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WOMEN AS SECONDARY EARNERS
Gendered preferences on marriage and employment of university students in modern Indonesia

Ariane J. Utomo

This paper addresses the issue of the gender gap in young people's work preferences and intentions within the context of changing gender relations in urban Indonesia. A survey of senior university students in Jakarta and Makassar in 2004 provided evidence on the interplay between labour market and marriage role preferences among the young educated elite in Indonesia ($n = 1761$). Along with ongoing demographic transitions and socio-economic change, the study hypothesised that shifting gender norms have created a preference for a more egalitarian, dual-earner marriage among the target population. However, findings indicate that neo-traditional ideals placing men as the breadwinner and women as secondary earners are widely prevalent. Qualitative insights highlight how the universality of marriage and having children entail women to assume a role to satisfy increasing economic needs without relegating their noble role to maintain family harmony.

KEYWORDS: gender roles; employment; transition to adulthood; work-family conflict; marriage; Indonesia

Introduction: Gender Relations in an Era of 'Reforms'

Rapid modernisation, in the sense of ongoing structural transformation of the economy and the labour market, continues to sweep Indonesia even after the onset of the Asian economic crisis and political instability in 1997. In the past decades, significant progress in gender parity measures in educational and labour market outcomes are clearly visible. For example, reflecting an increase in women's education attainment, women's share among the tertiary-educated population grew from 25 to 42 per cent between 1985 and 2000 (Depdiknas 2007; Rahardjo & Hull 1984; Utomo 2008). Correspondingly, women's labour force participation rose from 32 per cent in 1971 to 52 per cent in 2000 (BPS-Statistics Indonesia 2001a; Manning 1998), while women's share in the labour force increased from just 27 per cent in 1960 to 41 per cent in 2000 (World Bank 2003). Apart from the facilitation of women's employment brought about by the structural change in the economy, and the consequent formalisation and urbanisation of the labour force (Feridhanusetyawan & Aswicahyono 2001), previous studies have associated increasing female labour force participation with the underlying social and demographic changes in Indonesia, including the earlier mentioned rise in women's educational attainment,

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declining fertility, postponement of marriage and the socialisation of gender equity norms (Manning 1998).

Indonesia—a country with the world's largest Muslim population—provides an exciting case study to generate insights on the interplay between education, globalisation, development, democracy and gender relations, and how such interactions would be manifested in the labour market expectations of educated young people. The ambiguity in the future direction of the country's gender relations parallels the current political settings, which allow for interactions between the conflicting forces of modernity and its association with gender equity and egalitarianism on the one hand, and the sporadic revival of patriarchal ideals on the other (Nilan 2008).

After the fall of the New Order regime in 1998, attempts to promote gender equity norms and awareness have been increasingly pursued by both the government and the civil society in the so-called era of the reforms (Ind: *Reformasi*). Examples include calls for more gender-sensitive textbooks for school children, amendments to laws concerning domestic violence and a general increase in public exposure to issues concerning gender equity through the mass media. Against such a backdrop, it is plausible to assume that the cohort of educated young people in urban Indonesia would align their views and values on work and marriage with the increasingly egalitarian global trends.

On the other hand, along with the burgeoning democracy and the subsequent process of decentralisation of power to the local district governments, there is evidence of a significant revival of traditional customary law and religious sentiments at both the national and the regional levels (Creese 2004; Rinaldo 2002; Utomo 2008). Examples of sentiments illustrating an air of conservatism surrounding the position of women in the Reform era include: the introduction of district laws imposing night curfews to limit women's movements in several districts, the introduction of local laws of Islamic dress codes and the introduction of gender-biased district laws against prostitution.

In the light of these socio-political developments, this paper explores the gender dimensions of labour market expectations, and how they are made in the context of the expectations of marital roles among senior university students in urban Indonesia. Based upon fieldwork undertaken in 2004 in two cities with contrasting levels of development, this paper argues that the gendered labour market expectations among educated urban young people reflect the preferences and values made by individuals in a society where gender-role stereotypes denoting women as secondary earners in marriage continue to dominate.

Theoretical Focus

In social demography, family theory regards marriages as both institutions and functioning social forms based upon gender-role socialisation, where the husband plays a largely economic role, with the wife being mainly responsible for reproduction and care for the children at home (Oppenheimer 2001). In the Indonesian context, an entanglement of the so-called traditions, religious interpretations and a state-promoted gender ideology lie behind the social conditioning of gender roles.

A Java-centric approach to trace the historical roots of gender-role socialisation points to the class-specific traditions in the Javanese court system. Geertz (1960) and Hull (1979) observed that division of labour in the household differed markedly between social

classes in Javanese communities. In the Javanese traditional social stratification system, men and women both played active roles in productive activities. In contrast, among the upper-class, then formed by an elite of hereditary nobles referred to as the *priyayi*, women's high status was associated with their privilege to stay home. Should they choose to work, it would be in menial tasks that would not impinge upon their noble confinement. Their domestic role, however, did not necessarily imply great burden associated with household chores. Domestic tasks were done by other women from the lower-class working as servants. Upon examining the employment patterns of educated women in Indonesian cities, Rahardjo and Hull (1984) observed that the '*priyayi* values were extended and institutionalised where women's noble role (Ind: *peran mulia*) as daughters, wives and mothers became the norm in wider society.

