic goal is still communism. The Cultural Revolution, say the Chinese, necessarily foreshadows a new great leap forward in socialist construction and the step-by-step transition to communism. Internationally, the intermediate zone has been split in two and the world's underprivileged peoples set against the more fortunate. One or two national revolutions, the prerequisite to socialist revolution, must be carried out in Africa and the Middle East. Strenuous efforts to kindle and fan the flames of armed struggle in Latin America must also be made. In the European and North American nations, and in Australasia, the workers' and student movements must be intensified and made more violent. The anti-revisionist struggle, particularly among the European communist parties, urgently requires vigorous prosecution. It is in Asia, however, that China's main efforts must be made. The war in Vietnam, whose horrors are too well known to require amplification, occupies a central position in Chinese thinking. Communism must succeed in Vietnam, or must be made to appear to have succeeded. The ideology, strategy, and tactics of armed struggle cannot be permitted to fail. At the worst they must be shown to have ensured success at the conference table. But the war, as a war, has probably been over-emphasised in many quarters: it is what lies beyond the actual war which is important.

What are China's intentions regarding Vietnam? Though we cannot be at all certain of these enough has been said on the subject to provide some clues. A continuation of the war at approximately the same level for a number of years would clearly be of some advantage to China, providing the effort could be sustained in North Vietnam. By this means, at relatively no cost to the Chinese, the United States could be tied down to one small country in Asia and the Soviet Union could be further embarrassed. There are, however, other possibilities. If no total political and military victory is obtainable by the South Vietnamese and their allies there could be either a prolonged period of uneasy 'peace', such as has been the case in Laos, or an outright victory of the North Vietnamese and their allies. In the first

instance the Chinese may well resort to the tactic employed in 1962 which appeared to seek a so-called neutral zone of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. This would be a belt of political units around North Vietnam which, according to the definition of neutrality in the original Geneva accords, would exclude extraneous military forces that threaten the socialist states to the north. Under such conditions, presumably, the Chinese would hope to prevent foreign or American intervention and thereby eventually ensure the total usurpation of power by domestic communist forces. In the second instance, outright victory of the North Vietnamese, the Chinese reaction cannot be predicted. Superficially they would be gratified: a people's war would have succeeded and, according to their interpretation, Mao's thoughts would once more have proven correct. Moreover, all this would have been gained despite the bourgeois pacifism, cowardice, and sabotage of the Soviet revisionists. In the long term, however, it does not necessarily follow that it will be entirely in China's interests, that is, in the interests of Mao's China, to see emerge a strong and unified Vietnamese state.

Reunification of Vietnam is the foundation stone of Hanoi policy: this has always, and quite understandably, been its ultimate goal. Such an achievement would hardly run counter to China's interests, unless the reunified and no longer war-torn Vietnamese state turned completely against China. Even then such things have happened before, and the Chinese already live with not too friendly minor Asian socialist neighbours without undue concern. If, on the other hand, Hanoi reverted to its stand of 1951 and energetically sought to establish a federation of Indo-Chinese states, China might well consider its interests in the area threatened. When the Chinese publicised the Lao Dong federalist program in 1951 they must be presumed thereby to have at least tacitly supported it. Furthermore, as we have seen, China has grouped Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in one geo-political unit for a number of years. It could consequently be argued that a Hanoi-led federation would be acceptable to China. This may well be so. On the other hand the Chinese have been ensconced in the northern portion of Laos for a long time, and seem to have regarded that area as belonging to their sphere of influence. It is furthermore difficult to imagine the Chinese liquidating their interests in Cambodia, which have been assiduously built up over the years, merely on account of Hanoi. It is even less likely that

the Cambodians would relish the intrusion of the Vietnamese. On balance, any attempt on the part of Hanoi to extend its influence throughout the Indo-Chinese area is likely to be unwelcome to China. This Chinese reaction is underlined by the fact that any extension of Vietnamese influence over Laos would normally affect Thailand. China's attitude to the Vietnam war may thus be one of striving for eventual victory without haste, and thereafter working to limit Hanoi's influence in the Indo-Chinese area.

China's total foreign policy over the last twenty years has been designed principally to protect the nation from its real or imaginary enemies. Although its major goal has consequently been generally negative, in that policy has often been simply reactive, China has at the same time pursued certain forward policies. It has attempted, and with a degree of success, to spread its influence throughout the six continents. It has established genuinely friendly relations with a number of countries, eroded the influence of the Soviet Union, campaigned against the United States, and gained some revolutionary respectability among the people of the world. If it has not always and everywhere met with unqualified success, it is not alone in this respect and in any case has probably achieved more than most nations in the last twenty years. On the whole it has, following the Maoist precept, employed its strategy skilfully within the national limitations. Revolutionary communism has been the principal ideological weapon with which it has sought to ensure its national interests. In short the state interests of China have overridden all others as they may be said to have done for the Soviet Union and the United States. Even the reiterated call to establish communism in China and the world would seem to be little more than an ideological expression of state interests.

The Albanian command to the world revolutionaries to support and protect China is another expression of Chinese state interests. The fundamental requirement of the Chinese state is the attainment of political consolidation, economic well-being, and military security. What is more particularly Chinese in this respect is the extent of the domestic pressures. These may have altered in form over the years but there is little to suggest that they have slackened, and even less that they will markedly decrease in the foreseeable future. They may even intensify. Since 1949, consequently, the régime has consistently and with vigour made

every effort to keep the lid on at home; to maintain control and momentum. One gigantic movement has followed another in rapid and regular succession. It is almost as though the masses have been deliberately subjected to perpetual shock to keep them off balance and make them more receptive or amenable to control. The régime's foreign policy likewise has been partly designed to fulfill this purpose; it has sought to maintain national credibility in a ceaseless external threat. The propaganda drives of two decades against the United States, and about a decade against Soviet revisionism, have been adroitly integrated into the overall domestic effort.

Mao has led the nation for twenty years now with a combination of ruthlessness and skill. There have been, under his leadership, some remarkable achievements both at home and abroad, and some notable failures. China's prestige today is high, and it will almost certainly rise higher; though whether this is to be entirely attributed to Mao is doubtful. If ever a people can be called great, it is probable that the Chinese people deserve this epithet. Much that has been accomplished in China is not solely due to Mao or to communism. But Mao probably has to a certain extent been responsible for the pace of domestic development and for much of the external drive. We are standing too close to the past to be able to evaluate his role, nor is it the present purpose to attempt this. It is possible nevertheless that China's foreign policy, or more correctly the nation's total strategic drive, will be at least temporarily affected by Mao's death. The degree of this is impossible to foretell. The death of Stalin is our only analogy, and could turn out to be a most unreliable indicator. With or without Mao the internal pressures will probably remain intense for many years to come. The scope for domestic liberalisation consequently should be severely restricted by the natural limitations. The area for policy alternatives and alternative leadership should also be limited. International policy, though influenced by external developments beyond China's control, will probably be governed by the restrictive nature of the overall domestic situation. In sum there seems little reason to expect a fundamental change in China's foreign policy, with or without Mao's decease, in the foreseeable future. While the nation remains an agrarian society, politically and economically frail, there is probably slightly more to be gained from confronting the world's great powers than by adopting a less aggressive stance. Changes

in leadership in the future must have some effect on Chinese tactics; however, the strategic course is not set by the helmsman but by an inner necessity.

There may be little or no reason for the nations of the world, particularly those on China's fringe, to love the adolescent giant; but live with it all must until it grows to maturity. The main problem today is the gap in understanding between the Chinese and the rest of the world. This is dangerously wide. What may appear to the outside observer to be political extravagance, economic unorthodoxy, and diplomatic irrationality, may well be a necessity in strictly Chinese terms. At least it is a presumption and a dangerous one to conclude that what is not understandable to us is therefore wrong for them. On the other hand what is right for them is not necessarily right for anyone else. There is no virtue in narrow mindedness or blind stupidity, for the Chinese or anyone else. At the most, we can hope for a narrowing of the misconception gap over the course of years. But this will require goodwill on the part of all concerned. It will also require diligence in the pursuit of useful knowledge. We for our part must try to understand the fundamental China, the domestic enormity compared to which the image projected abroad is mere illusion.

---

## **Appendix 1**

### **Outline of Views on the Question of Peaceful Transition**

---

I On the question of the transition from capitalism to socialism, it would be more flexible to refer to the two possibilities, peaceful transition and non-peaceful transition, than to just one, and this would place us in a position where we can have the initiative politically at any time.

1. Referring to the possibility of peaceful transition indicates that for us the use of violence is primarily a matter of self-defense. It enables the communist parties in the capitalist countries to sidestep attacks on them on this issue, and it is politically advantageous—advantageous for winning the masses and also for depriving the bourgeoisie of its pretexts for such attacks and isolating it.

2. If practical possibilities for peaceful transition were to arise in individual countries in the future when the international or domestic situation changes drastically, we could then make timely use of the opportunity to win the support of the masses and solve the problem of state power by peaceful means.

3. Nevertheless, we should not tie our own hands because of this desire. The bourgeoisie will not step down from the stage of history voluntarily. This is a universal law of class struggle. In no country should the proletariat and the Communist Party slacken their preparations for the revolution in any way. They must be prepared at all times to repulse counter-revolutionary attacks and, at the critical juncture of the revolution when the working class is seizing state power, to overthrow the bourgeoisie by armed force if it uses armed force to suppress the people's revolution (generally speaking, it is inevitable that the bourgeoisie will do so).

II In the present situation of the international communist movement, it is advantageous from the point of view of tactics to refer to the desire for peaceful transition. But it would be inappropriate to over-emphasize the possibility of peaceful transition. The reasons are:

1. Possibility and reality, the desire and whether or not it can be fulfilled, are two different matters. We should refer to the desire for peaceful transition, but we should not place our hopes mainly on it and therefore should not over-emphasize this aspect.

2. If too much stress is laid on the possibility of peaceful transition, and especially on the possibility of seizing state power by winning a majority in parliament it is liable to weaken the revolutionary will of the proletariat, the working people and the Communist Party and disarm them ideologically.

3. To the best of our knowledge, there is still not a single country where this possibility is of any practical significance. Even if it is slightly more apparent in a particular country, over-emphasizing this possibility is inappropriate because it does not conform with the realities in the overwhelming majority of countries. Should such a possibility actually occur in some country, the Communist Party there must on the one hand strive to realize it, and on the other hand always be prepared to repulse the armed attacks of the bourgeoisie.

4. The result of emphasizing this possibility will neither weaken the reactionary nature of the bourgeoisie nor lull them.

5. Nor will such emphasis make the social democratic parties any more revolutionary.

6. Nor will such emphasis make communist parties grow any stronger. On the contrary, if some communist parties should as a result obscure their revolutionary features and thus become confused with the social democratic parties in the eyes of the people, they would only be weakened.

7. It is very hard to gather forces and prepare for the revolution, and after all parliamentary struggle is easy in comparison. We must fully utilize the parliamentary form of struggle, but its role is limited. What is most important is to proceed with the hard work of gathering the revolutionary forces.

III To obtain a majority in parliament is not the same as smashing the old state machinery (chiefly the armed forces) and establishing new state machinery (chiefly the armed forces). Unless the military-bureaucratic state machinery of the bourgeoisie is smashed, a parliamentary majority for the proletariat and their reliable allies will either be impossible (because the bourgeoisie will amend the Constitution whenever necessary in order to facilitate the consolidation of their dictatorship) or undependable

(for instance, elections may be declared null and void, the Communist Party may be outlawed, parliament may be dissolved, etc.).

IV Peaceful transition to socialism should not be interpreted in such a way as solely to mean transition through a parliamentary majority. The main question is that of the state machinery. In the 1870s, Marx was of the opinion that there was a possibility of achieving socialism in Britain by peaceful means, because 'at that time England was a country in which militarism and bureaucracy were less pronounced than in any other'. For a period after the February Revolution, Lenin hoped that through 'all power to the Soviets' the revolution would develop peacefully and triumph, because at that time 'the arms were in the hands of the people'. Neither Marx nor Lenin meant that peaceful transition could be realized by using the old state machinery. Lenin repeatedly elaborated on the famous saying of Marx and Engels, 'The working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery and wield it for its own purposes.'

