

PRIMORDIALISM AND MOBILIZATION
AMONG SYRIAN-LEBANESE IN SYDNEY:
A THREE GENERATIONAL ANALYSIS

A Thesis Submitted for the Ph. D. Degree
at The Australian National University

Name: James McKay

Date: May 23, 1980

Sections 2.5 through 2.7 of this thesis have been adapted from a paper which I coauthored with Frank Lewins. The article was published under the title "Ethnicity and the Ethnic Group : A Conceptual Analysis and Reformulation" in Ethnic and Racial Studies (Volume one, 1978). All other material in the thesis is original research which has never been published.

J. M. Kay

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

During the time I have been a student of ethnic relations, I have been profoundly influenced by the writings of Pierre van den Berghe and Richard Schermerhorn. My intellectual debt to them will become evident as the thesis unfolds. I am also indebted to my supervisors, Jerzy Zubrzycki and Frank Lewins, for their advice and constructive criticism over the past three years. Chapters two and eight of the thesis are the result of countless hours of discussion with Frank. Chris Barlow had the dubious pleasure of deciphering my handwriting and transforming it into a typed manuscript. The production of the thesis would have taken much longer without her diligent and proficient style of work. I owe the greatest debt to Susan. Her emotional (and other) support has been a constant source of inspiration to me. My research would not have been possible without her patience, understanding and encouragement.

ABSTRACT

Sociologists are currently polarized over how to account for the alleged ethnic revival around the world. "Primordialists" argue that ethnic resurgence can best be explained by reference to cultural factors and the socialization process. "Mobilizationists" counter with the claim that ethnic traits are manipulated by people in order to gain access to scarce resources. These diametrically opposed theses have been used to explain the phenomenon of "third generation return" among descendants of European immigrants in North America. In the present study, I use data from a case study of Syrian-Lebanese in Sydney to explore the third generation hypothesis. In the first chapter I examine the strengths and deficiencies of the primordial and mobilizationist viewpoints and present the rationale for the study. In chapters two and three I discuss the conceptual and methodological approaches to be used. In chapter four I give a synopsis of contemporary Lebanese society, including the major historical forces which have affected its development. In chapter five I examine Syrian-Lebanese migration to Australia in the context of the larger diaspora which occurred in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The changes in ethnic organization and ethnic identity among Syrian-Lebanese are analyzed in chapters six and seven. In chapter eight I specifically explore primordial and mobilizationist tendencies among Syrian-Lebanese. Overall, the data does not confirm the mobilizationist thesis and gives only weak support to the primordial argument. In terms of involvement in and identification with Lebanese institutions, the third generation evidence a pattern of decline rather than return. By using the data and empirical illustrations from other studies, I illustrate the insufficiency of dichotomizing primordial and mobilizationist tendencies. A matrix model is provided in order to demonstrate that mobilization and primordialism are complementary rather than

competing ethnic manifestations. Implications of the study at the applied and substantive levels are discussed in the concluding chapter.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Theoretical Debate on Ethnic Phenomena

It is clearly evident that contrary to earlier theoretical predictions, the importance of ethnic phenomena has not always receded due to processes of modernization and industrialization. Throughout the world ethnic diversity remains an important aspect of social life whether states are preindustrial or postindustrial, communist or capitalist (Brass and van den Berghe 1976; Cohen 1974; Connor 1972, 1973, 1978; Despres 1975; Esman 1977b; Glazer 1975; Glazer and Moynihan 1975; Greeley 1974; Heisler 1977a; Henry 1976; Yancey et al. 1976). Since World War II, Greeley (1974) estimates that as many as 20 million people have died in ethnic conflicts. During the same period, Connor (1973) reports that nearly half of the world's states have experienced varying degrees of "ethnically inspired dissonance". Ethno-regional movements flourish in Europe and rulers of many communist states are plagued by the persistence of separatist sentiments among their "national minorities". Developing states in Africa and Asia face difficulties in resolving ethnic conflicts among their citizens which rival their economic problems. The establishment of "benign quotas" for black-Americans has generated demands by "white ethnics" that they too should benefit from "positive discrimination" legislation. In Canada, the federal and Quebec governments are divided over the issue of sovereignty for Quebec. Migrants in Australia have become more articulate in recent years and politicians have become aware of the importance of the "ethnic vote".

This apparent ethnic renaissance has prompted an upsurge of scholarly interest in ethnic phenomena. A decade ago there was a paucity of text books and periodicals on the subject. When the topic did appear (in books) it was usually subsumed under the rubric of social problems such as prejudice and discrimination. Now there is a surfeit of books and journals and at least

a dozen institutes around the world specializing in the study of ethnic and racial relations. An intriguing outcome of this increased scholarly attention has been a seemingly insolvable debate on how the reemergence and persistence of ethnic factors can best be explained. Burgess (1978), for instance, claims that theories of functionalism, development and modernization, and class conflict all contain faulty theoretical premises which undermine scholars' capacity to predict the pertinacity of ethnic phenomena. Social scientists' feelings of surprise and perplexity (and often irritation) are succinctly encapsulated by the title of an article published in 1974 by Glazer and Moynihan - Why Ethnicity? Why, they ask, has ethnicity become a vehicle for political mobilization? Why has ethnic self-assertion become stronger and why has ethnic conflict become more pronounced in the last twenty years? In a later essay, they too note the inadequacies of various theories and conclude that the answers to their previous questions can best be answered by reference to two polar types - "primordial" and "circumstantial" or "situational" positions. The differences between these two competing perspectives are as follows:

The two poles of analysis by which we try to explain the persistence or revival or creation of ethnic identities seem to waver between what we may call 'primordialists': Men are divided thus and so, the reasons for their division are deep in history and experience, and they must in some way be taken into account by those who govern societies; and what we may call 'circumstantialists': We are doubtful of any such basic division and look to specific and immediate circumstances to explain why groups maintain their identity, why ethnicity becomes a basis for mobilization, why some situations are peaceful and others filled with conflict (Glazer and Moynihan 1975: 19-20).

A similar classification has been suggested by Campbell (1972: 5-6):

... those who urge that we be color-blind, that we judge others by their performance on other 'relevant' criteria, seem to say of race that it not merely ought to be, but reasonably can be, a trivial

epiphenomenon. Those fall into this category too who say that race and the emotions that accompany it are a kind of mythology, a false consciousness, whereas the true and critical relationships are between economic groups ... There is the opposed, and equally vigorous, view that race is of the essence in the way man groups himself and where he places his loyalties. It is, that is to say, a primordial phenomenon, of which religion and language may be other such, operating as a primary source or magnet of loyalty and identification wherever men gather.

In summary, we are told on one hand, that the continued salience of ethnic factors is because they are deep-seated, irrational, atavistic allegiances incapable of being altered, and on the other hand, because they are peripheral loyalties which can be readily manipulated in a rational way for pursuing political and economic goals. Let us now examine the strengths and weaknesses of these apparently incompatible outlooks.¹

1.2 The Primordial Perspective: An Overview And Assessment

The concept of primordialism was first introduced by Shils (1957) in his now famous essay on the relationship between sociological theory and research. In the article, Shils reexamined his own sociological inquiries and concluded that during his research on primary group dynamics, he had overlooked the effect of "primordial qualities" on social interaction. According to Shils, primordial attachments to kin, territory, and religion were characterized by "a state of intense and comprehensive solidarity", "coerciveness", "ineffable significance", "fervour and passion", and "sacredness". Unfortunately, Shils did not elaborate any further on primordial attachments beyond stating that they differed from ties to other social units.

Several years later, Geertz (1963) attributed a key role to primordial loyalties in the political development of postcolonial states. He noted that actions by central elites to foster a sense of civic consciousness among citizens, were often thwarted by the fact that people had no concept of

loyalty which extended beyond their kinship, racial, regional, or cultural groups. Geertz (1963: 109-110) outlines the nature of these latter attachments in the following way:

By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the 'givens' - or more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the 'assumed' givens - of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of language, and following particular social patterns. These congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves. One is bound to one's kinsman, one's neighbour, one's fellow believer, ipso facto, as a result not merely of one's personal affection, practical necessity, common interest, or incurred obligation, but at least in great part by the virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself. The general strength of such primordial bonds, and the types of them that are important, differ from person to person, from society to society, and from time to time. But for virtually every person, in every society, at almost all times, some attachments seem to flow more from a sense of natural - some would say spiritual - affinity than from social interaction.

Isaacs (1975: 38-39, 42-43) uses similar terminology in sketching the main components of the "basic group identity":

... basic group identity consists of the ready-made set of endowments and identifications that every individual shares with others from the moment of birth by chance of the family into which he is born at that given time in that given place. (These are) body, shared physical characteristics, birthplace, name, language, history and origins, (and) religion ... These legacies, with all their attached subclusters of mores, values, ethics, aesthetics, and assorted other attributes, come to the child carrying the immense weight of the whole past as his family has received it. Before he has barely any consciousness at all, they shape the only reality of his existence and are made part of him ... it is possible to say that in all cases the function of basic group identity has to do most crucially with two ingredients in every individual's personality and life experience: his sense of belongingness and the duality of his self-esteem ... An individual belongs to his basic group in the deepest and most literal sense that here he is not alone, which is all but a very few human beings most fear to be. He is not only not alone, but here, as long as he chooses to remain in and of it, he cannot be denied or rejected.

Isaacs contends that there is a current world trend towards "refragmentation", "retribalization", and "superbalkanization" because of the comfort and sense of belonging derived from the "basic group identity". This primal reversion has allegedly been caused by the collapse of old power systems (e.g. Ottoman, Hapsburg, Romanov, and British empires) and the failure of new states to provide stable and secure relationships for people:

Hence the fierce holding on to vestiges of a more secure past. Hence the search for what has somewhere, somehow been lost. Hence the lunge back to the tribal caves ... It is a desperate effort to regain that condition of life in which certain needs were met, to get behind walls that enclose them once more, if only in their minds, in a place where they can feel they belong, and where, grouped with their kind, they can regain some measure of what feels like physical and emotional safety (Isaacs 1975: 24).

Primordial factors have been emphasized to varying degrees by scholars attempting to account for the persistence or reemergence of ethnic diversity, tension, and conflict. Greeley (1974: 26-27), for instance, asserts that despite the effects of modernization, Gemeinschaft-like sentiments and relationships still endure among the descendants of European immigrants in the U.S.A.:

... when it comes to choosing role relationships where either intimacy or trust are involved, there is still a strong tendency to choose people to whom we can say in effect, 'Your mother knew my mother' ... The survival of religious and ethnic diversity in American society is motivated by a search for one's own kind, who will be preferential role opposites in one's intimate and trusting relationships ... ethnicity is one of the forms of Gemeinschaft that has survived in a rationalized, bureaucratized society. It is one of the tools we use to brush off the sharp edges of human relationships in a society run sine ira and sine studio and one of the criteria we have available for finding role opposites with whom we are able to relax.

According to da Silva (1975), the continued vitality of Basque nationalism is because of the emotional power of the Basques' group identity.

Drawing on the writings of Walker Connor and Clifford Geertz, da Silva (1975: 251) maintains that, "political modernization does not do away with ethnocentrism, it merely modernizes it". In analysing the evolution of Scottish nationalism, Esman (1977a: 260, 285) emphasizes the importance of situational factors (e.g., the discovery of North Sea oil) but also stresses that primordial elements are of considerable importance:

... Scottish national sentiment (has) remained - rooted in centuries of history; love of land; institutions of church, law, and education; a common socialization and sense of community; a vigorous set of indigenous Scottish-controlled media; a distinctive brand of humour; an active network of athletic leagues which participate in international competitions; and well-established cultural organizations ... While ethnic definition and ethnic group behavior can be regarded as contextual - a response to changing conditions - national sentiment and solidarity in Scotland have been so deeply rooted and persistent that they can be considered as a given for the purpose of political analysis.

At a more general level, scholars such as Greeley, Isaacs, and Connor affirm that the present global resurgence of ethnic diversity - some of it to be celebrated, some of it to be regarded with utmost revulsion - can largely be explained by man's primal need to belong. Connor (1978: 377), for instance, feels the current tide of ethnonationalism sweeping the world demonstrates that, "an intuitive bond felt toward an informal and unstructured subdivision of mankind is far more profound and potent than are the ties that bind them to the formal and legalistic state structure in which they find themselves". Adam (1977: 880) makes similar observations in rejecting Marxist interpretations of ethnic conflict:

This (Marxist) focus, however, neglects the psychosocial background of a culture - specific common socialization experience. At a fundamental level, in times of anxiety and conflict, this bond offers relief, because it is associated with the comfort and security of childhood, while the socialist unity with the stranger on the other side remains a doubtful promise. Herein lies the secret of the revival of ethnicity everywhere (emphasis added).

The main advantage of a primordial perspective is that it focuses our

attention on the great emotional strength of ethnic bonds. Primordially orientated research has demonstrated that some ethnic attachments persist for hundreds or thousands of years and that in certain cases they override loyalties to other important collectivities. Despite the benefits of this approach, there are several flaws which limit the explanatory power of a primordial viewpoint. First of all, primordialists tend to couch their explanations in deterministic and static terms. By and large, primordial "givens" are not seen to change, or to display dynamic properties because they are "primitive" or "atavistic" attributes. In recent years, a body of literature has emerged which stresses the fluidity and variability of ethnic identities and relationships. Much of this research demonstrates that ethnic phenomena are not the result of some primal need, but rational, calculated responses to certain contingencies. Yancey et al. (1976: 400), for example, argue that contemporary manifestations of ethnicity in the U.S.A. "may have little to do with Europe, Asia, or Africa, but much more to do with the exigencies of survival and the structure of opportunity in this country. In short, the so-called 'foreign heritage' of ethnic groups is taking shape in this country".

Secondly, primordial traits are often viewed as fixed, involuntary, and compelling. Man is seen as a leopard who cannot change his ethnic spots. This posture overlooks the creative abilities of human beings and consequently, ethnic strategies such as "passing", "manipulation", "entrepreneurship", and "impression management" are neglected. Even race, which is usually considered to be the most indelible of all primordial attributes, can be accentuated or disclaimed depending on the context (Patterson 1975; van den Berghe 1967; Wagley 1952).

Thirdly, there is a sense of primacy about ethnicity in primordial

literature. Rather than viewing ethnicity as a possible focus of identity it is seen as the cardinal orientation. However, it is obvious that many people do not feel ethnic at all and are not psychologically aberrant as a result. "Rootless cosmopolitans", "marginal men", and "universalists" manage to function quite normally without any ethnic attachments. Similarly, some immigrant populations have abandoned their ethnic traits because they found the institutions of the superordinates more attractive.

Fourthly, primordialism is often held to be ineffable and only comprehensible to "insiders". In short, "You have to be one to know one". Typical of this line of reasoning is Novak's (1973: 38) statement that: "Upper-class Quakers think and feel in a way I cannot think and feel; Jewish intellectuals tend to live and breathe out of writers, concerns, and experiences I can emulate as second nature, but not as first; certain Irish Catholics exhibit emotional patterns I can follow, but not find native to me". There is a certain amount of truth to this assertion, since any individual or group is like no other individual or group. Yet as Kluckhohn and Murray (1953: 53) remind us, an individual (and a group) is simultaneously like some and all other individuals (and groups). Adherence to this ethnocentric, solipsistic doctrine of "Insiderism" (Merton 1972) negates the possibilities of categorization and generalization, and even makes historical inquiries invalid, since one would have "to be Caesar in order to understand Caesar". A far more fruitful approach would be to examine the general characteristics of primordial groups without denying the uniqueness of each one.

In the fifth place, the severity of some ethnic conflict is often attributed to the intense emotional power of the primordial attachment - a tie that "has to do with something that is so basic to man's life, it is

not at all a mystery that he is willing, indeed almost eager, to die in defense of it" (Greeley 1974: 14). This ignores that fact that people can have their consciousness raised to highly emotional levels which have no primordial orientations. Millions have died in ethnic conflicts but millions have also been killed in class and ideological disputes. Also, one is left with the impression that primordial sentiments are viewed to be salient only in times of conflict and are unimportant at other times. However, there are many cases in which ethnicity is quiescent and it seems logical to ask why ethnic relations are sedate in some instances and conflictual in others (Doornbos 1972).

Finally, primordialists talk as if ethnic groups and identities existed in a political and economic vacuum. One cannot read primordial literature without being aware of the epiphenomenal role given to issues of social, economic, and political inequalities. For instance, it is seldom asked if primordial conflicts would evaporate if inequalities were eradicated or if they would persist if there was ethnic parity with respect to access to societal resources.

In summary then, a primordial perspective is extremely useful for understanding the emotional basis of ethnicity and the tenacity of ethnic bonds. But because of its psychological reductionism, its inability to account for social change, and its disregard for political and economic influences, it fails to provide a comprehensive theoretical explanation of ethnic phenomena.

1.3 The Mobilizationist Perspective: An Overview And Assessment

As was mentioned above, there has recently been a trend away from primordial explanations toward a more dynamic perspective which stresses change, contextuality, and competition among ethnic populations for scarce

resources. In Horowitz's (1977: 7) words, "In a fairly short time we have moved from metaphors of blood and stone to clay and putty". The essential feature of theorists (of Marxist and non-Marxist persuasion) who adopt this second viewpoint is as follows: Renewed ethnic tension and conflict are not the result of any primordial need to belong, but due to the conscious efforts of individuals and groups mobilizing ethnic symbols in order to obtain access to social, political, and material resources. A key concept among theorists of this posture is the notion of ethnic "interests". For instance, Glazer and Moynihan (1975: 7-8) observe that:

One of the striking characteristics of the present situation is indeed the extent to which we find the ethnic group defined in terms of interest, as an ethnic group ... it is clear the weight of (ethnic) conflicts has shifted: from an emphasis on culture, language, religion, as such, it shifts to an emphasis to the interests broadly defined as members of the group.

Thus Glazer and Moynihan talk about the "strategic efficacy of ethnicity"; van den Berghe (1976) claims that the use of ethnic symbols for attaining access to political and economic resources is an "ethnic game" being played in nearly all polyethnic societies; and Bernard (1971) and Henry (1976) argue that ethnic identities and ideologies are retained and stressed in order to influence political, economic and social policy. Some mobilizationist "extremists" maintain that ethnic groups are similar to classes in that they are rational interest groups devoid of any primordial significance:

Ethnicity viewed, not as a structure, not as a variable, but something which, in fact, happens and can be shown to have happened in human relationships, is very akin to class ... Ethnic groups ... are elements of political organization ... they have involved, for political action, the mobilization of individuals whose ethnicity is instrumental in achieving their ends. Unlike cultural minorities, ethnic groups are purposive groups: the main thing they have in common in all societies is that they are arbitrarily created and sustained for their practical utility ... Ethnic ties are not primordial ties - the assumed givens of a society and their actual realized organization in any situation have to be demonstrated (Vincent 1974: 377; emphasis added).²

Others assert that ethnic groups are, in fact, classes:

I do not think that primordiality and intensity of involvement is a distinguishing feature of ethnicity. This is not to say that such involvement does not sometimes characterize ethnic allegiance; it often does. But it is not peculiar to ethnic allegiance, and indeed, is not required by it. I think, instead, that individuals will be most intensely involved with those allegiances, or that allegiance, which is in their own best social and economic interests... people never make economic decisions on the basis of ethnic allegiance, but on the contrary, the strength, scope, viability and bases of ethnic identity are determined by, and are used to serve, the economic and general class interests ³ of individuals (Patterson 1975: 312, 347-8; emphasis added).

While this "theory of political and economic mobilization" (Freedman 1976) has considerable explanatory power for some groups in certain situations, it does not satisfactorily account for all ethnic phenomena. One major weakness of this position is that interests are usually defined too narrowly, for besides political and economic interests, humans struggle over ideal interests. For instance, Aronson (1976) argues that political and economic explanations of ethnic phenomena overlook issues such as value consensus/conflict and moral questions of what is right and wrong among ethnic groups. Similarly, De Vos (1975) and Uchendu (1975) refer to ethnic groups which persist despite the fact that their activities are socially disadvantageous, indifferent to self-interest, and even contrary to self-preservation. In Deshen's (1974) words, there are "ethnic manifestations that are primarily cultural, and perhaps not relevant at all to problems of conflict and competition". For instance, ethnic conflicts in the Catholic church in Australia and the U.S.A. have centered more around normative differences among groups than their access to political and economic resources (Greene 1966; Leonard 1976; Lewins 1976, 1978a, 1978b; Smith 1966). In short, explanations which deal exclusively with political and economic factors "underrate" the emotional power of ethnic bonds and "exaggerate" the influence of materialism on human behavior (Connor 1972). This is not to say that

individuals and ethnic groups do not have any political and economic interests. To the contrary, one of the major contributions of mobilizationists has been to highlight this sort of behavior. But as Epstein (1978: 56) has observed: "To describe an ethnic group as having interests is one thing, to define it in these terms is something quite different". Nor does the existence of political and economic interests negate the continued existence, even in a modified form, of primordial interests (Doornbos 1972: 269; Williams 1975: 131). Other scholars have also pointed out that to define ethnic groups as interest groups, begs the question of why interests are pursued through ethnic cohesion rather than by some other form of social solidarity (Ballard 1976; Charsley 1974; Freedman 1976; Oppenheimer 1977). Finally, it is necessary to ask whose interests are being promoted. Since members of ethnic groups are seldom in accord with regard to political, economic, and moral issues (Douglass and Lyman 1976: 214; Oppenheimer 1977: 223; Robb 1978; Yinger 1976: 208), the focus of a group's interests can be oversimplified.⁴

Similar problems arise when ethnic groups and classes are conflated. The relationship between class and ethnic factors is exceedingly complex and unlikely to be explained by oversimplified theories of economic or cultural determinism.⁵ Actors have multiple social attachments (e.g. class, religious, sexual, national, regional loyalties) which can coincide, contradict, or overlap with ethnic ties (Bell 1975; Cross 1971; Kornblum 1973; Richmond 1974; Salamone 1976; Suttles 1968). In Ulster, Lebanon, South Africa, Southeast Asia, and India, to cite a few examples, communal differences have made it difficult to forge classes with a pan-ethnic base, despite the objective economic advantages which all subordinate ethnic groups could gain from such an arrangement. In the case of Northern Ireland, the primordial dimension of the strife makes it almost impossible for the

protagonists to even agree on strategies for conflict resolution (Terchek 1977: 59). Even if it were possible to resolve economic disparities among ethnic groups by creating equality of opportunity, this would not always ensure equality of result, because groups have different values towards economic matters.⁶ The difficulties of subsuming ethnic factors under class are further compounded when it is considered that: (1) even when ethnic differences and economic discrepancies coincide, as they do with Brazilian Negroes (Glazer 1975), social conflict does not always ensue; (2) there are situations in which ethnic differences become more salient as economic gaps between ethnic groups actually diminish (Peterson 1975); and (3) there are contexts in which primordialism persists within subordinate groups despite the fact that they are more economically advanced than other ethnic groups and superordinates (Connor 1972: 342; da Silva 1975). Although classes and ethnic groups are "generically similar" with respect to their "exclusion practices" (Parkin 1974; also see Runciman 1974), they differ in their criteria for membership (Cross 1971; Harris 1959; van den Berghe 1978) and have contradictory revolutionary ideals (Kuper 1971a, 1971b; Lockwood 1970: 64). In theory, class and ethnic affiliations can coincide and sometimes they do, but in many cases they do not and this makes it necessary to distinguish conceptually ethnic and class phenomena.

In summarizing the mobilizationist perspective, it can be said that: (1) because some ethnic groups pursue political and economic interests, this does not mean that all ethnic groups have identical goals; (2) ethnic groups that do pursue political and economic interests are not ipso facto interest groups or classes.

1.4 The Present Study

I have outlined the main features of these seemingly diametrically

opposed theoretical perspectives in Figure 1-1. To date there have been

FIGURE 1-1

CONTINUUM MODEL OF PRIMORDIAL AND MOBILIZATIONIST
APPROACHES TO ETHNIC PHENOMENA

	Primordial Pole	Mobilizationist Pole
Rationale for Group Formation	Ethnic groups are formed to solve <u>expressive</u> problems related to culture, identity, and belief	Ethnic groups are formed to solve <u>instrumental</u> problems such as access to political and economic resources
Orientation of Ethnic Identities	Related to <u>ideal</u> interests	Related to <u>political and economic</u> interests
Key Explanatory Variables and Theories	Revolve around <u>psychocultural variables and socialization</u> processes	Revolve around theories of <u>structured social inequality and situational factors</u>
Relationship between Ethnic Groups and Classes	Primordial bonds are <u>more powerful than class</u> based ones	Primordial bonds are <u>used to serve class interests</u>
Examples	Tunisian Jews in Israel Hutterite Communities in North America	"White Ethnics" in the U.S.A. Scottish Nationalists

few detailed analyses of whether these two perspectives are antagonistic viewpoints which cannot be reconciled or complementary positions which can be fused. Burgess (1978) and Glazer and Moynihan (1975) sit on the theoretical fence and adopt a stance somewhere between the two poles of analysis.

Ballard (1976) claims that, "the material and cultural should be seen in a dialectical relationship with each other", and Epstein (1978) notes the need for "affect" and "circumstance" to be "treated in their complex interaction".

But no one offers any suggestions as to how this can be delineated in any substantial way. Lewins (1978b, 1978c) and Oppenheimer (1977) have been critical of the dogmatic way in which scholars have approached the theoretical debate. The latter author found that patterns of ethnicity among Israeli

Druze could not be explained by a single interest, as there was a "complex of interacting and changing interests involving both cultural and political orientations. Lewins reported that Glazer and Moynihan's concept of interest was too restricted to account for ethnic manifestations among Ukrainian Catholics and Italians in Australia. He suggests that the notion of ethnic interests should be extended to include cultural and religious values, as well as material goals.

In the present study I evaluate the utility of this polar model for explaining ethnic resurgence among a sample of third generation Syrian-Lebanese in Sydney. The fact that the analysis is restricted to Australian-born descendants of migrants, means that the findings cannot be directly compared with ethnic resurgences in preindustrial or communist societies or polyethnic societies which have not been created mainly by voluntary migration.⁷

Syrian-Lebanese began arriving in Australia toward the end of the last century. At that time Lebanon did not exist as a geopolitical entity; it was simply a region inside the Ottoman province of Syria. Thus the early migrants were first called "Turks", then "Syrians", and finally "Lebanese". Most of these migrants were Christians who came from hamlets and towns in what is now Lebanon. However, because Lebanon did not gain full independence until 1943, and because the inhabitants of the region had only a local instead of a national identity, they did not think of themselves as Lebanese or Syrians. After arriving in Australia, they discovered that although most people knew of Syria or the Holy Land, hardly anyone had heard of their specific towns and villages. Consequently, they identified themselves as Syrians. They did not use the phrase Lebanese extensively until after World War II. It is for these reasons that I use the term Syrian-Lebanese to describe the population in question. It should be stressed that this is my own description - not one which is used by members of the population. In fact, the phrase "Syrian" is anathema to most Christian Lebanese, because it is synonymous with Muslim oppression.

TABLE 1-1
APPROXIMATE NUMBERS OF LEBANESE MIGRANTS
AND THEIR DESCENDANTS IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES

Canada	70,000	India and Pakistan	20
U.S.A.	1,330,000	Iran	300
Subtotal N. America	(1,400,000)	Iraq	1,500
British Honduras	2,000	Jordan	1,000
Cuba	3,000	Kuwait	25,000
Guadeloupe	1,500	Philippines	10,500
Guatemala	50	Saudi Arabia	10,000
Haiti	550	Subtotal Asia	(39,320)
Mexico	87,000	Australia	110,000
San Salvador	150	New Zealand	2,000
Subtotal C. America	(94,250)	Subtotal Oceania	(112,000)
Argentina	400,000	Algeria	500
Bolivia	25,000	Cameroon	1,300
Brazil	2,000,000	Canary Islands	670
Chile	40,000	Dahomey	1,200
Colombia	30,000	Egypt	12,000
Uruguay	20,000	Ethiopia	1,200
Venezuela	40,000	Gambia	1,400
Subtotal S. America	(2,555,000)	Ghana	4,000
Austria	10	Guinea	2,500
Czechoslovakia	80	Kenya	150
France	320	Libya	2,200
Great Britain	115	Mali	1,300
Greece	250	Morocco	700
Italy	85	Niger	800
Monaco	10	Nigeria	12,000
Portugal	45	Portugese Guinea	2,100
Spain	60	Senegal	17,000
Switzerland	120	Sierra Leone	7,375
Subtotal Europe	(1,895)	Sudan	1,600
		Tanzania	3,000
		Togo	400
		Tunisia	50
		South Africa	20,000
		Upper Volta	1,200
		Subtotal Africa	(94,645)
		GRAND TOTAL	(4,297,110)

Source: World Lebanese Cultural Union (1977)

There is no way of knowing exactly how many Syrian-Lebanese immigrants and their descendants are distributed throughout the world. Since Lebanese immigrants were classified as "Turks" or "Syrians", no accurate demographic statistics are available for the early years of migration. Scholars who have conducted studies of Lebanese migration to Mexico (Maloof 1959), Brazil (Knowlton 1955), the U.S.A. (Kayal and Kayal 1975), and West Africa (Hanna 1958; van der Laan 1975) have reported that official government reports are generally imprecise, and they have usually been able to provide only rough population estimates. A pamphlet published by The World Lebanese Cultural Union in 1977, reports that there were at least four million people of Lebanese descent living in more than fifty countries (see Table 1-1). This unofficial estimate is undoubtedly a gross exaggeration, but it does demonstrate the pride which the Lebanese take in seeing themselves as sojourners. The Lebanese speak of two kinds of Lebanese - the resident and the migrant.

Syrian-Lebanese emigrants and their descendants have followed three general patterns depending on where they have migrated (Winder 1962). In the U.S.A., they encountered a society and culture which they perceived to be more modern and superior to their own and gradually lost their ethnic distinctiveness: "As an immigrant group the Syrians have thus gone through much the same processes as others in America, both in their relation to American life and in their orientation to the homeland" (Berger 1960: 372). In African countries, they found themselves in an ambivalent position between European colonials and indigenous Africans. They have kept a low profile to avoid antagonizing Africans who have criticized them for their trading and commercial practices. It is widely believed that Syrian-Lebanese have been involved in illicit diamond dealing and legislation has been enacted by African governments to curb their economic influence. Their shops have been

the targets of riots in several African countries, and they are commonly referred to as the "Jews of Africa" (Winder 1962: 297). In South America, they found societies and cultures perceived to be no more modern than their own and consequently, they have preserved their ethnic traits to a greater extent than in North America. In most South American countries, they have enjoyed considerable political and financial success. The recently elected president of Colombia, Emilo Tourbeigh, is a second generation Syrian-Lebanese and over 50 deputies of Brazillian parliaments are of Syrian-Lebanese descent.

No matter where they have gone, Lebanese migrants have left a mark in one particular field - business. In nearly all countries, the first generation migrants hawked goods until they acquired sufficient capital to open a small shop. The second and third generation have tended to enter more diversified occupations and have displayed impressive degrees of upward social mobility.

1.5 Rationale

A sociological investigation of the Syrian-Lebanese is justified for five reasons. First of all, there has been little research in Australia on ethnic resurgence among third generation descendants. Since the "law" of third generation return⁸ was first advanced by the American historian Hansen (1952), a great deal of controversy has been generated about the nature and extent of ethnic revival in the third generation (Abramson 1975; Alba 1976; Appel 1961; Bender and Kagiwada 1968; Clark et al. 1976; Gans 1979; Goering 1971; Goldstein and Goldscheider 1968; Greeley 1974; Johnson 1976; Kramer 1970; Krickus 1976; Laumann 1973; Lazerwitz and Rowitz 1964; Masuda et al. 1970, 1973; Matsumoto et al. 1970, Nahirny and Fishman

1965; Newman 1973; Novak 1973; Parenti 1967; Russo 1969; Ryan 1973; Sandberg 1977; Spiro 1955; Weed 1973; Wenk et al. 1977; Yancey et al. 1976). The behavioral and psychological orientations of the third generation are generally acknowledged as the crucial indicators of social integration among the descendants of voluntary migrants. As yet, the phenomenon of "third generation return" has not been researched in Australia.

Secondly, because the study encompasses three generations, it provides us with ideal site for examining the utility of primordial and mobilizationist theories of ethnic phenomena. It is the unexpected renewal of ethnicity among third and fourth generation Americans which has captured the attention of many sociologists. This so-called "white ethnic movement" has been attributed to both primordial and mobilizational factors. White ethnic spokesmen have decried the destruction of ethnic communities, the loss of ethnic identity, and the defamation of American ethnics by the "WASP establishment". In the quest for modernity, so the argument goes, all of those desirable features of the ethnic enclave - close family ties, psychological security, food, music, and ethnic pride - have been lost. America has not turned out to be a melting pot in which each ethnic group contributed to the development of a social smorgasbord, but a pressure cooker which dissolved the ethnic comestibles and produced a bland, WASPish porridge. In the words of one white ethnic American:

The melting pot is a fiction. Ethnic group loyalties are a fact of life. It is a mistake to suppress ethnic communal ties and values as the 'assimilationists' have tried to do, for both are necessary to the mental health of the individual and to the stability of the ethnic community of which he is a part ... We are fearful that our children, stripped of a strong group self-identity, will become defenseless and will

be unable to cope with the pressures which are a prominent part of our society today... You don't have to tell us we're Americans; we know that and we're proud of it; but don't forget that many of us are reminded of our 'ethnicity' when we hear Polish jokes or allusions that any office seeker of Italian descent must be involved in criminal activities. Because stereotypes of this kind have been perpetuated over generations and still thrive, many of our people carry invisible wounds - to recognize our uniqueness is not to promote inter-group hostilities. On the contrary, as long as a man is without communal ties of some kind and values which guide him through difficult periods of his life he will be unable to relate to and work with others on the basis of respect and good will (Ryan 1973: 6).

Undoubtedly, there is a considerable degree of merit in this argument. Ethnicity is one valuable form of identity which can provide meaning and continuity for humans. However, impassioned ethnics in the U.S.A. are not only concerned about their loss of identities and communities. They are also indignant over high taxes, inflation, unemployment, housing, political indifference to their needs, and preferential treatment of blacks. Goering (1971) has referred to this situation as a "free floating resentment" which provides "the basis for a variety of new interest groupings". Like Glazer and Moynihan, he sees any third generation return as revolving around political and economic interests, not cultural concerns.

This theoretical debate has gone largely unnoticed in Australia. Most research on ethnic populations has been demographically orientated and based on assimilation models. It is only recently that the primordial/mobilizationist debate has been noticed by scholars in Australia (Lewins 1978b, 1978c; Martin 1976; Parkin 1977; Storer 1975). White (1976: 1-4) suggests that:

What happened in the U.S. - and is gradually happening here - is that various ethnic groups are becoming both politicized and vocal ... In Australia, the political mobilization of various ethnic groups have been slower, but it is also evident on the public scene ... ethnic

groups are now a public concern in a way very different from the way they were a public concern fifteen years ago. These groups, rather than allowing themselves to be governed and defined by the powers - that-be are taking an activist role in that government and definition. They are no longer accepting assimilation into the 'dominant' culture as their destiny (emphasis added).

With the exception of Lewins' (1976, 1978a, 1978b) analysis of Australian-migrant relations in the Australian Catholic church, there have been no detailed empirical investigations of the processes mentioned by White.

Thirdly, the study permits us to explore the relationships between ethnic and religious factors and how they affect identity and behavior. Just as politics can be "ethnicized" and ethnicity can be "politicized", religion can be "ethnicized" and ethnicity "sacralized". In some cases ethnic and religious variables are mutually reinforcing and consequently, they strengthen group boundaries and identities. For example, Ukrainian nationalism and Catholicism are inseparable elements of Ukrainian cohesiveness. On the other hand, ethnic and religious loyalties often compete with one another and this can undermine group solidarity and identity. The experience of many European Catholic immigrants in Australia and North America is an example of this pattern. Faced with the choice of maintaining their "primitive", "parochial" forms of worship or submitting to the "civilized" styles of American and Australian clergies, many immigrants opted for the latter and unwittingly eroded a major source of their ethnic distinctiveness. Again, with the exception of Lewins' contributions, there has been a dearth of empirical research on this topic in Australia.

The relationship between ethnic and religious factors is

particularly significant among Syrian-Lebanese, because religion has been one of the most influential forces in Lebanese history. Despite the fact that (with the exception of Israel) Lebanon is the most modern of all Middle Eastern societies, religion still remains a dominant social institution. Several analysts have maintained that Lebanon has been able to modernize without drastically undermining the inhabitants' primordial loyalties (Barakat 1973; Crow 1962; Entelis 1974; Harik 1972; Hudson 1968; Suleiman 1967). Khalaf (1968: 259, 264-265) claims that in Lebanon:

Much like the persistence of primordial ties of kinship and fealty, religion permeates every aspect of the political process or administrative structure... kinship, fealty and confessional loyalties still supersede those of the nation, state or party... (Ties to) class, party, profession, and ideology, are still relatively weak and amorphous. They have not as yet found any widespread appeal to threaten the sentiments crystallized around primordial loyalties.

Like Ulster, Lebanon is a country in which religious boundaries are extremely rigid and religious conflicts are tied to territorial, economic and political issues. Muslim and Christian Lebanese have had a long history of mutual antagonism and the most recent internecine conflict among the various ethnoreligious populations has led to the deaths of 60,000 Lebanese citizens since 1975.

Fourthly, the study represents an original contribution to Australian social history. Syrian-Lebanese have been migrating to Australia for over a century; their first ethnic churches were erected in Sydney prior to 1900; Syrian-Lebanese hawkers (along with Afghans and Indians) carried their wares to areas of Australia's hinterland where no other traders ventured; their drapery and clothing shops were often major entrepôts in Australian country towns; they have represented Australia in international sporting contests,

and fought and died for Australia in two world wars; they have produced politicians who have served at the local, state and federal level. Yet there is not one piece of sociological or historical research which has thoroughly investigated the Syrian-Lebanese.⁹ Until now their existence has been an unwritten chapter in Australian social history.

Finally, the study is justified on the basis that, in some small way, it may add to sociological knowledge in general, which in turn can assist us to understand human behavior. Studies of ethnic dynamics are potentially explosive because of the sensitive issues surrounding research in the area: inequality, oppression, racism, and theories of genetic inferiority. A colleague once remarked to me that a moratorium should be called on sociological investigations of race and ethnicity. He argued that at some future date, scholars may be able to find irrefutable evidence that scores on intelligence tests are a direct function of ethnic or racial origin. Because of the scientific ammunition this would give to racists, he felt that there were certain areas which sociologists should simply leave alone. Setting aside the possibility of such a discovery and the effect it might have, I replied that without a sociological analysis of race and ethnicity, we would have no understanding of features such as prejudice and discrimination which are key social problems of our time. It is my contention that sociologists and historians have provided important insights into issues such as these. At one time it was thought that prejudice could simply be ameliorated by exposing bigots and racists to the moral injustices of their attitudes. Subsequent social research has shown that this is not the case. We have learned that prejudice is "a product of situations, historical

situations, political situations, it is not a little demon that emerges in people simply because they are deprived" (Schermerhorn 1970: 6). If the "debunking motif" is accepted as a major element of "sociological consciousness" (Berger 1963), then surely the study of ethnic relations provides us with a suitable laboratory for "seeing through the facades of the social order". It is only by asking questions like: "Is ethnicity an intractable primordial identity or a manipulative symbol?", that we can move closer to understanding the nature of human relationships. Before analyzing the results of the study, it is necessary to define some basic ethnic concepts, discuss the methodological techniques which were used, and obtain an understanding of Lebanese society.

NOTES

1. I have presented these two perspectives as ideal types; no particular "primordialist" or "mobilizationist" would include all of the characteristics mentioned in his or her respective point of view. For overviews and critiques of the primordial interpretations see Alter (1972), Doornbos (1972) and Stein and Hill (1977). For brief assessments of mobilizationist arguments see Ballard (1976), Connor (1973), Epstein (1978), and Freedman (1976). Particularly useful is da Silva's (1975) examination of Basque nationalism in which he compares and evaluates a variety of theories.
2. It is interesting to compare Vincent's comments with those of Enloe's (1973: 39): "Ethnic groups are not irrational, but they do grow out of custom and familiarity rather than out of calculation... they are unlike labor unions, peasant syndicates, corporations, and other functional interest groups".
3. Esman (1975: 415-416) has made exactly the opposite case in commenting on class and ethnic allegiances in Southeast Asia: "It would be easier to demonstrate that class conflicts can be diverted into communal hostility and violence than that ethnic conflict can be transmuted into class struggle, except where class and communal cleavages coincide. Even in the latter situation (for example, the Malays in Singapore) the struggle is likely to be articulated in communal, not in class language, because the former draws on deeper layers of identity and consciousness than the latter".

4. Yinger (1976) notes that the black power movement in the United States assisted better-educated, higher status blacks, but did virtually nothing for lower status ones.
5. Patterson's economic determinism has its cultural counterpart in the work of Stein and Hill (1973: 101) who state that: "Economics is, thus, not the foundation of culture, it is the reverse: the pattern or ethos of a culture determines the nature of economic relations, which are simply variations on a cultural theme... economics merely functions as a means of fulfilling cultural values".
6. West (1972) has proposed that if Indian and indigenous Fijians were given the same economic opportunities in Fiji, present discrepancies would likely increase rather than narrow. The urban Indian merchant would probably reinvest his capital or use it to educate his sons, whereas the Fijian villager might give it to his kin in order to improve his social status by gaining a reputation for generosity.
7. See chapter 8, p.253 and notes.
8. See chapter 3, pp.72-73 for a discussion of Hansen's "law".
9. The first article ever published on Syrians in Australia was Alam's (1927) brief contribution to the Syrian-American journal The Syrian World. Recently, Grassby (1978a, 1978b) has written two short articles on Arab migrants which contain some information on Lebanese migration. In the last two years, three government reports have appeared which are relevant to Lebanese. A study of migrant integration and satisfaction with the Australian educational system by Petty and Khamis (1979) included a sample of Lebanese respondents. Young et al. (1980) have recently completed a study of education and employment among Lebanese and Turkish adolescents. The N.S.W. Government has conducted an inquiry into the problems of Lebanese migrants in the Municipality of Canterbury (Mohr et al. 1978). Yarwood (1964) is the only historian who has studied Syrians and his contribution amounts to one chapter on them in his book on Asian migration to Australia. Ata (1978) has published a short article on the Arabic press in Melbourne. Sociological and psychological research on Lebanese is very meager and consists of the following: Walsh's (1973) study of Lebanese migrant children; Anderson's (1977) sociological analysis of sixteen Lebanese Muslim migrants in Sydney; McIlwain's (1976) case study of a Lebanese family in Brisbane; and Batrouney's (1979) case study of his own family's migration and settlement in Melbourne.

CHAPTER 2

BASIC CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS

2.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter I examined the main features of the primordial and mobilizationist perspectives. In this chapter I discuss the basic concepts used in the study and present a typology¹ of ethnic phenomena.² I attempt to demonstrate that one reason for the current theoretical debate, is that scholars have been conceptually imprecise and overlooked the different types and degrees of ethnic identity and organization.

2.2 Definitions

The following definitions are used in the study:

An ethnic trait or attribute is a symbol(s) which epitomizes the cultural and social distinctiveness of "peoplehood" (Abramson 1976; Spicer 1971). Examples of such symbols are: physical contiguity, language or dialect forms, religious affiliation, phenotypical features (e.g., color, physical appearance), or some combination of these (Schermerhorn 1970: 12). These traits may be real or fictitious, achieved or ascribed, and changed or supplanted without decreasing the social solidarity of an ethnic group (Abramson 1976; Francis 1947; Spicer 1971).

An ethnic category or population refers to an aggregate of people who can be classified into a specific grouping because they possess a particular ethnic trait(s). However, there is no sense of belonging among these people, as this common attribute is not perceived as the basis for meaningful social interaction. When we refer to "Asian migrants" we are dealing with an ethnic category or

population.

An ethnic group is a number of people who meaningfully interact on the basis of a similar ethnic trait(s) which they share. There is a "consciousness of kind" and a sense of belonging present.

Ethnic organization is the degree to which ethnic interaction is orderly, patterned, persistent, and predictable. Ethnic categories have no social organization while ethnic groups vary in their degree of social organization.

Ethnic identity refers to the degree of cognitive and affective attachment an individual displays toward an ethnic trait. It is a psychological property which indicates that there is some "rootedness" (Abramson 1976) to ethnic symbols. An individual does not have to interact in ethnic networks to have an ethnic identity. In this study, the terms ethnic identity and ethnicity are used interchangeably.

Ethnic awareness is a form of ethnic identity in which an individual knows he possesses an ethnic trait(s) which is no more meaningful than his other cultural, physical, or territorial characteristics. Ethnically aware individuals have low or minimum degrees of cognitive and affective rootedness to ethnic symbols.

Ethnic consciousness is a form of ethnic identity in which the possession of an ethnic trait(s) assumes considerable importance vis-a-vis other cultural, physical, or territorial characteristics to the extent that ethnic identification can be the mode of identification.

Degree of institutional enclosure refers to the extent to which interethnic relations are mutually exclusive or inclusive. Institutional enclosure is maximal when ethnic groups display rigid boundaries, there are ascribed and unambiguous membership criteria, and boundary-crossings are infrequent (Schermerhorn 1970: 15, 125-127; van den Berghe 1967: 142-143). In this situation, societies are separated into "functionally similar corporate groups" and social organization is characterized by compartmentalization into "analogous, duplicatory, parallel, non-complementary but distinguishable sets of institutions" (van den Berghe 1973: 966). Relations between groups tend to be "segmental, utilitarian, non affective, and functionally specific", while relations within groups tend to be "total, non-utilitarian, affective, and diffuse (van den Berghe 1973: 966). Institutional enclosure is minimal when ethnic boundaries are flexible, group membership is achieved and ambiguous, and frequent boundary-crossings occur. In this case ethnic groups share involvement in a certain number of institutions - e.g., economic, political, educational - while still maintaining institutional articulation in one or more areas (e.g., kinship, religion, recreation). Cultural enclosure (e.g., differences in norms, values, beliefs and knowledge) may be separated analytically from structural enclosure but these two have a dialectical relationship in the empirical world (Schermerhorn 1970: 127).

2.3 Ethnic Phenomena And Other Social Groupings

Having discussed the basic definitions used in the study, it is worthwhile stating what ethnic phenomena are not, because of the ways in which ethnic concepts are often interchanged with other concepts. It must be remembered that: (1) I am talking about analytical

differences not empirical ones; and (2) there are usually degrees of differences involved rather than absolute ones.

Cultural Collectivities

To say that ethnic groups are defined by cultural attributes does not mean that a number of people who share a set of cultural traits constitute an ethnic group. For example, we can speak of "a peasant culture" or a "culture of poverty". However, peasants and the poor do not have an historical "sense of peoplehood" or a "consciousness of kind" based on peasantry or poverty and they do not meaningfully interact with one another due to their agrarian or poverty-stricken traits.

Classes

Classes are aggregates of people who possess similar levels of "market capacity" (e.g., ownership of property in the means of production, possession of educational or technical qualifications, labour power) (Giddens 1973: 84, 110-111, 192). Classes become social groups when individuals recognize that their attitudes and beliefs signify a particular class affiliation and as a consequence they collectively compete for economic rewards. Empirically, there is sometimes a correlation between class position and ethnic group membership (e.g., Irish policemen and priests, Jewish entertainers, black athletes, Chinese laundrymen and restaurateurs), but this does not mean that ethnic cohesion can be equated with class solidarity. As we have already seen, some theorists, Marxists in particular, maintain that ethnic solidarity is only used to serve class interests. If this were so, then Catholic and Protestant proletariats in Ulster, Christian and Muslim proletariats in Lebanon, and Malayan, Chinese

and Indian proletariats in Malaysia would unite and overthrow the ruling classes in their respective countries. A major reason why this has not happened is that ethnic groups command more allegiance than classes in these countries.

Race

Distinguishing between racial and ethnic groups is a very difficult conceptual problem because the two often overlap to such a great extent. The basic difference is that racial groups are socially defined on the basis of physical criteria, whereas ethnic groups are socially defined on the basis of cultural attributes. An important difference between the two is that culture is intrinsically related to the ability to communicate with others and is inherently linked to social relationships. Race, on the other hand, has no intrinsic relationship to behavior and is not inherently linked to social interaction (van den Berghe 1971a: 41). Racists single out phenotypical features which are biologically trivial in order to legitimize invidious distinctions among groups. In some countries (e.g., most Middle East societies) race is an unimportant social attribute and it is possible to imagine a world in which race could be eliminated as a social reality. However, there are no societies which are acultural and it is impossible to envisage a world devoid of culture. In short, ethnocentrism is a universal phenomenon while racism is not.

Some scholars insist that because physical features can be easily recognized, race relations are more rigid and volatile than ethnic relations (Lewins 1978c; van den Berghe 1976). However, some of the most violent conflicts in the world have occurred between groups with no identifiable physical differences (e.g., Catholic and Protestant

Irish; Ibo, Fulani, and Yoruba Nigerians; Christian and Muslim Lebanese; Turk and Greek Cypriots). Systematic oppression and slaughter of specific castes in Japan, India, Rwanda, and Pakistan have been conducted despite "invisible" differences between "racial" groups. Over six million Jews were exterminated by the Nazis who could not tell prima facie, Jews from Gentiles: "It was of no avail that a 'Jew' looked like thousands of other German non-Jews, had been converted to Christianity, and had taken a Christian spouse; he was, according to the Nazis, a 'Jew'" (Wagley and Harris 1964: 8). Horowitz (1971) has cautioned against accepting the "figment of pigment" thesis of intergroup relations. He provides examples of how posture, gesticulation, dress, and dialect have been used in the absence of colour and phenotypical distinctions to oppress and massacre "racial" groups.³ Although I agree with Glazer (1971), Horowitz (1971), Rex (1970), and Schermerhorn (1970) that ethnic, racial, and caste groups are different types of a single of human collectively defined by "kinship selection" (van den Berghe 1978), it is useful to separate analytically each one.

Castes

Caste, racial, and ethnic groups are similar in that all three are defined by real or putative descent and tend to be endogamous. The main difference among them is that castes are always ranked whereas racial and ethnic groups are not necessarily hierarchical. Castes are found in vertically differentiated societies in which there are rigid boundaries between superordinate and subordinate groups and each one is located in a specific occupational sphere. Examples of these caste-like societies are traditional India, Egypt, Peru, and the ante-bellum South in the U.S.A. Although nearly all polyethnic

societies are marked by social inequalities among ethnic groups, social mobility is often possible and boundary-crossing sometimes occurs. Ethnic groups are horizontally differentiated in these circumstances rather than rigidly ranked. Polyethnic states such as Canada, Lebanon, and Malaysia, which practice elite accommodation, are examples of this situation. Some scholars maintain that castes are also characterized by the fact that subordinates and superordinates agree that the caste system is legitimate. This may be true of the Indian situation, but it is less applicable to Japan and the American South.