In line with the concepts of women's *noble* roles that continue to find their niche in the urban middle-class, the notion of *kodrat* is central to the contemporary discourse on gender roles. The term, *kodrat*, can be described as the prevailing sets of cultural beliefs, reinforced by religious interpretations and state ideologies, which differentiate men and women's inherent nature and natural roles that would particularly become complementary in marriage (Blackburn 2004; Brenner 1995; Creese 2004; Oey-Gardiner & Bianpoen 2000; Siahaan 2003; Sullivan 1994; Suryakusuma 1996; Utomo 2005; Wagemann 2000). With Islam being the religion of the majority, certain verses from the Holy Koran are often cited to validate the notion of *kodrat* through emphasising the importance of marriage for men and women.

In analysing Muslim perspectives on the roles of women in Indonesia in the 1980s, Woodcroft-Lee (1983) argues that the universality of marriage in Islam is deep-seated in Indonesia and is an important foundation of the socio-cultural conditioning in gender roles. In this marital framework, *kodrat* defines what men and women should and should not do, and what they are and are not. Men are supposedly dominant, protective and responsible for their families while women are naturally assigned with reproductive roles to be devoted to their husband and children.

The use of religious justifications in shaping the contemporary discourse of gender roles has been comprehensively analysed in the broader context of Indonesia's state gender ideology. Much has been written on the New Order gender ideology (1965–1998), which predominantly fuelled gender-role socialisation during the crucial growing-up period of the target population of this study (Blackburn 2004; Brenner 1998; Manderson 1983; Oey-Gardiner & Bianpoen 2000; Ong & Peletz 1995; Rinaldo 2002; Siahaan 2003; Sitepu 2000; Sullivan 1994; Suryakusuma 1996). As a concrete example, cultural norms that depict gender-role specialisation are institutionalised into the 1974 National Marital Act. Although the Act states equal positions of husbands and wives (article 31(1)), it further stipulates that the husband is the head of the household and the wife, the mother of the household (article 31(3)), and that the husband is the provider of the family (article 34(1)). Within this state gender ideology, women's role in the labour market is emphasised as secondary to her reproductive role, as embedded in the framework of men and women's natural complementary role in marriage.

Given such institutionalised socio-cultural conditioning on gender roles in marriage, it is interesting to see whether what materialises from gender equity socialisation in the public sphere in recent years would follow a somewhat different path to the evolution of a more egalitarian system in the family context. In the case of the United States, a time-series analysis using the General Social Survey indicates that while both men's and

women's attitudes towards appropriate gender roles have increasingly become less traditional since the 1970s, there is a clustering in the attitudes of men towards women's participation in paid employment and the family division of labour (Lee Badget *et al*. 2000, pp. 1–2). While men are becoming increasingly supportive of women's employment and the extra income that it brings, men continue to show resistance towards a more equal distribution of household and parental responsibilities.

In urban Indonesia today, educated women's decisions to engage in paid work involves negotiating around the often-conflicting traditional and modern norms in regards to gender roles in the household. Despite the recent trend in delaying marriage, middle-class women are continually required to fulfil social expectations to marry and have children, and hence, to conform to their *noble* role (Utomo 2005). Among the urban middle-class, even though a full-time domestic role does not equate high social status and educated women are increasingly expected to continue working after marriage, women are obliged to place family as their first priority (Djafar 1997). While men are perceived as primary income earners, the perception of married women as secondary earners continues to dominate much of the discourse on middle-class educated women (Oey-Gardiner & Sulastri 2000).

Being secondary earners, these women are expected to generate additional income for the family by choosing a career path that does not interfere with their primary roles as wives and mothers. In such situations, we expect to see married women working in less-demanding jobs than their husband, working less hours, obtaining less labour market experience, having lower labour force attachment and enduring slower wage growth. In a study of middle-class young people's vocabularies on household gender arrangements, the notion of women as secondary earners is also found across a sample of respondents in seven Asian countries, where the '. . .respondents were more likely to speak of the natural proclivities women had for raising children while asserting it was the 'duty' of the husband to earn an income' (Bulbeck 2005, p. 29). As suggested by supply-side theories, the gender gap in labour force outcomes, as often proxied by the wage gap, partly masks the earnings gap between husbands and wives, which, in turn, reflects the continued traditional division of labour within the household (Marini & Fan 1997; Tam 1996).

Within the context of an increasingly consumerist society, where a single income household can no longer suffice the thirst for a *modern* lifestyle (Nilan 2008; Sen 1998), the study postulates that the demographic and labour force aspirations of the young and educated are geared towards accommodating both rising economic pressures and a slightly modified version of the long-standing traditional gender-role ideals. Egalitarian marriage ideals are bounded by social norms that place women as secondary earners, the origins of which can be traced back to cultural accounts, as well as state and religious ideologies. As such, in a society where marriage and parenthood remain as universal ideals, women's curtailed labour force achievements remain to be seen as necessary to facilitate both family harmony and prosperity.

Study Sites and Target Population

This paper utilises data from a PhD fieldwork conducted in the two cities of Jakarta and Makassar between March and June 2004, with senior university students as the target population. The rationale behind the focus on university students in the two study sites

are as follows. First, looking at the expectations of university students today is of particular interest because this is the sub-group of the population most likely to challenge the prevailing traditional gender-role stereotypes in each study site. The young women in this group are also representative of the steady stream of women in recent cohorts who spend longer time in the Indonesian urban labour force and are gradually moving into what used to be male-dominated fields. Like their male counterparts, Indonesian tertiary-educated women are influential, in a general sense, as role models of social change, and more directly, in influencing policy directions (Rahardjo & Hull 1984). Second, since most studies of educated women's employment outcomes in contemporary Southeast Asia have mainly focused on the trends in mega cities, not much is known of the gender dimensions of white-collar employment in peripheral cities, where globalisation is much more intertwined with local customs, or where Westernisation is relatively dampened by the prevailing socio-cultural norms. For this reason, the study opted for the city of Makassar as a contrasting case study to Jakarta. Jakarta, being the Indonesian epitome of 'modernity', is compared to Makassar, where despite being the economic centre of eastern Indonesia, has its educated young people portrayed as exhibiting a stronger adherence to traditional gender-role ideals.