V The social democratic parties are not parties of socialism. With the exception of certain left wings, they are parties serving the bourgeoisie and capitalism. They are a variant of bourgeois political parties. On the question of socialist revolution, our position is fundamentally different from that of the social democratic parties. This distinction must not be obscured. To obscure this distinction only helps the leaders of the social democratic parties to deceive the masses and hinders us from winning the masses away from the influence of the social democratic parties. However, it is unquestionably very important to strengthen our work with respect to the social democratic parties and strive to establish a united front with their left and middle groups.

VI Such is our understanding of this question. We do hold differing views on this question but out of various considerations we did not state our views after the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Since a joint declaration is to be issued, we must now explain our views. However, this need not prevent us from attaining common language in the draft declaration. In order to show a connection between the formulation of this question in the draft declaration and the formulation of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, we

agree to take the draft put forward today by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as a basis, while proposing amendments in certain places.

Editorial Departments of *People's Daily* and *Red Flag*, 6 September 1963; *Current Background* 714, pp. 25-6

## Appendix 2

### Ministry of Foreign Affairs

### Principal Responsibilities of

### Vice-ministers 1949-68

| <i>Name</i>                                       | <i>Responsibilities</i>                                                       | <i>Remarks</i>                                                                                                                                                                      |
|---------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <i>1949 (autumn) - 1950 (late)</i>                |                                                                               |                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| Wang Chia-hsiang<br>(located Moscow)              | Soviet Union, East Europe                                                     | People's Republic of China, established 1 October 1949                                                                                                                              |
| Chang Han-fu                                      | West Europe, Africa, America, Australasia, Asia (communist and non-communist) |                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| Li K'e-nung                                       | Unknown; possibly intelligence                                                |                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| <i>1950 (late) - 1953 (late)</i>                  |                                                                               |                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| Wang Chia-hsiang<br>(by April 1951)               | Senior vice-minister, inter-Party relations                                   | Korean war started June 1950; Chinese entered October / November 1950; relocation of Wang Chia-hsiang to Peking, and addition of Wu Hsiu-ch'uan probably decided in relation to war |
| Chang Han-fu                                      | West Europe, Africa, America, Australasia, Asia (communist and non-communist) |                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| Li K'e-nung                                       | Unknown; possibly intelligence                                                |                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| Wu Hsiu-ch'uan<br>(by January 1951)               | Soviet Union, East Europe                                                     |                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| <i>1953 (late) - 1954 (autumn)</i>                |                                                                               |                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| Chang Wen-t'ien<br>(by April 1954 located Europe) | Geneva Conference                                                             | December 1953 probable major political purge (Kao Kang); Li K'e-nung dropped as vice-minister possibly in summer 1954, certainly by autumn when identified solely in PLA role       |
| Wang Chia-hsiang                                  | Inter-Party relations                                                         |                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| Chang Han-fu                                      | West Europe, Africa, America, Australasia, Asia (communist and non-communist) |                                                                                                                                                                                     |

| <i>Name</i>                                              | <i>Responsibilities</i>                                                                | <i>Remarks</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
|----------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Wu Hsiu-ch'uan                                           | Soviet Union,<br>East Europe                                                           |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| <i>1954 (autumn) - 1957<br/>(spring/summer)</i>          |                                                                                        |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| Chang Wen-t'ien<br>(Peking—Dec. 1954)                    | Senior vice-minister                                                                   | Relocation of Chang Wen-t'ien to Peking and appointment of Chi P'eng-fei were probably decided following signing of Indo-China cease-fire Geneva, July 1954; Wu Hsiu-ch'uan was dropped as vice-minister by the beginning of March 1955, when he was officially appointed ambassador to Yugoslavia                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| Wang Chia-hsiang                                         | Inter-Party relations                                                                  |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| Chang Han-fu                                             | West Europe, Africa,<br>America, Australasia,<br>Asia (communist and<br>non-communist) |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| Chi P'eng-fei<br>(by January 1955)                       | Soviet Union,<br>East Europe                                                           |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| <i>1957 (spring/summer) -<br/>1959 (spring/summer)</i>   |                                                                                        |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| Chang Wen-t'ien                                          | Senior vice-minister                                                                   | Decision to reorganise ministry possibly taken in April 1957; Tseng Yung-ch'uan's replacement officially appointed to E. Germany June, and Ch'en Yi (future minister) released from Scientific Planning Commission in May; November 1957, Moscow International Conference; Socialist States Department of MFA established spring 1958 (decision probably taken 1957); this department, under Chi P'eng-fei and Tseng Yung-ch'uan, was abolished December 1958; the Asian communist states together with Cambodia and later Laos formed the 2nd Asia Department; the remaining non-communist states, excluding those in the Middle East, came under 1st Asia |
| Wang Chia-hsiang                                         | Inter-Party relations                                                                  |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| Chang Han-fu                                             | West Europe, Africa,<br>America, Australasia,<br>1st Asia (basically<br>non-communist) |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| Chi P'eng-fei<br>Tseng Yung-ch'uan }<br>(by August 1957) | Soviet Union, East<br>Europe, 2nd Asia<br>(basically communist)                        |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| Lo Kuei-po<br>(by October 1957)                          | Vietnam, commencing<br>take over West Europe                                           |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |

| <i>Name</i>                                 | <i>Responsibilities</i>                                                                  | <i>Remarks</i>                                                                                                                                                                         |
|---------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <i>1959 (spring/summer) - 1961 (spring)</i> |                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| Chang Han-fu                                | Senior vice-minister since early summer 1959                                             | Chang Wen-t'ien purged in early summer 1959; decision to do so probably taken in spring same year; also dropped, by October, was Wang Chia-hsiang                                      |
| Chi P'eng-fei }<br>Tseng Yung-ch'uan }      | Various duties until winter 1959; then Chi — 2nd Asia, Tseng — Soviet Union, East Europe |                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| Lo Kuei-po                                  | Vietnam, West Europe                                                                     |                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| Keng Piao<br>(by December 1959)             | 1st Asia, West Asia/<br>Africa                                                           |                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| <i>1961 (spring) - 1962 (autumn)</i>        |                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| Chang Han-fu                                | Senior vice-minister                                                                     | Pattern of vice-ministerial responsibilities upset due to participation in Geneva Conference; Huang Chen was Ambassador to Indonesia                                                   |
| Chi P'eng-fei                               | 2nd Asia                                                                                 |                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| Tseng Yung-ch'uan                           | Soviet Union, East Europe                                                                |                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| Lo Kuei-po                                  | Vietnam, West Europe (?)                                                                 |                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| Keng Piao                                   | 1st Asia                                                                                 |                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| Huang Chen (Apr. 1961)                      | West Asia, Africa, Indonesia (?)                                                         |                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| <i>1962 (autumn) - 1963 (autumn)</i>        |                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| Liu Hsiao<br>(by May 1963)                  | Senior vice-minister, probably concerned with Sino-Soviet dispute                        | Sino-Indian war late 1962; Liu Hsiao replaced Moscow November, officially appointed vice-minister May 1963; Keng Piao's rôle changed February 1963; dropped as vice-minister September |
| Chang Han-fu                                | Deputy senior vice-minister (possibly Keng Piao's duties 1963)                           |                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| Chi P'eng-fei                               | 2nd Asia                                                                                 |                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| Tseng Yung-ch'uan                           | Soviet Union, East Europe; and West Europe (spring 1963)                                 |                                                                                                                                                                                        |

| <i>Name</i>                              | <i>Responsibilities</i>                                       | <i>Remarks</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
|------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Lo Kuei-po                               | Vietnam                                                       |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| Huang Chen                               | West Asia, Africa,<br>Indonesia(?)                            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| <i>1963 (autumn) - 1965<br/>(autumn)</i> |                                                               |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| Liu Hsiao                                | Senior vice-minister                                          | Chi P'eng-fei's activities alter about June 1963; the West Asia/Africa Department was probably split in February 1964 to form the West Asia/North Africa and Africa Departments; this change did not, however, occur officially till September; Huang Chen was dropped in April 1964; decision on Huang and addition of four vice-ministers probably taken late 1963 or beginning 1964 |
| Chang Han-fu                             | Deputy senior vice-minister                                   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| Chi P'eng-fei                            | West Asia, Africa,<br>1st Asia, 2nd Asia,<br>till spring 1964 |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| Tseng Yung-ch'uan                        | Assisted Chi, Africa                                          |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| Lo Kuei-po                               | Vietnam                                                       |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| Wang Ping-nan<br>(April 1964)            | Soviet Union, East<br>Europe, West Europe                     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| Han Nien-lung<br>(April 1964)            | 1st Asia, 2nd Asia                                            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| Ch'iao Kuan-hua<br>(April 1964)          | Unknown                                                       |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| Liu Hsin-ch'uan<br>(April 1964)          | Unknown                                                       |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| <i>1965 (autumn) - 1966<br/>(autumn)</i> |                                                               |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| Liu Hsiao                                | Senior vice-minister                                          | Tseng Yung-ch'uan unreported from October 1964, rare appearances in 1965, officially appointed Ambassador to Rumania January 1966; addition of Ch'en Chia-kang and Hsu I-hsin, January 1966, probably made to compensate for dropping of Chang Han-fu (April) and Wang Ping-nan (July); decision possibly taken late 1965                                                              |
| Chi P'eng-fei                            | West Asia, North<br>Africa, Africa                            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| Lo Kuei-po                               | Vietnam                                                       |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| Han Nien-lung                            | 1st Asia, 2nd Asia                                            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| Ch'iao Kuan-hua                          | Soviet Union, East<br>Europe by May 1966                      |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| Liu Hsin-ch'uan                          | Unknown                                                       |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| Ch'en Chia-kang<br>(by January 1966)     | Unknown                                                       |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |

| <i>Name</i>                              | <i>Responsibilities</i>                                          | <i>Remarks</i>                                                                                                                                                                                            |
|------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Hsu I-hsin<br>(by January 1966)          | Unknown                                                          |                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| <i>1966 (autumn) - 1968<br/>(autumn)</i> |                                                                  |                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| Lo Kuei-po                               | Acting as senior vice-minister (by April 1967), plus West Europe | Considerable instability due to Cultural Revolution; Liu Hsiao dropped by November 1966, but decision possibly taken in August; unclear whether Liu Hsin-ch'uan and Ch'en Chia-kang remain vice-ministers |
| Chi P'eng-fei                            | West Asia, North Africa, Africa                                  |                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| Han Nien-lung                            | 1st Asia, 2nd Asia; Vietnam after April 1967                     |                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| Ch'iao Kuan-hua                          | Soviet Union, East Europe                                        |                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| Hsu I-hsin                               | Unknown                                                          |                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| Liu Hsin-ch'uan                          | Unknown                                                          |                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| Ch'en Chia-kang                          | Unknown                                                          |                                                                                                                                                                                                           |



## Chapter 1

- <sup>1</sup> *Mao*, Vol. IV, 1961, p. 369.
- <sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 173.
- <sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 286.
- <sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 172. For a discussion on the 1957 assessment see below, under the heading 'East Wind'.
- <sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 415, 417.
- <sup>6</sup> See endpaper map.
- <sup>7</sup> *Red Star Over China*, Random House, New York, 1938, pp. 88-9, n. 1.
- <sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 88. For Formosa in the text read Taiwan.
- <sup>9</sup> West Asia, probably at this time, certainly later, included Turkey and Israel and at the eastern extremity excluded Afghanistan.
- <sup>10</sup> *People's China*, Vol. I, No. 1, 1950, p. 24.
- <sup>11</sup> *Mao*, Vol. IV, 1961, p. 433.
- <sup>12</sup> *People's China*, Vol. I, No. 7, 1950, p. 20.
- <sup>13</sup> *Mao*, Vol. IV, 1961, pp. 98-100.
- <sup>14</sup> *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*, 27 January 1950.
- <sup>15</sup> *NCNA*, 23 Nov. 1949.
- <sup>16</sup> *The Times*, 28 June 1950.
- <sup>17</sup> *NCNA*, 29 June, *SCMP*, No. 127, p. 36.
- <sup>18</sup> 'The Criminal Record of P'eng Te-huai', *Union Research Service*, Vol. 50, No. 16, 23 Feb. 1968, p. 193.
- <sup>19</sup> Speaking at the end of 1953, and in somewhat different context, Chou En-lai said that successes in the land reform and other campaigns 'were attained mainly in the process of the great struggle to resist American aggression and aid to Korea'.
- <sup>20</sup> *NCNA*, 5 Apr. 1951.
- <sup>21</sup> *People's China*, Vol. IV, No. 12, 1951, p. 7.
- <sup>22</sup> See, for example, Chinese coverage of the 'Platform of the Viet-Nam Lao Dong Party', and particularly the statement from this document that 'the people of Viet-Nam are willing to enter into long term co-operation with the peoples of Laos and Cambodia, with a view to bringing about an independent free, strong and prosperous federation of the states of Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia, if the three peoples so desire'. *People's China*, supplement to Vol. III, No. 9, 1951, p. 8.
- <sup>23</sup> See, for example, Lu Ting-yi's article: 'The World Significance of the Chinese Revolution'. *People's China*, Vol. IV, No. 1, 1951, p. 11.
- <sup>24</sup> *People's Daily*, 1 July, quoted in *People's China*, No. 14, 1952, p. 14.
- <sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 15, 1952, p. 32.
- <sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 18, 1952, p. 3.
- <sup>27</sup> First Five Year Plan, *FLP*, Peking, 1956, p. 13.
- <sup>28</sup> *People's China*, No. 19, 1952, p. 7.
- <sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 20, 1952, p. 7.