Religious Groups

Religious groups and ethnic groups are identical in some situations. Jews, Irish Catholics and Irish Protestants, Lebanese Muslims and Lebanese Christians, Ukrainian Catholics, and French Huguenots are commonly called ethnoreligious groups because religion is a major source of their sense of peoplehood. However, not all religious categories comprise ethnic groups. American Catholics, Australian Protestants, and Canadian Orthodox are composed of people who share common religious beliefs. But in each case Catholicism, Protestantism, and Orthodoxy is not necessarily intertwined with a sense of history and community. Religious and ethnic groups may be distinguished on the basis that the former are more likely to gain members by conversion and recruitment than the latter. This is why there are more pan-ethnic religious collectivities than pan-religious ethnic categories.

State and Nation

A state is a formal geopolitical organization which bestows citizenship on its inhabitants, administers territorial boundaries, and controls the polity. This does not mean that all of the state's

citizens owe their "terminal loyalty" to it. They may have greater commitments to their ethnic groups or see the state apparatus as an illegitimate structure. A nation is an ethnic group which demands self-determination through political sovereignty or federation. When state and national loyalties coincide we may then speak of a nation-state. However, less than 10% of the world's states are nation-states (Connor 1978). Germany and Japan are nation-states but most other countries are multinational states which contain "potential nations". As we have already seen in chapter one, an immensely difficult problem facing central elites in many countries is to get ethnonational groups to make the state rather than the ethnic group their focus of ultimate allegiance.

Superordinate/Subordinate Ethnic Groups

Traditionally, ethnic groups have been called "minority" groups. I find this description unsatisfactory for three reasons. First of all, it suggests that numerical disadvantage ensures subordination. But groups can be numerically inferior and still monopolize power (e.g., South African whites, Alawis in Syria). Secondly, it deflects our attention away from the superordinate group which imposes subordination on other groups. Also, it tends to lump ethnic groups with "minorities" which are not culturally based (e.g., gay activists, women's liberationists, conservationists, anti-smoking associations). Following Schermerhorn (1970: 12-13), a superordinate or dominant ethnic group is defined as "the collectivity within a society which has preeminent authority to function both as guardian and sustainer of the controlling value system and as prime allocator of rewards in the society". It then follows that subordinate ethnic groups are collectivities which are overtly and/or covertly denied access by the

superordinate group to dominant values and scarce resources. In a phrase, subordinate ethnic groups are "structurally disadvantaged" regarding the access they have to societal rewards.

2.4 Other Conceptual Issues

Scholars are currently polarized over two conceptual issues: whether ethnic groups should be defined by (1) cultural or structural aspects; and (2) objective or subjective criteria.

Cultural vs. Structural Aspects

There has been a good deal of criticism lately about conventional definitions of ethnic groups based on specific cultural traits such as language, dress, diet, nationality, and so on. It has been argued that cultural attributes are arbitrary and subject to manipulation. It has also been pointed out that ethnic solidarity has persisted despite imperceptible cultural differences between groups. Gmelch and Gmelch (1976) note that Swedish and Norwegian Tattare, Finnish Zigenare, Dutch Reiziger, Scottish Travellers, and Irish Tinkers maintain structural enclosure, despite the fact that they are culturally identical to dominant groups. These criticisms are quite valid, as they alert us to the dynamic properties of ethnic organization. However, I would not go so far as Schildkrout's (1974: 191-192) assertion that, "basically, ethnicity has nothing to do with cultural differentiation". Without some cultural trait ethnic group formation would not even be possible in the first place. Although a group's cultural symbol can modulate, as it has several times with the Jews, it is still present even if in a latent form. Ethnic groups, identities, and symbols are certainly fluid but they are not random. Cultural and structural constraints make it difficult for individuals

and groups to whimsically dismiss cultural attributes.

Objective vs Subjective Criteria

Until recently, social scientists tended to assume that their definitions of ethnic groups were congruent with how members defined themselves. Smith (1969: 104-105), for instance, defines ethnicity as "common provenience and distinctness as a unit of social and biological reproduction; it accordingly connotes internal uniformities and external distinctness of biological stock, perhaps of language, culture, cult, and other institutions". One is hard pressed to think of any ethnic group which would meet these criteria! On the other hand, it is difficult to agree with extreme subjectivists like Brunet (1976: 24) who states that: "An ethnic group is composed of those who consider themselves and are considered by others to belong to the same people. It is not definable in objective terms". As van den Berghe (1974: 124) points out in criticizing subjectivists, this viewpoint can lead to an "anything goes" definition: ".... an ethnic group is whatever anybody says it is. If it pleases, say, North American blacks, or women, or homosexuals, or university students to call themselves an ethnic group, then, by self-definition they are". As he goes on to state, it is wiser to recognize that ethnic groups have objective and subjective dimensions:

.... the best part of wisdom seems to define ethnicity, much as Marx did class, both in objective and subjective terms. A system of ethnic relations is defined in part by objective cultural, ecological, and demographic conditions such as language, occupation of territory, and relative size of population. It is also partly defined by what each group thinks of itself and of other ethnic groups. Any adequate description of the situation must of necessity take into account both the objective and subjective realities of ethnicity, though the relationship between these two aspects is seldom simply direct (van den Berghe 1974: 125).

2.5 Conceptual Inconsistencies

Now that I have outlined the key conceptual issues of the study, I would like to present a typology which provides a basis for the conceptual analysis of ethnic phenomena. A major reason for the current theoretical debate is the amount of confusion over basic ethnic concepts. Hechter (1974: 1151-1152), for instance, comments that:

The social origins of ethnic solidarity and change have remained obscure since Pareto's day. This obscurity derives partly from conceptual, and partly from empirical considerations ... there is no standard definition of ethnicity, let alone agreement on its explanation ... there is a serious lack of evidence about changes in the ethnic solidarity of particular groups over time... social scientists have often been content to consider ethnicity less as a phenomenon to be explained than a given, a defining attribute of particular social groups.

Conceptual inconsistencies can be illustrated by reference to the works of selected scholars. A case in point is Gordon's dual usage of the term ethnic group. His initial definition is as follows:

A convenient term for this sense of peoplehood is 'ethnicity' ... and we shall refer to a group with a shared feeling of peoplehood as an 'ethnic group' (Gordon 1964: 24).

Later, however, he states that:

When I use the term 'ethnic group' ... I shall mean by it any group which is defined or set off by race, religion or national origin, or some combination of these categories (Gordon 1964: 27).

Gordon's first definition refers to attitudinal and cognitive phenomena and his second to socio-demographic categories. Interestingly enough, interaction - the basis of any social group - does not appear in either of Gordon's definitions. The papers in two recent

books dealing with the comparative analysis of ethnicity and ethnic relations also demonstrate considerable disagreement over basic concepts. In his review of Cohen's (1974) volume on urban ethnicity, Freedman (1976) notes that confusion surrounds the use of terms such as "ethnic group", "ethnic category", and "ethnicity". Despres, the editor of a collection of papers dealing with the topic of ethnicity and resource competition in plural societies, makes the following comment about the orientations of the contributors:

... a convergent line of development is evidenced by a glossary of concepts which includes inter alia, ethnic and/or racial diacritica, identity, and status; ethnic boundaries, populations, groups, and stratifications; and boundary maintenance and incorporation processes such as accommodation, assimilation, and conflict. These conceptions repeatedly insinuate themselves in related discussions, suggesting perhaps that they are key elements and form an essential starting point for any critical examination of ethnic phenomena. Except for brief excursions, the central focus of this volume has not stimulated individual contributors to give a great deal of formal attention to the definition or clarification of these conceptual elements (Despres 1975: 191).

I will now construct a typology which, hopefully, will remedy this conceptual ambiguity. I was motivated to devise this typology by the belief that much of the confusion in the use and inter-relationships of various ethnic concepts stems from lack of precision in defining what ethnic and ethnic groups really are. Before outlining the typology in detail, it is important to examine some of the ways in which ethnic concepts have been used in the literature.

2.6 Ethnic Group And Ethnicity: A Variety Of Meanings

Ethnic concepts have been used ambiguously in the following ways:

- (1) in instances where ethnic identity is attributed to members of ethnic groups which are in fact ethnic aggregates, categories or

populations; (2) in cases where ethnicity is used to describe members of ethnic groups or categories with, what I shall refer to, as ethnic awareness; and (3) situations in which ethnicity is used to define members of ethnic groups or categories who manifest, what I term, ethnic consciousness.

Ethnic Category As An Ethnic Group

When an ethnic category is defined as an ethnic group in the literature, it refers to an aggregate of people who can be classified into specific "groups" because they possess "objective" characteristics such as religion, race, national origin, or some combination of these (e.g., Gordon's second definition above). Greeley (1974: 34-35, see also p.91), for example, posits a tentative definition of an ethnic group as "a collectivity based on presumed common origin (like) race, religion, nationality and language". Greeley justifies these "arbitrary divisions" ⁴ because they allow for "a sufficient number of respondents to provide information about the group, and on the intuitive impression that such a particular group did correspond to some reality in the American population" (emphasis added). Such "common origin" extends to categories composed of several "ethnic groups" (Spanish-speaking includes Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans and other Latin Americans, as well as those respondents whose families came directly from Spain) and a number of "religio-ethnic groups" (e.g., "British Protestants"). Whatever these socio-demographic permutations used by Greeley and others (also see Abramson 1975; Kellstedt 1974; Laumann 1973) represent, they most certainly are not ethnic groups. The assumption that a number of individuals possessing a similar socio-demographic characteristic(s) automatically constitutes a social group is untenable. As Francis (1976: 370) points out:

it has never been shown convincingly that a particular language, a sectarian religion, certain biosomatic traits, or any specific legal and moral ideas make all those of whom they are characteristic ipso facto a distinctive social group (see also Singer 1962; Treudley 1953).

To this observation we may add Stryker's (1973: 526) basic premise that:

... a group is a system of interactions. Where there is no interaction, there is no group. This is an obvious point, but some social analysts have gotten into difficulty because they neglected the obvious.

Equating an ethnic category with an ethnic group is analogous to presuming that Klasse an sich is the same as Klasse für sich. This demographic definition of ethnic group creates a problem in its relation to ethnicity, which for Greeley, is "a sense of presumed common origin" and a means of "self definition and social location" (1974: 27; emphasis added). That is, there is an assumption that members of an ethnic category experience ethnicity, or ethnic "self definition", or ethnic identity. As Greeley (1974: 91) states:

When we asked a respondent what his nationality or background was, we assumed that his answer, 'Irish' or 'Italian', indicated the possible presence of a predisposition to attitudes, values, norms and behavior that were part of the baggage of the immigrant group brought from their countries or origin... (emphasis added).

Even if Greeley's assumption is correct, this is a static characterization of ethnic identification which does not sufficiently represent the extent to which individuals are committed to their ethnic heritages. It is similar to assuming that an individual's religious preference is a measure of his or her degree of religiosity. Some scholars are less presumptuous than Greeley, as they do not posit a direct relationship between an ethnic group or category and ethnic

identity. Taft (1972: 76), for example, (who uses ethnic categories as ethnic groups) suggests that individuals may or may not affirm their ethnic identities because some people have greater emotional involvement than others in these identities. Despite such qualifications, it remains that in the case of Greeley, who assumes that possession of an ethnic trait entails ethnicity, and Taft, who is aware that people experience more or less ethnicity, the problem is that ethnicity has no explanatory dimension. That is, there is nothing to indicate why ethnicity exists, nor is there anything to distinguish between individuals with ethnicity who do and do not interact with fellow ethnics.

The above confusions do not apply to all writings in this area. Those scholars who recognize the difficulties described above and the salience of Francis' (1976: 370) claim, define ethnic groups in terms of the values and sentiments which members share. That is, "consciousness of kind" is a necessary precondition for the location of an ethnic group (Schermerhorn 1970: 12). However, it is my contention that scholars have not: (1) made an important distinction between two different types of ethnic identity - ethnic awareness, and ethnic consciousness;⁵ and (2) adequately considered the degree to which these affective phenomena manifest themselves.

Ethnic Awareness

Ethnic awareness exists when an individual knows (s)he possesses a certain ethnic trait(s) which is no more meaningful than his or her other cultural, physical, social, or territorial characteristics. In terms of an individual's self definition, ethnic awareness may derive from interaction in organizations such as voluntary ethnic associations

or from perceived membership in a wide social category (e.g., "Queenslander", "European"), but this source of identification is only one of a number of avenues of self identification. For example, for some Queenslanders the awareness of being a "Queenslander" is no more significant than, say, also being "elderly", "female", or "middle class".

In his early theoretical paper The Nature of the Ethnic Group Francis (1947), implicitly regards ethnic awareness as the significant characteristic of ethnic groups. By referring to it as a "community sub type", Francis points to the ethnic group's close relationship to other community phenomena, such as "family, caste, or residential community", other possible sources of personal identification (see also Bell, 1975). The "ethnic group" deserves a "special name" to distinguish it from individuals' membership in other "community phenomena" because:

... while the family or residential community is unable to satisfy all the basic societal needs of human nature, the ethnic group not only permits a high degree of self-sufficiency and segregation but tends to enforce and preserve it (Francis 1947: 399).

Although Francis (1947: 397-398) distinguishes ethnic groups from other groups and anticipates the processual, dynamic nature of ethnicity, he uses the term ethnic group to refer to groups with ethnic awareness, as such groups "are based on an elementary feeling of solidarity" (Francis 1947: 396, emphasis added).

An empirical illustration of ethnic awareness is contained in a recent paper by Driedger (1975). Although Driedger begins by using ethnic group as an ethnic category - "the largest ethnic groups in Manitoba were the British (396,000), Ukrainians (105,000)..." (see

also Driedger and Church, 1974: 31, 33, 37) - he does not assume that ethnic origin automatically entails ethnic identification among group "members". Rather, his aim is "to determine the extent to which national origin factors still apply to ethnic groups in Manitoba" (1975: 150). Driedger goes on to demonstrate a multidimensional measure of ethnic identity in terms of cultural and structural factors, such as language use, religion, endogamy, parochial education, choice of ingroup friends, and ethnic voluntary organizations. Moreover, he shows that identification with ethnic cultural and structural factors - ethnic awareness - varies by ethnic groups (1975: 157). An important point arising from Driedger's paper (1975), which relates to ethnic awareness, is that ethnic "groups" are conceptualised largely in cultural items and in terms of individuals' identities. Apart from two of the four items on the religious factor, the parochial education factor and the ethnic organizations factor (structural factors), group members' identification or awareness derives from factors which do not entail group organization or interaction with the same people from factor to factor. In short, using this characterization of ethnic group, it is possible to have a "group" with high ethnic identity, based on individual members' high identity scores, but a relative paucity of formal ethnic organization (see also Driedger and Peters 1973, 1977).

Ethnic Consciousness

Ethnically conscious, like ethnically aware individuals, know they possess a specific ethnic trait(s) but for them this characteristic assumes considerable importance. Its saliency is evident in the way in which it influences other cultural, social, or territorial attributes and modes of individual identification. Whereas ethnically aware individuals display an elementary feeling of solidarity, ethnically

conscious individuals manifest strong sentiments about their uniqueness. A "we" versus "they" mentality exists vis-a-vis other groups and there is more likely to be social tension and conflict (Connor 1972, 1973; Goering 1971). Ethnic groups with ethnic consciousness, which include such groups as Black Nationalists, The I.R.A., Armenian Liberationists, and certain sectors of migrant groups in Australia, have been viewed as creating "new identities" distinct from those traditional groups which maintain their identity (Driedger and Peters 1973: 243). Glazer and Moynihan (1975: 5), in illustrating this usage, point to the assertiveness and mobilization of groups along ethnic lines to achieve group interests. They regard ethnic groups as "major elements of a society", no longer "minority and marginal subgroups on the edges of society - groups expected to assimilate, to disappear...". Similarly, Lyman and Douglass (1973: 344-345) in stressing the dynamic, processual nature of ethnicity, argue that at the group level of social organization:

ethnic relations usually translate themselves into sets and series of strategic and tactical situations played out over time as contending ethnic groups seek to alter their respective statuses vis-a-vis one another.

Rather than ethnicity or ethnic identity being an ascriptive, static characteristic, it is a process which individual group members "make use of... as a manoeuver or strategem in working out their own life chances" (Lyman and Douglass 1973: 350; also see Greeley 1974: 291). This applies equally to assembling as it does to disassembling an ethnic identity. In either case, the ethnic group exists qua ethnic group because of the salience or strategic importance of ethnic consciousness vis-a-vis the wider social milieu. Unlike the earlier examples of individuals and groups with ethnic awareness, there are

"Queenslanders" to whom this attachment is a significant, or most significant, aspect of self definition. Although outside the scope of this study, the difference between awareness and consciousness is illustrated by the militant woman's liberationist for whom "female" assumes a paramount aspect of self definition.

2.7 A Typology Of Ethnic Concepts

Now that I have discussed the various ways in which ethnic concepts have been used in the literature, I would like to present a typology which I hope will clarify the confusion. In the conceptual

FIGURE 2-1

TYPES OF ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION AND ORGANIZATION

Type of Ethnic Identification	Ethnic Awareness	Ethnic Consciousness
Individual Level of Analysis	An individual knows (s)he possesses an ethnic trait(s) which is no more meaningful than his or her other cultural, physical, social or territorial characteristics.	An individual possesses an ethnic trait(s) which assumes considerable importance vis-a-vis other personal characteristics to the extent that ethnic identification can be the mode of identification.
Type of Organization	Ethnic Category	Ethnic Group
Group Level of Analysis	A certain number of people can be classified into a specific category because they possess an ethnic trait(s). However, there is no sense of belonging among these people, as this common attribute is not perceived as the basis for any sort of meaningful social interaction. Such aggregates may be called ethnic categories in themselves.	A certain number of people meaningfully interact on the basis of a similar ethnic trait(s) which they share. There is a consciousness of kind and a sense of belonging present. Such social entities may be called ethnic groups for themselves.

scheme (see Figure 2-1) I follow van den Berghe's (1967: 136) suggestion that the individual and group levels of analysis be kept separate. This is necessary because a high level of ethnic identification does not necessarily entail group formation and group formation does not necessarily involve high levels of ethnic identification among all individuals. It is obvious from this typology that I restrict the use of the term ethnic group to those situations in which individuals meaningfully interact on the basis of a shared ethnic trait(s), although members may experience ethnic awareness or ethnic consciousness. While I find it useful to dichotomize in terms of group/category and awareness/consciousness (if there is no interaction there is no group; if ethnic sentiments are vestigial or ephemeral rather than prominent or imperative then awareness exists), I consider ethnic group formation and ethnic consciousness to be variable phenomena. Ethnic groups differ in the extent to which they are organized in terms of features like ecological concentration, institutional duplication, endogamy, rigidity and clarity of group boundaries, and the amount and type of interaction which occurs with outsiders (van den Berghe 1967: 136; also see Horowitz 1975). As Gregory (1976: 703) observes:

... intergroup boundaries ... are complex phenomena; they are also potentially very fluid. They may or may not involve significant cultural or institutional differences; over time they may come into existence, be maintained, break down, or disappear; they may become more flexible or more rigid; they may be impermeable for the members of the groups involved (as in situations of apartheid), or may permit an inter-group flow of personnel; institutional differentiation; boundary maintenance and modification may be going on simultaneously in different sectors within the same ethnic/institutional arena; and so on.

Similarly, ethnicity is not viewed as a primordial "given" but an identity which can be managed, negotiated, aligned, manipulated, or

somehow transformed for a variety of expressive and instrumental reasons (Bram 1965; De Vos and Romanucci-Ross 1975; Salamone 1976; van den Berghe 1968, 1971b). In Cohen's (1974: XIV-XV) words:

We must remember that ethnicity is a matter of degree. There is ethnicity and ethnicity. The constraint that custom exercises on the individual varies from case to case... In some situations ethnicity amounts to no more than the exchange of jokes between different culture groups at the strange and bizarre nature of one another's customs. In other situations it leads to violence and bloodshed... Unless we recognize differences in degree of manifestation we shall fail to make much progress in the analysis of ethnicity. To put it in the idiom of the researcher, ethnicity is variable.

I will now demonstrate the utility of the typology by examining examples which correspond with each cell (see Figure 2-2).

FIGURE 2-2
EXAMPLES OF COMBINATION OF ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION
AND ETHNIC ORGANIZATION

	Type of Organization	
	Ethnic Category	Ethnic Group
Ethnic Awareness	Brazilian Negroes (Glazer 1975)	St Patricks Day marchers
	Polish-Americans (Sandberg 1974)	Participants in Scottish clan festival
Type of Identification		Ethnic 'manipulators' (Lyman and Douglass 1973)
	Basque shepherders (Douglass 1973)	Hausa traders (Cohen 1969)
Ethnic Consciousness	Ethnic 'orphans' (Feldstein and Costello 1974)	Italian-Catholics in Australia (Lewins 1975)
		Tunisian Jews (Deshen 1976)
		Basque separatists F.L.Q.

Ethnic Awareness Among Members Of Ethnic Categories

I have already dealt with this cell in some detail in discussing the work of Driedger, Greeley, and Taft. Glazer's (1975: 9) comments on Brazilian Negroes also illustrate this possible combination:

Brazilians of the predominantly Negro race do not appear as an ethnic group because they are not aware particularly of a common culture different from that of other Brazilians. This is so also because they don't have a corporate self-identity as a distinct group, even though individuals are aware of their physical characteristics and are aware that these physical characteristics tend to be associated with common group characteristics (viz. poverty) (emphasis in original).

Some individuals with Irish ancestry have no interaction of an ethnic nature with other Irishmen and little attachment to Irish culture, but on St Patrick's Day deem it appropriate to wear a "Kiss Me I'm Irish" button. Some Italian and Polish descendants with similar behavioral and identity patterns become upset over what they consider to be ethnic slurs. The person of Polish descent who considers the term "Polack" to be anathema, and the person of Italian descent who becomes upset over the word "Wop" or the way in which the media portrays Italian-Americans in movies like "The Godfather", are other illustrations of members of ethnic categories with ethnic awareness.

Ethnic Awareness Among Members Of Ethnic Groups

The difference between individuals in the first and second cells is that the latter interact with fellow ethnics. As was mentioned earlier, the frequency and duration of this interaction varies depending upon the group and the context. An example of individuals with ethnic awareness interacting in an ethnic group with minimum organization, is people of Scottish ancestry who come from various countries to participate in Scottish clan festivals held at irregular intervals. For some

people, participation in more established events such as annual St Patrick's Day parades, is the only time in which they really interact with other people of Irish ancestry. In both of these cases ethnic group formation is a sporadic occurrence. Some ethnic groups have more enduring structures but with a weak base. Members participate in an intermittent fashion because other involvements are more salient or compelling. The Syrian-Lebanese in America (Kayal and Kayal 1975) and the Maltese in London (Dench 1975) typify this situation. Finally, there are those individuals who interact frequently in ethnic groups but do so for instrumental or exploitative reasons and without strong commitments. The ethnic "manipulators" who engage in impression management and the ethnic "entrepreneurs" or "brokers" who gather economic and political rewards from "identifying" with their ethnic groups are other examples (Borowiec 1975; Hannerz 1974; Lyman and Douglass 1973).

Ethnic Consciousness Among Members Of Ethnic Categories

Some people impute a considerable degree of meaning to their ethnic background but for various reasons do not or cannot interact with people having similar sentiments. A case in point is the Basque shepherders of the American West (Douglass 1973). Although they congregate two or three times a year for traditional Basque dances and festivities, for most of the time they exist in near total physical and social isolation from other human beings. During these periods of isolation, the shepherders read Basque newspapers, listen to Basque or Spanish radio broadcasts, and carve into trees, slogans of the Basque Nationalist Movement.

Immigrants who readily "throw off" their ethnic heritages in an attempt to assimilate but find that they are excluded from superordinate circles also exemplify this pattern. Christowe (Feldstein and Costello 1974: 392, 395-396), a Bulgarian-American, lamented that:

In my passion to liken myself to the Americans, to rub out from my personality all foreign traits and characteristics, I suffered agonies... What has been the result of this long and blind gestation in the womb of America? The one answer that pounds my mind most is this: Despite the readiness and zeal with which I tossed myself in the melting pot, I am still not wholly American and never will be. It is not my fault, I have done all I could, America will not accept me ... what is my fate, and the fates of the thousands who fall into my category, or, should I say, into whose category I fall? What are we? Are we still what we were before we came to America, or are we half-Americans and half something else? To me, precisely there lies our tragedy. We are neither one nor the other; we are orphans. Spiritually, physically, linguistically, we have not been wholly domesticated. And at the same time we have rendered ourselves incapable of resuming life in the old country... In Bulgaria I am not wholly a Bulgarian; in the United States not wholly an American. When in the United States I long for the sleepy village and in the intimate life of the Balkans I dream of America day and night.

In their examination of the different types and degrees of ethnic identification among first and later generation American immigrants, Nahirny and Fishman refer to the "ambivalent" mode of ethnic identification which often characterizes the second-generation. They liken this situation to that of individuals who identify with the values and ideals of the proletariat but reject personal involvements with members of the proletarian class. Similarly, second generation individuals "may symbolically relate themselves to their respective ethnic groups" and pride this connection in abstracto, while despising any association with members of these ethnic groups in concreto (Nahirny and Fishman 1965: 321-322).

Individuals and groups are often assigned identities and statuses

by superordinates regardless of subjective feelings. In colonial situations, imperial administrators frequently divided territories into convenient administrative units which had territorial rather than social borders. Indigenous people were often grouped into categories which bore no resemblance to the pre-conquest situation. Previous ethnic arrangements were of no consequence to the conquerors - to them all indigenous people were the same - and ethnic units with long histories of mutual antagonism found themselves classified as one. Abramson's (1976) grouping of "socio-cultural exiles" (e.g., the isolated Chinese laundryman or restaurateur, court Jews in seventeenth and eighteenth century Germany) may also illustrate this particular cell, although some may fit more readily into the ethnic awareness/category division.

Ethnic Consciousness Among Members Of Ethnic Groups

In this cell I include ethnic groups such as South Moluccans in Holland, the F.L.Q., Hausa traders, and certain ethnoreligious collectivities. At first glance, this may appear to be a rather incoherent grouping. The rationale for classifying these various ethnic groups together is based on Patterson's (1975: 308) suggestion that for theoretical purposes, "it is best to concentrate on the analytic qualities such groups have in common: namely, the fact that they are structural expressions of primary, extrafamilial identity". In all of the groups to be discussed, ethnic consciousness of the "we vs they" variety exists to a greater or lesser extent, and is articulated in structural terms. However, each group differs on the basis of its structural expression. In some cases ethnic boundaries are related to access to political, economic, and material resources. This is the case with the Hausa traders in Yoruba towns described by

Cohen (1969). The Hausa used their ethnic traits as modes of social closure in order to prevent "outsiders" from obtaining economic rewards. In other cases ethnic consciousness is primordially rooted. The memorial celebrations of Tunisian Jews in Israel described by Deshen (1974), and Eaton and Weil's (1955) and Conkin's (1964) accounts of Hutterite communities demonstrate how ethnic consciousness is culturally based.

2.8 The Utility Of The Typology

This typology illuminates two important aspects of the primordial/mobilization debate. Firstly, it shows that scholars have approached ethnic phenomena without realizing that they have been dealing with different levels and types of organization and identity. As Yinger (1976: 200) reminds us: "One can be fully ethnic or barely ethnic". Wearing "Kiss Me I'm Irish" buttons and "Armenian Power" t-shirts is an expression of ethnicity. Taking political hostages, hijacking airlines, and bombing government offices in support of an irredentist cause are also ethnic manifestations, but of quite a different type and magnitude. Therefore, it is theoretically counterproductive to equate the ethnic awareness of third generation American ethnics with Basque, Welsh, or Kurdish nationalism. Basham and De Groot (1977: 423) allude to this distinction when they note that:

... the persistence of a sense of ethnic identity - and to a lesser extent of distinct cultural traditions - among many Americans is real enough. Its importance however, seems greatly exaggerated by the recent trend to rush the slightest symbol of ethnic distinctiveness into print to prove that we have not really blended into a common pot. Anthropologists who have studied truly plural societies would probably feel, for example, that attendance at Polish picnics, membership in a Polish - American voluntary association, and a reluctance to endure Polish jokes does not equate with strong ethnic identity when the individual speaks little if any Polish and shows scant adherence to Polish cultural traditions.

Consciousness of Polish identity in such circumstances seems partial at best.

Unfortunately, few protagonists in the theoretical debate have recognized that ethnic manifestations differ in their intensity. A second benefit of the taxonomy is that it suggests that the debate over the importance of primordial or interest factors is a needless dichotomy. Ethnic tension can occur over access to scarce resources, as is the case with Hausa traders. It can also take place over ideal interests, as is the case with Italian-Catholics in Australia. However, it can also happen when material and primordial interest are interrelated. With Basque nationalists, Armenian Liberationists, and South Moluccan secessionists, it seems pointless to bifurcate theories into primordial or interest camps when it is obvious that both dimensions are involved.

In this study I use the typology to explore primordialism and mobilization among Syrian-Lebanese. If there is an ethnic revival taking place, then the Syrian-Lebanese should exhibit certain structural and psychological characteristics. At the structural level, the Syrian-Lebanese should display some form of ethnic organization. They should constitute an ethnic group with a discernable degree of institutional enclosure. There should be evidence to suggest that they are mobilizing along ethnic lines to pursue "interests" or that there is an efflorescence of groups or organizations concerned with reviving Lebanese culture and history. In short, there must be some evidence to indicate that people are interacting in groups qua Syrian-Lebanese. At the psychological level, individuals should be ethnically conscious or at least exhibit moderate to high levels of ethnic awareness. They should see themselves as having qualities which make them distinct from

other ethnic groups and superordinates. There should be manifestations of ethnic resentment regarding the disadvantaged position of the Syrian-Lebanese in Australia or expressions of interest about one's genealogy or Syrian-Lebanese heritage. In short, whether or not individuals interact in Syrian-Lebanese social networks, they should demonstrate that they are aware of possessing an ethnic identity which is of more than passing importance to them. In the next chapter I describe how these indicators are to be measured and the methodological procedures used to collect and analyze the data.

NOTES

1. The value of the typology discussed in pages 36-51 of this chapter has already been recognized elsewhere (McKay and Lewins 1978).
2. I have borrowed the term "ethnic phenomena" from Despres (1975) and use it to refer to both affective/cognitive and structural aspects. The former dimension is usually called "ethnicity" or "ethnic identity" and the latter an "ethnic group". Although some scholars use these two different components interchangeably, I separate them for analytical purposes (see Abramson 1976; Freedman 1976; Mitchell 1974).
3. In 1302 Flemings in Bruges massacred French occupation forces at night in their beds. To ensure that no Flemings would be accidentally killed, the person was forced to utter a sentence containing Dutch phonemes which are virtually unpronounceable for a native speaker of French. According to van den Berghe (1978: 410), this selection test was over 99 percent effective and more reliable than any physical trait imaginable.
4. The logic behind these "arbitrary divisions" is puzzling. Greeley lumps those who identified their ethnic ancestry as "American" or "mixed" into residual categories instead of ethnic groups. Kellstedt pursues a similar line of reasoning by excluding from his analysis "blacks" and "whites" who could not be classified (including) "large numbers of Canadians, large numbers of ethnics from the remaining parts of the world, as well as a sizeable number of mixed parentage or grandparents". He also uses a comparison category composed of "non-ethnics" comprised of respondents who were born in the United States and whose parents and grandparents were also born there. As several authors have pointed out, restricting ethnicity to immigrants and their descendants overlooks the following points: (1) the superordinate culture is also ethnic (Abramson 1976; Gold 1976:

409; Porter 1975); (2) ethnicity can emerge among native-born Americans without a particular foreign heritage (Yancey et al. 1976: 400). Thus the reason escapes me why anyone in the U.S. who feels "black", "Canadian", or "mixed" is any less ethnic than someone who feels "Polish".

5. I have found Giddens' (1973: 111) distinction between class awareness and class consciousness helpful in differentiating between these two types of ethnic identity. However, it behooves me to emphasize that I am not equating class and ethnic modes of identification. See Connor (1973) and Goering (1971) for discussions of ethnic consciousness and Pitts (1974) for an analysis of race consciousness.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURES

3.1 Selecting An Ethnic Population

A thorough exploration of the primordial and mobilizationist theses would require the study of several ethnic populations. This was not feasible in the present study due to my limited resources and lack of time. Consequently, I decided to use a case-study approach which would hopefully provide in-depth information about a specific ethnic population. After reviewing the literature on the alleged ethnic revival throughout the world, it became apparent that a three-generational study of an immigrant population would be a suitable way of examining primordialism and mobilization in the Australian context. As mentioned in chapter one, Hansen's principle of the third generation return has been widely researched and debated by American and Canadian scholars, but has not been tested in Australia. Thus a major desideratum of the research design was to locate an immigrant population which spanned three generations.

My preliminary investigations revealed that it was extremely difficult to find a three-generational population which was mobilized. All ethnic groups which were "in the news" were of the post-World War II variety. For example, members of the various Baltic communities are mainly refugees who have only been in Australia for 30 years or so. The "New Australian Party" as its name suggests, appeals primarily to recent migrants. An organization like the Italian Federation of Immigrant Workers and Families (F.I.L.E.F.) is also largely concerned with migration issues. This left me with the prospect of studying primordialism among one of a number of possible ethnic populations such as Syrian-Lebanese, Greeks, Chinese, Germans, Jews, Anglo-

Celtics or Scandinavians. I was then faced with the dilemma of which group to choose, as this would have implications for any inferences which might be made about ethnic phenomena in general.

I finally selected the Syrian-Lebanese for three main reasons. First of all, there are hardly any substantial historical or sociological accounts of them in the literature. Secondly, because of their internal religious differences, they provide an excellent opportunity to study the relationship between ethnic and religious factors. This connection has been shown to be extremely important in the formation of ethnic identities and behavior among Catholic migrants in Australia (Lewins 1975, 1976, 1978a, 1978b). Thirdly, they have certain historical and social characteristics making them suitable for testing primordial and mobilizationist assumptions.

3.2 The Syrian-Lebanese As A Test Case

People of Syrian-Lebanese descent belong to one of the world's oldest ethnic populations. Present-day Lebanese trace their ancestry to the ancient Phoenicians who explored and colonized the Mediterranean over 3,000 years ago and they take pride in the impressive accomplishments of their forebearers. It was the nomadic Phoenician traders who transmitted the alphabet to the West, refined the manufacturing of dyes, glass, and textiles, and passed on their nautical skills to many other inhabitants of the Mediterranean. Lebanese theorize that their own acumen in business and commerce and their propensity to explore and pioneer new lands, are traits they have inherited from these entrepreneurial mariners of antiquity.¹

Lebanon is a country with a rich religious heritage. Lebanese

Christians are fond of pointing out that Solomon's fabled temple and sailing fleet, were constructed by Phoenicians from the tree which is now the republic's emblem, the cedar. Some of Lebanon's cities were visited by Christ and his apostles, and the language spoken by Christ and his disciples (Aramaic, now called Syriac) is still used for the Maronite liturgy. The Maronites, Roman Catholics of the Eastern rite, take immense pride in the assertion that their's is the only Eastern church which has maintained an unbroken tie with Rome throughout history. Lebanese Christians have had a precarious and beleaguered history. Despite being vastly outnumbered by succeeding waves of Muslim conquerors, Christians have clung tenaciously to their religious beliefs. As noted in chapter one, religious loyalties, along with other primordial ties, are a ubiquitous and often divisive feature of contemporary Lebanon.

Another integral aspect of Lebanese tradition is the emphasis placed on achievement and attaining economic security. Syrian Christians were key economic middlemen between European imperialists and Middle Eastern inhabitants during Ottoman rule.² In the closing decades of the 19th century, Syrian villagers migrated to all continents and quickly demonstrated their entrepreneurial flair. They were so effective in this respect that laws have been passed in some countries to specifically curtail their economic activities. Although most Syrian-Lebanese, like most Jews (whom they closely resemble in many respects), have not attained high levels of prosperity, their folklore is filled with many "rags to riches" stories which suggest most of them have. This is also true in Australia where there are numerous mythical and factual accounts of Lebanese Horatio Algiers. Stanton Melick, who arrived in Sydney from Kousba in 1888 with little

or no formal education, became a legendary figure because of his economic accomplishments. As early as 1927, Alam celebrated the level of affluence achieved by Syrians in Australia:

Australia, the land of untold possibilities, of unlimited opportunities and vast stretches of undeveloped land, is a veritable paradise for the Syrians, who by nature and by experience, running back into long centuries of history, are a race of pioneers and adventurers. There is perhaps no country in the world today in which the rate of individual and collective prosperity runs so high as in Australia and Syrians in Australia have shared in this general prosperity of the country. As a class, the Syrians are well-to-do. There are many men of wealth among them and almost all are in the employers' class. Some of the most fashionable and luxuriant homes in the exclusive residential section of Sydney belong to Syrians (Alam 1927: 42).

As we shall see later, Syrian-Lebanese still think they are a success today, a belief which correlates well with objective indicators of upward social mobility. In summary then, Syrian-Lebanese provide a case which is nearly as favourable as possible for testing the primordial thesis. By every imaginable criteria - historical continuity, beleagueredness, possession of a distinctive ethnic trait - they are probably surpassed only by Jews or Armenians with respect to the profundity of their basic group identity. They do not represent a case which is particularly favourable for testing the mobilizationist perspective. According to mobilizationist postulates, activism is confined to working class ethnics who feel they have been discriminated against politically and economically. It therefore follows that Syrian-Lebanese who are affluent and middle class and have obtained access to scarce resources, should not be politically or economically mobilized along ethnic lines. However, it is still necessary to test the mobilizationist thesis for two reasons. First of all, the Syrian-Lebanese could be mobilized in an "exclusionary" form in order to

prevent other ethnic groups from obtaining access to scarce resources.³ Secondly, if no mobilizational tendencies are present, then presumably any ethnic manifestations would have to be explained by primordial factors, especially when the population in question has such a profound "basic group identity". Phrased differently, it can be asked that if there is no mobilization along ethnic lines, then what accounts for the persistence or reemergence of ethnic organization and ethnic identity? One obvious possibility is primordialism.

3.3. Selecting A Sample

Syrian-Lebanese migration to Australia can be divided into three main categories. In the first classification are those migrants who came to Australia between 1880 and World War II. For reasons to be discussed later these migrants were classified as "Syrians". During this pre-World War II era, census figures indicate that except in 1933, the number of Syrian-born migrants never numbered more than 2,000. In this study I concentrate exclusively on these people and their descendants. The second division mainly consists of those migrants who came as the result of the relaxation in Australian immigration laws after World War II. They came in larger numbers than the pre-war migrants and numbered about 33,000 by 1976. The most recent Lebanese migrants, for whom no detailed statistics are available, are largely composed of quasi-refugees from the civil strife in Lebanon which has occurred intermittently over the past five years. Many of these quasi-refugees were admitted into Australia because the Commonwealth Government waived the usual entry requirements. Entry was granted on the condition that relatives already in Australia would guarantee support for them.

Other features besides time of arrival and numerical size separate these three cohorts. Nearly all of the pre-war migrants were village peasants from the Christian regions of northern Lebanon. They quickly scattered throughout urban and rural Australia and were not highly visible. Members of the first generation were occupationally segregated as hawkers and shopowners, while their children and grandchildren have entered business and professional life. A greater number of post-war migrants came from the urban areas of Lebanon and they tended to settle in urban areas after arriving. They were better educated than the earlier migrants and their children have also experienced a considerable degree of occupational mobility. Among these post-war migrants were the first significant numbers of Muslims. The recent arrivals are nearly all urbanites from Beirut and many of them live in the Sydney municipality of Canterbury. A substantial proportion are Muslims who have problems adjusting to western culture. The unemployment rate is high, many of them live in overcrowded conditions, and nearly all have financial difficulties. Because of their numbers and concentration they are moderately visible to many Australians. They have attracted a considerable amount of attention from the media for their alleged fraudulent compensation claims, high unemployment, and involvement in drugs, much to the dismay of members of the two previous populations.

Traditional methods of locating respondents via ethnic churches, voluntary organizations, and the press proved to be futile. Although the most recent Lebanese migrants, and to a much lesser extent the ones who arrived in the 1950 to 1976 period, are geographically concentrated, the descendants of the pre-World War II immigrants form no territorial community. This made it impossible to conduct a community study or

employ intensive participant observation. I attended services at the ethnic churches and quickly discovered that very few second or third generation Syrian-Lebanese patronized them. Nearly all of the worshippers were post-war adult migrants or recent arrivals. There were some voluntary associations, but all except two were formed in recent years by migrants from a particular Lebanese village. The only voluntary organization which ostensibly catered to the Lebanese as a whole, the Australian-Lebanese Association (A.L.A.), was also primarily composed of post-war migrants. The only one which contained members from the third generation was the Australian Kfarsghab Lebanese Association (A.K.L.A.). Its members have built their own clubhouse and they usually hold a picnic, dance, or card night every month or two. Attending some of their functions were the only contexts in which I was able to gather observational data. An A.K.L.A. committee has published a history of Kfarsghabi migration to Australia and the U.S.A. in their newsletter, and this proved to be useful historical information.

All of the Lebanese newspapers, save one, were founded in the past ten years and are printed in Arabic.⁴ Since hardly any third generation Syrian-Lebanese speak, read, or write Arabic, the ethnic press was of very little help in locating respondents. Late in 1977 an English weekly tabloid called Friday Morning began publication. The paper was edited by a post-war Lebanese migrant and designed to: (a) provide coverage of economic and social affairs in Lebanon and the Middle East; and (b) inform readers about Lebanese and Middle Eastern communities in Australia. The editor proclaimed that the paper would meet the needs of the 100,000 or so people of Lebanese descent in Australia who spoke English. After six months of public-

ation the paper changed its name to Ethnic Newsweek and extended its coverage to "serve the Australian multicultural society". I contributed several articles to this weekly about ethnic relations on the world scene, the history of the Maronite church in Sydney, Lebanese migration throughout the world, and the Lebanese community in Australia. I appealed for anyone with knowledge of Lebanese settlement in Australia to contact me and received no replies. I was also interviewed by the editor of an Arabic weekly, Saout Loubnan (The Voice of Lebanon), in which I discussed my research objectives and findings to date. Another request for any interested parties to contact me went unanswered.

Since I was able to meet only a handful of respondents by visiting traditional ethnic institutions (a significant comment on ethnic organization and identity itself), I asked individuals in the institutions to provide me with the names of people they thought would have a knowledge of pre-war settlement, had a long history of involvement with the Lebanese community, or were well-known community leaders. From priests, social workers, teachers, newspaper editors, executives of voluntary associations, and academics, I made a short-list of the ten most frequently mentioned individuals, sent letters explaining my research to them, and arranged interviews. After each interview I asked the respondent to nominate anyone else they thought might be helpful to me, and also requested the names and addresses of any other family members or friends who they thought might consent to an interview. In total, 122 interviews were conducted. By asking some questions about other family members I was able to collect partial data on a total of 775 people. When I subsequently speak of the "interview sample", I am referring to the 122 respondents whom I

interviewed face-to-face. The "total sample" refers to the 122 who were interviewed plus the 653 (total = 775) for whom partial information was obtained. The ancestral rites and generations of individuals in both samples are contained in Table 3-1.

TABLE 3-1
NUMBER* OF SYRIAN-LEBANESE IN "INTERVIEW" AND "TOTAL"
SAMPLES ACCORDING TO GENERATION AND ANCESTRAL RITE

Ancestral Rite	First Generation		Second Generation		Third Generation	
	Interview Sample	Total Sample	Interview Sample	Total Sample	Interview Sample	Total Sample
Maronite Catholic	5 (22)	57 (40)	16 (33)	112 (48)	13 (26)	159 (40)
Melkite Catholic	2 (9)	19 (14)	8 (16)	40 (17)	16 (32)	100 (25)
Antiochian Orthodox	16 (70)	65 (46)	25 (51)	80 (35)	21 (21)	143 (36)

* The percentages for each cell appear in parentheses.

3.4 The Main Research Instrument

Although I interviewed all respondents with a standardized questionnaire, the instrument was used as a guide to cover topics thematically (see Appendix A). Rather than follow the precise order of questions on the guide, I directed the respondent's conversation to certain areas at an opportune moment. For this reason and because many of the questions were open-ended, I seldom had the opportunity to ask all questions of all respondents. The average time for completion of an interview was approximately 1¼ hours. A few interviews consisted of several meetings. Most interviews were completed with one or two individuals, although one

session involved eight people. The interview guide was used in a flexible manner. It became apparent that some questions were irrelevant or difficult to interpret and these were eliminated or modified. Some questions were added later as I became aware of their importance.

3.5 Other Data Sources

In addition to the interview guides, historical information was obtained from the following sources:

- i) shipping lists, naturalization certificates, hawkers' licenses, and Colonial Secretarys' correspondence (in the N.S.W. state archives);
- ii) marriage, birth, and death certificates from Roman Catholic church registers in Redfern, Surry Hills, Waterloo, and St Mary's Cathedral archives in Sydney;
- iii) questions and debates on naturalization and immigration in the N.S.W. and Commonwealth parliamentary proceedings;
- iv) correspondence between the Archbishops of Sydney and Maronite and Melkites clergy and laity (in St Mary's Cathedral archives);
- v) Commonwealth government information relevant to Syrians in the Australian archives;
- vi) miscellaneous pamphlets, newspaper clippings, and other unofficial material.

3.6 Limitations

The decision to employ a case-study approach and the data-collection techniques which were used, imposed three major limitations on the study. Firstly, some of the demographic data is pertinent to N.S.W. and Australia but most information is confined to Sydney. This city was a logical choice because it attracted the bulk of the early settlers and one of its inner suburbs, Redfern, was of paramount importance to the development of the early Syrian community. Restricting the analysis to Sydney makes it impossible to generalise to other regions of Australia. Secondly, I used a "snowball" sample rather than a random one. Drawing a random sample was impossible

because there are no statistics available in Australia on ethnic ancestry past the second generation. Any estimate of the number of third and later generation Syrian-Lebanese in Australia would be purely conjectural. Hence the study is not representative of all Syrian-Lebanese in Australia. Despite these two shortcomings, I believe that the study is an accurate account of most Syrian-Lebanese because of the size of the population. Since I restricted my study to migrants who came to Australia prior to World War II, their children, and their grandchildren, it was not difficult to acquaint myself with members of the population. Before World War II, the Syrian-Lebanese population in Sydney was very stable and the only three ethnic churches in existence were the Maronite and Orthodox in Redfern, and the Melkite in Waterloo. After about 100 interviews I was beginning to be referred to the same people for additional information, and was well-known as "the bloke writing the book on the Lebanese".

The third limitation is that an interview guide was used as the main method for collecting data. The problems of differentiating between what people say and how they actually behave is a perennial debate among social scientists and needs no elaboration here. Although interviewing does have certain drawbacks, I maintain that it can yield reliable and valid information if it is properly conducted. My own feelings are congruent with the views of Goldthorpe et al. (1969: 50), who state that:

Interview data, when obtained by well-qualified personnel and carefully interpreted, can provide valid information on social behavior and relationships, as well as attitudes. Respondents are rarely able to maintain a 'front' throughout an entire interview and, more importantly, few appear even to attempt this (also see Riley 1963: 166-167).

3.7 The Problem of Generations

Before collecting the data I anticipated being able to code each respondent's generation according to the categories suggested by Price and Zubrzycki (1962; see Table 3-2). As it turned out,

TABLE 3-2
EXPECTED GENERATIONAL CATEGORIES AMONG RESPONDENTS
(From Price and Zubrzycki 1962: 62)

Generations			Birthplace or Nationality Divisions
First generation	1's	)	Foreign-born (alien-born)
Second generation	2a's	)	
Second generation	2b's	)	Native-born of foreign parentage (Citizen-born of alien parentage)
Third generation	3a's	)	
Third generation	3b's	)	Native-born of native parentage (Citizen-born of citizen parentage)
Fourth generation, etc.		)	

this model did not account for all of the possible generational categories which were observed. Price and Zubrzycki's model is adequate up to the second generation, but fails to consider the number of possible permutations in succeeding generations. As can be seen in Table 3-3, there are a number of third and fourth generations besides 3 a's, 3 b's, and 4's. These combinations are largely because Lebanese migration to Australia has extended over a hundred year period. For instance, an adult man who migrated in the 1930's could marry a third generation woman. In these instances, the problem arises of how the children of an intergenerational marriage ought to be classified. In the example just given, for instance, should the offspring be

TABLE 3-3

OBSERVED GENERATIONAL CATEGORIES AMONG RESPONDENTS

Generational Category	Number of Respondents	Percentage of Respondents
<u>First generation</u>		
1's : aged 12 or more on arrival	141	18
<u>Second generation</u>		
2a's : aged less than 12 on arrival; foreign-born of two 1's	47	6
2b's : native born of two 1's	187	24
*2c's : native-born; one parent a 1, one parent a non-Syrian-Lebanese	9	1
<u>Third generation</u>		
3a's : native-born of two 2a's	30	4
3b's : native-born of two 2b's	53	7
3c's : native-born of 1 and 2a	67	9
3d's : native-born of 1 and 2b	47	6
3e's : native-born of 2a and 2b	18	2
3f's : native-born; one parent 2a or 2b; generation of other parent unknown	29	4
*3g's : native-born; one parent a 2a, 2b; one parent a non-Syrian-Lebanese	43	6
3h's : native-born but unknown if second or third generation	18	2
<u>Fourth generation</u>		
4a's : native-born; one parent a 3a to 3e; one parent a 1, 2a, 2b, or 3a to 3c;	51	7
4b's : native-born; one parent 3a to 3e; one parent non-Syrian-Lebanese	26	3
	—	—
TOTAL	766	100

* Indicates respondents who are partially Syrian-Lebanese

considered second generation because of the father's foreign birth or fourth generation because of the mother's third generation status? In all cases such as these, I followed the procedure of assigning respondents to the biological generation which came after the parent who had been in Australia the longest. For example, in the case previously discussed, all children were categorized as fourth generation. There were two main reasons for this decision. Since none of the families in the study had returned or intended to return to Lebanon to live, it was assumed that the values and behavior of the third generation parent and (usually) her family would be more influential than those of the first generation parent and (usually) his family. Secondly, it is biologically illogical for a third generation person to produce second generation children, but not incongruent for a first (or second) generation individual to have third or fourth generation offspring. However, it is worthwhile to distinguish analytically between these children produced from inter-generational marriages and children born from parents of the same generation.