The proposition that Jakarta and Makassar would provide contrasting backdrops for research in gender-role expectations is based on the inherent differences in the characteristics of the two cities. These differences in characteristics are highlighted in terms of the two cities' differences in physical area and population size, stage and pace of economic development, labour market structure, and relative rigour of prevailing socio-cultural norms and traditions regarding gender relations.

In terms of their relative sizes, Makassar is much smaller than Jakarta. Being the capital city of Indonesia, Jakarta is inhabited by approximately 9.6 million people in 2010 (Badan Pusat Statistik 2011) Makassar, on the other hand, is a much smaller provincial capital city, with 1.3 million people (Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Sulawesi Selatan 2010). While Jakarta epitomises modern cosmopolitan living and typifies the growth centre of Indonesia, Makassar, albeit its status as the centre of development in eastern Indonesia, is representative of the slower-paced cities in Indonesia's outer islands. In 2002, Jakarta's per capita expenditure was about twice that of Makassar (BPS-Statistics Indonesia, Bappenas, UNDP 2004).

The differences in size and pace of development are related with another distinguishing feature between Jakarta and Makassar: the structures of their labour market. Relative to Jakarta, Makassar has a lower labour force participation rate for males and females, higher rate of open unemployment, lower percentage of workers working as paid employees, and a larger proportion of its workers in the informal sector. In terms of the labour market for the tertiary-educated workforce, Makassar offers less penetration of multinational corporations than Jakarta. Field observation indicates that in Makassar, most of the jobs for male and female graduates are located within the public sector, offering relatively shorter and more flexible working hours and significantly less commuting time than the typical white-collar occupations in Jakarta.

The contrast between the two cities is further driven by a contrasting ambience of religious and cultural attachment in the respective societies. Even though over 80 per cent of the population in both Jakarta and Makassar have nominated Islam as their religion, field observations suggest that in general, Makassar society exhibits a more cohesive and stronger air of adherence to Islamic norms and conduct relative to the more pluralistic

Jakarta. This impression relates to the fact that there is less influence of Westernisation amongst the target population in Makassar. Nevertheless, leaving aside the question of relative levels of religiosity, it can be said that on the whole, middle-class Makassar society is more conservative than that in Jakarta. Furthermore, the structure of Makassar society seems to exhibit more social control than the relatively more individualistic Jakarta, a fact attributed largely to the norms and values of the predominant ethnic group in Makassar—the Bugis/Makassar.

Although results from the 2000 Population Census identified 78 per cent of the Jakarta population as one of the ethnic groups originating from Java (Jawa, Betawi, Sunda/Priangan), the educated middle-class society in Jakarta exhibits a much more cosmopolitan attitude than in Makassar in the sense that it has its own melting pot of urban culture, which does not lean towards traditions of any specific ethnic group. On the other hand, Makassar remains characterised by a relatively homogenous ethnic mix with 75 per cent of the population being Bugis/Makassar (BPS-Statistics Indonesia 2001a). Anthropological studies elicit Makassar society as strongly defined along ethnic lines and social standings (Acciaoli 1989; Chabot 1996; Graham 2001; Idrus 2004; Mattulada 1991; Millar 1989; Pelras 1996). Further, it is suggested that the people of Makassar are strongly influenced by the traditional norms that regulate the sets of appropriate conduct for men and women (Chabot 1996; Graham 2001; Idrus 2004; Millar 1989). As such, although university students in the two cities are expected to be most receptive to challenges to traditional gender-role stereotypes relative to the rest of the local population in each respective city, the presumption of this study is that the combination of religious and cultural ideals in Makassar would create a backdrop that is less conducive to egalitarian gender relations than is the case for Jakarta.

Data Collection

The fieldwork combines both a survey and in-depth interviews as research instruments. The *University Students Survey 2004: Expectations on Career and Family Life* survey of senior university students in Jakarta ($n = 1087$) and Makassar ($n = 675$) was conducted in seven universities in Jakarta and five in Makassar. The universities were selected by stratified sampling to ensure representation from national and private universities in each city with different levels of academic reputation. To further control for the type of education, a stratified sample of senior students from a male-dominated faculty, a female-dominated faculty and a faculty with a roughly equal gender distribution were purposely selected in each university. The mean age of the respondents was 22, and 90 per cent of the respondents were third or later year students. Questionnaires were self-completed by respondents in a lecture room setting during normal class hours. The questionnaire included sections on: personal background, parental background, university experience, expectations on family formation, career and earnings expectations, ideal job criteria, perceptions on employment prospects and attitudes to gender roles. Descriptive statistics were used to explore the respondents' labour force expectations of themselves and their spouse.