<sup>30</sup> For a discussion of this see J. D. Simmonds, *Evolution of a Revolution*, Canberra 1968, pp. 101-2; hereafter referred to as *Evolution*.

<sup>31</sup> *People's China*, No. 21, 1952, pp. 5-6

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>33</sup> The date was May 1953, according to Li Fu-ch'ün. See *SCMP*, 335, p. 6.

<sup>34</sup> See the discussion on the theory of purges in *Evolution*, pp. 102-6.

<sup>35</sup> Address to the National People's Congress, 21 July. *CB*, 339, p. 12.

<sup>36</sup> *SCMP*, 813, pp. 22-5.

<sup>37</sup> *CB*, 342, pp. 1-3.

<sup>38</sup> 5 Oct. 1954. *CB*, 307, pp. 2-4.

<sup>39</sup> Documents of the First Session of the First NPC, 15-28 Sept. 1954. *FLP*, 1956.

<sup>40</sup> The activities of Ch'en Chia-k'ang, the director of this department, obscure the picture as he was on occasion involved in Indian affairs during this period. However, Ch'en was the senior of the two departmental directors, being also an assistant minister, so it is possible that this explains his 'errant' behaviour.

Further tenuous support for the above hypothesis is the fact that Ch'en Shu-liang, a deputy director, later appeared to be concerned with such 'communist' affairs as have been defined above. He had also been ambassador to Indonesia from 1952 to 1955.

<sup>41</sup> *NCNA*, 9 Mar. 1955; *CB* 318, p. 1.

<sup>42</sup> *Red Flag*, No. 16, 23 Nov. 1967; *NCNA*, 10 Feb. 1968; *SCMP*, 4118, p. 22.

<sup>43</sup> 31 July to 1 Aug. It was termed a conference of provincial and city Party secretaries.

<sup>44</sup> For example, Chang Nai-ch'i, 26 June 1956: 'an unprecedentedly rich harvest of grain'. *NCNA*, 26 June 1956; *CB*, 407, p. 25.

<sup>45</sup> 'Upsurge of Socialism in the Countryside,' published in February 1956. *CB*, 388, pp. 9 and 43. Furthermore, Mao himself appears by the Preface not to have foreseen a completion of co-operativisation before 1959 or 1960.

<sup>46</sup> 4-11 Oct. 1955. See *SCMP*, 1151, p. 9 and 1154, p. 28. See also *CB*, 410, p. 43.

<sup>47</sup> Fukien, *NCNA*, 19 Nov. 1955.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 17 Dec. 1955.

<sup>49</sup> Li Fu-ch'ün, 'On the Big Leap Forward in China's Socialist Construction'. *Red Flag*, 19, 1959. Quoted in *Peking Review*, No. 40, p. 23.

<sup>50</sup> P'eng Te-huai, speaking at Warsaw, 11 May 1955. *SCMP*, 1048, pp. 1-10.

<sup>51</sup> Molotov, 8 Feb. 1955. See also 'Who has gone Ahead in this Atomic Age' in *World Culture*, No. 4, 20 Feb. 1956. *ECMM*, 38, pp. 1-7; see also *Current Events*, No. 15, 10 Aug. 1955; *ECMM*, 3, p. 3.

<sup>52</sup> *FLP*, 1956.

<sup>53</sup> *ECMM*, 3, p. 3.

<sup>54</sup> *People's China*, No. 17, 1 Sept. 1955, pp. 6-9. Extracts from the article; the organisation of the paragraphs is my own.

<sup>55</sup> *Kuang Ming Daily*, 21 Oct. 1955; *CB*, 373, p. 26.

## Chapter 2

<sup>1</sup> Given 14 Jan. 1956, *CB*, 376, p. 4.

<sup>2</sup> This is evident from the reasonably well documented examples contained in *Evolution*.

<sup>3</sup> 15 June 1956, to the NPC. *CB*, 399, p. 19.

<sup>4</sup> 2 July 1956. *CB*, 399, p. 31.

<sup>5</sup> *NCNA*, 4 Apr.; *SCMP*, 1268, pp. 3-5. April was the occasion for an enlarged meeting of the Politburo.

<sup>6</sup> Teng Tzu-hui to the NPC, 19 June 1956. *CB*, 393, p. 1.

<sup>7</sup> *Study* No. 100, 2 Oct. 1956; *ECMM*, 59, pp. 5-8.

<sup>8</sup> *NCNA*, 29 Jan. 1956. *CB*, 376, pp. 3-23.

<sup>9</sup> *NCNA*, 30 June 1956. As we shall see, the Politburo finally approved the program and it was ratified by the Third Plenum in September 1957, pretty well on schedule.

<sup>10</sup> *Political Study*, No. 5, 13 May 1958; *ECMM*, 137, pp. 6-9.

<sup>11</sup> See, for example, *People's Daily*, 29 Aug. 1967, which described 1956 as 'an important historical turning point'. *SCMP*, 4019, p. 1.

<sup>12</sup> For example, Liu Shao-ch'i in his report to the Second Session of the Eighth Congress. *FLP*, 1958, p. 37.

<sup>13</sup> Eighth Congress. *FLP*, 1958, pp. 36-7.

<sup>14</sup> See, for example, *Political Study*, No. 5, cited above, and Liu's report to the Second Session of the Eighth Congress, *FLP*.

<sup>15</sup> *People's Daily*, 5 Apr. 1956; *CB*, 403, pp. 6-7.

<sup>16</sup> 17 Sept. 1956. *CB*, 415, p. 13.

<sup>17</sup> See 'On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat', *CB*, 403, pp. 6-7.

<sup>18</sup> See 'The Origin and Development of the Differences between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves', *CB*, 714, pp. 4-6.

<sup>19</sup> 'More on the Historical Experiences of the Proletariat', *People's Daily*, 29 Dec. 1956; *CB*, 433, pp. 1-6.

<sup>20</sup> 28 June 1956. *CB*, 395, pp. 1-10.

<sup>21</sup> No. 20, 20 Oct. 1956. *ECMM*, 63, pp. 31-5. See also p. 80 on the question of China's ultimate reliance on the Soviet nuclear deterrence.

<sup>22</sup> Political Report by Liu Shao-ch'i, 15 Sept. 1956. *CB*, 406, p. 45.

<sup>23</sup> *NCNA*, 30 Apr. 1957.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 7 May 1957.

<sup>25</sup> 18 Sept. 1957. *SCMP*, 1616, p. 11.

<sup>26</sup> K'o Ch'ing-shih in *People's Daily*, 27 Aug. 1957. *SCMP*, 1609, p. 10. See also *Political Study*, No. 8, 13 Aug. 1957. *ECMM*, 103, pp. 1-4.

<sup>27</sup> Issue No. 5, 1 Mar. 1957. *ECMM*, 86, pp. 1-4.

<sup>28</sup> Chang Hsi-jo, *NCNA*, 18 Apr. 1957.

<sup>29</sup> Ch'en Cheng-jen, 14 Mar. 1957. *CB*, 447, p. 1.

<sup>30</sup> 26 June 1957. *CB*, 463, p. 10.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 458, p. 12.

<sup>32</sup> 14 Sept. 1957. *SCMP*, 1618, pp. 20-2.

<sup>33</sup> The State Council report was dated 6 Sept. 1957. *SCMP*, 1627, p. 1.

<sup>34</sup> Teng Tzu-hui, *People's Daily*, 14 Nov. 1957.

<sup>35</sup> Teng Hsiao-p'ing, *CB*, 477, pp. 9-26.

<sup>36</sup> 26 May. *SWB*, No. 668, p. 8. See also *Political Study*, No. 5, 13 May; *ECMM*, 96, pp. 1-3.

<sup>37</sup> Or so it is stated by the Chinese; *NCNA*, 16 Aug. 1963.

<sup>38</sup> A point touched on in Chou En-lai's speech to the NPC on 10 Feb. 1958. *CB*, 492, p. 1.

<sup>39</sup> *Liberation Army Daily* and *Kuangming Daily*, 8 May 1966. *SWB*, FE/2160/B/2.

<sup>40</sup> 15 Dec. 1957. *SCMP*, 1685, p. 10.

<sup>41</sup> See *Evolution*, in particular pp. 93-100.

<sup>42</sup> Apart from the other evidence examined above, it is probable that late 1957 also saw the decision to reorganise on a large scale the subordinate economic institutions of the State Council. This reorganisation was revealed only in February 1958.

<sup>43</sup> *NCNA*, 18 Apr. 1959.

<sup>44</sup> 1 Jan. 1958. *SCMP*, 1685, pp. 3-5. For a discussion of this see pp. 50, 58-9.

<sup>45</sup> Po I-po, 2 Feb. 1959. *CB*, 494, pp. 4-7.

<sup>46</sup> Principal among these was the Chengtu Conference of March 1958.

<sup>47</sup> For the full report see *CB*, 507. Liu might well, in the event, have quoted another passage from Lenin: 'two steps forward, one step back—sometimes even both steps back'.

<sup>48</sup> We shall revert to this subject in a later section.

<sup>49</sup> *The Politics of the Chinese Red Army*, Hoover Institute, Stanford, 1966, pp. 224, 226-7, 651, 727 (hereafter referred to as *Politics*). See also *Peking Review*, 38, 22 Sept. 1959, p. 10; and an earlier reference to the upsurge in the study of Mao's military writings reported by *NCNA*, 29 May, 1958.

<sup>50</sup> With the Sino-Soviet agreement of October as his prophetic wand, Mao opined in June 1958 that it would take about ten years for China to produce 'some' nuclear weapons. *NCNA*, 18 June 1967.

<sup>51</sup> *Peking Review*, 38, 22 Sept. 1959, p. 10.

<sup>52</sup> *Red Flag* in its New Year editorial a few days later attacked the imperialists and reactionaries throughout the world for saying that the Chinese had retreated. *NCNA*, 31 Dec. 1958.

<sup>53</sup> Vice-Minister Chang Han-fu, who supervised Asian affairs, was concerned with Mongolia on 21 March 1958; Chi P'eng-fei then took over Mongolian affairs. The director of the new Socialist States Department was so identified, 2 April.

<sup>54</sup> The restriction of Chang's responsibilities may have been caused by the necessity for him to specialise more on Afro-Asian affairs, except for those concerned with Indo-China. The origins of this may be traced to developments in the summer of 1956 (see p. ??).

<sup>55</sup> On the latter date the existence of the new Second Asian Department was officially revealed; five days later the reconstituted Soviet and East European Department was overtly referred to. Chi P'eng-fei and Tseng Yung-ch'uan continued to share the task of supervising the Socialist States Department up to 8 December 1958, after which Chi took over the Second Asian area of responsibility, while Tseng oversaw relations with the European communist states.

<sup>56</sup> See also *Evolution*, pp. 3-7, and also my short study on the dismissal of Marshal P'eng Te-huai, in *China Quarterly*, No. 37, 1969.

<sup>57</sup> *PLA* Political Department directive. *NCNA*, 12 Feb. 1959.

<sup>58</sup> *Red Flag*, 16 Feb. 1959. *Joint Publications Research Service*, 706-D.

<sup>59</sup> Tu P'ing, *August First*, No. 12, 1959; *ECMM*, 180, pp. 6-11.

<sup>60</sup> *Red Flag*, No. 15, 1959; *ECMM*, 182, pp. 1-8.

<sup>61</sup> Lin Piao, *Red Flag*, No. 19, quoted by *Peking Review*, Vol. II, No. 40, pp. 16-17.

<sup>62</sup> *Evolution*, pp. 3-7, and *China Quarterly*, No. 37, 1969.