Biological generations and occupational generations were not considered to be equivalent. A respondent could be third or fourth generation biologically but second generation occupationally. The reason for this is that most inter-generational marriages were between first generation males and second and third generation females who had never entered the labour force. In analyzing social mobility, a few respondents who were third or fourth generation biologically, were classified as second generation members of the work force. In examining generational differences on non-occupational variables, the three generational categories employed were:

- 1) first generation : all 1's

- 2) second generation : all 2's
- 3) third and later generations : all 3's and 4's

3.8 Presentation Of Data

In most transgenerational studies data is usually presented in one of two ways. The first approach is to analyse the data chronologically according to some arbitrary temporal divisions. The problem with this technique is how to determine cut-off points. Does the researcher use decades or events such as wars to categorize the data? Another difficulty is that certain institutions may remain inert for long periods of time while others alter very quickly. A second tack is to consider each generation separately and then compare differences. But as we have just seen generations are not always neatly separated. How does one compare the first generation Syrian migrants who came to Australia in the 1890's with the ones who arrived in the 1920's, let alone contrast them with their descendants? In the present study I analyse some of the data chronologically and generationally. However, most of the data is presented in an historical fashion in which the processes of institutionalization and de-institutionalization are examined. My conceptualization of institutions is broader than Turner's (1974: 2), who emphasizes their structural properties. Following Smucker and Zijerveld (1970), I view institutions as meaning-structures. These authors note that an institutional structure can remain relatively stable while the meaning contents change dramatically. Conversely, meanings can stay comparatively fixed while structures alter. A concrete example of the former pattern is the changes that have occurred in the Swiss Guard:

The Swiss Guard of the Vatican was instituted in the Middle Ages as an obviously necessary bodyguard for the Pope. Viewed over time, this institution did not undergo much change in its outer-appearance and structural form. Even today the members of this 'body-guard' are still

dressed and armed in a medieval manner and are supposed to perform medieval roles in the defence of the Pope. However, it is clear that this institution continues to exist as a ceremonial survival. The Swiss Guard is a bodyguard in name only, because its real meaning today is to be part of the ritual embellishments of the papal glory. Through a process of ceremonialization, this institution has remained structurally the same for centuries, whereas its meaning content has changed most radically. What has happened is, of course, a qualitative change which can occur only because of the dialectic nature of institutions. Institutions can continue in history as independent forms which may be 'filled up' with new meanings (Smucker and Zijerveld 1970: 379).

It seems to me that this historical approach to social change is ideally suited to the study of ethnic identity (meaning) and ethnic organization (structure). It is obvious that a group's ethnic symbol can change without de-institutionalizing the structural components. For example, Francis (1947: 15) notes that:

... allegiance to some external object is the most essential factor in the formation or revival of ethnic groups. But the object shifts from period to period, from country to country. It may be a monarch, a religion, language and literature, other forms of higher culture, a political ideology centered around some type of government, a class, a 'race'. The type of catalyst apparently changes, as culture and the interests and ideas of man change - but, it seems, there is always a catalyst necessary to join the elements together in an ethnic group ... factors which have contributed to the formation of an ethnic group will lose their significance once a certain degree of group cohesiveness has been reached - or will be, later on, replaced by other factors not present in the beginning but contributing to the preservation of the group.

This is why many scholars adhere to a "structuralist" definition of ethnic groups. Because of the arbitrariness of cultural symbols, it is often claimed that structural properties are the major defining attributes. We have already seen that structural compartmentalization can occur even though cultural differences barely exist. American

sociologists often refer to this phenomena as "acculturation without assimilation" or "structural pluralism without cultural pluralism". Also, solidarity can be high at the very time a group's symbol has nearly vanished. An example of this pattern is the independence movement of the Irish in the late 19th century. Claims for sovereignty reached their peak at the same time English had replaced Gaelic as the Irish language (Spicer 1971). Similar trends can be detected among Basque, Welsh, Scottish, and Assyrian nationalists.

The most obvious example of a population that has maintained its basic "group" identity despite structural transformations is the Jews. In their diaspora they have widened their contacts with other ethnic populations while still retaining the essential features of their Judaic tradition. Other examples are given by Horowitz (1975) in his discussion of processes of "ethnic fusion" and "fission". He refers to the process of "proliferation", which occurs when a new group comes into existence without it or the "parent group" losing their identities. In certain West Indian slave societies for instance, "whites" and "blacks" produced separate "mulatto" or "brown" groups through procreation. Another illustration given by Horowitz, is the emerging "Muslim" ethnic group in Bosnia comprised of an amalgam of Muslim Serbs (most Serbs are Greek Orthodox) and Muslim Croats (most Croatians are Roman Catholic).

In analyzing historical trends it is not my intention to dwell on what happened to the Syrian-Lebanese in Sydney between say, 1880 and World War I, and then between World War I and World War II. Rather, I will focus on the ethnic institutions themselves. My aim is to analyse how and why ethnic institutions - that is, identities and

structures - were transplanted, maintained, and broken down or reconstituted. In short, I will be attempting to explain the processes of institutionalization and de-institutionalization in a given ethnic population. Central to this analysis is the concept degree of institutional enclosure defined in chapter two.

I will also be examining Hansen's "theory" of the third generation return. According to Hansen, the sons and daughters of the first generation experience conflict about their ethnic identity. Embarrassed by their heritage, they reject their parents' customs and fervently embrace the culture of the host society. Hansen (1952: 494) states that often, "Nothing was more Yankee than a Yankeeized person of foreign descent". It is the grandsons and granddaughters (who do not have an ethnic identity crisis) who return to the ethnic fold and show an interest in their ethnic culture and history. In Hansen's (1952: 495-496) words: "Anyone who has the courage to codify the laws of history must include what can be designated as the principle of the third generation interest ... The theory is derived from the almost universal phenomenon that what the son wishes to forget the grandson wishes to remember".

As I stated in chapter one, the nature and extent of third generation return have been persistent and controversial issues among North American historians and social scientists. Implicitly or explicitly, many scholars have used Hansen's hypothesis to explain ethnic revivalism among the third generation descendants of European immigrants in North America. Isajiw (1975: 135-136), for instance, suggests that ethnic rejuvenation may be connected with mobilizationist or primordial concerns:

The rediscovery pattern may emerge when members of ethnic groups begin to realize that cultural assimilation is indeed not sufficient to achieve their economic and/or social aspirations, but that owing to the community closure of the dominant groups, their opportunities are limited... Under such conditions a degree of ethnic community closure may enable the members of the group to achieve, through concerted group action, an access to the political, social and economic opportunity structure which they, as individuals would be unable to attain... On another level, contemporary North American societies have a deep-rooted problem of identity. Instead of inducing strong feelings of social solidarity, they tend to produce the opposite, feelings of social alienation. Search for personal identity in an alienating society is closely related to the rediscovery of ethnic identity and the search for the former often results in the latter. Meaningful decisions of the ego can take place only in terms of larger solidarity groupings. Since one's ancestry is a natural link to solidarity groups, search for psychological identity prevalent in our society is a significant source of emergence of ethnic rediscovery.

In my analysis then, I will give special consideration to generational variations in patterns of ethnic identity and ethnic organization. By controlling for generation it will be possible to discern whether or not any sort of ethnic rediscovery is taking place among third generation individuals.

3.9 Summary

In the first three chapters I have explicated the theoretical, conceptual, and methodological nature of the study. In chapter one I outlined the essence of the theoretical debate between primordialists and mobilizationists and examined the strengths and deficiencies of each position. In the second chapter, I attempted to demonstrate that one reason for the primordial/mobilizationist polarity was that scholars have been ambiguous in defining basic concepts. I then proceeded to construct a typology which was intended to: (a) clarify conceptual inconsistencies; and (b) serve as a basis for examining empirical

cases. In this chapter I have described: (a) why and how I selected the Syrian-Lebanese to test the two theoretical perspectives; (b) how the data was collected; and (c) how the data will be analyzed.

In chapters six and seven I analyze the data and in chapter eight I evaluate the utility of the primordial and mobilizationist positions in light of the findings. Before actually examining the data, it is first of all necessary to examine the historical antecedents which have shaped Lebanese culture and society. Without an understanding of these influences, it is impossible to explain the process of institutionalization and de-institutionalization among Syrian-Lebanese immigrants and their descendants. Therefore, in the next chapter I discuss: (a) the historical factors which have been most formative in Lebanon's development; and (b) how these historical forces continue to affect modern Lebanese institutions.

NOTES

1. There is very little historical evidence to support a direct link between Phoenicians and contemporary Lebanese citizens. The early Phoenicians called themselves Canaanites and probably originated somewhere in the Arabian peninsula. Sociolinguists have found close relationships among Canaanites, Amorites, Assyro-Babylonians, Hebrews, and Arabians (Hitti 1965: 15). By 3,000 B.C. the Canaanites had settled along the Levantine coast of the eastern Mediterranean. Phoenicia was not a nation, but an conglomerate of independent city-states who were not always on friendly terms with one another. The Phoenicians seemed to have had little contact with mountain tribes of the interior, as all of their colonial expansion was directed to the west. Hitti (1965: 59) states that officially, Phoenicia ceased to exist under Roman rule when the province of Syria was created. The Maronites, who are the most passionate propagators of the "Phoenician connection", are not autochthonous to Lebanon proper. Their patron saint, St. Maron (or Maroun) and his followers came from somewhere in the Syrian desert north-east of Antioch (Hitti 1965: 90-91). For an erudite refutation of the Phoenician-Lebanese link see Faris (1960).
2. Schermerhorn (1978: 246) submits that Syrians and Lebanese are examples of "marginal trading peoples". This category of ethnic populations was a "constructed type" devised by Becker (1940).

Becker argued that his heuristic device could be used to demonstrate that certain Jewish traits (e.g., a propensity to engage in trading occupations) were not the result of peculiar genetic factors, but of certain historical, geographical, social, and cultural variables common to various ethnic populations. Other examples of marginal trading peoples given by Becker and Schermerhorn are: Armenians, Greeks in Egypt, overseas Chinese, Parsis, border Scots, and Arabs on the Malabar coast.

3. Weber (1968) referred to this tactic as "social closure". It is a process by which members of collectivities single out any convenient attribute and then use it to prevent "outsiders" from gaining access to scarce resources. Parkin (1974; also see Neuwirth 1968), in refining Weber's original usage of the term, suggests social closure needs to be restated more specifically. He differentiates between strategies of exclusion and strategies of solidarism. The first concept refers to attempts by a given social group to maintain or enhance its privileges by the process of subordination. In turn, subordinate groups attempt to close off access to remaining resources and thus multiply the number of ineligible sub-strata. Solidarism refers to the collective responses of excluded groups which are unable to maximize resources by exclusion practices. The main difference between the two tactics is as follows: techniques of exclusion exert pressure downward and tend to stabilize structured social inequality; strategies of solidarism direct pressure upward and tend to disrupt the prevailing system of distribution. Parkin emphasizes that these tactics are not mutually exclusive but reciprocal types of action. Groups can and do use both strategies of social closure. Since the Syrian-Lebanese in Australia have generally obtained access to scarce resources, then they should not display solidaristic tendencies. However, they could adopt exclusionary tactics in order to occlude entry by other sub-strata.
4. See Ata (1978) for a brief description of the Lebanese media in Melbourne.

CHAPTER 4

A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF LEBANON

4.1 Introduction

The republic of Lebanon is one of the smallest independent states in the world. With a territory of around 10,000 square kilometers, it is about as large as Cyprus, Puerto Rico, or Jamaica. Despite its diminutive size, Lebanon contains one of the world's most ethnically diverse populations. Although Lebanese citizens follow similar eating, dress, and linguistic patterns, there has always been a high degree of cultural pluralism based on regional and religious differences. Also, relations among the members of Lebanon's ethnoreligious populations have always been very compartmentalized. In the past five years Lebanon has been the scene of a violent internecine conflict which has left over 60,000 dead. There are now serious doubts about the prospect of Lebanese Muslims and Lebanese Christians ever being able to live peacefully with one another again.

A detailed chronological account of Lebanese history is beyond the scope of this study, so I have elected to discuss the historical factors which scholars have deemed to be the most formative. In this chapter I first of all discuss how geography, religion, and Westernization have affected the evolution of Lebanese society. I then demonstrate how these factors have influenced ethnic identities and ethnic relations in contemporary Lebanon. Throughout the discussion I emphasize what seems to me to be the leit motif of the Lebanese experience: its citizens' inability to extend their allegiances beyond those of family, village, and sect.

4.2 Geographical Influences

Geography has exerted a paradoxical influence on the Middle East. Since the region contains strategic positions like the Suez Canal, the Persian Gulf, the Dardanelles, and the Mediterranean sea, it has been the pathway for a succession of ancient, medieval, and modern conquerors (from Asia, Africa, and Europe) wishing to establish political, military, and economic bases there. This has resulted in a wide variety of ethnic and racial populations being introduced to the area. On the other hand, the deserts and mountains have served as barriers behind which persecuted people have taken refuge and maintained isolated, homogenous, tightly-knit communities. Geography has played a particularly decisive role in the development of Lebanon. Its history is often said to be encapsulated by the inscriptions in nearly 20 languages on a rock at the mouth of the Dog River, six miles north of the capital, Beirut. The carvings are a chronology of the armies which have occupied Lebanese soil at various times. Among the invaders have been Semites, Sumerians, Babylonians, Egyptians, Assyrians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, European Crusaders, Mamluks, Ottomans, Frenchmen, and Americans. In the past decade Syrians, Palestinians, Israelis, and United Nations peacekeeping forces have also occupied Lebanese territory. Lebanon has been located at "the crossroads of the world ... astride the great international highway which with its ramifications linked the historic continents" (Hitti 1965: 2). This has made Lebanon both a receiver and transmitter of a great number of spiritual and material products to the rest of the world. Yet Lebanon has also been a haven for oppressed minorities, who have sealed themselves off from persecution by taking refuge in its impenetrable mountain ranges: "Schismatic Christians, non-conformist Moslems, and expatriated communities have found in the mountain the security denied them on the plain"

(Hitti 1957: 23). Moreover, these persecuted minorities have lived side by side as "self-contained nationalistic or semi-nationalistic communities (because) the Lebanon, especially through its valleys and hills tends to divide its inhabitants" (Hitti 1957: 7).

Lebanon is separated into four distinct geographic regions. The first area is a very narrow maritime plain which runs 200 kilometers along the eastern shore of the Mediterranean. Slightly inland, running parallel to this coastal strip, is a mountainous area called Western Lebanon or Lebanon proper. It is about 170 kilometers long and averages about 40 kilometers wide in the north and narrows to less than 10 kilometres in the south around Sidon. Its northern region of snow-capped peaks and cedar trees is familiar to many foreigners. Adjacent to this alpine region is the intermontane Biqa plateau which is less than 10 kilometers wide in most parts and extends for roughly 175 kilometers. The south Biqa near the source of the Litani river is fertile, but the land becomes progressively unproductive the further north one goes. Next to the Biqa and bordering the Syrian desert is another mountainous area known as the Anti-Lebanon. It receives less rainfall than the Western range, is less fertile, and hence less populous. The protection afforded by these topographic features made it possible for Lebanese mountaineers to live in isolated situations of a true Gemeinschaft nature:

The economic organization of the Lebanon village was very simple and harmoniously integrated with other aspects of community life. Land was of supreme value to them, and farming was their occupation, their way of life. Attachment to the soil and locality was very strong. The same family line lived on the same land for generations. Their economy was self-sufficient, practically producing all that they consumed ... the church was fully integrated with other aspects of

Community life. Family life was the third main pillar of life... members owned the land in common, cultivated it cooperatively and shared equally in the produce. A more comprehensive unit than the family and the church was the village. Community consciousness was intense and loyalty to that unit was very strong. The village was compact and integrated, physically and psychosocially (Tannous 1943a: 265; also see Tannous 1949).

4.3 Religious Influences

As the birthplace of Islam, Judaism, and Christianity, religion has been a dominant force in the Middle East. Hourani (1961: 72) has written that, "the primary divisions inside the Near East are, as they have been for over a thousand years, religious: whether a man is Moslem, Christian or Jew, and which branch of the Moslem, Christian or Jewish community he belongs to". Nowhere is the assertion more evident than in Lebanon. In the Middle East where 95% of all societies are Muslim, Lebanon is the only country in which Muslims do not clearly outnumber Christians. Lebanon has always been a Christian island in a Muslim ocean. Through centuries of Muslim domination and persecution Christians have held firmly to their faith by entrenching themselves in unassailable mountain villages. Muslim rulers were often too concerned about strengthening their borders to worry about subduing a small group of dissident subjects and this sometimes permitted de facto autonomy in certain regions. The constant threat of a Muslim invasion engendered the development of a siege mentality among non-Muslims.

4.3.1 Islamic Influences

An important influence on Christian-Muslim relations is the status of non-Muslims in Islamic religion. Islam is essentially a theocratic religion in which there is no separation between secular and spiritual spheres:

Unlike modern Western society, in which religion is so often reserved for Sundays and such special occasions as marriage and death, traditional Islam is all-encompassing. All social relations are determined and sanctioned by religion. Functional differentiations along political, economic, social, and religious lines characteristic of the modern world do not exist. Instead there is a unity between religion and society. There is no division between temporal and religious, between secular and sacred; all is sacred. An Islamic spirit permeates the entire area and all aspects of life - private, political, social, economic, and religious (Rivlin and Szyliowicz 1965: 19).

According to Arab-Islamic doctrine, there were three categories of people: (a) Muslims who constituted the umma or nation of Islam; (b) dhimmis or "protected" people who were tolerated because they were "people of the book" (i.e., Jews and Christians); and, (c) pagans who were non-believers and not to be tolerated. Although dhimmis were "protected" their status was decidedly second-class:

... although falling outside the Muslim community (dhimmis) are permitted to practice their own religion and live according to its laws as long as they pay certain taxes, do not take up arms against Muslims, do not testify against Muslims in Muslim courts, and do not marry Muslim women. The fact that dhimmis were obliged to wear distinct dress, so that they would not be confused with Muslims, has served to emphasize the mosaic division of (Middle East) society (Rivlin and Szyliowicz 1965: 30-31).

Muslim-Christian relations were further petrified by the legal and administrative system instituted by the Ottomans when they subjugated the Arabs in the fifteenth century. Conquered territories were divided up into provinces under the role of walis or governors whose main functions were to collect taxes and maintain law and order. Conquered peoples were treated as raya or flocks to be "protected" and divided into millets on the basis of their sectarian affiliation. Christians, Jews, and heterodox Muslims such as Druzes and Shiites, who were considered to be "imperfect Arabs", were all divided into millets.

The nature of the millet system was as follows:

In essence it was a continuation of the view prevalent under the Arab dynasties that the 'People of the Book', that is, the Jews and Christians, though outside the community of Islam had the right to their own laws and religion... As in the past, the leaders of each community had to be approved by the Sultan, but once approved his position was fortified by an imperial decree (berat) which alone enabled Ottoman officials to assume their offices and stipends. The head of the community had a senior position in the State and was the channel by which the affairs of their communities were represented to the Sultan and his advisers. The head of the millet was assisted by a council and had jurisdiction over the community not only in matters directly concerned with religion, such as clerical discipline, but in a large range of activities including education, wills, divorces, church, property and civil rights. Judicial decisions of the millet council could be executed by the state on their behalf (Frend 1969: 255-256).

Kayal and Kayal (1975: 40) have noted that Western notions of nationhood based on territorial sovereignty do not apply to the Middle East prior to the twentieth century. This is because the millet system was based on religious not geographical boundaries. The Ottomans based their millet system on the mistaken assumption that each minority was descended from a different "race" of people who held particular religious beliefs. No matter where an individual lived in the empire, he was subject to the laws of his millet not local ones. For instance, Jews, who came from several linguistic groups and regions, formed one millet. Thus when Christians talk about their "nation" they are usually referring to their church - a "religious nation" - which extends across "national" boundaries. This is why some Melkite Catholics in Lebanon have more in common with Melkites in Syria and Egypt than with Lebanese Moslems, Lebanese Maronites or Lebanese Orthodox.

The millet system permitted a certain amount of independence among

the various religious populations. It allowed some minorities to play important entrepreneurial roles in trade and commerce which were activities despised by Muslims. In Egypt, finance was largely controlled by Coptic Christians; in Syria, Armenians, Greeks, Jews, and Christians dominated wholesale and retail trade (Moutafakis 1976). However, non-Sunnis were still dhimmis subject to prejudice and discrimination and even loss of life. The Turks exploited the millet system by favouring the minorities which best served their own interests. In 1860 they abetted the massacre of over 10,000 Christians by Druzes in Lebanon partly because the Maronites had been cultivating ties too closely with France. The Turks' ability to manipulate various minorities was a consequence rather than a cause of intra-religious factionalism. The degree of segmentation between Muslims and Christians was real enough, but this did not cause the members of each sect to act in a cohesive manner.

4.3.2 Christian Divisions

Christianity never developed uniformly after the death of the apostles and the fall of Jerusalem in the first century. Roman persecution of Christians and the geographic isolation of some of the empire's provinces prevented the formulation of a standard theology. In Attwater's (1961a: 2) words :

For sometime after all the Apostles were dead the organization and worship of the Church were fluid; she was there in her essential structure and living reality, but she had not come from Christ's hands 'ready-made' and fully developed in all her parts and aspects. The unit was the local church, the community of Christians in one place, whose bishop, assisted by priests and deacons, 'presided in the place of God' over the faithful of that locality...

Gradually, churches in various places developed idiosyncratic forms of worship based on local customs, and bishops assumed authority over certain cities and regions. Rome, Antioch, Alexandria, and Constantinople, when it became capital of the empire in 330, were recognized as the important Christian centres (with primacy given to the see of St. Peter in Rome). The major types of Christian liturgy used today - Latin, Antiochian, Alexandrian and Byzantine - all have their origins in these four cities. The different styles of worship and conflicting interpretations of Christian doctrines quickly led to inter-regional disputes and rivalries. The conflict which evolved was symptomatic of the political and cultural differences between the Latin-dominated Western empire and the Greek-orientated East.

The first schism occurred when the Council of Ephesus (431) declared that the teachings of the patriarch of Constantinople, Nestor, were heretical. As the result of his condemnation, which was engineered by the Roman and Alexandrian patriarchs, his followers in Persia formed the Nestorian church. In 452 some Nestorians renounced Nestor's teachings and entered into communion with Rome. Today they are called Chaldeans of the Catholic rite. A more serious split occurred after the Council of Chalcedon (451) when the doctrine of Monophysitism was also declared heretical. Among the Monophysites (also called non-Chalcedonians) to secede over this controversy were the Copts in Egypt and the Ethiopians (Abyssinians) who followed the Alexandrian rite, the Syrians (also called Jacobites) who used the Antiochian rite, and the Armenians who had their own distinctive rite. Between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries splinter groups from all of these churches followed the Chaldeans' lead and reunited with Rome. Collectively, these churches and others which subsequently

reunited with Rome are usually referred to as the "Uniates". However, this phrase has derogatory connotation and it is more precise to speak of them as "Catholics of such and such a rite" (Attwater 1961b: X-XI). Nestorians and Monophysites are often incorrectly categorized with the Eastern Orthodox Church which came into existence in 1054; technically, they do not belong to either the Catholic or the Orthodox churches.

Over the next six hundred years political and cultural control of the empire slowly gravitated towards the East and the cultural gap between East and West became wider. After Rome yielded to the pressure of succeeding waves of invaders from the north and Antioch and Alexandria fell to the Arabs, Constantinople assumed leadership of the Christian world. The year 1054 is generally given as the date on which the Greek East and the Latin West severed all ties with one another. At that time a series of anti-Latin actions by the patriarch of Constantinople, Michael Cerularius, resulted in him being excommunicated by Rome. The church of Constantinople was not excommunicated but it, along with the other Eastern patriarchates in Alexandria and Antioch, separated from Rome and formed the Eastern Orthodox Church. Attempts at reconciliation by both parties were made for over a hundred years and it was not until the Latin Crusaders committed atrocities against the Orthodox that the separation became irreversible. Sentiments against the Crusaders were so vehement that the Orthodox in Constantinople uttered the now-famous phrase: "better the turbans of the shayks than the crowns of the cardinals"; meaning that Muslim domination was preferable to Latin oppression.

The Eastern Orthodox church was composed of a loosely articulated federation of autocephalous or self-governing churches which used the Byzantine rite. Unlike the Catholic church which was unified through the leadership of the Pope in Rome, the Orthodox had no corresponding head who spoke for all member churches. Today the basic differences between the Catholic and Orthodox churches are as follows:

- (i) the Orthodox reject the Roman Patriarch's claim of universal supremacy and infallibility;
- (ii) they disagree over key points of doctrine such as the precedence of the Holy Ghost in the Trinity;
- (iii) they differ on matters of ritual and discipline such as the celibacy of priests and liturgy.

Kayal and Kayal (1975: 28) claim that the different geopolitical structures which evolved in the East and the West further accentuated the dissimilarities between the two churches:

Because the East underwent a different sociocultural experience from the West, geographic locality became a major force in religious development. The isolated character of the various populations contributed to this development. In the West, where Christianity more or less inherited the Holy Roman Empire, one single religious tradition developed and unified the area. In the East however, plurality characterized the Christian experience. The symbiosis between religion and culture finally resulted in the formation of local Christian communities that developed their own liturgical expression of their faith. This is what is commonly meant by the term 'rite'. It is an entire way of life that is spiritually and liturgically unique. The very nature of these rites allowed them to be eventually organized into religious 'nations' or 'millets'.

This is why the Orthodox church has played a much more active role than the Catholic church in nationalistic movements. Because the Orthodox church evolved into a number of independent national churches, politics and religion have been intertwined. The Bulgarian,

Greek, and Serbian Orthodox churches all played significant parts in their nations' struggles for self-determination in the nineteenth century. With a few exceptions, the Maronites in Lebanon being a notable one, Catholics have not supported nationalistic causes because of the church's alleged "universal" structure. As we shall see later, these divergencies also influenced the ways in which Lebanese Catholics and Orthodox aligned themselves with Western powers and how they responded to Arab nationalism. In recent times there has been a rapprochement between the Catholic and Orthodox churches, but any chance of a merger is extremely remote. The two churches have had centuries of hostile relations which still have not been forgotten by many members of both faiths.

4.3.3 Christian Divisions In Lebanon

In Lebanon the three main Christian churches - Maronite, Melkite, and Orthodox - continue to be separated by their orientations toward the East and the West.

(a) Maronites

The Maronites trace their ancestry to St. Maron, an ascetic monk who won a following while preaching in the Syrian desert north-east of Antioch in the late fourth and early fifth centuries. A series of conflicts with the Syrian Orthodox (Jacobites), the Byzantine emperor, and invading Muslims forced the Maronites to migrate south late in the seventh century. They found refuge in the mountainous region of northern Lebanon where they are still firmly entrenched today. The Maronites claim that they alone of all Eastern Catholics have maintained links with Rome throughout history.¹ Their close ties with Rome has made them the most pro-Western of any religious sect in Lebanon.

Because of their attachment to Rome, their insistence that the inhabitants of Lebanon are different from the rest of the Arab world through their Phoenician heritage, their concentration in the mountains, and their beleaguered past, the Maronites have been the most ardent proponents of Lebanese nationalism based on territorial sovereignty.

(b) Orthodox And Melkites

In 1724, a long standing dispute between pro-Roman and pro-Constantinople factions within the Orthodox church in Syria reached its climax, when a splinter group broke away and reunited itself with Rome. This group is now known as the Melkites or Greek Catholics. They have somewhat of an ambivalent stance towards Orthodoxy and Catholicism. Technically, both Maronites and Melkites are Eastern rite churches in communion with Rome. However, the Melkites still use the Byzantine rite which is virtually indistinguishable from the Orthodox style of worship, while the Maronites use a form of the Antiochian rite. Since the Melkites were once part of the Orthodox church, they are far more Easternized than the Maronites and not wholly sympathetic to the latter's nationalistic goals. On the other hand, their obedience to Rome is unacceptable to the Orthodox church. The Orthodox have always been the most pro-Arab of any Christian sect and resentful of "Latinization" by Rome:

In the view of the Orthodox, Roman imperialism and paternalism have disfigured all the Eastern churches leaving them impotent and directionless. The Orthodox consider them anathema. For them, 'Catholic' has come to mean not only Latin but anti-Oriental as well. They consider Uniates nothing more than schismatic Orthodox who have become Catholic at the expense of their own Eastern heritage (Kayal and Kayal 1975: 37).

In summary, internal differences have made it impossible for Lebanese Christians to forge a pan-denominational sense of Christian peoplehood. Theological disputes and geopolitical divergencies have resulted in the different sects marching along different religious roads.

4.3.4 Islamic Divisions

Internal divisions among Muslims stem from the struggles for Islamic leadership following the prophet Muhammad's death in 632. The third Caliph (successor) was overthrown by Muhammad's son-in-law Ali and his supporters, who moved Caliphate to Iraq. In ensuing internal strife, Ali and his son were killed and the Caliphate was assumed by the Damascan Umayyad family which was not descended from Muhammad. The majority of Muslims in the world are Sunnis who accept these historical events as legitimate. From the time they conquered the Eastern Mediterranean in the seventh century until the time of Ottoman rule, Sunni Muslims dominated Syria. Even when Syria became an Ottoman province they still held a favourable position as members the umma (nation) of Islam, because Turks were also Sunnis.

The Shiites, known in Lebanon as the Matawilah (friends of Ali), are a dissident sect which only recognizes Ali and his descendants as true Islamic leaders or Imams. During the tenth and eleventh centuries they enjoyed the protection of the Shiite Fatimid Caliphate in Cairo, but following his death they endured centuries of persecution from Sunni Arabs and Turks because of their heterodox beliefs. The phrase "Shiite character" is often used to refer to their mentality of resignation and submissiveness caused by a history of subordination (Colie 1976).

The Druze of Lebanon are an eighth century offshoot of the Shiites. They believe that an eleventh century Fatimid Caliphate was a reincarnation of God. Following his death they were forced to flee Egypt, as this view was held to be heretical by Sunnis. Like the Maronites they too found refuge in highland Lebanon. Little is known about Druze religion, since they forbid proselytization and divulge nothing about their beliefs and practices to outsiders. They have been described by Hitti (1928: 27) as "a religious community that has survived for nine centuries like a fossil". Their doctrines are so far removed from traditional Islamic thought that most Muslims consider them to be non-believers. At certain times Sunnis have been more oppressive towards Druzes than towards Christians. Druze influence reached its zenith during the rule of Fakhr al-Din (1586 - 1635), an amir who controlled Lebanon virtually independent of Ottoman control. After his death their power was gradually eclipsed by the Maronites.

In summary, Muslims and Christians in Lebanon are not comprised of unified social groups. Intra-religious conflicts have played as important a role in the development of Lebanese society as inter-religious ones. As well as slaughtering Christians, Sunnis have massacred Shiite Muslims and Druzes; Orthodox Christians have killed Catholic Christians and Muslims; Druzes have joined forces with Maronites to slay Muslims then later murdered Maronites by the thousands. It has been rare when the various sub-categories have acted as a coordinated unit and even rarer when sects from different faiths have coalesced.

4.4 Western Influences

Western intrusion into the Middle East also served to reinforce sectarianism and weaken national sentiments among Lebanese. For the purpose of analytical convenience I have divided Western influences into three categories: religious, political and ideological. It should be noted that in practice these three areas are interrelated. It is also essential to recognize that direct European intervention in Lebanese affairs was a complex function of religious, political, and economic motives. The carving up of the Ottoman empire after World War I by European states ended a prolonged attempt by the latter to gain political and economic control of the Middle East. This is why religious ventures like the Crusades and French and English missionary activity must be viewed in the context of European imperialism.

4.4.1 Religious Influences

During the Crusades the Maronites fought with Latin armies and won the praise of European warlords for their military prowess. In 1182 it is estimated that 40,000 Maronites pledged their allegiance to Rome, an act which marked the beginning of close ties between the Maronite church and the Holy See. In 1584 Pope Gregory XII established a college for Maronite scholars in Rome. Some of its graduates became renowned scholars and ecclesiastics in Italy, France and Spain, while others returned home to occupy key positions in the Maronite hierarchy. According to Kayal and Kayal (1975: 41), "by the fifteenth century, in token of their obedience to Rome (the Maronites) were following the customs and rites of the Latins almost completely". Relations were consolidated in 1736 when the Maronite church was officially recognised as a Roman Catholic church of the Eastern rite in communion with Rome. Although they accepted Roman hegemony, the Maronites were permitted to

retain Eastern customs like their Syriac liturgy, non-celibary among their parish priests, and their own Patriarch who was virtually autonomous from Rome. Because of their special relationship with Rome, the Maronites developed views on nationalism which were more pro-Western than any other Christian sect and diametrically opposed to the outlook of most Muslims. As Entelis (1974: 34-35) observes:

Throughout its development Maronite nationalism was closely related to the idea of Western especially French protection and association. Trained abroad in Catholic schools, clerical and lay Maronite elites transported Western ideas and influences back to Lebanon which, for better or worse, determined the community's nationalist orientation as it related to non-Maronite Christians and Muslims. It was thus not surprising to have Maronites view Lebanon not so much as the western frontier of the Arab East but as the eastern frontier of the Christian West.

4.4.2 Political Influences

Through a series of adroit political manoeuvres, France was able to use its contacts with the Maronites as a way of protecting its economic interests in the Middle East. The French extracted concessions, later called capitulations, from the Ottomans whereby they were permitted to act as guardians over Maronites domiciled in the Empire. In 1616 the French opened a consulate in Sidon and in 1655 took the unusual step of appointing a Maronite as their deputy council in Beirut. They later made him a vice-counsul in Venice and granted him French citizenship. A symbiotic relationship was thus institutionalized between French and Maronite merchants. France was able to use the Maronites as a way of gaining access to Middle East markets and the latter were able to obtain a monopoly on French business and safeguard their security by claiming French protection. Other Western powers were quick to realize the economic advantages of claiming protection over minorities and began cultivating relations with other millets. Through the auspices of the

Russian Orthodox church, the Czar was able to assert guardianship over the Orthodox Christians who held key financial and commercial positions in Syria. The Crimean War (1854-1856) was precipitated by Russia's charge that the Turks were mistreating their Orthodox brethren, but Russia's desire to obtain a warm water port was the real underlying cause of the war. The British safeguarded their interests by supporting Greeks, Copts, and Jews, who along with Armenians and Syrian Christians, had a stranglehold on the economy of the Middle East by the mid-nineteenth century. Economic rivalry among these various minorities was present before Western interference, but became more pronounced as each sought the protection of their millets by a European power. This "protection" was anathema to the Muslims, who were hostile to Western intrusion into their territory and despised Western customs.

Around the turn of the eighteenth century, European states began to play an even more active political role in the Middle East. Alarmed by Napoleon's invasion of Europe, the British counterbalanced French influence by supporting the Druze in northern Lebanon. British involvement increased after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 which provided a direct link with its colonies in Southern Asia and the Far East. As the Ottoman empire slowly disintegrated in the nineteenth century, Russia also attempted to counteract British and French influence. The independence struggles of the Greeks, Serbs, and Bulgarians were assisted by the Orthodox churches of each country and the Russians used their own Orthodox church to establish links with them. From the 1840's onwards, European powers began directly intervening in the political affairs of Syria. The effects of European powers on Lebanese politics can be seen in two ways. The first is the way in

which they forced the Ottomans to settle internal disputes between Christians and Druzes which occurred in the nineteenth century. The second is the constitutional arrangement devised by the French when they held a mandate over Lebanon between the wars.

(a) Western Involvement In Internal Conflicts

Following civil disturbances between Christians and Druzes in 1840, European states pressured the Ottomans to ensure the safety of their protected minorities. A solution was devised which became a precedent for settling intersectorian disputes. An imaginary line was drawn between Beirut and Damascus bisecting Lebanon into northern and southern districts or quaimmaqamiyahs. The northern region was allocated to the Maronites and the southern area to the Druzes. Each area was administered by a governor and a council. Each council consisted of a deputy and representatives from Sunni, Shiite, Druze, Orthodox, Melkite, and Maronite sects. Since neither one of the quaimmaqamiyahs was religiously homogeneous, the formula never worked and tensions continued. Twenty years later a three month war took place between Christians and Druzes. Hitti (1965) estimates that over 10,000 Christians were killed in Damascus alone, and perhaps twice as many in the Mount Lebanon region. In some cases Turkish officials encouraged and assisted Druze atrocities. A favourite ploy was to assure Christians that they would be protected by the Ottoman authorities and ask them to lay down their arms. After complying with the Turks' wishes, Christians were then left at the mercy of Druze soldiers who slaughtered them. Morally concerned about the decimation of the Lebanese population and alarmed about the effects of the war on trade, Europeans forced the Turks to end the war or face direct military intervention. In 1861, Turkey, Britain, France, Russia, Austria, and

Prussia signed the Règlemente Organique, a treaty which made Lebanon an autonomous district within the Ottoman province of Syria.

Geographically, it was similar in size to present-day Lebanon except that the coastal cities of Beirut, Tripoli, and Sidon and the Biqa valley were not included in its boundaries. A non-Maronite Christian was appointed governor or mutasarraf by the Ottomans, subject to approval by the five European states. The governor was assisted by heads of the various communities which were represented in proportion to their numbers - four Maronites, three Druzes, two Orthodox, one Melkite, one Sunni, and one Shiite. This political arrangement brought peace to the area for the first time in twenty years and during the mutasarrafaya era between 1860 and World War I, Lebanon became the most advanced region of the Ottoman empire. The mutasarrafaya system also provided the basis for two important aspects of Lebanese politics: the tacit acceptance of Maronite domination and loyalty to sectarian rather than national organizations.

(b) The Effect of the French Mandate

After the war the League of Nations awarded the French a mandate over Lebanon. France's desire to keep Lebanon in a state of colonial dependency made it advantageous for her to encourage sectarian differences rather than harmonizing them. This was reflected in Article 95 of the constitution which Lebanon was given when it was declared a (dependent) republic in 1926. The article stated that: "As a provisional measure and for the sake of justice and amity, the sects shall be equitably represented in public employment and in the composition of the Ministry, provided such measures will not harm the general welfare of the state". If the boundaries of the mutasarraf had been maintained during the mandate it is possible that the French-imposed

TABLE 4-1

SECTARIAN COMPOSITION OF THE LEBANESE POPULATION
BEFORE AND AFTER ENLARGEMENT
(PERCENTAGES OF GRAND TOTAL)

Sect	1913	1932	1932 (emigrants included)
Maronites	55	29	34
Greek Orthodox	12	10	13
Melkites	7	6	7
Protestants	*	*	*
Armenian Orthodox	*	3	3
Armenian Catholics	na	*	*
Syrian Orthodox	*	*	*
Syrian Catholics	*	*	*
Chaldeans	*	*	*
Nestorians	*	*	*
(Christian Subtotal)	(329,482)	(396,746)	(612,790)
(% of Grand Total)	(75%)	(50%)	(58%)
Sunnite	3	22	19
Shiites	5	20	16
Druzes	11	7	6
(Muslim Subtotal)	(85,232)	(386,499)	(423,364)
(% of Grand Total)	(19%)	(49%)	(40%)
Others	6	*	*
Grand Total	441,800	793,426	1,047,813

Source: Rondot (1947: 28-29)

n.a. = not available

* = less than 1 per cent

constitution would have proven to be satisfactory. However, the French added Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon, and the Biqa to Lebanese territory which almost doubled Lebanon's area, increased the total population by one half, and multiplied the number of Muslims nearly five fold (see Table 4-1). After being the dominant sect in Syria throughout history, the Sunnis now found themselves in a minority position in Lebanon and

separated against their will from coreligionists. They were anti-French, anti-Western, pro-Arab, and had little or no affinity for Maronite concepts of Lebanese nationalism. Most of Lebanon's history since full independence was achieved in 1943, can be told in terms of political clashes between Western-orientated Maronite nationalists and Arab-minded Sunnis.

4.4.3 The Introduction of Nationalist Ideology

The final Western influence on the development of Lebanon was the introduction of the concept of nationalism. As was observed earlier, it was imported to the Middle East by Maronites who studied abroad. It was also brought there by Western missionaries. Latin missionaries had been active in Syria since medieval times. In 1291 a Franciscan missionary was established at Acre, and in the seventeenth century Capuchins, Jesuits, and Carmelites founded outposts in what is present-day Lebanon. They were followed by Lazarists who set up a mission in Damascus in 1755. With Maronite assistance, Jesuits built the first European-styled high school in Lebanon, south of Tripoli, in 1734. In the nineteenth century, Britain attempted to undermine the influence of Russian Orthodox missions in Syria by sending Anglican missionaries there. The Anglicans established close links with Orthodox Christians and had a reasonable degree of success in converting some of them to Protestantism. The American Protestant missionaries, who began arriving in Syria in the 1820's, also had their highest rates of conversion among Orthodox. This partially explains why Orthodox immigrants have gravitated towards Episcopal and Presbyterian churches in the U.S.A. and Anglican churches in Australia.

The students who attended the schools established at these missions

learned ideas which challenged centuries of traditional thought. In his case study of an Orthodox village in the Kura district, Tannous (1943b) found that the establishment of an American Presbyterian mission changed nearly every facet of social life there. Hitti (1955) states that the infusion of Western ideas into the Middle East was "perhaps the most eventful happening in the history of the area in modern times", in light of their demographic, economic, political, educational, and social impacts.

In the final decades of the nineteenth century the idea of nationalism began to be expounded by Arab Christian intellectuals and journalists. Arab nationalism was at first directed against Turkish rule. But as Muslim Arabs gradually became involved in the "Arab awakening", it took on anti-Western and pro-Islamic characteristics. Christians and Muslims never agreed on the goals of Arab nationalism, because they differed in their definitions of it. To the Christians, and particularly the Maronites, nationalism was based on geopolitical foundations. As Hitti (1955: 630) comments, this was contradictory to Muslim ideas of Nationalism:

... the modern concept of nationalism is in conflict with Islam the religion. Islam is universal; nationalism is local, operating within limited geographical boundaries. Islam exalts spiritual values, nationalism material ones. According to nationalism all within the nation, regardless of creed or color, are bound to stand together against all outsiders; according to Islam all followers of the religion of Muhammad - no matter what their geographic distribution may be - constitute a brotherhood set against the world.

In summary, Europeans' political intervention in Syria was a result of their desire to protect their economic interests. In the millet system they found a ready-made way of aligning themselves with

various minorities who were only too willing to accept their "protection". European imperialists repeatedly exploited this relationship to weaken Ottoman rule and outmanoeuvre other expansionist rivals. In the process they ossified pre-existing hostilities among the various sects and stultified the development of national identity.

4.5 Summary

The combined effect of these three features - geographical isolation, religious sectarianism, and Western intervention in domestic affairs - helped to encourage the development and maintenance of parochial loyalties. I will now describe how modern Lebanon continues to be characterized by parochial structures and identities.

4.6 Institutional Enclosure In Contemporary Lebanon

4.6.1 Number And Distribution Of The Religious Sects

The ethnic diversity of Lebanon's population can be seen in Table 4-2. Unlike some polyethnic societies in which one population is numerically superior, no sect in Lebanon constitutes more than one third of the total population. If these figures simply referred to ethnoreligious aggregates, then the percentage distribution of the various sects would be of little importance. However, because sectarian affiliation has a corporate aspect and each sect is apportioned parliamentary seats on the basis of its size, numbers are very significant. The population issue is so sensitive that no official census has been taken since 1932, for fear that newer figures would indicate that the sizes of the various sects have changed. If a census were taken today, it is likely that Muslims would slightly outnumber Christians and that

TABLE 4-2

SECTARIAN COMPOSITION OF THE LEBANESE POPULATION (1956)

Sect	Number	% of Christians	% of Muslims	% of total
Maronite Catholics	424,000	55	na	30
Melkite Catholics	91,000	12	na	6
Armenian Catholics	15,000	2	na	1
Syrian Catholics	6,000	*	na	*
Latin Catholics	4,000	*	na	*
Chaldean Catholics	1,000	*	na	*
(Catholic Subtotal)	(541,000)	70	na	38
Greek Orthodox	149,000	19	na	11
Armenian Orthodox	64,000	8	na	5
Syrian Orthodox	5,000	*	na	*
(Orthodox Subtotal)	(218,000)	28	na	15
(Protestant Subtotal)	(14,000)	2	na	1
(Christian Subtotal)	(773,000)	100	na	55
Sunnite Muslims	286,000	na	46	20
Shiite Muslims	250,000	na	40	18
Druzes	88,000	na	14	6
(Muslim Subtotal)	(624,000)	na	100	44
Jews	7,000	na	na	*
Others	7,000	na	na	*
GRAND TOTAL	<u>1,411,000</u>	<u>55</u>	<u>44</u>	<u>100</u>

Source: Bullard (1958: 453)

na = not applicable

* = less than 1 per cent

Shiites would constitute a plurality of all sects. Thus, Muslims claim that Christians, particularly Maronites, are overrepresented in government and demand a redistribution of parliamentary seats. The

Maronites and other Christians who were in a majority in 1932, have refused to have a new census taken. They protest that any re-allocation of parliamentary seats would be the first step towards Lebanon being absorbed by Muslim Syria. The most absurd suggestions have been offered by both sides as solutions to the population issue. Christians have stated they will consent to a new census provided that Lebanese emigrants and their descendants, who are overwhelmingly Christian, are included. Muslims have countered by insisting that any new census would have to enumerate the (mainly Sunni) Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.

Relations among members of the different sects tend to be minimized because of their geographical distribution. In northern Lebanon, Sunnis outnumber any other sect and are heavily concentrated in Tripoli. Further south where the terrain becomes mountainous they are outnumbered by Maronites and Orthodox. Mount Lebanon is mainly Maronite territory, but there are also considerable numbers of Druzes, and sprinklings of Sunnis, Shiites, Orthodox, and Melkites. In the Biqa region, Shiites and Sunnis comprise about one-third and one-fifth of the population respectively, while Maronites, Melkites, and Orthodox together make up roughly one-third of the total. Most of the Christians live in Zahle, the region's main city. Southern Lebanon is numerically dominated by Shiites, but Sunni and Christian inhabitants are concentrated in specific towns and cities. Beirut has two areas which are ethnically diverse. One is the Qarantina section where the urban "lumpenproletariat" live, and the other is the fashionable suburb of Ras Beirut. The rest of the city tends to be divided along ethnoreligious lines. Achrafieh and Ain Rummaneh are mainly Maronite suburbs; Ain Mreise, the Basta, and section of Mazraa are dominated by Sunnis; Armenians live in the Doru,

TABLE 4-3
LEBANESE POPULATION BY SECTS AND REGIONS
(PERCENTAGES)

Sect	Beirut	Mount Lebanon	North Lebanon	South Lebanon	Biqā	Total Number
Sunnite	34	6	38	11	19	286,238
Shiites	7	5	*	56	31	250,655
Druze	1	17	*	3	4	88,131
Maronites	8	53	36	15	15	423,708
Melkites	2	5	1	9	18	90,788
Greek Orthodox	12	8	20	4	9	148,927
Protestants	2	*	*	*	*	14,365
Latins	1	*	*	*	*	4,446
Armenian Catholics	4	*	*	*	*	14,631
Armenian Orthodox	19	3	*	*	*	63,679
Chaldeans	*	*	*	*	*	1,466
Syrian Catholics	2	*	*	*	*	5,699
Syrian Orthodox	1	*	*	*	*	4,798
Jews	2	*	*	*	*	6,692
Others	*	*	2	*	*	7,193
Total Number	220,849	422,193	307,695	264,716	195,476	1,411,416

Source: Suleiman (1967: 27)

* = less than 1 per cent

TABLE 4-4
PREDOMINANT RELIGIOUS CATEGORY IN EACH REGION

Region	Predominant Category
Beirut	56% Christian
Mount Lebanon	78% Christian
North Lebanon	60% Christian
Biqā	52% Muslim
South Lebanon	67% Muslim

Source: Smock and Smock (1975: 96)

TABLE 4-5

DISTRIBUTION OF RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN LEBANON, 1956
(PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION OF DISTRICT*)

District	Maronite	Greek Orthodox	Greek Catholic	Armenian Orthodox	Sunnite	Shiite	Druze
Akkar	18	2	1	0	52	0	0
Tripoli	5	10	0	1	78	0	0
Zaghartat	90	3	0	0	6	0	0
Batroun	76	18	2	0	1	3	0
Koura	28	63	0	0	8	4	0
Hermel	3	0	30	0	6	62	0
Baalbek	12	2	4	0	12	68	0
Zahleh	19	10	23	8	24	10	1
Kisrwan	85	2	1	2	1	8	0
Metn	51	9	5	19	0	0	30
Baabda	48	8	3	1	3	18	18
Aley	29	16	3	0	1	2	46
Chouf	34	0	9	0	22	2	31
Saida	8	0	8	0	18	62	0
Jezzine	63	0	16	0	3	5-20	1-5
Rachaya	4	25	2	0	28	0	37
Merjayoun	6	14	5	0	13	45	13
Tyre	6	0	6	2	4	80	0
Beirut	8	11	3	24	24	6	1-5

* Percentages by caza (district) are the same as those calculated after the evaluation of population on December 31, 1944. That is the most recent date for which there are figures on confessional distribution for cazas as well as muhafazas (provinces). Religious data for the entire populations of the cazas were not available; therefore the columns for districts do not total 100 per cent. Several of the minor sects have been omitted.

Source: Hudson (1968: 27)

Zokak-al-Blat, and Bourj Hammond areas; Jews tend to congregate in Wadi Abu Jamil (Starr 1978).

Precise figures on the distribution of the various sects according to geographic region and cazas (electoral districts) are shown in Tables 4.3 to 4.5. It is obvious that although no particular region or district is the exclusive domain of one sect, and that all sects are represented in nearly every area, there is a pattern of ecological

clustering. In 12 of the 19 cazas one sect comprises at least 50% of the total population. It is not difficult to understand why policies of separation and partition have been mooted at various times. Regional differences are further accentuated by economic disparities. A study commissioned by the Government in 1960 (the IRFED study) reported that Lebanon could be divided into three stages of economic development. Mount Lebanon, except for the Chouf region (mainly populated by Druzes), was the most advanced region. Southern Lebanon, southern Biqa, and the Chouf were labelled "underdeveloped". Northern Lebanon and northern Biqa were in a state of "non-development" or "absolute backwardness" (Suleiman 1967: 26).

4.6.2 Religious Enclosure

Religion is one of the most highly compartmentalized institutions in Lebanon. Each sect has its own voluntary associations, schools, political parties, and a host of other structures which make it possible for individuals to interact only with co-religionists. Religion is virtually an ascribed trait. Every Lebanese citizen is issued an identity card by the Government which specifies his religious affiliation. In most social encounters Lebanese can tell one another's religion by interpreting a variety of ethnic clues. Appearance, dress, name, dialect, place of residence, occupation, and political beliefs correlate highly with specific religious backgrounds (Starr 1978). The Lebanese legal system does not provide for civil marriages. Matters relating to marriage, divorce, and adoption are conducted in the separate religious courts of each sect. Intermarriage sometimes occurs (usually for pragmatic reasons) within religious categories, but almost never across them. Sunni and Shiite Muslims do intermarry as do Melkite, Maronite, and Orthodox Christians, but marriages between Christians and Muslims are

extremely rare.

As several scholars have rightly observed, this degree of religious compartmentalization does not mean that the Lebanese are divided over purely religious issues. It is more the case that each sect is the source of social, political, and economic security for its adherents. Like the situation in Ulster, ethnic conflict in Lebanon is particularly difficult to resolve because political and economic grievances are interlocked with the highly emotional power of religious identity. As Suleiman (1967: 38-39) points out, the affectation of religion is central to the everyday life of all Lebanese:

... it cannot be stressed enough that religious affiliation is a most important feature in the life of the Arab in general and the Lebanese in particular. Religion penetrates every facet of a person's life. God and numerous religious symbols are so much a part of the living language that an Arab would be extremely disadvantaged if he decided to drop them from his vocabulary. In greeting, swearing, congratulations, wishing, praising, or any possible activity, it is God or some functionary of His who is called upon to perform what is desired. Religion undoubtedly remains one of the strongest social forces in Lebanon and the Arab world.