To complement survey findings, in-depth interviews were conducted with selected male and female respondents from the survey, and non-survey respondents consisting of fresh graduates ($n = 7$) and key informants ($n = 13$) (Table 1). Using purposeful sampling,

I tried to find respondents who represented the different groups of university students. This method was effective to get a maximum variation of respondents with different upbringings and from different socio-economic classes. The method of identification I employed was mostly based on their personal attributes (clothing, accessories, method of transportation, residence), where they congregate (library, canteen, prayer's hall, students' association rooms) and their personal lifestyles (speaking jargon, weekend and extra-curricular activities, origin). For example, I took note of female respondents who were wearing their headscarves/Muslim attires. Among those wearing the headscarf (Ind: *jilbab*), I further differentiated between those with very conservative attire, as indicated by the length of their scarves and loose dressing, loose long skirts and stockings, from those with a more fashionable dress-code, which usually involved a combination of tight jeans, long-sleeve t-shirts and a headscarf tied around the neck. I also took note of students who were actively involved in student politics/organisations, as well as those with little involvement in student organisations and extra-curricular activities. Students with active involvement in various student organisations and clubs came across as being relatively more involved in their career planning and more attentive to social issues than students who were not. Among the respondents interviewed were also students from the inter-state or outer regions.

The key informants interviewed included researchers and academics who were able to provide insights and further reference into the socio-cultural context of gender relations, which was particularly important in the case of the Bugis/Makassar society. Individual experiences gathered from the interviews with married and never-married non-student tertiary graduates were used to explore and refine research issues dealing with academic and working experience, gender roles in marriage, and how the respondents' expectations towards marriage and work had changed over the years.

Results

Preferences on Couple's Work Arrangements: Emergence of Egalitarian Ideals

Data from a nationally representative survey carried out by the national statistical board in 2000 indicated that the labour force participation rate for the tertiary-educated urban men and women stood at 91 and 74 per cent, respectively (BPS-Statistics Indonesia

TABLE 1
In-depth interview respondents by location, sex and marital status.

	Students and fresh graduates		Non-students and key informants				
			Jakarta		Makassar		
	Jakarta	Makassar	Married	Never married	Married	Never married	Total
Male	7	7		3	2		19
Female	4	8	3	1	1	3	20
Total	11	15	3	4	3	3	39

2001b). Correspondingly, a further analysis on a sub-sample of urban tertiary-educated couples suggested that 63 per cent of these couples were dual-earners (BPS-Statistics Indonesia 2001b). In the light of the emerging popularity of dual-earner households, it is reasonable to hypothesise that the survey respondents' preference would also reflect an overwhelming preference for dual-earner households.

Table 2 reports the percentage distribution of respondents by sex and preferred household model. Building upon the work by Hakim (Hakim 2000), the survey asked the respondents what their ideal household scenario would be. The first option, the egalitarian model, is for the husband and wife to be equally busy at work and to equally share domestic work. The second model, the compromise model, is for both husband and wife to work, but with the wife assuming a secondary-earner position and with a greater household responsibility. In the third option, the situation is reversed, with the male becoming the secondary earner and doing a larger share of the housework. The fourth option is the single male breadwinner model, with the wife having no paid employment outside the home. In hindsight, the choices offered in the questionnaire failed to address the distinction between wives working from home, e.g. running an online business, and wives working outside the home. Here, the working assumption would be for respondents envisioning their wife to earn an income while working from home to opt for the second model.

As expected, in Jakarta, the dual-earner arrangements comprising both the egalitarian and the compromise model was preferred by over 90 per cent of men and women. Most men and women in Makassar also favour the dual-earner arrangement although those favouring the compromise model outweigh those nominating for the egalitarian model. In both samples, a higher proportion of women prefer the egalitarian model relative to men, hinting that women may perceive that there is more to gain from an egalitarian marriage than men do.

The survey further asked whether the respondents agreed with the statement that both husband and wife needed to work to cover living costs (Figure 1). The majority of females in both study sites agreed with the statement that both husband and wife needed to work to cover living costs. However, men are much more optimistic with their own ability to meet the living costs of their family, as the proportion of men agreeing to this statement is less than their female counterparts.

TABLE 2
Percentage distribution of respondents by preferred household model and sex.

	Jakarta		Makassar	
Preferred household model	**%Male $n=574$**	**%Female $n=513$**	**%Male $n=340$**	**%Female $n=334$**
Dual: egalitarian	30.7	49.7	29.1	39.5
Dual: husband primary earner/compromise	60.5	48.5	57.9	50.6
Dual: wife primary earner	0.2	0.0	0.6	2.1
Only husband work	7.8	1.6	12.1	6.6
Missing	0.9	0.2	0.3	1.2

Source: University Students Survey 2004: Expectations of Career and Family Life.



FIGURE 1
Percentage distribution of respondents agreeing to the statement, 'both husband and wife need to work to cover living costs'.
Source: University Students Survey 2004: Expectations of Career and Family Life.

Upon closer examination of the so-called emerging egalitarianism among the respondents, it is worth noting how male breadwinner ideals persist even when the respondents aspire for a dual-earner egalitarian marriage (Figure 2). Eighty per cent of 'egalitarian' men in both Jakarta and Makassar agreed to the statement that the husband was the one responsible to earn money for the family. The corresponding figures for 'egalitarian' women in Jakarta and Makassar were 71 and 66 per cent, respectively.

Further, although 74–80 per cent of both egalitarian men and women stressed equal career importance, when asked about who should be the primary earner, more than half of the egalitarian men nominated themselves and correspondingly, at least half of the egalitarian women in both samples nominated their partners.