<sup>63</sup> A further resolution concerning P'eng Te-huai has been made public during the Cultural Revolution.

<sup>64</sup> He had acted in this capacity before, the last time in April 1959 when Chang Wen-t'ien was abroad.

<sup>65</sup> *Evolution*, pp. 7-14.

<sup>66</sup> *NCNA*, 27 Apr.; *SCMP*, 2252, p. 17.

<sup>67</sup> *Politics*. No understanding of contemporary China is even remotely possible without a very careful scrutiny of the whole of this bulky volume. The documents it contains refer to developments specifically related to PLA or para-military matters and cover the period from late 1960 to mid-1961.

<sup>68</sup> *Politics*, p. 65.

<sup>69</sup> *Evolution*, pp. 8-10.

<sup>70</sup> *NCNA*, 21 Jan. 1961.

<sup>71</sup> *Evolution*, pp. 3-6, 11, 14-16.

<sup>72</sup> *Politics*, p. 368.

<sup>73</sup> See also *Politics*, p. 481: 'the world is like a chessboard, and "one careless step will cause the loss of the whole game"'.  
<sup>74</sup> *Politics*, pp. 585, 588.

<sup>75</sup> *NCNA*, 21 Jan. 1961.

<sup>76</sup> Chou was replaced as chargé in Yugoslavia in May, and was publicly referred to in his new position on 22 July 1961.

### Chapter 3

<sup>1</sup> Issue No. 35, p. 9. The context was that of the US Navy shelling of Cuba on 24 August, 1962. *People's Daily* on 15 September said that the US was 'clamouring for a direct invasion of that country'.

<sup>2</sup> It was also in July 1962 that the United States first became aware of the fact that something strange was going on in Cuba.

<sup>3</sup> A Cultural Revolution source has it that in October 1962 the national program of retrenchment was completed. See *SCMM*, 616, p. 23.

<sup>4</sup> All the party regional leaders were then in the capital, which is a sure sign of a high-level conference.

<sup>5</sup> Liu's arrival almost exactly coincided with the beginning of the extremely grave Buddhist crisis in South Vietnam.

<sup>6</sup> Xuan Thuy, officially appointed 1 May 1963.

<sup>7</sup> *Peking Review*, which is a good barometer for Chinese diplomacy, carried no articles on North or South Vietnam after 18 Jan. 1963, and only resumed doing so on 15 March.

<sup>8</sup> 12 May 1963. *Peking Review*, 20, p. 11.

<sup>9</sup> But see p. 87.

<sup>10</sup> It is of interest to note that Radio Peking commenced its Hausa language broadcasts to West Africa on 1 June 1963. Chou departed on 13 December and returned on 5 Feb. 1964.

<sup>11</sup> A further possibility which does not contradict that made above but, in a sense, reinforces it is that following the conclusion of the Sino-Indian war it had become necessary to work diplomatically, and in intelligence matters, into India from Burma (and Pakistan).

<sup>12</sup> For the discussion on his likely responsibilities in Paris, see p. 100.

<sup>13</sup> *Evolution*, pp. 57-8.

<sup>14</sup> The West Asian and African Department had been split into two. See p. 50.

<sup>15</sup> See endpaper map.

<sup>16</sup> Officially in June 1964. It had been a bureau; turning it into a commission equated to up-grading it in importance.

<sup>17</sup> Quoted in *Peking Review* No. 2, 1965, p. 22.

<sup>18</sup> This decision was not publicly announced until June 1965.

<sup>19</sup> It is improbable, despite all that has been said of Mao's 'irrationality', that the leadership would have undertaken to launch the Cultural Revolution and to destroy national political cohesiveness if they had really believed in the danger of imminent war.

<sup>20</sup> Most of the leaders, including the regional ones who were normally in the provinces, were in Peking on that date.

<sup>21</sup> A Cultural Revolution pamphlet has revealed that the Chinese had 'over-estimated and miscalculated the bourgeois coup of Algeria'. *SCMM*, 636, p. 8.

<sup>22</sup> Despite some evidence to the contrary, from articles published under the names of Lin Piao and Lo Jui-ch'ing (Chief of Staff), at the beginning of September. The real emphasis in these articles, however, was implicitly that of the long-term danger. Where urgency was stressed, it is probable that the motive was ulterior and related more to the domestic political struggle than to the Vietnam war. See *Evolution*, pp. 82-3.

<sup>23</sup> Quite a large number of ambassadors were officially reappointed early in January 1966 in addition to those mentioned above.

<sup>24</sup> The changeover may have come earlier, as he went with Chou En-lai on a visit to Rumania on 16 June 1966.

<sup>25</sup> The plenum was held between 1-11 August 1966 and was the occasion for the demotion of Liu Shao-ch'i. In fact, however, the first crucial moves had probably been taken against Liu in March and April.

<sup>26</sup> *NCNA*, 12 Aug. 1966.

<sup>27</sup> The general concept of the world United Front goes back at least to 1946; the implicit exclusion of the Soviet Union may perhaps be traced to 1963 or 1964.

<sup>28</sup> Made 25 Oct. 1966. *Peking Review*, 46, p. 5.

<sup>29</sup> According to *Peking Review*, 51, p. 31.

<sup>30</sup> Hoxha, quoted by *Zeri i Popullit*, 12 Dec. 1966. *Peking Review*, 6, 1967, p. 28.

<sup>31</sup> Though much of the evidence for this change comes from foreign statements there can be no doubt that, as in past years, these were reflections of Chinese views; hence their republication in Chinese media.

<sup>32</sup> 15 Mar. 1967, *SCMM*, 635, p. 12.

<sup>33</sup> Ch'en Yi, 15 Feb. 1967. *Peking Review*, 9, p. 12.

<sup>34</sup> See the bulky Cultural Revolution pamphlet on the question of Ch'en Yi in the three issues of *SCMM*, 635-7.

<sup>35</sup> Also concerned was Li Yu-min. I have been unable to establish this man's background.

<sup>36</sup> This was dated 5 Nov. 1957, and marked the fiftieth anniversary of the October Revolution. *SCMP*, 4057, p. 37.

<sup>37</sup> According to an alleged statement by Ch'en Yi on 15 Mar. 1967: 'The East European countries are revisionist ones'. *SCMM*, 635, p. 12.

<sup>38</sup> 29 Nov. 1967. *SCMP*, 4071, p. 42.

<sup>39</sup> *NCNA*, Hong Kong Branch, Selected News Items No. 45, 4 Nov. 1968.

#### Chapter 4

<sup>1</sup> Report to Second Plenum. *Mao*, Vol. IV, 1961, p. 370.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 374.

<sup>3</sup> 'Strategy and Tactics of World Communism—Communism in China'. 81st Congress, 1st Session. *House Document No. 154*, Pt 3, 1949, p. 60. Original emphasis.

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, 81st Congress, p. 48.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 42, referring to the communist coup in Czechoslovakia.

<sup>6</sup> *Mao*, Vol. IV, 1961, pp. 406-7.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 97-101.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 416-17.

#### Chapter 5

<sup>1</sup> *Mao*, Vol. IV, 1961, p. 419.

<sup>2</sup> *Evolution*, pp. 101-2.

<sup>3</sup> The 1965 reorganisation was probably partly due to predictable requirements concerned with the Cultural Revolution. 1968 may well be the beginning of a new major phase.

#### Chapter 6

<sup>1</sup> *Selected Works*, Vol. II, 1954, p. 120.

<sup>2</sup> *Mao*, Vol. IV, 1961, p. 161.

<sup>3</sup> *Peking Review*, No. 15, 1965, p. 16.

<sup>4</sup> Documents of the 1st Session of the 1st NPC, *FLP*, 1956, p. 116.

<sup>5</sup> *Mao*, Vol. IV, 1961, p. 415.

<sup>6</sup> *Selected Works*, Vol. II, 1954, pp. 144-5.

<sup>7</sup> *People's China*, Vol. I, No. 7, 1950, p. 20.

<sup>8</sup> See *Selected Works*, Vol. II, 1954: 'Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan' and 'On the Protracted War'.

<sup>9</sup> We shall examine what may be described as the fourth strategic period, beginning in the autumn of 1968, in Part III.

<sup>10</sup> *Selected Works*, Vol. III, 1954, pp. 216-18.

<sup>11</sup> Quoted by Ch'en Po-ta in 'Notes on Ten Years of Civil War', *FLP*, 1954.

<sup>12</sup> See Appendix I for Chinese views concerning peaceful transition.

<sup>13</sup> *Politics*, p. 485.

<sup>14</sup> *Selected Works*, Vol. III, 1954, p. 125.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. I, 1955, p. 173.

#### Chapter 7

<sup>1</sup> *People's China*, supplement to No. 5, 1951, p. 7.

<sup>2</sup> *Mao*, Vol. IV, 1961, p. 433.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 434.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 99. To bring it fully up to date one would, of course, add to it Latin America.

<sup>5</sup> 'Communism in China', 81st Congress, 1st Session, *House Document No. 154*, Pt 3, 1949.

<sup>6</sup> *People's Daily*, 21 Jan. 1964.

<sup>7</sup> *Selected Works*, Vol. II, 1954, pp. 140-5.

<sup>8</sup> The changed Soviet status *vis-à-vis* the intermediate zone and the United Front will be discussed later.

### Chapter 8

<sup>1</sup> *Mao*, Vol. IV, 1961, p. 172.

<sup>2</sup> *SCMP*, 1048, p. 4.

<sup>3</sup> *NCNA*, 26 May 1957.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 25 Nov. 1957.

<sup>5</sup> *Red Flag*, No. 18, quoted by *Peking Review*, 38, 1959, p. 10.

<sup>6</sup> *Liberation Army Daily* and *Kuangming Daily*, 8 May 1966; *SWB*, FE/2160/B/2.

<sup>7</sup> *Mao*, Vol. IV, 1961, p. 455.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 157.

<sup>9</sup> *Selected Works*, Vol. IV, 1956, pp. 247-8.

<sup>10</sup> *Peking Review*, 24, 1965, p. 12.

<sup>11</sup> *Politics*, pp. 484-5.

<sup>12</sup> 'China is flesh of your flesh and blood of your blood. China is coloured and knows to what a coloured skin in this modern world subjects its owners'. Du Bois, *Peking Review*, 9, 1959, p. 12.

<sup>13</sup> *Peking Review*, 43, 1963, p. 13.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 49, 1963, p. 14.

<sup>15</sup> *Selected Works*, Vol. II, 1954, p. 245.

<sup>16</sup> *Peking Review*, 44, 1962, p. 20.

<sup>17</sup> *Selected Works*, Vol. III, 1954, pp. 111-19.

<sup>18</sup> *Peking Review*, 29, 1962, p. 12.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 45, 1965, p. 26.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 46, 1965, pp. 8-9.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 46, 1966, p. 26.

### Chapter 9

<sup>1</sup> *Selected Works*, Vol. IV, 1956, pp. 96, 336.

<sup>2</sup> *Mao*, Vol. IV, 1961, p. 100. See also p. 21.

<sup>3</sup> *Selected Works*, Vol. II, 1954, p. 203.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 199.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 36.

<sup>6</sup> *Peking Review*, combined issue 10 and 11, 1963, pp. 24, 28.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 37, 1966, p. 13.

<sup>8</sup> *Politics*, p. 250.

<sup>9</sup> See, for example, Chou En-lai, *NCNA*, 30 Jan. 1956.

<sup>10</sup> *Selected Works*, Vol. II, 1954, p. 272.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 273.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 199; see also p. 198.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. III, 1954, p. 135. See also below on the United Front.

<sup>14</sup> *Peking Review*, 21, 1963, p. 13.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 20, 1963, p. 11.

<sup>16</sup> *Selected Works*, Vol. II, 1954, p. 192.

<sup>17</sup> *NCNA*, 27 Apr. 1960.

- <sup>18</sup> *ECMM*, 7, 1956, p. 3; *ECMM*, 39, 1956, pp. 1-7.  
<sup>19</sup> *SCMP*, 3933, p. 7.  
<sup>20</sup> *SCMP*, 4035, p. 18; *Politics*, p. 486.  
<sup>21</sup> *NCNA*, 16 Aug. 1963.  
<sup>22</sup> *SWB*, FE/2495/B/17. Mao's alleged statement was revealed on the occasion of China's explosion of her first hydrogen bomb.  
<sup>23</sup> 1 July 1958. *SCMP*, 1881, p. 4.  
<sup>24</sup> *Politics*, p. 253.  
<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 67.  
<sup>26</sup> *Peking Review*, 33, 1962, p. 10.  
<sup>27</sup> *SCMP*, 3043, pp. 33-4.  
<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35.  
<sup>29</sup> *Selected Works*, Vol. I, 1955, p. 335.  
<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. II, 1954, p. 25.  
<sup>31</sup> *Peking Review*, 1, 1962, p. 8.  
<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, combined issue 47 and 48, 1962, p. 31.  
<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 36, p. 24.