4.6.3 Family Loyalties

Many observers have commented that the dominant social and cultural characteristic of the Middle East is its "pervasive familism". In all Middle Eastern societies, the family - extended, patriarchal, patrilineal, patrilocal, and endogamous - is the key social institution. This is particularly true of Lebanese society:

If there ever has been a culture with an exclusive kinship orientation, Lebanon comes close to being such. Kinship has been and is likely to remain, Lebanon's most solid and enduring tie... In Lebanon the family, not the individual is the basic social unit; his occupation, social and political prestige are defined by it... Lebanese society is predominantly a kinship culture. The Lebanese has small appreciation for the solitary ego... One's society begins and ends with

his family... outside of the relatively closed kinship network, his ties are tenuous and amorphous (Khalaf 1971: 236-237).

Throughout history, family bonds among peasant villagers in Lebanon were inseparable from attachments to the land and one's religious sect. Processes associated with modernization have made an impact on traditional family life, but even in large urban centres like Beirut, the family continues to be closely interwoven with economic, religious, political, and recreational institutions. Agriculture, trade and industry are generally small-scale, family-owned ventures in which recruitment, remuneration and promotion are based on family and clan connections (Farsoun and Farsoun (1974). Family solidarity makes it unnecessary for many Lebanese to rely on state agencies for social services such as health, education, and welfare. In their study of Lebanese kinship, Farsoun and Farsoun (1974) reported that families provided the following services for extended members:

1. financial support for retired, disabled, unmarried (women), and unemployed or ill kinsmen;
2. educational, migratory and funeral expenses;
3. free health care either via a family doctor or a family friend; contributions to hospitalization costs; assistance with the household affairs of the ill;
4. performing day-to-day services such as shopping and baby-sitting for the housebound.

In an analysis of formal organizations in Lebanon, Khalaf (1971) found that 477 were family associations, 405 were non-governmental welfare agencies, 169 were labour unions, 85 were employer groups, and 12 were political parties. Membership in the family associations was restricted to descendants of the same lineage and the main objectives of most organizations were to promote family solidarity, carry out benevolent functions, and raise the educational and cultural levels of

family members (see Table 4-6). Another important finding of Khalaf's study was the way in which family associations were ecologically linked. Families related through marriage and living in a particular area formed joint associations bearing the name of their specific locale, village, or town. Family, clan, and geography are also interrelated in political spheres. Political loyalties still continue to be influenced by a feudal arrangement, whereby groups of families in the same village or region pledge allegiance to a sort of chieftan or political boss known as za'im (plural zu'ama) in return for security and protection. Today a handful of powerful families dominate Lebanese politics and many people have no political fidelity to anyone but the zu'ama who head them.

TABLE 4-6

OBJECTIVE OF FAMILY ASSOCIATIONS : RELIGIOUS VARIATIONS

Objectives	Christian	Sunnite	Shiite	Druze	Total
Solidarity	70 (58.8)	36 (60.0)	56 (50.9)	18 (60.0)	185 (58.0)
Benevolent	65 (54.6)	29 (48.3)	69 (62.7)	20 (66.7)	183 (57.4)
Educational	35 (29.4)	36 (60.0)	65 (59.1)	15 (50.0)	151 (47.3)
Social	26 (21.8)	24 (40.0)	50 (45.4)	9 (30.0)	109 (34.2)
Economic	24 (20.2)	17 (28.3)	20 (18.2)	7 (23.3)	68 (21.3)
Co-operative	11 (9.2)	8 (13.3)	5 (4.5)	2 (6.7)	29 (9.1)
Health	2 (1.7)	9 (15.0)	13 (11.8)	2 (6.7)	26 (8.1)
Moral-Religious	6 (5.0)	4 (6.7)	3 (2.7)	2 (6.7)	15 (4.7)
Mediation	5 (4.2)	2 (3.3)	1 (0.9)	1 (3.3)	9 (2.8)
Recreational	1 (0.8)	2 (3.3)	1 (0.9)	1 (3.3)	9 (2.8)
Total (N)*	119	60	110	30	319

* Totals add up to more than 100% because of multiple response. An association may state an interest in more than one objective.

Source: Khalaf (1971: 245)

4.6.4 Educational Enclosure

The system of public education in Lebanon has very little impact on inculcating civic pride and national awareness among students. In every respect the parochial schools are much more powerful socializing agents. Sixty per cent of all students attend private schools and Catholic schools alone account for 14% of all primary, complementary, and secondary institutions (Smock and Smock 1975: 85; see Tables 4-7 and 4-8). The students in these parochial schools are usually from

TABLE 4-7

PERCENTAGE OF LEBANESE STUDENTS
ENROLLED IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS 1943-1970

Year	Total Enrollment	Percentage In Public Schools	Percentage In Private Schools
1943	131,000	17.5	82.5
1959	266,900	39.7	60.3
1965	442,510	40.9	59.1
1970	732,681	38.0	62.0

Source: Smock and Smock (1975: 178)

TABLE 4-8

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENROLLMENT
BY TYPE OF SCHOOLS IN LEBANON IN 1970

Type of School	Percentage of Public School Enrollment	Percentage of Private School Enrollment
Primary	44	56
Complementary	51	49
Secondary	29	71
University	29	71

Source: Smock and Smock (1975: 179)

the same religious background and are mainly exposed to the beliefs of their own religious community.² In a content analysis of 72 history texts used by various Lebanese schools, Smock and Smock (1975: 186) reported that the major difference in the books was whether Lebanon's heritage was viewed as predominantly Phoenician or Arab. Christian writers generally promulgated the Phoenician dimension by devoting more space to this topic, selectively emphasizing the favorable aspects of Phoenician civilization, and equating Lebanon's current territory with that of the Phoenician city-states. Muslim authors tended to stress Lebanon's relationship with the Arab world and to emphasize that Phoenician and Lebanese boundaries were not comparable. Education is not simply a matter of cultural differentiation but also a political and economic issue. Together, the predominantly Sunni north and predominantly Shiite south comprise an area three times as large as Mount Lebanon and have a population twice that of the latter region. Yet there are many more schools and students enrolled in the preponderantly Christian region of Mount Lebanon (see Table 4-9). Thus Muslims and Christians tend to have different types and levels of educational

TABLE 4-9
PERCENTAGE OF SCHOOLS IN EACH REGION
1966 AND 1971

Region	Predominant Religious Community	% of Total Population	Total Percentage of Schools	
			1966	1971
Beirut	56% Christian	15	10.5	11.5
Mount Lebanon	78% Christian	29	36.8	38.2
North Lebanon	60% Christian	22	21.4	22.1
South Lebanon	52% Muslim	19	15.3	14.8
Biqā	67% Muslim	14	15.9	13.4

Source: Smock and Smock (1975: 96, 180)

TABLE 4-10
DIFFERENCES IN LANGUAGE ABILITY
BETWEEN LEBANESE MUSLIMS AND CHRISTIANS (%)

Language Ability*	Males		Females		Boys		Girls	
	C	M	C	M	C	M	C	M
Illiterate	23	39	45	69	22	28	29	33
Arabic Only	48	39	28	22	32	34	29	37
Arabic & French	21	17	24	7	37	32	39	28
Arabic & English	3	3	1	2	3	5	1	2
Arabic, French & English	5	2	2	-	6	1	2	-

* includes ability to read, write, and speak

C = Christian

M = Muslim

Source: Gulick (1965: 169)

attainment. Christians are much more likely than Muslims to have attended a private school and have higher rates of literacy and multilingualism (see Table 4-10). Muslims resent Christian dominance of the educational sphere and demand more expenditure on public schooling.

4.6.5 Political Enclosure

Nowhere is ethnic factionalism in Lebanon more pronounced than in the polity. During the French mandate (1920-1943) a political system called "confessionalism" was introduced. Based on the census of 1932, at which time Christians outnumbered Muslims by a 6:5 ratio, each sect was allocated parliamentary seats on the basis of its numerical representation. Table 4-11 shows that although the number of parliamentary seats has increased over the years, the proportions allotted to Christians and Muslims has remained fixed at 6:5. Before independence in 1943, the sects worked out a gentleman's agreement known as the

TABLE 4-11
NUMBER OF PARLIAMENTARY SEATS BY SECT
1943-1972

Sect	Year								
	'43	'47	'51	'53	'57	'60	'64	'68	'72
Maronite	18	18	23	13	20	30	30	30	30
Greek Orthodox	6	6	8	5	7	11	11	11	11
Greek Catholic	3	3	5	3	4	6	6	6	6
Armenian Catholic	2	2	3	2	3	4	4	4	4
Minority	1	1	3	1	2	3	3	3	3
Sunnite	11	11	16	9	14	20	20	20	20
Shiite	10	10	14	8	12	19	19	19	19
Druze	4	4	5	3	4	6	6	6	6
Totals:									
Christians	30	30	42	24	36	54	54	54	54
Non-Christians	25	25	35	20	30	45	45	45	45
Totals	55	55	77	44	66	99	99	99	99

Source: Entelis (1974: 495)

National Pact whereby specific government positions were reserved for each sect. This unwritten formula provided for the President always to be a Maronite, the Prime Minister a Sunni, the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies a Shiite, and the Deputy Speaker and Deputy Prime Minister Orthodox. Less important portfolios were also parceled out on the basis of sectarian affiliation. The defence Minister was to be a Druze, the Commander of the Army a Maronite, the Foreign Minister a Christian, and the Minister of the Interior a Sunni. Tables 4-12 and 4-13 illustrate how this informal distribution of ministerial positions has become institutionalized over the years. It is interesting to note that the Sunnis, Maronites, and Orthodox have been overrepresented in the higher administrative and diplomatic posts, while the Shiites have been

TABLE 4-12
SUMMARY OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION
OF THE SIX MAJOR RELIGIOUS SECTS

Percentage of	Maronites	Sunnite	Shia	Greek Orth.	Greek Cath.	Druze	Total
Population	30	20	18	10	6	6	1,430,908
Parliamentary seats, 1943-1961	30.8	20.45	18.4	10.85	6	6.6	398
Ministerial port- folios, 1943-1961	20	26	13.8	15.7	10.5	13	369
Cabinet ministers, 1943-1961	25.1	23.8	13.4	12.1	11.3	13.4	231
Higher adm. and diplomat posts 1946	38.7	29	3.2	19.3	3.2	6.4	31
Higher adm. and diplomat posts 1955	40	27	3.6	11.7	9	7.2	111

Source: Crow (1962: 519)

TABLE 4-13
DISTRIBUTION OF MINISTERIAL PORTFOLIOS BY SECT IN
26 CABINETS 1943-1961*

	Prime Minister	Vice Prime Minister	Finance	Justice	Education	Foreign Affairs	Public Works	Interior	Post, Telephone Telegraph	Public Health	Defense	Agriculture	National Economy	Supply	Social Affairs	Information	Planning	State
Maronites			13	4	15	12	3	5	4	9	1	2			2	3		1
Sunnite	26		11	6	1	1	3	16	4	2	4	1	9	1	5	4	2	2
Shiite	1			3			7	2	9	4	4	8	4		1	4	3	1
Greek Orth.	15			10	4	4	8	2	2	2		4	5			1		
Greek Cath.			2	1	5	9	4	1	3	1			7		5		1	
Druze				2	1		1		4	8	17	11	1		1	2		
Armenian Cath.																	1	
Armenian Orth.																		1

* Omitting 8 interim and abortive cabinets.

Source: Crow (1962: 506)

underrepresented in these positions. However, Shiites have lobbied strongly for a greater political share, and recent data suggests they have been successful in some respects. (see Table 4-14). This system

TABLE 4-14

DISTRIBUTION OF CLASS ONE CIVIL SERVICE POSTS
(AMBASSADORS AND DIRECTORS GENERALS) AMONG SECTS 1946-1974

Sect	1946	1962	1972	1974
Maronite	12	18	28	39
Orthodox	6	11	10	14
Melkite	1	7	9	8
Other Christians	0	2	2	9
(Christian Subtotal)	(19)	(38)	(49)	(70)
(Percentage Christian)	(61%)	(54%)	(52%)	(50%)
Sunnite	9	24	23	31
Shiite	1	2	15	29
Druze	2	6	7	10
(Muslim Subtotal)	(12)	(32)	(45)	(70)
(Percentage Muslim)	(39%)	(46%)	(48%)	(50%)
TOTAL	31	70	94	140

Source: Smock and Smock (1975: 127)

of political quotes has enabled the interests of each sect to be represented, but it has also meant that the quality of performance has suffered. For example, in 1955 a Maronite engineer was allocated the foreign affairs ministry, since this portfolio has always been reserved for Christians, while a Sunni ex-diplomat was appointed minister of public works. Certain public service positions are also subject to religious quotes. If four positions become vacant, two must be filled by Christians and two by Muslims. If the four most qualified applicants are say Muslims, only two of them can be appointed along with two less experienced Christians. If four Muslims are qualified but no Christians have applied, then all the positions remain vacant until Christian

candidates apply. The biggest problem with this policy is that there is usually a surplus of capable Christians but a deficit of qualified Muslims. In the past it has often proved exceedingly difficult to locate Shiites who have prerequisites for the positions which are reserved for them.

As long as the sectarian composition of the population remained constant, this formula worked reasonably well. But the proportions have gradually shifted over the years, because Muslims have had higher birth rates than Christians and more of the latter than the former have emigrated. The Muslims argue that the ratio should now be altered so that they can be more fairly represented in parliament. Christians, especially the Maronites, claim that everything they have created in Lebanon-democracy, liberty, economic prosperity, secularization, high standards of literacy and education, the emancipation of women - would be lost under a Muslim-dominated government which would be theocratic, culturally backward, intolerant of non-Muslims, and likely to merge with Syria. Their apprehensions are summed up by Father Paul Naaman, head of a think-tank at the Maronite Kaslik University which provides background studies for the rightist Christian parties and militias. According to him, Muslims in Lebanon backed by the rest of the Arab world, want to reduce Lebanon's Christians to the status of dhimmis:

It is unthinkable and inadmissible for a Moslem to accept living under a non-Islamic government. This is an unchangeable rule of Islam. Lebanese Moslems, therefore, aim to install an Islamic government in Beirut and force the Christians to live as second-class citizens. They want us to be as passive and powerless as the Copts of Egypt (New York Herald Tribune 1972: 2).

Muslim leaders reply that linguistic, national, and sectarian differences make Arab unity impossible and that they are just as committed to the preservation of Lebanon as Christians are. They charge that they are the ones being discriminated against, because the framework of the National Pact prohibits them from having a fair representation in parliament and access to key posts.

These political grievances are also tied to the economic disparities among the sects. In nearly every aspect of socioeconomic life - income, education, control of elite positions in trade and commerce, occupational prestige, and rates of social and occupational mobility - Christians outrank Muslims. Muslims see this as a system of monopoly and favouritism which the Christians perpetuate through the political sphere, whereas the latter view it as a natural consequence of their cultural superiority over Islamic traditions. Again the conflict is not simply a matter of Muslim - Christian confrontation. The Shiites feel particularly discriminated against in political and economic institutions and have formed their own pressure group to press for a fairer degree of representation (Sulemein 1967: 48). Each sect is split into numerous factions because the zuma are ambitious to have themselves elected to the major executive positions allocated to each sect. These zuma and the political parties which they represent, "are so involved with parochial and personalistic rivalries that they fail to serve the larger national purpose of mobilizing the population for the broader aims of the society" (Khalaf 1968: 243).

The fissiparous nature of Lebanese politics is indicated by the fact that a country with approximately the same population as Sydney,

harbors nearly thirty political parties, over half of which have their own militias (see Appendix B). Moreover, not one of the parties has a platform based on national interests and none is a representative of all sects and regions in Lebanon. Entelis (1974) has suggested that the ideological orientations of Lebanese political parties fall somewhere along a continuum between "Lebanonism" and "Arabism".

"Lebanonists" maintain that their country is unique in the Arab world because of its Phoenician ancestors, its reputation as a refuge for persecuted minorities, its degree of Westernization, and its Christian heritage. Some extreme Lebanonists claim that Lebanon has no Arab traits and is really a European country. Most acknowledge Lebanon's Arab heritage but feel that it is far from the most important characteristic of being Lebanese. Leaders of the Christian parties who support the nation of Lebanonism feel that "Lebanese are Arabs just as the Danes are Scandinavians, the Rumanians Slavs, or Chileans Latin Americans" (Entelis 1974: 79). "Arabists" on the other hand, dismiss Lebanonism as sheer nonsense. To deny the influence of Arab civilization on Lebanon is, as Yamak (1966: 84) points out, to assert "that fourteen centuries in the history of a nation are but a fleeting moment and are, therefore, of no consequence whatsoever". Some Arabist extremists deny that Lebanon has any characteristics which distinguish it from the Arab world. Most Muslims recognize that Lebanon is unique in certain respects but feel that its Arab components are its most important features.

It hardly comes as a surprise then, that members of the various religious communities manifest strikingly different political attitudes. For instance, Smock and Smock (1975: 136) asked a sample of Lebanese Christians and Muslims questions about their political orientations.

Respondents were asked to rank the following in terms of their personal importance: their locality, their religious sect, Lebanon, the Arab nation, and their extended family. Sixty-two percent of the Christians but only 34% of the Muslims ranked Lebanon first; 30% of the Muslims but only 8% of Christians placed the Arab nation first. Respondents were also asked which two persons (alive or dead) whom they most admired. Forty-three percent of the Christians and 13% of the Muslims nominated Christian politicians (usually Chamoun). Thirty-three percent of the Muslims and only 5% of the Christians nominated the deceased Egyptian president Nasser. When they were asked which other country they thought Lebanon had the most in common, 40% of the Muslims indicated Syria or another Arab state. Only 18% of the Christians mentioned an Arab country; most mentioned a European state like France or Switzerland.

These differences between Christians and Muslims have resulted in the inability of the Lebanese to create a Lebanese identity. Lebanese often display intense loyalty of their family and clan, village, and church, but hardly ever to their state. As Suleiman (1967: 1) remarks, there is no such thing as a corporate Lebanese identity:

... the inhabitants of what constitutes Lebanon today have rarely, if ever, had strong feelings of loyalty to a Lebanese "nation". One may talk of Maronite, Druze, Moslem, or Arab nationalism, but Lebanese nationalism as such... has yet to become a reality.

In light of these parochial loyalties, it is hardly surprising that the central government is largely ineffective. It draws no commitment from the different political parties because it is irrelevant to their specific interests. The government has become

stagnant because it has been forced to adopt a policy of maintaining the political status quo in order to prevent confrontations among the sects. For instance, it has purposely kept the army weak so that it could not side with one particular sect.³ This has led to the concentration of military power in the hands of the zuma and their militias. The government has no control over these private armies and provides little resistance to external threats by Syrians, Palestinians, and Israelis. Furthermore, it has often been the case that de facto power has been wielded by religious rather than political elites. According to Longrigg (1958: 252), in the 1930's the Maronite patriarch was "a party leader with the prerogatives of a monarch".

4.7 The Road To Civil War

Despite the fragility inherent to such a political system, it appeared in the early years of independence that confessionalism and elite accommodation would allow Lebanon to function with a tolerable degree of conflict. In the halcyon decades of the 1950's and 1960's, a number of Lebanon's features - ethnic diversity, a cosmopolitan capital, political neutrality, scenic topography, and a clandestine banking system - earned it the title of the "the Switzerland of the Middle East". However, internal conflicts, facilitated once again by external factors, have led to the virtual destruction of Lebanon as a sovereign state.

The weakness of the government was first highlighted in the 1950's when the charismatic Egyptian leader, Gamel Abdel Nasser, came to power. His leftist, pan-Arab ideology found great support among Lebanon's Muslims, who were furious at President Chamoun's refusal to join other Arab countries in breaking diplomatic relations with Britain and

France over the Suez crisis in 1956. Opposition to Chamoun, a pro-Western Maronite, intensified and when Egypt and Syria merged in 1958 to form the United Arab Republic, six months of insurrection broke out in Lebanon. To restore order Chamoun invoked the "Eisenhower doctrine" - an agreement whereby the U.S.A. offered military and financial aid to anti-communist countries in the Middle East - and 10,000 U.S. marines landed in Lebanon. The situation was defused when Chamoun was voted out of office and replaced by Fuad Chehab, who had support from Christian rightists and Muslim leftists. The crisis of 1958 underlined the inability of the central government to control internal conflict and the ability of external powers to disrupt and restore stability.

This two-sided problem of internal disunity and external interference is the reason for Lebanon's most recent conflict. In 1948 about 70,000 Palestinians, mainly Sunni Muslims, were settled in United Nations refugee camps in Southern Lebanon. After the Six Day War in 1967, the number of Palestinians swelled to 300,000. From Southern Lebanon the Palestinians began mounting guerilla attacks on Israel which led to Israeli reprisals. The Lebanese government attempted to resolve the conflict, but politicians were divided in their sympathies for the Palestinians and no concrete action was taken. The Israeli-Palestinian confrontation intensified in 1970 when Palestinian guerillas were expelled from Jordan and fled to Lebanon. By now the Palestinians had their own army, and virtually constituted a nation of their own within Lebanese borders. Christian rightists viewed the Palestinians as a threat to Lebanese sovereignty and accused Muslim leftists of collaborating with them in order to overthrow the Lebanese government. The Muslim leftists felt that Christians'

attitudes toward the Palestinians was a reflection of Christians' anti-Arab sentiments in general. The various factions began mobilizing their militias and one of the Christian zuma was shot at during the consecration of a church in Beirut in 1975. His Phalangist supporters retaliated by ambushing a busload of Palestinians.

In 1976 when a group of Christians blockaded Palestinian refugee camps which had previously been bombed by Israel, Syria sent in its troops to assist the Palestinians. Under Syrian protection a coalition of Palestinian and Lebanese Muslims began an offensive which was so successful, that Christian forces were on the brink of being obliterated. Realizing that a complete defeat of the Christians would draw Israel into the conflict, the Syrians halted the Palestinian-Muslim advance. A cease-fire was arranged and Elias Sarkis, a Maronite backed by the Syrians, was elected President. For a brief period, order was restored, but the Palestinian issue was left unresolved. In 1978 a group of Palestinian guerillas left southern Lebanon in boats, landed in Israel, hijacked a bus and killed 35 Israeli passengers. Israel replied by a week-long assault on southern Lebanon, killing 500 Lebanese civilians, most of them Shiites, and 250 Palestinians. Civil war again began and only a U.N. resolution to send an interim force to Lebanon (U N I F I L) stopped an all-out onslaught by both sides. A cease-fire presently exists, but it is constantly violated. Unless Israel agrees to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, which is highly unlikely, the Lebanese crisis will continue to simmer. Short of partition, it is unlikely that the Maronites will ever regain their position of dominance in the country. Today, Lebanon is still being compared to other polyethnic societies,

but as the recent commentary below suggests, it is now called not "the Switzerland" but the "Northern Ireland" of the Middle East:

Lebanon itself no longer exists as a sovereign state. By the middle of 1978 it had become an armed camp with, at one time, no less than six separate armies fighting over what was left of the most sophisticated and opulent trading centre in the Middle East. Beirut is in ruins, effectively partitioned between Christian and Moslem, rich and poor, refugee camps and the pathetic remains of special kind of Levantine middle class extravagance. Amid these scenes real political life is non-existent. President Elias Sarkis, less than a Syrian puppet but not much more than a well-meaning technician, has no political base to speak of, and neither has his government. The institutions which would give credibility to a Lebanese state-army, parliament, government - are paper thin. The only tangible asset left to Lebanon is its gold, and that is probably held abroad (Cass 1978: 17).

In summary then, Lebanon lacks a raison d'etre, because there is almost no sense of loyalty to the state among its citizens. The different communities have experienced centuries of mutual animosity and there is no common social unit capable of encouraging them to forego their allegiances to kin, village, and sect. In fact, as Harik (1972: 315) observes, sectarianism is reinforced by other social characteristics:

.... Lebanon is a microcosm of small ethnic groups where the occurrence of one ethnic attribute means the incidence of at least one other attribute. The key factor here is religion. If a person is a Christian, then in the majority of cases he is likely to be literate, relatively well off, an inhabitant of Mount Lebanon or Beirut city, and Western-orientated politically. If, on the other hand, a person is a Sunni Muslim he is likely to be also literate, relatively less well off than the Christian, dweller in the coastal towns of Tripoli, Beirut, or Sidon, and Arab-orientated in his politics. If he is a Shiite, then he is likely to be illiterate, on the lower income scale of the country, peasant or worker by occupation, dweller in the geographic belt around Mount Lebanon, and with mixed political feelings on Arab nationalism.

The principle of ethnic particularism is enshrined in the Lebanese constitution and is evident in every institutional sphere. Lebanese society is a system of checks and balances in which all sects are in a sense minorities. This means that no particular sect can force its will upon the others and hence necessitates a certain degree of compromise. It also means that each sect jealously guards its privileges and will not sacrifice its own narrow goals for the sake of the wider society. "Every sect", as Hudson (1968: 24) comments, "in effect holds hostages of other sects and is simultaneously vulnerable to reprisals". He notes that this is preferable to a Hobbesian state of "war of all against all", but far removed from consensus based on positive trust. It is a small wonder then, that scholars have labelled Lebanon a "precarious republic" and an "improbable nation".

4.8 Summary

This general overview has been intended to acquaint the reader with some fundamental cultural and social traits of the Lebanese. In the first part of the chapter I described how geography, religion, and Westernization encouraged the development and maintenance of parochial loyalties. In the second section I discussed the extent to which provincialism still characterizes modern Lebanon. An obvious conclusion from this historical analysis is that loyalty to the state is virtually non-existent because citizens' allegiances to family, village, and sect have militated against the development of civic consciousness.

Without understanding certain historical factors, it would be exceedingly difficult to explain the processes of institutionalization and de-institutionalization among Syrian-Lebanese in Australia. For instance, the absorption of the Maronites by the Australian Catholic

church is comprehensible once we are aware of the history of close ties between the two churches. The importance of other historical features discussed in this chapter will become apparent when I analyze changes in ethnic organization and ethnic identity in chapters six and seven. Before examining these changes, it is necessary to present some demographic information about Syrian migration in general, and migration to Australia in particular.

NOTES

1. Many historians and theologians are of the opinion that this assertion, like the Maronites' avowal of their Phoenician ancestry, has very little substance. Most scholars agree that until the Crusaders arrived in the Holy Land, the Maronites adhered to the heretical, Monothelite doctrine.
2. There is a familiar Lebanese anecdote about the way in which religion is an imposed attribute. When enrolling at a Lebanese university, a foreign student entered "none" under the heading "applicant's religion". The admissions clerk advised the student that all applicants had to specify their religion for administrative purposes. After arguing unsuccessfully with the clerk the student said, "Put me down as an atheist". The clerk then asked, "Christian atheist or Muslim atheist?"
3. Another humorous account of confessionalism is contained in a parable about the Lebanese army during the Palestinian war. A Maronite lieutenant found a Melkite platoon completely inactive, even though fighting was raging all around it. The lieutenant castigated the unit and demanded to know why they were not engaged in combat. A Melkite officer explained that one of their men had just been killed and they were now waiting for three Maronites, two Sunnis, two Shiites, two Orthodox and one Druze also to be killed before they resumed fighting.

CHAPTER 5

THE SYRIAN DIASPORA

5.1 Reasons for Migration

Syrian migration to Australia was a small segment of a mass exodus to nearly every corner of the world. The reasons for this diaspora, which began around the middle of the last century, were a combination of the following interrelated political, economic, and religious factors: (1) Turkish oppression; (2) Christians' precarious future following the civil war between themselves and the Druze in 1860; (3) the influence of American Protestant missionaries; they encouraged and assisted converts to pursue their studies abroad and provided information about the opportunities available overseas; (4) the depressed state of the Lebanese economy caused by the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 (which undermined the silk industry); (5) the bleak outlook of a region in which the population was rapidly increasing and the availability of land was consequently decreasing; (6) the success of early emigrants which had the "snowball effect" of influencing friends and relatives to go abroad and "pick up the gold in the streets".

5.2 Countries of Immigration

Early migration was directed mainly toward Egypt which required businessmen and professionals to assist in the government's attempts at modernization. Hitti (1965: 209) estimates that by 1907, the Syrian population controlled nearly 10% of Egypt's wealth. Migration elsewhere was on a small scale before the 1880's. Around this time Syrians began arriving in the Americas, Africa, Australia, and New Zealand in appreciable numbers. Tannous (1943a) reports that, "by 1925 practically every household in every village of the Lebanese mountains had one or more of its members as permanent emigrants in American countries". In the late 1880's Syrians bound for America boarded the wrong ships at Marseilles and found themselves in

West Africa (Hanna 1958). Most of these early migrants intended to make a quick fortune and return home as successful men. Some did, but most found the economic and religious freedom which they experienced irresistible, and they soon sent for the other members of their families.

5.3 Problems Of Deriving Population Estimates

It is impossible to obtain precise data for early Lebanese migration. This is because: (a) Lebanese were never categorized as Lebanese before the 1920's; and (b) they were a relatively inconspicuous immigrant population in most countries. Under Ottoman rule, all emigrants were issued Turkish passports regardless of their regional, linguistic or religious origin. Thus, Greeks, Syrians, Armenians, Copts, and Jews who emigrated from Ottoman territory were all classified as "Turks" upon entry. This led to the paradoxical situation of immigrants in the 1880's and 1890's being classified as "Turks" when hardly any of them were bona fide Turks. Many had emigrated because of Turkish persecution, so to be called Turks was anathema to them.

As immigration authorities became aware of internal differences among "Turks", they began sorting them out on the basis of region of origin. This makes it possible to distinguish "Syrians" from other "Turkish" immigrants, but does not help us to distinguish between Lebanese and non-Lebanese Syrians. Until the French mandate, Lebanon was merely an autonomous district in the Ottoman province of Syria and its boundaries had constantly changed throughout history. Syria referred to an amorphous territory bounded on the west by the Mediterranean, on the southwest by Egypt, on the north by the Euphrates, and on the southeast by the Arabian Desert. Among the early Syrian migrants were not only people from Lebanon proper, but also Jews, Greeks, Armenians, and Christians from Greater Syria. Exactly how many non-Lebanese Syrians emigrated is unknown, but it is generally thought that they never exceeded

10% of the total. It was not until after dependent statehood was achieved in 1926, that individuals migrated with Lebanese passports. Even during the French mandate, many Lebanese migrated to the U.S.A. not as Lebanese, but as "passport Syrians" (Kayal and Kayal 1975).

Another factor which contributed to the lack of reliable information on early migration to most countries, is that Syrian immigrants were relatively inconspicuous. Firstly, they did not migrate in numbers comparable to Southern and Eastern Europeans. Secondly, they rapidly dispersed throughout most countries. They did form "Little Syrias", mainly in the U.S.A., but in most countries they settled in the hinterland. Thirdly, they exhibited no physical characteristics which signified they belonged to a specific ethnic or racial population. According to van der Laan (1975), the early Syrians in Sierra Leone were thought to be another variety of Europeans. He suggests that some of the early Syrians may have gone undetected because of their physical resemblance to Europeans. Given these demographic facts, it is not surprising that scholars disagree over early emigration statistics. Hitti (1965) and Berger (1960) estimate that emigration from Lebanon between 1900 and World War I totalled about 100,000. This would have comprised nearly a quarter of the population of Lebanon. Entelis (1974) gives a figure of 225,000 for the same period which seems high, as this would have constituted about half of Lebanon's population. Before 1880, annual migration to the U.S.A. was in the hundreds, but afterwards climbed into the thousands with peak intakes of 9,000 in 1913 and 1914 (Berger 1960). According to Hitti (1924), there were approximately 200,000 Syrians (including American-born descendants) in the U.S.A. by the mid 1920's. Emigration resumed after World War I but in lesser numbers. Immigration quotas in the U.S.A. and the depression of the 1930's discouraged migration in the two decades following the war. Hitti (1965) estimates that by the end of 1959, about 1.1 million Lebanese emigrants and their offspring - almost equivalent to Lebanon's own population at that

time - were scattered throughout the world. The mass dispersal of so many people from such a small country is one of the most remarkable episodes in the annals of human migration. The material success achieved by some of these emigrants ranks the Lebanese with the Jews and Chinese as quintessential commercant nomades.

5.4 Migration To Australia

It is unlikely that we will ever know the exact date on which the first Syrian(s) arrived in Australia due to the inadequacies of Turkish and Australian migration records. As is usually the case with ethnohistory, the analysis of Syrian migration involves separating fact from myth. There are stories of Syrians being in the Victorian goldfields as early as the middle of the last century. The possibility that there were some Syrians on gold rush boats cannot be ruled out, as there is evidence of people coming to Australia from the Middle East region as early as 1846. The odd Syrian could have been on one of the boats which evaded official immigration procedures by unloading their passengers on isolated Victorian beaches. However, the possibility that Syrians landed in Australia before 1850 is quite remote, as any emigration from Lebanon before then was almost non-existent.¹ There are also apochrypal tales of Syrians mistakenly boarding boats bound for Oceania in the 1860's and 1870's and disembarking in Australia and New Zealand. According to legend, they were thought to be men from the Holy Land because of their dress and the religious artifacts which they sold. There is some evidence to indicate that Syrians were in Australia in the 1850's. In the 1921 Commonwealth census, a crosstabulation between birthplace and length of residence reveals that one person reported being in Australia between 60 and 69 years, and two individuals reported a residential period of 50 to 59 years. If correct, this means that the first Syrian immigrant could have been in Australia as early as 1852. However, these three individuals could have been

Syrian Jews, as they were included with other Syrian-born respondents in the 1921 census. In the register of deaths in the St. Mary's Cathedral archives, a certificate bearing a Lebanese sounding name appears as early as 1861. Based on this information, it can be inferred that the first Syrians arrived in Australia between 1850 and 1860.

These very early migrants came as individuals or in small groups, as it was not until the early 1890's that Syrians migrated in numbers large enough to attract the attention of the native population. It is possible that the first migrants, like the Syrians who went to West Africa, came to Australia unintentionally. Hitti (1957: 231), for instance, states that, "He who amassed the largest fortune in Australia was there two years before he discovered he was not in 'Al-Na-Yurk' (New York), the shipping agent in Marseilles having put him on the wrong boat".

The earliest Syrian migrant on whom I was able to obtain reliable information was Joseph Arida. In most respects Arida was atypical of most Syrian immigrants. Firstly, he came from an affluent and influential family. One of his younger brothers became the Maronite Patriarch of Lebanon in the 1930's. Secondly, because of his family background he was well educated speaking English, French, Spanish, and Arabic. Thirdly, he arrived in Australia as a wealthy man having made his fortune with another brother in the clothing trade in Argentina. In characteristic Syrian fashion he was determined to be independent, so obtained his share of profits from the business in Argentina and took a boat to Spain, with the possible intention of going to the U.S.A. While in Spain he heard about Australia and decided to go there and arrived in Sydney in 1879 or 1880. After purchasing several horses and a waggon loaded with an assortment of dry goods, he travelled north selling from his cart along the way. In Brisbane he heard about the money to be made

in mining towns, so set off for north Queensland. By 1882 he had opened a general store in Charter's Towers which eventually became one of the biggest of its kind in Queensland. By the end of the 1880's he had been joined by his wife, a younger brother, and some relatives from his native town of Becharre. Together, they operated stores in Winton, Hughenden, Cloncurry, Normanton, Bowen, Collinsville, and several other locations.

It was after Arida's arrival that Syrians began coming to Australia in substantial numbers. The first Syrian to obtain citizenship was Antonia Mansur, a hawker from Damascus, who arrived in the colony of N.S.W. in 1883 and was naturalized 5 years later. Between 1880 and 1889 approximately 80 Syrians were naturalized in N.S.W.; another 130 were naturalized between 1890 and 1899; between 1900 and 1903 (after which the Commonwealth Government controlled immigration and citizenship) another 160 were naturalized. Registers of baptisms and marriages in Australian Catholic churches in Redfern, Surry Hills, and Waterloo, where many of the early Syrians settled, record the first native-born child of Syrian parents in 1884. The first recorded marriage between two Syrians was in 1888. During the 1880's the number of Syrians in Australia was still very small. According to Lyng (1935: 185), the almost complete absence of Syrians in colonial records attested to "their insignificance both in regard to number and importance". Syrians first appeared as a separate entity in the N.S.W. census of 1891. In his 1891 report the census statistician referred to the "Syrian and Indian hawker nuisance".

Throughout the 1890's, Syrians, frequently called "Assyrians", were mentioned in N.S.W. Parliamentary speeches,² usually in conjunction with immigration restriction laws or moves to have hawkers' licences withdrawn from "Asiatics", "aliens", "coloured races" or "black labour". On the 23rd of

January, 1893 the N.S.W. Premier sent a circular telegram to all other colonial premiers inquiring about convening an intercolonial conference to take joint action against "the influx of people of coloured races - Syrians, Afghans, Hindus, and others".³ In November of the same year, the MLA for Richmond asked the Colonial Secretary if the Government intended to introduce a bill "to stop the influx of Kanakas, Syrians, other Asiatics, and alien people coming into this colony".⁴ In March of the following year, the MLA for Bourke stated that in the opinion of the House, "the presence of inferior races - such as Assyrians, Afghans, Kanakas, and Cingalese - and their liberty to engage in various avenues of employment is unjust to Australian citizens, and demoralizing to society".⁵ He then called on the Government to introduce a bill to restrict the immigration of all such races to the colony.

On four different occasions during the next year, various MLA's pressed the Government to legislate against "inferior races" and "coloured labour". On 2nd July, 1895, the House adjourned at the request of the MLA for West Macquarie "in order to call attention to a matter of urgent public importance, namely the attitude of the Government in opposing the introduction of legislation to exclude aliens from this colony".⁶ The speaker then went on to propose a restriction bill which would apply to Japanese, Javanese, Kanakas, and Syrians, all whom were deemed to be "lower than the lowest of Chinese", and "whose conditions of life are such that they cannot be assimilated to the conditions of the working population of this colony".

Syrians were also alluded to during debates on the Government's Coloured Races Restriction Bill and Immigration Restriction Bill, but it is clear that they were of minor importance compared to the perceived

7
threats from Japanese, Hindus, and Kanakas. The same is true of debates on the Commonwealth Government's Immigration Restriction Act of 1901. Yarwood (1964) notes that they received little attention in the debates and were not singled out in the way Japanese were.

5.5 Population Estimates For Australia

The problems mentioned earlier about obtaining reliable statistics for Syrian migrants also applies to Australia. Before 1901 Syrians were usually classified under the categories "Turkey", "other countries in Asia", or "other". In the Commonwealth census, Lebanese and Syrian immigrants were not classified separately until 1954. In the N.S.W. Parliamentary debates, Syrians (or Assyrians) were lumped together with "alien" or "coloured hawkers", and were indiscriminately referred to as "Turks", "Afghans", "Arabs", "Hindus", and "Asiatics". On pre-federation hawkers' permits and naturalization certificates, and on wedding and baptismal certificates, it is common to find individuals who were born in Lebanon proper to be designated as natives of "Persia", "Arabia", "Bessarabia", "Asia Minor", "Turkey", "Palestine", and "Assyria", as well as "Syria". One individual who was born in the northern coastal city of Tripoli and was naturalized in South Australia in 1898, had Tripolis, Greece entered as his birthplace on his naturalization certificate.

Syrians first appear as a distinct category in the N.S.W. census of 1891 where 116 are listed under the heading "Turkey in Asia" (see Table 5-1). There is no way of telling how precise this figure is. It may be inflated because some Jews, Armenians, and Greeks from Damascus or Aleppo could have been classified as Syrians. On the other hand, it could be an understatement, as some Syrians could have been included as natives of "Arabia", "Asia Minor", "Persia", "Afghanistan", or even

TABLE 5-1
NUMBER OF TURKISH AND MIDDLE EASTERN
IMMIGRANTS IN N.S.W. IN 1891

Place of Origin	Number
Turkey (in Europe)	242
Turkey (in Asia)	116
Syria	2
Armenia	2
Asia Minor	18
Total "Asian Turks"	136
Total Turks	378
Afghanistan	20
Persia	2
Arabia	151
Egypt	29

Source: Census of N.S.W., 1891

"Egypt". In his report of 1891, the N.S.W. statistician remarked that the Arabs enumerated were probably all hawkers. As we shall see later, hawking was an occupation conducted by nearly every Syrian migrant, so it is possible that some "Arabs" and "Persians" were in fact Syrians. With these socio-demographic caveats in mind, I estimate there were about 250 Syrians in Australia in 1891, half of whom resided in the colony of N.S.W.

In 1901 Victoria also categorized Syrians separately. The number of Syrian-born immigrants in Australia had jumped to nearly 1500 by this time (see Table 5-2). From 1911 to 1966 "race" was enumerated by the Commonwealth census bureau and this gives us a rough idea of how many "full-blooded" and "half-caste" Syrians were in Australia. Unfortunately, these figures are of dubious value. The main reason for this is that the census forms were self-enumerated and did not specify "Syrian" as racial category. This is particularly important in the

TABLE 5-2

NUMBER OF SYRIAN-LEBANESE IN AUSTRALIA BY RACE¹ AND BIRTHPLACE, 1891-1976

Year	Syrian or Lebanese-born	Full Syrians by Race	% of Full Syrians born in Australia	Half Syrians by Race	% of half Syrians born in Australia	Total No. of full and half Syrians
1891	250 e	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1901	1,498	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1911	1,527	2,339	36	84	94	2,423
1921	1,803 a	2,892	54	348	91	3,240
1933	2,020	2,880	44	302	n.a.	3,182
1947	1,885	1,675	45	223	88	1,898
1954	Lebanon 3,861 Syria 305	2,290	32	199	81	2,489
1961	Lebanon 7,253 Syria 228	3,241	29	216	88	3,457
1966	Lebanon 10,668 Syria 395	4,855	37	n.a.	n.a.	4,855
1971	Lebanon 24,218 Syria 1,364	n.c.	n.c.	n.c.	n.c.	n.c.
1976	Lebanon 33,324 Syria 2,468	n.c.	n.c.	n.c.	n.c.	n.c.

(1) From 1911-1966 race was self-enumerated according to geographical origin. The instructions on the census card usually told individuals to indicate which of the following racial categories they belonged to: "European", "Aboriginal", "Chinese", "Japanese", "Hindu", "Javanese", "Manilaman", "Negro", "Polynesian", or "half-caste". The category "Syrian" was never provided on any census card.

(a) includes 150 Jews.

(e) estimate

(n.a.) no figures available

(n.c.) information not collected after 1966

Sources: Commonwealth Census 1911 - 1976
N.S.W. Census 1891, 1901

case of the Syrians, as they protested that they were not Asiatics but Europeans, whites or Caucasians.⁸ As Yarwood (1964: 150) notes:

... Syrians came to be accepted as immigrants and as citizens because it was felt that they were racially akin to the host population... As the result of a geographical accident... they were initially regarded as Asians, and it was to be some years before they could be properly separated, in the minds of Australian

policy makers, from their darker-hued brethren from India, China, and Japan. But this separation was achieved, primarily because the Syrians obviously conformed in migration pattern, colour, language, education and religion with the races of southern Europe.

The Syrians' desire to dissociate themselves from Asiatic origins probably dissuaded them from enumerating themselves as members of the Syrian race. Their proclivity to "fit in" and adopt Anglo-Celtic norms would certainly have inhibited the second generation from thinking of themselves as Syrians. With the attainment of dependent and independent statehood in 1926 and 1943 respectively, Lebanese severed their symbolic ties with Syria and this too would have discouraged people from identifying themselves as Syrians. Finally, it must be remembered that "Syrian" was a term for which many Christians had little or no affinity. For most it was a label which was either used as a matter of convenience or applied unilaterally by immigration authorities.

The inadequacy of the census data is suggested by the low number of Australian-born Syrians. It seems incredible that their number was so small among an ethnic population which has a very high fertility rate and in which large families are the norm. I know a third generation Kfarsghabi who has compiled a family tree with more than 500 Australian-born descendants on it. Today, immigrants from this hamlet and their descendants number at least 3,000 in Australia. So I contend that the census data considerably underestimate the number of Syrians in Australia, particularly native-born Syrians. However, it is the only data which contains any extensive information on Syrians and may be used for illustrative purposes.

5.4 Pre-Migration Characteristics

All but a handful of the pre-war immigrants were Christians. A few Druze landed in South Australia in the 1880's or 1890's and took up farming along the Murray River. There were also a small number of Jews and Muslims who probably came from Syrian cities like Baghdad, Aleppo, and Damascus. About 5% of the Christians, nearly all of them Melkites and Orthodox, came from Damascus in Syria. The rest came from what now constitutes the state of Lebanon. Since religion and geography are closely intertwined in Lebanon, it is not surprising that migrants came from specific regions rather than randomly. Around 20% were Melkites from Zahle and Baalbeck in the fertile, intermontane Biqa plateau. A few of these Melkites were members of influential families who left in a spirit of adventure. A similar percentage was drawn from the towns and villages along the narrow coastal plain between Beirut and Tripoli. About half of these people were Orthodox and the other half were Maronites. The remaining and largest proportion were from villages in the mountainous area east and southeast of Tripoli. Approximately 50% of migrants from this region were Maronites from villages along the Qadisha River and the other half were Orthodox from the towns of Kousba, Btarram, Bishmizzeen, and Douma. Among the Orthodox there were also some members of prestigious families. Except for a few individuals from the coastal town of Sidon and the inland town of Rachaya, almost no migrants came from southern Lebanon, which is predominantly Muslim.

The overwhelming majority of these early migrants were illiterate villagers or townsmen. As was mentioned above, a few were from the upper class who came with sufficient capital, education, and business experience to begin as shopowners or warehousemen. There were also a

few tradesmen who possessed skills in tailoring, barbering, and cobbling. But most, like their ancestors before them since time immemorial, had cultivated a small plot of family land on which they grew only enough food for their own consumption. They owed their allegiance first and foremost to their extended family, and secondly to other members of the village who were also their co-religionists.

5.7 Patterns Of Migration

The Syrians displayed most of the features of chain migration in coming to Australia. Nearly all of the early migrants were individuals or small groups of males who either intended to make a quick fortune and return home or wanted to investigate the possibilities of permanent settlement. Some had previously migrated to other countries before landing in Australia, and nearly all knew a relative or fellow villager who had emigrated elsewhere. The married ones who had saved enough money, would either send for their wives and children or return home and bring them back. It was common for the parents to leave the youngest children with relatives in case they decided to return home. Once the decision to stay was made, the rest of the children along with their grandparents, aunts, uncles and other elderly family members usually followed. Meanwhile the success of the initial migrants filtered back to their relatives and prompted other young men to emigrate. Thus a chain reaction was started as other villagers saw and heard of the successes of these emigrants, not only in Australia, but in other countries as well.

Several cases can be used to illustrate this pattern of migration to Australia. One example is the Orthodox families from Kousba who formed a small colony around Cootamundra. Emigration began in 1884

when Abraham Jourage and his brother-in-law Andrew Backash (and possibly his wife and children) hawked their way from Sydney to Cootamundra. Jourage wrote home to another brother-in-law, George Deep, who with two of his brothers sailed from Port Said to Darwin via Bombay, Canton, Hong Kong and Singapore. When they arrived in Darwin in 1886 the three brothers were penniless, but encountered another Syrian who lent them fares for passages on a steamer to Sydney. After receiving some assistance from Syrians in Redfern, the three brothers also hawked their way to Cootamundra. By this time, Jourage and Backash were operating a small store and were able to supply the three newcomers with material to hawk around the surrounding area. Within three years the Deeps opened their own general store in Cootamundra and had saved enough money to send for their wives and children, all of whom finally reached Cootamundra by 1896. In the meantime at least 7 other Orthodox families had arrived in Cootamundra all of whom were outfitted for hawking by the Deep brothers and most of whom went on to set up their own stores in Temora, Junee, Young, and Wagga Wagga. At the turn of the century there were over 50 individuals living in Cootamundra who were born in Kousba or descendants of Orthodox Kousbans. Around the same time a similar situation prevailed in the adjacent Riverina area, although settlement there was more widely dispersed. The towns of Griffith, Narrandera, Leeton, Hay, and Coolamon were inhabited either by a Melick, Bashir, Moses, or Doumani family, all of whom were Orthodox from Btarram. All of them were initially assisted by Constantine Melick, the largest Syrian warehouseman in Redfern.

The most vivid example of chain migration is found among the migrants from Kfarsghab. Migration to Australia from this Maronite hamlet in the Qadisha valley began in 1887 when 7 men from the village disembarked at

Adelaide. For reasons unknown, they went to Broken Hill and with the help of a Catholic priest began working as hawkers. They sent word of their success back to Kfarsghab and during the next two years, 18 men and 3 women arrived in Adelaide and 11 men and 3 women landed in Sydney. Approximately 40 more Kfarsghabi came to Australia in the last decade of the nineteenth century and another 8 went to New Zealand. Some of these early Kfarsghabi travelled as far north as Cairns before settling. Some of them had already been to the U.S.A. where the first Kfarsghabi arrived in 1883. There is a community of Kfarsghabi in Providence, Rhode Island with which the Australian Kfarsghabi still maintain close links. Except for the war years, groups of Kfarsghabis have been migrating to Australia annually (see Table 5-3). They are the only pre-World War II migrants with sufficient numbers to establish their own voluntary organization separate from the Australian Lebanese Association. Through a continual

TABLE 5-3

NUMBER OF KFARSGHABI IMMIGRANTS TO AUSTRALIA 1887-1965

Years	Number of Immigrants
1887 - 1889	43
1890 - 1899	41
1900 - 1914	53
1921 - 1929	166
1930 - 1939	56
1947 - 1949	199
1950 - 1959	278
1960 - 1965	188
TOTAL	1,024

Source: A.K.L.A. Newsletters

program of assistance, which is now nearly one hundred years old, Kfarsghabi in Australia have helped fellow villagers migrate and obtain jobs, and have sent substantial sums of money back to the village. They consider themselves and are considered by other Lebanese to be a cohesive group.

It was mentioned above that Syrian men usually sent for their wives and families as soon as possible. This was another reason why they were looked upon more favourably than other "Asians" by Australians. While the ratio of men to women among the Chinese, Indians, and Japanese was generally about 9:1, the Syrians had a sex ratio which was nearly evenly balanced (see Table 5-4). Objections to

TABLE 5-4

PERCENTAGE OF MALES IN CHINESE, INDIAN, JAPANESE,
AND SYRIAN POPULATIONS IN AUSTRALIA 1901-1947

	1901		1911		1921		1933		1947	
	Total No	% Males	Total No	% Males	Total No	% Males	Total No	% Males	Total No	% Males
Chinese	30,542	98	22,753	96	17,157	93	14,349	79	12,094	68
Indians	4,684	99	3,653	96	2,881	95	3,098	83	2,898	87
Japanese	3,554	93	3,489	94	2,740	93	2,466	86	335	59
Syrians	1,498	66	2,339	55	2,892	55	3,182	53	1,898	52
Source: Commonwealth census 1911 - 1947										

Asian immigration were based on two main premises: (1) Asians came to Australia, exploited its resources, put white men out of work, and then returned home⁹; (2) Asian men would interbreed with Australian women and dilute the European race. By bringing out their wives, Syrians demonstrated an intention to stay in Australia permanently and simultaneously posed little threat regarding miscegenation. Yarwood (1964) suggests that this was another reason why Syrians were the only Asians who received special treatment under the Immigration Restriction Act.