In-depth interviews provide valuable insights on the prevalent expectations for men to be the primary earner, and for women to be the secondary earner, in the household:

> It's expected [Ind: *wajar*] that the husband is the breadwinner. The wife can work, but just as secondary activity [Ind: *sampingan*] and as long as she does not forget her responsibilities to me [husband] and the child. It's alright to say emancipation [*Ind: emansipasi ya emansipasi*], but [can women do it] with all the limitations that women have? Why do we have the term ladies first? Like getting her period every month, [so are her natural] responsibilities to husband and children. (Farhan, male, single, 26, Mechanical Engineering major, Jakarta)

> The basis of marriage includes the obligation to provide [for men] [Ind: *menafkahi*]. Even if the wife was working, we still have to give some of our income for her. The main objective for women to work is not to earn money [Ind: *bukan untuk cari duit*]. Rather, it is



FIGURE 2
Percentage distribution of 'egalitarian' respondents agreeing to the statement, 'the husband is the one responsible to earn money for the family'.
Source: University Students Survey 2004: Expectations of Career and Family Life.

> for her excitement, [to fulfil] her aspirations from her school. . .. To give the child a bath and to feed, that's the maid's job, but for educational lessons, the mother must be the person in charge. (Abdul, male, single, 28, civil servant, Jakarta)

> I'd like both of us to work [husband and wife], but women must know her inherent roles! [Ind: *Cuman wanita harus tau kodratnya*!]. We must be devoted to our husband [*Ind: berbakti sama suami*], devoted to our children [Ind: *berbakti sama anak-anak*]. Especially when we have children, so whatever happens we still have more obligation than our husband to our child. So I want both of us to work. I work until late afternoon, and he works until night. (Erin, female, 22, Science major, Makassar)

In-depth interviews also suggest the need to assess the respondents' egalitarian preference with caution since in some cases, especially for men, what is being said on the questionnaire may be different from the respondents' true feelings on the issue. That is, it may seem more socially preferable to present an egalitarian preference because its ideals are in line with modernity and with the current discourse on gender equity. For example, as elaborated by Farhan:

> As a husband, my portion to do domestic work will be much less although in the questionnaire I said, it will be equal! (Farhan, male, single, 26, Mechanical Engineering major, Jakarta)

In a similar case, a fresh graduate who was already working and was not a survey respondent was asked to fill in the questionnaire prior to being interviewed during the pre-test. Here, again, although he opted for the household scenario involving equal

division of housework and equal earners, he later asserted that he would prefer to have longer working hours than his future wife. Respondents' statements on leaving it up to the wife to do whatever she pleased with regard to her work decisions were sometimes inconsistent with their own preferences. For example, during the interview, a respondent stated that he would give full autonomy to his future wife in regards to her work decisions, yet, his preference was for his wife to take a year-long maternity leave.

Ideals and Expectations of Self and Spouse: Marriage and Paid Employment

Traditionally, in patriarchal societies, ideals on the qualities of husbands and wives reflect the male-dominant model. The norms in such societies define the husband as the head and the provider of the household, and compared to his wife, he is older, richer and more educated (Casterline *et al*. 1986). In Indonesia, it has been suggested that even in the dual-earner household context, socio-cultural values still strongly uphold male breadwinner ideals (Utomo 1997, p. 205). This section examines how the notion of the husband as a primary earner and hence, the wife as a secondary one, is a part of a larger set of ideals on the roles and qualities of husbands and wives that emerged from the survey.

Although a significant proportion of respondents indicated a preference for dual-earner egalitarian households, results from the field indicated that male-dominant ideals still resonated through the respondents' gendered preferences on spouse qualities (Table 3). Female respondents perceive their partner as someone who is older, and who has equal or slightly higher educational qualifications than the wife. Conversely, the majority of males in Jakarta and Makassar do not mind if their partner has a lower education, and the largest proportion of men in both samples prefer a younger spouse. It is noteworthy that men's preferences are more spread out across relative age categories and are seemingly more 'egalitarian' compared to women's.

The male-dominant view on the relative age and education level of couples is further resonated in the responses on preferences on the labour market behaviour of the respondents and their future spouse. While the response on a husband's and wife's relative career importance indicate an emergence of egalitarian values amongst the respondents, the response patterns on expectations of the relative work hours and earnings of the respondents themselves and their spouse are reflective of the expectation for men's higher attachment in the labour market. First, men and women have corresponding expectations that husbands would have longer work hours than wives. Second, the response pattern for both men's and women's relative earnings favour men as primary earners. Third, the view that men should shoulder the responsibility of being primary earners is echoed by the response to the question on whether the respondents feel uncomfortable if their partner earns more money. Women respondents are more homogenous than men with their answers, as 96 per cent in Jakarta and 88 per cent in Makassar responded, 'no'. While only about 30 per cent of male respondents stated that they would feel uneasy should their partner become the primary earner, a stronger resentment against wives as primary earners was often encountered during in-depth interviews with male respondents:

> I see many examples of women who are so smart and so ambitious in their career, but somehow, I don't know why, I often see that they start losing their female personality [womanhood], be it in the form of their kids being neglected and/or their husband not being properly taken care of. What I am afraid of is that she will be the decision-maker. So drawing from my observations in the society, my fear is that a woman who earns more

TABLE 3
Percentage distribution of respondents by preference on future spouse's qualities.