#### Chapter 10

- <sup>1</sup> *Peking Review*, 9, 1963, p. 13.  
<sup>2</sup> *Selected Works*, Vol. III, 1954, p. 51.  
<sup>3</sup> *Politics*, p. 482.  
<sup>4</sup> *Selected Works*, Vol. III, 1954, p. 83.  
<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. IV, 1956, p. 303.  
<sup>6</sup> *ECMM*, 87, pp. 4-6.  
<sup>7</sup> *Political Study* No. 5; *ECMM*, 94, pp. 11-12.  
<sup>8</sup> *CB*, 415, p. 11.  
<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 714, p. 27.  
<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 507, p. 25.  
<sup>11</sup> *Peking Review*, combined issues 47 and 48, 1962, p. 31.  
<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 5, 1963, p. 6.  
<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 7, 1963, p. 8.  
<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, combined issues 10 and 11, 1963, p. 19.  
<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 7, 1963, p. 8; 9, p. 9.  
<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 39, 1963, p. 11.  
<sup>17</sup> *SCMM*, 434, pp. 1-6.  
<sup>18</sup> *NCNA*, 25 Nov. 1963.  
<sup>19</sup> *The Great Socialist Cultural Revolution in China*, 4, Pamphlet of Foreign Languages Press, 1966, p. 8.  
<sup>20</sup> *SCMM*, 434, p. 1.  
<sup>21</sup> *Peking Review* 6, 1965, pp. 22-5.  
<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 37, 1967, p. 25. See also 40, 1967, pp. 26-9.  
<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 43, 1967, p. 27.  
<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 18, 1967, pp. 30-1.  
<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 34, 1968, supplement, p. IV.  
<sup>26</sup> *SCMP*, 4273, p. 30.  
<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 4071, p. 42.  
<sup>28</sup> At the Eleventh Plenum, August 1966. *SCMP*, 4131, p. 24. See also 4231, p. 23.

## Chapter 11

- <sup>1</sup> *Selected Works*, Vol. III, 1954, p. 97.
- <sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol I, 1955, p. 259; Vol. III, 1954, p. 218.
- <sup>3</sup> *Mao*, Vol. IV, 1961, pp. 187-8.
- <sup>4</sup> *Selected Works*, Vol. II, 1954, pp. 249-50.
- <sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. III, 1954, pp. 190-202.
- <sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 191.
- <sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. II, 1954, pp. 262-4.
- <sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. III, 1954, p. 194.
- <sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 197.
- <sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 198-9.
- <sup>11</sup> See, for example, Li Wei-han, *Peking Review*, 8, 1962, p. 1.
- <sup>12</sup> *Selected Works*, Vol. III, 1954, p. 199.
- <sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 200, 213.
- <sup>14</sup> *Mao*, Vol. IV, 1961, pp. 158-9.
- <sup>15</sup> *People's China*, Vol II, No. 1, 1950, p. 4.
- <sup>16</sup> *NCNA*, 18 June 1957.
- <sup>17</sup> See, for example, the Chinese statement on policy towards nationalist countries, *Peking Review*, 44, 1962, p. 20.
- <sup>18</sup> *CB*, 403, p. 7.
- <sup>19</sup> *Selected Works*, Vol. III, 1954, pp. 196-7.
- <sup>20</sup> *Peking Review*, 25, 1963, p. 8.
- <sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 43, 1963, p. 15.
- <sup>22</sup> *CB*, 403, pp. 6-7.
- <sup>23</sup> *Peking Review*, 12, 1966, p. 22.
- <sup>24</sup> *NCNA*, 12 Aug. 1966.
- <sup>25</sup> *Peking Review*, 51, 1966, p. 31.
- <sup>26</sup> *SCMP*, 4057, p. 37; 4276, p. 20.

## Chapter 13

- <sup>1</sup> 'Long Live the Victory of People's War', *Peking Review*, 36, 1965, p. 26.

## Chapter 14

- <sup>1</sup> *Rural Youth*, 17, 10 Sept. 1967, Shanghai Union Research Service, Vol. 49, 28 Nov. 1967, p. 236.
- <sup>2</sup> *Peking Review*, 11, 1968, p. 13.



- Administration: cadres, 55, 97; CCP re-organisation, 5, 67; central efficiency, 6; centralisation, 32-3, 66; communes, urban, 73; de-centralisation, 45-6, 55, 72, 78; domestic control, 227-8; education, 55, 65, 130; incentives, 79; labour, rural, 66; local, semi-modernised sector, 4; manpower, 62; mass movements, 228; political departments, 96; regional, 32-3, 45, 72, 78; retrenchment, 55, 65; seventy regulations, industry, 79; sixty regulations (agriculture) 79, (education) 79; social conflict, 218; social mobility, 116; urban dislocation, communes, 73; *see also* Agriculture, CCP Development, Leap Forward, Planning
- Afghanistan, 104, 147-8, 240
- Africa, 7, 14, 94, 95, 101-2, 105, 109, 110, 114, 143, 148, 161, 212, 225, 244
- Afro-Americans, 161, 247
- Afro-Asia, 92-3, 95, 98, 100, 158, 160, 163, 175, 182, 185-6, 192, 195, 197, 205-7, 209, 211, 213, 215, 243
- Aggression, *see* Armed struggle
- Agriculture: agrarian nature of China, 129, 131-2, 177, 210, 219, 228; Agrarian Reform Law (1950), 19-20; CCP (decision on co-operativisation) 29, 38, (directive on co-operatives) 54, (draft regulations on) 44, (leadership attitudes to) 44-5, 241, (3rd Plenum, 1957) 54; cadres, rural, 55; Chou En-lai, reform timetable, 20, 53; collectivisation, Soviet, 180; communes, 60-2, 65, 67, 69; communications, 131; conservancy, water, 131; conservatism, peasant, 31-2, 130, 210, 219; consumer goods, 130; co-operativisation, 29, 30-1, 37-40, 44-6, 53-4, 130, 134, 180, 210, 223, 241; crops, national yield, 25, 38, 53, 78, 83, 86, 90, 92, 131-5, 219, 241; development funding, from co-operatives, 54; economic collapse, 66, 69; Eight Point program, Mao, 19-20; electrification, 131; Five Year Plan, Second, 53; health, 131; improvement in, 1962, 133; Khrushchev, on communes, 180; land reform (Agrarian Reform Law, 1950) 19-20, (Chou En-lai timetable) 20, (germ warfare campaign) 24, (Korean war) 240, (Mao timetable) 20, (rectification) 24; Leap Forward, 54-5, 65, 133, 135, 172; Ministry of, 31; natural calamities, 54, 66, 78, 130; peasants (conservatism) 31-2, (discontent) 78, 130-1, 210, 219, (education) 32, 55, 130-1, (production basis) 65, (psychology) 31-2, (rich) 20; PLA, 67-8; procurement, 219; program, world significance of, 42; relation to foreign affairs, 31, 90, 132-4, 210; relation to policy, 131-4, 135, 210; rural affairs, neglected, 130-1, 210; rural experience, international relevance of, 207; sixty regulations, 79; socialist education, 96; Third Plenum, June 1950, 19-20; Twelve Year Plan, 44, 54; villages, relation to co-operatives, 54; weaknesses, 38, 65-6, 96-7, 210, 219, 228; winter slack season, 90; *see also* Ch'en Yun, CCP, Development, Domestic affairs, Planning, T'an Chen-lin, Teng Tzu-hui
- Aid, *see* Development
- Albania, 7, 15, 110, 111, 112, 115, 117, 155, 182, 185-6, 245
- Algeria, 107, 212, 245
- America, North, 162; *see also* USA
- America, South, *see* Latin America
- Antarctica, 150
- Armed struggle, 17, 41, 49, 80, 99, 102, 112, 113, 115, 118, 143, 145-6, 153, 155, 164, 166, 167-9, 174-6, 182-5, 188-9, 190-2, 193, 195-7, 202, 204-8, 211-13, 216-18, 224-5, 231-4.
- Asia, 7, 14, 15, 36-7, 40, 50, 64, 101, 148, 151, 155, 160, 222, 225, 240; *see also* East
- Asian and Australasian Trade Union Conference, 17
- Asian and Pacific Peace Conference, 26
- Atomic weapons stalemate, *see* Weapons

- Australia, 149, 152  
 Australasia, 149, 225  
 Ayub Khan, *see* Pakistan
- Baguio, 85  
 Bandung, 33, 36, 40-1, 98  
 Base, for world revolution, 112, 144, 145, 155, 164, 169, 174-6, 182, 184, 185, 197, 213, 223  
 Beria, 28  
 Blooming and Contending Campaign, 43  
 Border agreements, 72, 76, 147  
 Borneo, 147  
 Boundaries, 147, 221  
 Bourgeoisie, 160, 162, 163, 175, 181, 201, 208-9, 211-12, 215  
 Brazil, 112, 197  
 British Empire, 150  
 Bucharest meeting, 75  
 Bulganin, *see* Soviet Union  
 Burma, 37, 79, 80, 93-4, 95, 147-8, 222, 244
- Cambodia, 64, 79, 80, 82, 87, 93, 100, 148, 222, 226-7, 240  
 Camp David, *see* Soviet Union  
 Canada, 149, 152  
 Canary Islands, 148  
 Cape Verde Islands, 149  
 Capitalism, 150-3, 163, 169, 175, 181, 186, 188, 192, 195, 201, 204, 207, 211, 224; *see also* Imperialism, US imperialism
- CCP: aggressiveness, 220-1; anti-rightist campaign, 44, 51-2, 60; capitalist-roaders, 102; centre of Marxist-Leninist world, 182, 185, 193, 196-7, 205, 207, 224; Central Committee (on co-operatives) 54, (on work methods) 51; communism, 60, 127, 224, 227; conferences (2nd Plenum, March 1949) 11-12, 246, (3rd Plenum, June 1950) 19-20, 134, (Chengtu, March 1953) 243, (Politburo, December 1953) 29, 32, (4th Plenum, February 1954) 29, 32, (National Conference, March 1955) 39, (5th Plenum, April 1955) 39, (agricultural co-operativisation, July 1955) 38, 241, (6th Plenum, October 1955) 38, 46, 241, (on intellectuals, January 1956) 43, 241, (Politburo, April 1956) 46, 47, 135, 242, (7th Plenum, September 1956) 135, (8th Congress, September 1956) 43, 46-7, 49, 60, 242, (2nd Plenum, November 1956) 50, (National Conference, propaganda work, March 1957) 51, (Politburo) 54, (3rd Plenum, September 1957) 54-5, 60, 242, (Leap Forward, winter 1957) 60, (8th Congress, 2nd session, 1958) 181, 242, (Leap Forward, November 1958) 62, 65, (6th Plenum, winter 1958) 62-3, 65-6, (Chengchow, February 1959) 65, (Politburo, March 1959) 66, (7th Plenum, April 1959) 66, (Politburo, July 1959) 69, (8th Plenum, August 1959) 68-9, (no Plenum, 1960) 74, (9th Plenum, January 1961) 74, 78, (Politburo, March 1961) 75, (enlarged conference, January 1962) 83, (conferences, July and August 1962) 84-5, (10th Plenum, September 1962) 86, 89, 133-4, (Politburo, September 1963) 92, 244, (Politburo, autumn and winter 1964) 97, (late December 1964) 102, (Politburo, September-October 1965) 103, 106, 108, 135, (11th Plenum, August 1966) 110, 245, 248, (12th Plenum, October 1968) 115, 117, (9th Congress) 117; CRSU, alleged control by, 125; Cultural Revolution, 5; de-Stalinisation effects, 44, 51; domestic affairs, principal concern, 102; domestic crisis, 1960-1, 77; draft regulations, agricultural development, 44; European parties, 91, 245; failure to hold Plenum, 1960, 74; foreign policy, periods of change in, 132-4; guerilla psychology, 145, 155; Hundred Flowers, 43; insecurity, 219-20; International Liaison Department, 71; international role, 182; Japan, aggression, 123; Kao Kang, 29-30, 39; leadership (ageing) 221, (awareness of foreign affairs) 108, (attitudes to co-operativisation) 44-5, 241, (insecurity) 219-20, (Sino-Soviet dispute) 182, (uncertainty) 72, 74, (world views distortion) 214; Leap Forward, 45-9, 52, 54-5, 59, 60-3, 65, 69, 72-5, 77-9, 133, 135, 172, 181, 241, 244; Lenin Anniversary (90th), 75; Lin Piao, 68, 73-4, 84-5, 89, 96, 170, 217, 243; Mao (leadership) 86, 89-90, 99, 228, 241, (personality) 219-20, 245, (universal applicability of thoughts) 213, 223; Marxism-Leninism, adaptation, 129; Military Affairs Committee, 74, 102, 172, 244; Moscow talks, *see* Moscow conferences; Nationalists (KMT), 123; over-reaction of régime, 220-1; Party's role in United Front, 188-90; P'eng Te-huai, 69, 240-1, 243; policy