TABLE 5-5
DISTRIBUTION OF SYRIANS IN EACH STATE AND TERRITORY
1901 - 1947

State	Percentage of all Syrians Year				
	<u>1901</u>	<u>1911</u>	<u>1921</u>	<u>1933</u>	<u>1947</u>
New South Wales	48	51	55	61	71
Victoria	23	19	18	13	8
Queensland	n.a.	14	13	12	12
South Australia	n.a.	12	9	12	8
Western Australia	n.a.	1	2	1	1
Tasmania	n.a.	4	1	1	1
Northern Territory	n.a.	-	-	-	-
Australian Federal Territory	n.a.	1	-	-	-
TOTAL NUMBER	1,498	2,339	2,892	2,880	1,675

Sources: Commonwealth census 1911-1947, N.S.W. census 1901
n.a. = figures not available

Most of the early Syrian-Lebanese settled in N.S.W. and were followed there by later migrants (see Table 5-5). The reasons why N.S.W. attracted the early settlers are obscure. It simply may be that the early settlers travelled on ships whose first Australian port of disembarkation was Sydney.

5.8 Summary

In the preceding chapters I have concentrated on theoretical, conceptual, methodological and historical issues. In the next two chapters I focus on empirical matters. In chapter six I analyze the structural changes which have occurred among Syrian-Lebanese by examining the degree of enclosure in various institutions. In chapter seven I look at the changes which have taken place regarding the ethnic identities of Syrian-Lebanese. As was mentioned at the end of chapter two, certain structural and

psychological manifestations should be readily discernable if an ethnic revival is taking place.

NOTES

1. The years in which Syrians first arrived in the following countries are: the U.S.A. in 1849 (Hitti 1965); Brazil in 1871 (Knowlton 1955); Argentina in the mid-1870's (Ferenczi 1929); Mexico in 1879 (Kayal and Kayal 1975); Nigeria, Senegal and Sierra Leone in 1890, 1892 and 1893 respectively (Hanna 1958; van der Laan 1975).
2. The following abbreviations are used to refer to archival and parliamentary sources: N.S.W. G.A. refers to N.S.W. Government archives; A.A. refers to Australian archives; St. M.A. refers to St. Mary's cathedral archives; N.S.W. P.D. refers to N.S.W. parliamentary debates; C.P.D. refers to Commonwealth parliamentary debates.
3. N.S.W. G.A. file CSIL 5/6114, no. 93-1473.
4. N.S.W. P.D., vol. 67 : 784.
5. N.S.W. P.D., vol. 70 : 1462-63.
6. N.S.W. P.D., vol. 78 : 7721-35.
7. N.S.W. P.D., vol. 85 : 3945-75.
8. During Commonwealth debates on naturalization, Senator Playford objected to the broad way in which the term "Asia" was used by speakers. He stated that, "The term 'Asia' includes Syrians and others who are as white as we are" (C.P.D., vol. 14 : 1938). In a memorandum to the Minister of External Affairs, the permanent Secretary of the Department noted that, "Syrians are of swarthy appearance with dark hair, and of sallow complexion, but approximate far more closely to the European types than to those of India or parts of Asia farther East. So far as general appearance goes, they cannot be distinguished from the people of Southern Italy, Spain or Greece and in fact are considerably lighter in complexion than the Turks" (A.A. file CRS-AI, no. 14/20363). In another memorandum an officer noted that, "The Department has from time to time granted authority to certain resident Syrians to bring their wives and other female relatives to Australia, and some of these were as fair-skinned as any women to be met within our own cities. So far as the Syrian men are concerned, they are dark, but not more so than the Italians, Spaniards or Greeks" (A.A. file CRS-AI, no. 15/3101). In writing to Deakin about Syrians, W. Abourizk, a successful Syrian merchant, commented that, "Syrians are Caucasians and they are a white race as much as the English. Their looks, habits, customs, religions, blood etc., are those of Europeans, but they are more intelligent" (A.A. file CRS-AI, no. 10/3915). Writing on behalf of a Syrian

who wished to be naturalized, the mayor of Redfern commented that, "Being put on a level with the Chinese, Lascars, etc., hurts them very much, as they claim they are Caucasians and not Asiatics (A.A. file CRS-AI, no. 15/3101). An article which appeared in The Bulletin on 18th January 1906 was generally hostile towards Syrians, but the writer noted that, "Though an Asiatic, the Syrian is certainly white, being much of the complexion of the Southern European".

9. In 1909 the municipality of Redfern celebrated its 50 year jubilee. To mark the occasion, a souvenir pamphlet was published containing a brief history of Redfern and profiles of prominent politicians, businessmen, and socialites in the community. Photographs and accounts of seven Syrians appeared in the booklet. They were highly commended for their business initiatives, generosity, and the employment they had created for people. For instance, the Melick brothers received praise because they had: "proved themselves worthy citizens of the Commonwealth, giving employment to a number of people, and making their investments in property in the city, as well as land and mining properties in both New South Wales and Queensland, thus having all their interests centred in Australia" (Souvenir of Redfern Municipal Jubilee 1859-1909).

CHAPTER 6

CHANGES IN DEGREES OF INSTITUTIONAL ENCLOSURE :

PATTERNS OF ETHNIC ORGANIZATION

6.1 Introduction

According to some scholars, the world is presently undergoing an ethnic resurgence of unprecedented magnitude. For instance, in his article, The Universalisation of Ethnicity, Glazer (1975: 17) states that the source of ethnic conflict must be placed at "the very centre of our concern for the human condition". In his discussion of ethnicity and technology, Isajiw (1978: 33) comments that, "My conclusion is that ... this re-emergence of ethnicity has been taking place among most, if not all, ethnic groups in Canada and the United States". Similarly, Burgess (1978: 278) avows that, "One can no longer ignore the renewal of ethnic consciousness; no locale, level of development, or form of government seems immune to, or determinative of, this resurgence".

Because of the theoretical and conceptual confusion discussed in chapters one and two, I am not as presumptuous as these scholars about the existence of a global ethnic resurrection.¹ Therefore, in my discussion of institutional enclosure in this and the following chapters, I do not assume that an ethnic revival has taken place among the Syrian-Lebanese. Instead, I simply ask what institutional changes have occurred and how they have occurred. The direction of these changes is left open to empirical analysis. In the final two chapters I attempt to explain why these changes have eventuated. In chapter two I emphasized the need to separate analytically individual and group levels of analysis. With this distinction in mind I examine changes

in ethnic organization in this chapter and changes in ethnic identity in chapter seven.

6.2 Patterns Of Settlement And Occupations

Price (1979) has observed that many migration studies treat settlement and occupation as separate entities. Although this allows data to be concisely presented, it often obscures the degree to which the two are interrelated. I have opted to discuss both areas together, because they are so closely intertwined in the case of Syrian-Lebanese, at least in the early years of migration.

6.2.1 Early Settlement And Occupations

The early Syrians who came expecting to amass an easy fortune and return home rich men were quickly disappointed. Unable to speak English, having no special occupational skills to offer, and in some cases discriminated against because of their physical appearance, they found few employment opportunities open to them. However, they soon found a niche in hawking, the occupation which Syrian immigrants in all parts of the world entered en masse. The reasons why Syrians gravitated towards peddling were a combination of the following factors: (1) some had been hawkers in other countries before coming to Australia; (2) it required little capital investment, profits were high, and turnover was quick; (3) no special skills beyond speaking a few phrases in English were necessary; (4) role models in the form of Afghan, Indian, Jewish, and Chinese hawkers were present; (5) it posed a limited threat to the employment status of Australians, as hawking was an activity they looked down on; (6) cultural factors related to Syrians' disdain for manual labour, the unattractiveness of the type of farming carried out in Australia, and a heritage in which the wandering, commercial spirit of

their Phoenician ancestors was (and still is) emphasized predisposed them towards some sort of trading occupation;² (7) it was seen as the penultimate step towards the goal of all Syrian migrants - the independence and prosperity which came with owning a small business.

In N.S.W. the early immigrants settled in the inner city working class suburb of Redfern. The area's low rents and its proximity to the city and railway lines made it attractive to low income earners. By 1895 enough of them had settled there to arouse the ire of the MLA for Redfern, who complained in Parliament that:

... we see all around us an insidious invasion of people that are gradually creeping on us, and sapping away the character of the British race from which we are descended ... It does not matter whether it was the 600 (Chinese) men who attempted to land in 1888, or the 70 Syrians who landed only a few months ago in my electorate... Now, in the Redfern electorate we have a Syrian town where not only Syrians but Hindus are gradually forcing the white population out... In my district it is practically impossible for white people to live anywhere near the people to whom I refer... white people do not care to reside anywhere close to them. Some couple of hundred of them are now settled in my electorate, and they are forcing away from ⁵two streets all the white population who reside there.

Complaints were raised against Syrians the following year when the member for Darlington asked the Government to deal with "the undesirable Assyrians, who have enclosed one side of Redfern Park and put up a series of buildings which are a menace to the public health, to say nothing else".⁴

The early arrivals hawked goods which they possibly bought from Chinese or Jewish merchants. However, they soon discovered that urban dwellers could purchase most of their items at retail outlets and they began peddling their wares outside of the metropolitan region (see

Appendix C). In fact, the most common complaint lodged against Syrians and other hawkers, was that they terrorized helpless women in isolated country areas and forced them to buy their goods. The menace of coloured hawkers in remote country areas was first raised in Parliament in 1891⁵, and Assyrians were specifically mentioned as early as 1892⁶. Thereafter, several members continually protested about the influx of Syrian or Assyrian hawkers throughout the whole colony of N.S.W. and called for their licences to be revoked and/or measures to prohibit any further Syrian immigration.

TABLE 6-1

GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF SYRIANS IN N.S.W. 1901-1947

Geographic Area	Year				
	1901	1911	1921	1933	1947
Sydney Metropolitan Area	27	23	36	41	48
Non-Metropolitan Urban Areas	59	na	41	40	31
Rural Areas	14	na	23	19	21
Migratory	1	na	1	-	-
TOTAL NUMBER	722	1,194	1,605	1,144	1,188

Sources: 1901 N.S.W. census; 1911-1947 Commonwealth census

As can be seen in Table 6-1, most Syrians did not live in Sydney but resided in country towns. Furthermore, they seldom congregated in substantial numbers throughout the state and it was rare to find more than one or two Syrian families in each country town. The reasons for this were mainly economical. From talking to elderly Syrians who were hawkers and storekeepers during the pre-War years, it was clear that there was an unwritten economic law that a Syrian would not open up a business against another Syrian unless the town could clearly

support two businesses. Newcomers were expected to do what their predecessors had done - move on until they found a location where no one else was established. Because they posed a threat to their monopoly on trade, newcomers were not welcomed by established shopkeepers. Their sentiments were the same as those of the Syrian described by Hitti (1924: 97):

Because of the nature of their work (trade), Syrians do not congregate in colonies. Whether peddlers or dealers in lace, kimonos and underwear, they must keep close to American home life. In Xenia, Ohio, I came across a Syrian family which had lived there for the last dozen years without attracting another Syrian. When asking someone in Lafayette, Indiana, who said he had been there by himself since 1890 and with his family since 1908 as to whether there were other Syrians in the town, the sharp reply came back, "No. Al-hamd-li" Allah (Thank Goodness!)

Despite being isolated in the country, Syrian hawkers and storekeepers still maintained links with Redfern, as this is where nearly all of them obtained their stock. The connection between the Redfern Syrians and the country Syrians largely explains why hawking became the first profession of nearly every adult Syrian male (and some females) who arrived in Australia before World War II. By the late 1880's and early 1890's, several Syrians had established warehouses and manufacturing plants in Redfern. Some of these men had previously been merchants in Syria and came with enough money to rent a shop before moving on to wholesaling. Others had started out hawking, accumulated enough money to rent a store, and then became wholesalers. This group of about half a dozen or so men did not constitute any sort of collusive elite, but their individual positions gave them a near-monopoly on incoming Syrian labour. Word of their success reached home and prompted the migration of fellow villagers who sought them out upon arrival - Orthodox migrants from Kousba went to Naser Abdullah's warehouse; Orthodox from Zahle

looked for George Dan; Melkites from Zahle found J.G. Malouf; Orthodox from Btarram sought out the Melick brothers; all Maronites from Kfarsghab turned to the Coorey brothers. In the early years, nearly all economic relationships between the warehousemen in Redfern and newly arrived Syrians were based on these village ties. As migrants began coming from other villages, they too found it useful to solicit the assistance of one of these established businessmen. These people did not have patrons from their own villages, so they usually enlisted the help of a warehouseman with the same religious background. For instance, migrants from predominantly Orthodox places like Bishmizeen, Douma and Batroun would be more likely to turn to a fellow Orthodox such as the Melicks, Abdullah or Dan, than a Maronite like Coorey.

The role of these economic gatekeepers in Redfern cannot be overestimated. They had a profound impact on the economic and socio-demographic patterns of Syrian settlement in N.S.W. After arriving in Sydney and being informed that there was no gold to be picked up off the streets, newcomers were given a crash course in the fundamentals of hawking. The warehouseman had one of his assistants teach the new arrivals how to set prices and bargain, and which essential phrases to use. Sometimes they were taken on a day or overnight trip in order to gain some experience. The initiate was then given an assortment of goods on credit and a railway ticket to a country area which seemed promising. Most hawkers peddled around country areas until they came to a town where they felt they could open up a shop. Again they relied on the Redfern Syrians for their goods (which usually came by train). Once business was running smoothly the hawker cum shopkeeper sent for his relatives and friends. The system was then

duplicated on a smaller scale, as the small shopowner would outfit other Syrians who subsequently set up shop in another area and perpetuated the cycle.

This system gradually broke down as Syrian shopkeepers became financially independent enough to shop around the various Syrian warehouses and bargain for the best price on the goods he wanted. It rapidly disintegrated when the storekeepers' sons, who had been educated in Australia, started dealing with Anglo-Celtic Australian⁷ wholesalers. This economic system was "closed shop" for many years and shaped the demographic and occupational structure of the Syrian population in N.S.W. more than any other factor.

The decision by Syrian immigrants to become hawkers had important ramifications for their spatial distribution. Most men established routes which took them on the road for days and weeks at a time. They were physically separated from their own families and led solitary lives while hawking. When hawkers finally opened a shop they did so in a town where there were no other Syrians. Some country Syrians maintained contact with relatives and fellow villagers in neighbouring towns with whom they exchanged visits on the weekends. Like Kytheran Greeks (Price 1979: 225), some Syrians kept in touch with relatives and friends by visiting Sydney for weddings, funerals and religious events at the ethnic churches. It was not uncommon for a mother to take several of her children to Sydney and live with relatives during summer holidays. The biggest influx of country Syrians occurred at Easter and Christmas when they came to Sydney to order goods which they were low on. Most attended church services in Redfern and visited friends and relatives. However, for the majority of country

inhabitants contact with other Syrians was intermittent. All of them lived in environments, which except for the occasional Greek, Italian or Chinese family, were one hundred percent Anglo-Celtic Australian. During my interviews, I came across many first and second generation respondents who recalled not seeing another Syrian for years at a time while they lived in the country. Two respondents who were born and grew up in two small towns in northern Queensland, stated that aside from relatives who visited them every couple of years, they never came in contact with any Syrians until they came to Sydney when they were young adults.

TABLE 6-2

OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF SYRIAN MALES
IN N.S.W. IN 1901 AND 1911 (PERCENTAGES)

Occupational Category	1901	1911
Commercial	94	76
Professional	1	2
Transport and Communication	1	*
Industrial	*	12
Primary Producer	4	9
Other	*	1
Total Number	404	894

* = less than 1 percent

Sources: N.S.W. census of 1901 and Commonwealth census of 1911

There is no official data on the occupations of Syrians before 1901. However, the occupations listed on naturalization forms and wedding certificates indicate that almost all early Syrians were engaged in commercial callings as shopkeepers or hawkers. We can see from Table 6-2 that Syrians were segregated in commercial occupations in 1901 and 1911. Unfortunately, census categories changed

after 1911, but the data in Table 6-3 shows that the majority of Syrians were self-employed in some form of private enterprise before World War II.

TABLE 6-3
OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF SYRIAN MALES
IN N.S.W. FROM 1921 TO 1947 (PERCENTAGES)

Occupational Category	1921	1933	1947
Employer	21	26	34
Self-employed	56	56	35
Wage or salary earner	22	16	30
Other	1	1	1
Total Number	1,027	1,152	1,035

Source: Commonwealth census 1921 to 1947

6.2.2 Settlement And Occupations Among Later Generations

In the mid 1920's two important demographical shifts began among the Syrians. The first occurred in Redfern when some of the more affluent and socially mobile members of the first and second generation moved into more prestigious locations in North Sydney and the Eastern suburbs. Members of the first generation often maintained their businesses in Redfern after moving to suburbs like Coogee, Randwick and Rose Bay, while the second generation generally severed all ties with the place. The depression of the 1930's bankrupted some Syrian merchants in Redfern and forced them to set up operations elsewhere.

The second ecological change began in the 1920's, was restrained during the depression years, and then re-commenced after World War II. It entailed the movement of many Syrians from country areas to Sydney.

The main reason for this was the parents' desire to maintain family unity. Desirous of having their children well educated, many first generation Syrians sent their children to boarding schools in Sydney. Their second generation children were beginning to graduate from schools and universities and had no intention of returning to country towns where employment opportunities were limited. Rather than be separated from their children, many parents sold their businesses and moved to Sydney. The decision was made easier by the fact that they were financially well off after 15 or 20 years of business in the country. Many already owned another home in Sydney or had invested in real estate there. When they came to Sydney they did not consider living in Redfern as it was seen as a slum or ghetto. They settled mainly in middle class suburbs and today, the eastern suburbs of Coogee, Randwick, Maroubra, Rose Bay and Kingsford contain many retired first generation immigrants.

In contrast to the first generation population the second generation was more urban. Although many second generation respondents were born in country areas, they either came to Sydney for schooling and remained or moved there after finishing school in the country. In turn, nearly all of their children have been born in Sydney and have never lived in non-metropolitan areas. As was noted in chapter two, these people are widely dispersed throughout the Sydney metropolitan area and do not form any sort of territorial community.

No matter where they have migrated Syrian-Lebanese have attained noticeable levels of success. In almost all countries they have exhibited similar occupational patterns. Most of the first generation

immigrants hawked cheap goods until they accumulated enough money to rent a small store, although a few were able to operate as wholesalers. The second generation sons often consolidated and expanded their fathers' businesses but some began to move into the professions. Most of the third generation men (and by this time women) have entered professional and technical occupations.

In Sierra Leone the first Syrians were called "Corals" or "Coral Men" by the natives, because of the imitation coral beads and other trinkets they sold on street corners in Freetown (Hanna 1958; van der Laan 1975). By World War I most Syrians had become shopowners. Between the wars they branched out into other business enterprises such as the textile industry, transportation, and diamond trading, and today monopolize these forms of commerce. In South America, the early Syrian peddlers who carried their packs into the interior are part of Brazilian folklore (Newsweek 1968). Their sons and grandsons are now among the most powerful industrialists and politicians in several South American countries.

Before World War I most Syrians in the United States were hawkers and retailers. They then expanded into the wholesaling and manufacturing of clothing and also into trucking, amusement, and food industries. By World War II many second generation Syrians had become lawyers, doctors, pharmacists, dentists and employed in the fields of entertainment and communications. According to Berger (1960: 355), "most Syrians are undoubtedly in the comfortable income brackets". Similar views are expressed by Kayal and Kayal (1975: 105, 107-108, 111):

If a Syrian father had been a petty merchant, labourer, or artisan, his son was to be a businessman or professional... It was when the peddlers settled down (after they acquired more capital) that their wealth became more secure. In time the evolution of the shopkeeper into the wholesaler took place... By 1904 Syrians throughout the country were engaged largely in the retailing of cheap dry goods and notions... By the end of the Korean War, Syrian-Americans had given up their 'nomadic' life and moved into quite diversified occupations. They had entered completely the mainstream of American economic and social life and are today represented in practically every industry and profession. The immigrants' prosperity permitted their children to go into the sciences, professions, politics and the arts, and they have distinguished themselves in each of those fields... Unlike other immigrant groups who had to wait two or three generations to exert their independence from ghetto life and to satisfy their desire for mobility, it was the first generation who amassed the wealth that their sons used as a lever for bringing themselves into wider contacts with society.

This mobility pattern among Syrian immigrants and their descendants has also occurred in Australia. Even in the first generation, many illiterate peddlers were able to improve their lot. It can be seen from Table 6-4 that although the majority of them started as hawkers, many eventually became small shopowners or wholesalers.

TABLE 6-4

FIRST AND LAST OCCUPATIONS OF FIRST GENERATION
SYRIAN MALES IN AUSTRALIA

First Job	Number	Last Job	Number
Clothing Wholesaler	1	Priest	1
Commercial Traveller	1	Clothing Wholesaler	7
Shopkeeper	13	Transport Executive	2
Shop Assistant	1	Real Estate Investor	1
Farmer	3	Hotel Proprietor	3
Miner	1	Commercial Traveller	1
Tradesman or Labourer	6	Shopkeeper	43
Hawker	47	Farmer	7
Unknown	2	Miner	1
		Tradesman or Labourer	4
		Hawker	5
TOTAL	<u>75</u>		<u>75</u>

By the 1920's second generation Syrians began making inroads into more prestigious occupations. During this decade the first lawyers and medical practitioners of Syrian descent graduated from Sydney University. In 1925 Frank Gaha was appointed professor of ancient history and classics at Melbourne University and Alexander Alam became a member of the Legislative Council of New South Wales.

Table 6-5 contains information on the occupations of second and third generation Lebanese. Significant proportions of second and later generation males are still represented in the wholesale and retail clothing trade as administrators, managers and executives. But there

TABLE 6-5

OCCUPATIONS OF SECOND AND THIRD GENERATION SYRIAN-LEBANESE

Occupational Classification	Second Generation		Third Generation	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
1. Professional and Technical	9	3	31	19
2. Administrative, Executive and Managerial	18	1	11	-
3. Clerical Workers	1	6	8	10
4. Sales Workers	26	4	14	4
5. Farmers, Fishermen, Timbergetters	4	-	-	1
6. Miners and Quarrymen	1	-	-	-
7. Transport and Communication	2	-	2	-
8. Tradesmen, Production Process Workers and Labourers	9	1	7	-
9. Service, Sport and Recreation	-	-	-	3
TOTAL	70	15	73	38

is a definite preponderance of professional and technical workers in the third generation, especially among women. These figures indicate a considerable degree of upward occupational mobility among the descendants of illiterate peasant hawkers. As we shall see later, these objective measures are mirrored in respondents' subjective

estimates of their social class.

This entry into white-collar and professional occupations necessarily involves working in ethnically heterogeneous environments. As we can see from Table 6-6, only one respondent reported working in a mainly Lebanese situation. Slightly over half worked with people who were all or mainly Anglo-Celtic Australian, and just under a quarter worked in ethnically mixed environments.

TABLE 6-6

ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF RESPONDENTS' PLACE OF WORK*

Ethnic Composition of Workplace	Number	Percent
Totally Australian	12	25
Mainly Australian	13	27
Variety or Mixed	11	22
Other	12	25
Mainly Lebanese	1	2
TOTAL	49	100

* The question asked was: "What are the ethnic backgrounds or nationalities of the people you work with?" For self-employed respondents and professionals such as doctors and lawyers, the same question was asked about the respondent's clientele.

6.3 Religion

The religious history of Syrian-Lebanese in Sydney is an interesting paradox. Although Eastern Christianity was an integral part of their heritage, it, along with their native tongue, was one of their first ethnic traits to dissolve. The reasons for this were twofold: (1) internal differences among the three churches which prevented the formation of any trans-denominational solidarity or identity; and (2) the ability of Australian Catholic and Protestant

churches to absorb Syrian-Lebanese Catholics and Orthodox.

6.3.1 Internal Differences

At the official level, relations among members of the three Syrian churches fluctuated between cordiality and coolness depending on the personalities of the priests and leaders of church councils. According to oral tradition, a group of Syrians from the three sects met in the early 1890's to formulate plans for the construction of a church which would be shared by all. Preliminary discussions apparently went well until it came time to decide on a name for the church. All three groups refused to consider having it named after anyone but their own patron saint, so they went their separate ways and eventually built three different churches. Relations were exceptionally amicable when a Melkite bishop visited Australia in 1928. He celebrated a Byzantine mass at St. Maron's and was honoured by a banquet held at the home of the president of the Orthodox association.⁸ Relations were much less cordial during the occasions when the Maronite and Melkite priests refused to enter the Orthodox church for Syrian funerals and stood outside to watch the proceedings.⁹

Religious bigotry among Catholic and Orthodox Syrians was common. For some second generation individuals, the decision to marry a spouse from a different denomination, even though he or she was a Syrian, was met by absolute opposition from the parents. In some cases, inter-denominational marriages only occurred when a religiously intransigent parent or grandparent had died and no longer presented an obstacle. Traditionally, Syrian-Lebanese have espoused the principle that when it comes to marriage, the woman should always follow the man's faith. Some Orthodox feel that the Catholics have refused to follow this norm

and have expected Orthodox men to convert to Catholicism too. The degree of segmentation between Catholics and Orthodox can be seen by examining Table 6-7 (in which Maronites and Melkites have been grouped together). It is obvious that marriages between Catholic and Orthodox individuals have occurred relatively infrequently across the generations.

TABLE 6-7
RATES OF INTERDENOMINATIONAL MARRIAGES AMONG
SECOND AND THIRD GENERATION SYRIAN-LEBANESE

Respondent's Spouse's Denomination	<u>Respondent's Generation</u>			<u>Third Generation</u>		
	<u>Second Generation</u>					
	Ma.	Me.	Or.	Ma.	Me.	Or.
Catholic	90	72	15	88	63	27
Orthodox	3	15	55	-	13	40
Protestant	7	8	15	12	19	21
Other	-	5	55	-	6	13
Total	90	39	55	67	32	48
Ma. = Maronite						
Me. = Melkite						
Or. = Orthodox						

6.3.2 Australian Influences

Australian Catholic and Protestant churches have played a decisive role in the religious life of Syrian-Lebanese. Australian priests were a constant source of help to new arrivals in providing accommodation, giving basic language instructions, handling postal matters, and performing religious duties. Before the erection of the Melkite church in Waterloo (1895) and the Maronite church in Redfern (1897), Syrian Catholics attended St. Vincent's in Redfern, St. Peter's in Surry Hills and Mt. Carmel in Waterloo. The Syrian-Orthodox church was not erected until 1921. Before then the Orthodox usually went to the Melkite church, although a few attended St. Maron's and the local Australian Catholic churches. Even after the Maronite and Melkite

churches were built, some Catholics still went to the Australian Catholic churches for marriages and baptisms. The reasons for this are not entirely clear, but were probably a function of the facts that: (1) some second generation children were attending the schools run by the churches and had developed a greater affinity for the Latin rite; (2) there were disputes between Syrian priests and the laity over finances and administration¹⁰ which resulted in some of the latter leaving the ethnic church for the Australian one; (3) involvement with the Australian church was a sign of respectability and a means of access to the wider Australian society; (4) Melkite and Maronite priests were not authorized by the archbishop to perform marriages and baptisms.

As Syrian Catholics scattered throughout N.S.W., they simply went to the local Latin church. Orthodox had to decide whether they should attend the Protestant or Catholic church. The decision was not always a straightforward one. Since they associated the Catholic church with dogmatism, conservatism and intolerance, they were reluctant to have their children experience what they saw as a program of indoctrination. On the other hand, they appreciated the emphasis on moral strictness in Catholic churches and schools. Protestant churches, particularly the Church of England, were seen as much more tolerant of religious diversity, as evidenced by their practice of allowing Orthodox priests to conduct ceremonies in their churches, something the Catholic church forbids. However, the Orthodox viewed the moral laxity of Australian Protestants with a considerable degree of alarm and were hesitant to expose their children to their values and behavior. In some cases the decision for an Orthodox storekeeper

to become involved in the Protestant or Catholic church was based on the religious preference of his clientele. In a town with a Scottish Presbyterian mercer, he might attempt to capture the business of Catholics; in one where his competitor was an Irish Catholic, he might endeavour to attract Protestants by attending the Anglican church.

The decision to forego Eastern rites in favour of Western Catholicism and Protestantism had very significant implications for the ethnic and religious dimensions of Syrian Christianity in Australia. The combination of being baptized in Latin and Protestant churches, attending Latin and Protestant schools, and going to Latin and Protestant services caused the Arabic language to almost disappear among second generation children. The only place Arabic was preserved was in the ethnic churches and they had become superfluous to the religious life of the second generation. The extent to which Australian churches have supplanted the ethnic churches is obvious when we examine where the second and third generation have been baptized, the churches they attend, who they have married, and their religious identities and values.

It can be seen from Table 6-8 that comparatively few second generation Catholics were specifically baptized as Maronites or Melkites. One reason for this is that some of them were born in country areas where their parents were unable to obtain the services of Maronite or Melkite priests. A higher percentage of second generation Antiochians were baptized according to their rite, because Orthodox priests made a point of visiting country areas to perform marriages and baptisms. Maronite and Melkite priests were less active

TABLE 6-8
CHURCHES OF BAPTISM OF ALL AUSTRALIAN-BORN
SYRIAN-LEBANESE ACCORDING TO GENERATION AND
ANCESTRAL RITE (PERCENTAGES)

Church of Baptism	<u>Ancestral Rite</u>					
	<u>Second Generation</u>			<u>Third Generation</u>		
	Maronite	Melkite	Antiochian	Maronite	Melkite	Antiochian
Maronite	19	-	-	7	-	-
Melkite	-	39	-	-	38	2
Antiochian	-	-	63	-	-	85
Latin	81	60	24	93	59	11
Anglican	-	-	12	-	3	1
Total Number	75	33	49	146	81	89

in this respect. But the underlying reason why so many Catholic parents had their children baptized as Latins, is that they simply did not make much of a distinction between being Eastern rite and Latin rite Catholics. Table 6-8 shows that the rates of baptism in the three ethnic churches among third generation individuals has declined among Maronites, stayed relatively constant among Melkites, and increased moderately among Antiochians. Also, no individuals of Maronite ancestry and only 3% of those of Melkite ancestry were baptized as non-Catholics. Among those individuals of Antiochian ancestry, 11% were baptized as Latins. Thus, the Australian Catholic church has had a great impact on Maronites and Melkites, and a mild effect on Antiochians in terms of where second and third generation Syrian-Lebanese have been baptized.

It is clear from Table 6-9 that the Maronite, Melkite, and Orthodox churches elicit only token involvement in comparison to the Australian Catholic church. Whereas 79% of Maronites, 76% of Melkites,

TABLE 6-9
ATTENDANCE AT VARIOUS CHURCHES BY RESPONDENT'S
ANCESTRAL RITE (PERCENTAGES)

Church	Pattern of Attendance								
	Maronites (n = 19)			Melkites (n = 21)			Antiochians (n = 41)		
	Never	Low	High	Never	Low	High	Never	Low	High
Maronite	5	95	-	95	5	-	93	5	2
Melkite	100	-	-	38	62	-	93	7	-
Orthodox	100	-	-	95	5	-	2	88	10
Latin	-	21	79	-	24	76	78	5	17
Anglican	95	-	5	90	10	-	90	10	-
Other	100	-	-	90	10	-	81	17	2

High = At least one a week

Low = Monthly or less

and 17% of Orthodox attend Latin services at least once a week, none of the Maronites or Melkites and only 10% of the Orthodox regularly go to their respective ethnic churches. It is only on special occasions such as Christmas and Easter, or when there is a marriage, baptism, or funeral, that the Eastern churches have any "drawing power". When asked why they did not attend the ethnic churches regularly, respondents usually gave the following reasons: (1) they couldn't speak Arabic and couldn't understand the service; (2) they had drifted away from the traditional beliefs of their parents and grandparents; (3) the ethnic church was inconvenient because it was either too small, too far away, or only held services once a week; (4) they never attended the ethnic church while they were young; and (5) the Catholics saw no differences between the Eastern and Latin rites.

Rates of endogamy according to rite have gradually declined among Maronites, Melkites, and Orthodox (see Table 6-10). Only the Maronites have managed to maintain a rate of endogamy near 50% in the third generation. Among third generation Orthodox, nearly 30% have Catholic spouses (including

TABLE 6-10
RATES OF INTERMARRIAGE AMONG MARONITES, MELKITES
AND ANTIOCHIAN ORTHODOX BY GENERATION (PERCENTAGES)

Respondents' Spouses' Rites	Respondents' Ancestral Rites								
	First Generation			Second Generation			Third Generation		
	Ma.	Me.	A.	Ma.	Me.	A.	Ma.	Me.	A.
Maronite	91	12	7	70	15	6	49	3	6
Melkite	5	82	4	4	28	6	6	16	4
Antiochian	4	6	82	3	15	55	-	13	40
Latin	-	-	-	16	28	4	33	44	17
Protestant	-	-	3	7	8	16	12	19	21
Other	-	-	3	-	5	15	-	6	13
Total	56	17	56	90	39	55	67	32	48

Ma = Maronite
Me = Melkite
A = Antiochian

Maronites, Melkites and Latins) and a similar percentage have married people of Protestant or "Other" backgrounds. Less than 20% of third generation Melkites also have Melkite spouses.

Most respondents held religious views which they perceived to be radically different from their ancestors. It should be remembered that the first generation came to Australia with Gemeinschaft-like religious beliefs. For example, until the 1940's men and women sat in different sections of the ethnic churches in Redfern. Second and third generation respondents felt their ancestors' beliefs were characterized by "superstition", "devoutness", "blind faith", and "intolerance". They perceived their own views to be more "critical", "liberal", and "less dogmatic". Their liberal philosophy was indicated by their views about the traits they felt were important in marriage partners for themselves or their children. When asked about the importance of a person's rite, religion, nationality and social

TABLE 6-11
RESPONDENT'S SUBJECTIVE RELIGIOUS IDENTITY

Subjective Religious Identity	Number	Percent
Maronite	2	2
Maronite-Catholic	2	2
Situational Maronite	2	2
Melkite	1	1
Melkite-Catholic	2	2
Catholic-Melkite	2	2
Situational Melkite	3	3
Antiochian Orthodox	2	2
Christian-Orthodox	1	1
Orthodox and Anglican	1	1
Catholic	25	28
Lapsed Catholic	2	2
Orthodox	22	25
Christian	10	11
Other	11	13
Total	88	100

class, none of these factors were usually deemed to be more important than individual qualities. The fact that a prospective spouse was a "Christian" or "a good person" was generally more important than his specific denomination, rite or nationality. Only one third generation respondent specifically stated that it was desirable that his children marry spouses of the same rite. Few respondents specifically defined themselves as Maronites, Melkites, or Antiochians (see Table 6-11). When asked to give their religious identity, most Maronites and Melkites simply classified themselves as "Catholics" or "Christians"; and most Antiochians thought they were "Orthodox" or "Christians".

The degree to which Syrian-Lebanese have been de-ethnicized by the Australian Catholic church is discernible in Maronites' reactions to recent developments in their church. In 1974 the first Maronite bishop was appointed to Australia and all Maronites automatically came under his

jurisdiction. With the bishop's arrival it became canonically unlawful for Australian priests to perform marriages if the groom was a Maronite. Thus, third generation Syrian-Lebanese who had been baptized in the Latin rite and always worshipped at their local parish, discovered that their marriage ceremonies would have to be performed by a Maronite priest. Among some respondents, this has aroused feelings of annoyance at the "inconvenience" caused to them. Among others, it has provoked hostility towards the Maronite church and clergy. Some Maronites have even obtained special dispensations so that they would not have to be married in the Maronite rite. The bishop has been especially criticized, as he is held to be responsible for most of the recent changes. One third generation woman complained that: "He (the bishop) had a special law passed by the Pope forcing us to get married in the Maronite church". This, of course, is entirely wrong; the bishop has merely exercised the prerogatives of his position. He has also been criticized for trying to "hold on to the old ways". One second generation man complained that:

He's set the church back a hundred years. He doesn't realize that the Lebanese here are different from Lebanese in Lebanon. He's trying to bring everything from the old country over here and it just won't work. We need someone who can communicate with the Australian-born Lebanese who've grown up here and don't want anything to do with Lebanon (Chemist, case no. 81).

Another third generation woman commented that:

He's gone too far. He doesn't realize that Australia isn't Lebanon. We've now got Maronite nuns out here teaching Arabic at the church (St. Maron's). Now that's a bit much; it's getting just like the Greeks here who want to keep their grandchildren Greek even today... He's a real 'hard-liner'; he's been involved in all the political wrangling in Lebanon and that's not important here (Teacher, case no. 82).

The church is presently split into various factions supportive and critical of the bishop. None of the people I interviewed were actively

involved in the in-fighting, as it is mainly confined to post-war migrants. However, some of them were indirectly affected by the internal disputes. One respondent, who had a long history of involvement with the church, stated that he had "gone underground" as a result of the recent events. "It's not worth the hassle", he said, "to have to deal with a man (the bishop) of the nineteenth century. It's easier not to take sides and go (to church) around the corner". Another man stated that, "I go to church only to worship; with me it's a very personal thing. I don't need all the politics and brawling that goes on at St. Maron's. That's why I never go there anymore. I prefer to worship in peace".

The above findings demonstrate how religion can divide more than culture can unite. Unlike Ukrainian Catholics and Ukrainian Orthodox in Australia, who have maintained a degree of national consciousness despite their religious differences (Lewins 1978a, 1978b), Syrian-Lebanese have tended to put religious loyalties ahead of national ones. In contrast to Ukrainians, Poles, Croatians, and Italians in Australia, who stress the national components of Catholicism, Maronites and Melkites have not greatly emphasized the fact that they are Lebanese-Catholics. Rather, they think of themselves as Catholic-Lebanese. For instance, there are over a dozen Catholic priests in N.S.W. of Syrian-Lebanese descent. All of them have been ordained in the Latin rite and have little or no contact with the Maronite or Melkite churches.

The close relationship between the Maronites and Rome which was discussed in chapter four, can also be observed in Australia. Father Dahdah, one of the two original Maronite priests to come to Australia wrote that: "The Maronites became distinguished from all the Christians of the Patriarchate of Antioch by their inviolable perserverance in the true faith; by an indissoluable attachment to the church of Rome, and by filial obedience to the Apostolic

see from which they have never separated" (Dahdah 1899: 64). When Pope Paul VI visited Sydney 71 years later, the Maronites still accentuated their fidelity to Rome.¹¹ In a letter of loyalty presented to the Pope by the Maronite Church Council, the committee stated that:

The Maronites of Australia are happy to be able to proclaim their loyalty to the Holy See and to the Holy Father... The Maronites of Australia are some of the twentieth century descendants of the followers of their illustrious founder St. Maron, and are proud that their loyalty to the Holy See has never waived... The tradition of faith that we have received from our founder are the custody of this generation of Maronites, and we rejoice that it is our bounden duty to pass them on intact to the next generation and, foremost among these traditions is our answering loyalty to the Holy See and the person of the Holy Father" (Ziade 1973: 121).

The structural consequence of this enthusiastic adoption¹² of Australian Catholicism can be seen by comparing Tables 6-10 and 6-12. It is obvious that when Maronites and Melkites have married outside of their rites, they have stayed within their larger denominational Catholic boundary by marrying one another and, more commonly, by marrying Anglo-Celtic Catholics.

TABLE 6-12

RATES OF INTERDENOMINATIONAL MARRIAGES AMONG SECOND
AND THIRD GENERATION SYRIAN-LEBANESE (PERCENTAGES)

Respondent's Spouse's Denomination	Respondent's Ancestral Rite					
	Second Generation			Third Generation		
	Ma.	Me.	A.	Ma.	Me.	A.
Catholic	90	72	15	88	63	27
Orthodox	3	15	55	-	13	40
Protestant	7	8	15	12	19	21
Other	-	5	15	-	6	13
Total	90	39	55	67	32	48

Ma. = Maronites
Me. = Melkites
A. = Antiochian

In contrast to the Catholic church, there is very little degree of pan-ethnic Orthodoxy in Australia which binds Antiochians, Russians, Greeks, Serbians and Ukrainians together. The Orthodox in Australia have been largely disunited because there is no central organization or official to whom they owe their allegiance. Whereas the Maronites and Melkites see themselves as one tile in a larger Catholic mosaic, the Antiochians are unable to do so. In fact there were only two Antiochians in the total sample who married non-Antiochian Orthodox (one a Greek, one a Copt). Historically, the Antiochians have had close theological ties with the Greek Orthodox church but this has not been translated into any inter-ethnic sociation between members of the two churches. As we shall see later, a major reason why Antiochians have not forged close social relationships with Greeks, is that they, like most Catholic Lebanese, view Greeks as unwilling to "mix", "integrate", or "assimilate" into Australian society. Thus, within the Orthodox denomination we have a case of culture dividing more than religion uniting. When they have married out, Antiochians have married Lebanese Catholics, Anglo-Catholics, and Anglo-Celtic Protestants. So even though Orthodox have three times as many third generation marriages endogamous by rite as the Melkites, they have also lost more of their followers to other denominations than any other Eastern church. *Anglo-Celtic Catholics are also prominent in the marriage networks of Antiochians. They account for 27% of all marriages among third generation Orthodox.

In summary then, Australian churches have had a great impact on Syrian-Lebanese religion.¹³ Shortly after the first immigrants arrived in Australia they had their children baptized as Latins and Protestant, sent them to Catholic and Protestant schools, and took them to Latin and Protestant services. These factors rapidly desocialized the ethnic content of Syrian Christianity

by ensuring that the Arabic language and liturgy were replaced by Latin and English. Had they been able to submerge their denominational differences for the sake of preserving their ethnic identity the Syrian-Lebanese might have persisted as a cohesive social entity. However, the mutual enmity between Catholics and Protestants which was transplanted to Australia, and both denominations' acceptance of Australian Catholicism and Protestantism, precluded the formation of any pan-denominational ethnic identity or organization.

6.4 Recreation

Syrian-Lebanese living in the country never established any formal recreational organizations because of their wide geographical dispersal. As was mentioned earlier, some managed to maintain links with friends and relatives through weekend visits and occasional trips to Sydney. By and large, family-based activities were the major focus of recreation, but being in business, many found it advantageous to become involved in the social and political life of country towns. The second generation had no options. They grew up in Anglo-Celtic environments and simply joined the same sports teams, drama societies, and hobby clubs as their Australian schoolmates. A typical example of how Syrians adapted to life in country towns, was J. Nader of Temora. In an obituary in the local newspaper in 1949, his involvement in community life was discussed and praised.¹⁴ Nader came to Sydney with his family in 1895 when he was 13. The family walked from Sydney to Cootamundra, where they were helped by George Deep from their village in Lebanon. After helping his father hawk and operate a store in Adelong, Nader opened a shop in Temora. Once the business became solidly established, Nader turned over control to his wife and began breeding horses. He became a committee member of the Temora trotting club and soon earned a reputation for

showing and racing horses throughout the State. The paper notes two of his most important achievements were breeding an Australian record holder and lobbying for the introduction of night trotting in Sydney. His other activities included being: president of the local swimming club, a member of the School of Arts committee, Grand Master of the Manchester Unity I.O.O.F., a pioneer member of the Temora Homing Pigeon Club, and a billiards and cycling champion. By all accounts, Nader was, as the Lebanese are fond of saying, "a good mixer".

The inhabitants of Redfern were the only Syrians capable of sustaining recreational patterns with any marked degree of ethnic exclusiveness. Most recreational activities were informally structured and revolved around visits to one another's homes for card games, singing and exchanging gossip. An important locus of recreation was Redfern Park, situated in the heart of the Syrian community. On weekends, especially after church on Sundays, many Syrians congregated there for picnics and other forms of conviviality. During the week it was a meeting place for the aged and mothers. Each church held an annual picnic on one of the harbour islands but being once a year affairs, they had little impact on promoting community solidarity. Oddly enough, the ethnic churches seemed to have had little impact on the Syrians' social activities, as they were chiefly active at Christmas, Easter and on feast days. Few respondents who lived in Redfern could recall much extra-religious involvement in the community by the churches. Most former residents expressed nostalgic sentiments about "Little Syria" despite Redfern's delapidated condition. One second generation respondent who lived there until her early 20's recalled that:

It was a slum, a ghetto, but there was a tremendous feeling of community spirit among the people there. Redfern was almost a Lebanese village. My parents lived there for 30 years and you could have transported them back to Tripoli and not noticed any difference in them. They didn't pick up one iota of Anglo-Saxon culture. It was terribly traumatic for my mother when the government demolished the place after the War. She was uprooted from this familiar little village atmosphere she had known ever since she had arrived from Lebanon. (Second generation housewife, case no. 50)

Although it was possible for first generation immigrants to work, worship, and recreate in a totally Arabic-speaking environment, it must be emphasized that Syrians comprised only a tiny fraction of Redfern's population. The suburb was overwhelmingly composed of Anglo-Celtic immigrants and their descendants. Thus the second generation children and adolescents were exposed to Australians at school and through recreational activities. This helped to erode some of the community's degree of ethnic exclusiveness. Between 1900 and World War II "Little Syria" was in its heyday. The community began to destabilize in the 1920's when the more affluent first and second generation Syrians began moving out, and during the depression years when others left. Except for the ethnic churches and a few stores, all traces of the community's history were obliterated by a government redevelopment project in the early 1950's. By then the Syrian population was largely confined to a small number of elderly first-generation migrants and the communal life of the past was just a memory.

6.4.1 Voluntary Organizations

Lyng's (1935: 186) statement that Syrian associations never existed is untrue. A pamphlet published in 1909 to celebrate Redfern's municipal jubilee¹⁵ lists the following organizations: The United Syrian Association, The Syrian Committee of South Sydney Hospital, The United Syrian

Association of Victoria and The Ottoman Association. These associations were ephemeral as no other mention of their existence is recorded. They probably died out during World War I. It is highly unlikely that anyone would have dared to maintain an organization with the name "Ottoman" during the war years. Each church also had councils which were restricted to males, dominated by a few wealthy and influential families and not representative of the larger Syrian community.

During the inter-war years two charitable organizations were founded by Syrian women. In 1926 the Lebanon Ladies Association was established for the purpose of raising hospital funds. It later directed its energies towards collecting money for the war. During World War II it contributed several thousand pounds to war funds. The association was patronized by lieutenant governors and state premiers. In 1939 the Australian-Lebanon Ladies War Comfort League was formed. Through the energetic efforts of its president the organization donated several hundred thousand pounds, eleven ambulances, and X-ray equipment to the war effort, and paid for renovations to Navy House. Except for the efforts of the Lebanon Ladies Association to establish a chair of Arabic at Sydney University, the efforts of both organizations have been solely concerned with Australian activities.

In 1946 a group of second generation Syrian-Lebanese in Sydney established the Australian Lebanese Association (A.L.A.). The aim of the organization was to promote Lebanese culture in Australia and perform benevolent functions. During its formative years its main activities were to hold dances and dinners for club members. In the 1950's, the first significant inflow of migrants from Lebanon since the 1920's occurred, and conflicts ensued between them and the founders of the association. The

original members felt that the "newcomers" were transporting their village feuds to Australia and undermining their attempts to mould a Lebanese organization. The founders of the association were outnumbered by the recent arrivals and resented the factionalism which they brought to the club. As one former executive of the A.L.A. stated:

The 'old guard' was Australianized and in the association for everyone's benefit. The new ones were in it for the status game. The newcomers swamped us with their politics and narrow minds. The Kfarsghabi always had a chip on their shoulder and an inferiority complex. They wanted quota representation because they felt they were discriminated against. We had a bond of fellowship that was destroyed when the new ones came after the war. (Second generation public servant, case no. 108).

Because of disagreements among members over the goals of the A.L.A., it slowly began to disintegrate. Most of the founding members quit in frustration, and in 1952 the Kfarsghabi formed their own organization, the Australian-Kfarsghabi Lebanese Association (A.K.L.A.). The A.L.A. is still in operation today, but receives little support from the second and third generation who described it as "a joke", "a front for gun-running", "too political", or "run by Muslims".

Overall, respondents were not greatly involved in voluntary organizations. At one time 35% of them belonged to at least one Lebanese association, whereas only half that number belonged to one when interviewed (see Table 6-13). Although a few respondents, mainly professionals, had multiple memberships, just under 17% belonged to only one organization while 42% had no membership whatsoever (see Table 6-14). Today, a second or third generation Lebanese is more likely

TABLE 6-13

RESPONDENTS' PAST AND PRESENT MEMBERSHIP IN
LEBANESE VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS (PERCENTAGES)

Past and Present Membership	Number of Lebanese Organizations			
	0	1	2	3 or more
Used to be a member of:	47	35	15	4
Is presently a member of:	74	17	8	1
(Total N = 88)				

to belong to the council of his local Anglican or Catholic church than an Eastern rite church council, and is more likely to be a member of a local League or R.S.L. Club than the A.L.A.

TABLE 6-14

RESPONDENTS' PRESENT MEMBERSHIP IN LEBANESE AND
NON-LEBANESE VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS (PERCENTAGES)

Type of Voluntary Organization	Number of Voluntary Organizations			
	0	1	2	3 or more
Lebanese	74	17	8	1
Non-Lebanese	42	17	13	28
(Total N = 88)				

The most cohesive voluntary association is the A.K.L.A. The organization has its own clubhouse in Carlingford and usually holds a picnic, dance or card night about once a month. Several members have prepared a history of Kfarsghabi migration to Australia and the U.S.A. which has been serialized in the association's newsletter. A substantial portion of the association's funds is sent back to Kfarsghab to assist in upgrading facilities in the village. At one Kfarsghabi picnic I sat at a table where homus, taboolie and coobee were served along with steaks, snags, and Colonel Sanders' Chicken. At one point our

cricket game had to be suspended, as most of the players were crowded around a radio listening to the broadcast of a football play-off match.

In summary, there is only a minor degree of institutional enclosure among Syrian-Lebanese in the recreational sphere. There is absolutely no evidence of ethnic mobilization in Lebanese associations. The only associations which hold any attraction for Syrian-Lebanese are culturally-based and these have exhibited declining rates of membership in recent years.

6.5 Education

The educational experience of second and third generation Syrian-Lebanese has been an entirely Australian one. The first and second

TABLE 6-15

RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF IMPORTANCE THEIR
PARENTS PLACED ON THE NEED FOR CHILDREN TO
OBTAIN A GOOD EDUCATION BY GENERATION (PERCENTAGES)

Degree of Importance	Generation	
	Second Generation	Third Generation
Unimportant	13	8
Somewhat Important	7	8
Very Important	67	80
Important only for boys	13	4
Total Number	15	40

generations felt that education was the key to social mobility and made great sacrifices to educate their children, especially their sons (see Table 6-15). It can be seen from Table 6-16 that most members of the second and third generation attended private schools. Slightly more than 25% of the second generation and 70% of the third generation were tertiary graduates (see Table 6-17). Not one respondent had ever

TABLE 6-16
RESPONDENTS' TYPE OF SCHOOLING BY GENERATION (PERCENTAGES)

Type of Schooling	Generation	
	Second Generation	Third Generation
Private Catholic	58	65
Private Protestant	4	9
Government	31	26
Other	7	-
Total Number	28	35

attended an ethnic school and no one expressed any interest in sending their children to one.