	Jakarta		Makassar	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
	$n = 574$	$n = 513$	$n = 340$	$n = 334$
Would you mind if your partner has a lower education level than you?				
Yes	18.8	59.5	17.9	41.0
No	80.5	40.4	79.4	57.8
Missing	0.7	0.2	2.7	1.2
Ideally, your partner's age is:				
Older than me	1.4	73.3	2.4	66.5
More or less the same as me	26.7	17.4	24.4	23.4
Younger than me	55.9	0.6	62.7	2.7
Any age does not matter	15.9	8.8	9.1	6.6
Missing	0.2	0.0	1.5	0.9
Whose career would be more important?				
My partner's career is more important than mine	0.5	42.1	2.7	48.2
My career is more important than my partner's	43.4	0.4	42.7	3.6
Equal importance	48.8	55.0	44.7	42.5
Don't know	6.1	2.5	9.4	4.5
Missing	1.2	0.0	0.6	1.2
Who should be the primary income earner?				
My partner	0.2	63.0	1.2	63.2
Myself	74.4	0.0	76.8	3.6
Both myself and my partner	21.8	33.5	17.7	24.3
Depends who earns more	1.6	2.9	3.5	6.6
Don't know	1.4	0.0	0.9	1.8
Missing	0.7	0.6	0.0	0.6
Would you feel uneasy if your partner earns more than you?				
Yes	29.4	2.0	32.4	5.4
No	58.5	96.1	55.0	88.0
Don't know	11.7	1.8	12.4	5.1
Missing	0.4	0.2	0.3	1.5
Your working hours relative to your partner's:				
My partner should (or will) work longer hours than me	1.7	69.0	3.2	64.1
I will work longer hours than my partner	73.0	1.0	72.4	3.6
Equal hours	8.9	17.4	10.6	14.7
Don't know	15.3	12.1	13.8	17.1
Missing	1.1	0.6	0.0	0.6

Source: University Students Survey 2004: Expectations of Career and Family Life.

> [than her husband] will end up positioning herself higher than her husband. When we turn back to the religious perspective, it's wrong, right? I don't know why, but at the end something will go wrong. It's not the problem of how much [money] she makes but it's the impact of her wage! Usually, women can get big-headed, feel more powerful, or feel they deserve more respect. (Donny, male, single, 21, Architecture major, Jakarta)

The above patterns in expectations of labour force commitments for the self and the spouse are sustained despite the fact that half of the male and female respondents see their careers as having equal importance as their partners. Clearly, the notion of shared career importance is a different matter from shared contribution to the family finance.

In sum, traces of male breadwinner ideals remain in the survey respondents' preferences on the qualities and work-force behaviour of their spouse and themselves.

Expectations of Labour Market Adjustments and Interruption for Self and Spouse

When women expect and are expected to take up a secondary-earner position in a household, one can assume that women will accordingly make more career adjustments and take more career breaks than men for family reasons. To support this argument, a number of interesting trends emerged from the respondents' answers on the labour market expectations of themselves relative to their spouse.

First, Table 4 illustrates that more women than men expect their own work pattern to be compromised by marriage and even more so, after having children. Second, for the expectations of spouse's work patterns, almost half of the men leave it up to their partner to make the decision on whether or not to work post-marriage, but the response for preference on spouse's working pattern after having children is more varied. In contrast, women's preference over their partner's work pattern after marriage and children is more clear-cut and consistent with the idea of husbands as primary earners. The majority of women, over 80 per cent, do not expect their partner to make any career adjustment, both post-marriage and after having children.

The questionnaire further investigated whether the respondents anticipated themselves and their spouse to take career breaks specifically around childbirth (Table 5). Again, the results for men and women's preferences correspond with each other, showing that women expect and are expected to take leave associated with childbirth. While the majority of men anticipate to take childbirth-associated leaves of no more than three months, women's expectations of leave durations are more varied, with the bulk lasting anywhere from less than three months to 24 months (Table 6).

Fieldwork experience indicated the gendered expectations of work behaviour in marriage to be so entrenched that a number of respondents inquired whether there were different questionnaires for men and women, and whether the wrong questionnaires were given to them. During the survey pre-tests, it was suggested, several times, that separate questionnaires should be given to male and female respondents. In the actual survey, some respondents suggested that several questions should only be asked to women and some, only to men. For example, questioning labour force intentions for males after childbirth was seen as a waste of time as they would always want to work. There were also inquiries on why the option of working more hours after marriage and childbirth was not in the questionnaire, as this was seen as a more rational response for the male breadwinners.

Furthermore, follow-up interviews with a number of survey respondents revealed that female respondents, in particular, were prone to re-adjust their answers to be more in line with socially expected female roles. For example, when filling in the questionnaire, the respondent could often communicate with a romantic partner if the latter happened to be nearby and was participating in the survey as well. In such cases, answers were often negotiated, usually to reflect the female respondent's negotiated role as a secondary earner:

> We filled [in] the questionnaire together, he filled his in, I filled [in] mine, and then we matched our answers. For example, he said I should not work. [Then I said,] 'why?' [Then

TABLE 4
Percentage distribution of respondents by work preference after marriage and having children for self and spouse.