- (debate) 97, (relation to agriculture) 131-4; political departments, 96, 103; purges, 29-30, 39, 69, 97, 102-3, 115-16, 241, 243, 245; racial discrimination in Politburo, 161; radical politics, 84, 96, 97; rectification (1950), 19, 23, 51-2, 54, 60, 78, 95-7, 102; Regional Bureaux, 72, 78; reorganisation, 221; revisionism, domestic, 89-90, 95-7, 102-3; revolutionary successors, 96; socialism, 112, 127; socialist education, 89-90, 92, 95-7, 102-3; summer policy meetings, 131-2, 135; unfirm elements within, 69; US opposition to, 220; Vietnam war, 99, 104; war preparations, 103; Yang Hsien-chen, 183-4; youth, 96; *see also* Cultural Revolution, PLA, Soviet Union, United Front, Weapons
- Ceylon, 50
- Chad, 149
- Ch'angch'un railroad, 16, 25
- Chang Han-fu, 12, 13, 14, 22, 25-6, 35, 36, 50, 64, 71, 81, 94, 100, 109, 235-8 *passim*, 243
- Chang Hsi-jo, 242
- Chang Nai-ch'i, 241
- Chang Wen-t'ien, 22, 33, 35, 36, 50, 69, 71, 235-7 *passim*, 244
- Chauvinism, 116, 162, 212
- Ch'en Cheng-jen, 242
- Ch'en Chia-kang, 26, 108, 110, 114, 118, 238-9, 241
- Ch'en Po-ta, 246
- Ch'en Shu-liang, 82, 241
- Ch'en Yi, 7, 59, 95, 104-6, 113, 201, 236, 245
- Ch'en Yun and co-operativisation, 31
- Chess, Chinese, 138, 244
- Ch'iao Kuan-hua, 100, 109-10, 114, 118, 238-9
- Chi P'eng-pei, 7, 36, 50, 58, 72, 81, 94, 100, 105, 110, 114, 118, 236-9 *passim*, 243
- Chou Ch'iu-yeh, 82, 244
- Chou En-lai, 12, 25, 33-4, 43, 45, 49, 50, 59, 94, 95, 101, 105, 115, 116, 131, 157, 186, 240, 242, 244, 245, 247
- Civil disturbances, *see* Armed struggle
- Civil war, *see* Armed struggle
- Class struggle, *see* Armed struggle
- Co-existence, *see* Peaceful co-existence
- Colombo Conference, 33
- Colonialism, 14, 113, 143, 151, 153-4, 162-3, 174-6, 185-6, 205, 207, 208, 215, 216, 223
- Colour, 142, 151, 160-2, 185, 207, 209, 215, 247
- Communes, *see* Agriculture
- Communications, 131
- Communism, 60, 127, 224, 227
- Compromise, 204
- Confrontation, *see* Indonesia
- Congo, 101
- Consolidation, domestic, 16, 19
- Constitution, state, 30
- Contradictions, 11-12, 51, 99, 141, 175, 178, 180, 183-4, 191, 201-2, 208, 209, 211
- Co-operativisation, *see* Agriculture
- Cuba, 85, 87, 147, 181, 244
- Cultural Relations Commission, foreign, 64, 101, 113, 133
- Cultural Revolution, 118, 135, 224-5, 245, 246; effects on Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 108, 109, 110, 112, 113, 239; end of phase, 115-16, 119; prime documentary source, 74
- Cyprus, 148
- Czechoslovakia, 116, 149, 186, 197, 246
- De-centralisation, 45-6; *see also* Planning, Development
- Defence by World United Front, *see* Protection
- Democracy, 192, 214-15, 220
- Détente, US-Soviet, 70, 85, 140, 180; *see also* Peaceful co-existence
- Deterrence, *see* Weapons
- Development: aggressiveness, 220-1, 228; agrarian basis, 177, 207, 210, 219, 228; aid, 11, 21, 27-8, 34, 40, 44-5, 55, 75, 126-7, 131, 143, 178, 183, 205-6, 212-13, 216; capitalist world, *see* Capitalism; Chinese experience, world significance of, 42, 181; Chou En-lai, 53, 131; communes, *see* Agriculture; communications, 131; communism, 60, 127, 224, 227; co-operativisation, *see* Agriculture; developed societies, 175, 182, 205, 216; domestic control, 227-8; economic independence, 151-2; economy, 32; education, 32, 53, 65, 79, 130-1; electrification, 131; élites, 2, 4; *see also* CCP, Administration, PLA; foreign policy, *see* Domestic affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Foreign Trade, Ministry of, 26, 64; fundamental problems, rural, 2, 4, 210; health, rural, 131; illiteracy, 32; incentives, 79; industrialisation, 29, 130-2, 134, 138,

- 140, 181, 210; industrial self-sufficiency, 32, 131, innovation, 5; intellectuals, 43, 46; Leap Forward, 44-9, 52, 54-5, 59, 60-3, 65, 69, 72-5, 77-9, 133, 135, 172, 181, 241, 244; liberalisation, 228; major phases (1950, 1956, 1962, 1968), 26, 34-5, 134-5, 138, 139-40, 154, 220, 242-4, 246; markets, world, 151, 163, 207, 211; mass movements, domestic, 227-8; modernisation, 129-31; peasants, 5, 20, 31-2, 96, 130-1, *see also* Agriculture, United Front; periodisation, 134-5, 138; political departments, 96, 103; raw materials, 151, 163, 207, 211; regions, 32, 45, 72, 78; science, 43, 45, 132, 210; social conflict, 218; socialisation, 138; socialism, 60, 112, 127; socialist education, 89, 102-3; social mobility, 116, *see also* Administration; Soviet Union, comparative stage, 139; spiritual force, 206, 210, 221; technicians, Soviet withdrawal of, 75-6, 172; ten sets of relationships, 46; United Nations, 216; underdevelopment, 151, 163, 175, 182, 207, 211-12, 215-16, 219; upsurge in, 44; urban communes, 73; urban sector, semi-modernised, 4; village experiments, 4-5; village disputes, 218; youth, 96; *see also* Cultural Revolution, Domestic affairs (related to foreign), Planning, Soviet Union, Strategy, Tactics, Weapons
- Dictatorship, proletarian, 163
- Disarmament, *see* Weapons
- Division of world, 117
- Domestic affairs, relative to foreign, 1, 2, 6, 39, 65, 88-9, 92, 101-2, 108, 112-13, 116, 119, 128-9, 131-4, 135, 136-43, 168, 179, 184, 213, 220-1, 227-8
- Domestic basis for revolution, 205-6
- Domestic control, 228
- Domino theory, Chinese, 80, 144, 244
- East, 159-60; *see also* Asia
- East Wind, 40-1, 56-7, 68, 157-64 *passim*, 188, 240
- Economic aid, *see* Development
- Economic planning, *see* Planning
- Economic Relations Commission, foreign, 101, 113, 245
- Economics, international, *see* Development
- Education, *see* Development
- Elites, *see* CCP, Development
- Ethiopia, 148
- Eurasia, 149
- Europe, 7, 12, 14, 50, 94, 109, 111, 116, 149-50, 152, 154, 158-63, 175-6, 182, 185-6, 192, 195, 197, 202, 205, 207, 208-9, 211, 223, 225, *see also* West
- Export: of counter-revolution, 206; of revolution, 142, 168, 205-6
- External interference, 205-6
- Feudalism, 174-5, 185, 189, 205
- Foreign affairs, *see* Domestic affairs
- Foreign aid, *see* Development
- Foreign policy, 3, 6, 11, 13, 209, 213-14; *see also* Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Formosa, *see* Taiwan
- Four contradictions in international affairs, 201
- Four major forces, 192
- France, 7, 18, 22, 48, 95, 152, 177, 212, 244
- Friendship treaties, 72, 76, 147
- Gambia, 149
- Geneva conferences, 28, 33, 36, 79, 81, 85, 138, 226, (1954) 235-6, (1961) 237
- Geo-political view, 35-6, 147-8; *see also* Intermediate Zone
- Germany, East, 58, 236
- Germ warfare campaign, 23
- Greenland, 149
- Guerilla-ism, *see* PLA
- Guerilla psychology, *see* PLA
- Hainan, occupation of, 17
- Han Chinese superiority, 161
- Han Nien-lung, 7, 101, 110, 114, 118, 238-9
- Himalayan regions, 222
- Historical doctrinal superiority, 42, 116
- Hong Kong, 83, 147, 222
- Ho Wei, 59
- Hoxha, *see* Albania
- Hsiao Hua, *see* PLA
- Hsu I-hsin, 7, 108, 110, 114, 118, 238-9
- Huang Chen, 7, 81-2, 95, 97, 100, 237-8
- Hundred Flowers Campaign, 43
- Hungary, 47, 179
- Iceland, 149
- Ideological supremacy, 42, 116
- Ideology, 15, 60
- Illiteracy, 32, 55
- Imperialism, 48, 128, 141, 152, 158, 160-2, 163, 166-9, 174-6, 178, 182-3, 188-9, 191, 201-6, 209, 217, 243; *see also* Capitalism, US imperialism