TABLE 6-17
RESPONDENTS' LEVEL OF EDUCATION BY GENERATION (PERCENTAGES)

Level of Educational Attainment	Generation	
	Second Generation	Third Generation
Never attended	7	-
Attended primary	20	-
Attended secondary	26	14
Obtained intermediate certificate	13	3
Obtained leaving certificate	7	11
Tertiary graduate	26	71
Other	3	-
Total Number	31	35

Some groups in Australia (e.g., Greeks and Ukrainians) are very active in providing educational structures in which children can learn about their ethnic heritage. It was clear that Syrian-Lebanese did not manifest this concern. As we have already seen when we looked at religion, Syrian-Lebanese have an antipathy towards ethnic organizations which foster structural pluralism. This attitude was also evident with respect to their views on education. For instance, some individuals of Maronite descent were even antagonistic towards the recent opening of an ethnic school in Redfern by the Maronite church. In short, these

findings do not suggest a revival is occurring among Syrian-Lebanese with respect to the preservation of their ethnic heritage.

6.6 Politics

The history of Lebanese political participation is much the same as their involvement in the educational system - it has been totally orientated towards Australian rather than Lebanese affairs. Although most early settlers had little interest in, or time for politics, they were not politically inert. The Redfern Syrians were clever enough to solicit the assistance of politicians to help them sponsor relatives and friends and to lobby against immigration legislation which was potentially threatening to them. This was often facilitated at the formal level through the auspices of the ethnic churches. Politicians, members of the Australian Catholic hierarchy, and other dignitaries were always invited to attend religious events as a matter of protocol. For example, in his speech at the consecration of St. Maron's church in 1897, the Hon. D. O'Connor, MLA for Redfern, expressed his opposition to the anti-alien legislation then being discussed in Parliament which would exclude "fine Christians like the Maronites" who had "appealed" to him "for succor and support".¹⁶ The consecration was also attended by the Consul-General and Vice-Consul for France and the Consular Agent for Turkey. When Bishop Clement Malouf, a high ranking member of the Melkite church visited Australia in 1928, he was honoured at banquets given by religious and political leaders.¹⁷ Among those who hosted and attended functions held in honour of Bishop Malouf were: archbishops Mannix, Duhig, and Kelly and other members of the Australian Catholic hierarchy; Cardinal Cerretti, the papal legate to Australia; clerical and lay members of the Maronite and Orthodox churches; officials of the French consular corps; the Chief Civic

Commissioner of Sydney; the Lieutenant-Governor and Premier of N.S.W.; and the Governor-General and Prime Minister of Australia. The Syrian-Lebanese took advantage of the bishop's visit to ingratiate themselves with Australian religious and political elites.

An Australian politician who played a key role in Syrian politics was William McKell, MLA for Redfern, and later Governor-General of Australia. McKell grew up in Redfern and was strongly backed by the Syrians even though most of them were debarred from voting. In return, McKell vigorously defended the rights of Syrians when they were threatened by immigration restriction acts in the 1920's. In 1951 President Chamoun awarded him the Order of the Cedars, the highest ranking honour in Lebanon, for his contributions to the Lebanese community in Australia. Through their political contacts the Syrians were able to have themselves exempted from the restrictions placed on Asiatics which were enacted in various immigration laws. Yarwood (1964, 1968) notes that because of their approximation in physical appearance to Europeans, and their intention to settle in Australia (as evidenced by their low male to female ratio), they were regarded as a special case by the government and were the only "Asian" population whose families were permitted to migrate.

In 1925, Alec Alam became the first Syrian and non-Anglo-Celtic to enter Parliament when he became a Labour MLC for N.S.W., a position which he held until 1977. Aside from his foray as a private citizen into the racial status of Syrians a few years earlier, Alam, like every politician of Syrian-Lebanese descent who followed him, was solely concerned with Australian political issues. Unlike America where politics has been an avenue of social mobility for some ethnic groups,

the Australian polity has been characterized by an absence of ethnic politics until the last decade.¹⁸ Lebanese have been elected to local, state and federal governments, but have always run as members of the conventional political parties and have never attempted to mobilize support along ethnic lines.

Any incidents involving politicians of Lebanese descent have strictly revolved around domestic concerns. For instance, in 1979 Robert Katter, a third generation Lebanese and Member of the House of Representatives for Cloncurry, protested about television coverage of cricket. Mr. Katter claimed that the decision to grant television rights to commercial stations instead of the A.B.C., would deprive many isolated communities in his electorate the traditional opportunity to watch matches. One of the most controversial political issues in Sydney in 1979 involved Dr. Peter Solomon, a third generation Lebanese who had been endorsed by the Liberal party for the blue-ribbon seat of North Sydney. For reasons still not clear, Solomon became the centre of an internal dispute between moderate and conservatives factions within the party and resigned. One ethnic newspaper commented that Solomon was "purged" because he was an ethnic and a Catholic, and that his plight had "suddenly rallied the Lebanese-Australian community to his side". The article also went on to note that Solomon "did not speak Arabic" or "mingle much with Lebanese".¹⁹

As is the case in America, Syrian-Lebanese in Australia are politically conservative. Just under 60% of the respondents were Liberal party supporters while only 13% supported Labour (see Table 6-18). The political views of most respondents were imbued with anti-communist and pro-capitalist rhetoric. Most respondents felt

TABLE 6-18

RESPONDENTS' POLITICAL PREFERENCE

Party Preferred	Number	Percent
Liberal	36	58
"Swinger"	17	27
Labour	8	13
NCP	1	2
Total	62	100

that the major political issues of today were: (1) the damage being done to the economy by militant unionists and the government's failure to "crack down on" or "control" trade unions; (2) the disastrous after-effects of the Whitlam government's economic policies which had "ruined" Australia; (3) increased government interference in the private business sector which was undermining the free-enterprise system; (4) the excesses of the welfare state system which encouraged unemployment, discouraged personal initiative, and forced the average citizen to support "dole bludgers".

In summary, Syrian-Lebanese are involved in politics qua Australians. Politicians of Syrian-Lebanese descent have always focused on domestic issues and followed traditional party structures. Syrian-Lebanese are solely concerned with political issues related to Australian affairs. There is no trace of mobilization along ethnic lines in the political sphere among Syrian-Lebanese.

6.7 Friendship

It can be seen from Table 6-19 that friendships with others of like ethnic ancestry are still conspicuous in the social networks of second and third generation individuals. But it is also clear that

TABLE 6-19
ETHNIC BACKGROUND OF RESPONDENTS' CLOSEST
FRIENDS* BY GENERATION (PERCENTAGES)

Friends' Ethnic Backgrounds	<u>Generation</u>		
	First Generation	Second Generation	Third Generation
Had no friends outside of the family	5	7	6
All Lebanese	16	9	4
Mainly Lebanese	53	20	20
Equal proportions of Lebanese & Australians	17	8	10
Mainly Australians	16	29	20
All Australians	-	29	26
No Lebanese or Australians	-	-	14
	—	—	—
Total Number	19	45	50

* The question was asked as follows: "I'd like you to think of the friends you feel closest to. I mean people you can really rely on when the 'chips are down' and who will stand beside you 'through thick and thin'. I don't mean family but friends outside of the family".

in contrast to the first generation, the second and third generation have friendship networks which are more ethnically diverse. No one in the first generation reported having totally non-Lebanese friendship networks compared to 29% and 40% for the second and third generations respectively.

In exploring the nature of friendship networks, it became obvious that respondents felt there were important affective differences between Lebanese and Australians. In the company of the latter there is generally an atmosphere of "coolness", "reserve" or "restraint"; with Lebanese people there is usually a feeling of "spontaneity", "intimacy", or "warmth". A third generation primary school principal explained that she was always aware of the differences between Lebanese

and Australians at social functions:

If you go into a room full of Anglo-Saxons they sit there like bumps on a log. No one makes a move to talk with anyone else or make you welcome; each one will stand with their cup and saucer and say 'How are you?', smile, and go on sipping. No one will act like a hostess and get you to join in like Lebanese do. Australians won't make you feel comfortable or make anybody welcome because you're an intruder. Most Australians are frightened to be spontaneously nice to each other... there's always that certain hesitancy among them... they're frightened they'll make a fool of themselves... (case no. 80)

Her brother, a pharmacist, interjected that:

I have a flamboyancy which the Australians don't have. I just take it for granted, whereas there is a certain restraint they have. Anglo-Saxons think you musn't express yourself too much. When I was in Europe and the Mediterranean, I found the people warm, volatile, easy to contact... they say it's the climate - the further north you go the colder people are - but I say it's cultural upbringing... Australians just can't 'let go' and that's what ethnic people here find so difficult to understand. Lebanese people are vibrant, warm; Australians are deadheads. (case no. 81)

Another respondent, who felt she was atypical of most Lebanese, described the differences between her Australian and Lebanese friends as follows:

Something went wrong with me when I was being brought up - I had a short-circuit somewhere because I'm not like most Lebanese. I like my privacy and I like time by myself. Don't get me wrong! I love my family and love Lebanese people. When I'm with them I'm much more vivacious, brighter and raucous. When I get together with my sister the roof comes off the house! But I'd no more act like that with Australians than fly to the moon! I'm just very well behaved with Australians and I have to admit that I like it in some ways. It's peaceful among Australian people; their quiet, restrained manner appeals to me a lot. If I had to live with Lebanese in my pockets like my parents did in Redfern I'd shoot my brains out; with Lebanese there's no such thing as being alone. (Second generation housewife, case no. 50)

At this point her husband, a second generation clothing retailer,

stated, "That's sure different to me! I like being surrounded by Lebanese because of the warmth. That's why I have to drink at social functions with Australians - I need some 'Dutch courage' because I find it hard to 'let go' with them". His wife then pointed out that, "We do have some Australian friends who are quite extroverted; some are restrained but truer, truer friends you couldn't find". Her husband then reminded her that, "It's taken a long time to get to that situation with them". She agreed and said, "Yes, perhaps they've responded to us because we're a little bit warmer and brighter than them".

Another respondent, a third generation salesman, indicated that although his closest friend (Jack) was an Australian he knew from childhood, he had two Lebanese friends (Paul and Phil) with whom he felt different:

If I walked into Paul or Phil's house and saw an apple lying there, I'd just pick it up and eat it. I couldn't do that at Jack's. When Jack comes here he brings a bottle of grog; if Paul or Phil did that I'd throw them out - what an insult! With Lebanese people it's a 'what's your's is mine' attitude. Lebanese just have those little customs that make things like eating and parties more convivial. (case no. 90)

When I asked this respondent if he felt more "at ease" with Lebanese than Australians, he replied, "I think so, yes. It's not that I'm uncomfortable with Australians by any means. It's just that there's a certain warmth with Lebanese people that makes you feel more at home".

In summary, there is a mild degree of enclosure in friendship networks which shows a decline over the three generations. The data

did not indicate there was a high degree of in-group solidarity or a "we vs they" mentality. These are features one would expect to find among ethnically consciousness members of an ethnic group. Respondents are aware of affective differences between Angloceltic-Australian and Syrian-Lebanese friends. But they attribute these dispositions to the different cultural upbringing of the two populations.

6.8 Kinship

Of all the institutions which Syrians brought with them to Australia, the family has proved to be the most enduring. Family factors are the main reason why second and third generation individuals feel Lebanese even if they cannot speak one word of Arabic and have never been to an Eastern church. Family closeness is the major feature by which Lebanese distinguish themselves from Anglo-Celtic Australians. However, endogamy rates have gradually declined across the generations and it is highly likely that ethnically homogeneous marriages among fourth generation spouses will be in the minority.

6.8.1 Family Ties In The First Generation

Kinship played an important role in the immigration process. Villagers usually heard about Australia through relatives already there and it was to them they turned for assistance when they migrated. The economic relationships among warehousemen, shopkeepers and hawkers were predicted on village and family ties. In the few instances where Syrians settled in small communities, they did so on a family and village basis. However, as we have seen, the majority of Syrians did not congregate together; the general pattern was for a family to settle in a town where there were no other Syrians. The typical Syrian family

consisted of parents, children, paternal grandparents, unmarried paternal aunts and often, brothers, cousins, and other relatives who had recently migrated. The father was the absolute head of the household and children were strictly obedient to him and all elders in the family. Family loyalty was of utmost importance; family honour was to be upheld at all times by observing strict moral codes, particularly with respect to sexual matters. A disgraceful act by a family member was a blot on the whole family and it was up to all family members to atone for any wrongdoing by an individual. Children were expected to marry their "own kind", meaning a fellow villager and co-religionist, and in some cases a cousin. If a young man could not find a suitable spouse among Syrians in Australia, he was pressured to go back to the village and return with his bride.

The integrity of the extended family unit was particularly evident in economic life, as nearly all businesses were based on the principle of what Khuri (1965: 389) terms "kinship enterprise". This simply refers to the situation in which the entire family takes part in the business. Although the husband controlled the business, he relied heavily on his wife and children for ancillary support. Indeed, many wives took an active role in hawking and storekeeping. Children helped take stock, weigh items, and wrap merchandise. The children's Australian education was a boon to the parents in helping them maintain accurate accounts and deal with Anglo-Celtic Australian merchants. Business alliances with "outsiders" - Syrians from other villages and of different faiths - were practically non-existent. Like the Syrians in America, Syrian entrepreneurs in Australia mistrusted any one but close relatives and did not form partnerships with "strangers".

The main features of Syrian enterprise in Sierra Leone outlined by Van der Laan (1975: 251), are identical to the Australian situation:

Behind each Lebanese trader stood his wife and his sons. It was taken for granted that they would help and if necessary replace and succeed the father. There was safety in numbers; protection against illness and death. The coherence of the family was the social factor which was the backbone of the economic success of the Lebanese traders: the authority of the man over his wife and children meant that the business was run as resolutely as by a single person and yet was as strong as a group. It combined the strengths of individualism and of cooperation... Rather than seeing themselves as individuals who join the business as partners, (children) see the business as belonging to the family, in particular the father... family cohesion is a firm foundation for small-scale unincorporated enterprise. Many Sierra Leoneans have noticed the way in which Lebanese support each other, but it is often wrongly interpreted as national solidarity, when in fact it is family solidarity (emphasis added).

6.8.2 Family Ties In The Second And Third Generations

The influence of this tight kinship network is still evident among second and third generation Lebanese. They continue to have an extended conception of the family, maintain close contacts with their relatives, and place a great deal of emphasis on family solidarity. As can be seen from Table 6-20, visitation with family members is frequent. Eighty-five percent of all respondents visited a family member at least once a week and one-third had daily contact with a relative.

TABLE 6-20

FREQUENCY OF VISITATION WITH FAMILY MEMBERS

Frequency of Visitation	Number	Percent
Daily	34	33
2/3 Times a Week	31	30
Weekly	22	22
Fortnightly	4	4
Monthly	3	3
Occasionally	8	8
Total	102	100

Respondents consistently expressed their amazement at how infrequently Australians saw their relatives. As one respondent stated while explaining the major difference between Australian and Lebanese families:

With the Lebanese it seems like everyone is related or everyone is your cousin. I have a third cousin I'm very close to. I'd be closer to my second or third cousin than most Australians are to their own brothers. Some Australians have never even seen their first cousins. (Third Generation Ph. D. student, case no. 45)

The extent of family cohesion is apparent when Tables 6-21 and 6-22 are observed. When asked how close they felt their families were, 91% of respondents replied "close" or "very close". They also felt that there were vast differences between their families and the typical Australian

TABLE 6-21

RESPONDENT'S PERCEPTION OF "HOW CLOSE" HIS FAMILY WAS

Perceived Closeness	Number	Percent
Fairly Close	9	10
Close	6	7
Very Close	78	84
Total	94	100

TABLE 6-22

PERCEIVED CLOSENESS OF RESPONDENT'S FAMILY
COMPATED TO THE AVERAGE AUSTRALIAN FAMILY

Closeness of Respondent's and Australian Families	Number	Percent
About the same	1	1
R's family a bit closer	4	6
R's family much closer	68	93
Total	73	100

family. Only one respondent felt that his family and the typical Australian family were equally close. All others indicated that their families were "somewhat" or "much closer" than the typical Australian family. In the words of one respondent:

I'm proud to have a Lebanese background with its tremendous traditions and family respect. I train my family similar to how I was trained - to have respect for parents. My father is 80 and I pay homage to him by visiting him at least once or twice a week. This is a traditional custom you don't find outside. Other kids piss off from home at fourteen and may never see their dad again. (Second generation bank executive, case no. 100)

Similarly, Syrian-Lebanese feel it is important for their children not to become independent too quickly. Parents encourage their children (their daughters in particular) to remain in the household until they are married. One woman felt that:

Australian people are very cold in their ways. As soon as their kids are sixteen - that's it! Out you go! You're on your own! I don't believe in that; families should stick together. (Second generation stenographer, case no. 77)

Another woman expressed the view that:

The Lebanese believe in a special togetherness. We've always grown up believing that the family unit is very important. That's how our parents were with us. Just because the children reach fifteen doesn't mean that they have to leave home and live somewhere else. This is what most Australians say: 'Go on your own'. They can't wait for their kids to leave the house so they can enjoy themselves when they're rid of them. Our parents want us to stay even if we leave school; we're still welcome as part of the family. Even after we're married our parents are still interested in us and want us back home now and then. (Second generation housewife, case no. 82)

Below are the comments of a third generation male. His sentiments capture nearly all the essential features of family values among Syrian-Lebanese:

In bringing up a family in this day and age it pays to be Lebanese or continental and keep control of your family. The continental people can handle their families better than the local variety. It pays to keep them close to you in the continental way, like doing things with their grandparents. This had to be instilled in them even if it means separating them from their peers at school - their values are different and they're not to be ashamed of this. They will be a part of the family circle until they get married and afterwards we hope they will be as close to us as we still are to our parents. To bind them to you is very important. We have certain codes of behavior they'll learn. We're not in favour of pushing them beyond their years. We're not in favour of pairing off a little fellow with a little girl and taking her to a dance. He will accompany his sister or cousin to a function which we hope is desirable. This is why I feel very happy to keep the Lebanese tie, the continental tie which has warmth. I feel they should hasten slowly; bring them along slowly and pave their concrete deep so that when they stand up they feel as though there's depth in themselves. This is where I feel it's terribly important for them to be Lebanese - not necessarily Lebanese - to be continental, worthwhile people. I don't say this isn't just as strong in Anglo-Saxon types but we identify this with our background; it's embedded in our background; it's the part we know best because we got it ourselves. We're anxious to make sure that this past we have learnt is definitely instilled in our children. (Clothing wholesaler, case no. 106)

It is interesting to note that this respondent did not view the features he outlined as being uniquely Lebanese. Like some other interviewees he saw "Mediterranean", "Old World", or "Continental" people as generally having strong family traditions. Therefore a desirable marriage partner is not necessarily a Lebanese individual. For instance, I asked a fourth generation teacher if she preferred to marry a Lebanese and she replied that, "It wouldn't have to necessarily be someone Lebanese, but I'd prefer someone ethnic". When I asked why

she had this preference she explained that, "Well, you feel there's a certain kind of sensitivity or feeling there. You know how they say there's something in the blood? There's a certain depth to their character or feelings that isn't in Australian people. They understand the family pressures on you - that the family is the most important influence on your life".

Those who expressed a preference for themselves or their children to marry Lebanese they always specified that it had to be a certain type of Lebanese. In the words of one father:

I'd want them to marry Lebanese because of the family traditions, but it would have to be a second-generation Lebanese who's assimilated like us. I don't want them with someone who just came over from the old country and doesn't understand Australian ways. (Second generation accountant, case no. 72)

In most cases, respondents were likely to emphasize an individual's suitability as a marriage partner on the basis of his or her personal characteristics. One man's comments on marriage preferences were typical of most third generation respondents' views:

I think it's important to look for someone who you can communicate with, who's on the same wavelength as you. Now I know this never happens, but if everything else was equal, I'd choose the Lebanese girl because she'd understand the family thing. But I don't go out looking for someone who is Lebanese to marry. This is where my dad is different. He'd rather have us marry a Lebanese who just got off the boat and couldn't speak a word of English than (marry) the most refined Australian. It's not that he's anti-Australian, it's just that he feels less can go wrong if you marry your own kind. I'm more inclined to look at the person and the qualities she has. (Third generation lawyer, case no. 68)

When we examine the structural dimensions of kinship, it is obvious that there has been a steady decline in endogamous marriages

across the generations. As we can see in Table 6-23, intermarriage has reached 50% by the third generation. It can also be observed that individuals with a mixed ancestry are very unlikely to marry back into the Lebanese fold. If this trend continues, then three-quarters of the fourth generation will have non-Lebanese spouses.

TABLE 6-23

RATES OF INTERMARRIAGE BY NATIONAL ORIGIN BY GENERATION
AMONG TOTAL SAMPLE OF SYRIAN-LEBANESE (PERCENTAGES)

Spouse's National Origin	<u>Generation</u>				
	First Generation	"Pure" second Generation	"Mixed" second Generation	"Pure" third Generation	"Mixed" third Generation
Lebanese	97	67	11	50	15
Non-Lebanese	3	33	89	50	85
Total	(129)	(209)	(9)	(181)	(20)

Interestingly enough, respondents were quite aware of the degree of intermarriage which had occurred but showed little or no alarm about it. When I asked respondents if they were concerned about the apparent high rates of out-marriage, most manifested little distress. There was no lament or anxiety but rather a matter-of-fact acceptance of this trend. I suspect a major reason for this resigned attitude, at least in the case of Catholics, is that marriages have been across national lines but within religious boundaries. Since nearly all Catholics are Catholics first and Lebanese second, the fact that most non-Lebanese spouses have been Catholics has been no cause for alarm. The fact remains, however, that an institution which has exerted a very profound influence on Syrian-Lebanese attitudes and behavior has undergone a gradual but steady structural disintegration.

6.9 Summary

In this chapter I analyzed the structural changes which have occurred within the key institutions of Syrian-Lebanese. From the evidence presented, it is obvious that an ethnic resurgence is not taking place. In nearly all institutions the degree of enclosure has decreased across the generations. Third generation Syrian-Lebanese have almost completely abandoned their ethnic churches in favour of Australian Catholic and Protestant churches. The only exception to this trend is that more third generation than second generation Orthodox have been baptized as Antiochians. Respondents demonstrated little interest in the religious traditions of their ancestors, were unconcerned about establishing ethnic schools for their children, and displayed a declining rate of involvement in ethnic clubs. There was absolutely no evidence to suggest that Syrian-Lebanese were mobilizing along ethnic lines for political purposes. In fact, the occupational, religious, recreational and political activities of nearly all Syrian-Lebanese occur mainly in superordinate institutions. The two institutions which did feature some degree of ethnic segmentation were kinship and friendship. At the primary group level, Syrian-Lebanese continue to choose people of like ancestry for friends and spouses. But even at this level of intimacy, where we would expect primordial bonds to be particularly strong, there has been a steady trend towards heterogeneity and exogamy. Only 10% of third generation respondents had solely Lebanese friends and 50% had married non-Lebanese spouses. In brief, the structural changes which have transpired are more indicative of a third generation decline rather than a return.

NOTES

1. In North America, some of the literature on ethnic revivalism seems to be the product of estranged ethnic intellectuals railing

against the insensitivity of the "WASP establishment" towards ethnic minorities. For instance, the works of Greeley and Novak, (one an Irish Catholic, the other a Slovak Catholic) are tinged by a good deal of moral indignation. The media has also played a role by making ethnic characters more visible in books, movies and television. In some cases this has caused resentment, (e.g., The Italian Unity League's protests over the movie The Godfather), and in others it has evoked feelings of pride (e.g., the reaction of black-Americans to Alex Haley's novel Roots). It is also possible that the renewed interest in ethnic ancestry is related to a general nostalgia for "the good old days". In recent years there has been a "1950's revival" in North America and Australia. Concern with one's ethnic heritage may be related to this fad.

2. See chapter 3, note 2.
3. N.S.W. P.D., vol. 85 : 3960-61.
4. N.S.W. P.D., vol. 88 : 1745.
5. N.S.W. P.D., vol. 52 : 425.
6. N.S.W. P.D., vol. 56 : 5264.
7. Migrants from the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic have traditionally been called "Anglo-Saxons", "British" or "WASPS". Technically, these terms apply mainly to English Protestants. The term "Anglo-Celtic" is more accurate as it includes Catholics and Protestants of English, Welsh, Scottish, and Irish origin. In tables and respondents' quotes, the terms "Australian" and "Anglo-Saxon" are synonymous with "Anglo-Celtic Australians".
8. A detailed account of the bishop's visit is contained in a pamphlet issued in 1928 by the Melkite Association of N.S.W. (Souvenir of the Visit of Right Reverend Monseigneur Clement Malouf to The 29th International Eucharistic Congress). The booklet is the only account of any length about the early Syrian churches and a valuable source of historical information.
9. Issues like these were not always as straightforward as divisions between Catholics and Orthodox. For instance, in 1916 one of the Maronite priests at St. Maron's, (Father Dahdah) filed two complaints with archbishop Kelly about his fellow priest (Father Yazbeck) allowing "the Syrian Greek Schismatic Priest" to enter the church during a funeral service. Father Dahdah's charges resulted in Father Yazbeck being called to St. Mary's cathedral to face a personal inquiry by the archbishop (St. M.A. file B-20/1916).
10. In 1903 and again in 1923, members of the Melkite church council requested audiences with the archbishop to discuss improper behavior by their priests. Members of the council alleged that among the priests' improprieties were: the neglect of their spiritual duties; selling oil and holy water from the Jordan

River to the public; and engaging in disreputable financial transactions (St. M.A. file B-20/1903, 1923). In 1923, the secretary of the Melkite association wrote to archbishop Kelly and asked him to postpone the blessing of an ikon at St. Michael's, because of "indifferences in the Melkite community at the present time which will not heal for some time yet" (St. M.A. file B-20/1923).

11. This is not to say that relations between the Australian Catholic church and the Eastern churches have always been amicable. From the time they first landed in Sydney, Maronite and Melkite priests were constantly reprimanded by archbishops about collecting funds for their churches outside the Syrian community. In 1912 all parish priests in the archdiocese were sent a directive ordering them "to restrain Oriental ecclesiastics from any pecuniary requests; first by prohibition, secondly by not allowing them access to celebration, and thirdly by denunciation in the public press" (St. M.A. file 20-B/1912). There was also conflict over granting Eastern priests the right to perform marriages and baptisms. The archbishops were reluctant to grant this power and when they did, emphasized that the priests' jurisdiction was confined to their own churches. In 1927 the archbishop's secretary informed Father Caba that the Registrar-General had been advised he could perform marriages "only of the Greek Melkites", and "in his own church" (St. M.A. file 20-B/1927). Another source of friction was the promotion of priests by their Patriarchs without consultation with the archbishop. In 1926 Father Dahdah received a promotion without the knowledge of archbishop Kelly. Dahdah was informed that the archbishop considered "it inadvisable to exalt with special honours the Oriental clergy, because of their character of questing in an unpriestly manner among the Latin dioceses". Dahdah was instructed not to "wear his purple stock" (which came with his promotion) and to "confine his change of title to his own functions within St. Maron's church". In his memoirs about his tenure as the parish priest at St. Maron's from 1963 to 1973, Father Ziade (1973) makes several references to the condescending and insensitive attitudes of the Australian Catholic hierarchy towards the Maronites. For instance, when Ziade inquired about establishing a Maronite diocese in Sydney, archbishop Gilroy replied that it might be worthwhile to place all the Oriental rites under the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian bishop! These dealings with the Melkites and Maronites are consonant with Lewins' (1978a: 92) observation that, "migrants' experience of the Australian Catholic church is generally characterized by neglect and antagonism".
12. One of the strongest arguments made by Ziade for the establishment of a Maronite diocese was the outflow of Maronites to the Latin rite. He complained to archbishop Gilroy that, "The Maronite church in Sydney, today, suffers from the loss of its old-established families to the Latin Rite... the pattern will inevitably be followed by the next generation unless a halt is called... it assuredly occurs through a steady process

of integration and assimilation. The continuation of this trend in the future along the same lines as in the past would simply mean the eventual destruction of our Rite as a separate entity... one of our greatest problems in Australia and New Zealand is to retain the adherence of the Australian-born generation of Maronites to the Rite of their parents to which they legitimately belong".

13. Kayal and Kayal (1975) estimate that in the United States, the Maronites and Melkites lost over half of their faithful to the American (Latin) Catholic church.
14. "Late J.M. Nader Had a Colourful Career". The Temora Independent, November 11, 1949.
15. Souvenir of Redfern Municipal Jubilee 1859-1909.
16. "The Maronite Church, Redfern". The Freeman's Journal, January 16, 1897.
17. See note 8 above.
18. See Parkin (1977) for a comparison of ethnic politics in Australia and the U.S.A.
19. "The Solomon Affair : Questions Must be Answered". Ethnic News, November 9, 1979.

CHAPTER 7

CHANGES IN DEGREES OF INSTITUTIONAL ENCLOSURE : PATTERNS OF ETHNIC IDENTITY

7.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter I focused on changes at the structural level. In this chapter I concentrate on transformations at the level of meaning or identity. The importance of separating these two levels of analysis was explained in chapters two and three, when it was shown that ethnic identity and ethnic organization vary independently of one another.

7.2 The Basis Of Syrian Ethnicity

In their seminal analysis of ethnic identification among American immigrant populations, Nahirny and Fishman (1965) emphasized three important points. First, many immigrants were ignorant of their "national" identities - dialect, dress, food, folklore and religion were based on local, not national foundations. Second, when these immigrants arrived in America, they transplanted these traditions and formed institutions based on the shetl, paese or bygdelag, not the nation. Third, national awareness did not usually crystallize until after settlement due to the way in which immigrants were categorized by native Americans. In short, first generation immigrants "possessed many different ethnic pasts rather than one national past" ¹ (Nahirny and Fishman 1965: 315).

This sequence of events described by Nahirny and Fishman was also characteristic of Syrian migration. Syrian immigrants never developed any strong sense of national identity because they never had one

before emigrating. As noted in chapter four, Syrians lived in Gemeinschaft environments where their loyalties seldom extended beyond the village. Also, the millet system created a situation in which any extra-village allegiances were directed towards one's sect, not the state. As Hitti (1924: 28) observed:

While at home they thought of themselves as Beirutis, Zahlawis, Hasrunis, Haqilanis, or as Maronites, Druzes, Greek-Orthodox, Matawilah, in their lands of emigration they had to answer the question 'What are you?' in broader terms.

Hitti submitted that most immigrants said they were Syrians because Syria was the only geographic referent with which most Americans were familiar. It was, as Kayal (1974: 116) comments, "purely a Western invention which most of the immigrants were forced to use for the sake of their hosts who did not know how to classify them". The Syrians who came to Australia underwent a similar experience. They called themselves Syrians for two reasons. First, few Australians had ever heard of the immigrants' specific villages or rites, but most had a vague idea of where Syria was. Even in the 1930's, immigrants who carried Lebanese passports called themselves Syrians, since few Australians knew of Lebanon. A similar situation prevails today among immigrants who tell Australians they are from Papua New Guinea, rather than specifying they are from Manus or Bouganville. Second, colour-conscious immigration authorities found the term a useful way of distinguishing Syrians from other non-European "races" - Japanese, Indians, Polynesians, Malaysians and Chinese. Although classifying Syrians as Asians was later seen as a "geographical accident" by the government and they were eventually treated as a "special case" (Yarwood 1964, 1968), census officials used the category "Syrian race"

until 1966.

It may be said then, that the fact these village peasants called themselves Syrians, stemmed more from the ways in which they were defined by Australians, than from any meaningful identification on their part. Btarram Orthodox, Kfarsghabi Maronites and Ain Bourday Melkites were concerned mainly with their "own people" and not "outsiders" from other villages. As has been observed in their religious, economic and associational endeavours, family, village and sectarian loyalties prevented the creation of a corporate Syrian identity. The development of an inclusive Syrian identity was also impeded by Syrians' low level of political awareness. Unlike the Irish, Syrians had almost no history of political activism in their homeland. As observed in chapter four, nationalism did not gain much momentum until after 1900 and independent statehood was not attained in Lebanon until 1943. Even today, it is difficult to speak of a Lebanese identity. Syrian migrants, most of whom were illiterate peasants, had little exposure to nationalistic doctrines. In Hitti's (1924: 25) words: "The Syrian is a man without a country par excellence. His patriotism takes the form of love for family and sect... Syrian patriotism has no political aspects".

Thus, the cultural baggage which Syrians brought with them to Australia did not provide the basis for generating anything beyond a rudimentary feeling of ethnic awareness. In fact, their materialistic values made the emergence of a Syrian identity difficult. Most Syrians did not choose to live close to other Syrians. Instead, they deliberately situated themselves in country towns where they could monopolize trade. They discouraged other Syrians from settling near them, as this

threatened their control of the town's business. Furthermore, circumstances in Australia did little to encourage Syrian ethnicity. Australia provided Syrians with economic security, religious freedom and educational opportunities for their children. The thought of returning to an impoverished mountain village was hardly an attractive prospect in comparison to conditions in Australia. The emergence of a religious identity never occurred because Syrians had their religious needs met by the Australian churches. Arabic, another possible source of ethnic identity, nearly vanished among members of the second generation. They were Anglicized and Latinized at church and at school, and became Australians before they could become Syrians.

The lack of any linguistic, religious, national or geographic identity left the family as the principal focus of Syrian ethnicity. To be a Syrian meant that one identified with certain family customs: food was prepared and eaten in a certain way; hospitality was always extended to visitors; family elders were venerated; members of the family maintained close ties with one another. "Syrianism", then, was basically a privatized type of identity which was mainly confined to the household. Before examining what effect this mode of ethnic identity has had on the descendants of Syrian immigrants, it is necessary to discuss the transition from Syrian to Lebanese ethnicity.

7.3 From Syrians to Lebanese

There is no exact date on which we can say Syrians in Australia started calling themselves Lebanese. As was the case in America (Kayal and Kayal 1975), the transformation was a process which took about thirty years to complete. The geographic and political definitions of Lebanon in 1920 and 1926 respectively, had some impact on the

development of a Lebanese identity. But it was not until after World War II that the term "Lebanese" finally supplanted the phrase "Syrian". The issue over proper terminology first arose in 1925, when a group of about 50 women met to form a benevolent association. The president had intended to call the organization the Syrian Ladies Association, but objections from other members resulted in it being named the Lebanon Ladies Association. However, the term "Syrian" was still commonly used for the next decade or so. In an article on Australia in The Syrian World in 1927, Alam used the terms "Syria" and "Syrians" and made no reference to "Lebanon" or "Lebanese". The two latter terms first appear in a souvenir pamphlet printed in 1928 by the Melkite Association of N.S.W. Written in impeccable English, the booklet was intended to commemorate the visit to Australia of Bishop Malouf of Syria, who was representing the Melkite patriarch at the International Eucharistic Congress in Sydney. The document contains several references to the Syro Marounite Association and the terms "Syria" and "Syrians" are used often. Mention is also made of the Lebanese Greek Orthodox Association and the phrases "Lebanon" and "Lebanese" frequently appear.

The appearances of the Australia-Lebanon Ladies War Comfort League (1939), the Australian Lebanese Association (1946), and the Australian-Kfarsghab Lebanese Association (1952) signalled the phasing out of the term Syrian, although it was still utilized by census officials. The achievement of Lebanese independence in 1943 stimulated the use of the term Lebanese. Several respondents recalled that soldiers of Anglo-Celtic Australian and Lebanese descent, who had fought in the Middle East during World War II, returned home telling people here that they

should call themselves Lebanese and not Syrians. In the 1950's, the first influx of Lebanese immigrants for some time helped to accelerate the replacement of the phrase "Syrian" with the term "Lebanese".

7.4 The Basis Of Lebanese Identity

It was noted in chapter two that some scholars have measured ethnic identity by assigning individuals an "identity" which has been measured "objectively" (e.g., racial origin, paternal ancestry). I argued against this practice by demonstrating that ethnicity is subjective, variable, contextual and cannot necessarily be inferred from "objective" indicators. Consequently, I examined Lebanese ethnicity from the actors' own viewpoints by asking them the following questions:

- i) how they defined their ethnic identity;
- ii) what meaning their ethnic identity had for them;
- iii) if their feelings about their ethnic identity had changed in any way throughout life;
- iv) if there were times when they felt more or less Lebanese.

The purpose of these questions was to discover the precise nature of Lebanese ethnicity and how intense identification was with Lebanese traits.

7.4.1 Subjective Definitions of Identity

It can be seen from Table 7-1 that there was no consensus on one ethnic identity, but rather a number of different ethnic identities. For analytical purposes I have grouped the various categories into three broad classifications: "Lebanese", "Bi-ethnics" and "Australians".

(a) Lebanese

These people owed their allegiance to Australia, but felt that their

TABLE 7-1

RESPONDENT'S SUBJECTIVE IDENTITY BY GENERATION

Subjective Ethnic Identity	<u>Generation</u>		
	First Generation	Second Generation	Third Generation
Lebanese	8	11	6
Lebanese-Australian	1	5	9
Lebanese and Australian	2	6	3
Situational	1	4	4
Australian-Lebanese	5	12	10
Australian	5	10	13
Had No Ethnic Identity	-	-	5
Total Number	22	48	50

values and lifestyle were predominantly Lebanese. They usually stated that their close family ties, their consumption of Lebanese food and, in a few cases, a nostalgic attachment to Lebanon made them "think" or "feel Lebanese". Most of the respondents who identified themselves as Lebanese came to Australia as adult or infant migrants. Adult migrants usually stated that it was impossible to forget one's place of birth, thus they still thought of themselves as Lebanese. Infant migrants generally focused on the influence of family ties. One second generation woman commented:

It's the family that makes me Lebanese. I had a strict upbringing and was more restricted than what my own children are. I wasn't allowed outside the door; maybe that's why I'm more Lebanese than my kids. It's really the family that affects you. I wouldn't make any distinction between my brother's children and my own. My brother is the same way about my kids. They're all part of the same big family. (Housewife, case no. 23)

Third generation respondents also felt that family factors were responsible for making them feel Lebanese:

It's having a certain lifestyle that makes you feel Lebanese - a particular attitude toward the family which I like. We're

much closer than Australians are. Perhaps we overdo it a bit and the parents have too much say. But I can look at non-Lebanese families and see where the parents haven't had enough say or guided their children - they do what they want. That's fine for the time being, but the implication for the future can be quite disastrous. (Fourth generation industrial engineer, case no. 89)

Most of the first and second generation respondents who called themselves Lebanese, had few non-Lebanese friends and few friends at all outside of the family.

(b) Bi-ethnics

People in this category reported having varying amounts of Lebanese and Australian traits. Some Lebanese-Australians thought they were more Anglified than their ancestors, but had retained enough Lebanese characteristics to make them feel more Lebanese than Australian. Again, the bases of their Lebanese identity were their close family ties and their love of Lebanese food. Eleven people indicated that they could not say if they were predominantly Lebanese or predominantly Australian. They felt equally at ease with Australians or Lebanese and usually stated that they had a "happy mixture" or "nice combination" of Lebanese and Australian customs. Nine people reported that their ethnic identity was dependent upon the situation. For example, some of them indicated that in Lebanese company they tended to feel their Lebanese heritage emerging, while at work they only thought of themselves as Australians. A case in point was a third generation lawyer who called himself a Lebanese, but then qualified this by saying that:

It varies - at work I'm almost totally Australian; I identify more with Australia (there). In my home and social life, in my weekend life with my family, I'm probably more Lebanese. (case no. 25)

Australian-Lebanese knew that their Lebanese background had some influence on them, but felt that this was outweighed by their Australian values. They felt "somewhat" or "remotely" Lebanese when they went to a Lebanese wedding or interacted with elderly relatives. But in most situations their Lebanese background was irrelevant. For example, a third generation woman said:

I don't consider myself Lebanese. I'm an Australian with Lebanese grandparents, customs and heritage. I called myself Lebanese when I went to Lebanon, but in Australia I'm an Australian with a Lebanese heritage. I'm glad I've got my heritage; I don't want to lose it; but being Lebanese is not consciously part of my daily life. (Solicitor, case no. 71)

(c) The Australian Type

There was virtually no identification with Lebanese culture among these people. They had little knowledge of Lebanese affairs either in Australia or Lebanon. They knew that their ancestors came from Lebanon, but could seldom specify the exact town or village. Interaction with people of Lebanese descent was mainly confined to occasional visits with their relatives. Attempts to extract attitudes or opinions from them about their identity usually yielded little information.

There was very little to suggest that respondents were undergoing a resurgence of ethnic identity. Although the relationship in Table 7-1 is not linear, there is a definite trend for the members of the second and third generations to identify themselves as Australians rather than Lebanese. Also, the five respondents who indicated they did not have a particular ethnic identity were all third generation respondents. These people generally felt that nationalism was one of the world's greatest evils and that people should think of themselves as "members of the human race" or "citizens of the earth". Third

generation respondents displayed little interest in learning Arabic or studying Lebanese history and culture. The following comments of a third generation teacher typified most third generation respondents' attitudes about their ethnic heritage:

I would like to learn another language, but this could just as well be French or German as Arabic. Arabic might be useful to learn given the appearance of the Arabs on the world scene. I'd like to know Arabic because I'm of Lebanese background; because when I tell people that, they ask me what I know about Lebanese things and that's the end of the conversation. I would have liked to have got more out of the Lebanese culture but I didn't - it's minimal. There's not much I can do about it unless I make a conscious effort to learn (Arabic), but it's all extra work. (case no. 10)

7.4.2 The Meaning of Ethnicity

After respondents stated their ethnic identity, I asked them to explain the meaning it had for them. It can be seen from Table 7-2

TABLE 7-2

ITEMS WHICH RESPONDENTS FELT GAVE THEM AN ETHNIC IDENTITY (N = 99)

Item	Number of Times Mentioned	Percent of total items
Family closeness	60	24
Having certain values & outlooks (unspecified)	28	11
Fondness of Lebanese food	27	11
Having a heritage you are proud of	26	10
Having parents or grandparents of Lebanese origin	20	8
Being generous and hospitable	18	7
Being a member of a community	16	6
Having a natural trading instinct	14	5
Being morally strict	10	4
Being spontaneous and excitable	10	4
Being born in Lebanon	7	3
Having certain physical traits	4	2
Having a certain religious heritage	4	2
Being clannish, sectional or narrow	3	1
Being overbearing and too inquisitive	3	1
Being a member of a minority group	3	1
Being able to speak Arabic	2	1
Total	255	100

that nearly all respondents attributed their ethnic identity to consanguineous and cultural factors. Having close family ties was the trait most often reported by respondents when they were asked to explain why they held a particular ethnic identity. Moreover, most of the other items mentioned were closely connected with the primary socialization process. Possessing certain personality traits and having specific values and lifestyles were seen as characteristics inherited from parents and/or grandparents. As one third generation respondent stated:

It's basically the family unit in which culture has survived - the language, the food, the formalities, the way people treat each other in day-to-day life, the customs - like at funerals and weddings. In the formal sense, when you go to a social gathering, Lebanese culture, religion and family comes out, but in day-to-day life it just comes out in the family - the fact that people around you are Lebanese - your wife, parents, cousins most of whom are your close friends... Certain people, mostly dead now, such as grandparents, uncles, etc. You think back to them, how good they were and all the qualities they had; it makes you feel good to know that they were your relatives; it makes you feel good to know that you may have something good that they had, you might be part of them, have some of their character. (Ph.D. student, case no. 45)

A fourth generation woman felt that her identity was mainly related to her relationship with her mother and was uncertain if it was attributable to Lebanese factors:

I guess (I feel Lebanese) because of different eating habits and the respect I have for my family. You have a different sort of loyalty. I don't know if this is strictly Lebanese, or something I've got from the close contact I have with my mother, which may not be specific to Lebanese. It's difficult to say if the advantages I get from being Lebanese are because my mother is Lebanese, or (because she is) just mom. I think my mother and father, but my mother to a greater extent, has given me a pattern which will always make me content in life... Things are similar with Greeks and Italians - your coming and going is controlled. (Ph. D. student case no. 88)

This respondent's last statement was echoed by others who felt that Lebanese were similar to other "ethnics" in Australia. A third generation man commented that:

To me the big feature is the family association; you're always conscious of your Lebanese contacts, your family relatives. I don't think of it in terms of anything about Lebanon very much. I don't think of myself as being dispossessed from Lebanon or anything like that. I don't get involved in any discussions over Lebanon because I'm not sure what the conflict is all about. I don't think there's any other characteristics I attach to the Lebanese apart from the family. I think we're very similar to the others: the Greeks, the Italians, the others who seem to have a strong family unit which is distinct from the Anglo-Saxon family. Apart from that I don't see any big distinction. (Lawyer, case no. 25)

7.4.3 Changes In Ethnicity During The Life Cycle

In order to discern if any resurgence had taken place among respondents, I asked if their feelings had changed in any way during their life. The following factors were mentioned as having affected respondents' feelings about their identity: ageing, marriage, family deaths, occupational, demographic or educational mobility, the outbreak of civil strife in Lebanon, and visiting Lebanon.

(a) Ageing

Nearly all respondents recalled being embarrassed or resentful about their ethnic background during childhood and adolescence. This had usually been caused by the ridicule they received from their peers because of the food they ate, the restrictions imposed on them by their parents, their parents' use of Arabic in public, and their physical appearance. With one exception, all respondents stated that as they matured, their ethnic background was something they had "come to terms with", "worked out" or "resolved". The sole exception was a young

third generation woman who felt she still had an "ethnic identity crisis". A typical response about the effects of ageing was given by a second generation woman who came to Australia as an infant:

We were the only Lebanese in town and one of the few non-Anglo-Saxon families. I was one of the few darker people there so I always felt very foreign and inferior. I'll always remember wanting to be blond, blue-eyed and tall as a child. All of that changed as I matured and came to grips with my Lebanese heritage; but I always felt different and that I had an inferior status as a child. (Second generation social worker, case no. 98)

(b) Marriage

Several second generation respondents indicated that they had become more Lebanese after marrying Lebanese-born spouses. They found that marriage enmeshed them in predominantly Lebanese social networks and thus heightened their ethnic awareness. On the other hand, one second generation woman felt she had become less Lebanese since marrying her third generation husband, because she subsequently had time for only her immediate family instead of all of her relatives. One third generation respondent who married an Anglo-Celtic man and thought of herself as an Australian, had her child baptized in the Melkite church. This was despite the fact that the woman hardly ever attended the Melkite church herself and considered herself to be a Catholic. She explained her action by saying that for some unknown reason, she became more conscious of her background after marrying in a Latin church, "missed" the Melkite church, and decided to have her child baptized there. An interesting case was provided by a woman who had a Lebanese-born father and an Anglo-Celtic mother. She married an Anglo-Celtic and found that this intensified her attachment to Lebanese culture. She attributed this to the fact that it was only after marriage she had been able to "look back as an outsider" and see how much she had been

influenced by Lebanese values. In her words:

Until I was married and started to live my own life with an Australian husband, I never realized how much I was Lebanese. I didn't know it until I got out of the situation. There's a hangover from the Lebanese in me. I'm family-minded which sounds ridiculous because I don't live in their pockets, but I get twinges of guilt when I don't do the right thing, like go visiting every week. Time constraints have curtailed entertaining which I love to do; I really love having lots of people around. Every time I entertain I serve Lebanese food. I'd say I've gone back; reverted right back. I've got this family pride. I've always got the direct family in mind. I've got to hold up my side for dad and mom.
(Teacher, case no. 84)

(c) Family Deaths

A common finding was the waning of attachment to Lebanese ways after the deaths of family patriarchs or matriarchs who were the chief sources of Lebanese values. For instance, following their deaths, children and grandchildren no longer felt compelled to attend the ethnic churches just to please them.

(d) Occupational, Educational And Geographic Mobility

Two health professionals reported that until they went to university, they had an inferiority complex about their ethnic background. Both had lived in small country towns during childhood and adolescence and were conscious of their physical and ethnic distinctiveness. Once at university, they found themselves in a cosmopolitan atmosphere and therefore, at ease with their ethnicity. One young, fourth generation respondent had never given his ethnic background much thought until he came to Sydney to attend university. He had grown up in a medium-sized country town, only had Australian friends, and thought of himself as an Australian. His aunt in Sydney introduced him to some Lebanese people and he discovered that compared to Australians, they were

"more generous" and "warmer". Since living in Sydney he felt himself being "pulled back" to the Lebanese, although his closest friends were still Australians. A third generation woman related that prior to establishing her own business in a fashionable Eastern suburb, she had virtually no contact with Lebanese outside of her family. Shortly after opening her shop, she noticed that a lot of second and third generation Lebanese were coming into her store and introducing themselves. Consequently, she felt she had "developed an affinity" for Lebanese people, because of the warmth and friendliness they had displayed towards her.