	Jakarta		Makassar	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
	$n = 574$	$n = 513$	$n = 340$	$n = 334$
Do you plan to continue working after marriage?				
Yes, as usual	89.6	48.9	90.0	55.4
Yes, but less hours	3.8	29.8	4.7	23.1
Yes, but self-employed from home	3.8	6.6	0.9	2.4
Depends on my partner	1.1	11.5	2.4	12.6
No	0.4	0.6		0.3
I don't know	1.2	2.3	1.8	5.7
Missing	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.6
Do you plan to continue working after having children?				
Yes, as usual	81.9	23.2	84.4	33.8
Yes, but less hours	10.1	43.9	9.1	37.7
Yes, but self-employed from home	4.7	10.7	1.8	3.9
Depends on my partner	0.9	13.1	2.1	14.4
No	0.5	2.9	0.3	1.2
I don't know	1.6	5.9	2.1	8.1
Missing	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.9
Do you wish for your partner to continue working after marriage?				
Up to my partner	47.4	2.1	47.7	6.0
Yes, he/she should work as usual	12.0	94.5	16.8	86.5
Yes, but less hours	20.7	0.8	17.4	3.0
Yes, but self-employed from home	3.8	1.6	5.6	1.2
No, I prefer him/her not to work	11.9		8.8	0.6
I don't know	1.7	0.2	1.8	1.8
Other	1.9	0.4	1.8	0.3
Missing	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.6
Do you wish for your partner to continue working after having children?				
Up to my partner	37.3	3.1	43.2	7.2
Yes, he/she should as usual	6.1	89.5	10.0	80.5
Yes, but less hours	23.9	3.3	24.4	7.8
Yes, but self-employed from home	6.3	1.6	4.4	0.9
No, I prefer him/her not to work	21.8		13.8	0.6
I don't know	1.7	0.8	1.5	1.8
Other	3.0	1.2	2.4	
Missing	0.0	0.6	0.3	1.2

Source: University Students Survey 2004: Expectations of Career and Family Life.

> he said,] 'who will look after the kids?' [Then I said,] 'we have maids'. [Then he said,] 'you can't rely on the maids, what is the point of you becoming a mother?' [Ind: *Apa fungsinya kamu jadi ibu*]. He still thinks like that. But then he agreed I should work to help out the family. But he said, 'there is a time when I must quit'. [Interviewer: 'and you agree?'] We'll see about that. If the work is like. . .you know, and he can meet all our needs, why not? (Respondent ID#7, Rini, female, 22, Architecture major, Makassar)

In sum, survey results indicate that respondents' expectations of work behaviour are placed in the relative context of the husband-and-wife dyad. Accordingly, as expected,

TABLE 5
Percentage distribution of respondents by expectations of career breaks in the event of childbirth for self and spouse.

	Jakarta		Makassar	
	Male	**Female**	**Male**	**Female**
	***n* = 574**	***n* = 513**	***n* = 340**	***n* = 334**
In the months before and after the birth of your child, do you plan to take a leave from work?				
Yes	19.5	75.1	12.9	50.6
No	42.0	4.7	51.5	10.8
Don't know	37.5	19.7	35.6	38.6
Missing	1.1	0.6	–	–
Do you prefer your partner to take leave before and after the birth of your child?				
Yes	67.1	16.8	51.5	15.3
No	7.3	65.9	13.5	61.4
Don't know	24.2	17.2	35.0	23.4
Missing	1.4	0.2	–	–

Source: University Students Survey 2004: Expectations of Career and Family Life.

when using intended work interruption as an indication of future labour market attachment, a higher proportion of women than men have lower expected labour force attachment following marriage and childbearing. Further, the response patterns of men's labour market preferences of self and spouse largely correspond with those of women's, and are driven by the assumption of men as primary earners in the household.

TABLE 6
Percentage distribution of respondents by expected duration of leave for childbirth for self and spouse.

	Jakarta		Makassar	
Expected leave for childbirth	**Male**	**Female**	**Male**	**Female**
For self	***n* = 102**	***n* = 361**	***n* = 44**	***n* = 107**
3 months or less	69.6	28.0	45.5	27.5
4–6 months	12.8	28.5	22.7	28.1
7–12 months	8.8	22.7	9.1	16.2
13–24 months	5.9	13.6	22.7	24.6
More than 24 months	2.9	7.2	0.0	3.6
For spouse	***n* = 354**	***n* = 78**	***n* = 173**	***n* = 49**
3 months or less	26.6	70.5	30.1	42.9
4–6 months	21.2	15.4	17.3	20.4
7–12 months	24.6	5.1	25.4	4.1
13–24 months	20.9	9.0	22.5	26.5
More than 24 months	6.8	0.0	4.6	6.1

Source: University Students Survey 2004: Expectations of Career and Family Life.

Discussion

The tabulation of the respondents' preferences for their household work-family arrangement highlights that the dual-earner arrangement, with the husband as the primary earner, remains the popular model for men in both cities and for women in Makassar. Still, the survey identifies a significant proportion of the respondents, particularly female respondents in Jakarta, with a preference for a dual-earner egalitarian household. The relatively stronger preference for an egalitarian household model among the respondents in Jakarta as compared to those in Makassar is an expected result. The variation found in the patterns of work and gender-role expectations among the respondents in the two study sites points to the differences in characteristics of the two cities, as laid out earlier in the paper. For example, the difference in the work habits in the two cities may explain why there are relatively more female respondents in Makassar who are aspiring to keep working the same hours post-marriage and -childbirth than in Jakarta, as illustrated in Table 4.