- India, 163, 212, 241, 244; war with, 70, 76-7, 79, 84-9, 96, 104-5, 133-5, 147, 181, 202-3, 212, 214, 222, 237, 244; ambassador recalled from, 84, 88; Pakistan, 104-5
- Indian subcontinental states, 37, 64, 95, 148, 222
- Indo-China, 6, 37, 64, 95, 100, 107-8, 118, 138, 147-8, 225-6, 243; federation, 226-7, 240; neutral zone, 225-6; US assists France, 18; war (1950), 13; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 35; *see also* Vietnam
- Indonesia, 37, 79, 92-3, 95, 97, 103, 104-5, 106-7, 109, 148, 160, 222, 237-8, 241
- Industrialisation, *see* Development
- Insecurity, 219-20
- Intellectuals, 43, 46
- Intelligence, possible MFA functions, 12-13, 244
- Intercontinental ballistic missiles, *see* Weapons
- Intermediate zone, 15-16, 147-56 *passim*, 184-5, 188, 193-4, 201, 207, 225, 247
- International Communist Movement, 17, 48, 56-8, 63, 71-2, 75-6, 95, 98, 106, 108, 111, 126, 143, 157, 169, 177, 179, 181-5, 187, 195-6, 209, 215, 231-4
- Internationalism, 127-8, 204, 206
- International relations: institute, 49; methodology, 1-2; principles, 49-50
- Invasion fears, *see* Threat
- Israel, 48, 240
- Japan, 64, 123, 136, 148, 152, 189, 222; control over Korea and Taiwan, 13-14; JCP, 17; Sino-Soviet treaty, 19; US occupation, 17, 19
- Jungle warfare, *see* Armed struggle
- K'ang Sheng, 187
- Kao Kang, 29-30, 39, 235
- Kashmir, *see* India, Pakistan
- Keng Piao, 7, 71-2, 82, 95, 100, 237
- Khrushchev, *see* Soviet Union
- K'o Ch'ing-shih, 242
- Korea, 12, 37, 63-4, 79, 93, 108, 147-8, 222-3, 235; historical view of, 13; Liu Shao-ch'i visits, 93; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13; war (aids Chinese domestic consolidation) 20-1, (armistice) 23, 26, 28, (Chinese involvement) 18, 20, 132, 134, 214, 235, (economic burden) 20-1, (foreknowledge by Soviet Union, China) 18-19, (germ warfare campaign) 23, (land reform) 240, (MacArthur replaced by Ridgway) 21, (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 13, 17-18, 132, (P'eng Tehuai) 20, 240, (protracted war) 20, (Sino-Soviet friendship treaty) 19, (Soviet peace proposal) 21, (Truman) 17-18, (US threat to China) 19
- Kowloon, *see* Hong Kong
- Kuznetsov, 28
- Kweichow donkey, 165, 170; *see also* Paper Tiger
- Laos, 64, 79-80, 81, 82, 85-6, 100, 148, 222-3, 225-7, 236, 240
- Latin America, 7, 14, 119, 150, 153-4, 158, 160, 163, 175, 182, 185, 192, 195, 197, 205-7, 209, 211, 213, 215, 225, 246
- Leap Forward, 45-9, 52, 54-5, 59, 60-3, 65, 67, 69, 72-5, 77-9, 133, 135, 172, 181, 241, 244; *see also* CCP, Development
- Liberalisation, 228
- Li Fu-ch'un, 241
- Li K'e-nung, 12, 13, 22, 33, 35, 235
- Lin Piao, 68, 73-4, 84-5, 89, 96, 170, 217, 243, 245
- Li Tso-p'eng, 137
- Liu Hsiao, 88, 94, 100, 110, 111, 117-18, 237-9 *passim*
- Liu Hsin-ch'uan, 101, 110, 114, 118, 238-9
- Liu Shao-ch'i, 17, 27, 38, 46-7, 60, 76, 78, 92-3, 95, 115, 141, 170, 181-2, 223, 242, 243, 244, 245
- Li Wei-han, 249
- Li Yu-min, 245
- Lo Jui-ch'ing, 245
- Lo Kuei-po, 7, 58, 59, 63-4, 81-2, 88, 94-5, 100, 107-8, 109, 114, 118, 236-9 *passim*
- Lost Territories, 221
- Lu Ting-yi, 240
- Macao, 147, 222
- MacArthur, General Douglas, 18; replaced by Ridgway, 21
- Major world forces, 192-3, 195, 203
- Malaya, *see* Malaysia
- Malaysia, 93, 95, 106-7, 147, 222
- Malenkov, *see* Soviet Union
- Malta, 148
- Manchuria, Soviet occupation of, 117
- Mao Tse-tung, *see* CCP
- Markets, world, 151, 163, 207, 211
- Marxist-Leninist parties, 95, 111, 177, 182, 185, 193, 196-7

- Marxist-Leninist world block, 182, 185, 193, 196-7, 205, 207
- Mass violence, *see* Armed struggle
- Material weaknesses, 123, 145, 170, 181, 210, 219, 243
- Mauritania, 148
- Mauritius, 149
- Metropolitan countries, relative to colonial, 14, 154, 163, 182, 207, 211
- Middle East, 155, 225
- Mikoyan, *see* Soviet Union
- Militia, *see* PLA
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs: academic research, 87; aggressiveness, 220-1, 228; agriculture related to foreign policy, 90; ambassadors, 50, 87-8, 94, 108, 241, 245; Americas-Australasia, 14; Arab nations, *see* Middle East; Asia-Africa Society, 87; Asia (West) and Africa, 50, 101, 244; assistant ministers, 33, 241; balance of forces, 157; Canton conference, September 1963, 94-5; Chou En-lai replaced, 59, 63, 133; cultural revolution, 6, 109, 118, 246; Cultural Relations Commission, foreign, 64, 101, 113, 133; development phases (1950) 134, (1956) 135, 139, 154, 242-3, (1962) 135, 244, (1968) 246; diplomacy, 145, 155-6, 244; Economic Relations Commission, foreign, 101, 113, 245; established, 12; foreign policy (offensive), 85, 87, 88, 92, 101-2, (related to agriculture), 90; Foreign Trade, Ministry of, 26, 30, 64, 101, 113, 133; geographic areas, 12, 25-6, 35-7, 40, 50, 64, 94, 101, 114, 119, 148, 150, 154, 222, 226, 241, 243-4; geo-politics, 35-6, 147-9, 154-5; goals, national, 224; Guerilla psychology, 145, 155-6, 188, 202, 208; Indo-China federation, 226-7; Indo-Pakistan war, 104-5; insecurity, 219-20, 228; intelligence, possible functions, 12-13, 35; international affairs, offensive, 85-7, 92, 101-2; major phases, organisation, 134, 136-41, 154, 220, 246; Minister, Ch'en Yi, 59, 63, 133; neighbour states, 212, 225; North Africa Department, 101; numerical superiority, 158, 185, 203, 207, 209; over-reaction, 220-1; periodic structural change, 119, 132-4, 136-41, 154; periodisation, 134, 136-41, 154, 220, 246; polemics, 142-3; policy (future restrictions) 228, (related to theory) 202, 209, 213; population size, 158; prestige, national, 228; priority targets, 222; protection, international, 195, 209, 227; revisionism, *see* Soviet Union; rural experience, international relevance of, 207, 223; Second Afro-Asian Conference, 98, 105-6, 107; secrecy, 202; Socialist States Department, 63-4, 243; Soviet Union (East Europe) 12, 88, 111, (importance) 13, 132; space related to time, 137; strategy, 129, 136-40, 141-2, 145, 156, 166, 168, 175, 188, 203, 210, 216, 217, 228; structure related to policy, 118-19, 132; summer-autumn changes, 133; tactics, 136-7, 141-3, 145, 169, 191, 193-4, 203, 204, 206, 211-13; Third World, *see* Intermediate Zone; time related to space, 137; underdeveloped world, affinity with, 163, 211; unequal treaties, 178, 221; vice-ministers, 12, 13, 22, 30, 33, 35-6, 40, 50, 58, 72, 81-2, 88, 94, 100, 107, 108-9, 110, 114, 118, 119, 150, 154, 235-9 *passim*, 243-4; West Europe-Africa, 7, 12, 14, 50; world leadership, 205, 207-9; world revolution, China's role in, *see* Armed struggle; *see also* under separate countries, and Contradictions, Development, International Communist Movement, Sinocentrism, United Front
- Ministry of Foreign Trade, 26, 30, 64, 101, 113, 133
- Misunderstanding gap, 229
- Molotov, *see* Soviet Union
- Mongolia, 13, 25, 37, 63-4, 94, 117, 147-8, 222-3, 243; inner, 161; *see also* Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Moscow conferences (1957) 56-8, 157-8, 236, (1960) 72, 75-6, (1963) 91
- Nanwei Islands, 147
- Nasser, 48
- National democratic revolution, *see* Armed struggle
- National interests, 48, 56, 81, 127-8, 156, 165, 175-8, 183, 204, 207, 221, 226-8
- Nationalism, 142, 162, 181, 187, 206, 208-9, 211-12, 215, 225, 249
- National liberation struggle, *see* Armed struggle
- National People's Congress, 45, 49, 241-2
- Negotiations, role of, 191
- Neighbour states, 212, 225
- Neo-colonialism, *see* Colonialism
- Nepal, 79, 148, 222

- Neutrality, 169, 194, 203, 208, 212, 225-6  
 New Guinea, 149  
 Ne Win, *see* Burma  
 New technology for national defence agreement, *see* Weapons  
 New Zealand, 149, 152  
 Niger, 148  
 Northeast industrial base, 29  
 Nuclear capability, *see* Weapons  
 Numerical superiority, 152, 158, 185, 203, 205, 207, 209
- Oceania, *see* Australasia  
 Oppressed nations, 163-4, 169, 183, 185, 201, 205-7  
 Oppressors, 163-4, 169, 186, 201  
 Overseas Chinese, 79
- Pacific Islands, 149-50  
 Pacificism, 167, 175, 181, 209  
 Pakistan, 104-5, 147-8, 244  
 Panyushkin, 26, 28  
 Paper Tiger, 40-1, 57, 68, 99, 126, 136-7, 145, 165-76 *passim*, 188, 209  
 Papua, 149  
 Paracel, *see* Sisha Islands  
 Path for others, 15, 17, 163, 207, 213  
 Patriotism, *see* Nationalism  
 Peace, 142, 168-9, 173, 192, 204, 224-5  
 Peace Conference, Asian and Pacific, 26  
 Peaceful coexistence, 41, 63, 91, 93, 140, 143, 153, 166, 169, 178, 180, 183-4, 204; *see also* Détente, Armed struggle  
 Peaceful transition, 175, 181, 183-4, 209, 211, 231-4  
 Peasants, *see* Agriculture  
 P'eng Te-huai, 20, 69, 157, 240-1, 243; *see also* Korea (war)  
 People's Liberation Army, 30, 61-2, 65, 67-9, 73-4, 102, 244; balance of forces, 157; civil government, participation in, 103; conventional weapons, reliance on, 171-2; equipment and technical standards, 171; foreign policy, 137; guerilla, 102-3, 145, 155-6, 188, 190-1, 193, 202, 208, 213, 217-18; and India, 70, 84-7, 133-5; insignia, 102; Li Tso-p'eng, 137; Lin Piao, 68, 73-4, 84-5, 89, 96, 170, 217, 243, 245; Lo Jui-ch'ing, 245; Mao (position after victory over India) 87, (study of military thought) 243; Military Affairs Committee, *see* CCP; military thought, 137; militia, 61, 73-4, 170; nuclear war, 140, 143; nuclear weapons timetable, 171, 243, 248; political departments, *see* CCP; ranks, 102; war preparations, 103, 245; Yenan style, 102-3; *see also* Armed struggle, India, Weapons  
 People's: democracies, Asian, 14, 192; Republic, established, 11; war, *see* Armed struggle  
 Peru Communist Party, 196  
 Philippines, 37, 147-8, 222; US assistance, 18  
 PKI, *see* Indonesia  
 Planning, economic: centralisation, 32-3, 66; Cultural Revolution disruption, 135; de-centralisation, 45-6, 55, 72, 78; economic (collapse) 66, 69, 73, 75-6, 77, 78-9, 244, (policy) 83, 96-7, 129-31, 135; First Five Year Plan, 21, 24-5, 26, 32-3, 37, 39-40, 46, 52, 60, 131, 138, 240, (ideological significance of) 25; germ warfare campaign, 23-4; Greater, Faster, Better, More Economical, 39-40; incentives, 79; industrialisation, 130-1, 134, 138, 140; Kao Kang, 29-30; Leap Forward, 45-9, 52, 54-5, 59, 60-3, 65, 69, 72, 73-5, 77-9, 133, 135, 172, 244; major phase of, 138-9, 242-3, 244; Ministry of Foreign Trade, establishment of, 26; 1960 plan, 78; PLA labour role, 67-8; readjustment, 62-3; rectification campaign, 23-4; regional administration, 32-3, 45, 72, 78; rehabilitation, economic, 131, 138, 244; related to war preparation, 86; retrenchment, 55, 65, 135, 244; scientific, 43, 45; Second Five Year Plan, 53; self-sufficiency, industrial, 131; Soviet economic assistance, 21, 131; State Economic Commission, 54; State Planning Commission, 25, 29-30, 54; Ten Sets of Relationships, 46; weapons, advanced, 130-1; *see also* Administration, CCP, Development  
 Po I-po, 243  
 Poland, riots, 47, 179  
 Polemics, 142-3, 178, 184  
 Population size, *see* Numerical superiority  
 Port Arthur, 16, 25, 34  
 Poverty: change and revolution, 205-7; related to advanced weapons, 128  
 Proletariat, international, *see* United Front, Working-class movement  
 Protection, international, 195, 209, 227, 245  
 Purge and domestic consolidation, 19, 29-30; *see also* CCP