(e) Civil Strife In Lebanon

Although all respondents expressed sorrow about the people killed during the recent disturbances in Lebanon, the strife was clearly a source of embarrassment to them. A fourth generation woman indicated that:

I used to be very proud of my Lebanese background... but the insanity of the war and the way they just fight and kill off one another has made me realize there must be something lacking in their rationale or mentality which is something akin to the Irish, who are the butt of a lot of jokes in Australia. Irish jokes are a big thing, but I don't think it will be too long before Lebanese will be in much the same bracket... Would you want to be associated with the greatest number of cease-fires ever? That's all they've got to be proud of; even Ireland can't claim that. Lebanon has had about 150 unsuccessful cease-fires. Any person who had a brain wouldn't want to be associated with that. It's stupid! It defies logic! For the stupidity of the war I criticize them; I want to be apart from them. (Ph.D. student, case no. 88)

Another respondent stated that:

(Being Lebanese) used to be important when I had respect for Lebanon. I used to be proud that Lebanon could be a

model to the rest of the world until this trouble started; now I've become disappointed. How can brother kill brother? I'm disgusted! (Second generation salesman, case no. 57)

Respondents were not only embarrassed by the war, but also resentful of and even hostile to the Lebanese refugees who had come to Australia. A third generation man contrasted the difference between the "old" and "new Lebanese" in the following way:

There are times when I'm ashamed to be Lebanese, like when I hear about the people who have come out here in recent years. The old Lebanese were solid, hard-working, proud of their names. Now the catch-cry is to make money any dirty way you can. We've never had the publicity like we've had with the ones today - drug-running, prostitution, all the muck and filth. Maybe the old ones were just as bad and I'm looking through the eyes of a child, but I don't think so. The type that exists now, compared to my father and uncles, are of different character altogether... A lot of them don't seem to want to work... they're not as solid. (Chemist, case no. 81)

Similar sentiments were expressed by another respondent:

I think that the main difference is that people of my father's vintage came seeking opportunity, while this recent lot have come as opportunists. Today, the new ones can't get work; some don't want to work. They're very clever and resourceful people - even with large families they can live off the dole. There's no impetus for them to work and this annoys me a bit. I can understand why they do it. They think if anyone is that stupid you may as well take advantage of it. This would have been a completely foreign way of thinking to my parents and their contemporaries who had get up and go. (Second generation medical practitioner, case no. 25)

Another respondent was more emphatic in expressing her views on recent arrivals:

The older established families resent them. They're shaming the Lebanese people and giving them a bad name. The older families came out and worked very hard for themselves and are well-to-do. They've held their head up high; they've

assimilated and been accepted into Australian society ... Then all of a sudden there are a lot of people coming out not as family proud, not a very nice class as people... sort of rubby-dubs. They're getting out here pretty easily and been promised jobs and the whole bit. They come out and don't hold up what the Lebanese people here think is their end of the bargain... It's a shame, they're really letting a lot of rubbish in here at the moment... They're coming out here to absolutely drain the country. They expect the red carpet out and pots of gold at the end of it! Well, I think they'd better go back home to work a bit harder and stay in their own country! (Second generation teacher, case no. 98)

Other respondents also revealed that the arrival of "new Lebanese" had aroused negative feelings:

I was always very proud (of being Lebanese), but in the last few years with the fighting that's been going on and with the refugees that have been coming out, different sorts of images are around. I sometimes feel quite unhappy that I have to say I'm Lebanese. (It's) not that I'm not proud of myself anymore, but I'm not proud of a lot of people who have come recently along with their ideas. (Second generation housewife, case no. 82)

I used to call myself Lebanese until about five years ago. When the newcomers started arriving I realized how much more Westernized I was. (Third generation teacher, case no. 91)

The class of Lebanese that came to Australia up to 1960, even until say 1965, were very good; the government would vet them very well. Generally, we were proud to be a member of hard-working, conscientious, sober-minded, straight lot. In recent times we're getting a lot of all and sundry - a lot of which I don't identify with at all. You try to keep your distance from them. (Second generation clothier, case no. 103)

(f) Visiting Lebanon

Respondents who had visited Lebanon manifested the most profound changes in ethnicity. Their experiences in Lebanon are classic illustrations of primordialism. Many respondents referred to the feelings of "belonging", "identity", and "pride" which they experienced in Lebanon. For some people, the trip made them aware of their

Lebanese background for the first time:

Before I went to Lebanon I always said I was Australian. I didn't want to acknowledge my Lebanese heritage. At school I didn't like being thought of as being Lebanese. Besides, my father never passed on much to me about Lebanese culture. Now I'm Lebanese-Australian. In my own mind I like to assert that I'm Lebanese before Australian, but I'm probably really more Australian than Lebanese. When we were flying into Lebanon I had the most overwhelming feeling of homesickness, which was really amazing, because I never identified with Lebanese. After landing I had a wonderful feeling. I felt very much at home; I never felt a stranger. I'm sometimes inhibited in strange places. In Hong Kong we were walking down dark alleys and I was nervous and wanted to get out. In Lebanon we were walking down alleys twice as dark and unsavoury and I felt quite at home. The three weeks there were too short. I'd love to go back - not to stay, of course - I'm too fond of Australia. (Third generation housewife, case no. 107)

Among others, it evoked feelings of pride in what their ancestors had accomplished and handed down to them:

Just to see where we started from would have been worth the trip to Lebanon alone, because it made me realize that the gains our family made in this country have only been through hard, conscientious, dogged work. For that reason I was very proud to think that we started there and now in the third generation we've achieved a considerable degree of success. I'm proud to be the grandson of a fellow who came out to Australia with nothing and built what we have today through hawking, sweat, persistence, and hard work. This family's pride is in the fact that he worked and didn't ask for anything in the way of social services. I'm very glad to be a member of that family and to see the line go on. (Third generation clothier, case no. 104)

Others felt that visiting Lebanon helped them solve identity problems which they had experienced hitherto. A second generation man recalled that:

Here I was standing on the same spot my father did as a boy. Until then I'd always felt a vacuum. For my generation it was difficult being brought up in a strange country - you're neither one thing nor the other. I

wouldn't want to go through my adolescence again; believe me, it was hell! When I went to Lebanon I thought 'What am I?', 'Who am I?' Seeing where my family and relatives came from, the villages my parents came from - I knew. (Bank executive, case no. 100)

The reaction of some respondents was almost like a mystic experience. For example, a second generation woman recalled that:

Before I went I didn't give much thought to my ethnic background - 'My parents are Lebanese and I was born here' was always my statement. I didn't call myself Lebanese until I went over there and my attitude suddenly changed. I then started to classify myself as Lebanese.

Q. How did your attitude change?

A. I had a sense of belonging there. I don't know why. I often ask myself: 'Now why should I feel I belong there when I belong here?' It's a terribly funny feeling.

Q. Can you tell me a bit more about your reaction to Lebanon?

A. I went after my parents died. Everything in our upbringing was Lebanese and this had a great influence on me. When my parents died I experienced this loss and wanted to go to Lebanon to find mom and dad. Mom and dad always talked about Lebanon. When I went back, I started walking down the streets where I knew my mother and father walked and almost had this feeling they were with me. I went to the church where they were married and met the old priest who had married them. I met my aunts and they took me around to my grandfather's and great grandfather's place and told me stories. They pointed out certain things and I knew exactly what they were talking about, because mom had told us the same story. It was there; it was imprinted in my mind; it became real. Without a doubt, the trip to Lebanon was the most wonderful time of my life! (Secretary, case no. 118)

An interesting aspect of most people's comments was an intensely strong identification with their family heritage and a corresponding rejection of Lebanese culture and society in general. The corrupt political system and the class inequality was repugnant to all respondents

and served to heighten their Australian identity. The respondent who earlier expressed pride in his grandfather's achievements (case no. 104) went on to note that:

When I went there I found that I was clearly not Lebanese.

Q. Why do you say that?

A. Because I'm a bloody Inglese there! You don't speak the language and a lot of their customs you don't go along with. My blood might be Lebanese, but my customs are clearly 80% Australian. Over there they rip you off at every corner. The management of the country and the status quo that exists there stinks - it's an industry of corruption. You can murder over there and get away with it as long as you have money. If you've got enough money to pay your electorate off, then you can be in politics - there's no justice. Even common things we appreciate in Australia, like medical care, is shameful. The doctors are unscrupulous, unsympathetic bastards only in it for money and nothing else. To be Lebanese and associated with those things make me sick. I'm much prouder to be an Australian. It's sickening to be associated with that; it's disgraceful and disgusting; I spit on that side of the Lebanese.

The comments of one woman demonstrate how people could identify with their own family while simultaneously rejecting Lebanese ways:

It was a deadshit country; it stunk; the Arab influence was awful! Whatever I had that was inside me that was Lebanese most certainly didn't match that country, and that country didn't belong to it... All those dirty Arabs walking around their dirty shops yelling at one another, the class distinctions, the graft and corruption in the police force - it was horrific!

Q. But didn't you say earlier that you had a special place in your heart for Lebanon?

A. I feel very close to our piece of land. That's inside me, deep inside me, but it's because it belongs to my parents. It's not Lebanon, it's my parents' land and my father's house that's still standing there from two centuries ago. It was very precious to go and visit, but only because it was my father's house. It could have been in any country of the world. (Second generation health professional, case no. 113)

7.4.4 Situational Aspects

Aside from experiencing changes during the life cycle, many respondents also reported that their ethnic identity fluctuated depending on the situation. This was most evident when they recounted their feelings after being in Lebanon, which has been discussed in the previous section. For most people, their ethnicity was something they were not conscious of in everyday life. For instance, a third generation public servant stated that:

I'm Australian in my daily life. But because of my closeness to my relations, I have obligations such as funerals and weddings to go to and this is my Lebanese part. (case no. 93)

On the other hand, a second generation health professional indicated that her work was a milieu in which she felt particularly Lebanese:

I feel especially Lebanese with Australians, particularly when I have them around and cook Lebanese food. I also feel it professionally. I have far greater freedom in expressing my feelings. I'm aware of a capacity to feel way and beyond what the Australian allows himself to do. Being able to intellectualize that and present it in my professional life has been an incredible benefit. That combination the Australian doesn't have - he either intellectualizes and cuts his feelings out or cuts his intellect out. I've got a beautiful marriage of the two and I'm sure it's because of my heritage. I'm able to feel in-depth, which the Australian is totally embarrassed about... with the old Lebanese I feel more Australian, because they know I'm half-Australian and I'm not expected to live up to their mores. (case no. 113)

An interesting finding was that people reported feeling differently in similar situations. For instance, many people stated that they felt Lebanese in Lebanese company and Australian in Australian company. However, others reported that with certain Lebanese they felt Australian, and with certain Australians they felt Lebanese. A second generation woman commented that:

When you mix with 'real' Lebanese people you realize how Australified you are. The 'old Lebanese' really make you feel that way. But you think you're really Lebanese when you're with 'real' Aussies. (Secretary, case no. 77)

A third generation medical practitioner explained that:

Unless it specifically comes up like right now when we're talking about it, I don't give it much thought. It only really surfaces when an Australian asks me about it or occasionally at Lebanese functions. I've felt very Australian when I've been to a function where there are Kfarsghabi - they're more Lebanese than the people in Lebanon. I've felt very Lebanese when I've discussed it with Australians. I'd say I'm most conscious of being Lebanese at a social function with Italians, Greeks or other ethnics. It's not pride you feel, but a lowest common denominator we have in common. We've all had the same problems: pressures from our parents, pressure from Australians, and problems in working out who we are. (case no. 68)

Two women felt that their ethnicity sometimes surfaced when they interacted with men. One woman, a Ph. D. student, stated that:

It sometimes comes out in the fact that I'm working with a professor and my upbringing has been that you don't tell guys what to do - especially older men. I'd rather say nothing than walk all over his ideas. I don't push a point because I've always been told to shut-up and pay respect at home. This hinders my viewpoint. (case no. 88)

The other woman commented that:

My friends are constantly amazed that I don't like to see men cleaning or washing up and ascribe it to my background. I don't know, maybe it's probably more to do with our family background than necessarily being Lebanese, because we had three girls and one boy in the family. (Third generation nurse, case no. 58)

Another third generation woman said that she occasionally felt compelled to do "ethnic things" for no apparent reason: "I find myself driven sometimes to do things like eating dry bread, cheese, and olives for breakfast like my grandfather did, but I can't explain why". A second generation

medical practitioner, reported that he had felt particularly Lebanese when travelling in different countries:

When I'm outside Australia I say I'm Australian. In Australia, people obviously mean your origin, so I say Lebanese. I've felt both Australian and Lebanese. When I went to Lebanon and met my relatives and went to the village, I was very happy and proud. But I also felt Australian because they can pick you out somehow 80% of the time. I was in South Africa last year and looked up some Lebanese who straight away warmed to me because I knew X, Y, and Z. You're immediately accepted, given the run of the place, and taken here and there. This also happened to me in America. At times like this it felt very good to be Lebanese. The Lebanese encounters were 'extras' which were very pleasant. (case no. 25)

A third generation man explained that although he was "an Australian-Lebanese - in that order", he was careful about which Lebanese traits he emphasized:

I suppose I constantly acknowledge myself as being Lebanese. I pride myself by the same token, as being a mottled lizard and being able to change my colours for every surrounding. Quite often this can be an identity crisis in as much as you can't strike a medium halfway between. I'd say I'm 80% Australian and 20% Lebanese. I'm very proud of the parts that I choose to inherit from my Lebanese background.

Q. So it's a selective thing?

A. Yes, I'm selectively Lebanese - clearly selective. I make no apologies for it and make no apologies for disowning other aspects (Accountant, case no. 2).

7.5 Summary

This examination of Lebanese ethnicity does not indicate an ethnic regeneration is occurring. The Syrian peasant who migrated to Australia identified with his family and the co-religionists in his village. Because of this, Syrians did not arrive in Australia with a corporate ethnic identity. The term "Syrian" was merely a geographic label for a category of people who had little "consciousness of kind" before emigrating. Because of these and

other pre-migration traits, and because of certain conditions in Australia, an inclusive Syrian identity did not emerge after they settled. There was no linguistic, national, or religious basis to Syrian ethnicity. It was a form of identity which was mainly restricted to the family setting.

Second and third generation Lebanese "think" or "feel Lebanese" because of the family traditions which have been passed on to them. Thus, their ethnicity is highly privatized and does not extend into other institutions (e.g., work, religion, politics). Moreover, strong family ties are not always perceived to be uniquely Lebanese, but characteristic of "Old World", "Mediterranean" or "non-Anglo-Saxon" people in general. Some respondents experienced an increased awareness about their Lebanese background after visiting Lebanon. But in most cases, the primordial sense of belonging emanated from an appreciation of one's family heritage, not Lebanese society and culture. In fact, many respondents had adverse reactions to Lebanese ways and had their identification with Australia heightened as a result of their trip to Lebanon.

Overall then, there was little evidence of a third generation return. Only two third generation individuals displayed anything resembling ethnic consciousness. One was a lawyer who stated that his Lebanese background "saturated" his daily life. He said he identified with the Phoenician spirit of adventure, his "thoroughbred" past, his close family ties and Lebanese food. He felt particularly Lebanese when defending a Lebanese client in court. He also stated that he would not be satisfied to remain a lawyer, but wanted to achieve higher goals. To him, this achievement-orientated behavior was his most dominant Lebanese trait. He explained his aspirations by saying that, "Being Lebanese and being ambitious are the same thing".

Despite his heightened sense of ethnicity, there was one important fact which made me classify him as an ethnically aware individual: he had just married an Anglo-Celtic woman.

Near the end of the interview stage of the study, I met a Maronite who was the most knowledgeable of all third generation respondents about Lebanese history. He was married to a Lebanese-born woman and was the only respondent who stated it was important to him for his children to marry people of the same rite. At the conclusion of the interview, I mentioned that he was one of the few people I had encountered who displayed a strong interest in Lebanese history or emphasized his national and religious heritage. His comment was:

Being Lebanese is important from a personal sense, but from a practical sense it's probably of little importance. It doesn't mean anything in terms of your future to be Lebanese, in that you're not going to go back to Lebanon to settle or work. You're not going to get involved in anything Lebanese apart from your social and religious life. It's not an important thing in a business sense. I've become assimilated into the Australian way of life because I've been born and educated here and classify myself as an Australian. The Lebanese part of me is still important - very important - but not from a practical point of view. (Ph. D. student, case no. 45)

In brief, ethnicity among members of the third generation is partial, situational, and residual. By and large, they manifest an ethnic awareness which does not transcend the family context.

NOTES

1. Nahirny and Fishman's generalizations are exemplified by

Moss and Flowerday's (1972: 131) comments about "Cortinese" immigrants: "Geographic identification did not make for feelings of communality. To an American, he was an Italian: to an Italian he was Molisano; to a Molisano, he was a Cortinese; to a Cortinese, he was from one parish or the other; to a fellow parishoner, he was a member of a specific family. This is until he came to America. Thrown together with fellow villagers in that strange land, he began to feel bonds of mutuality which transcended the rivalries so important in the life of the village".

CHAPTER 8

A REANALYSIS OF PRIMORDIAL AND MOBILIZATION PERSPECTIVES

8.1 Introduction

So far, I have only mentioned primordialism and mobilization in passing. In this chapter, I specifically focus on these two perspectives and attempt to determine how useful each one is for explaining institutional changes among Syrian-Lebanese. In the first part of the chapter, I examine responses to the questions explicitly designed to explore primordial and mobilizationist tendencies. Based on the results, I then proceed to reanalyze the primordial/mobilizationist debate and demonstrate how the two perspectives can be synthesized.

8.2 The Incidence Of Mobilization Among Syrian-Lebanese

I specifically explored mobilizational tendencies by asking the following questions:

- i) what the interests were of Lebanese in Australia;
- ii) how Lebanese were treated in Australia, (e.g., amount of prejudice and discrimination; media coverage);
- iii) what the political concerns of Lebanese should be;
- iv) how successful Lebanese had been in Australia.

We can see from Table 8-1, that respondents did not perceive Lebanese to have many interests. Some respondents indicated that the "white Australia" policy still operated covertly, and this discriminated against non-Anglo-Celtic migrants like the Lebanese. A few others felt that the government could be more active in extending health, welfare and language services to Lebanese migrants. It should be noted that only recent arrivals were perceived to have interests. Not one respondent mentioned any interests among second or third generation

TABLE 8-1

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO THE QUESTION :
"ARE THERE ANY LEBANESE INTERESTS OR GRIEVANCES WHICH YOU
FEEL ARE NEGLECTED BY AUSTRALIANS OR THE GOVERNMENT?" (N=49)*

Type of Interest	Number of Times Mentioned	Percent of Total Responses
Government's restrictive immigration policies	9	17
Insufficient Government funds for health, welfare and interpreting services	5	10
Other	3	5
None	35	67
Total	52	100

* = Second and third generation respondents only

Lebanese. The perceived differences between "new" and "old Lebanese" emerged when I probed the topic of "ethnic interests". Some respondents were critical of the assistance extended to all migrants, including Lebanese. There were numerous complaints about "red carpet treatment" being given to Lebanese migrants and the way in which they "drained Australia's resources" through their alleged involvement in fraudulent compensation claims. For example, a second generation clothier claimed:

They're being too well treated at the moment. They're being indulged by the government and not exposed to the adversity which builds character. They're falling back on benevolent institutions and losing their capacity to work. If there's one thing I can't stand it's bludgers or people who don't make an effort to gain meaningful employment! Some of the ones coming out now find out that they pay you to have an accident here. They think: 'Ah, what a wonderful thing'. They never manage to get well. (case no. 103)

The data on prejudice and discrimination did not suggest there was a swell of resentment against superordinates. Just under 50% of

all respondents thought that Lebanese were well treated in Australia (see Table 8-2). Another 16% indicated that although there had been

TABLE 8-2

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO THE QUESTIONS :
"DO YOU FEEL THAT (A) PEOPLE OF LEBANESE DESCENT AND (B)
MIGRANTS AND THEIR DESCENDANTS ARE TREATED FAIRLY IN
AUSTRALIA?" (N=75)

Treatment by Australians of:	Lebanese Percent	Migrants Percent
Well-treated	48	44
Receive some prejudice and discrimination	16	17
Used to be ill-treated but conditions have improved in recent years	16	19
Treated badly	9	9
Ill-treated only by working-class Australians	4	4
"Old Lebanese" well-treated,		
"New Lebanese" ill-treated	4	3
Unsure	3	4
Total	100	100

prejudice and discrimination in the past against Lebanese, attitudes and behaviors had improved in recent years. Only 9% felt that Lebanese were ill-treated and a further 16% indicated there was some prejudice and discrimination. Respondents did not think that Lebanese were treated much differently than migrants in general.

Forty-two percent of respondents reported never having personally experienced prejudice or discrimination since childhood (see Table 8-3). Only four people stated they had encountered a major form of prejudice or discrimination. Three individuals reported they had either been refused employment or subjected to humiliating job interviews because of their ethnic and/or religious background. Another person claimed

TABLE 8-3

RESPONDENT'S PERSONAL ENCOUNTERS WITH
PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION

Encounter with Prejudice or Discrimination	Number	Percent
None	31	42
Only when young at school	29	39
Only in a minor way	10	15
In a major way	4	5
Total	74	100

that she had been denied entry into medical school because the dean of the faculty was "a well-known wog-hater". In all four instances, the respondents felt that they had not been discriminated against because they were Lebanese, but because they were non-Anglo-Celtics and/or Catholics. Ten people said they had personally experienced some minor form of prejudice or discrimination. Seven of them stated they felt they had been treated rudely by shop assistants because of their ethnic background. Three individuals said they'd been subjected to ethnic slurs while driving their cars. Again, these acts were perceived to be directed against non-Anglo-Celtics in general and not Lebanese in particular. As one woman commented:

I've felt it directly a couple of times when I've driven through real working class suburbs like Marrickville, where the uneducated Australians - the real 'Ockers' - live. Once I didn't go right away when the light turned green. This bloke behind started yelling, and shaking his fist and saying, 'Learn to drive you bloody wog!'

- Q. Do you think he said this because he knew you were Lebanese?
- A. Oh no, I don't think Australians know one from the other - they're all wogs or New Australians (to them). Most people don't take me for Lebanese. They usually think I'm Greek or Italian. I feel sorry for the Greeks because I've been mistaken for a Greek quite often.

We can see from Table 8-4, that only 13% of respondents thought

TABLE 8-4

RESPONDENT'S PERCEPTION OF HOW ACCURATE THE AUSTRALIAN MEDIA
IS IN ITS ACCOUNTS OF LEBANESE AND MIGRANTS GENERALLY (N = 47)*

Degree of Accuracy	About Lebanese Percent	About Migrants Percent
Fair and Accurate	13	12
A bit distorted	17	16
Inaccurate and sensational	53	50
Don't know	17	23
Total	100	100

* = Second and third generation respondents only

that the Australian media gave fair or accurate accounts of Lebanese. Seventeen percent felt the media was a bit or somewhat distorted and fifty-three percent indicated they were sensational in reporting Lebanese affairs. However, respondents did not feel that Lebanese were being victimized in any fashion by the media. Those who indicated that coverage was biased, unfair, or distorted, did so because they felt the media was generally incompetent, inaccurate and sensationalist. As one respondent put it:

The only thing they ever print correctly is the footy scores. Everything else is either 'horror smash' or 'man bites dog'. They don't have their facts straight on anything, so I wouldn't expect them to know much about migrants. (Third generation public servant, case no. 93)

It can also be observed from Table 8-4 that respondents did not perceive media coverage of Lebanese to differ significantly from that given to migrants in general.

Most respondents felt they had been successful in Australia and that Lebanese had generally "gotten ahead" (see Tables 8-5 and 8-6).

TABLE 8-5

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO THE QUESTION :
 "PERSONALLY, DO YOU FEEL YOU'VE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN GETTING
 AHEAD IN LIFE IN TERMS OF YOUR JOB, WHERE YOU LIVE, ETC?"

Response	Number*	Percent
Yes, have been successful	22	73
No, haven't been successful	6	20
Unsure	2	7
Total	30	100

* = Second and third generation respondents only

TABLE 8-6

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO THE QUESTION :
 "DO YOU THINK THAT PEOPLE OF LEBANESE DESCENT HAVE 'MADE IT'
 OR 'GOTTEN AHEAD' IN TERMS OF JOBS, HOMES, EDUCATION, ETC."

Response	Number	Percent
Lebanese have been very successful	33	42
Lebanese have been somewhat successful	41	53
Lebanese have been as successful as anyone else	1	1
"Old Lebanese" have succeeded, "new Lebanese" have not	3	4
Total	78	100

It can be seen from Table 8-7, that respondents mainly attributed Lebanese success to their ambitious, thrifty and hard-working characteristics. In terms of access to societal resources, the data in Table 8-8 suggests that respondents perceived little discrimination towards Lebanese. Most respondents perceived themselves and Lebanese in general to be predominantly middle class (see Tables 8-9 and 8-10). The difference between "old" and "new Lebanese" emerged once again

TABLE 8-7
RESPONDENT'S EXPLANATION FOR WHY LEBANESE
WERE SUCCESSFUL IN AUSTRALIA (N=73)

Reason for Lebanese Success	Number of Times Mentioned	Percent
Their hard work, ambition and thrift	55	52
Their natural trading instinct	15	14
Their natural intelligence or shrewdness	9	8
The opportunity provided in Australia	8	8
Their emphasis on education	6	6
Their familiarity of living under adverse conditions	5	5
Their close family ties	4	4
Their ability to assimilate so well	4	4
Total	106	100

TABLE 8-8

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO THE QUESTION :
"SOME LEBANESE FEEL THAT BECAUSE OF THEIR BACKGROUND,
THEY'VE HAD TO WORK HARDER THAN NATIVE AUSTRALIANS OR
OTHER IMMIGRANTS IN ORDER TO GET AHEAD; DO YOU AGREE
WITH THIS STATEMENT?"

Response	Number	Percent
Agree	1	3
Disagree	29	91
Unsure	2	6
Total	32	100

* = Second and third generation respondents only

TABLE 8-9
RESPONDENT'S PERCEIVED SOCIAL CLASS

Class	Number*	Percent
Middle class	19	38
Upper middle class	6	12
"Average" class	3	6
"Good" middle class	2	4
"Educated" middle class	2	4
"Professional" middle class	1	2
"Made it" class	1	2
Upper class	1	2
Unsure	15	30
Total	50	100

* = Second and third generation respondents only

TABLE 8-10
RESPONDENT'S PERCEPTION OF SOCIAL CLASS
TO WHICH MOST LEBANESE IN AUSTRALIA BELONG

Class of Most Lebanese	Number*	Percent
Working class	1	2
"New Lebanese" working class, "Old Lebanese" middle class	12	29
Middle class	14	33
Variety of classes	4	10
Unsure	11	26
Total	42	100

* = Second and third generation respondents only

when class was discussed in detail. The following comments of a second generation health professional typified the class images of most second and third generation respondents:

I'm proud of being the Lebanese that I am and class of Lebanese that I am. I like that class and I think it does very nicely indeed. It's a nice layer of society that I can fit into.

Q. And what class or layer is this?

A. The second generation Lebanese who have made it into the intellectual level or the business world and present a nice image to the world, as against the newcomers that are terrible. (case no. 117)

Similarly, a third generation teacher, who described herself as "educated middle class", noted that Lebanese of her "vintage" had "made it" and were different from the "new Lebanese":

The new ones with hotted up Valiants aren't well off. They lead a simple life. They paint their houses turquoise and bright pink. They're the ones you don't like to be associated with... They tend to be very loud and noisy people. They'll stop a car in the middle of the road and get out and start talking. That's okay in Lebanon, but not in Australia. (case no. 86)

There was almost no evidence of "political interests" among respondents. Most thought Lebanese were mainly inactive in Australian politics and could become more involved, but that Australian issues should be their main concern. Forty-two percent felt that Lebanese were not greatly involved in Australian politics, 38% thought they were a bit or somewhat involved, and only 4% felt they were greatly involved (see Table 8-11). Fifty-six percent

TABLE 8-11

RESPONDENT'S PERCEPTIONS OF LEBANESE INVOLVEMENT IN AUSTRALIAN POLITICS

Extent of Lebanese Involvement in Politics	Number*	Percent
Not greatly involved	22	42
A bit involved	20	38
Involved as much as most people	6	11
Greatly involved	2	4
Unsure	3	6
Total	53	100

* = Second and third generation respondents only

indicated that Lebanese should be more politically active, while 37% felt that greater political involvement was a matter of individual choice (see Table 8-12). Among those who thought that Lebanese should

TABLE 8-12

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO THE QUESTION :

"SHOULD PEOPLE OF LEBANESE DESCENT BECOME
INVOLVED IN POLITICS IN AUSTRALIA?"

Response	Number*	Percent
Yes, they should be more involved	23	56
Up to each individual to decide	15	37
Unsure	3	7
Total	41	100

* = Second and third generation respondents only

be more politically involved, 80% indicated that they should only be concerned with Australian issues; 3% felt that Australian concerns should come first and Lebanese second; and 10% suggested that Lebanese affairs were the most important political concerns of Lebanese in Australia (see Table 8-13). Respondents who singled out Lebanese

TABLE 8-13

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO THE QUESTION :

"WHAT DO YOU THINK SHOULD BE THE MAJOR POLITICAL
CONCERNS OF LEBANESE IN AUSTRALIA?"

Political Concerns	Number*	Percent
Strictly Australian concerns	24	80
Australian concerns first and Lebanese concerns second	1	3
Lebanese concerns	3	10
Don't know	2	7
Total	30	100

* = Second and third generation respondents only

interests, complained that politicians of Lebanese origin, unlike Jewish politicians, were not "visible" enough to the Australian public. Because of their "low profile", most Australians did not know that they were of Lebanese descent.

In summary then, there was virtually no ethnic mobilization among Syrian-Lebanese. Respondents were aware of few Lebanese interests; they saw themselves as successful, middle class people who had achieved their status through hard work; they did not perceive much discrimination towards Lebanese in Australia, and they evinced little indication of mobilizing politically qua Lebanese. This lack of political mobilization along ethnic lines is not surprising. As noted in chapter six, Syrians did not come to Australia with a heritage of political activism. And as observed in chapter seven, Syrian-Lebanese have generally supported conservative parties.

8.3 The Incidence Of Primordialism Among Syrian-Lebanese

In light of the almost total absence of mobilization, it is necessary to ask if patterns of ethnic identity and organization can be accounted for by primordial factors. At least this is what one would ask if the polar model of ethnic phenomena is correct in its assumptions. I specifically explored primordial tendencies by asking the following questions:

- i) how interested respondents were in Lebanese history and current events in Lebanon;
- ii) how often respondents spoke Arabic;
- iii) how often respondents ate Lebanese food;
- iv) if respondents approved of government funding of Lebanese clubs;
- v) what contributions respondents thought Lebanese had made to Australia;
- vi) if having a Lebanese background gave respondents a sense of "roots" or "belonging".

It can be seen from Tables 8-14 and 8-15, that respondents had scant knowledge of or interest in historical and contemporary events in Lebanon. For instance, nearly 80% indicated they knew nothing or little

TABLE 8-14

RESPONDENT'S KNOWLEDGE OF LEBANESE HISTORY

Level of Knowledge	Number	Percent
Knew nothing	19	31
Knew a little	30	48
Knew a fair amount	9	15
Knew a lot	4	7
Total	62	100

TABLE 8-15

RESPONDENT'S INTEREST IN CONTEMPORARY
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL EVENTS IN LEBANON

Level of Interest	Number	Percent
Uninterested	25	34
A bit interested	28	38
Very interested	20	27
Total	73	100

about Lebanese history. Only 27% stated they followed contemporary events in Lebanon closely; 38% said they were a bit or somewhat interested, and 34% expressed no interest at all. Only 25 of 57 respondents knew the name of Lebanon's current president. Some respondents gave the names of Assad (the Syrian president) and Sadat (the Egyptian president) in answering this question. Some respondents said they were embarrassed when non-Lebanese people asked them to explain the causes of the Lebanese conflict, because they did not understand its nature themselves. Others reported they were

more interested in the conflicts in Iran, southeast Asia, and Ireland than the strife in Lebanon. Others claimed that they were more concerned with events in Lebanon than in other countries, but not to the point where this raised any ethnonationalistic sentiments:

We watch television if there's going to be a show on it (the civil war) or we'll read an article in the paper; but we don't stand with baited breath. We're concerned, but it's a problem thousands of miles from here. There's not a lot you can do. (Third generation librarian, case no. 33)

As can be observed in Table 8-16, fluency and use of Arabic is almost totally confined to first generation migrants. Although a few

TABLE 8-16

RESPONDENT'S FLUENCY AND USE OF ARABIC BY GENERATION
(PERCENTAGES)

Fluency and Use of Arabic	<u>Generation</u>		
	First Generation	Second Generation	Third Generation
Speaks no Arabic	-	26	77
Speaks some Arabic but seldom uses it	10	33	15
Speaks fluent Arabic but seldom uses it	57	26	6
Speaks fluent Arabic and frequently uses it	33	14	2
Total Number	21	42	48

second generation individuals reported they could speak Arabic, hardly any of them used it regularly. Only 2% of third generation respondents could speak Arabic fluently, and very few showed any interest in learning it. One third generation man, two of his sisters, and one of his cousins were attending Arabic classes once a week at a multicultural centre. Another third generation man was teaching himself Arabic by tape cassette method. These were the only respondents who demonstrated any interest in their

linguistic heritage. There was a consensus that the loss of the Arabic language was unfortunate and that Lebanese in Australia compared unfavourably to Greeks in this respect. However, few individuals expressed any deep regret or lament about this. Most respondents simply resigned themselves to the fact that Arabic had been irretrievably lost.

Food patterns were retained to a much greater extent than language. Only 6% of third generation respondents consumed Lebanese food daily, but 74% ate it once a week or more (see Table 8-17). Food was a cultural trait

TABLE 8-17
RESPONDENT'S CONSUMPTION OF LEBANESE FOOD
BY GENERATION (PERCENTAGES)

Consumption Pattern	<u>Generation</u>		
	First Generation	Second Generation	Third Generation
Daily	37	18	6
3-4 times a week	53	49	37
Weekly	11	16	31
Occasionally	-	15	19
Never	-	3	8
Total Number	19	39	49

respondents saw as a major contribution made by the Lebanese to Australian culture (see Table 8-18). They cited the recent proliferation of Lebanese restaurants in Sydney and Australians' sudden fondness for Lebanese food as indicators of this. It can be observed in Table 8-18, that most respondents thought the major contribution of the Lebanese was that they had "added to" or "given some colour" to Australian culture. By this, respondents usually meant that Australians had been exposed to or influenced by Lebanese lifestyles and values. For example, one second generation respondent commented that:

RESPONDENT'S PERCEPTION OF LEBANESE CONTRIBUTIONS TO AUSTRALIA (N=65)

Contribution	Number of Times Mentioned	Percent
Have added to Australian society and have made it more cosmopolitan or multicultural	25	16
Lebanese Food	21	14
Have assimilated into Australian society particularly well	19	13
Have been faithful, solid Australian citizens	18	12
Have stimulated business & commerce generally	16	11
Have contributed to the professions	15	10
Have contributed to Politics	9	6
Have contributed philanthropically	7	5
Have stimulated business and commerce in country towns	6	4
Have stimulated the building industry	5	3
Have stimulated the clothing industry	4	3
Have contributed to sport	2	1
Other	4	3
Have contributed nothing	1	1
Total	152	100

We've lost the Arabic language; but the best parts of our culture have crept into the Australian community - food and that close family tie have infiltrated the Australian community through inter-marriage. A new culture is arising which isn't predominantly Anglo-Saxon, but an Australian culture which has the best of all nationalities. (Business executive, case no. 47)

After food, the third and fourth most important contributions mentioned were the exceptional way in which Lebanese had assimilated compared to other ethnic groups, and the outstanding loyalty they had given to Australia. In an era in which ethnicity is allegedly resurging, it seems contradictory that members of an ethnic population should pride themselves on how well they have integrated or assimilated into the superordinate population. Towards the end of my interviews, I actually began asking people how well they thought Lebanese has assimilated into Australian society. Most responded that Lebanese had assimilated "a great deal", "exceptionally well" or "more so than any other ethnic community". They gave themselves or

members of their family who had married non-Lebanese as examples of Lebanese assimilation. They frequently noted that Lebanese were not like some ethnic communities in Australia which did not "mix", "integrate" or "assimilate" with Australians. They singled out Greeks and Jews for particular stricture, because they "held on to their customs" or "segregated" themselves from Australians. They also criticized recent Lebanese migrants for "forming ghettos" and "holding on to the old ways". Their antagonism towards the Maronite bishop, which was discussed in chapter six, is a good example of their view on the behavior expected of ethnic populations, including their own, in Australia. As we will see shortly, respondents are emphatically Australian when it comes to issues such as multiculturalism and ethnic rights.

A list of Lebanese who were perceived to have made outstanding individual contributions to Australia appears in Table 8-19. The most

TABLE 8-19

LEBANESE INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE SEEN AS HAVING MADE
IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTIONS TO AUSTRALIA (N=57)

Individual	Number of Times Mentioned	Percent
Sir Nicholas Shehadie	27	18
Reuben F. Scarf	16	11
Hon. A.A. Alam	9	6
Frank Gaha	5	3
Phil Malouf	5	3
Dr. Marie Bashir	5	3
Others	84	56
Total	151	100

frequently mentioned person was Sir Nicholas Shehadie, former Lord Mayor of Sydney and holder of the Australian record for most appearances in international rugby union matches. He was lauded for his political

and sporting achievements. But not everyone was sure if he was known as a Lebanese. For instance, one third generation respondent stated:

I suppose Nick Shehadie is the most prominent Lebanese, but I don't think Australians know him as a Lebanese. He's done a lot for Australia and most Australians know him. But I think they think he's an Aussie, not a Lebanese. (Lawyer, case no. 91)

A third generation respondent who complained about the "low profile" of Lebanese politicians, commented that:

He's really well known in Australia because of rugby and being the mayor. Personally, I think he could have pushed his Lebanese background a bit more when he was in office. We've had Jewish mayors and Australians have known they were Jewish, because they made no bones about it. I'm not saying that he played down the fact that he was Lebanese. It's just that I would liked to have seen him play it up a bit more; you know, just to let people know he was a Lebanese. (Chemist, case no. 20)

The second most mentioned individual was Reuben Scarf, a very successful clothing retailer, who was cited for his contributions to commerce and his philanthropic activities. Alec Alam and Frank Gaha were nominated for their service to politics in N.S.W. and Tasmania, respectively. Phil Malouf, another highly successful clothier, was mentioned for his innovations in business and commerce. Dr. Bashir was commended for her psychiatric work with adolescents. The rest of the people mentioned were politicians and professionals who were named because of their contributions to politics, medicine, religion, and business in Australia. What is interesting about the people nominated is that they were hardly ever acclaimed because they had promoted Lebanese affairs. In nearly all cases they received accolades for acts they had done as Australians and/or for Australia.

The above findings suggest that primordialism is diminishing rather than resurging. This is corroborated by respondents' views on the possibility of government funding of clubs wishing to preserve Lebanese culture in Australia (see Table 8-20). Over two-thirds were opposed

TABLE 8-20

RESPONDENT'S ATTITUDES TOWARDS GOVERNMENT FUNDING
OF LEBANESE CLUBS AND ORGANIZATIONS

Attitude towards Government funding of Lebanese clubs	Number	Percent
No funds should be given	34	64
Funds should be given	10	19
Limited funds should be given	1	2
Funds should be given only if other ethnic communities are also funded	4	8
Uncertain	4	8
Total	53	100

to any government funding. Most opponents felt that preserving ethnic customs was the responsibility of members of each community, not the burden of Australian taxpayers. Others objected because they felt this would encourage the separation of ethnic groups in Australia rather than their integration. Although more forceful than some respondents' views, the following third generation man's comments were typical of many people's attitudes towards government spending on ethnic communities:

If a fellow comes and lives in Australia, I feel it's for him to fall in line with the Australian established pattern of life. If he wants to maintain the old ways, let him put his hand in his pocket together with his other countrymen and pay for it. The Australian government can't be asked to pay for the idiosyncracies of lands far away... the government can only do so much. Doing too much for them is not a good thing... Migrants that whinge, whatever their nationality may be, that really gets me going; that's when the Australian flag comes out of my ears. If they're not happy with the country - then piss off! If these people have taken up roots in a country,

they've got to take it warts and all and they have to do their bit in building it. If they want an ethnic club, which I don't believe is such a totally wonderful idea... then let them pay for it. (Clothier, case no. 104)

As mentioned above, respondents saw themselves as "good mixers" who had assimilated into Australian society. Thus, their antipathy towards what they called "segregation" or "separation" by ethnic communities is understandable. The propensity of Syrian-Lebanese to assimilate was noted as early as 1927 by Alam:

Syrians, on the whole, assimilate with the English race more easily and naturally than some other races do. They avoid 'colonization' as much as possible and whenever they have a chance (Alam 1927: 44).

According to Berger (1962), Kayal and Kayal (1975) and Winder (1958), Syrian-Lebanese in the U.S.A. have, by and large, been absorbed into mainstream American life. Commenting on the fate of nineteenth and twentieth century emigrants, Hitti (1965: 201) claimed that: "In their diaspora ... Lebanese emigrants integrated themselves with their new countrymen more readily than any other people of Near Eastern origin, including Jews". An example of the extent to which Syrian-Lebanese see themselves as "assimilators", is evident from the following comments of a second generation man who lived in Redfern between 1910 and 1930. In comparing the "old" and "new Lebanese", he stated that:

The difference is that we assimilated - not like this new crop. The government now encourages ethnic communities to keep things like newspapers, languages and radio, which in my opinion is entirely wrong! The word ethnic should not be used after the first generation. In America they remain Polish-American, German-American and so on for generations. We're Australian-Lebanese, but first and foremost we're Australians. We're not disrespectful (to Lebanon) but we're definitely Australians. Time will assimilate the new arrivals too. I hope we don't become like America... Any migrant that comes should be encouraged or channeled into the country areas. When they come to Sydney they congregate. If they went to the country in

small groups they would be absorbed more readily into the Australian way of life. (Business executive, case no. 47)

A most noticeable aspect of this examination of primordialism is the almost complete absence of Lebanese factors. When I asked respondents if they had a sense of "roots" or "belonging" because of their Lebanese heritage, most replied affirmatively. But they rarely associated this with Lebanese culture. Lebanese "roots" invariably turned out to be family "roots". This is illustrated by the following exchange I had with a third generation woman:

Q. You've talked a great deal about your pride in your grandparents' achievements. Does this make you identify with Lebanon? Do you have a sense of 'roots' or 'belonging' because you're of Lebanese descent?

A. Definitely, it does give you a sense of roots. You know that your family came from Lebanon; they didn't come from England with the convicts or (as) 'this or that'. You know exactly where your family came from.

Q. It seems as though your pride in being Lebanese comes mainly from your family, rather than anything you feel for Lebanon in particular. Would it be fair to say that?

A. I don't feel any deep-rooted thing for Lebanon. I know if I went there I'd be a stranger. The war wouldn't make me go flag-waving for Lebanon - it's too remote to me. I feel deeply grieved for the people - more than say (in) Ireland which is further removed. But I'd be a hypocrite if I shed any tears. (Real estate broker, case no. 60)

To recapitulate then, the mobilizationist perspective was of no explanatory value in the present study. This is not to say that Syrian-Lebanese have not pursued material interests. Indeed they have, but without mobilizing along ethnic lines. Because they have been able to rely entirely on family resources, there has been no need for the creation of extra-familial structures designed to achieve interests. This reliance on the family explains why they are largely unsympathetic and antagonistic towards

"new Lebanese" or any migrants who turn to the government for assistance. Since their families attained prosperity without any outside help, they fail to understand why other migrants need any support. However, just as there has been no mobilization along political or economic lines, there has been no primordial resurgence. In chapters six, seven and eight a number of indicators were used to measure degrees of institutional enclosure: rates of endogamy/exogamy, religious behavior and identity, geographical and occupational dispersion/segregation, heterogeneity/homogeneity of friendship networks, political orientations, recreational activities, education, subjective ethnic identity and so on. In nearly every case, respondents showed a declining rate of involvement in and identification with Lebanese institutions with each successive generation. Primordial factors were present and they had more relevance than mobilizationist elements. But the degree of primordialism was anemic and was almost totally confined to the family. In short, there was no third generation return, no ethnic mobilization and an attenuation of primordial attachments. Since these findings do not seem to be adequately explained by the polar model, it is necessary to re-examine the utility of primordial and mobilizationist perspectives.

8.4 A Revision Of Primordial And Mobilizationist Perspectives

The problem raised by these apparently diametrically opposed perspectives is similar to the debate in the 1960's between "consensus" and "conflict" theorists, who could not agree on which theory best explained the nature of social order. After considerable argumentation, theorists realized that both conflict and consensus were interrelated, dialectical aspects of social organization. Schermerhorn (1970: 57-58), for instance, comments that:


In the area of ethnic relations it is possible to bring out this duality by denying that integration is inevitably harmonious, or conflict necessarily disruptive. There are times when integration can only occur in and through conflict, and conversely, other times when conflict is necessary to reach a new order of integration. Whether relationships like these are modal or whether they are exceptional is a matter to be determined empirically; the probability surely is that on a comparative basis there will be widespread societal differentials on these parameters.

Similarly, I believe that primordial and mobilizationist viewpoints can be reconciled, once it is recognized that protagonists in the debate have been arguing about different, though interrelated manifestations of ethnic phenomena. As noted near the end of chapter two, material and primordial interests are often interrelated, so it seems pointless to dichotomize primordialism and mobilization into mutually exclusive categories. As Deshen (1974: 283) puts it:

I suggest that the various concrete manifestations of ethnicity be kept conceptually separate. Ethnicity is a very inclusive and highly abstract term which on the level of concrete action is always charged with different substantive content: one can talk of political ethnicity, marital ethnicity, cultural ethnicity, and so on, but in concrete cases it may not always be easy to discern analytically the various kinds of ethnicity. Thus 'ethnicity' is not synonymous with the political expression of ethnicity ('political ethnicity'), or with any other particular kind of ethnicity. Different kinds of ethnicity might operate, or be more prominent, in different social situations, individually and at times simultaneously.

What is needed at this juncture then, is some schema which specifies the relationships among various manifestations of ethnic "interests". Drawing on Deshen's comments, I have reformulated the polar model into a scattergram or matrix model (see Figure 8-1). The major advantage of this approach is that obviates the practice of placing the competing perspectives into mutually exclusive compartments. Instead of asking which approach -

FIGURE 8-1 : MATRIX MODEL OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF ETHNIC INTERESTS



primordial or mobilizationist - has more explanatory power, it is now possible to inquire about the extent to which both are operative in varying degrees. However, it is unsatisfactory to leave this model at the speculative stage, because relationships between primordial and mobilizationist factors, like linkages between consensus and conflict, are empirical questions. Therefore, in the scattergram model I have plotted empirical examples at different points on the basis of how scholars have described the association between primordial and material interests in each case.

8.4.1 Ethnic Traditionalists

In the upper left-hand corner of the diagram are what Abramson (1976) calls "Ethnic Traditionalists". These groups display what Spicer (1971) terms a "persistent cultural identity system". This refers to a pattern of beliefs and sentiments concerning historical events" which is maintained in a flexible form for hundreds or thousands of years. Traditionalists are, to use Abramson's (1976: 50-51) phrase, rooted in their ethnic groups in two ways:

... through adherence to and internalisation of the distinctive set of cultural symbols, i.e., the culture of the group itself, with its corresponding values, myths, ethos, language, religion, and history; and through involvement on the primary-group level in the distinctive networks of subcultural relationships, in a word, the structure of the group itself, with its constituent associations, organizations, friendships, and institutions ... The behavior of the Traditionalist reflects persisting and present attachments to both symbols and relationships. Such behavior shows continuity and consonance, for the ongoing networks and associations of the traditional structure respond to the corresponding cultural values and ethos of prior socialisation and acceptance.

What distinguishes these sorts of ethnic groups from other types, is that primordial interests are much more salient than material ones. An empirical illustration is the Tunisian Jews observed by Deshen (1974: 282), whose orientations were primarily explained in terms of "strategies to solve problems of identity, belief and culture and perhaps only secondarily in terms of political strategies". Lewins (1978b: 30-31) makes almost identical comments in his study of Ukrainian-Catholics in Australia:

... there is no evidence to support the saliency of political and material interests in Ukrainians' relations with non-Ukrainians. Ukrainian-Catholics, like the rest of their countrymen, have little contact with Australians and are seldom 'in the news'... The formation of ethnic group life is not, and has not been, associated with perceived disadvantage vis-a-vis Australians, or any other group... It is primary socialisation, together with the collective experiences of Ukrainian-Catholics before their arrival in Australia, which I regard as the principal influences on Ukrainian-Catholics' behavior and identity.

Scholars who have completed research on Hutterites in North America have made similar statements:

The survival of this 16th century peasant culture in the heart of the most 20th century minded continent is a vivid demonstration of the power of values and beliefs (Eaton and Weil 1955: 237).

In few cases in human history have ideas and beliefs been so enduringly significant, or even determinant in the lives of people. Rarely have economic considerations meant so little (Conkin 1964: 4).

I am not claiming that these sorts of groups are never involved in interethnic conflict. When they are involved in conflict, however, it tends to be over normative differences. For instance, Italian-Catholics in Australian parishes, unlike Ukrainian-Catholics, do

perceive themselves to be disadvantaged vis-a-vis Australians and have coalesced to protect their interests. But these interests primarily revolve around a complex combination of linguistic, regional, and religious factors (Lewins 1978b). Nor am I suggesting that these groups have no material interests or cannot be mobilized along political and economic lines given the proper circumstances.¹ I am merely pointing out that groups do exist which have high degrees of primordialism and low degrees of political and economic mobilization, and that they must be accounted for by theorists. Beleaguered minorities such as Armenians, Assyrians, Copts, Kurds and Jews are quintessential ethnic traditionalists.

8.4.2 Ethnic Militants

Commenting on the increasing universal importance of ethnic phenomena in the last ten years or so, Bell (1975: 169) suggests that this trend can partially be accounted for by the ability of groups to interfuse "interest" and "affect":

Ethnicity has become more salient because it can combine an interest with an affective tie. Ethnicity provides a tangible set of common identification - in language, food, music, names - when other social roles become more abstract and impersonal (emphasis added).

I have situated groups which rank high on both of these dimensions in the upper right-hand corner of the scattergram. These "ethnic militants" are just as culturally and structurally "rooted" as traditionalists, but are also intensely involved in conflicts over political and economic resources. In many cases these groups persist due to what Spicer (1971) calls the "oppositional process" engendered by state organizations. In trying to incorporate them into the state,

central elites often provoke the opposite response of facilitating "intensive collective consciousness and a high degree of internal solidarity". The continued existence of such groups is particularly embarrassing to modernization theorists who predicted their demise in industrial societies. As it has turned out, primordialism and modernization are not incompatible. This is evident with respect to the Basques of Spain according to da Silva (1975: 251):

As suggested by the case of the Basques, the growth of modernity need not mean the loss of traditional identities. To be sure, socio-economic changes have introduced some alterations in traditional cultures, but this does not mean the loss of group identity. It may well be - and the evidence available seems to suggest the direction, as Clifford Geertz has argued - that political modernization 'does not do away with ethnocentrism, it merely modernizes it'.

Another example is provided by the Druzes of the Middle East described by Hudson (1968: 32; also see Oppenheimer 1977):

Of all the politically relevant sects, the Druze is the most paradoxical... the Druzes are described by Phillip Hitti as '... a religious community that has survived for nine centuries like a fossil'. It is an accurate description in many ways, for the Druzes are extremely close knit socially, yet at the same time Druzes in modern Lebanon operate an airline serving Bombay, London, and Accra, as well as the entire Middle East; they produce numbers of engineers and doctors; and they support Lebanon's only indigenous socialist party. Whether or not the Druzes are also losing their communal identity - their religion prohibits proselytizing - is a debated point, but the evidence of such identity displayed during the 1958 crisis and their daily life suggests that it is still very strong.

Considering the great emotional appeal of popular sovereignty, it is not surprising that ethnoregional movements are conspicuous here. In fact, Esman (1977a: 285) has suggested that, "for the political mobilization of regional interests, an ethnic base is useful, perhaps

indispensable, both to activate domestic support and to claim legitimacy within the system".

8.4.3 Ethnic Manipulators

In the lower right hand area of the diagram are "ethnic manipulators". They too attempt to gain access to societal resources but without the high levels of primordialism characteristic of ethnic militants. This important difference between militants and manipulators is apparent when the admixture of primordial and material interests² of Scottish nationalists is compared with other ethno-regional groups:

... Scottish political nationalism differs in quality from that of the Catalans, the Bretons, the Welsh or the French-Canadians... It is not linguistically or culturally rooted. While dedicated Scottish nationalists and S.N.P. activists have grand visions of Scottish - even a Gaelic - cultural revival once independent statehood is achieved, their electoral appeals since the 1960's have been primarily economic (Esman 1977a: 282).

Cohen (1969: 14, 22) provides us with another good illustration of this pattern in his comments on Hausa traders in Yoruba towns:

Hausa anxiety in this respect (political threats) arises from fear of losing their source of livelihood, rather than from the fear of suffering the ultimate loss of Hausa cultural identity. This is because Hausa identity and Hausa ethnic exclusiveness in Ibadan are the expressions not so much of strong 'tribalistic' sentiment as vested economic interests... Hausa culture is not just a way of life, but identification with it is in many ways a political ideology, emphasizing identity as well as exclusiveness... This political organization is achieved under the banner: 'Our customs are different, we are Hausa'.