Despite the noted difference in patterns of household preference, particularly among female respondents, in the two study sites, the dominating preference towards women as secondary earners applies in both survey locations. The survey indicates that the notion of husbands as primary earners and hence, wives as secondary earners, is part of a larger set of ideals on the roles and qualities of husbands and wives that emerged from the survey. A closer examination of the survey data argues that male breadwinner ideals persist even when the respondents aspire for dual-earner egalitarian marriage. Assessing respondents' preferences on the qualities and work behaviour of their spouse and themselves indicate that in the context of marriage, as a group, women expect and are expected to work shorter hours than men. When using intended work interruption as an indication of future labour market attachment, a higher proportion of women than men have expressed expectations for longer durations of labour market interruptions following marriage and childbearing. The response patterns of men's labour market expectations of self and spouse largely correspond with those of women. Overall, respondents' work expectations of self and spouse are driven by the assumption of men as primary earners in the household, or as the backbone of the family's finance. Accordingly, egalitarian aspirations for equal career importance between husband and wife do not always correspond to aspirations for equal contribution to the household pool of income. In short, the survey suggests that despite the popular expectations for dual-earner marriage, the driving attitude behind gendered work expectations is the widely held view that men should be the one shouldering much of the responsibility to earn a living for the family.

Respondents in both cities continue to accept the universality of marriage and having children, viewing both as natural and expected progressions following schooling and employment. However, reflecting the relatively more homogenous nature of Makassar's ethnic make-up, in-depth interview respondents in Makassar are more likely than the respondents in Jakarta to refer to specific local customs and Islamic cultural norms as factors that influence gender differences in labour force behaviour. Given the richness of the dataset collected in the fieldwork, future investigation into the survey data should address the role of other variables, namely, gender ratio in field of study, religion, parental role model, socio-economic variables, such as mother's education, as well as

geographical and ethnic variations in shaping respondents' work and gender-role orientation through a multivariate framework.

Qualitative data from the fieldwork has proven to be a valuable research instrument in providing insights to the preferences of and for women as secondary earners. Three underlying, and related, themes surrounding the notion of women as secondary earners have been identified from the analyses of in-depth interviews and open-ended questions in the survey. First, the culturally and religiously derived notion of *kodrat* has been identified as the primary driver of the respondents' accounts of their gendered work-marriage expectations in support of men's breadwinning responsibilities and the nature of women's paid work as supplementary in marriage. Second, common perceptions of work-marriage conflicts faced by married women, especially by mothers, continue to confine the social expectations for tertiary-educated young women within their ascribed role as secondary earners. Third, women themselves find comfort in their secondary-earner role and the supplementary nature of the money they earn, because they see those as a way to accommodate their 'gender role-compatible' participation in the formal labour market. In sum, being a secondary earner is interpreted as:

- a way to maintain women's inherent (Ind: *kodratif*) reproductive role whilst accommodating the increasing demand for their economic role;
- a means for women to supplement the main income of their husband;
- enabling women to provide safety nets for family income;
- providing women with financial freedom while still relying on their husband as a primary financier of family needs;
- one way for women to have less attachment to work commitments and more attachment to family responsibilities;
- a means for women to work in jobs that are relatively compatible with their maternal role; and
- helping to minimise work-family conflicts faced by women.

The themes raised during in-depth interviews provide a rich insight into the mechanism through which socio-cultural conditioning exerts its influence on gender differences in labour supply intentions and preferences among the respondents. The key argument is that social conditioning of gender roles drives women to place their labour market aspirations within the boundary of their role as secondary earners in the household. Furthermore, such socio-cultural conditioning conveniently serves to feed the social demand for educated women to take multiple roles as income earners, wives and mothers.

Conclusion

Despite having reached quasi-equal status in tertiary schooling with men, young female graduates in urban Indonesia continue to face a persistent gender gap in the labour market, as well as a general under-representation in the legislative, senior official and managerial positions. This paper adds to the literature highlighting that gendered labour market preferences reflect the choices and values made by individuals in a society where traditional gender-role stereotypes in marriage are repackaged into the dual-earner marriage framework. Most importantly, this paper argues that labour-supply intentions

and preferences are often made within the constraint of the prevailing gender ideology. As previously indicated in research on women and work in Indonesia, few women are able to make free and unconstrained work choices, particularly, in the face of entrenched socio-cultural conditioning advocating the importance of their womanly nature (Ind: *kodrat wanita)* (Brenner 1998; Djafar 1997; Oey-Gardiner 2001; Raharto 1992).

Being secondary earners, university-educated women are expected to generate additional income for the family by choosing a career path that does not interfere with their primary roles as wives and mothers. In this framework of gender-role socialisation, we expect to see educated married women working in less demanding jobs than their husband, working less hours, obtaining less labour market experience, having lower labour force attachment and enduring slower wage growth. Hence, the socialisation of women as secondary earners provides a coherent theoretical link on how the continuation of traditional gender roles in marriage translates into the gender gap in the contemporary labour market.

In the light of the above argument, the notion of women as secondary earners should be a focal consideration in the formulation of policies aiming to improve the position of educated women in the labour market, and to widen young educated women's access to decision-making positions. If women's continued participation in the skilled labour market is to be promoted, the major policy implication of this study relates to the importance of gender mainstreaming and socialisation of gender equity in marriage, particularly, through the education system and the mass media. An example of an existing policy that will affect the gender gap in the labour market in the long run is the revision of school textbooks to make them more gender sensitive. Efforts to challenge religious justifications for the *natural* assignment of gender roles in marriage, as shown by the failed initiative of the Counter Draft for Islamic Law Compilations 2004, should also be continually supported as they make issues of gender equity in marriage visible in public discussions. Further investigations of the sources or origins of gender-role expectations, the obstacles to changes in these sources, and the identification of key entry points to make such changes in the communities would assist in the effective design and implementation of gender equity policies. Since the paper has argued that labour market aspirations are made in the context of expected marriage roles, as opposed to a sole reliance on labour market policies to address the gendered wage gap, policies advocating more egalitarian marriage roles would ultimately lead to more equitable outcomes in the labour market.

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