- Race, *see* Colour  
 Racial superiority, *see* Colour  
 Raw materials, 151, 163, 207, 211  
 Reformism, 175, 181, 209  
 Refugees to Soviet Union, Hong Kong, 83  
 Regional administration, *see* Development, Administration  
 Reliance on Soviet Union, *see* Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Soviet Union  
 Retrenchment, 55, 135  
 Revisionism, *see* Soviet Union, dispute with China  
 Revolution: domestic potential, 205-6; external support, 205-6; not exportable, 142; *see also* Armed struggle  
 Rightists, campaign against, 44  
 Roschin, 26  
 Rumania, 107, 238, 245
- SEATO, 86, 106-7  
 Secrecy, 202  
 Self-defence, 203  
 Self-help, 213  
 Semi-colony, 123-4, 205, 207; *see also* Colonialism  
 Senegal, 149  
 Shehu, Mehmet, *see* Albania  
 Singapore, 222  
 Sinkiang, 117  
 Sinocentrism, 15, 147-8, 151, 160, 182, 193, 196-7, 205, 207, 213, 222-4, 225, 227  
 Sisha Islands, 147  
 Snow, Edgar, 13-14, 222  
 Social imperialism, *see* Soviet Union  
 Socialism, 60, 112, 127, 209, 227  
 Socialist camp, 41, 57-8, 112, 126, 143-4, 150-3, 155, 157, 159, 169, 173, 176, 178, 180, 183-5, 192-3, 195-6, 201, 203, 213  
 Socialist education, *see* CCP  
 Socotra, 148  
 South America, *see* Latin America  
 Soviet Union: Asian initiatives, 42; Asian Republics, 98, 222; Beria, 28; Bucharest meeting, 75; Bulganin, 42; Camp David, 70, 75; central Asia, 83, 148; Ch'angch'un railroad, 25; chauvinism, 116-17; Chinese interest upgraded, 23, 26; communism, building of, 60; conventional military strength, 68; collectivisation, 180; collusion with US, 111, 113, 135, 154, 186; CPSU (differentiated from state) 58, (model) 11, 143, 180, 215, (19th Congress) 27, (20th Congress) 44, 179, 231-4, (21st Congress) 181; Cuba, 85, 87; Czechoslovakia, 116, 149, 186, 197; definition of, European or Asian, 14, 98, 153-4, 175, 216; de-Stalinisation, 43-4, 47, 57, 179; developed society, 216; development (model) 11, 143, 163, 175, 215, (Chinese comparison) 139; dispute with, 6-7, 13, 14, 17, 40, 42, 47-8, 49, 50, 56-8, 60-2, 63-4, 67, 69, 70-1, 72-8, 80-1, 83, 85-9, 89-93, 94, 95, 97-9, 102, 106, 111-13, 116-17, 128, 133, 135, 139-40, 143-5, 151, 153-4, 155, 157-65, 166-9, 172-6, 177-87 *passim*, 188, 195-7, 208-9, 231-4, 210, 212-13, 215-16, 220-2, 224, 227-8, 236-7, 242, 245; division of world, 117; dissimilarity with, 178; economic assistance from, 11, 21, 27, 28, 34, 40, 44, 45, 55, 75, 126-7, 131, 143, 179, 180-1, 183, 196; Europe, East, 48, 245; exclusion from world United Front, *see* United Front; faith, 221; Far East, 222; friendship treaty with, 19; foreign policy, new direction, 26; geopolitical definition, 147-9; heads world democratic forces, 12, 178-9, 192; Hungarian uprising, 47; identical interests with, 34, 178; India, PLA clash, 70, 212; industrial might, 55-6, 157, 181; international effects of Stalin's death, 27; joint stock companies, 16, 34; Korean war, 18-19; Khrushchev, 28-9, 34, 42, 43-4, 56, 60, 62, 69, 70, 75, 87, 92, 98-9, 179, 180-1, 183, 196; Kuznetsov, 28; lean to one side, 12, 126-7, 137-8, 144, 150, 151, 177; Lenin anniversary, 90th, 75; major world forces, 196; Malenkov, 27, 28, 29; Mao's visit to, 16, 55-8; Middle East crisis, 48; Mikoyan, 44, 47, 180; missile, intercontinental, 57, 157; Molotov, 40, 241; Mongolia, 17; Moscow conferences, 56-8, 72, 75-6, 91, 106, 108, 157, 158, 236; national interests, 56, 81, 116, 174-8, 183; national liberation, support, 182; Nehru invites leaders, 42; neo-colonialism, 208; new technology for national defence agreement, 56, 243; nuclear proliferation treaty, 85; nuclear test ban, 91, 173; nuclear umbrella, 170, 172-3, 242; October Revolution, 163-4; Panyushkin, 26, 28; PLA relations with, 61; Port Arthur, 25, 34, 117; race, *see* Colour; reliance on, 11-12, 126-7, 134, 137-8,

- 140, 144, 150-1, 177, 242; revisionist leadership, 48, 58, 75; relations with, 132, 235-9; rivalry with US, 12, 15, 139-40, 158, 173; Roschin, 26; satellite, earth, 57, 157; scientific and technical aid, 34; social imperialism, 116-17, 186, 215; sphere of influence, 117; Stalin, 16, 17, 26, 27, 28, 29, 112, 125-6, 131, 179-80, 196; state (defined as European) 15, 98, (differentiated from Party), 58; strategic defensive, 140; strategic stalemate, 140-1; strength overtakes US, 12, 57; support for world revolution, 144, 175; technicians withdrawn from China, 75-6, 172; territorial dispute, 222; theory against China, 215; treaties, unequal, 178; underdeveloped world, 178, 183, 196; United Nations, 216; Urals, 149; Vietnam, 225; Voroshilov, 55; world support, 209; Yudin, 28; *see also* Armed struggle, Colour, Europe, Geneva conference, Intermediate Zone, Peaceful coexistence, Russia, Socialist camp, United Front, Weapons
- Spheres of influence, *see* Soviet Union, USA
- Spiritual force, 206, 210, 221
- Spratly Islands, *see* Nanwei
- Stalemate, *see* Contradictions
- Stalin, *see* Soviet Union
- State Council, 242-3
- Strategy, 129, 136-40, 141-2, 145, 156, 166, 168, 175, 188, 203, 210, 216-17, 242, 246
- Subversion, *see* Armed struggle
- Sudan, 148
- Suez, 48
- Sukarnoism, *see* Indonesia
- Super powers, 139, 171-2, 186, 210
- Supreme State Conference, 50, 97
- Su Yu, 62
- Tactics, 136, 137, 141-3, 145, 169, 191, 193-4, 203, 204, 206, 211-12, 213
- Taiwan, 13-14, 18, 147, 222; long-term status, 18; relation to US defence, 18; Straits crisis, 62, 84-5
- Technicians, foreign, *see* Development
- Temporary allies, 191
- Teng Hsiao-p'ing, 242
- Teng Tzu-hui, 31, 38, 242
- Thailand, 80, 85, 93, 222, 227
- Third world, *see* Intermediate Zone
- Threat, external, 2, 6, 11-12, 128, 135, 142, 167, 174, 204, 210, 220-1, 227-8, 245; nuclear attack, 102, 166, 243; socialist aggression, theory, 117; Taiwan invasion, 84-5; US imperialism, 107, 117, 134-5, 243; Vietnam escalation, 99
- Three: antis, 23; major forces, 192-3; principles, 191; stages, *see* Contradictions
- Tibet, 16, 17, 20, 70, 79
- Timor Sea, *see* Indonesia
- Treaty of Friendship with Soviet Union, 19
- Tribal war, *see* Armed struggle
- Tseng Yung-ch'uan, 58, 72, 81, 88, 94, 100, 107, 109, 243, 236-8 *passim*
- Tu Ping, 243
- Turkey, 148, 240
- Underdeveloped world, *see* Development
- Unequal treaties, *see* Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- United Front, 111-13, 116-17, 135, 145, 176, 188-97 *passim*, 205-6, 208-9, 211, 213, 218, 224, 225, 231-4
- United Kingdom, 48
- United Nations, 216
- United States of America, 154-6, 202, 220, 227; aid to Chinese Nationalists, 125, 220; bases, 216; CCP successes in North China, 124-5; Congress views, 124-5, 151, 214; Czechoslovakia, 186; elections, 29; foreign aid, 212, 216; geo-political view of, 149-50; military strategy, 216-17; national interests, 116, 220, 216; negative policy towards China, 214; nuclear testing, 173; revolutionary movements, 225; Soviet Union control of China, 125; Stalin policies, 125; Vietnam, overcommitment, 225; workers' movement, 195; world communism, 125, 220; *see also* US imperialism
- United States Imperialism, 2, 5, 6, 144-5, 153-4, 169, 173-4, 183-6, 192, 197, 208-9, 211, 212-14, 217, 221, 224, 228; advanced weapons, stalemate with Soviet Union, 49, 85, 170-3, 220; bases, 216; bombing of North Vietnam, 104; Camp David, 70; collusion with revisionism, 111, 113, 135; conventional military strength, 68, 80, 158; Cuba, 244; détente, 140, 153, 180; division of world, 117; Europe, 48, 176; foreign wars, disadvantages of, 217; ground forces in South Vietnam, 104; historical threat, 124-6, 220; inevitable defeat, 136, 216; intermediate zone, 150-3, 184; invasion

- threat, 107, 134-5, 166-7; involvement in Vietnam, 59, 96, 98, 99, 139, 225; Korean war, 13, 240; Lin Piao on threat, 73-4; Middle East, 48; military strategy, 216-17; nuclear proliferation treaty, 85; nuclear strength, 68, 80, 158, 210; nuclear test ban, 91; occupation of Japan, 17; overtaken by socialist camp, 57; principal enemy, 214; rivalry with Soviet Union, 12, 15, 139-40, 158, 173; SEATO, 86; Sino-Soviet dispute in, 143; Southeast Asia, 80, 93; special warfare, 85; sphere of influence, 117; strategy, 15, 139, (defensive) 140, (offensive) 140-1, (stalemate) 140, (weaknesses) 217; support for South Korea, 17-18; Taiwan Straits, 62, 84; threat of nuclear attack, 73-4, 102, 166; treated with caution, 102; united front against, 81, 188-97 *passim*; world aims, 12, 220; *see also* Armed struggle, Capitalism, Imperialism, Intermediate Zone, Peaceful coexistence, Soviet Union, United Front, USA, Weapons, West
- Urban communes, 73; *see also* Development
- Vietnam, 12, 37, 58-9, 63-4, 79, 82, 85-6, 96, 99, 100, 103-4, 105, 107, 135, 139, 144, 147, 214, 222-3, 225-6, 236-9, 240, 244-5; contradictions, theory relating to, 99; Lao Dong, 22, 226, 240; National Liberation Front, 105; neutrality, 169, 225-6; Ngo Dinh Diem, 59; North, 17, 92-3, 115, 118, 187; Paris peace talks, 5, 118; reunification, 226; South, 80, 85, 93, 95; US involvement, 59, 85, 96, 99; war against French, 22; *see also* Indo-China
- Village disputes, *see* Armed struggle
- Violence, mass, *see* Armed struggle
- Voroshilov, *see* Soviet Union
- Wang Chia-hsiang, 12, 22, 25, 33, 50, 71, 235-7 *passim*
- Wang Ping-nan, 100, 107-10, 238
- Wang Yu-t'ien, 101
- War, *see* Armed struggle
- Warsaw Pact, 186
- Weakness, *see* Material weakness
- Weapons, 40-1, 49, 56-7, 61-2, 68-9, 73-4, 91-2, 94, 98-9, 102, 126, 128, 131, 135, 140, 143, 145, 157-9, 165-7, 169-74, 181, 204, 210, 212, 217, 219, 241, 242, 243, 248; *see also* Paper Tiger, East Wind, PLA
- West, 159-60, 175, 205, 215, 218; *see also* Europe
- Will, mass, 206, 210, 221
- Working-class movement, international, 163, 185, 192, 195-7, 201
- World Federation of Scientific Workers, Peking, 94
- World leadership, 205, 207-9, 213
- World Peace Council, 26
- World War, third, *see* Armed struggle
- Wu Hsiu-ch'uan, 22, 26, 35, 36, 235-6
- Xenophobia, 128, 161
- Xuan Thuy, 244
- Yang Hsien-chen, 183-4; *see also* Contradictions
- Youth, 4, 96; *see also* Administration, Development
- Yudin, 28
- Yugoslavia, 36, 178-9, 236, 244

J. D. Simmonds was born in Tientsin and educated at Tientsin Grammar School and is a graduate in Asian Civilisation at the Australian National University. From 1968 to 1969 he held a Public Service Research Fellowship in the Department of International Relations at the same university.

During World War II he was interned in China by the Japanese. After the war he joined the British army and was stationed in Hong Kong and in 1949-50 observed the civil war in Muslim and Tibetan areas of northwest China.

After joining the UK Commissioner General's Office, Singapore, in 1950, he studied Chinese Islam during a six months' stay in Baluchistan. From 1954 to 1957 he worked at the UK Foreign Office. He is now with the Australian Defence Department in Canberra.



Designed by Cathy Akroyd

Set in 10 pt Baskerville one point leaded and printed on 85 gsm

English Finish by Gillingham Printers Pty Ltd,

106 Currie St, Adelaide, South Australia