Some additional examples can be found in the literature on ethnic politics in the U.S.A. One is Borowiec's (1975) analysis of "gatekeeping"

activities among Polish-American politicians. Although the younger, more middle class politicians considered the conventional activity of "doing favors" for fellow ethnics to be bothersome and relatively unimportant compared to "real" responsibilities, they were forced into performing these tasks in return for votes. In short, they did not provide assistance due to any deep-rooted loyalty to Polish culture and people, but because they feared the electoral repercussions of withdrawing their traditional gatekeeping services. Similarly, Schiller (1977) makes it quite clear in her examination of politics among Haitian immigrants in New York, that ethnic leaders were sheer opportunists who gained political and economic benefits by exploiting the structures provided by the American political system. Many other kinds of ethnic "entrepreneurs" and "brokers" who "manage" or "negotiate" their identities and group boundaries are contained in studies by Brettell (1977) and Hannerz (1974). This sort of behavior has also been observed by Douglass and Lyman, who claim that the manipulation of identities and boundaries is latent and manifest in all polyethnic environments:

Ethnicity in a pluralistic society provides a storehouse of identities for the individual who has the social skills and situational opportunities to employ a repertory... In his ordinary encounters with peers, lovers, and relatives; with strangers, traders, and politicians; with agents, social workers, and, of course, social scientists, the ethnic man lives out his life drama adopting and dropping the masks of identity as ability, opportunity, and luck permit (Douglass and Lyman 1976: 217-218; also see Lyman and Douglass 1973).

8.4.4 Psuedo-Ethnics

Several cases have been placed on the diagram under the heading "psuedo-ethnics". Although these ethnic categories can become ethnic

groups, the lack of any significant ethnic diacritic makes it difficult for leaders to stimulate anything beyond a rudimentary feeling of solidarity among members-whose loyalties are mainly with the state. In some cases it is even necessary to fabricate ethnic traits. For instance, Esman (1977b: 373) refers to Occitania as a situation in which there have been attempts to "invent or re-discover an ethnic base for regional claims in order to legitimize them externally and enhance their capacity to promote internal mobilization". Leaders of dormant ethnic collectivities such as Appalachian-Americans (Whisart 1974), some other "white ethnics" in the U.S.A. (Yancey et al. 1976), Queensland and North Queensland separatists, and South Island secessionists in New Zealand face a formidable task. Not only must they persuade "outsiders" like central elites (and other superordinates) and other competing ethnic groups that they have ethnically based demands; they must also convince the "insiders" themselves that first of all, they are bona fide ethnics, and secondly that because of this fact they suffer politically and economically.³ It could be said that ethnic militants and manipulators possess an ethnic trait which they utilize in order to obtain access to societal resources, whereas psuedo-ethnics try to make their pursuit of political and economic goals more legitimate by finding an ethnic foundation on which they can be based. The chances that these collectivities can be mobilized should not underestimated for as van den Berghe (1976: 243) reminds us: ... "objectively trivial differences can be seized upon as the basis of profound social cleavages and savage conflicts". However, at the present time, the categories mentioned more closely resemble interest groups or social movements than ethnic groups per se.

8.4.5 Symbolic Ethnics

In an insightful analysis of the alleged "ethnic revival" in the United States, Gans uses the term "symbolic ethnicity" to describe patterns of behavior and identity among third and fourth generation American "ethnics". This is a good way of describing the orientations of the individuals and groups located in the lower left-hand portion of the matrix. These situations are characterized by low degrees of (ethnically based) political and economic interests and minimum levels of primordial attachments. Ethnic identification and behavior is primarily ephemeral, sporadic, and nostalgic. In Gans' (1979: 12) words:

Symbolic ethnicity... does not require functioning groups or networks; feelings of identity can be developed by allegiances to symbolic groups that never meet, or to collectivities that meet only occasionally and exist as groups only for the handful of officers that keep them going. By the same token, symbolic ethnicity does not need a practiced culture, even if the symbols are borrowed from it.

"Ethnic publics" which feature only token involvement or identification by their members are examples of symbolic ethnics. The Maltese in London (Dench 1975), the Syrian-Lebanese in the U.S.A. (Kayal 1973: Kayal and Kayal 1975), and the Welsh in New York (Ellis 1972) exemplify ethnic communities which have greatly eroded and remain important only in a peripheral way. Another illustration is the "Saturday" Italians of New York who make nostalgic trips from the suburbs to "Little Italies" on weekends (Pileggi 1967). Other symbolic ethnics are people of Scottish descent who attend clan festivals once in a while and individuals of Irish ancestry who occasionally march in St. Patrick's day parades. The behavior exhibited in the last two examples is analagous to Scottish migrants who "celebrate 'Burns night'

at meetings of Caledonian societies" (Rex 1970: 99). As Gans notes, people can feel ethnic without participating in ethnic networks. Some examples of this situation were given in chapter two when I referred to people of Italian and Polish descent who became indignant over ethnic slurs, or people of Irish descent who wear "Kiss me I'm Irish" buttons on St. Patrick's Day. This pattern is also evidenced by people who act and feel ethnic because they identify with parents and grandparents without being aware of belonging to any particular ethnic group or category (Nahirny and Fishman 1965: 324).

Most of the second and third generation Syrian-Lebanese in the present study can be called "symbolic ethnics". Except for their Kinship networks and to a lesser extent their friendship networks, they display little or no structural compartmentalization or institutional duplication. At the group level, they constitute an "ethnic public". Ethnic organizations such as churches and voluntary associations have very little attraction for them. At the individual level, "feeling Lebanese" emanates from identifications with family members and family traditions. Syrian-Lebanese exemplify the "situation of ethnic heterogeneity" (Breton 1978). In such cases, ethnic identity tends to be "fragmented" or "partialized" rather than being "total". Identity and behavior are "de-ethnicized" to the extent that only certain areas of an individual's life and identity involve ethnic manifestations (e.g., as a spouse or parent). Ethnicity is "latent" and only acquires significance in specific situations. Social interaction tends to be structured in the form of "individual-based coalitions" rather than in "closed ethnic networks". In Breton's (1978: 61) words:

Friendships, marriages, business relationships, and so on, are formed in a multiplicity of directions; 'members of the ethnic group cease to have a single focus of alliance with their fellow-members' (Zenner 1967: 111). Ethnic ties characterize a limited number of the 'intersecting circles' to which a person belongs. Ethnicity may characterize, for example, his kinship and friendship ties, but not his occupational, religious, and political affiliations. A person's ties may be even further specialized in the sense of being limited to membership in ethnocultural associations. In such instances, ethnic networks are virtually completely dissociated from other types of social affiliation.

8.5 The Utility of The Matrix Model

This matrix model approach is presently in an exploratory stage and has several limitations. I have not related the five categories to the different sequential patterns by which polyethnic situations are created.⁵ The various conditions under which ethnic populations initially come in contact with one another, and the forms of dominance which subsequently become institutionalized, have substantial implications for the way in which ethnic phenomena manifest themselves (Porter 1975: 94; van den Berghe 1976: 244-245, 249; Wilkie 1977). Further research is necessary in order to examine the relationship between types of recurrent intergroup sequences and resultant expressions of ethnic interests. Secondly, the plotting of the various groups is my own subjective estimate of where they roughly ought to be placed on the scattergram. Except in the case of ethnic militants, I have ranked the categories on differences among them but not within each one. It is quite straightforward to say that Basques outrank "Caledonians" on both primordial and material orientations, but impossible to state how much higher or lower the former are on these dimensions compared to Quebec separatists and Druzes. Some might

argue that the Hausa and Scottish nationalists examples should be placed in an interstitial classification because they exhibit characteristics of manipulators and militants. So a more detailed examination would probably necessitate shifting some groups to more precise locations. Finally, the diagram is by no means exhaustive. Undoubtedly there are other permutations which could be added.

Despite these limitations, I feel the matrix model is a considerable improvement over existing approaches. Polar models oversimplify the relationships between primordial and material interests by forcing the analyst to slot ethnic groups into mutually exclusive categories. Dichotomous models also work on a replacement principle whereby it is assumed that a certain percentage gain on the material dimension entails a corresponding drop in primordialism. As McFee (1970) observes in a similar analysis, this "replacement procedure" commits the "container error" of not allowing for cases which exceed 100 percent. Thus the matrix model allows for a much greater number of permutations of primordial and material factors.

A second advantage of the matrix model is that it enables the analyst to discern inter and intra-group differences regarding the relative importance of primordial and material factors. This is an important consideration, because even among groups which appear homogeneous to outsiders, there are considerable internal differences among members (Douglass and Lyman 1976: 214; Robb 1978). For example, Orthodox Jews, members of Jewish "defence" organizations, and militant Zionists have different types and degrees of ethnic organization and

identification. Some other cases in point are Levy's (1975) "subgroups" among Hassidic Jews in "Lubovitch", Radecki's (1977) typology of "ethnic Poles" in Canada, and Clark et al's (1976) "ethnic identity profile types" among third-generation Japanese-Americans and Mexican-Americans. Similarly, there are "Bruxellois", "Walloons" and "Flemish" in Belgium (Heisler 1977b), and "French-Canadians" and "Quebecois" in Quebec (Breton 1972). Greenwood (1977) identifies at least five distinct views among the Basques that are "compatible with a sense of Basque ethnic identity". Berger (1977) notes the spectrum of activities among Breton nationalists which range from participation in purely cultural, folkloric and linguistic activities to membership in the terrorist organization, the Breton Liberation Front. An almost identical example is the difference between Irish-Catholics who belong to Gaelic football and hurley clubs and those who belong to the I.R.A. (Terchek 1977). Within each category then, there are different blends of primordial and political and economic interests and varying degrees of organizational rigidity with respect to membership criteria. So in dealing with groups such as Quebec, Basque, and Breton nationalists, it is important to discern whether the people in question are members of the Parti Quebecois or the FLQ, the PNV or ETA, CELIB or the FLB.

Another benefit of the model is that it allows one to "track" groups which "flow" from one section of the scattergram to another. For instance, the Maronite Kataeb party in Lebanon originated in the 1930's as a sports club. Likewise, the Scottish nationalists mentioned earlier did not always appeal to Scots' economic and political predispositions:

The early nationalists were mostly intellectuals and literary people concerned primarily with Scottish cultural redemption. They were fueled by a nostalgia for the past and by a pronounced anti-English bias... The movement was strong in dramatic rhetoric and exhortations, but weak in political organization... In the early 1960's the SNP was taken over by a group of younger men who shared their predecessors' patriotic aspirations for a politically independent and an economically regenerated Scotland, but who shifted the movement's emphasis from literature and language to practical politics (Esman 1977a: 262-263).

Esman's comments do more than illustrate the dynamic aspects of ethnic phenomena. They also underline the aforementioned necessity of analytically distinguishing between ethnic solidarity and allegiances to other social units. For no matter how high the degree of political and economic interest in a given group (whether it be militant, manipulative or psuedo), there must have been some ethnic diacritic (no matter how real or contrived) which made mobilization possible in the first place. In van den Berghe's (1976: 243) words:

The subjective definition of a situation can profoundly and rapidly change ethnic reality, and, indeed, create new ethnic groups, but ethnogenesis is not a deus ex machina. New ethnic definitions are always grounded in pre-existing ethnic realities. Ethnicity, then, is both primordial and highly changeable (emphasis added).

Finally, the matrix model is much better suited for examining social change. In the polar model changes in meaning and structure tend to be linear, unidirectional and irreversible. Primordialists and mobilizationists are primarily concerned with explaining increased levels of ethnic phenomena. This leads them to neglect instances in which ethnic manifestations have decreased or taken on different structures and meanings. The matrix model allows for change to occur in a number of different directions. "Caledonians" and "Saturday"

Italians are symbolic ethnics who were once traditionalists. Scottish nationalists in the 1920's and Kaeteb's in the 1930's are traditionalists who have become manipulators and militants respectively. The Gaelic Athletic Association, which flourished between 1884 and 1916, is an example of an ethnic institution which has undergone several changes. Originally, it was a cultural organization formed to promote indigenous Irish sport which was being threatened by "foreign" British games. Covertly, it was manipulated by the Irish Republican Brotherhood for furthering nationalistic goals. Mandle (1980: 118) claims that, "The G.A.A. provided, as it was always intended to provide, the muscle for the Easter Rising of 1916". Today, the political focus of the G.A.A. has greatly diminished, although relations among Catholics and Protestants in Ulster are still segmented along recreational lines (Tercek 1977).

This matrix model does not explain why ethnic collectivities emerge, persist or disappear; it only describes what combinations of interests they exhibit. In the concluding chapter I discuss how the model can be used to ask questions which have greater explanatory import.

8.6 Summary

In this chapter I specifically analyzed primordial and mobilizational tendencies among Syrian-Lebanese. Mobilization was virtually non-existent and primordialism was latent, partial and mainly confined to the family context. In order to account for these findings I constructed a matrix model of primordialism and mobilization. In the model, primordialism and mobilization were not seen as dichotomous, polar types of ethnic manifestations; they were viewed as complementary interests which are present to varying degrees among all ethnic

populations. Empirical examples were used to illustrate the various ways in which primordial and mobilizational tendencies interdepend. It was concluded that the Syrian-Lebanese in the present study were best described as "symbolic ethnics". Members of these types of ethnic populations display primordial sentiments which are nostalgic, sporadic and partial and have little or no ethnically based material interests.

NOTES

1. There are groups with pacifistic philosophies whose members would passively resist or even give up their lives rather than engage in political conflicts with other groups.
2. One campaign slogan of the S.N.P. which gave voters the option of being "rich Scots or poor Britons" (with respect to who should control North Sea oil), clearly appealed to their economic sentiments.
3. It is possible that Quebec may secede from Canada. The possibility of secession by Alberta or Newfoundland is much less likely. Some Albertans and Newfoundlanders, like Quebecois, have a number of political and economic grievances against the Federal Government. However, they are unlikely to convince a significant number of inhabitants of these provinces that they are being discriminated against on the basis of ethnic distinctions between themselves and the rest of Canada. Just the opposite situation exists among Bavarians who Esman (1977b: 376) claims have "as proud and distinct an identity as Bretons and Scots". Esman partially attributes the absence of ethno-regional demands among Bavarians to "the devolution of power and political elbow room" provided for in the German Federal Republic.
- 4.. Swan and Saba (1974) use Horton and Hunt's (1972: 400) definition of a public - "a scattered number of people who share an interest in a particular topic". As an "ethnic public" they give the example of a highly assimilated immigrant group whose members retain an interest in the affairs of the ethnic home or in certain aspects of the ethnic culture. They suggest that this sort of "interest" can persist for several generations through identification with "family history" or "family name" or because of "an emotionally tinged intellectual interest".
5. The six major sequential patterns of ethnic relations are: the emergence of pariahs, the emergence of indigenous isolates, annexation, migration, colonization and religious cleavage (Schermerhorn 1970, 1978).

CHAPTER 9

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

9.1 Summary of Findings

In summarizing the results of this study, three features seem particularly prominent. First, with respect to structural phenomena, it is clear that Syrian-Lebanese do not constitute a cohesive ethnic group but rather an ethnic category. In seeking economic security, most first generation Syrians settled in non-metropolitan towns in order to monopolize trade in the area. This isolated them from contact with fellow villagers and coreligionists and left the family as the sole locus of ethnic organization. The first generation and their offspring became involved in the major institutions of country life and had little interaction with other Syrians. The metropolitan Syrians did create a bona fide ethnic community with territorial, religious, economic and emotional bases. However, the community's integrity was undermined by the upward social mobility of members of the second generation who had little or no affinity for it. Consequently, there are little structural differences between second and third generation Syrian-Lebanese and Anglo-Celtic Australians in political, economic and educational institutions. There is a very minor degree of religious segmentation among some Syrian-Lebanese, but this is restricted to token attendance at one of the ethnic churches. The only institutions characterized by weak to moderate degrees of enclosure are the "private" spheres of family, friendship and recreation with all three being interrelated a certain amount. Second and third generation Syrian-Lebanese do not perceive their common ethnic attributes as the basis for any meaningful social interaction, because their concept of ethnic solidarity has rarely extended beyond the family.

Second, at the individual level, Syrian-Lebanese manifest ethnic

awareness rather than ethnic consciousness. Individuals know they possess certain ethnic traits, but these are not always perceived as unique to Lebanese and certainly do not provide the basis for a "we vs. they" mentality. First generation Syrians came to Australia without a sense of national identity, never developed one after settling, and passed on no notions of ethnonationalism to their descendants. In Syria, the inhabitants' loyalties were to the family, church, and village, all of which were inextricably intertwined. The term "Syrian" was simply a convenient designation employed by Australians and had little affective meaning for those to whom it was applied. In Australia, most Syrians were separated from their fellow villagers and churchmen, so the family became the only crucible of ethnicity. Two other ethnic traits which could have engendered some form of Syrian ethnicity among the second generation - language and rite - were quickly eradicated. Anglicized at school and Latinized and Anglicized at church, the second and third generations never developed any affinity for Lebanon or the Arabic language; they became Australians before they had the chance to become Syrians and later Lebanese. The second and third generations do not feel Lebanese because of any linguistic, religious or nationalistic ties to Lebanon. Their Lebanese ethnicity is mainly confined to identification with family traditions. It has virtually no orientation towards Lebanese nationalism, the Arabic language or one of the Lebanese churches. In this way Syrian-Lebanese in Australia are markedly different from Ukrainians, Armenians, Greeks and Croatians. Lebanese sentiments, when they extend beyond the family, are generally residual and situational. Being of Lebanese descent is simply of secondary and even trivial importance to the everyday life of many Syrian-Lebanese.

Third, mobilizationist theories of ethnic phenomena were of no explanatory value in the present analysis. There was no evidence of ethnic

identification or organization based on political, economic or material interests. Almost all aspects of ethnic behavior and identity revolved around the socialization process and cultural influences. This was most apparent among respondents who had visited Lebanon and had intensely primordial experiences. However, the degree of primordialism displayed was generally weak and ephemeral. Primordial orientations were latent or potential rather than active.

9.2 Explanations of De-institutionalization Among Syrian-Lebanese

In attempting to account for the erosion of ethnic phenomena among Syrian-Lebanese, I found Schermerhorn's (1970) typology of centripetal and centrifugal trends extremely useful. According to Schermerhorn, "the conditions that foster or prevent the integration¹ of ethnic groups into their environing societies" depend not only on how superordinates view ethnic groups, but also on how ethnic groups view themselves. In some cases the "modal tendency" of an ethnic group is centrifugal. This refers to situations in which subordinate groups attempt to engender separation from the dominant group. The subordinate group can promote segmentation at both the cultural and structural levels. Culturally, it can retain and preserve its "distinctive traditions in spheres like language, religion, recreation, etc., together with the particularistic values associated with them". Structurally, centrifugal orientations can be expressed through "demands for endogamy, separate associations, and even at times a restricted range of occupations". Centripetal orientations, on the other hand, "refer both to cultural trends such as acceptance of common values, styles of life, etc., as well as structural features like increased participation in a common set of groups, associations and institutions". The extent to which superordinates agree or disagree with the subordinate groups' modal tendencies, largely

determines the nature of ethnic relations between members of ethnic collectivities. As is the case with institutional enclosure, centripetal/centrifugal orientations are a matter of degree.

The permutations of centripetal and centrifugal orientations between superordinates and subordinates have been mapped out in Figure 9-1. We can see that relations tend to be integrative when both parties agree that relations and values should be centripetal or centrifugal. For example,

FIGURE 9-1

CONGRUENT AND INCONGRUENT ORIENTATIONS TOWARD CENTRIPETAL AND CENTRIFUGAL TRENDS OF SUBORDINATES AS VIEWED BY THEMSELVES AND SUPERORDINATES

	A	B	
Superordinates	Cp	Cf	Tending toward integration
Subordinates	Cp	Cf	
	Assimilation Incorporation	Cultural pluralism Autonomy	
	C	D	
Superordinates	Cf	Cp	Tending toward conflict
Subordinates	Cp	Cf	
	Forced segregation with resistance	Forced assimilation with resistance	

Cp = Centripetal trends
Cf = Centrifugal trends

(from Schermerhorn 1970: 83)

in cell A the subordinates want to adopt the values and behavior of the superordinates and the latter are willing to accommodate the formers' wishes. Schermerhorn suggests that Czechs in the United States are an example of this

combination. Americans wanted Czechs and all European immigrants to assimilate, and Czechs, who had values similar to middle class Americans, were also quite willing to assimilate. Anglo-Celtic, German, Dutch and Scandinavian immigrants in the U.S.A., Canada and Australia are other illustrations.

Relations also tend towards integration when subordinates wish to maintain some form of cultural exclusiveness and/or political autonomy and superordinates are willing to tolerate this type of ethnic articulation (Cell B). Schermerhorn gives the "live and let live" policy of German Swiss towards Italian and French subordinates as a case in point. The allowance for cultural pluralism and proportional ethnic representation in the Yugoslavian government is another example, as is Lebanon, at least until recently.

Conflictual tendencies predominate when subordinates want to emulate superordinates but the latter are opposed to this (Cell C). Negro-white relations in the U.S.A. in the 1950's is illustrative of this situation. Superordinate whites pursued a centrifugal goal of wanting to segregate Negroes from key institutions, while the latter pressed for desegregation and incorporation into white society. Other examples are ex-pariahs such as Japan's Burakumin and India's Harijan. Relations also tend toward conflict when superordinates attempt to coerce or subjugate subordinates who desire cultural and/or political autonomy (Cell D). This is the case with "national minorities" in China and the U.S.S.R. Much of the contemporary ethnoregional conflict in Canada and Europe is the result of demands by subordinate groups that they be granted some form of independence from central governments.

Schermerhorn's typology is very valuable for explaining relationships between Syrian-Lebanese and Anglo-Celtic Australians. Until recently, the official policy of the Australian government and the attitude of most Anglo-Celtic Australians was characterized by what Martin (1972) calls an "ideology of settlement". The main tenets of this view are that: all migrants should immediately relinquish their ethnic customs and assimilate into Australian society; migrants have no special problems which need attention; they should be given no extraordinary treatment. The Syrian-Lebanese accepted this doctrine wholeheartedly. In fact, many of them would make ideal spokesmen for Anglo-Celtic Australians' ideology concerning migrants. This is especially evident with respect to their religious orientations. In his study of the Australian Catholic church's migration policies, Lewins found that the church's main response was to resist special considerations for migrants and ignore the national and regional characteristics of migrants' religious beliefs. Among some groups, like Italians and Ukrainians, this policy has led to tension and conflict. For instance, Lewins suggests that relations between Anglo-Celtic Catholics and Ukrainians, Poles and Croats fit into Cell D: "(because these groups) desire to preserve their own ethnic Catholic life runs counter to the desire of Australian priests that they fit into existing parish life and do away with their national differences, (then) there is a situation tending towards conflict" (Lewins 1978a: 142-143). On the other hand, he indicates that English-speaking migrants and, to some degree, Dutch migrants, have an integrative relationship with the Australian Catholic church. This is because both the church and migrants agree on the goals for the latter. Syrian-Lebanese and the Australian Catholic have also had congruent goals. The church wanted them "in" and Syrian-Lebanese were happy to oblige. If the words "Australian" and "Australianized" are respectively substituted for "American" and "Americanization" in the following comments of Maloof, we have a very accurate

picture of what happened to Syrian-Lebanese Catholics in Australia:

They wanted to be more 'American' in all aspects of the word. Americanization remoulded home, family, work and recreation. Some unfortunately, over-zealous in their good intentions, confused the word 'Americanization' with 'Latinization'. The general idea seemed to be, 'We are in America now - therefore our churches and customs should be the same of those of other American Catholics (Latins); so that we may all be alike; we should not confuse people' (Maloof 1951: 256).

Having examined other institutions and analyzed the nature of Syrian-Lebanese ethnicity, it can now be seen that their religious orientations are isomorphic to their attitudes and behavior toward Australian society in general. Except in their kinship networks, Syrian-Lebanese have emulated Angloconformist ideals. In politics, education, religion, and the economy they wanted to be and have become like Anglo-Celtic Australians. In this respect they are identical to their American cousins:

It would not be an understatement to say that the Syrians arrived here as 'ready made Yankees'. While they were poor, they were psychologically ready for the American middle class. Imbued with a desire to succeed and own property, a readiness to gain financial security and independence, they looked for and found opportunity in the free - enterprise climate of America... In many ways then the Syrians always seemed to be typically American ... These traits served them well... Their rapid accumulation of wealth was in large part due to their cultural values, and business acumen. Syrian values, it seems never really had to be greatly modified in the process of assimilation (Kayal and Kayal 1975: 94-96).

It is clear then, that Syrian-Lebanese fit into cell A of Schermerhorn's typology, as their predispositions have been largely congruent with Australian values. Their proclivity towards Australian values, in combination with their internal factionalism, militated against both the development of rigid ethnic boundaries and a strong sense of ethnic identity. The enthusiastic adoption of Australian values has meant that the survival of the Syrian-Lebanese as a

distinct social entity is highly questionable. There is not only an ethnic demise among Syrian-Lebanese but the very real likelihood of an ethnic extinction.

9.3 Some Suggestions For Future Research

The results of this study suggest at least two lines of further research. A very obvious undertaking would be to extend the study to encompass post-war Lebanese migrants and their descendants. These "new Lebanese" emigrated from a Lebanon which was different from that of the pre-war Syrian-Lebanese. They also live in an Australian society which has undergone some significant social and demographic transformations since World War II.² Today, Lebanese do not face the intensely assimilationist, Anglophilic attitudes of their pre-war counterparts. This is not to say that Australia is a paradise of ethnic tolerance. It is simply to state that ethnic populations are now at greater liberty to express their distinctiveness than at any other time in Australia's history. The government at least pays lip-service³ to the idea of "multiculturalism" (whatever that means) - something which was inconceivable a decade ago. One would expect to find different patterns of identity and organization among post-war Lebanese because of these changes and because of their larger numbers. The more recent arrivals manifest a certain degree of ecological clustering, have established ethnic schools and ethnic associations, and attend their ethnic churches and mosques. A particularly intriguing research project would be to compare patterns of identity among Muslims and Christians. This would permit a more thoroughgoing analysis of the interplay of ethnic and religious variables among Lebanese.

A second endeavour would be to replicate the study with other populations which span three or more generations (e.g., Chinese, Greeks,

Italians, Jews, Germans, Anglo-Celtics, Scandinavians). Since each ethnic population, in a sense, has its "own history" and thus responds differently to external pressures, an analysis of other ethnic categories would be a more comprehensive test of the three generation hypothesis and a more adequate exploration of primordial and mobilizationist perspectives.

9.4 Some Applied and Substantive Implications of the Study

This study has implications at the applied and substantive levels of social research. At the applied level, the study demonstrates that policy makers must exercise great caution in defining basic terms. It is my observation that only superficial attention has been given to fundamental concepts like "migrant", "ethnic group" and "multiculturalism". For instance, the Report of Review of Post-arrival Programs and Services for Migrants (1978) recommends that the Australian Government allocate nearly fifty million dollars to meet needs of "migrants" in Australia. Nowhere in the report is the term "migrant" defined. The authors do not make one comment regarding the fact that "migrants" come from scores of countries and have a variety of needs and interests. It is clear from my study that one cannot refer to "Lebanese" in Australia without differentiating between "old" and "new Lebanese", Christian and Muslim Lebanese, and whether they are Maronite, Melkite or Orthodox Christians or Sunni or Shiite Muslims. Thus, one must question how meaningful phrases like "migrants", "Middle-East migrants", "Arabic-speaking migrants" and even "Lebanese migrants" really are.

A more precise categorization of "migrants" is contained in the report of the Welfare of Migrants by the Australian Government Commission of Inquiry into Poverty (1975). The author of the report recognizes the ethnic diversity in Australia and attempts "to assess the nature and degree of welfare need among immigrants in relation to specific ethnic groups" (p.125). He then

attempts to summarize the degree of ethnic diversity by categorizing groups according to the role they play in "ethnic development" (pp. 128-129). These three roles are: as reactive or protective structures (in response to rejection from superordinates); as structures which perpetuate a unique cultural tradition; or as "interest" groups. This tripartition has two major drawbacks. In the first place, it artificially compartmentalizes "culture" and "interest", a procedure which I have emphasized is oversimplistic. Secondly, it assumes that all "groups" in the second category - "cultural groups" - have similar levels of "rootedness" to their cultural heritage. As I have pointed out, this seldom holds true for the members of one particular ethnic population, so one must be careful in classifying different collectivities under the same heading. For instance, the Syrian-Lebanese in my study would presumably be classified as a "cultural group". But their situational, circumscribed ethnic awareness differs markedly from the heightened ethnic consciousness of some Ukrainian-Catholics. In summary then, policy makers must be much more discrete in their definitions of terms such as "migrant" and "ethnic group".

Similarly, the term "multiculturalism" is often used in a vague fashion. According to Lewins, multiculturalism can be interpreted in three different ways in the Australian context. He comments that, "the notion of multiculturalism lacks conceptual clarity and is all things to all people. Hence, reference to 'discussions of multiculturalism' and multiculturalism as 'new thinking' in the area of race and ethnic relations are premature" (Lewins 1979: 5). As Lewins and Martin (1976, 1978) point out, superordinates have generally emphasized cultural pluralism and ignored structural pluralism in promulgating multiculturalism. This concept of multiculturalism considers all ethnic manifestations to be culturally based and hence, policies intended to promote toleration of cultural diversity are instituted. This philosophy

ignores two essential points: (a) some groups are primarily concerned with political issues such as power and superordinate control of access to scarce resources; (b) cultural pluralism often entails structural segmentation.

An example of "political ethnicity" is the following demands made in an A.C.O.S.S. (1979) publication titled Migrants at Risk:

.... the current structural trends that have resulted in increasing unemployment in Australia in general are having particular effect on non-English speaking migrant workers. All indications are that these structural changes are likely to continue and the problems faced by migrant workers will intensify unless action is taken immediately by Australian Governments. Action must be taken, both to reduce the current levels of unemployment and the disproportionate share borne by migrants, and to ease the distress of those who are unemployed. In particular, the institutionalised discrimination faced by migrant workers, because of language difficulties, inadequate recognition of their skills and training, and their vulnerable social and economic position, must cease.

The above claims have nothing to do with cultural rights; they are demands for social rights. Thus, government initiatives such as funds for ethnic dance troupes, ethnic history projects and ethnic television are of no consequence to groups engaged in political and economic struggles.

Regarding the second point, it must be remembered that culture and structure are dialectically related. In some cases, this means that adherence to cultural traditions necessarily involves a certain degree of structural enclosure. A case in point is Muslims in Australia who wish to preserve their Islamic customs. This involves building mosques, teaching Arabic and providing religious instruction for children. It also includes demands for separate religious courts to deal with matters that are illegal under Australian laws (e.g., polygamy, marriages between cousins, informal divorce). Since there is already a precedent of a separate legal system for Aboriginal people, then why

shouldn't Muslims be granted this right too? If multiculturalism is to be implemented with the view towards creating "a society in which people of non-Anglo-Australian origin are given the opportunity, as individuals or groups, to choose to preserve and develop their culture" (Australia as a Multicultural Society 1977: 17), then presumably Muslim religious courts should be established. At present, since multiculturalism is based on the principle of cultural pluralism, such a possibility is highly unlikely.

Multiculturalism, as it is presently propagated, appeals to "symbolic ethnics" and "ethnic traditionalists". To "ethnic militants" and "ethnic manipulators" it is a palliative measure designed to deflect public attention away from social inequalities among ethnic populations. Australian multiculturalism is almost identical to Canadian multiculturalism:

... the cultural differences which are tolerated, consumed, and perhaps even respected, involve private matters. They deal with instructions in a second language, and modes of dress, recreation and weekend behavior. Folk dances, ethnic restaurants, and diverse forms of religious worship enhance the freedom of choice of participants and consumers alike. They do not, however, challenge our dominant attitudes towards resource development, relations between rich and poor, and what it means to be a success in modern Canada. They might even provide escapes which help us to adjust to the conformity required in our jobs and other public roles... the Federal Government's multiculturalism policy has received wide acceptance by the media and other opinion-moulding elites because it does not go beyond the reigning consensus which undergirds Canada's identity as an industrial society (Hutchison 1978: 142).

In brief, formulators of multicultural policies must be aware that:

(a) in some cases, ethnic groups form for the explicit purpose of pursuing political and economic goals and have only a secondary or peripheral interest in cultural rights; (b) some groups' demands for cultural autonomy also entail claims for structural separation. Unless these features are understood, multicultural policies will simply be irrelevant to the goals of some ethnic

groups in Australia.

The first implication at the substantive level is related to the notion of ethnic revivalism. Now it is clear that some scholars have gathered evidence which demonstrates there is a third generation return among some ethnic populations. However, it is essential to realize that in these instances, the ethnic behavior and identity of grandparents and grandchildren differ in degree and kind. A nostalgia for ethnic food and music or an intellectual interest in one's family tree differs enormously from the Gemeinschaft mentality of first generation immigrants. Even if they could, few third generation Jews would want to return to the shetls or urban ghettos of their ancestors. Furthermore, far from all third generation descendants return. Therefore, the third generation hypothesis must be tested with the knowledge that because of internal variations, different populations react in different ways to external contingencies. In the case of the Jews, internal and external influences (e.g., the Entebbe raid, the media's preoccupation with the holocaust, the tenacity of anti-Semitism) are conducive to a "continual revival" which may persist for an unknown length of time. For other populations (e.g. Italians or Syrian-Lebanese), symbolic or romantic ethnicity will probably persist in a latent or mildly active state for perhaps as long as seven or eight generations. But without a high rate of endogamy it is likely that future generations will have to visit ethnic museums to acquaint themselves with their heritage. Among other populations (e.g., Poles, Scandinavians, Anglo-Celts, Dutch), the prospect of a third generation return is minimal because the second generation has already become indistinguishable from superordinates.

Finally, it is important to recognize that ethnic revivalism in post-industrial societies among descendants of immigrants, differs in degree and

type from separatist and irredentist sentiments and the primordial attachments among citizens of preindustrial states. Third generation ethnics in Australia, Canada and the U.S.A. do not have any prospect of creating a nation within the borders of their respective states. On the other hand, Quebecois, Basques, Kurds and Walloons can establish independent territories. Irredentist and separatist causes can evoke strong feelings of patriotism because they are based on the principles of self-determination and popular sovereignty. The "terminal loyalty" of most third generation ethnics is to the state. In many postcolonial Asian and African countries, central elites have not been able to generate loyalty to the state through a common educational system, linguistic uniformity or secularization. Thus, there are major differences between the symbolic, romantic ethnic awareness of third generation descendants and the "we-they" consciousness of Karens and Kachins in Burma or Shiites and Kurds in Iran. In Porter's (1975: 292) words:

The ethnic identity of a Hutu or Ibo must surely be of profoundly different psychological quality and social consequence from that, say, of an Italian American or a Ukrainian Canadian that the subjective states involved are scarcely of the same order. It is questionable whether both can be considered 'primordial'.

In brief, terms such as "ethnic revival" or the "universalization of ethnicity" are too general to have much sociological meaning. Changes in ethnic phenomena must be analyzed with reference to historical and contextual determinants and the unique cultural and structural traits of each ethnic population.

The second implication is that the study demonstrates the counter-productivity of utilizing zero-sum categories in sociological analysis. In a critique of contemporary sociological research, Robertson (1974) notes that scholars tend to dichotomize major analytical categories. For instance, they

emphasize social or cultural factors; they stress objective or subjective approaches. According to Robertson, many modern sociologists are "paradigmatic entrepreneurs", who "talk past" one another because they are "committed to dogmatic, one-best-way analytical principles". Thus, modern sociology is characterized by a "deflationary situation of sociological fundamentalism". Although it is premature to speak of "paradigms" in the area of ethnic phenomena, Robertson's comments are relevant to much contemporary research. Scholars tend to be "subjectivists" or "objectivists", "culturalists" or "structuralists", "primordialists" or "mobilizationists". Throughout this study I have argued against this tendency towards analytical and theoretical purism. In the preceeding chapter I demonstrated that primordial and material interests were not mutually exclusive, but interrelated ethnic manifestations which are operative in varying degrees depending on the context. I contend that if sociologists are to further their understanding of ethnic phenomena, they must utilize a theoretical framework which emphasizes mutuality and complementarity instead of polarity.

Some clues as to how such a theoretical perspective can be developed can be found in the work of Giddens (1973) and Parkin (1974), who criticize the zero-sum approach to class. These two authors claim that the conventional technique of dichotomizing class relations (e.g., propertied/propertyless, manual/non-manual) poses three difficulties: it oversimplifies the nature of inter-class conflict; it obscures the importance of intra-class conflicts; it presents ethnic conflicts as residual or epiphenomenal features of class conflict. Both authors have suggested a less dogmatic method of analysis is in order. Giddens (1973: 110) uses the term structuration to indicate that class

formation is not an either/or situation:

.... structuration is never an all-or-nothing matter. The problem of the existence of distinct class 'boundaries', therefore, is not one which can be settled in abstracto: one of the specific aims of class analysis in relation to empirical societies must necessarily be that of determining how strongly, in any given case, the 'class principle' has become established as a mode of structuration. Moreover, the operation of the 'class principle' may also involve the creation of forms of structuration within the major class divisions.

According to Parkin, the use of mutually exclusive categories precludes acknowledgement that the attributes by which one class is defined may also be possessed in greater or lesser measures by the opposing class. Thus, anomalies such as "white-collar proletariats" or intra-class cleavages along ethnic lines tend to be seen as residual or anachronistic features of an essentially zero-sum model. Parkin claims that the fluid nature of class relations can be analyzed if we view class as process. This entails considering classes as partially manual, partially propertyless, or partially subordinate and acknowledging that classes can simultaneously adopt solidaristic and exclusionistic strategies of social closure.⁴ Moreover, Parkin argues that this processual approach is useful for analyzing inter-ethnic cleavage and intra-class conflict along ethnic lines.

I believe it is also possible to view ethnic phenomena from a processual perspective by using the matrix model which was outlined in the previous chapter. Having dispensed with the fruitless debate over which approach - primordial or mobilizationist - best explains ethnic phenomena, it is now possible to ask more meaningful questions like: (1) under what conditions are primordial manifestations likely

to emerge, persist and disappear? (2) under what conditions are expressive, primordial orientations combined with or transformed into rational, instrumental ones? (3) under what conditions are ethnic groups which are formed to pursue material interests likely to disappear or reassume a primordial orientation? These questions, of course, do not constitute a theory. However, they do form the basis for answering the following general theoretical question: What are the historical, cultural and structural variables which account for the institutionalization and de-institutionalization of ethnic boundaries and ethnic identities? Phrasing the question this way sensitizes researchers to patterns of emergence, persistence, submergence and re-emergence. It also links theories of ethnic phenomena to the central theoretical problem of sociology - explicating the changing nature of social order (Cohen 1972, Turner 1974). This entails viewing ethnic phenomena as manifestations worthy of study in their own right and not as epiphenomenal, residual features of social organization.

NOTES

1. Schermerhorn (1970: 14) defines integration as "a process whereby units or elements of a society are brought into an active and coordinated compliance with the ongoing activities and objectives of the dominant group in that society".
2. At the 1947 census, 7 percent of Australia's foreign-born population was born in the British Isles and 3 percent was born in other countries. By 1971 the percentage of overseas-born people had doubled to 20 percent. The proportion of people born in the British Isles remained relatively constant at 8 percent, but the percentage of those born in other countries had risen to 12 percent (Immigration Policies and Australia's Population 1977: 24). Thirty years ago Australia's ethnic population was relatively homogeneous. Today, outside of Israel and Arab OPEC states, Australia has the most ethnically diverse workforce of any western industrialized country (A.C.O.S.S. 1979).
3. This is demonstrated by the establishment of advisory bodies like the Australian Ethnic Affairs Council and the Australian

Population and Immigration Council. The government has also funded several major studies of migrant welfare and education (e.g., Report of the Post-arrival Programs and Services for Migrants, 1978; Welfare of Migrants, 1975; Inquiry into Schools of High Migrant Density, 1975; Report of the Committee on the Teaching of Migrant Languages in Schools, 1976). An example of the trend towards what Martin (1976) terms "robust pluralism", is the Australian Ethnic Affairs Council's comments that "... we believe that... harmony (in Australia) has been preserved largely because ethnic communities have kept to themselves. Ethnic groups and institutions, such as the ethnic press, have not been systematically drawn into the process of community consultation and decision making... Multiculturalism means ethnic communities getting 'into the act' " (Australia as a Multicultural Society, 1977: 13,17).

4. See chapter 3, note 3.

APPENDIX A

INFORMATION COLLECTED WITH INTERVIEW GUIDES

1. Personal Details

a. Socio-demographic variables

- i) sex
- ii) age
- iii) residence
- iv) occupation
- v) birthplace
- vi) level of educational attainment
- vii) type of schooling (e.g., private, public, Catholic, non-denominational)
- viii) marital status
- ix) spouse's occupation
- x) spouse's level of educational attainment
- xi) spouse's birthplace

b. Religious Variables

- i) subjective religious identity
- ii) attendance at Lebanese and Australian churches
- iii) attachment to ethnic church
- iv) church of baptism
- v) spouse's church of baptism
- vi) ancestral rite
- vii) spouse's ancestral rite
- viii) church of marriage

c. Social Networks

- i) ethnic backgrounds of closest friends
- ii) ethnic composition of neighborhood
- iii) ethnic composition of workplace
- iv) involvement in Lebanese and non-Lebanese voluntary organizations
- v) people with whom leisure time is spent

2. Orientation of Ethnic Identity

a. General

- i) subjective ethnic identity
- ii) meaning of subjective identity
- iii) changes in ethnic identity during the life cycle
- iv) situational aspects of ethnic identity

b. Primordial Orientations

- i) extent to which having a Lebanese background gives a sense of "roots" or belonging
- ii) use and fluency in Arabic language
- iii) consumption of Lebanese food
- iv) knowledge of Lebanese history

- v) interest in current social and political events in Lebanon
- vi) interest in visiting Lebanon
- vii) Lebanese contributions to Australia

c. Mobilizational Orientations

- i) perceived interests or grievances of Lebanese in Australia
- ii) political concerns of Lebanese in Australia
- iii) perceived success of Lebanese in Australia
- iv) perceived personal success
- v) social class position of Lebanese in Australia
- vi) subjective social class
- vii) personal encounters with prejudice and discrimination
- viii) treatment of migrants in general and Lebanese specifically in Australia
- ix) media accounts of migrants in general and Lebanese specifically in Australia
- x) approval/disapproval of government funding for Lebanese clubs in Australia

3. Kinship Details

a. General

- i) birthplace of (grand) parents
- ii) (grand) parents' churches of baptism

b. (Grand) parents' migration history

- i) reasons for leaving Lebanon
- ii) reasons why they came to Australia
- iii) pattern of migration (e.g., individually, with relatives)
- iv) occupations in Lebanon

c. (Grand) parents settlement in Australia

- i) residential and occupational history
- ii) importance of village, religious and national loyalties
- iii) leisure patterns
- iv) friendship networks
- v) ethnic identities
- vi) encounter with prejudices and discrimination

d. Values

- i) family emphasis on marrying spouses of the same rite, denomination and nationality
- ii) family emphasis on maintaining Lebanese customs and Lebanese identity
- iii) family emphasis on maintaining ancestral rite
- iv) family emphasis on educational achievement
- v) generational differences in religious and ethnic identities

e. Rates of Endogamy/Exogamy

- i) ethnic and religious backgrounds of family members' spouses

f. Visitation

- i) frequency of visitation with family members

APPENDIX B

COMPOSITION OF CONTENDING FACTIONS IN LEBANON

I. Christians-Rightists

1. The Phalanges under the leadership of Pierre Gemayel (Kateb Party). There are about 10,000 regulars plus 8,000 irregulars.
2. El-numour (the Tigers) - the armed forces of the Free National Party - under the leadership of Camille Chamoun. His militia is about 2,000 strong.
3. The Liberation Army of Zghorta under the leadership of President Suleiman Franjeh. This militia is of unknown strength but is supported by about 300 ex-Lebanese Army Regulars.
4. The Cedar Guards Front - right-wing militant group known to favour partition - under the leadership of Dr. Fuad Shimaali.
5. The Maronite Monasteries Organization under the leadership of Father Charbel Cassis. Known to favour partition.
6. The forces of Colonel Antoine Barakat - a faction of the Lebanese army which works closely with Christian irregulars.
7. The Tashnaq Party - an Armenian rightist organization whose paramilitary units operate closely with the Phalanges.

II. Muslims-Leftists

1. The Progressive Socialists under the leadership of Kamal Jumblatt - including Druze, Moslem, and Greek Orthodox. Jumblatt commands over 3,000 Druze militiamen.
2. The National Socialist Party (the Syrian Nationalist Party) under the leadership of Inaam Raid. Under the influence of Libya.
3. The Communist Party under the leadership of George Hawi. Under the influence of the Soviet Union.
4. The Nasserite faction which include:
 - a. The Reformist Movement Organization - loyal to Egypt - under the leadership of Isam Al-Arab.
 - b. The Socialist Union.
 - c. The Nasserite Forces (or Union of National Workers' Forces) under the leadership of Jajah Wakim and Kamal Shatila which are under the influence of Libya, and
 - d. El-Murabitun (or independent Nasserites) under the leadership of Ibrahim Quleilat. There are 2,000 Nasserite extreme left radicals based in Beirut.
5. The 24th of October Movement under the leadership of Farouk El-Muqaddam.

6. The Lebanese Arab Army numbering about 4,000 Muslim ex-Lebanese Army members under the leadership of Lieutenant Ahmed Khatib, coordinates its activities with Jumblatt and Arafat, their main strength being in the South.
7. The Army units of Brigadier General Aziz Ahdab in Beirut. Both Ahdab and Khatib are now members of the Revolutionary Council which is headed by Ahdab.
8. Prime Minister Karami's militia (Arab Liberation Army) used for the Defence of Tripoli.

III. The Pro-Syrian Forces

1. Al-Saiqa, a component of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) under the leadership of Zuhair Muhsin who is the head of the military department of the PLO and a strong rival to PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. Muhsin is also an executive member of the Syrian Ba'ath Party.
2. The Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) under the leadership of General Misbaah Boudiri. The PLA receives its military supplies from the Syrian general staff.

Al-Saiqa and the PLA have numbered 5,000 - 8,000 men, but many have switched support to Arafat.

3. The Lebanese Ba'ath Party under the leadership of Isam Kanzo.

IV. The Pro-Arafta Palestinians

1. Fatah under the leadership of Arafat - the largest Palestinian component of the PLO - has about 8,000 regulars and many irregular Palestinians.
2. The Arab Liberation Front (ALF) under the leadership of Abdel Wahhab Kayyali. It receives its military supplies from the Ba'ath Party of Iraq.
3. The PLA unit of Ain Jalut - under the control of Egypt.
4. The Popular Front factions which include:
 - a. Popular Front-General Command (PFGC) of Ahmad Jebril,
 - b. The Revolutionary Popular Front of Wadi Haddad,
 - c. The Marxist Popular democratic Front (PDFLP) of Nayef Hawatmah, and
 - d. The PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) of Dr George Habash who has Marxist tendencies.

These Popular Front forces are probably 1,000 strong and include "volunteers" from Left Wing regimes and organizations.

Source: The Lebanon Crisis : Humanitarian Aspects. Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence; Interim Report. December, 1976 (Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Paper No. 331/19760.

APPENDIX C

OCCUPATIONS OF SYRIANS IN N.S.W. BY METROPOLITAN
AND NON-METROPOLITAN RESIDENCE IN 1901

Occupation	Males			Females		
	M	R	NSW	M	R	NSW
Maronite Priest	2	1	3	-	-	-
Medical specialist (irregular)	1	-	1	-	-	-
Photographer	1	1	2	-	-	-
Hotelkeeper	-	2	2	-	-	-
Boarding-house keeper	2	-	2	3	2	5
Cook	2	-	2	-	-	-
Servant	1	-	1	-	4	4
Barber	-	1	1	-	-	-
Fancy goods agent	1	-	1	-	-	-
" " dealer	3	4	7	-	1	1
Machinery, commercial traveller	-	1	1	-	-	-
Draper	10	22	32	-	-	-
" accountant	1	-	1	-	-	-
" clerk	1	-	1	-	-	-
" commercial traveller	-	3	3	-	-	-
Drapery hawker and relative assisting	5	22	27	1	8	9
Clothier, salesman	-	1	1	-	-	-
Dairy produce dealer, labourer	1	-	1	-	-	-
Fishmonger	-	2	2	-	-	-
" cook	1	-	1	-	-	-
Oyster dealer	-	1	1	-	-	-
Fruiterer	2	8	10	-	2	2
Dried fruits, importer	1	-	1	-	-	-
Grocer	-	1	1	-	-	-
Skin dealer	-	2	2	-	1	1
Produce merchant	-	2	2	-	-	-
Wood merchant	-	1	1	-	-	-
Opal dealer	-	3	3	-	-	-
Importer	1	-	1	-	-	-
Mercant	10	1	11	-	-	-
" clerk	4	-	4	-	-	-
Storekeeper, shopkeeper and relative assisting	16	55	71	-	-	-
Storekeeper, shopkeeper, bookkeeper	1	1	2	-	-	-
Storekeeper, shopkeeper, clerk, relative assisting	1	-	1	3	12	15
Dealer	4	14	18	1	3	4
Hawker and relative assisting	20	128	148	10	55	65
Indent Agent	1	-	1	-	-	-
Commercial traveller	1	1	2	-	-	-

Occupation	Males			Females		
	M	R	NSW	M	R	NSW
Carrier	-	1	1	-	-	-
Driver	1	1	2	-	-	-
Electric Car Maker	1	-	1	-	-	-
Tailor	2	1	3	-	-	-
Shirt maker	1	-	1	-	-	-
Bootmaker	1	4	5	-	-	-
Cigarette maker	1	-	1	-	-	-
Tobacco factory employee	1	-	1	-	-	-
Road labourer	-	1	1	-	-	-
Farmer	-	1	1	-	-	-
Market gardener and relative assisting	-	8	8	-	-	-
Government dam, teamster	-	1	1	-	-	-
Miner, silver	-	3	3	-	-	-
" " trucker	-	1	1	-	-	-
Miner, coal	-	1	1	-	-	-
" undefined	-	1	1	-	-	-
Dressmaker & relative assisting	-	-	-	-	8	8
Milliner	-	-	-	-	2	2
Machinist	-	-	-	-	1	1
Domestic duties, wife	-	-	-	22	64	86
" " widow	-	-	-	1	1	2
" " daughter	-	-	-	5	7	12
" " visitor	-	-	-	2	2	4
" " lodger	-	-	-	4	-	4
Independent means	2	1	3	1	-	1
Scholar	16	17	33	11	16	27
" home	1	1	2	1	1	2
Dependent on parents or children	1	5	6	1	3	4
Patient, hospital	1	1	2	-	1	1
Prisoner, gaol	-	1	1	-	-	-
Not stated	3	-	3	-	-	-
TOTAL	126	328	454	66	202	268

Source: NSW Census of 1901

M = Metropolitan

R = Remainder of State

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